“rogue states” how useful is the concept?. i. are some states worse than others? a. possible...

“Rogue States”

How useful is the concept?

I. Are some states worse than others?

A. Possible threats to international order1. “Rogue states” -- States that ignore international

norms and international law

2. “Revisionist states” -- States that seek to upset the status quo

3. “Aggressors” – States that violate the sovereignty and independence of other states

B. Alleged Characteristics of “Rogue States”

1. Ignore international law

2. Build “weapons of mass destruction”

3. Sponsor terrorism

4. Violate the human rights of their own people

C. The US View: Compare 1998, 2002, 2005 speeches 1998: “Rogue States” -- Iran, Iraq, Libya (85%

of mentions) Other mentions: Sudan, North Korea, Serbia,

Cuba 2002: “Axis of Evil” -- Iran, Iraq, North Korea

“Beyond the Axis of Evil” Speech (2002): Libya, Syria, Cuba

2005: “Outposts of Tyranny“ – Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Belarus, Zimbabwe, Myanmar

D. Which countries meet these criteria?

1. Who ignores international law?

What is the only country which managed to violate the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Nonproliferation Treaty, and the Biological Weapons Convention all at the same time?

North Korea, but… Iran is trying

1. Who ignores international law?

What is the only state opposing inspections under the Biological Weapons Convention?

United States

1. Who ignores international law?

Which two states have not ratified “the most widely and rapidly ratified human rights treaty in history,” the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child?

Somalia and United States

2. Who has WMD?Suspected Arsenals: 9 Nuke, 5 Biological, 10 Chemical

3. Who sponsors terrorism?

Which state sponsored the following act? After it finds out that an environmental group is

planning to conduct a peaceful but illegal protest, a government secretly plants a bomb on the group’s ship while it is docked in a neutral, peaceful country. The blast sinks the ship, killing the group’s photographer.

France (attack on Greenpeace)

3. Who sponsors terrorism?

Which state sponsored the following group? An Islamic fundamentalist group fighting a civil

war has the nasty habit of tying down prisoners, pouring gunpowder on their eyeballs and setting it alight. However, when it isn’t killing other groups in the civil war, it targets the military forces of a hated enemy. Its state sponsor gives it tons of weapons, including portable missiles for shooting down aircraft. It continues this aid even after the group targets a civilian airliner.

United States (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar)

3. Who sponsors terrorism?

Israel (Lebanese Phalange in the 1980s) Pakistan (Kashmiri insurgents) India (Tamil insurgents, Hindu fundamentalists) Iran (Hezbollah) Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Namibia,

Congo Republic, etc. Let’s just say Africa…

Wait a minute: Central America too …and Asia, North America, South America,

Australia (!), and Europe… Problem: Just about everyone has provided some aid

to “terrorists” / “freedom fighters”

4. Which states violate human rights?

Autocracies: Repress dissent, rig elections, imprison or murder opponents (more on “outposts of tyranny” later)

Notable democracies: Israel, US, India: Detention without trial, prisoner

abuse Europe: Migrants, ethnic minorities, religious

freedom Japan: Racial discrimination, secret executions

5. Conclusions

a. Many states ignore international law, including prominent democracies such as the US

b. Even more states sponsor terror in some form

c. Similarly, most states violate human rights

d. Only WMD narrows the field substantially – and this field also includes prominent democracies

e. Conclusion: “Rogue state” is not a useful concept for predicting differences between states

II. Are some states more aggressive?

War initiators since 1980

Three times: USA (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq) Twice: Iraq (Iran, Kuwait), Israel (Lebanon 1980

and 1982) Once:

Argentina (1982 occupation of Falklands) China (1987 attack on Vietnam) Armenia (1991 war with Azerbaijan, depending

on definition) Rwanda and perhaps Uganda (1998 war with the

DRC) Eritrea (1998 war with Ethiopia)

A. Power

Great powers fight more – but also cooperate more (foreign aid, support for IGOs, etc)

B. Regime: Democracy makes a difference

1. War initiation. Democracies:

a. May be slightly less likely to wage war in general

b. Are less likely to initiate war

2. Warfighting. Democracies at war:

a. Win battles and wars more frequently

b. Suffer fewer casualties

c. Undermine enemy morale by taking prisoners

d. Are not notably better at extracting resources to fight wars

3. Does Democratization Peace?a. Raw evidence suggests democratization is

dangerous

b. Democratization may be more dangerous in multi-ethnic societies

c. Counter-evidence: The 1989-1995 Transitions in Europe Interpretation: Stalled transitions are

dangerous but quick ones are not

d. Increased democracy decreases war risk – but is this always “democratization?”

e. Possible explanation: Regime change is the real danger

After controlling for regime change….

C. Conclusions

1. Watch out for powerful countries

2. Regime type does little to predict likelihood of war, but does reduce likelihood of aggression

3. Democratization is to be welcomed – if regime change is unavoidable

4. Limitations: Intangibles like “nationalism” are difficult to measure and evaluate

Failed States: Sovereignty without authority

A. Three Paths to State Failure

1. Catastrophe: Something overwhelms state’s ability to provide even minimal protection or enforce law.

2. Sovereignty without institutionalization: State is created which lacks de-personalized institutions or capacity to extract taxes and monopolize force (de-colonization in Congo)

3. Poverty trap: State is so poor than virtually no surplus exists to support political institutions (like catastrophe, but long-standing)

B. Predicting catastrophic failure

1. Capacity to absorb catastrophe: essentially determined by wealth and efficient governance (GDP, Corruption)

Corruption Perceptions Index

B. Predicting “natural” catastrophic failure

1. Capacity to absorb catastrophe: essentially determined by wealth and efficient governance (GDP, Corruption)

2. Predicting catastrophei. Disease – Compare Prevalence to

Resources

HIV Cases

TB Cases

Malaria Deaths

Cholera Deaths

Polio Cases

Per-Capita Health Spending

B. Predicting “natural” catastrophic failure

1. Capacity to absorb catastrophe: essentially determined by wealth and efficient governance (GDP, Corruption)

2. Predicting catastrophei. Disease – Compare Prevalence to

Resources

ii. Natural disasters – Tend to recur in same places

Affected by Disasters, 1975-2004 (UNEP)

Killed by Disasters, 1975-2004 (UNEP)

C. Predicting de-institutionalization

1. Recent decolonization/independence -- “New” states at risk

2. State “birth” type and institutional strengtha. Hypothesis: States born in revolution,

secession, or nonviolent struggle for independence should be stronger than those granted independence without struggle (examples: Congo, Uzbekistan)

b. IV = Better birth experience (requiring organization and solution of collective action problems)

c. Tests using both GDP and Rotberg’s (2004) index of state failure as DVs reveal…

d. The puzzle of state birth

Good births increase later GDP and decrease odds of state failure but… Relationship disappears when war

participation is also included as a (control) IV. Why?

Theory: War produces state strength. Interstate war increases later growth! Civil war decreases later growth

Another finding: States with imposed borders different from pre-colonization ones have lower growth, higher rates of failure

D. Predicting civil war

1. Causes of civil war – Weak States and Opportunism

a. Weak States: Low GDP and…

D. Predicting civil war

1. Geographic Factorsa. Land Area: Bigger countries more

prone to secessionism

b. Terrain: Mountains increase war risk (less evidence for jungles or forests)

c. Resources: Oil increases risk (less evidence for metals and diamonds)

d. Neighborhood: Contagion effects

2. Economic Factors

a. Per-capita GDP: Both level and growth rate reduce war risk, but “vertical” inequality has no effect (few studies of “horizontal” inequality)

b. Primary commodity exports: Countries dependent on raw material exports are war-prone

c. Social welfare: Low infant mortality and high secondary school enrollment reduce war risk

d. Agriculture: Soil degradation increases war risk

3. Political Factors

a. History: Recent wars increase risk (effect lasts for more than 10 years)

b. Regime type: Anocracy is dangerous

Anocracy and State Failure

3. Political Factors

a. History: Recent wars increase risk (effect lasts for more than 10 years)

b. Regime type: Anocracy is dangerous (and strong democracy is better than autocracy)

c. Regime change: Political instability increases war risk

4. Demographics

a. Population: More people = higher risk (but evidence on population density is mixed)

b. Diversity: Results are mixed, but some studies find ethnic heterogeneity increases risk (no real evidence for linguistic, religious, or social diversity)

Relationship: Diversity and Income

Relationship: Diversity and Freedom

5. Civil War Risk is Declining

The Poverty Trap: Dilemmas of Development

Combined National Poverty Estimates

A. Modernization Theory

…aka Neoclassical or Development Economics

1. Western-centric “stages of development”

A. Modernization Theory

…aka Neoclassical or Development Economics

1. Western-centric “stages of development”

2. Implicationsa. S-Shaped Growth Curve

Predicted Growth Over Time

Diminishing Returns to Capital

Capital-Fueled Growth

Lack of Capital

TIMEPer

Cap

ita G

DP

A. Modernization Theory

…aka Neoclassical or Development Economics

1. Western-centric “stages of development”

2. Implicationsa. S-Shaped Growth Curve

b. Convergence – Size of national economies will eventually be determined only by population (more or less equal GDP per capita)

3. Recommendations: Agricultural surpluses, resource extraction, foreign investment, loans and aid, free capital markets, political stability (possibly authoritarianism)

4. Problems with modernization theory

a. Authoritarian regimes often renege on promises of development, become corrupt

b. West used state intervention to develop: Germany and France needed industrial banks, Russia and Japan needed massive state involvement and protectionism

c. Capital not reinvested in industry

4. Problems with modernization theory

a. Authoritarian regimes often renege on promises of development, become corrupt

b. West used state intervention to develop: Germany and France needed industrial banks, Russia and Japan needed massive state involvement and protectionism

c. Capital not reinvested in industryd. Developed countries refused to lower barriers

on textiles and other goods

4. Problems with modernization theory

a. Authoritarian regimes often renege on promises of development, become corrupt

b. West used state intervention to develop: Germany and France needed industrial banks, Russia and Japan needed massive state involvement and protectionism

c. Capital not reinvested in industryd. Developed countries refused to lower barriers

on textiles and other goods

e. Debt crisis: Terms of trade worsened

Commodity prices stall while the cost of living rises….

B. Neoliberalism: An update to modernization theory

1. New Institutionalism: Institutions must create incentives for investment (transparency, prevent corruption, prevent rent-seeking) embrace democracy and limited government

B. Neoliberalism: An update to modernization theory?

1. New Institutionalism: Institutions must create incentives for investment (transparency, prevent corruption, prevent rent-seeking) embrace democracy and limited government

2. Embrace export-led development: invest in infrastructure relevant to modern industries

3. Structural Adjustment: Austerity programs to reduce government spending and tax burden (increasing private investment, preventing debt spiral)

4. Focus on “micro” incentives to individuals/firms rather than “macro” national development projects (dams, power plants, railroads, etc.)

5. Evidence against Neoliberalism

1. Sill cannot explain NICs: autocracy “worked” in Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong

a. “Developmental State” – government picked winners and losers

b. Export-led industrialization did not emerge “naturally”

2. Difficult to sustain free market and democracy in poor states

3. Self-serving: All recommendations tend to help foreign investors, but many harm domestic poor

C. Dependency theory

1. Capitalism creates dependence by poor “peripheral” states on commodity exports to “core” states, which impose unfair terms of trade (foreign investment and loans strings attached)

Core – Periphery: 2000

FOREIGN AID, DEBT, AND INTEREST PAYMENTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1992 AND 1997 (IN $US BILLIONS)

65 53.7116.7 165.3

1666.8

2361.6

0

400

800

1200

1600

2000

2400

1992 1997

aidinterest (estimated at 7%)debt

$US Billions

Year

Aid as percentof interest: 55.7%

Aid as percentof interest: 32.5%

C. Dependency theory

1. Capitalism creates dependence by poor “peripheral” states on commodity exports to “core” states, which impose unfair terms of trade (foreign investment and loans strings attached)

2. Profits are used to buy imports rather than re-invest in the country

3. The “Iron Triangle” of dependency theory: MNCs, Civilian Elites, Military conspire to generate profits (must analyze at lower level of analysis)

4. Policy Recommendations

a. Radical Variant: De-Linking (Autarky) and South-South Links. Example = Maoism

Emphasize industrialization at expense of agriculture (esp. Great Leap Forward)

b. Moderate variant: Import-Substituting Industrialization (ISI)

Tariffs and Subsidies directed to replacing imports with domestically-produced goods

Shift from primary to manufactured products

5. Evidence for Dependency Theory

a. Mild de-linking (devaluation and tariffs) protected some Latin American states from Great Depression

Latin America: Exporters relying on foreign investment performed poorly

5. Evidence for Dependency Theory

a. Mild de-linking (devaluation and tariffs) protected some Latin American states from Great Depression

b. Recent development programs have had mixed results

Performance: Maoism in ChinaCHINA: Real GDP Growth Rates, 1953-2003

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

Year

Performance: Neoliberalism in ChinaCHINA: Real GDP Growth Rates, 1953-2003

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

Year

Real GDP Growth Rates, 1953-2003

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

1953

1957

1961

1965

1969

1973

1977

1981

1985

1989

1993

1997

2001

Year

China

USA

Performance: State-led development in Mexico

MEXICO: Real GDP Growth Rates, 1953-2003

-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Year

Performance: Neoliberal development in Mexico

MEXICO: Real GDP Growth Rates, 1953-2003

-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Year

Performance: State-led development in Brazil

BRAZIL: Real GDP Growth Rates, 1953-2003

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Year

Performance: Neoliberal development in Brazil

BRAZIL: Real GDP Growth Rates, 1953-2003

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Year

6. Shortcomings of Dependency Theory

a. ISI = inefficiency. Worse products, subsidies undermine incentives to expand size of domestic market

b. Consumers rejected protectionism -- Even dependency theorist Cardoso governed as a neoliberal!

c. Urban focus undermines farming: All those city workers need cheap food…. price controls and perverse incentives

d. The problem of the NICs… Investment increased growth!

Dependency in Taiwan: Investment increased during “take-off” period

D. Conclusions: The puzzle of poverty

1. Overview:Modernization Neoliberalism Dependency

Core Assumption

Economies naturally progress through stages

Free markets in free societies generate growth

Structure of world economy prevents peripheral development

Economic policies

Borrow money and sell commodities to finance industrialization

Free trade: Privatize, reduce social spending, balance budget

Reduce dependence (autarky or ISI)

Politics Insulate economic policy from public (autocracy or independence)

Libertarian democracy: Low taxes, low spending, minimal state

Prevent foreign-domestic alliances and empower urban workers

2. No Panaceas

a. No theory completely explains NICs: Autocracy and Protection Export-led growth

b. “Path dependence” – existing investments and coalitions limit policy flexibility (history matters)

c. Is development even a state-level process? We must revisit the issue at the sub-state level!

Nation-Building: Can we fix “states of concern?”

A. Does foreign aid work?

1. Aid and corruption: No overall correlation, positive or negative

a. More corrupt countries tend to attract US aidb. Less corrupt countries tend to attract aid from

Australia and Scandinavia

2. Aid and growtha. “Good policies” -- Aid may have positive

effectb. “Bad policies” -- Aid has no effectc. Problem: Hard to establish effect of aid on

growth. Why?

B. Regime Imposition

1. Can Regime Be Imposed?

Clear answer = Yes. Plenty of examples of long-term regime change imposed from outside (Germany and Japan after World War II)

Most wars and interventions do not result in regime change

2. When does regime type imposition occur?

a. Great power politics – Most regime changes imposed by great powers

b. Government type defines coalitions – World politics is ordered around domestic institutional choices: Catholic vs. Protestant, Monarchy vs. Republic, Democracy vs. Fascism, Capitalism vs. Communism

c. Democratization requires decision of conqueror and successful implementation. Example: US military intervention

d. War Losses Transformation (Perhaps Internal…)

The Fate of Leaders Who Fail

e. Membership in IOs Increases Democratization. Why?

C. Why do civil wars end?

1. Most Common Outcome:

Civil War Outcomes, 1816-1997

Outcome # of Wars

Percentage of All Wars

Percentage Ending With

Formal Agreement

Percentage Followed By

Massacre

Average Duration in Years

Percentage Won By

Government

Complete Defeat 101 51.27 7.92 57.43 2.27 66.34

Surrender With Amnesty 22 11.17 45.45 9.09 2.17 72.73

Cosmetic Concessions 38 19.29 65.79 5.26 3.43 71.05

Genuine Compromise 31 15.74 90.32 3.23 5.19 N / A

Stalemate 5 2.54 20.00 0.00 5.57 N / AGovernmental advantage has been much less pronounced recently – while governments won about 65% of civil wars from 1816 to 1949, they won 54% of wars between 1950 and 1974 and only 37% of wars terminated since then.

C. Why do civil wars end?

1. Most Common Outcome: Government Wins

2. Reason:

Government Advantage

Government Advantage

C. Why do civil wars end?

1. Most Common Outcome: Government Wins

2. Reason: Government is usually stronger

3. Does parity produce a stalemate or compromise?

Strong Government = Rebel Defeat – but Strong Rebels = Compromise!

C. Why do civil wars end?

1. Most Common Outcome: Government Wins

2. Reason: Government is usually stronger

3. Does parity produce a stalemate or compromise? No!

a. Strong Government = Government Wins

b. Strong Rebels = Rebels Win OR Compromise

4. Reason:

C. Why do civil wars end?

1. Most Common Outcome: Government Wins

2. Reason: Government is usually stronger

3. Does parity produce a stalemate or compromise? No!

a. Strong Government = Government Wins

b. Strong Rebels = Rebels Win OR Compromise

4. Reason: Asymmetrya. Government has recognition: credibility

b. Government has institutions: spokesperson

5. What about outside intervention?

No Pro-Rebel Intervention

Pro-Rebel Intervention

No Pro-Government Intervention

119(60.41%)

24(12.18%)

Pro-Government Intervention

29(14.72%)

25(12.69%)

5. What about outside intervention?

a. Does intervention lead to compromise?

5. What about outside intervention?

Probability of Compromise, 1816-1997

Intervention for government

No intervention

5. What about outside intervention?

a. Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes

b. Does intervention prolong wars?

5. What about outside intervention?

a. Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes

b. Does intervention prolong wars? Yes

c. Is intervention getting more common?

Intervention Over Time

1825 to 1849

1850 to 1874

1875 to 1899

1900 to 1924

1925 to 1949

1950 to 1974

1975 to 1997

Number of Civil Wars 22 28 16 23 21 39 43

InterventionFrequency 36% 25% 31% 35% 24% 49% 51%

5. What about outside intervention?

a. Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes

b. Does intervention prolong wars? Yes

c. Is intervention getting more common? Yes

6. Summary: Findings on Civil War

a. Civil wars are different from interstate wars: they are asymmetric and are rarely resolved by compromise

b. The intervenor’s dilemma: Saving lives vs. Justice

i. Want to end the war quickly? Let the strong crush the weak

ii. Want to find a compromise? Write off another 10,000 people

Are some states worse than others?

A. “Rogue states” – Concept isn’t useful B. “Revisionist states” – Power and regime type,

not status, seem to be key. Beware strong autocracies!

C. “Failed states” – Beware new, poor, states with lootable resources.

D. “Least developed states” – No panaceas: Need a sub-state theory of state performance. Good policies make aid more effective.

E. “Outposts of Tyranny” – Regime change is dangerous, but we should promote democracy when transitions are inevitable