raga gopalakrishnan university of colorado at boulder adam wierman (caltech) amy r. ward (usc)...

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Raga GopalakrishnanUniversity of Colorado at Boulder

Adam Wierman (Caltech)Amy R. Ward (USC)

Sherwin Doroudi (CMU)

Routing and Staffing when Servers are Strategic

server

𝝁

𝝁

Routing and Staffing

∈ πšπ«π π¦πšπ±βŸ¨π’„π’π’π’”π’•π’“π’‚π’Šπ’π’•π’” 𝒐𝒏𝝁 βŸ©π‘Όπ’•π’Šπ’π’Šπ’•π’š (𝝁 ;π’‘π’π’π’Šπ’„π’Šπ’†π’” )

strategicserver

is fixed

Routing and Staffing

𝝁strategicserver

β€’ Journal reviewsβ€’ Call centersβ€’ Crowd/Out-sourcingβ€’ Cloud computingβ€’ Enterprise data centersβ€’ …

service systems

systemperformance

strategicserver

systemperformance

Classic Queueing: Assumes fixed (arrival and) service rates, fixed control/policies.

[Hassin & Haviv 2003] [Kalai, Kamien, & Rubinovitch 1992] [Gilbert & Weng 1998][Cachon & Harker 1999] [Chen & Wan 2002] [Cachon & Zhang 2007]

This talk: Impact of strategic servers on optimal system design

Routing and Staffing

CS-Econ Literature: Servers strategically misreport their service rates.[Nisan & Ronen 1999] [Archer & Tardos 2001][Christodoulou & Koutsoupias 2009]

[Halfin & Whitt 1981] [Borst, Mandelbaum, & Reiman 2004][Armony 2005] [Atar 2008] [Armony & Ward 2010] [Armony & Mandelbaum 2011]

Queueing Games: Strategic arrivals and service/pricing amidst competition between different firms.

(within the same firm)

[Zhan & Ward 2014] Compensation and Staffing for Strategic Employees: How to Incentivize a Speed-Quality Trade-off in a Large

Service System. Working Paper.

Outlineβ€’ The M/M/1 queue – a simple example

β€’ Model for a strategic server

β€’ The strategic M/M/N queue

β€’ Classic policies in non-strategic setting

β€’ Impact of strategic serversβ€’ Asymptotically optimal policy

Routing Staffingwhich idle server gets the next job?

how many servers to

hire?

M/M/1/FCFS

mm

𝔼 [𝑾 ]= 𝝀𝝁 (πβˆ’π€ )

𝑰 (𝝁 )𝑰 (𝝁 )βˆ’π’„ (𝝁)𝑼 (𝝁 )=𝑰 (𝝁 )βˆ’π’„ (𝝁)

strategic serveridleness cost

utility function

πβˆ—βˆˆπšπ«π π¦πšπ±π>𝝀

𝑼 (𝝁 )

𝔼 [𝑾 ]= 𝝀

πβˆ— (πβˆ—βˆ’π€)

𝑼 (𝝁 )=πŸβˆ’ π€πβˆ’π’„ (𝝁)

π€πβˆ—πŸ=𝒄′ (πβˆ—)

l0

1 / l

m*

LHS

RHS

𝔼 [𝑾 ]= 𝝀𝝁 (πβˆ’π€ )

l

Outlineβ€’ The M/M/1 queue – a simple example

β€’ Model for a strategic server

β€’ The strategic M/M/N queue

β€’ Classic policies in non-strategic setting

β€’ Impact of strategic serversβ€’ Asymptotically optimal policy

Routing Staffingwhich idle server gets the next job?

how many servers to

hire?

M/M/N/FCFS

strategic servers

routing

𝑼 π’Š (ππ’Š , οΏ½βƒ—οΏ½βˆ’π’Š ;𝚷)=𝑰 π’Š (𝝁 π’Š , οΏ½βƒ—οΏ½βˆ’ π’Š;𝚷 )βˆ’π’„ (ππ’Š)𝑼 π’Š (ππ’Š , οΏ½βƒ—οΏ½βˆ’π’Š )=𝑰 π’Š (𝝁 π’Š , οΏ½βƒ—οΏ½βˆ’ π’Š )βˆ’π’„ (ππ’Š)

𝚷

𝔼 [𝑾 ]=𝓒(𝑡 ,

π€πβˆ— )

π‘΅πβˆ—βˆ’π€

πβˆ—βˆˆπšπ«π π¦πšπ±ππ’Š>

𝝀𝑡

𝑼 π’Š (ππ’Š , οΏ½βƒ—οΏ½βˆ’π’Šβˆ— ;𝚷)ππ’Š

βˆ—βˆˆπšπ«π π¦πšπ±ππ’Š>

𝝀𝑡

𝑼 π’Š (ππ’Š , οΏ½βƒ—οΏ½βˆ’π’Šβˆ— ;𝚷)

symmetricNash equilibriumNash equilibrium

existence?performance?

β€’ Blue for strategic service ratesβ€’ Yellow for control/policy

parameters

ππ’Šβˆ—βˆˆπšπ«π π¦πšπ±

ππ’Š>𝝀𝑡

𝑼 π’Š (ππ’Š ,οΏ½βƒ—οΏ½βˆ’ π’Š ;𝚷 )

m1

m2

mN

l

𝓒 (𝑡 ,𝝆 )=π‘¬π’“π’π’‚π’π’ˆβˆ’π‘ͺπ‘­π’π’“π’Žπ’–π’π’‚

=

𝝆𝑡

𝑡 !𝑡

π‘΅βˆ’ 𝝆

βˆ‘π’‹=𝟎

π‘΅βˆ’πŸ 𝝆 𝒋

𝒋 !+ 𝝆

𝑡

𝑡 !𝑡

𝑡 βˆ’π†

Outlineβ€’ The M/M/1 queue – a simple example

β€’ Model for a strategic server

β€’ The strategic M/M/N queue

β€’ Classic policies in non-strategic setting

β€’ Impact of strategic serversβ€’ Asymptotically optimal policy

Routing Staffingwhich idle server gets the next job?

how many servers to

hire?

l

m1

m2

mN

Classical Results: (nonstrategic setting)

[Lin and Kumar 1984] [de VΓ©ricourt & Zhou 2005] [Armony 2005]

[Atar 2008]

(1) Fastest Server First (FSF) is β€œasymptotically optimal” for minimizing the mean response time

(2) Longest Idle Server First (LISF) is β€œasymptotically fair” in distributing idle time proportionately among the servers

routing

𝚷

M/M/N/FCFS

Rate-basedpolicies

Idle-time-basedpolicies

FSFSSF

LISFSISF

Random

Goal: minimize the mean response time at symmetric Nash equilibrium

l

Our Results:

πβˆ—

πβˆ—

πβˆ—

routing

𝚷

M/M/N/FCFS

Rate-basedpolicies

FSFSSF

Random&

Idle-time-based policies

First order condition:

same uniquesymmetricequilibrium

Goal: minimize the mean response time at symmetric Nash equilibrium

l

Our Results:

πβˆ—

πβˆ—

πβˆ—

routing

𝚷

M/M/N/FCFS

[Haji & Ross 2013]

𝓒 (𝑡 ,𝝆 )=π‘¬π’“π’π’‚π’π’ˆβˆ’π‘ͺπ‘­π’π’“π’Žπ’–π’π’‚

=

𝝆𝑡

𝑡 !𝑡

π‘΅βˆ’ 𝝆

βˆ‘π’‹=𝟎

π‘΅βˆ’πŸ 𝝆 𝒋

𝒋 !+ 𝝆

𝑡

𝑡 !𝑡

𝑡 βˆ’π†

same uniquesymmetricequilibrium

Rate-basedpolicies

FSFSSF

Random&

Idle-time-based policies

Can we do better than Random?

Yes, but…

Goal: minimize the mean response time at symmetric Nash equilibrium

l

Our Results:

πβˆ—

πβˆ—

πβˆ—

routing

𝚷

M/M/N/FCFS

Outlineβ€’ The M/M/1 queue – a simple example

β€’ Model for a strategic server

β€’ The strategic M/M/N queue

β€’ Classic policies in non-strategic setting

β€’ Impact of strategic serversβ€’ Asymptotically optimal policy

Routing Staffingwhich idle server gets the next job?

how many servers to

hire?

Goal: minimize the total system cost

m

m

m

Random

per-unit staffing

cost

per-unit waiting

cost

mean waiting

time

Square-root staffing:

β€œasymptotically optimal”

[Borst, Mandelbaum, & Reiman 2004]

l

𝑡 𝝀

Classical Result: (nonstrategic setting)

M/M/N/FCFS

Randoml

πβˆ—

πβˆ—

πβˆ—

𝑡 𝝀

Goal: minimize the total system cost at Nash equilibrium

Our Result:

Let . Then, the policy with and

is asymptotically optimal in the sense that:

as has 1 solution

M/M/N/FCFS

Suppose for some function .Then, feasibility is satisfied only if .

STEP 1: Discard infeasible policies

Randoml

πβˆ—

πβˆ—

πβˆ—

𝑡 𝝀

Proof Outline:

Feasibility: We are interested in policies for which:

β€’ overstaffing: servers get too lazyβ€’ understaffing: servers β€œwork to death”

Recall the FOC:

M/M/N/FCFS

STEP 2: Analyze the limiting cost and the limiting FOC

Randoml

πβˆ—

πβˆ—

πβˆ—

𝑡 𝝀

Proof Outline:

Let . Then, as ,

Limiting FOC:πŸπ’‚βˆ’πŸπβˆ—=

πβˆ—πŸ

π’‚πŸ 𝒄′ (πβˆ— )

𝟏/𝒂

𝟎

Limiting Cost:πŸπ’‚π’„π‘Ί

Pick to optimize limiting costsubject to the limiting FOC

having at least one solution.

Observation:

π’‚βˆ—<πβˆ—

βŸΉπ‘΅βˆ— ,𝝀>𝑡𝑩𝑴𝑹 ,𝝀=π€πβˆ—+𝒐(𝝀)

π‘΅βˆ— ,𝝀

M/M/N/FCFS

Concluding remarks

β€’ We need to rethink optimal system design when servers are strategic!

β€’ Joint routing-staffing optimization?β€’ Empirical studies / Experimental evaluation?β€’ Asymmetric models / equilibria?β€’ Interaction between strategic arrivals and

strategic servers?

lπβˆ—

Randomπβˆ—

πβˆ—

π‘΅βˆ— ,𝝀𝑡𝑩𝑴𝑹 ,𝝀

loss of efficiency

?

$$$$$

$$

? ?

M/M/N/FCFS

Ragavendran GopalakrishnanUniversity of Colorado at Boulder

Adam Wierman (Caltech)Amy R. Ward (USC)

Sherwin Doroudi (CMU)

Routing and Staffing when Servers are Strategic

[Zhan & Ward 2014] Compensation and Staffing for Strategic Employees: How to Incentivize a Speed-Quality Trade-off in a Large

Service System. Working Paper.

Companion Talk

MSOM: Saturday@11:15am

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