sssipart1: thesocialcostofinequality · 2016. 7. 19. · sssipart1: thesocialcostofinequality...

SSSI Part 1: The Social Cost of Inequality

Nathaniel Hendren

Harvard

July, 2016

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 1 / 49

Motivation

Inequality generates need for interpersonal comparisonsDecisions about economic policies (R&D, free trade, mergers, safetynet, health, education, taxation, etc.)General measurement of societal well-being

Two common economic methods for resolving interpersonalcomparisons

1 Kaldor Hicks Compensation Principle (Kaldor (1939), Hicks (1939,1940))

Motivates aggregate surplus, or “efficiency”, as normative criteriaIgnores issues of “equity”

2 Social welfare function (Bergson (1938), Samuelson (1947), Diamondand Mirrlees (1971), Saez and Stantcheva (2015))

Allows preference for equitySubjective choice of researcher or policy-maker

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 2 / 49

This Lecture

Follow Hendren (2014) “The Inequality Deflator: InterpersonalComparisons without a Social Welfare Function”Revisit Kaldor-HicksModify so that transfers are incentive compatible (Mirrlees (1971))Kaldor and Hicks envisioned feasible transfers:

“If, as will often happen, the best methods of compensation feasibleinvolve some loss in productive efficiency, this loss will have to be takeninto account. (Hicks, 1939)

Existing literature: Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), Coate (2000),Kaplow (1996, 2004, 2006, 2008)

Provide simple (yet general) empirical method of accounting for thesedistortions

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 3 / 49

This Lecture

Key idea: Envelope theorem allows for empirical method to accountfor distortions

Corresponds to weighting surplus by the “inequality deflator”Turns unequal surplus into equal surplus using modifications to the taxschedule

Inequality deflator is the marginal cost to government of providing $1of welfare to an income level

Differs from $1 because of how behavioral response affects governmentbudget (basic PF logic)

Suppose we want to provide transfers to those earning near y ∗

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 4 / 49

(c)  y-­‐T(y)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

Modifications to Income Tax Schedule

(c)  

y*  

y-­‐T(y)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

Modifications to Income Tax Schedule

(c)  

y*  

ε  

y-­‐T(y)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

Modifications to Income Tax Schedule

(c)  

η  

ε  

y-­‐T(y)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  y*  

Modifications to Income Tax Schedule

(c)  

η  

ε  

y-­‐T(y)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

Marginal  welfare  impact  per  η:  =$1  per  mechanical  beneficiary  

y*  

Modifications to Income Tax Schedule

(c)  

η  

ε  

y-­‐T(y)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

Mechanical  cost  per  η:  =F(y*+ε/2)-­‐F(y*-­‐ε/2)  =$1  per  mechanical  beneficiary  

y*  

Modifications to Income Tax Schedule

(c)  

η  

ε  

y-­‐T(y)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

Behavioral  responses  affect  tax  revenue  But  don’t  affect  u/lity  (Envelope  Theorem)  

y*  

Modifications to Income Tax Schedule

(c)  

η  

ε  

y-­‐T(y)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

Total  cost  per  η  per  beneficiary:  =1+FE(y*),  FE  =  “fiscal  externality”  

y*  

Modifications to Income Tax Schedule

(c)  

η  

ε  

y-­‐T(y)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

Total  cost  per  η  per  beneficiary:  =1+FE(y*),  FE  =  “fiscal  externality”  

y*  

g(y)  =  1+FE(y)  

E[1+FE(y)]  

Inequality  Deflator:  

Modifications to Income Tax Schedule

Formal Model

Inequality deflator: Formal Model

g (y) = 1+ FE (y)E [1+ FE (y)]

To first order: $1 surplus to those earning y can be turned into$g (y) /n surplus to everyone through modifications to tax schedule

Fiscal externality logic does not rely on functional form assumptions

Allows for each person to have her own utility function and arbitrarybehavioral responsesExtends to multiple policy dimensionsNests a lot of optimal tax expressions as special case (e.g. Mirrlees)

Key assumption: “partial equilibrium” / “local incidence”

Behavioral response only induces a fiscal externalityOther incidence/externalities would need to be accounted for

Inequality Deflator can turn unequal surplus into equal surplus

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 14 / 49

Formal Model

Inequality deflator: Formal Model

g (y) = 1+ FE (y)E [1+ FE (y)]

To first order: $1 surplus to those earning y can be turned into$g (y) /n surplus to everyone through modifications to tax scheduleFiscal externality logic does not rely on functional form assumptions

Allows for each person to have her own utility function and arbitrarybehavioral responsesExtends to multiple policy dimensionsNests a lot of optimal tax expressions as special case (e.g. Mirrlees)

Key assumption: “partial equilibrium” / “local incidence”

Behavioral response only induces a fiscal externalityOther incidence/externalities would need to be accounted for

Inequality Deflator can turn unequal surplus into equal surplus

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 14 / 49

Formal Model

Inequality deflator: Formal Model

g (y) = 1+ FE (y)E [1+ FE (y)]

To first order: $1 surplus to those earning y can be turned into$g (y) /n surplus to everyone through modifications to tax scheduleFiscal externality logic does not rely on functional form assumptions

Allows for each person to have her own utility function and arbitrarybehavioral responsesExtends to multiple policy dimensionsNests a lot of optimal tax expressions as special case (e.g. Mirrlees)

Key assumption: “partial equilibrium” / “local incidence”Behavioral response only induces a fiscal externalityOther incidence/externalities would need to be accounted for

Inequality Deflator can turn unequal surplus into equal surplus

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 14 / 49

Formal Model

Inequality deflator: Formal Model

g (y) = 1+ FE (y)E [1+ FE (y)]

To first order: $1 surplus to those earning y can be turned into$g (y) /n surplus to everyone through modifications to tax scheduleFiscal externality logic does not rely on functional form assumptions

Allows for each person to have her own utility function and arbitrarybehavioral responsesExtends to multiple policy dimensionsNests a lot of optimal tax expressions as special case (e.g. Mirrlees)

Key assumption: “partial equilibrium” / “local incidence”Behavioral response only induces a fiscal externalityOther incidence/externalities would need to be accounted for

Inequality Deflator can turn unequal surplus into equal surplusNathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 14 / 49

(s)  

Surplus  

Earnings        (y)  

0  

s(y)  

Example:  Alterna/ve  environment  benefits  the  poor  and  harms  the  rich  

Example: Alternative Environment Benefits Poor

EV and CV

Given s (y), two ways of neutralizing distributional comparisons

“EV”: modify status quo tax schedule

By how much can everyone be made better off in modified status quoworld relative alternative environment?

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 16 / 49

EV and CV

Given s (y), two ways of neutralizing distributional comparisons“EV”: modify status quo tax schedule

By how much can everyone be made better off in modified status quoworld relative alternative environment?

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 16 / 49

EV and CV

Given s (y), two ways of neutralizing distributional comparisons“EV”: modify status quo tax schedule

By how much can everyone be made better off in modified status quoworld relative alternative environment?

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 16 / 49

(c)  y-­‐T(y)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

Replicate  surplus  in  status  quo  environment  

“EV” Example

(c)  y-­‐T(y)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

Replicate  surplus  in  status  quo  environment  

s(y)   ∧  y-­‐T(y)  

y-­‐T(y)+s(y)  

=  

“EV” Example

(c)  y-­‐T(y)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

Replicate  surplus  in  status  quo  environment  

Is  T  budget  feasible?  

s(y)   y-­‐T(y)  ∧  

∧  

y-­‐T(y)+s(y)  

=  

“EV” Example

(c)  y-­‐T(y)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

s(y)   y-­‐T(y)  ∧  

Is  T  budget  feasible?  Case  1:  YES  

∧  

“EV” Example

(c)  y-­‐T(y)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

s(y)   y-­‐T(y)  ∧  

Is  T  budget  feasible?  Case  2:  NO  

∧  

“EV” Example

(c)  y-­‐T(y)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

SID  >  0  s(y)  

Inequality  Deflated  Surplus:  SID=E[s(y)g(y)]  How  much  be+er  off  is  everyone  in  the  alterna6ve  environment  rela6ve  to  a  modified  status  quo?  

y-­‐T(y)  ∧  

“EV” Example

(c)  y-­‐T(y)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

SID  >  0  s(y)  

Inequality  Deflated  Surplus:  SID=E[s(y)g(y)]  How  much  be+er  off  is  everyone  in  the  alterna6ve  environment  rela6ve  to  a  modified  status  quo?  

y-­‐T(y)  ∧  

SID  <  0  Modified  status  quo  delivers  Pareto  improvement  

“EV” Example

EV and CV

Given s (y), two ways of neutralizing distributional comparisons“EV”: modify status quo tax schedule

By how much can everyone be made better off in modified status quoworld relative alternative environment? Formal "First Order" Statement

“CV”: modify alternative environment tax scheduleBy how much can everyone be made better off in modified alternativeenvironment relative to status quo?

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 24 / 49

(c)  y-­‐Ta(y)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

Compensate  Lost  Surplus  in  Alterna/ve  environment  

“CV” Example

(c)  y-­‐Ta(y)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

Compensate  Lost  Surplus  in  Alterna/ve  environment  

-­‐s(y)  

y-­‐Ta(y)  ∧  

“CV” Example

(c)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

-­‐s(y)  y-­‐Ta(y)  

y-­‐Ta(y)  ∧  

SID  >  0  

Compensate  Lost  Surplus  in  Alterna/ve  environment  

“CV” Example

(c)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

-­‐s(y)  y-­‐Ta(y)  

y-­‐Ta(y)  ∧  

SID  <  0  

Compensate  Lost  Surplus  in  Alterna/ve  environment  

“CV” Example

(c)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

-­‐s(y)  y-­‐Ta(y)  

y-­‐Ta(y)  ∧  

SID  >  0  

Inequality  Deflated  Surplus:  SID=E[s(y)g(y)]  How  much  be+er  off  is  everyone  in  the  modified  alterna6ve  environment  rela6ve  to  the  status  quo?  

“CV” Example

(c)  

Consum

p/on

Earnings        (y)  

-­‐s(y)  y-­‐Ta(y)  

y-­‐Ta(y)  ∧  

SID  >  0  

Inequality  Deflated  Surplus:  SID=E[s(y)g(y)]  How  much  be+er  off  is  everyone  in  the  modified  alterna6ve  environment  rela6ve  to  the  status  quo?  

SID  >  0  Modified  alterna/ve  environment  delivers  Pareto  improvement  

“CV” Example

Inequality Deflated Surplus <-> Pareto Comparisons

If g (y) is similar in status quo and alternative environment, thesethese two interpretations of inequality deflated surplus are first-orderequivalent Formal Assumptions and Proposition

Similar to first order equivalence of CV and EV

When surplus is homogeneous conditional on income:S ID provides first-order characterization of potential ParetocomparisonsS ID quantifies difference between environments without makinginter-personal comparisons

By how much is everyone better off?

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 31 / 49

Heterogeneous Surplus

Redistribution based on income, not individual-specificTwo people with same income, y (θ), can have different surplus, s (θ)Income tax is a “blunt instrument”∫s (θ) g (y (θ)) = how much on average is each income level better off

Search for potential Pareto comparisons more difficult

But inequality deflator can still be used to characterize Paretocomparisons Proposition

DefineS ID = E [min {s (θ) |y (θ) = y} g (y)] > 0

S ID= E [max {s (θ) |y (θ) = y} g (y)] < 0

Modified alternative environment delivers Pareto improvement iffS ID > 0Modified status quo offers Pareto improvement iff S ID

< 0

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 32 / 49

Heterogeneous Surplus

No potential Pareto ranking when S ID < 0 < S ID

Potential solution: Add more status quo policiesMarginal cost 1+ FE (X) as opposed to 1+ FE (y)

Augment both tax schedule and Medicaid

Inequality deflator well-suited for comparisons in which surplus doesnot vary conditional on income, so that S ID = S ID = S ID

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 33 / 49

Rough Bound from Behavioral Responses to Tax Changes

Existing evidence on behavioral responses to taxation providesguidance on 1+ FE (y)

EITC causes people to:

Enter the labor force (summary in Hotz and Scholz (2003))Distort earnings (Chetty et al 2013).1+ FE (y) ≈ 1.14 for low-earners (calculation in Hendren 2013)

Taxing top incomes causes:

Reduction in taxable income (review in Saez et al 2012)Implies 1+ FE (y) ≈ 0.50− 0.75Disagreement about amount, but general agreement on the sign:FE (y) < 0

Reduced form empirical evidence suggests deflator values poormore so than the rich

Despite evidence that taxable income elasticities may be quite stableacross the income distribution (e.g. Chetty 2012)

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 34 / 49

Rough Bound from Behavioral Responses to Tax Changes

Existing evidence on behavioral responses to taxation providesguidance on 1+ FE (y)

EITC causes people to:Enter the labor force (summary in Hotz and Scholz (2003))Distort earnings (Chetty et al 2013).1+ FE (y) ≈ 1.14 for low-earners (calculation in Hendren 2013)

Taxing top incomes causes:

Reduction in taxable income (review in Saez et al 2012)Implies 1+ FE (y) ≈ 0.50− 0.75Disagreement about amount, but general agreement on the sign:FE (y) < 0

Reduced form empirical evidence suggests deflator values poormore so than the rich

Despite evidence that taxable income elasticities may be quite stableacross the income distribution (e.g. Chetty 2012)

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 34 / 49

Rough Bound from Behavioral Responses to Tax Changes

Existing evidence on behavioral responses to taxation providesguidance on 1+ FE (y)

EITC causes people to:Enter the labor force (summary in Hotz and Scholz (2003))Distort earnings (Chetty et al 2013).1+ FE (y) ≈ 1.14 for low-earners (calculation in Hendren 2013)

Taxing top incomes causes:Reduction in taxable income (review in Saez et al 2012)Implies 1+ FE (y) ≈ 0.50− 0.75Disagreement about amount, but general agreement on the sign:FE (y) < 0

Reduced form empirical evidence suggests deflator values poormore so than the rich

Despite evidence that taxable income elasticities may be quite stableacross the income distribution (e.g. Chetty 2012)

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 34 / 49

Rough Bound from Behavioral Responses to Tax Changes

Existing evidence on behavioral responses to taxation providesguidance on 1+ FE (y)

EITC causes people to:Enter the labor force (summary in Hotz and Scholz (2003))Distort earnings (Chetty et al 2013).1+ FE (y) ≈ 1.14 for low-earners (calculation in Hendren 2013)

Taxing top incomes causes:Reduction in taxable income (review in Saez et al 2012)Implies 1+ FE (y) ≈ 0.50− 0.75Disagreement about amount, but general agreement on the sign:FE (y) < 0

Reduced form empirical evidence suggests deflator values poormore so than the rich

Despite evidence that taxable income elasticities may be quite stableacross the income distribution (e.g. Chetty 2012)

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 34 / 49

Rough Bound from Behavioral Responses to Tax Changes

Existing evidence on behavioral responses to taxation providesguidance on 1+ FE (y)

EITC causes people to:Enter the labor force (summary in Hotz and Scholz (2003))Distort earnings (Chetty et al 2013).1+ FE (y) ≈ 1.14 for low-earners (calculation in Hendren 2013)

Taxing top incomes causes:Reduction in taxable income (review in Saez et al 2012)Implies 1+ FE (y) ≈ 0.50− 0.75Disagreement about amount, but general agreement on the sign:FE (y) < 0

Reduced form empirical evidence suggests deflator values poormore so than the rich

Despite evidence that taxable income elasticities may be quite stableacross the income distribution (e.g. Chetty 2012)

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 34 / 49

A More Precise Representation

Use optimal tax approach to write FE (y) as function of taxableincome elasticities

Letεc (y) = avg comp. elasticity for those earning y

ζ (y) = avg inc. effect for those earning y

εP (y) = avg LFP rate elasticity for those earning yFormal Definitions

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 35 / 49

A More Precise Representation

Use optimal tax approach to write FE (y) as function of taxableincome elasticitiesLet

εc (y) = avg comp. elasticity for those earning y

ζ (y) = avg inc. effect for those earning y

εP (y) = avg LFP rate elasticity for those earning yFormal Definitions

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 35 / 49

Optimal Tax Expression

For every point, y ∗, such that T ′ (y) and εc (y ∗) are locally constant andthe distribution of income is continuous:

FE (y∗) = − εP (y∗) T (y)−T (0)y −T (y)︸ ︷︷ ︸

Participation Effect

− ζ (y∗) τ (y∗)1− T (y∗)

y∗︸ ︷︷ ︸Income Effect

− εc (y∗) τ (y∗)1− τ (y∗)

α (y∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸Substitution Effect

where α (y) = −(1+ yf ′(y)

f (y)

)is the local Pareto parameter of the income

distribution General Formula

Heterogeneity in FE (y) depends on:1 Shape of income distribution, α (y)2 Shape and size of behavioral elasticities3 Shape of tax rates

Generalized version of “uni-dimensional” formulas (e.g. Bourguignonand Spadaro (2012), Zoutman (2013a, 2013b))

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 36 / 49

Optimal Tax Expression

For every point, y ∗, such that T ′ (y) and εc (y ∗) are locally constant andthe distribution of income is continuous:

FE (y∗) = − εP (y∗) T (y)−T (0)y −T (y)︸ ︷︷ ︸

Participation Effect

− ζ (y∗) τ (y∗)1− T (y∗)

y∗︸ ︷︷ ︸Income Effect

− εc (y∗) τ (y∗)1− τ (y∗)

α (y∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸Substitution Effect

where α (y) = −(1+ yf ′(y)

f (y)

)is the local Pareto parameter of the income

distribution General Formula

Heterogeneity in FE (y) depends on:1 Shape of income distribution, α (y)2 Shape and size of behavioral elasticities3 Shape of tax rates

Generalized version of “uni-dimensional” formulas (e.g. Bourguignonand Spadaro (2012), Zoutman (2013a, 2013b))

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 36 / 49

Estimation Approach

Calibrate behavioral elasticities from existing literature on taxableincome elasticities

Assess robustness to range of estimates (e.g. compensated elasticity of0.1, 0.3, and 0.5) Calibration Details

Estimate shape of income distribution and marginal income tax rateusing universe of US income tax returns

Account for covariance between elasticity of income distribution andmarginal tax rate Estimation Details

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 37 / 49

Estimation Approach

Calibrate behavioral elasticities from existing literature on taxableincome elasticities

Assess robustness to range of estimates (e.g. compensated elasticity of0.1, 0.3, and 0.5) Calibration Details

Estimate shape of income distribution and marginal income tax rateusing universe of US income tax returns

Account for covariance between elasticity of income distribution andmarginal tax rate Estimation Details

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 37 / 49

Estimation Approach

Calibrate behavioral elasticities from existing literature on taxableincome elasticities

Assess robustness to range of estimates (e.g. compensated elasticity of0.1, 0.3, and 0.5) Calibration Details

Estimate shape of income distribution and marginal income tax rateusing universe of US income tax returns

Account for covariance between elasticity of income distribution andmarginal tax rate Estimation Details

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 37 / 49

Estimation Approach

Calibrate behavioral elasticities from existing literature on taxableincome elasticities

Assess robustness to range of estimates (e.g. compensated elasticity of0.1, 0.3, and 0.5) Calibration Details

Estimate shape of income distribution and marginal income tax rateusing universe of US income tax returns

Account for covariance between elasticity of income distribution andmarginal tax rate Estimation Details

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 37 / 49

Average Alpha

-10

12

3Al

pha

0 20 40 60 80 100Ordinary Income Quantile

Average Alpha by Income Quantile

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 38 / 49

Inequality Deflator

.6.8

11.

2In

equa

lity D

eflat

or

0 20 40 60 80 100Ordinary Income (Quantile Scale)

Inequality Deflator

Estimation Details / Components Income Scale

Inequality Deflator

0.5

11.

5In

equa

lity D

eflat

or

0 20 40 60 80 100Ordinary Income (Quantile Scale)

Baseline Specification Low Elasticity (e=0.1)High Elasticity (e=0.5)

Alternative Elasticity SpecificationsInequality Deflator

Household Income

Application #1: Income Inequality

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

Top

1% (K

)

050

000

1000

0015

0000

2000

00In

com

e ($

)

1980 1990 2000 2010year

Bottom Quintile 2nd Quintile3rd Quintile 4th Quintile5th Quintile Top 1% (K)

Source: CBO; Supplamental Tables 43373, Table 7

After-Tax Household Income Distribuition by Quintile

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 41 / 49

1. Income Distributions

Define surplus function

s (θ) = Qa (α (θ))−Q0 (α (θ))

How much growth if tax schedule distributed it equally?

Could do other counterfactual experiments...

Search for Pareto comparisons using particular counterfactuals (e.g.SBTC vs no SBTC)

Quantile stability implements Kaldor (1939)’s idea of holdingdistribution constant + Hicks (1939) idea of doing it in cheapestmanner possible

More costly to make the rich poor and the poor rich than to keepeveryone rich and poor

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 42 / 49

1. Income Distributions

Define surplus function

s (θ) = Qa (α (θ))−Q0 (α (θ))

How much growth if tax schedule distributed it equally?

Could do other counterfactual experiments...

Search for Pareto comparisons using particular counterfactuals (e.g.SBTC vs no SBTC)

Quantile stability implements Kaldor (1939)’s idea of holdingdistribution constant + Hicks (1939) idea of doing it in cheapestmanner possible

More costly to make the rich poor and the poor rich than to keepeveryone rich and poor

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 42 / 49

1. Income Distributions

Define surplus function

s (θ) = Qa (α (θ))−Q0 (α (θ))

How much growth if tax schedule distributed it equally?Could do other counterfactual experiments...

Search for Pareto comparisons using particular counterfactuals (e.g.SBTC vs no SBTC)

Quantile stability implements Kaldor (1939)’s idea of holdingdistribution constant + Hicks (1939) idea of doing it in cheapestmanner possible

More costly to make the rich poor and the poor rich than to keepeveryone rich and poor

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 42 / 49

1. Income Distributions

Define surplus function

s (θ) = Qa (α (θ))−Q0 (α (θ))

How much growth if tax schedule distributed it equally?Could do other counterfactual experiments...

Search for Pareto comparisons using particular counterfactuals (e.g.SBTC vs no SBTC)

Quantile stability implements Kaldor (1939)’s idea of holdingdistribution constant + Hicks (1939) idea of doing it in cheapestmanner possible

More costly to make the rich poor and the poor rich than to keepeveryone rich and poor

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 42 / 49

1. Income Distributions

Define surplus function

s (θ) = Qa (α (θ))−Q0 (α (θ))

How much growth if tax schedule distributed it equally?Could do other counterfactual experiments...

Search for Pareto comparisons using particular counterfactuals (e.g.SBTC vs no SBTC)

Quantile stability implements Kaldor (1939)’s idea of holdingdistribution constant + Hicks (1939) idea of doing it in cheapestmanner possible

More costly to make the rich poor and the poor rich than to keepeveryone rich and poor

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 42 / 49

1. Income Distributions

Define surplus function

s (θ) = Qa (α (θ))−Q0 (α (θ))

How much growth if tax schedule distributed it equally?Could do other counterfactual experiments...

Search for Pareto comparisons using particular counterfactuals (e.g.SBTC vs no SBTC)

Quantile stability implements Kaldor (1939)’s idea of holdingdistribution constant + Hicks (1939) idea of doing it in cheapestmanner possible

More costly to make the rich poor and the poor rich than to keepeveryone rich and poor

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 42 / 49

Deflated Growth

-200

00-1

0000

010

000

2000

0D

iffer

ence

Rel

ativ

e to

201

2

1980199020002010Year

Mean HH Inc (CPI Deflated) Inequality Deflated HH IncLow Elasticity Specification High Elasticity Specification

Difference Relative to 2012Raw and Deflated Household Income Change

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 43 / 49

Social Cost of Increased Income Inequality

-400

-200

020

040

060

0So

cial

Cos

t of I

ncom

e In

equa

lity

1980199020002010Year

Baseline Low Elasticity (e = 0.1)High Elasticity (e = 0.5)

119K * (Mean - Deflated Change in HH Income)Social Cost of Increased Income Inequality

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 44 / 49

Country Comparison to US

AUS

AUT

BEL

CAN

DEU

DNK

FIN

FRA

NLD

SWE

USA

-100

00-5

000

050

0010

000

Ineq

ualit

y D

eflat

ed S

urpl

us

40000 45000 50000 55000 60000GNI Per Capita

Inequality Deflated Surplus Low/HighGNI PC Comparison

Inequality Deflated Surplus vs. 2012 GNI Per Capita

Other Country Orderings

Preference for “pro poor” policies?Two conceptualizations of policy experiments:

Non-Budget Neutral (“should the government spend money on G”)Budget Neutral

Budget neutral policies: weight surplus by inequality deflator

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 45 / 49

Example: Producer versus Consumer Surplus

Suppose budget neutral policy with benefits to producers SP andconsumers SC

Extreme assumption: producer surplus falls to top 1%Consumer surplus falls evenly across income distribution

Optimal weighting:S ID = 0.77SP + SC

“Consumer surplus standard” requires top tax rate near Laffer curveFrance should have tighter merger regulations?

Key assumption: policy is budget neutral (inclusive of fiscalexternalities)What about non-budget neutral policies?

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 46 / 49

Targeted Policies

Suppose G affects those with income yConstruct

MVPFG =s (y)

1+ FEG

WTP per unit gov’t revenue (Mayshar 1990; Slemrod and Yitzhaki2001; Hendren 2013)Depends on causal effects (FEG) and WTP for non-market good

Additional spending on G desirable iff

MVPFG︸ ︷︷ ︸Value of G

≥ 11+ FE (y)︸ ︷︷ ︸

Value of T (y)

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 47 / 49

Welfare Impact

Section 8Food Stamps

JTPA

Income Tax / EITC

0.5

11.

52

MVP

F

0 18K 33K 53K 90K 696KHousehold Income (Quantile Scale)

Source: MVPFs compiled in Hendren (2013) drawing on existing estimates from Bloom et al (1997), Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012), and Jacob and Ludwig (2012) Income is average income of policy beneficiaries normalized to 2012 income using CPI-U

MVPF of Targeted Policies

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 48 / 49

Conclusion

Inequality isn’t just a transfer!Policy implications

Compare policies to the efficiency of the tax scheduleWeighting individual WTP by inequality deflator provides method to dothis

General idea: use marginal costs of feasible redistribution +envelope theorem + Pareto principle instead of a SWFKey question: what policies are more efficient than the income taxschedule at redistribution?

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Cost of Inequality July, 2016 49 / 49