religion and politics the demographic imperative

Religion and Politics

The Demographic Imperative

Source: ‘The Moment of Truth’, Ha’aretz, 8 February 2007

Religious Fertility vs. Religious Decline

"One of the most central injunctions of virtually all traditional religions is to strengthen the family, to encourage people to have children, to encourage women to stay home and raise children, and to forbid abortion, divorce, or anything that interferes with high rates of reproduction. As a result of these two interlocking trends, rich nations are becoming more secular, but the world as a whole is becoming more religious." (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 22-23, emphasis added)

Hypothesis: a combination of higher religious fertility and immigration will lead to a growth in the religious population (defined in terms of belief) that exceeds the net loss of communicants through religious apostasy.

Methods

• Source: EVS / WVS & ESS + ethnic minority surveys

• Cohort Component Projection Parameters: Fertility & Switching (i.e. religious decline or revival) by age and sex, plus current Age/Sex Structure of Religious and Secular 'Populations'

• Mortality Rates assumed as standard

Fig. 5 Projected Religious Population, 6 Early Secularising Societies, 2004-2104

40%

41%

42%

43%

44%

45%

46%

47%

48%

49%

50%

2004 2014 2024 2034 2044 2054 2064 2074 2084 2094 2104

Pro

po

rtio

n R

elig

iou

s

Fig. 7 Age Structure of Major Religious Groups in UK, 2001 Census

34

25

18

3739

22

25

32

41

4 4

19

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Muslim No religion Christian

% in

Ag

e B

an

d

0 - 15

16 - 34

35 - 64

65 and over

What About the Muslim World?• The religious cleavage between Islamists and

Secular Nationalists/Socialists/Liberals is Paramount• Q: Will higher fertility endow Islamists (or even

the wider 'religious' population) with political leverage into the future?

• Berman & Stepanyan (2003) find a significant but modest link between Madrassa attendance and fertility in four countries

• This study uses WVS 1999-2000 dataset on 7-15 countries (depends on question)

• Aim is to determine parameters for population projections

coun

try

relig

tot fertility rate1.4048 7.1

.592294

.98574

Source: 2000 WVS and World Bank.

Religiosity and Fertility in Muslim Countries, 2000

Tanzania

Jordan

Egypt

Algeria

Bosnia

Iran

Azerbaijan

'95-97

Bangladesh

Albania 2000

Turkey

Indonesia

Pakistan

Morocco

Nigeria

Uganda

Albania '95-97

Attitudes to Shari'a and Fertility, Islamic Countries, by Urban and Rural, 2000 WVS (Muslims Only)

1.5

1.7

1.9

2.1

2.3

2.5

2.7

2.9

3.1

3.3

3.5

Str. Agree Agree Neither Disagree Str. Disagree

Ch

ildre

n E

ve

r B

orn

city > 100k

town < 10k

Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 2796 respondents in towns under 10,000 and 1561 respondents in cities over 100,000. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.

Religious or Not, by Age Category, Muslims in Islamic Countries, 2000 WVS

0%10%20%

30%40%50%60%70%

80%90%

100%

15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-98

'A R

elig

iou

s P

erso

n'

Source WVS 1999-2000. N=15197 cases. Question asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Egypt, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Iran, Morocco, Turkey, Uganda and Tanzania.

Attendance at Religious Services, by Religion and Age, 2004 ESS

0%5%

10%15%20%25%

30%35%40%45%50%

18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+

We

ek

ly A

tte

nd

an

ce

RC

Prot

Eastern

Muslims

Source: ESS 2004

Agree with Shari'a Law, by Age, 2000 WVS, Muslims in Islamic Countries

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-98

Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 7436 respondents. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.

Agree with Shari'a Law, by Education, Islamic Countries, WVS 2000, Muslims Only

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%

> Prim

ary

Primar

y

>Sec

onda

ry

Secon

dary

Tec

h.

>Sec

onda

ry (u

nivpr

ep)

Secon

dary

(Univ

prep

)

Some

Univer

sity

Univer

sity

% A

gre

ein

g

Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 7412 respondents. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.

Education: +

Town Size: -

National Pride: -

GDP per Capita: -

Age: indeterminate

Married/Children: weak -

Country Ed.: +Country Fertility: -

Conclusions: Fertility

• In Muslim developing countries, unlike other developing countries, higher national religiosity is associated with lower fertility and National GDP per head has no impact on fertility

• Islamists in Muslim countries are more fertile; some evidence for sharpened fertility effect in more 'modern' contexts, i.e. cities, the educated

• But effect modest: Muslim Religious Fertility Dynamics more like USA and Europe than Israel

• The growth of the religious population through fertility is a long-term process, unlike Israel

Conclusions: Religiosity• Younger, Educated are less religious and/or Islamist,

but effect is complex and there are exceptions (18-24, university students)

• Urbanites more Islamist than rural population• Higher education levels may modestly lower Islamism,

but urbanization may raise it. Generational change will have little effect

• GDP per head unlikely to affect religiosity• Nationalism and Islamism seem compatible• All told, we should expect a distinct Muslim trajectory

of modernization and development rather than secularism

• Future Research: projections of religious and Islamist populations for Muslim world, Europe, North America

• Own project: http://www.sneps.net/RD/religdem.html

• IIASA projections project: http://www.iiasa.ac.at/~terama/Relig.html