swinburne omniscience
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Religious Studieshttp://journals.cambridge.org/RES
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Divine Self-Limitation in Swinburne's Doctrine of
Omniscience
Avery Fouts
Religious Studies / Volume 29 / Issue 01 / March 1993, pp 21 - 26
DOI: 10.1017/S0034412500022010, Published online: 24 October 2008
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0034412500022010
How to cite this article: Avery Fouts (1993). Divine Self-Limitation in Swinburne's Doctrine of Omniscience.Religious Studies, 29, pp 21-26 doi:10.1017/S0034412500022010
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Rel. Stud 29, pp. 21-26 . Copy right
©
1993 Cambridge University Press
AVERY FOUTS
DIVINE SELF-LIMITATION IN
SWINBURNE S DOCTRINE OF
OMNISCIENCE
In his book,
The oherence
of Theism,
1
Ric har d Sw inburn e seeks to co nstruct
a coherent doctrine of God. As
a
pa rt of this endeav our he examines the idea
of omniscience in cha pte r 10. O ne of Sw inburne s conclusions is th at God as
an omniscient being must engage in cognitive self-limitation in order to
preserve the freedom of both divine and human future actions. In this paper,
I want to look at his a rgument as it is presented in this chapter. I will
conclude th at S winburne s position on divine cognitive self-limitation results
in an internal contrad iction.
Swinburne rejects the Thom istic doctrine of God as a timeless entity
because it is clearly non sense to suggest th at yesterday , to day and to-
morrow could be simultaneous with each other (pp.
220-1 ,
page references
are to the reprinted edition, 1986). M oreover, Sw inburn e finds a timeless
God incom patible with m uch of theistic doctrine. F or exam ple, talk of Go d s
warnings and Go d s forgiveness w ith ou t his do ing these things at times
before or after o the r times (often, times on the hu m an scale of time) seems
inco here nt (p. 221). For these reasons, Sw inburn e retains the notion of God
as a person existing in t ime (p. 174).
Swinburne thinks th a t in norm al use, propositions about a nam ed future
time (including claims about any future free actions)
are
t rue
or
false
-
timelessly (p. 175). And as an initial, working definition, Sw inburne defines
an omniscient person as a person who at a particular time knows of every
true proposition tha t it is true (p. 162). M oreover, Sw inburn e thinks tha t the
notion of a person who knows all true propositions is coherent. He says that
it
is
coherent to suppose that there
is
an omniscient
person.
There would be no reason
why it
is
incoherent to suppose that a spirit, omnipresent and creator of the universe,
is omniscient. Such a spirit, if asked, could give you the answer to any question, if
he chose to do
so.
The state of the universe in the past and future would be so clearly
known to him
—
maybe its whole history could be seen by him at glance and be held
in his mind - that he would not need to conduct an investigation to find out how
things had been years ago or would be in years to come (p. 166).
Swinburne asks whether the existence of a temporal God who knows all true
1
Richard Swinburne, Th e oherence
of
Theism (Oxford: Claren don Press, 1977; reprinte d (as paper -
back),
1986).
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22 AVERY FOUTS
propositions at any partic ular time, including future-tensed propositions, is
compatible with human and divine freedom. Concerning human freedom,
Sw inburn e argues th at the tru th values of future-tensed propositions abou t
future free hum an actions cannot be known until the respective action occurs.
Fo r exa mp le, if Jone s possesses real freedom either to get married or not to
get married
at
t
27
, Swinburne would argue that the truth value of Jones will
get married at t
2 7
cann ot be known until t
27
. For Swinburne, it is of logical
necessity,
if P is
omniscient
at t, he
believes
at t all
true propositions
(p.
169).
2
And if
is a free agent at t
x
and P is a person at t with beliefs about
everything describable by
a
true proposition,
P
will be in danger of having
one of his beliefs made false by the action of
at t
x
(p. 170). Thus, if God
foreknows Jon es will
get
married
at
t
27
, Jo ne s will
get
m arried
at t
27
. If
Jones decided
not to get
married
at t
27
,
Go d s foreknowledge would
be
rendered incorrect.
But an
incorrect foreknowledge
is an
obvious con tra-
diction . S win burne s fear here is not so much tha t G od will fail to be future
omniscient, but that humans will not be free.
T he conc ern is all the mo re acute w ith rega rd to divine freedom. If God s
freedom be preserved, not only can God not be future omniscient, but God
can no t even justifiably predict divine future actions. In chap ter 8, Sw inburne
defines a perfectly free person as a person w ho is no t influenced in his choices
by
any
causal factors
(p.
145). Moreover,
he
says that
no
one
can be
justified in holding beliefs about the future actions of a perfectly free agent
(p.
172). If I unde rstand Swinburne at this point, even though hum ans are
not ab le to know the future, hum ans might be able justifiably to predict w hat
future human actions might occur because there is a causal connection with
the present; but, since there is no causal connection from the present
to
the
actions of a perfectly free agen t, to say tha t God can even justifiably predict
future divine actions (without knowing them) implies that there is
a
causal
connection from the future action to the present
belief.
But this implies
backward causation which
for
Sw inburne
is
incoh erent (p. 172).
3
Swinburne implies that if the Thomistic doctrine of God were coherent
it
would resolve the problem of divine and hu m an freedom because there
would be n o question of God first believing something and then , later, there
occurring that which makes his belief true or false (p. 173). But given, on
the one hand, the incoherence of the Thomistic doctrine of God and, on the
2
For Swinburne, knowing x entails believing x. Mo reov er, he uses belie ve to refer to both those
propositions which we are ordinarily said to believe and also those propositions about the truth of which
we are convinced or hav e no dou bt (see p. 169 n. 9). Thu s, as far as
I
can tell, God s beliefs, as one who
knows all true propo sitions, are the same as God s knowledge.
3
This seems immediately problematic. True, God is not necessarily influenced by causal factors as
hum ans a re, bu t is not God causally effected by God s own na ture and will? And if
so,
it seems that even
if God does no t know tru e future-tensed propositions, justifiable predictions could be m ade by God about
God s own future actions without threaten ing God s freedom. Moreov er, since for Swinburne G od acts
without influence from non-rational factors (pp. 146-8), it seems all the more likely that, given the nature
of God and God s purposes, given
a
particular state of affairs
in
the world, and given standard canons
of rational behav iour, God s actions could be sometimes justifiably predicted.
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DIVINE SELF-LIMITA TION 23
other ha nd , the problem of reconciling a tem poral Go d s future omniscience
with free actions, Swinburne argues that theists should modify their defini-
tion of omniscience. His modified version is:
A person P is omniscient at a time t if and only if he knows of every true proposition
about t or an earlier time that it is true and also he knows of every true proposition
abou t a time later th an t, such tha t w hat it reports is physically necessitated by some
cause at t or earlier, that it is true (p. 175).
This modified definition of omniscience is a result of divine self-limitation.
God limits God so that only those true propositions about physically necessi-
tated future occurrences are acceptable for God to know. Knowledge of the
latter does not impinge on freedom and contingency. Swinburne says:
T ha t G od is omniscient only in the atten uat ed sense would of course - given tha t he
is perfectly free and omnipotent — have resulted from his own choice. In choosing to
preserve his own freedom (and to give other s freedom ), he limits his own kno wled ge
of wh at is to come. H e con tinually limits himself in this way by not c urtailin g his or
men s future freedom (p. 176).
For a person would not be less worthy of worship if he voluntarily limited his
knowledge in order to allow himself and some of his creature s to determ ine their own
destiny (p. 178).
Yet to maintain his freedom, he limits his knowledge of his own future choices
(p . 178).
(Swinburne defines future omniscience as comprised of true propositions
concerning both human and divine actions. For the sake of clarity, I will
discuss human and divine actions individually. Also, I will assume that
Swinburne is right in saying that a future-tensed proposition can be true and
as long as God does not know it the event to which the proposition refers
remains undetermined.)
Swinburne is not explicit about the nature of this choice to engage in
cognitive self-limitation. So, let s assume for the sake of the discussion th at
there was a specific time when G od limited Go d s know ledge an d that God
foreknew all true propositions before that specific time. Concerning human
action, it seems that future human action would still be determined after the
self-limitation. In other words, if Jo n e s will get ma rried at t
2 7
were
ever
foreknown as true, and thus determine d to happ en, Go d s self-limitation
could do nothing to a/zdetermine it. If it were ever determined, it could not
become undeterm ined since, by Sw inburn e s own admission, th e idea of
backwa rd cau sation is inco here nt. If God foreknows at t Jone s will get
married at t
27
, and if God engages in self-limitation at t
3
, one would have
to maintain both that Jones must still get married at t
27
so th at God s
omniscience at t will not be falsified and th at G od s self-limitation rend ers
Jon es will
not
get married at t
2 7
as a real possibility.
Concerning future divine action, the problem is more severe. God could
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24 AVERY FOUTS
never
freely
become future ignorant after ever being future omniscient since
future omniscience determines all subsequent divine actions.
It is clear from the foregoing that at any time there is a free human or
divine action, God could never have been future omniscient up to that point.
Freedom is not just a m atter of Go d s not know ing the future, but rather a
ma tter of God s never knowing the future up to the time of any particular free
action . In o ther w ords, it is not a m att er of God simply perm itting free actions
at any p art icu lar time irrespective of Go d s decisions throug ho ut the ever-
lasting past. Since all true propositions are timelessly true, God could never
have been omniscient of all true propositions. On this basis, Swinburne must
say that God has been everlastingly self-limited
so
tha t there has been
no
particular time that true future-tensed propositions were ever known. That
is,
God can know that future omniscience would render the future deter-
mined without actually knowing any particular true future-tensed propo-
sitions. God has thus chosen
at
each mo me nt of everlasting time not
to be
future omniscient thereby preserving future free actions. I think something
like this
is
w ha t S win burne means. But while this position seems coherent
with regard to hu m an actions, it seems incohere nt with regard to divine
actions.
The coherence of everlasting, cognitive self-limitation toward future hu-
m an actions rests on the fact tha t it is a cond itional necessity tha t God engage
in such limitation. That is,
on
the condition
of
hu m an freedom, God has
never been future omniscient up to the time of free hum an action, and at
each moment of everlasting time, God has had to engage in cognitive self-
limitation. But God could actually have chosen to be future omniscient at
any one of those moments, even though it would have been at the expense
of hu m an freedom.
The coherence of everlasting, cognitive self-limitation breaks down when
divine action enters the picture.
It
may seem that future omniscience with
regard to divine actions is also
a
conditional necessity. That is, God chooses
at each moment of everlasting time not to know future divine actions as
if,
as in the case of hu m an actions, God actually could choose to be future
om niscient. But, in Go d s case, God is necessarily free; God is not free because
God
chooses
not to be future omniscient. Th at is tan tam ou nt to saying th at
God is free because God freely chooses not to know the future. Swinbu rne
himself defines a pers on al ground of be ing as inclusive of being eterna lly
perfectly free (p. 224). In ch ap ter 14, he a rgues for th e coherence of Go d s
being
necessarily
a person al ground of bein g . He argues that it is necessary
on, what
he
calls, criteria [A ], [B], [C ],
[D] and [E] (p.
269).
For our
purposes here, we need only look at criteria [A], [B] and [D ].
Criterion [A]:
A proposition is necessary if and only if it is analytic (p. 235).
Criterion [B]:
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DIVINE SELF-LIMITATION 25
A proposition is necessary if and only if it is incoherent to suppose that
the individuals
in
fact p icked ou t
by
the referring expressions
in
th e
sentence which expresses it do not h ave the p roperties a n d /o r relations
claimed by the proposition (p. 236).
Criterion [D]:
A proposition p is necessary if and only if it is true, b ut the t ru th of w ha t
it states
is
not (was not,
or
will not be) de pen den t on a ny thin g,
the
description of which is not entailed by
p
(p. 250).
Swinburne argues
on
these ground s tha t the p roposition
I f
there
be a
Personal Ground of Being, this Personal Ground of Being is not eternally
perfectly free is incohere nt. O n cr iteria [A] and [B], freedom is necessarily
a predicate of G od , or Personal Grou nd of Being . O n criterion [D ], God s
freedom
is
necessary
in
the sense th at
it
does not d epend
on
anything
including G od s own choices. (C riterion [A]
is
logical necessity for Swin-
burne, and criterion [D]
is
ontolog ical necessity.) So, Sw inburn e himself
supports the predication of God as necessarily free.
Given Sw inbu rne s position tha t future omniscience of all true propo sitions
is not compatible with freedom,
it
must be conc luded that G od necessarily
does not know the future. The necessity arises not because God is everlast-
ingly ignorant
of
the future, bu t ra the r because there
is no
moment
of
everlasting time at which God could do otherwise. For Sw inburn e to say tha t
God could do otherwise is to make freedom an accidental property of God
rath er tha n a n essential one . God s know ledge is necessarily limited by Go d s
essential freedom.
Moreover, Swinburne says
a
perfectly free person
is a
person who ca n
only perform an action if he believes that there is no overriding reason for
refraining from doing i t (p. 159; see also chap ter 8 ). Assuming tha t
a
free
God
is
more rational tha n
a
determined God,
in
every logically possible
situation there would always be an overriding reason to refrain from fore-
knowing all true propositions.
I t
seems to me that this in itself would make
the refraining
a
necessity. Swinburne himself says there is
a
logical limit on
God s freedom — tha t is, God will never do
an
action
if
he acknowledges
overriding reasons for refraining from doin g it (p. 148). But to speak in such
a way presupposes, as Swinburne does, that God has the power to become
future omniscient even th oug h God never does so because of this logical lim it.
But
if
God
is
necessarily free, God does not possess the pow er
to
become
future omniscient. Swinburne s definition of om nipo tenc e is:
A person P is omnipotent
at a
time
t
if and only if he is able to bring about the
existence of any logically contingent state of affairs x after t, the description of the
occurrence of which does not entail that P did not bring it about at t, given that he
does not believe that he has overriding reason for refraining from bringing about x
(p . 160).
Given this definition, God does not possess the power
to
become future
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2 6 A V E R Y F O U T S
omniscient since a persona l gro und of being lacking eterna lly perfect freedom
is not only n ot a logically con tingent state of affairs bu t, on the ab ove criteria,
is neither logically nor ontologically possible at all. Again, it is a necessity
that God not know the future because God does not possess the power to do
so.
If my arg um en t be correct, there is no point in talking of a cho ice as if
God had an alternative. Since God can never choose future omniscience,
God does not choose not to be future om niscient. M oreov er, if future knowl-
edge is of one piece comprised of knowledge both of divine and human free
actions, it follows that God is necessarily limited of both types of knowledge.
Swinburne thinks it is coherent to suppose that God can be both omni-
scient in the sense of knowing all true propositions and perfectly free. He says
that an om niscient person if asked, could give you the answer to any
question,
if he chose to do so (emphasis mine; see above quotation from p.
166).
It seems to me that Swinburne wants to retain in his doctrine of God
the notion that God is capable of knowing all true propositions. This much of
the classical Thomistic God Swinburne wants to preserve. In other words,
self-limitation mean s more th an G od m erely creating a world with free
actions as opposed to creating a world where all actions are determined.
Since an omniscient person who knows all propositions is coherent for
Swinburne, he retains the notion that God is able to be such a person but
chooses not to be such a person for the sake of freedom. But, again, if my
arg um ent be correct, on Sw inburn e s own groun ds, it is not coherent to
suppose that a perfectly free Go d can be omn iscient. Sw inbu rne s God simply
cannot know the future.
In sum m ary, given Sw inburn e s position th at future omniscience of all true
propositions is incompatible with free acts, future omniscience never has
occurred and, more impo rtantly, can never occur. Th us, talk of ch oic e and
a self-limiting G od becomes highly prob lem atic. S win burne s God seems to
be a God for whom future omniscience is neither a logical nor an ontological
possibility.
4
Department of Religion,
Claremont Graduate School,
Claremont,
California
Thanks are due to Stephen T.
Davis,
John Hick and Keith Ward for reading drafts of this paper
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