sharing and protection in multics landon cox february 5, 2016

Sharing and protection in Multics

Landon CoxFebruary 5, 2016

Layer 0

Layer 1

Layer 2

Layer 3

Layer 4

Scheduler

Pager

Console

I/O devices

User programs

Supervisor code

User/kernel translation data

Virtual memory

0GB

4GB

3GB (0xc0000000)

Kernel data(same for all page tables)

User data(different for every process)

Where to store translation data?

1. Could be kept in physical memory• How the MMU accesses it• On x86, PTBR (aka CR3 register) refers to physical memory

2. Could be in kernel virtual address space• A little weird, but what is done in practice• How to keep translation data in a place that must be

translated?• Translation for user address space is in kernel virtual memory• Kernel’s translation data always in physical memory (pinned)

• Does anything else need to be pinned (and why)?• Kernel’s page fault handler code also has to be pinned.

Where to store translation data?

• How does kernel access data in user’s address space?• If for currently loaded process, access using current

page table• If for another process, have to change page table

Kernel vs. user mode• Who sets up the data used by

the MMU?• Can’t be the user process• Otherwise could access anything• Only kernel is allowed to modify any

memory• Processor must know to allow

kernel• To update the translator• To execute privileged instructions (halt,

do I/O)

Kernel vs. user mode• How does machine know kernel

is running?• This requires hardware support• Process supports two modes, kernel and

user• Mode is indicated by a hardware register

• Mode bit

Protection1. All memory accesses go through a

translator• Who can modify translator’s data?

2. Only kernel can modify translator’s data• How do we know if kernel is running?

3. Mode bit indicates if kernel is running• Who can modify the mode bit?Making progress: the amount of protected data is down to a bit

GBsof protected data

One bit of protected data

Protecting the mode bit• Can kernel change the mode bit?• Yes. Kernel is completely trusted.

• Can user process change the mode bit?• Not directly• User programs need to invoke the kernel• Must be able to initiate a change

When to transition from user to kernel?

1. Exceptions (interrupts, traps)• Access something out of your valid address

space• (e.g., segmentation fault)

• Disk I/O finishes, causes interrupt• Timer pre-emption, causes interrupt• Page faults

2. System calls• Similar in purpose to a function call• Kernel as software library

Example system calls• Process management

• Fork/exec (start a new process), exit, getpid• Signals

• Kill (send a signal), sigaction (set up handler)• Memory management

• Brk (extend the valid address space), mmap• File I/O

• Open, close, read, write• Network I/O

• Accept, send, receive• System management

• Reboot

System call implementation• Syscalls are like functions, but

different• Implemented by special

instruction• syscall

• Execution of syscall traps to kernel• Processor safely transfers control to

kernel• Hardware invokes kernel’s syscall trap

handler

System call implementation• Libc wraps systems calls• C++/Java make calls into libc

Tracing through “cin >> a;”

C++: cin >> a

C: read ()

libc: syscall(SYS_read,filenum,offset,numbytes)

Java: in.read()

Processor: kernel’s syscall handler

kernel: sys_read

kernel: // perform I/O

Crucialstep

Kernel trap details• Hardware must atomically

1. Set processor mode bit to “kernel”2. Save current registers (SP, PC, general

purpose)3. Change execution stack to kernel (SP)4. Jump to exception handler in kernel (PC)

• What does this look a lot like?• Switching between threads (see previous

lecture)

Kernel trap details• User process can initiate mode

switch• But only transfers control in limited way• (i.e., to predefined kernel code)

• How does processor know where to jump?• Stored in hardware “interrupt vector

table”• Who can update the interrupt

vector table?• Kernel does this at startup• Code that runs first gets control of

machine

Syscall arguments, return values

• For args passed in memory, in which address space do they reside?• User (programs can’t access kernel’s portion of address space)• Linux passes parameters via registers

• Before syscall• Push ebp, edx, ecx vals onto user stack• Copy esp (stack pointer) into ebp

• Each process has kernel stack• CPU knows kernel stack via “Task Segment State”• CPU sets esp using TSS• Kernel finds user stack in ebp register

Tracing through read()C: read (int fd, void *buf, size_t size)

libc: push fd, buf, size onto user’s stack

Note: pointer!kernel: sys_read () { verify fd is an open file verify [buf – buf+size) valid, writable read file from data (e.g. disk) find physical location of buf copy data to buf’s physical location }

Verifyarguments!

Layer 0

Layer 1

Layer 2

Layer 3

Layer 4

Scheduler

Pager

Console

I/O devices

User programs

THE• Were THE processes protected from each other?

• Yes, processes had private segment spaces• Those spaces were isolated via the compiler and Layer 1

• Isolation/protection was the motivation for layering

• What is the flip side of protection?• Sharing!• There are often many benefits to sharing (i.e., “features”)• Sharing also creates complexity

• Ongoing issue: balancing features and complexity

THE• Could THE processes share in-core

data?• Only within the structure of the hierarchy• Lower layers were like shared libraries• User processes could not share with each other

• What about persistent data?• Not really, “no common data base.”

THE• Important idea not supported by THE• The notion of a user• “not intended as a multi-access system”

• What is a “user” in a computer system?• Identifier assigned to processes and storage objects• Unit of access control in most systems• Often associated with a person, but doesn’t have to

• Do modern machines support users?• Desktops/servers do, mobile devices kind of do

Multics• Multi-user operating system

• Primary goal was to allow efficient, safe sharing btw users• What was the central data abstraction in

Multics?• A segment• All data was contained within a segment• No distinction between files and memory• Means everything is persistent

• What is a segment?• Named range of contiguous data + associated meta-data• Accessed through loads/stores in memory• Think of a segment as an mmapped region of memory

Multics segments• Implications of segments• Difference between a program and process?

• We think of a process as an execution of a program• In Multics, there was very little distinction

• What does this force programmers to do?• Must explicitly manage segments• Process cannot just exit and return to a “known” state• Places a lot of burden on programmers• Beware, complexity creep …

Segment accessAddress [s,i]

Core|Ld

Core|Ls|Acc|F

Descriptor Segment

sSegment

Descriptor WordSegment

word of data

i

Descriptor BaseRegister

if(DBR.L < S) faultsdw = DW[s]if(sdw.F || sdw.L<i) faultif(!verify(sdw.Acc)) faultreturn sdw.Core + i

Lookup algorithm?

Ld

Ls

What about paging?• How do we make sure that segments

are in-core?• Segments are broken into fixed-size pages (1k)• Another structure to map parts of a segment to

pages• Page tables describe where pieces are

in core• Descriptor segment is a segment too• Must locate the pages on which it is located • Can then walk data structure to locate data

Paged segment access[s,i] [sp,sw,ip,iw] Core|

L

Core|L|Acc|F

Page sp of DS

swSegment Descriptor

WordPage ip ofSegment S

word of dataiw

Descriptor BaseRegisterPage Table of

Descriptor Segment

Core|L sp

Page Table of Segment S

Core|Lip This is a lot of memory accesses

What’s the problem with this?

Caching in hardware: TLBHow do we make it faster?

(1) Find page table for

descriptor segment(2) Page holds

part of descriptor segment(3) Use

descriptor segment to

find page table for data segment

(4) Use page table to locate data we want

to access

Multics supervisor code• Location of THE supervisor state• In separate processes at low-level layers

• In Multics, where did supervisor state reside?• In segments mapped into every process• Supervisor segments were at top of address

space• How was supervisor state protected?• Hardware protection provided by processor• Hardware supported 8 protection rings• Idea was to enforce layering via hardware• Exactly like mode bit (kernel/user) you are

used to

Multics supervisor code• How did programs invoke the supervisor?

• Just a procedure call• Calls always reside in segments at top of addr. sp.• Just jump into code in those segments

• What else has to happen?• Have to change hardware protection mode

• Who/what changed protection modes?• This was hardware enforced• All segments were assigned a ring level (including code)• Mode for an instruction was set in descriptor on which it

resided

Segment sharing• To facilitate sharing need common namespace for

segments• Multics uses file hierarchy to name all segments• Populating address space like a bunch of mmap calls

• Why is this a nice abstraction?• Maps human-readable names (easy to program) to data• Makes it easy to specify what data you want to operate on

• Who manages the namespace?• Must be privileged code• Common data structure used by all processes• Only code trusted by all should be allowed to modify directly

Segment sharing• What operations can a process perform on the

namespace?• Create a segment• Delete a segment• Change a segment’s name• Change the access policy of a segment• Read the content of a directory

• Who prevents collisions in the namespace?• The supervisor code• On a request to create a segment, checks to see if it already

exists

Segment sharing• How does a process populate its address

space?• Must know or compute parts of the namespace• Invokes the OS to map named segment into memory• OS updates the Known Segment Table for process• KST maps segments to pathnames• OS returns beginning of segment, length to process

• Once mapped, how is data loaded into memory?• Data is demand loaded• Process accesses address (e.g., [s,i])• This triggers a page fault and a trap to the OS• The OS uses the KST to locate data on disk

Discussion• Are Multics segments a good idea or bad?

• Programmers must do a lot of garbage collection• Temporary state must be re-initialized by hand• Adds complexity

• Danger of accessing persistent data via loads/stores?• Buggy programs can lead to stray writes• Stray writes become permanent

• Why are permanent stray writes bad?• Important data structures could become corrupted• “Restarting” program just puts you back in a bad state

Discussion• How do most modern systems present persistent storage?

• Must access persistent storage through file system• File system interface: open, read, write

• Why is an explicit file system interface safer?• Write system call is similar to a “commit”• An explicit acknowledgement that data is ready to be made persistent• Buggy programs much less unlikely to generate a spurious write call• Spurious loads and stores are very common in buggy programs

• We actually see this observation in Multics itself. Where?• In how it handles the namespace• Important, persistent data structure• Can only be modified in a controlled way, through narrow interface• Nice to offer same protections for user data

Topic we will revisit• Interfaces to persistent storage• Periodic source of new research

• In the 90s: battery-backed RAM• Memory persists across reboots• Rio-Vista from Michigan (SOSP ‘97)

• In the 00s: phase-change memory• Fast, persistent substrate• BPFS from Microsoft and UCLA (SOSP

‘09)