on the evolutionary origins of religious belief · the ubiquity of religious belief and experience...

University of Arkansas, FayettevilleScholarWorks@UARK

Theses and Dissertations

12-2015

On the Evolutionary Origins of Religious BeliefRobert Duane HowardUniversity of Arkansas, Fayetteville

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OntheEvolutionaryOriginsofReligiousBelief

Athesissubmittedinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeof

MasterofArtsinPhilosophyby

RobertHowardUniversityofArkansas

BachelorofArtsinPoliticalScience,2013

December2015UniversityofArkansas

ThisthesisisapprovedforrecommendationtotheGraduateCouncil._____________________________________________ProfessorEricFunkhouserThesisDirector_____________________________________________ _______________________________________________ProfessorEdMinar ProfessorThomasSenorCommitteeMember CommitteeMember

Abstract Religiousbeliefisabyproductofevolutionarilydesignedcognitivemechanisms.

Theubiquityofreligiousbeliefandexperienceacrosshumanculturesisexplainedbyour

commonhumanpsychology;ourdomain-specificcognitivemechanismsgiverise,

collectively,tothephenomenonofbyproductreligiousbelief/experience.Inthisthesis,I

willexaminewhatIcallreligion-generatingcognitivemechanisms,andIwillarguethat

byproductrawgod-beliefsaredevelopedbyculturesintorefinedgod-beliefs.Theserefined

god-beliefsareco-optedbyevolutionaryprocessesandareculturaladaptations.My

conceptionof“religiousbelief”intermsofrawandrefinedgod-beliefsallowsa

disambiguationoftheterm“religion,”anditcontributestotheongoingdebatebetween

byproducttheoristsandadaptationistsbyclarifyingthatrawgod-beliefsarebiological

byproductswhilerefinedgod-beliefsareculturaladaptations.

Acknowledgments

IextendmythankstotheUniversityofArkansasPhilosophyDepartment,without

whichmyMaster’sdegreeandthesiswouldhavebeenimpossible.Thisdepartmenthas

mademygraduateexperiencewonderful.

Further,I’dliketoextendspecialthankstoDr.EricFunkhouser,whoseexpertise

andexcellenceinadvisinghelpedthisthesistobecomethebestversionofitself.I’dliketo

thankDr.EdMinarandDr.TomSenorfortheirserviceonmythesiscommittee.

Dedication

OntheEvolutionaryOriginsofReligiousBeliefisdedicatedtomymomanddad,John

andBeckyHoward.

TableofContents1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………..1

2. TheMechanisms…………………………………………………………………………………….6

A. FolkPsychology&TheoryofMind…………………………………………………………..12

B. PromiscuousTeleology…………………………………………………………………...……..17

C. Anthropomorphism………………………………………………………………………………..19

D. AgencyDetection……………………………………………………………………………………23

E. Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………………………29

3. CulturalEvolutionandGod-Beliefs…………………………………………………………30

A. VirusesoftheMind&MemeTheory………………………………………………………35

B. Group-LevelSelection……………………………………………………………………………41

C. AdaptiveCost/BenefitAnalysis………………………………………………………………48

C-1. CostorInvestment?................................................................................................................49

C-2. Health&WellBeing………………………………………………………………………………..53

C-3. GroupCohesion&Pro-SocialBehavior…………………………………………………….58

C-4. ReligionasCostly……………………………………………………………………………………62

4. Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………………………….66

Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………………...75

1.Introduction

Religiousbeliefhasbeenasubiquitousaphenomenonasanyotherinhuman

history.Nearlyeveryhumanculturehashadatitscoreasetofbeliefsandassumptions

thatcouldbedeemedreligious.Humansocietiesbuildworldviewsandinterpretive

frameworks,andthroughouthistorywehaveappealednearlyuniversallyinour

storytellingtostuffthatisnotnatural.By“stuffthatisnotnatural,”Imeananythingthat

doesnotfitintoaphilosophicallynaturalisticphysicormetaphysic.Forinstance,trees

havespirits,thecosmoshasacreator,myancestorsaretryingtocommunicatewithme,

inanimatestuffisanthropomorphized,theEarthisrestingonagiant,deifiedturtle,andso

on.Nearlyeveryexpressionofhumanityhasfeaturedasapartofitsworldviewsomenon-

naturalisticreligiousstorythatdoessignificantexplanatorywork(Boyer,2001).

Wehaveknownofthepervasivenessofreligiousbeliefandpracticeinhuman

cultureforalongtime,andforalongtimereligiousbeliefwasimmuneto“explainingaway”

andacademicinquiry(Bloom,2007).However,relativelyrecentadvancesinthefieldsof

empiricalpsychology,cognitivescience,andevolutionarypsychologyhavegivenriseto

excitingresearchprogramswhosegoalitistoexplainwhyreligiousbeliefissouniversal.

Itisimportanttoclarify:whenIsay“religiousbelief,”IdonotreferexclusivelytoWestern

conceptionsofthedivineortotheexpansivesystematictheologiesofthevarious

establishedandorganizedreligions.Thosethingsarecertainlyincludedunderthe

umbrellaofthisinquiry,butIalsoincludebeliefsaboutancestralspirits,the

anthropomorphizingoftheelementsintheenvironmentaroundus,afterlifebeliefs,beliefs

associatedwithreligiousrituals,conceptslikeKarma,etc.Forourpurposes,let’scallany

suchreligiousbeliefagod-belief.Itistheoriginsofsuchgod-beliefs,ingeneral,thatIwill

investigateinthisinquiry.

Theseresearchprogramstaketwomainapproachesintheirendeavorstoexplain

theoriginsofsuchgod-beliefs.Thefirstapproachtoexplainingthenaturaloriginsofthese

beliefsisthe“Adaptationist”approach,whichpostulatesthatgod-beliefsareadvantageous

biological(orcultural)adaptationsthatconfersomedegreeofreproductivefitnessto

believingindividuals(orsocieties).Underthisview,theubiquityofgod-beliefsisexplained

bythesurvivalbenefitthesebeliefsconfertotheirrespectivesubjects.Thatis,the

evolutionary“winners”ofhistorywereofthereligioussort.Thesecondapproachto

explainingthenaturaloriginsofgod-beliefsisthe“Byproduct”approach,whichdraws

heavilyfromcognitivescienceandfromthecognitivescienceofreligion(CSR).The

Byproductviewisaptlytermeda“byproduct”viewofreligiousbelief,becauseitpositsthat

god-beliefsarethenatural,structuralbyproductsofbrainsliketheoneswehappentohave.

Underthisview,theubiquityofgod-beliefsisexplainedbythefunctioningofourcognitive

structuresindomainsforwhichtheywerenotevolutionarilyselected;structural

byproductsareselected,butnotselectedfor.Literally,byproductgod-beliefsarebyproduct

beliefs,ratherthanbyproductbiologicalstructures.Wewillexplorethedetailsofthese

accountslateron.

Mostcontemporaryresearchpitstheseapproachesagainstoneanotheras

alternativehypotheses,butIthinkthereisroomforeachcamptocomplementtheother.

Indeed,Iwillarguethatthetruthoftheevolutionaryoriginsofourgod-beliefsliesina

fusionoftheByproductandAdaptationistapproaches.Thedebatebetweenbyproduct

theoristsandadaptationistsconcerningtheoriginsofreligiousbeliefcanberesolvedbya

disambiguationoftheterm“religion.”“Religion”isacomplicatedamalgamofrawgod-

beliefsandrefinedgod-beliefs(muchmoreonthislater).ItisclearthatbothByproduct

theoristsandAdaptationistsmakecrucialcontributionsinunderstandingtheevolutionary

originsofgod-beliefs,morebroadlyconstrued,somyaccounttakesa“both-and”approach.

Iwillfavortheworkofcognitivescientistsofreligion,whichaccountsforboththe

genesisofthesegod-beliefsandsomeoftheircontentinawaythattheAdaptationist

accountscannot(ordonot,presently).Iwilladvocatefora“byproduct”orbiological

spandrel1viewoftheoriginsofsuchbeliefs,butIwillalsocontendthatthesebeliefs,at

somepointinevolutionaryhistory,cametolendsurvivalfitnesstotheirbelievers.So,the

workbeingdonebyevolutionarypsychologistsinthisarea,farfrombeingwrongor

misguided,isextremelyvaluable;ithelpsustoexplainthingsliketheevolutionand

transmissionofgod-beliefsacrossculturesandacrosstime,theadaptivevalueofsuch

beliefs,andhowcertainspandrelorbyproductbeliefsmighthavebeenco-optedbynatural

selectionandmadesalientfactorsinculturalandbiologicalevolution.Withaviewlike

mine,god-beliefsarethebyproductsofourcognitivemachinery,buttheyaredynamicand

adaptivelyusefulbyproducts.

Myprimarycontentionisthefollowing:thecognitivestructuresstudiedinthefield

ofCSRprovideuswithbyproductrawgod-beliefs,anditisbythehoningforcesofcultural

evolution,culturallearningandtransmission,andhumanexperience(and,perhaps,

1Theterm“spandrel”isanarchitecturaltermco-optedbyGouldandLewontin(1979)intheirlikeningofcertainbiologicaltraitstostructuralbyproducts.Aspandrelisastructuralbyproductofanarchitecturalarch—thespandrelofanarchservesnorealarchitecturalpurpose.Wecanconceiveofbiological“spandrels,”then,asbeingtheselected(butnotselected-for)byproductsofselected-forbiologicalstructures.Strictlyspeaking,god-beliefsarenotbyproductbiologicalstructures.Theyarebyproductbeliefs.Shortly,wewillspecifytheconditionsforabelief’sbeingabyproduct.

revelation)thatourevolutionarilyancientrawgod-beliefsweredevelopedintoourmore

evolutionarilyrecent(and“cultural”)refinedgod-beliefs.2Theserawgod-beliefsaremost

properlyunderstoodasthecognitivefoundationsofthevariousrefinedgod-beliefs;raw

god-beliefsarethebyproductsofourcognitivemechanisms,whilerefinedgod-beliefsare

theresultofculturalevolutionaryprocesses(atboththeorganismic-groupandcultural

levels).Mybyproductclaimisstrong:ourcognitiveprocessesprovideuswith“religious”

notionsoftheworld,asabyproductofthenaturalfunctioningofourbrains.Byvirtueof

thesortsofcognitivemechanismswepossess,wenaturallyconceiveoftheworld

“religiously,”anditactuallytakesintellectualwork,socialization,oreducationtoconceive

oftheworldcontrarytothesebyproductreligiousbiasesandtendencies.Itisourcommon

humanpsychologythatexplainstheubiquityofreligiousbeliefsacrossthehuman

experience.Theobserveddifferencesinrefinedreligiousbeliefsacrosscultures,then,

ultimatelyamounttoaccidentsofenvironment,culturalhistory,religiousstorytelling,and

evolutionaryhistory.

Ausefulwayofunderstandingtheraw/refinedgod-beliefdistinctionisintermsof

DanielKahneman’s(2011)System1/System2conceptualizationofhumanpsychology.In

fact,thedistinctionImakebetweenthetwotypesofgod-beliefsisverymuchinthespiritof

Kahneman’swork.AccordingtoKahneman,thehumanmindoperatesontwodifferent

levels.System1isthoughttobecomposedofthosecognitiveprocessesandmental

activitiesthatareunconscious,automatic,fast,serial,efficient,associationist,

evolutionarilyancient,etc.System2,however,isthoughttobecomposedofthose2Therewillbemuchmoreonthislater,butrawgod-beliefsincludethingslikethefolkpsychologicalbeliefsandintuitiveteleologicalnotionsdeliveredtousbyourcognitivemechanisms,whilerefinedgod-beliefsincludemoredeveloped,theologicallyinvolvedbeliefsystems(liketheism,orBuddhism).

cognitiveprocessesandmentalactivitiesthatareconscious,deliberate,slow,rule-

following,resource-demanding,rational,relativelyevolutionarilynew,etc.Eachofthese

systemsdescribesaverydifferentkindofmind,andtheactivitiesofthetwotypesof

processesworkingintandemareconstitutiveoftherangeofourhumanpsychology.To

whateverextentarawgod-beliefisformedbyunconsciousSystem1processes,weshould

callit“automatic”or“unconsciouslydelivered.”Towhateverextentarefinedgod-beliefis

formedbyconsciousSystem2processes,weshouldcallit“deliberate.”Itismyhopethat

thisinvocationoftheSystem1/System2conceptualizationofthemindwillproveusefulas

weproceed.Indeed,conceivingofrawgod-beliefsasthenaturalbyproductsofSystem1

processes(i.e.,rawgod-beliefsas“automatic”)goesalongwaytowardexplainingthe

pervasivenessofgod-beliefsacrosshumanexperience.

Twofurtherpointsshouldbequicklymadebeforewecontinuethispaper.First,the

theorizinginthefieldsofCSRandevolutionarypsychologyhastendedtooutpacethe

experimentalcapabilitiesofbothempiricalpsychologistsandcognitivescientists.Iwilltry

toavoidconjectureandtosticktoinformationonwhichthefieldhasreachedsomethingof

aconsensus.AsImentionedearlier,CSRisanemergingfield,andmanyofitsideassimply

cannotbetestedyet.Moreover,itisdifficulttoknowwhichofthetheoriesinCSRandin

evolutionarypsychologyareeveninprincipletestable,andwhichoneswillonlyeverbe

conjecturalexplanatorystories.Inconsideringevolutionaryaccounts,Ioftenfindmyself

musing,“Ithinkthisparticularadaptationiststoryisneat,buttowhatextentisitentirely

madeup?”Iwillbracketthe“just-sostory”objectionssothattheconversationcantake

place,butadaptationiststoriesshouldbereceivedwithagrainofsalt.

Thesecondpointthatneedstobemadeisthatindiscussingthesedomain-specific

RGCMs,themechanismsareoftenreferredtoaspromiscuousorasmalfunctioning.Itis

importanttonotethatthereisaheavycommitmentinthefieldsofevolutionary

psychologyandCSRtothefalsityofgod-beliefs,tothenotionthatsuchbeliefsaremistaken

fictions.However,asshouldbeclear,howgod-beliefsareformeddoesnotnecessarily

speaktothetruthorfalsityofsuchbeliefs.Theprocessbywhichreligiousbeliefsare

formed,however,doesspeaktotheirjustification.Thislineofresearchraiseschallenging

andinterestingproblemsfortheism,problemsthatthetheistneedstoaddress.3Forthe

reader’ssake,Iwantedtospotlightthebiasesatworkinthesefieldsandtheimplicationsof

thelanguagethatisfrequentlyused.

2.TheMechanisms

Thecognitivescienceofreligionappealstoanarrayofcognitivefacultiesthat,asa

whole,isresponsibleforourexperienceoftheworldaroundus.Thesecognitivefaculties

arehighlyspecializedsystemsthatperformdomain-specifictasks.Ifthebrainwerean

automanufacturingplant,thenourcognitivemechanismswouldbetheparticularsteps

alongthewaytobuildingacar.Somedobodywork,someworkinelectrical,somerunthe

transmission,etc.Themechanismsareexpertsatwhattheydo,andthepresenceofeach

oneisbestexplainedbytheadaptiveadvantagethatitsproperfunctioningconferredto3Thetheistmightbeginbyaskingsuchquestionsas:IsitpossiblethatsomeoftheRGCMs,intheirgenerationofgod-beliefs,arenotoperatingoutsideofthedomainforwhichtheywereoriginallydesigned?IsitpossiblethattheseRGCMsweredesignedbyGod,orthattheevolutionaryprocessesresponsiblefortheseRGCMsaredirectedbyGod?MightGodhavebeeninvolveddirectlyintheformationofourcognitivestructuresthroughoutourevolutionaryhistory(oratcertaincrucialmomentsinourevolutionaryhistory)?DoesanevolutionarystoryliketheoneIwillproceedtotellinthisthesisactuallyunderminethejustificationofthetheist’sbeliefs?

ourancestors.So,theevolutionarypsychologist’sviewofthebrainisthatitisamassof

highlyspecializedtask-performersthatwasbuiltbytheselectivepressuresofevolutionary

history(Pinker,1997;Lyons,2001).

Assuch,CSRseekstoexplainthephenomenonofgod-beliefsinthehuman

experiencebyappealingtothesecognitivemechanisms.I,alongwithotherbyproduct

theoristslikePascalBoyer(2001)andScottAtran(2002),rejectanystoryaboutthe

originsofgod-beliefsthatappealstoasinglecognitivemechanism,religionmodule,or

religiongeneinordertoexplainthegenesisandpervasivenessofgod-beliefs;suchastory

wouldbefartoosimple,anditwouldbeinadequatetothetaskofexplainingthevastrange

ofvaryinggod-beliefsinthehumanexperience.4Mytheoryisthatthereisasuiteof

cognitivemechanismsthatisresponsibleforthegenerationofourbyproductrawgod-

beliefs.Anystorythatseekstoexplaintheoriginsofreligiousbeliefbyappealingtoasingle,

unifiedcognitivesystemisprobablydescribing,withverybroadbrushstrokes,thesuiteof

mechanismsIwillexamineinthefirstpartofthispaper.Let’scallthissuiteofmechanisms

ourReligion-GeneratingCognitiveMechanisms(RGCMs).

AccordingtotheByproductview,theseRGCMsperformdomain-specific,

evolutionarilyselected-forcognitivefunctions(Cosmides&Tooby,2001),andthe

4ThestatusofsomethinglikeAlvinPlantinga’s(2000)“divinesense”isworthconsidering,here.Thetheistmightjustcallmyreligion-generatingcognitivesuitea“divinesense”—however,thissuiteofcognitivemechanismsisresponsibleformorereligiousbeliefsthanjustWesterntheism.ItisproblematicforPlantingathatthe“divinesense,”ifitreallyisjustthereligion-generatingcognitivesuite,leadssometoformreligiousbeliefsthatarecontrarytotraditionaltheisticbeliefsaboutGod.Ofcourse,thetheistmightjustsaythatthe“divinesense”issomethingdifferentthanthesetofcognitivemechanismsIwillexamine.ButevenifPlantinga’s“divinesense”istakenbythetheisttobeasufficientexplanationforWesterntheologicalbeliefs,thereremainsawholehostofothernon-Western,non-theologicalgod-beliefsthatstandinneedofexplanation.And,presumably,thatiswhereaccountslikeminewouldcomein.

byproductsoftheproperfunctioningoftheseRGCMsarerawgod-beliefs;again,such

byproductbeliefsareselected,butnotselectedfor.Wewilloperatewithaveryspecific

definitionoftheterm“byproduct”;forourpurposes,abyproductbeliefisanybeliefthat

emergesasabyproduct(orspandrel)ofproperlyfunctioningcognitivemechanisms

performingtheirfunctioninanimproperdomain5.Wewillsaythatacognitivemechanism

isproperlyfunctioningwhen,andonlywhen,themechanismisappliedinthedomain(s)

forwhichitwasdesignedbyevolutionaryprocesses(i.e.,isfunctioningintheparticular

waythat,inourevolutionarypast,yieldedsurvivalbenefittoourancestors).Again,a

byproductbeliefisjustabeliefthatariseswhenacognitivemechanismisappliedinan

unintendeddomain.Wewillconsiderparadigmexamplesofbyproductbeliefslater

(“intuitivetheism,”“hypersensitiveagency-detection,”etc.).AnRGCMisresponsiblefor

producingbyproductbeliefstowhateverextentitoperatesoutsideofthedomainforwhich

theRGCMwasoriginallydesignedbyevolutionarypressures.

If,however,theoriginofagivengod-beliefcanbeexplainedexclusivelybyreference

toevolutionarypressuresoccurringatthebiologicallevel,theproblemsfacedinour

evolutionarypast,andtheadaptiveadvantagesthebeliefconferstoitsbeliever,thenthe

god-beliefoughtnottobeconsideredabyproduct,butratheranadaptation.Rawgod-

beliefsarethebyproductbeliefsofcognitivemechanisms,anditisonlyafterthese

byproductbeliefsundergosignificantdevelopmentintorefinedgod-beliefsthattheycome

tolendadaptiveadvantagetotheirrespectivebelievers(seeSection3).Typically,

byproductsarenotthoughtofintermsofadaptivevalue—thatis,theyareregardedas

purelystructuralbyproducts,orastheadaptivelyneutralconsequencesofselected-for5By“improperdomain,”Imeanthosedomainsforwhichthecognitivemechanismswerenotselectedbyevolutionarypressures.

biologicalstructures.Myaccountoftheoriginsofgod-beliefsdivergesfromstandard

Byproductaccountsofreligiousbeliefinmyclaimthatgod-beliefs,whileinitially

byproducts,aredevelopedbyevolutionaryprocesses(attheculturalandgrouplevels)into

systematicworldviews;itisafterthisdevelopmentthatgod-beliefsconfersignificant

adaptiveadvantagetotheirbelievers.Imaintainthatmyaccountisabyproductaccountof

theoriginsofreligiousbeliefs,becausegod-beliefsattheirbiologicaloriginsarebyproducts,

becausebyproductrawgod-beliefspersistintothepresent,andbecausewecandistinguish

byproductrawgod-beliefsfromtheirgroupadaptationcounterparts,refinedgod-beliefs.

Myviewiscontrarytotheviewsofhard-lineevolutionarypsychologistsand

biologists,whoseektoexplainthephenomenonofreligiousbeliefstrictlybyappealto

evolutionarypressuresatthebiologicallevel.Theirpuritanicaladaptationistapproach

wandersintomurkywaters.Itisunclearwhattheirclaim—thatreligiousbeliefsare

selectedfor—entails,asitisunclearhowabeliefcouldbeselectedforatabiologicallevel.

Thequestionmustbeasked:inevolutionbynaturalselection,what,exactly,arethebasic

unitsofselection?Genesthataffectthesurvivabilityandtheabilityofanorganismto

reproducearethefodderofevolutionaryprocesses.Genesareselected,whichmeansthat

neuralprocesses,psychologicalstructures,andperhapsevenbelief-formingtendencies

maybeselectedfor;however,theclaimthatthereligiousbeliefsthemselvesareselectedfor

(i.e.,religiousbeliefsasbiologicaladaptations)isdubious.Itseemstheonlywaytoget

suchaclaimoffofthegroundwouldbetopositthatthecontentsofourreligiousbeliefs

themselves(aswellasotherofourbeliefs)arepackagedneatlyintoourgenesor

psychology.Butweshouldstayawayfromsuchfull-boreinnatenessclaims.

Anotherdifficultyfacedbyadaptationistsinexplainingtheoriginsofreligiousbelief

isthesheercomplexityofreligioussystems.Religiousbeliefandreligioussystemsarethe

confluenceofmultipleelements(supernaturalagentbeliefs,music,ritualpractice,

formalism,emotionallychargedsymbolsandexperiences,morality,societalstructureand

organization,etc.),andeachoftheseelementshasitsownuniqueevolutionaryhistory

independentofthephenomenonofhumanreligion,morebroadlyconstrued(Sosis,2009).

Inlightofthevastlydifferentevolutionaryoriginsofitsconstituentparts,“religion”does

notseemtobethesortofthingthatcouldbeselectedfor,astheadaptationistcontendsitis.

Certainly,atsomepointinhistorythesedifferentelementsofreligionbegantogiveriseto

religiousbeliefsandsystems,butthisfactultimatelylendsitselftothebyproduct

perspectiveforwhichIargue.If“religion”justisalloftheseotherselected-forfaculties

operatingintandeminsomeevolutionarilyunintendedreligiousdomain,thenweshould

saythatreligiousbeliefisabyproduct.

Duetothesedifficultiesthatfacetheadaptationistapproach,Iproposemy

byproductstorytoaccountfortheoriginsofgod-beliefs—theyarethenaturaloutputsof

thefunctioningofourcognitivemechanismsinevolutionarilyunintendeddomains.These

variouscognitivemechanismsarethemselvestheproductsofevolutionbynatural

selection—theywereselectedforbyvirtueofthefactthattheirfunctioningintheproper

domainconferredgreatadaptiveadvantagetoourancestors.(Successfulfolkpsychology

andtheoryofmind,agencyattribution,teleologicalnotions,etc.,areclearlytoourbenefit,

andcanbeeasilyconceivedofasadaptations.Moreonthisshortly.)Ourrawgod-beliefs

arethenaturalbyproductsofthesecognitivesystems.InSectionThreeofthispaper,I

discussingreaterdetailhowmybyproductaccountdivergesfrommoretraditional

byproductstories6—religionasweknowittodaycanhardlybeconsideredtobethemere

byproductofourcognitivemechanisms.

Iconcedetotheadaptationistssomeofthegroundtheyoriginallyclaimed:itis

clearthatreligiousbelief(initsrefinedforms)confersadaptiveadvantagetothe

individualsandsocietiesthatadheretosaidreligiousbelief.Butbecausenotalladaptively

advantageoustraitsarenecessarilyadaptations(Sosis,2009),thefactalonethatrefined

god-beliefsconferadaptiveadvantagetoindividualsandsocietiesisinsufficienttowarrant

theirclassificationasadaptations.Atsomepointinourevolutionaryhistory,our

byproductgod-beliefsweredevelopedintoreligiousstoriesandexplanations,andthese

culturalideas/beliefsbecameunitsofselection(attheculturalandgrouplevels)byvirtue

oftheirinfluenceonthewaywe(asindividualsandsocieties)liveourlives.Throughthe

processesofmulti-levelselection,religiousbeliefbecameawinningevolutionarystrategy

andselectablegrouptrait.Iappealtothemechanicsofmemetransmission,multilevel

selectiontheory,andculturalevolutiontoexplainthetransitionfromrawgod-beliefsto

refinedgod-beliefs.Myaccountoftheoriginsofgod-belief,then,isafusionofthe

AdaptationistandByproductapproaches.

6Byproducttheorists(Gould&Lewontin,1979)typicallyholdthatbyproductsaretheinevitablestructuralbyproductsofothertraits,andthattheytendtobeadaptivelyneutral.Iagreethatbyproductgod-beliefsaretheinevitablybyproductsofourcognitivemechanisms,butIaddtotheirstorythatourbyproductgod-beliefsare,atsomepoint,developedintorefinedgod-beliefs.Further,byproductsaretypicallyviewedasstaticstructuralinevitabilities,butIconceiveofrawgod-beliefsasbeingdynamicbyproductsthatareaccessibletotherestofourpsychology(becausetheyarebeliefs).Inthisway,byproductbeliefsaffect—andareaffectedby—ourdeliberatebelief-formationprocessesandtheoutputsoftheseprocesses.Unlikethespandrelsofevolutionarybiology,byproductgod-beliefsarenot“structures.”Thespandrelsofevolutionarypsychologyareprocessesandbeliefs.

IndividualRGCMsonlytellapartofthestory.TheentiresuiteofRGCMsprovidesus

withacumulativefoundationfortheformationofgod-beliefs.Itisthesuiteofthese

mechanismsworkingintandemwithourbelief-formationprocessesthatexplainsour

consciousassenttogod-beliefs.So,IwillnotconsiderindividualRGCMsandtheir

respectivecognitivebiasesinisolation;rather,Iwillapproachtheissuewithanenlarged

scopethatconsidersthebroadercognitivesuitetobetheoriginforagivengod-belief.Now,

letusmoveontotheRGCMsthemselves,innoparticularorderofimportance.Notethat

therewillbesignificantconceptualoverlapbetweenthesedifferentmechanisms.Bythat,I

meanthatitisdifficulttotellwhereonemechanism’sdomainstartsandtheotherstops,as

thesemechanisms’purviewsaresoconceptuallyrelated.

A.FolkPsychology&TheoryofMind

ThefirstRGCMwewillexamineisthecognitivesystemresponsibleforwhatsome

havetermedourintuitive“folkpsychology.”Thissystem’soutputsrendertousour

“theoryofmind”—ourbeliefsabouttheminds,beliefs,intentions,andgoalsofthebeings

aroundus.Both(1)theevolutionarilyintendeddomainofourintuitivefolkpsychology

and(2)thismechanism’spurportedtendencytoformfolkpsychologicalbeliefsregarding

thingsoutsideofitsintendeddomainarerelevanttoourunderstandingtherelationship

betweenthisRGCMandtheoriginofcertaingod-beliefs.

Ofcourse,a“theoryofmind”issupposedtoformbeliefsregardingactualminds.

However,ourfolkpsychologicalsystemsseemtooftenjumptheboundariesofthedomain

forwhichtheywereselected(people,animals,beingsinthenaturalworld,etc.)andapply

ourtheoryofmindtothingsnotinthatdomain(thingsthatdonotactuallypossessminds,

beingsthatdonotactuallyexist,mereconcepts,etc.).Folkpsychologicalmechanismsare

responsibleforbyproductrawgod-beliefswhentheoryofmindisappliedtothingsthatare

notintheintendeddomainoffolkpsychology;forinstance,wesometimesattribute

personalitiestothingsliketrees,stars,mountains,andsoon.Ourfolkpsychological

mechanismwasselected-forbynaturalprocessesbecauseofthesurvivalbenefitsit

conferredtoourancestorsbyitsproperfunctioning;itisapparentthatitistoorganisms’

adaptiveadvantagetobeabletotrackthementalstatesandintentionsofthebeings

inhabitingtheworldaroundthem.

Theclaimthatsuchgod-beliefs(beliefsaboutthementalstatesoftrees,stars,non-

existentbeings,andsoon)arebyproductsofourfolkpsychologicalmechanismsdepends

ontheassumptionthatourfolkpsychologicalmechanismsdonotconferadaptive

advantagetobelieversintheattributionofmentalstatestothingsweconsidertobenon-

membersofthemechanism’sintendeddomain.Ifthefolkpsychologicalmechanismsdo

(anddid,inourevolutionarypast)conferadaptiveadvantagetothebelieverintheir

attributionofmentalstatestothingsofthatsort,thengod-beliefsoughtnottobe

consideredbyproducts.Theclaimthattheautomaticattributionofmentalstatesto

inanimatethingsintheworldaroundusmightbeadaptivelyadvantageousissuspect.On

theotherhand,itisclearhowtheabilityto“mindread”thebeingsaround(beingsthat

actuallyhavebeliefs,goals,andintentions)wouldbetoourevolutionaryadvantage.

Theoryofmindisalsoactiveinourexplanationsoftheeventsweexperienceinthe

worldaroundus,anditplaysacentralroleintheinterpretationandpredictionofthe

behaviorofotherminds.PsychologistJesseBering(2006)saysthefollowingaboutour

folkpsychologicalsystemsandtheirroleinexplainingeventsandpredictingbehaviors:

Consider,forinstance,thatonedayallhumanbeingsbecamehard-coresolipsists…Imagine,say,thateveryonewasstruckdownwithautismorotherwiselostthecapacitytothinkaboutotherminds,whatwouldhappenthen?I’dventurethatchurchattendancewouldreachanall-timelownextSunday.HerethenisonekeyingredientforbeliefinGodorspirits:aninnatedispositiontoseeothersnotjustasambulantobjectsorbrain-deadsacksofmeat,butasthinking,feelingbeingsthat,justlikeoneself,arecausalagentswhodothingsintentionally…Inthecaseofpeopleordeities,weappealtoothermindstoexplainandpredictbehaviors,tounderstandwhyothersdowhattheydo.7

Beringpositstheoryofmindasakeyingredientforformingbeliefsaboutgodsorspirits

(god-beliefs),andhetiesitdirectlytotheformationoforganizedreligion.Itshouldnotbe

surprisingthataninabilitytoreasonaboutotherminds,ingeneral,wouldleadtoan

inabilitytoreasonaboutnon-naturalminds.Theclaimisthatweusethesamefolk

psychologicalmechanismsinreasoningaboutthemindsofGodandnon-physicalbeings,in

general,aswedoinourreasoningaboutthemindsofphysicalandnaturalpersons.In

reasoningaboutnon-actual,non-physicalminds,ourintuitivefolkpsychologieshave

activated—asabyproductofproperlyfunctioningtheoryofmind—thesetofinferences

andexpectationstypicallyreservedforactual,physicalmindsandhaveappliedthissetof

inferencesandexpectationstonon-actual,non-physicalminds.Theguardrailsofthe

intendeddomainhavebeenjumped.

Justasourintuitivefolkpsychologyhelpsustoexplaintheeventsthatweassociate

withactualbeingsbyappealingtotheirgoals,intentions,desires,etc.,amalfunctioningfolk

psychologymayhelpustoexplaineventsintheworldbyappealingtothegoals,intentions,

desires,etc.,ofeither(1)somethingthatdoesnotactuallyexistor(2)somethingthatdoes

exist,butthatisonlyimproperlythoughttopossessthegoals,beliefs,anddesires

associatedwithmindedness.Ultimately,suchamisapplicationofamechanism’sproper7Bering,2006,pg.147.

functiontosomeimproperdomaincouldhelpexplainthepervasivenessofgod-beliefs

pertainingtothegoals,intentions,anddesiresofthegods,spirits,God,ourancestors,etc.,

thatarecommonlybelievedin.Inthisway,folkpsychologicalsystemsactasanRGCM.

Bering(2006)citeshis“PrincessAlice”experiments,inwhichhetestedforthepoint

inhumandevelopmentatwhichachildcouldrecognizeintentioninexternaleventsaswell

asagency,ratherthanmerelyagency.ThesePrincessAliceexperimentsaresupposedto

showtheabilityinchildrentoruninferencesfromthepresenceofanunseenprincessand

theoccurrenceofotherwiseunexplainedeventstotheconclusionthattheseunexplained

eventsareperformedforareasonbytheunseenprincess.8Thechildrenaretoldthatthe

princessiscommunicatingwiththem,butitisnotuntilacertaincapacityisdeveloped—

second-orderreasoning(“EventXmeansPrincessAlicewantsmetodoYforsomereason

Z”)—thatthechildrencaninterprettheunexplainedeventsintermsofthespecificgoals

andintentionsthattheysubsequentlyattributetoPrincessAlice.So,itisnotuntilwereach

acertainpointofcognitivesophistication—accordingtoBering,aroundsevenyearsold—

thatweareabletoapplytheoryofmindtonon-physicalagentsinordertoevaluatethe

intentionofnon-physicalagentsinthevariousphenomenawehaveexperienced.Oncethis

pointofcognitivesophisticationisreached,itseemsgod-beliefsasexplanatoryhypotheses

foreventsareanaturaloutputofourcognitivemachinery—wenaturallyexplaineventsin8OnethingtonoteregardingBering’sPrincessAliceexperimentsisthatBeringexplicitlytoldthekidsinhisexperimentsthataspirit—PrincessAlice—wasgoingtobepresentintheroom,andthatshewouldhelpthemperformcertaintasks.So,itisnotasifthekidswereautomaticallypositingdisembodiedagentsastheexplanationsofvariousphenomena—thechildrenwereovertlyprimedtoreferencePrincessAliceinexplainingvariouseventsfromthestart.Intheroom,lightswouldturnonoroff,pictureframeswouldfallormove,etc.,cuedbytheexperimenters.ThechildrenweretaskedwithdiscerningwhatPrincessAlicemeantbytheseevents,inrelationtodifferentproblemsthechildrenweregiventosolve.ThechildrentookthevariouseventstobeassistanceandinputfromPrincessAlice.

termsofthegoals,desires,andintentionsof“gods.”God-beliefsasreasonedexplanations

forvariousphenomenaseemtobematurationallynatural,atleastincaseslikethePrincess

Aliceexperiments,inwhichtheexistenceofanunseenbeingisassumedfromthestart.

Clearly,arobustfolkpsychologyandtheoryofmind—bywhichwecanmake

judgmentsabouttheminds,intentions,andfeelingsofothers—isanecessaryconditionfor

theoriginofcertainkindsofgod-beliefs(god-beliefsregardingdisembodiedagentsand

theirintentionsforcertainevents).Thatwecanformbeliefsaboutthemindsofnon-

physicalentities(realorfictitious)isabyproductofthefolkpsychologicalRGCM,because

theobjectsoffolkpsychologicalgod-beliefsarenotmembersoftheevolutionarilyintended

domainofthefolkpsychologicalRGCM.ThefolkpsychologicalRGCMaccountsforaspecific

rangeofgod-beliefs—thatrangeofgod-beliefsthatincludesbeliefsaboutthementalstates

ofinanimateobjectsinourenvironment,explanatoryhypothesesregardingspecificevents

andtheintentionsoftheagent(s)believedtoberesponsibleforthoseevents,etc.

Thecognitivemechanismsrequiredforinteractingwithpersonsinthenatural

worldandattributingtothemtheresponsibilityfortheeventsweexperiencearethevery

samecognitivemechanismsresponsiblefortheformationofcertaingod-beliefs.Theseraw

god-beliefs,however,findtheirorigininthemisapplicationoffolkpsychological

mechanismstoanimproperdomain.Inshort,Ihavedescribedthisparticularcognitive

systemasitworksinitsproperdomain(i.e.,thedomainofthingsinthenaturalworldthat

haveminds),andIhaveproposedthatourfolkpsychologysometimesdoesoperateoutside

ofitsproperdomain(i.e.,outsideofthedomainofthingsinthenaturalworldthatdohave

minds).Whethertheobjectsofhumangod-beliefsarefictitiousorinanimate,thesebeliefs

aretheproductsofthesystemsinourbrainsthattracktheintentionsofactualphysical

agentsandminds.Thus,humanfolkpsychologicalmechanismsareprimecandidatesfor

beingconsideredRGCMs;theirgod-beliefoutputsaretobeconsideredbyproductsto

whateverextenttheyaredeliveredtousbythemisapplicationoffolkpsychological

systemstoimproperdomains.

B.PromiscuousTeleology

ThenextRGCMwewillconsideristhecognitivesystemresponsibleforwhathas

beentermed“intuitivetheism.”DeborahKelemenhascoinedthephrase“promiscuous

teleology”(Kelemen,2004)inreferencetothismechanismandthebiaseswithwhichit

providesus.Kelemensaysthefollowingabouttheteleologicalintuitionssheandher

colleagueshaveobservedatworkinchildren:

…Whenaskedtoidentifyunanswerablequestions,American4-and5-year-oldsdifferfromadultsbyfindingthequestion“what’sthisfor?”appropriatenotonlytoartifactsandbodyparts,butalsotowholelivingthingslikelions(“togointhezoo”)andnonlivingnaturalkindslikeclouds(“forraining”).Additionally,whenaskedwhethertheyagreethat,forexample,rainingisreallyjustwhatacloud“does”ratherthanwhatitis“madefor,”preschoolersdemur,endorsingtheviewthatnaturalentitiesare“madeforsomething”andthatiswhytheyarehere.9

Initially,onthebasisofobservingagents’object-directedbehavior,childrenunderstandobjectsasmeanstoagents’goals,thenasembodimentsofagents’goals(thus“for”specificpurposesinateleologicalsense),and,subsequently—asaresultofagrowingunderstandingofartifactsandthecreativeabilitiesofagents—asintentionallycausedbyagents’goals.Abiastoexplain,plusahumanpredilectionforintentionalexplanation,maythenbewhatleadschildren,intheabsenceofknowledge,toageneralized,defaultviewofentitiesasintentionallycausedbysomeoneforapurpose.10

9Kelemen,2004,pg.295.10Kelemen,2004,pg.296.

ThesamefindingshavebeendocumentedinKelemen’sstudieswithBritishchildren,which

shetakestohavesufficientlycontrolledforthe“relativelypronouncedculturalreligiosity”

oftheUnitedStates.

Thesefindingsindicategoodevidencefortheclaimthatchildrenare“intuitive

theists”—thatchildreninterpretnaturalphenomenaashavingbeenintentionallydesigned

byaGod.Putanotherway,childrenintuitivelyholdtogod-beliefsregardingtheperceived

designandorderoftheworldaroundthem.Shelistssomecapacitiesthatshetakestobe

prerequisitetosuch“intuitivetheism”:thecapacitytomaintainamentalrepresentationof

agod,despiteitsintangibility;theabilitytoattributetothatspecialagentmentalstates

thatdistinguishitfrommorecommonplaceagents;andtheabilitytoattributedesign

intentionstoagentsandtounderstandanobject’spurposeasderivingfromsuch

intentions.AlloftheseabilitiesarefoundtobepresentinthesubjectsofKelemen’s

experiments.Sheinsiststhatthedetailsregardingchildren’s“emotionalormetaphysical

commitments”areirrelevant;rather,whatisimportantiswhetherchildren“makesenseof

theworldinamannersuperficiallyapproximatingadulttheism,”awayofinterpretingthe

worldthatmaybedevelopedorhonedbyagivenreligiousculturebutthatfindsitsorigins

primarilyin“cognitivepredispositionsandartifactknowledge.”

Thisstudyoftheintuitivetheismofchildrenisimportant,becauseitshedslight

ontothecognitivemachinery,biases,andexplanatoryinferencesatworkinthehuman

mindpriortomuchculturalorenvironmentalindoctrination.So,thephenomenonof

intuitivetheisminveryyoungchildrenlendssupporttotheideathateventhroughoutour

adultlives,itismostnaturalforushumanstoappealtoteleologicalreasoningand

explanationinmakingsenseoftheworldaroundus.Wenaturallyunderstandagentsto

havedesignintentions,andweseethingsinourenvironmentasderivativesofthose

intentions.Wehavetolearntodootherwise.

Thecognitivesystemsresponsibleforchildren’sinherentpredispositionsto

interprettheworldaroundthemintermsofpurpose,design,andagencyintentionislikely

activeinthedeliveranceofmanyofourrawgod-beliefs.“Intuitivetheism”isthesumof

suchastrongteleologicalbiasashasbeendocumentedbyKelemen;oftheperceptionofan

ordered,designed,and“artifact”world;oftheintuitionthatitisagentswhoare

responsibleforwhatweperceivetobedesignedandmeaningful;andoftheinnatehuman

drivetopursueexplanation.Towhateverextentthesystemresponsibleforrecognizing

artifacts,intention,anddesignoverlayssuchteleologicalnotionsontoanaturallyformed,

inanimate,andnon-designedworld,ourteleology-trackingRGCMisoperatingoutsideofits

intendeddomain;inasmuchasthenaturalworldfallsoutsideoftheproperdomainofthis

RGCM,teleologicalbeliefsaboutthe“purpose”and“design”ofthenaturalworldarerightly

consideredbyproductrawgod-beliefs.

C.Anthropomorphism

Thecognitiveprocessesassociatedwithanthropomorphismareournextareaof

examination.AnthropologistStewartGuthrie,whowasamongthefirsttoconceiveof

agencyandagencydetectionascentraltoacognitivetheoryofreligion(Westh,2013),

developedatheoryofanthropomorphismtoexplainreligion(Guthrie,1993).11According

toGuthrie(1993),religionjustisanthropomorphism(whereanthropomorphismisthe

ascriptionofhuman-likecharacteristicstonon-humanentitiesorobjects).Dueto11DavidHume(1779)alsodiscussedtheroleofanthropomorphisminhisDialoguesConcerningNaturalReligion.

evolutionarypressuresandtheprimacyofourabilitytorecognizeotherhumanagentsin

theenvironmentaroundus,anoveractivetendencytoanthropomorphizetheworld

aroundushasbeenworkedintoourhumanpsychologybynaturalselection(Guthrie,

2002).Itwouldhavebeenbetterforourancestors,Guthriewrote,towronglyperceivea

bear-likeboulderasarealthreat,ratherthantoperceiveaboulder-likebearasabigrock.

Theadaptivepayoffofhypersensitivitytothepresenceofpredators,oragentsin

general,shouldbeapparent:wereonetomistakearealthreatforanon-threat,thelossto

theindividualwouldbepotentiallycatastrophic,butwereonetomistakeanon-threatfora

threat,thelosstotheindividualwouldbemarginal.Theideaisthatovertime,evolution

wouldfavorthoseindividualswhoseabilitiestodetectpredatorsweresohonedastogive

themfalsepositivereports,overthoseindividualswhoseabilitieswerenotsimilarlyhoned.

Thosewithrelativelyclumsyabilitiestodetectpredatorswouldlosestakeinthegenepool,

relativetothosewhocouldsurvive,reproducemore,andtakealargershareofthe

population.Thus,itisthoughtthatourtendencytohyper-sensitivelyanthropomorphize

evolvedovertimetoyieldagooddealoffalsepositives.

Asthemisperceptionofbear-likequalitiesinaboulderisnot,strictlyspeaking,

anthropomorphism,somethingneedstobesaidhereabouttherelationshipinevolutionary

historybetweenanorganism’shypersensitivitytoanimismanditstendencyto

anthropomorphize.Later,Imentionthepossibilitythatanimacy-detectionisan

evolutionaryprecursortoagency-detection—ahypersensitivitytoanimacylikelywould

haveprecededthedevelopmentofeffectiveagency-detectiondevices.Here,Guthrieis

explainingwhyatendencyto“anthropomorphize”mighthavebeenworkedintoour

psychology,andheappealstothemisperceptionofanimacyinordertodoso.Ibelievehe

usestheterm“anthropomorphism”ratherlooselyasanumbrellaterm,suchthat

anthropomorphismincludesthedetectionofmereanimacy.WesthsummarizesGuthrie’s

position:

Soeveniftheperceptualstrategyofanthropomorphismgeneratesmassiveover-detection,ithashadadaptivevaluenevertheless,asthepriceoffalsepositivesismuchlowerthanthepriceofmissingimportantcues.Perfectparanoiaisperfectawareness.12

Anthropomorphismasatheoryfortheoriginsofreligiousbeliefcoversawidearray

ofagencyattribution(Westh,2009):theperceptionoffacesinclouds(Guthrie,1993),the

perceptionofhumanshapesinRorschachinkblots(Guthrie,1980),themistakingof

mailboxesforhumans(Guthrie,1980),talkingabouttablesashavinglegsandgenesas

beingselfish(Guthrie,2002),andsoon.Theprocessesandmechanismsof

anthropomorphismarealsothoughttoberesponsibleforourperceptionofnatural

disastersasdivinepunishment(Guthrie,1980)andourinclinationstowardperceiving

intelligentdesigninnature(Guthrie,1993).Inlightofcontemporaryresearchinthearea

(agencydetection,intuitivetheism,etc.),Ithinkitisperfectlyreasonabletobeskepticalof

theideathatanthropomorphismandthemechanismsassociatedwithitarealone

responsibleforsuchabroadarrayofdifferenttypesofgod-beliefs.Manygod-beliefsare

muchmorethan—ormerelyofadifferentkindthan—thesortsofbeliefsweformabout

facesinthecloudsorourmistakingofbouldersforbearsatadistance.Manyofourgod-

beliefsaremoreinferentiallyinvolvedandmoreconceptuallycomplicatedthanthemere

misperceptionofhumancharacteristicsinnon-humansornon-agents.Instead,Ibelieve

thatindescribingasingleprocessofanthropomorphizing,Guthriewasplowingtheground

12Westh,2009,pg2.

fortheresearchbeingdonetodayonthemultiplicityofdomain-specificcognitive

mechanismsthatareinfactresponsibleforeachofthesortsofgod-beliefsandphenomena

thathesoughttoexplain

Alongthislineofthought,Westh(2009)hascontendedthattheterm

anthropomorphismisanumbrellaterm,butthatitdoesnotadequatelyexplaincertainvery

specificphenomena:

Thereisnoconvincingargumentthat,forexample,seeingfacesinthecloudsorhumanshapesinRorschachinkblotssomehowinvolvestheattributionofagencyormind.Therefore,itwouldseemthatBoyerandGuthrieareinfacttalkingaboutdifferentthings.TheagencydetectionofBoyerandBarrettisaveryspecificpsychologicalmechanism.Bycontrast,theanthropomorphismofGuthrieisanumbrellatermthatcertainlycoversthepsychologicalmechanismofagencydetection,butonlyasoneamongmanyotherphenomena.13

Theexactboundariesanddomainsofthesedifferentmechanismsare,atthispoint,unclear.

Theprocessofanthropomorphismisprobablybestunderstoodasanadequateexplanation

forcertainkindsofgod-beliefs(e.g.,perceptualbeliefsaboutstufflikefacesintheclouds,

facesinRorschachinkblots,abiastoprojecthumancharacteristicstoinanimateobjectsin

theworldaroundus,etc.),butasonlyacourse-grained,inadequateexplanationforother

kindsofgod-beliefs(e.g.,activelyseeingintentionandpurposeinevents,theattributionof

agencyandintentiontoinanimateobjects,theformationofbeliefsaboutancestralspirits,

etc.).

Despitetheexplanatorylimitsofanthropomorphism,though,itdoesseemtobean

importantfactorinexplainingtheoriginsofgod-beliefs.Perhaps,forinstance,beliefsabout

thepersonalitiesofmountainsortreesfindtheiroriginsinachancearrangementof

featuresonagivenmountainortreethatisvaguelyreminiscentofahumanface;ourfacial13Westh,2009,pg.4.

recognitionsystemskickin,andweproceedtoanthropomorphizetheinanimateobjects

aroundus.Agenerationlater,themountainortreemightbeconsideredadeity.Sucha

storyisreasonable.Towhateverextenttheprocessesofanthropomorphismareappliedto

improperdomains—thatis,toanythingthatisnotactuallyahuman—theresultisa

byproductbelief.

D.AgencyDetection

AgencydetectionisournextRGCM.AnthropologistPascalBoyer(2001)has

claimedthathumanssufferfroma“hypertrophyofsocialcognition.”PsychologistJustin

Barrett(2004)haspositedthatwepossess“hypersensitiveagencydetectiondevices.”

Barrettdescribestheagencydetectiondevice:

WhenHADDperceivesanobjectviolatingtheintuitiveassumptionsforthemovementofordinaryphysicalobjects(suchasmovingonnon-inertialpaths,changingdirectioninexplicably,orlaunchingitselffromastandstill)andtheobjectseemstobemovinginagoal-directedmanner,HADDdetectsagency.14

TheseHADDshyperactivelyattributeagencytothestuffinourenvironment,andasaresult

theseattributionsareoftenwrong.Attherecognitionofagent-likebehavior—an

otherwiseinexplicablechangeindirection,stop-and-gomovement,etc.—theagency

detectiondeviceflagsanobject(agentornot)asanagent.Anykindofbehavioror

movementthatmightbeperceivedasgoal-directedorastheproductofmindednessis

enoughtoactivateHADD,andtheendresultistheunconsciouspresentationofnon-agents

asagentsandtheconsciousformationoffalsebeliefsregardingtheagencyofwhatare

actuallynon-agents.

14Barrett,2004,chapter3.

BloomrecountstheexperimentsconductedbyHeiderandSimmelinthemiddleof

thetwentiethcentury:

HeiderandSimmel(1944)…madeasimplemovieinwhichgeometricalfigures—circles,squares,triangles—movedincertainsystematicways,designed,basedonthepsychologists’intuitions,totellatale.Whenshownthismovie,peopleinstinctivelydescribethefiguresasiftheywerespecificpeople(bullies,victims,heroes)whohavegoalsanddesires…15

BloomgoesontomentionsubsequentresearchperformedbyhimselfandVeres(1999),in

whichitwasfoundthat“youcangetmuchthesameeffectwithmovingdots,aswellasin

movieswherethe‘characters’arenotsingleobjectsatall,butmovinggroups,suchas

swarmsoftinysquares.”Thegeneralideaisthatattheperceptionofanobjectorevent

thatwedeemtohavebeendesignedorordered,orattheperceptionofsomethingthat

seemstobehaveaswewouldexpectanagenttobehave,ourbrainsareapttoascribe

agency(ordesign,oragencyintention)tothatobjectofourperception.

IthinkitisworthinvestigatingtheimplicationsoftheexperimentsrunbyHeider

andSimmel,andthenlaterbyBloomandVeres.Inonesense,theagencydetectorsofthe

participantsinthestudiesgotitwrong:clearly,dotsandfigures,althoughtheybehavelike

agents,areonlyimproperlyattributedgoals,desires,andpersonality.However,inanother

sense,theagencydetectorsoftheparticipantsinthestudiesgotitright:thedotsand

shapeswere,indeed,designedandprogrammedintentionallybyanothermind(ascientist’s

mind)toactinwaysthatwouldgiveoffairsofagency.Itshouldnotbesurprisingthat

peoplereadilyrecognizedtheintentionofanothermindintheperceptionofanactually

createdartifact—beitatool,anexperimentalprogram,oranythingelse—thatisbehaving

inintentionalways.So,Ithinkitisappropriatetoask:towhatextentweretheagency15Bloom,2007,pg.149.

detectorsactuallyactingoutsideoftheirintendeddomainsintheseexperiments?Arenot

therecognitionofagencyintentionandtheawarenessofcreatedartifactsnotcriticaltasks

ofanagencydetectionmechanism?Itisclear,however,thattheagencydetectionsystem

wasnotselected-forsoastotrackdotsonacomputerscreen;so,whiletheagency

detectionmodulecorrectly(inasense)perceivedagencyandagentintentioninthedotson

thescreen,wearejustifiedinsayingthatitdidsoonlyasabyproductoftheagency-

detectionmodule’sproperfunctioning(i.e.,itsevolutionarilyintendedpurposeof

perceivingagencyintrueagents,ratherthanindotsonacomputerscreen).

Bloom(2007)says,“Wearehypersensitivetosignsofhumanagency,somuchso

thatweseeintentionwhereallthatreallyexistsisartificeoraccident.”Theproposed

cognitivemechanismthatleadsustoascribeagencytothingsthatveryclearlyarenot

agents(likegeometricalfiguresordots)isprobablyfoundationaltoourunderstandingthe

originsofmostkindsofgod-beliefs.ImportanttorememberatthispointisBering’s(2006)

workontheattributionofagentintentiontoevents(thePrincessAliceexperiments).Given

thiscombinationofcognitivebiases—thebiastoattributeagencytotheobjectsinour

environment,togetherwiththebiastoascribeagencyintentiontotheeventswe

experience—wecanbegintoseehowthehumanexperiencelendsitselftotheformationof

god-beliefs.Itshouldperhapsbenosurprisethatsuchgod-beliefsoverlayourexperienceof

theworldinthewaythattheydo,ifwegrantthattheseagency-detectionandintention-

attributionbiasesaresopervasive.

PsychologistScottAtransaysaboutourhypersensitive,“trip-wire”agency

attribution:

Theconceptofsupernaturalagentisculturallyderivedfrominnatecognitiveschema—“mentalmodules”—fortherecognitionandinterpretationofagents,such

aspeopleandanimals.Inparticular,suchconceptsaretriggeredbyanagent-detectionmodule.Thisisasortofinnatereleasingmechanism,whoseproper(naturallyselected)domainencompassesanimateobjectsbutwhoseactualdomain(ofstimulithatmimictheproperdomain)extendstomovingdotsoncomputerscreens,voicesinthewind,facesintheclouds,andsmokefromaburningbuilding…16

Hecontinues:

Soulsandspirits,whichderivemuchoftheirinductiveforcefromanalogytothedissociatedthoughtsofdreamsandthedisembodiedmovementsofshadows,arenear-universalcandidatesforreligiouselaboration.Thisisbecausesouls,spirits,dreams,andshadowshavemanypsychologicallyco-occurringthematicassociations(e.g.,immaterialityandunworldlieness,nightanddeath).Theyalsosystematicallymanipulateinnate,modularizedexpectationsaboutfolkmechanics,folkbiology,andfolkpsychology.17

So,byAtran’sestimation,agencydetectionisrelevanttotheRGCMhypothesiswhenagency

detectionoperatesoutsideofitsnaturaldomain(thatdomainfullofobjectsthatare

actuallyagents).

Boyer’s(2001)theorythatsuchgod-beliefshaveasortofincreasedstayingpoweris

relatedtoAtran’sideasaboutthewayourconceptsofthenon-naturalmanipulateour

innateandmodularizedfolk-mechanics,folk-biology,andfolk-psychology.Boyer’sideais

thatourgod-beliefshaveviolatedcertainessentialexpectationswehaveabouttheworld,

expectationsdeliveredtousbyourlearned“conceptualtemplates.”God-beliefsare

counterintuitive,totherightdegree.Forinstance,theconceptualtemplatefortheconcept

“person”probablyincludestheconstituentconceptofan“embodiedbeing.”Itistotally

natural—or,inlinewithourconceptualtemplates—forustoconceiveofapersonas

havingabody,becausehavingabodyisconstituentofbeingaperson.However,manygod-

beliefsregardingpersonsviolatethatcentralexpectation;spirits,souls,anddeitiesare16Atran,2002,pg.266.17Ibid.,pg.266.

oftenconceivedofaspersonshavingnobody.Toputitsimply,Boyerpositsthatsuch

supernaturalconcepts,wheninviolationofourconceptualtemplates,arememorableand

demandingofattention.Itisimportantthatthesupernaturalconceptsviolatecorepartsof

ourconceptualtemplates,buttheymustconformtotheconceptualtemplateclosely

enoughthatthesupernaturalconceptdoesnotdevolveintoconceptualabsurdity.The

conceptofapersonwithoutabodyissolid;theconceptofapersonwithnobodyormind,

butthatisactuallyaplace,isbasicallymeaningless.AccordingtoBoyer,storiesthat

includesuchcounterintuitive,supernaturalconceptsaredisproportionatelyeasierto

remember,areeasiertotell,andarethereforeprimecandidatesforculturaltransmission.

Thesekindsofbeliefsarerenderedtousintuitivelyduetoadegreeofconceptualsimilarity

betweenthemandourother,moreordinarybeliefs.Wewilltalkmoreaboutthislater.

Inexplanationofwhytheagencydetectionsystemsooftenoperatesoutsideofits

intendeddomain,Atransays:

Allsupernaturalagentconceptstriggerournaturallyselectedagency-detectionsystem,whichistrip-wiredtorespondtofragmentaryinformation,incitingperceptionoffigureslurkingintheshadowsandemotionsofdreadorawe.Mistakinganonagentforanagentwoulddolittleharm,butfailingtodetectanagent,especiallyhumanoranimalpredator,couldwellprovefatal;it’sbettertobesafethansorry.Theevolutionaryimperativetorapidlydetectandreacttorapaciousagentsencouragestheemergenceofmalevolentdeitiesineveryculture,justasthecountervailingevolutionaryimperativetoattachtocaregiversfavorstheapparitionofbenevolentdeities.18

Atrandescribestheadaptiveadvantageofanagencydetectiondevicethatregistersfalse

positives:itissimplybetterthatwehavea“trip-wire”mechanismthatsometimes

mistakesasound,movement,orinanimateobjectforanagent(friendorfoe)thathas

intentionsdirectedtowardus,ratherthantohaveamechanismwithahigheractivation18Atran,2002,pg.267.

thresholdthatfailstodetectactualagentsinourenvironment.Atrantheorizesthatover

time,thelatterwaswinnowedfromthegenepooltotheadvantageoftheformer.Asa

result,wedoirrationalthingslikeformbeliefsaboutspiritswhenwehearbumpsinthe

night,orweperceivephantoms“lurkingintheshadows.”Ourbrainsgivethesethings

agency,quiteoutsideofourcontrol.Thus,withourtrip-wireagencydetector,muchofthe

worldaroundusispresentedtousautomaticallythroughthefilterofagencydetection.

Westh(2009)saysthefollowingregardingtheevolutionaryoriginsofagency

detectiondevicesinourcognitivemachinery:

StewartGuthrie,bypositingastrongcontinuitybetweenanimismandanthropomorphism,gavethecognitivemechanismsunderlyinggodconceptsanextremelydeepevolutionaryhistory.Animism,inthisview,evolvedfirstasamechanismofpredatorevasion;astheevolutionarypressureofhumansocialgroupsintensified,anthropomorphismdevelopedasacognitivestrategy.ThemechanismofhyperactiveagencydetectionpositedbyBoyerandBarrettsharesmoreorlessthesameevolutionarynarrative.19

IbelieveWesth’sconclusionsareright.Itseemsreasonablethatanoverlysensitiveagency

detectiondevicewasbestowedtousthroughtheprocessesofnaturalselectionasnew,

uniquelyhumanevolutionarypressuresemerged.Itseemsreasonabletobelievethatthis

HADD’sevolutionarypredecessorwasasimplermechanismdesignedfordetecting

animacy,morebroadlyconstrued.Thishighlyattunedmechanismwouldhavedeliveredto

ourancestorsfalse-positivedetectionsoffoes,predators,etc.,andthiswouldhavebeento

ourancestors’benefitintheirancientenvironments.Itcertainlyseemstobethecasethat

suchanagencydetectiondeviceasHADDactshyper-sensitivelytoattributeagencyto

inanimateobjects.Suchhypersensitivity,bothinourevolutionarypastandcontemporarily,

helpstoyieldthepanoplyofgod-beliefsthatcharacterizeshumanculturesandworldviews.19Westh,2009,pg.18.

Whethertheobjectsofourgod-beliefsarerealorimagined—gods,spirits,

anthropomorphizednaturalobjects,etc.—theagencydetectionRGCMissurelyactiveinthe

formationofthesegod-beliefs.

E.Conclusions

Imentionedtowardthebeginningofthisthesisthatitisdifficulttodetermine

where,exactly,onecognitivemechanismendsandwherethenextbegins.Youcan

probablyseethatbynow.ThemechanismsIhavediscussedsofar—intuitivefolk

psychologyandtheoryofmind,promiscuousteleology,anthropomorphism,andagency

detection—seemtohavevastareasofconceptualoverlap.Forinstance,oneprobably

cannotmeaningfullytalkaboutourbiastoattributeagencyandagencyintentiontothe

worldarounduswithoutalsotalkingaboutintuitivefolkpsychology(whichisreallyjust

theabilitytoformbeliefsaboutothers,pertainingtotheiragency).Oneprobablycannot

talkmeaningfullyaboutpromiscuousteleologyandagencyintentionwithoutsome

content-richtheoryofmindorartifacttheory.Itisdifficulttosaytheextenttowhichthese

differentmechanismsarerelated;Ibelieveitisfairtosay,though,thateachofthem

performsdistinctfunctions,andthatthesedifferentfunctionsarewhyeachofthemhas

attracteditsownsetofresearchers.

TheseRGCMsleadustoexperienceandconceiveoftheworldinacertainway:in

termsofbyproductrawgod-beliefs.Rawgod-beliefsaredeliveredtousasbyproductsof

theunconsciousprocessesofourreligion-generatingcognitivemechanisms—the

mechanismsresponsiblefortheoryofmind,promiscuousteleology,anthropomorphism,

andagencydetection.Withtheserawgod-beliefsasourstartingpoints,webuildour

inferentialbeliefsystems(ourrefinedgod-beliefs).Itisthisnaturalwayofexperiencingthe

world—throughthefilterofourRGCMsandrawgod-beliefs—thatultimatelyexplainsthe

ubiquityofreligiousworldviewsandsystems.Indeed,itisthestrongByproductclaimthat

wenaturallyexperiencetheworldinthisway—coloredbytheautomaticprocessesthat

yieldintuitivetheism/promiscuousteleology,anthropomorphism,hypersensitiveagency-

detection,andourascriptionofmentalstatestotheworldaroundus.Byvirtueofthekind

ofcognitivestructuresourbrainshave,itisnotnaturaltoconceiveoftheworldcontraryto

theserawgod-beliefs.Thesebyproductrawgod-beliefsarenotadaptations,becausethey

contributenoadaptivebenefittospeakof.Rather,theyarebyproductsofmechanismsthat

areadaptations—mechanismsthatapplytheoryofmind,notionsofteleology,andnotions

ofagencyinevolutionarilyintendeddomains.

Inthenextsectionofthispaper,Iwillexaminehowgod-beliefsare“pickedup,”

developed,andtransmittedbyhumancultures.TheybeginasbyproductsofRGCMsand

areeventuallydevelopedbysocietiesintheaimtohaveexplanatorystoriestotell.

Learning,evolutionaryforcesoperatingattheculturallevel,andcontingenthistorical

events(andperhapsrevelation)areallactiveinthedevelopmentofrawgod-beliefsinto

refinedgod-beliefs.Iwillexaminewhytheserefinedgod-beliefsareselected-forby

evolutionaryprocessesatthegroupandculturallevels,andIwillconsiderthesortsof

adaptivebenefitstheyconfertotheirrespectivebelievers.

3.CulturalEvolutionandGod-Beliefs

Sofar,Ihaveproposedthatthehumanbrainpossessescertainreligiongenerating

cognitivemechanisms.Thesemechanismsconstituteareligion-generatingsuite,the

processesofwhichgiverisetothenaturalhumantendencytoformbyproductgod-beliefs.

Ourpropensitiestoconceiveoftheworldinteleologicalterms,tohyper-sensitivelyproject

agencyandagentintentionintotheworldaroundus,andtoprocesstheworldthroughthe

filterofourintuitivefolkpsychologicalmechanismsdosomeseriousexplanatoryworkin

theareaof“religion.”Itistheserawgod-beliefsthatareeventuallydevelopedintoour

refinedgod-beliefs.

Mybyproductstoryfortheoriginoftheserawgod-beliefsleavesmuchinneedof

explanation.Ihavearguedthattheserawgod-beliefsarebyproducts,ratherthan

adaptations;thebyproductswereselected,ratherthanselected-for.Rawgod-beliefsstill

characterizehumanpsychologytoday—theanthropomorphizingofinanimateobjects,the

intuitivedesign/causalhypothesestowhichweintuitivelyhold,thehypersensitive

attributionofagencytotheenvironment,etc.—but“religion”isafarmoreinteresting

phenomenonthanwhatIhavedescribedsofar.Anaccountofthesebyproductbeliefs

hardlyservesasanexplanationfortherichlandscapeofreligiousworldviewsthat

characterizesthehumanexperience.Thereisclearlymoretoreligiousbeliefasweknowit

todaythanthemerebyproductgod-beliefsdeliveredtousbyourcognitiveprocesses.

Refinedgod-beliefsarefarmoreevolutionarilyconsequentialthanrawgod-beliefs,

andassuchtheyhaveplayedaformativeroleinthedevelopmentofhumansocietiesand

culture.AsIwillargueinthecomingpages,itisrefinedgod-beliefs(ratherthanrawgod-

beliefs)thathaveconferredadaptiveadvantagetotheindividualsandgroupsthathave

possessedsuchbeliefsthroughoutrecentevolutionaryhistory.Religionisawinning

evolutionarystrategy.Howdothebyproductrawgod-beliefsdeliveredtousbyour

cognitivesystemsbecomemoredevelopedandsystematic?Howdotheycometoorganize

entirecultures?Whydoweassenttothem,andwhydotheypersist?Therawgod-beliefs

areourstartingpoint,butitishumannaturetotellstoriesandtopursueexplanation

beyondtheintuitionsdeliveredbyourcognitivemechanisms.Thesestoriesand

explanationstaketheformofculturallytransmittedcreationmyths,systematictheologies,

folklores,etc.Withourrefinedgod-beliefs,wetellrich,complicated,andfancifultales.

Thissectionofthepaperwilldiscussthedevelopmentofreligionasagroupand

culturaladaptation,anditwilluserecentresearchinevolutionarybiologyandgroup

selectiontheorytoshowhowreligionitselfconfersadaptiveadvantage.Iwillarguethat

religion—atthegrouplevel—isadaptivelyadvantageous,andthatthesurvivalbenefits

grantedbyrefinedgod-beliefshelptoexplainwhygod-beliefsaresocommontohumanity.I

willalsoexaminethenaturalprocessesbywhichreligiousbeliefs,concepts,andideashave

becomesoubiquitousandvariedthroughouthumanexperience.

PsychologistsBarrettandKeil(1996)haveframedthedifferencesbetweenwhatI

havecalledourrawandrefinedgod-beliefsinontologicalterms.Theyspecificallyaddress

theintuitiveanthropomorphizingofthetheisticconceptofGod,andtheypresent

experimentalfindingsthatsuggestweactuallyhavetwodifferentsetsofreligiousbeliefsat

workregardingGod.20Onesetisourintuitive,anthropomorphizedsetofbeliefsaboutGod,

andtheotherisournon-intuitive,“theologicallycorrect”setofbeliefsaboutGod.Thetwo

setsareincommensurable,becausetheypertaintodifferentontologicalcategoriesof

existence—theontologyofthingsinthenaturalworld,andtheontologyofGod:

Ifthesereligions,whichhavehadaprofoundimpactonWesterntheologicalconcepts,attributetoGodavastlydifferenttypeofexistencethanourown,howdo

20BarrettandKeilfocusexclusivelyonadistinctionbetweenthetheist’s“theologicallycorrect”and“anthropomorphized”conceptsofGod,whileIhavepresentedadistinctionbetweenrawandrefinedgod-beliefs,ingeneral.

wecrossthisontologicalgapandunderstandGod...IfGodisrevealedthroughnaturalisticmeansandinnaturalisticterms,howthendowemakesenseofthisrevelation?Howdoweincorporatenaturalfeaturesintoourrepresentationofanonnaturalentity?Ananalogousproblemmightbetoconsiderwhatitwouldbeliketobeabat(Nagel,1974).Theotherstateofbeingissodifferentthatthetaskseemsimpossible.21

Theyposethequestion:ifGod,accordingtoone’stheology,isofadifferentontological

categorythanhumankind—i.e.,spaceless,timeless,unbound,etc.—howcouldhumankind

possiblyaccuratelyconceiveofGod?IfGodwererightlyconceivedofasbeingofadifferent

ontologicalcategorythanus,anyattempttoanthropomorphizeGodwouldradically

misrepresentHimorHer(orWhatever).Iwouldposeafurtherquestion:Howcouldour

“theologicallycorrect”god-beliefspossiblyhavedevelopednaturallyiftheirobjects(God,

gods,spirits,etc.)are,atrockbottom,ofadifferentontologicalcategoryfromusandfrom

anythingelseweexperience?

BarrettandKeil(1996)offermoreonthesetwodifferentbeliefsetsthatrun

simultaneously,butincompatibly:

Despitetheologicaldescriptions,peopleseemtoincorporateanthropomorphicandnaturalisticcharacterizationsintotheirintuitiveGodconcepts…PerhapsconceptionsofGodmustbeanthropomorphic,evenwhiletheologicalbeliefsmaintainotherwise.Itmaybethatthe“theologicalGod”isradicallydifferentfromthe“intuitiveGod”normallydescribedineverydaydiscourse.EvenindividualswhoexplicitlyendorsethetheologicalversionofGodmightnonethelessimplicitlyembraceaverydifferentversioninmostoftheirdailythoughts.22Psychologistshavelongassumedthatanthropomorphiclanguagereflectsunderlyingcognitiveanthropomorphism.FreudinitiatedthislineofthoughtmostdramaticallywiththesuggestionthatGodconceptsareprojectionsofone’sfatherandthatthestartofreligionisthe“humanizationofnature.”23

21BarrettandKeil,1996,pg.220.22Barrett&Keil,1996,pg.223.23Ibid.,pg.221.

TheyprovidedatasuggestingthatwhenpressedtotalkaboutGod,peopletendto

anthropomorphizeHim(toputHisactionsintospatial,temporal,andsequentialterms,

restrictHimtoonlyhavingoneconversationatatime,etc.),regardlessofhavingavowedto

“theologicallycorrect”doctrinalbeliefsaboutHisdivineattributes(existenceoutsideof

time,omnipresence,etc.):

…subjectsdouseanthropomorphicconceptsofGodinunderstandingstorieseventhoughtheymayprofessatheologicalpositionthatrejectsanthropomorphicconstraintsonGodandGod’sactivities.ItappearsthatpeoplehaveatleasttwoparallelGodconceptsthatareusedindifferentcontexts,andtheseconceptsmaybefundamentallyincompatible.24Perhapsstoriesinvolvinganatemporalandomnipotentagentcreateprocessingdifficulties,andanefficientwaytodealwiththeproblemistouseasimplerGodconcepttounderstandstories.25

Allofthisgoestohighlightthedistinctionbetweentheintuitivegod-beliefsdeliveredto

individualsbytheircognitivemechanismsandthemorereflectivegod-beliefsthatare

developedbysocietiesandculturesthroughculturalevolutionandlearning(andinthe

theist’scase,revelation).

Theideaisthatourintuitivegod-beliefsarecognitivelyeasiertograsp.Theyare

morenatural.Inparticular,thebeliefsonemightprofessinthedomainoftheologyare

quiteunnaturalandcognitivelycounterintuitive—somuchsothatwhenundercognitive

load(aswhenaskedtorecounttalesaboutGod),ourcognitivesystemstendtoshirk

theologicalconceptionsofGodformoreintuitive,anthropomorphicconceptionsofGod

(Barrett&Keil,1996).BarrettandKeilwereconcernedwiththe“ontologicalgap”between

ourintuitive,anthropomorphicbeliefsaboutGodandourmorecounterintuitive,

24Ibid.,pg.240.25Ibid.,pg.243.

theologicalbeliefsaboutGod.Therestofthissectioninquiresintotheriseofsuchan

“ontologicalgap.”Although,perhapsourparticularsubjectmattercallsforare-

appropriationoftheirlanguage;let’scallthedistancebetweenourrawgod-beliefsandour

refinedgod-beliefsa“cognitivegap.”Theformerareevolutionarilyolderandcognitively

easier,whilethelatterareevolutionarilyrecentandmorecognitivelydifficult.Theformer

arethenaturalbyproductsofourcognitivemechanisms,whilethelatterarethe

counterintuitiveoutputsofgenerationsofstorytelling,culturalselection,andhuman

reasoning.

Wenowturntoexaminingthedevelopment,transmission,andadaptivevalueof

refinedgod-beliefsandreligioussystems.

A.VirusesoftheMind&MemeTheory

“Virus”isaloadedterm.Butitisatermthat,asusedbelow,iswellsuitedforits

intendeduse.Someevolutionarybiologistsandevolutionarypsychologistshavelikened

thespreadofreligiousworldviewstothespreadofviruses.Tosome,the“virus”ofreligion

isdetrimentaltohumansociety;toothers,thenegativeconnotationsassociatedwiththe

word“virus”arenotnecessarilyappliedtoreligion.Hereisaclearsummaryofthe“virus

view”fromevolutionarybiologistRobertTrivers(2011):

Whatsomehaveisametaphor.Religionisaviralmeme;thatis,itisnotanactualvirus,whichcaneasilybringapopulationtoitsknees,butratheritismerelyathoughtsystemthathappenstopropagateasifitwereavirus,tothedetrimentofthosewiththebeliefsystem.Despiteitsnegativeeffects,itapparentlygeneratesinsufficientselectionpressuretosuppressthespreadofthisnon-coevolvingnonorganism.26

26Trivers,2011,pg.278.

Oneofthebiggestproponentsofthe“virusview”ofreligionisevolutionarybiologist

RichardDawkins(2003).Dawkinsdevelopedawayofthinkingabout“unitsofculture”—

thestuffthatgetstransmittedfromonegenerationofasocietytothenext—thatlikens

suchunitsofculturetopathogens.Dawkins’spointwasthatunitsofculturelikereligious

beliefs“infect”themindsoftheindividualstowhomtheyaretransmitted,andthat

religiousbeliefsareparticularlysuccessfulviruses.Dawkins(1976)cashedouthistheory

inthelanguageof“memes.”His“virus”positionasideforthemoment,Dawkins’sworkon

memesisextremelyhelpfulformypurposes.Boyer(2001)explainsDawkins’smeme

theory:

[Dawkins]summarizedallthisbydescribingcultureasapopulationofmemes,whicharejust“copy-me”programs,likegenes.Genesproduceorganismsthatbehaveinsuchawaythatthegenesarereplicated—otherwisethegenesinquestionwouldnotbearound.Memesareunitsofculture:notions,values,stories,etc.thatgetpeopletospeakoractincertainwaysthatmakeotherpeoplestoreareplicatedversionofthesementalunits.27Inthisaccount,familiarreligiousconceptsandassociatedbeliefs,norms,emotions,arejustbetter-replicatingmemesthanothers,inthesensethattheircopy-meinstructionsworkbetter.28Ifyouwillrecall,Boyer(2001)laidoutsomenecessaryconditionsforthesuccessful

culturaltransmissionofa“godconcept.”Heproposedamodelofsuccessfultransmission

thatrequiredthe“godconcept”toviolatecertainconceptualexpectationstoan

appropriatedegree.Forinstance,theconceptslike“god”and“spirit”aretransmittedso

well,becausetheyfitnicelyintotheconceptualtemplatewehavefortheconcept“person,”

withtheexceptionofahandfulofcounterintuitiveviolations(likenothavingabody,being

atemporal,beingabletopassthroughthings,etc.).Thesecounterintuitive“god”and“spirit”27Boyer,2001,pg.35.28Ibid.,pg.37.

conceptsarestrangeandmemorable,buttheyalignwiththe“person”conceptclosely

enoughthattheyarenotrenderedunintelligibleinourconceivingofthem.So,these

conceptsarecounterintuitivetotheappropriatedegree,andourstoriesinvolvingthese

conceptsare,asaresult,culturallytransmittedinadisproportionatelysuccessfulway.

(Someofthishelpsustounderstandwhygod-beliefspersist,despitetheexplanatory

alternativeswehaveathand—theyareconsistent,tojusttherightdegree,withour

intuitiveexpectationsoftheworldaroundusandwithourconceptualtemplates.Moreon

“persistence”later.)

BoyertakesDawkins’smemetheoryandexpoundsonit.Boyer’sworkrepresents

thebeginningsofourabilitytounderstandhowourrefinedgod-beliefsmighthaveevolved

fromourrawgod-beliefs:

Culturalmemesundergomutation,recombinationandselectioninsidetheindividualmindeverybitasmuchandasoftenas…duringtransmissionbetweenminds.Wedonotjusttransmittheinformationwereceived.Weprocessitanduseittocreatenewinformation,someofwhichwedocommunicatetootherpeople.29

Ourreligiousconcepts,evenaftercountlessgenerationsofculturaltransmissions,bear

significantresemblancetooneanotherandtoourmoreprimitivegod-beliefs.Our

conceptualtemplates(whicharethebasicbuildingblocksforourunderstandingofthe

world)arefundamentallyunchangedbytheprocessesofevolution;thisservestopreserve

certaincrucialbitsoftheinformationthatwetransmitculturallyovertime.Italsohelpsto

explainwhyourgod-beliefssharesomuchincommon,cross-culturally.Memetheory,then,

workswellinhelpingtoshowhowculturallytransmittedbeliefs—likevariousgod-

beliefs—mayevolveovertimeintotherichvarietyofbeliefsweseeintheworld;and,with

29Boyer,2001,pg.39.

Boyer’sadditions,memetransmissiontheoryservesasausefulexplanationofthedifferent

culturalthemesthataresharedincommonbymanypeoplegroups.Theprocessofmeme

transmission,then,isonemechanismthataccountsforthespreading,transformation,and

persistenceofreligiousconceptsandgod-beliefsoverevolutionarytime.Itistheselection

ofideas.

Intheculturaltransmissionofourgod-beliefsovertime,wedowitnessimportant

changesinthecontentofthosetransmittedbeliefs.Butourcognitivemachinerykeepsus

honest.PeoplelikeBoyercontendthattheseconceptualtemplatesanchorus,inan

importantsense,tothecross-generationallypreservedbitsofthesebeliefs(prevailing

themesandvalues,commondenominatorsacrossreligiousstories,etc.).Someofthese

cross-generationallypreservedtemplatesarepresumablysharedbyall,byvirtueofour

sharedevolutionaryhistories,whilesomeofthemarerelativetospecificculturesand

societies,byvirtueoftheiruniqueevolutionaryhistories.Thishelpsusanswerthe

question:whatarethemechanicsofthedevelopmentofrefinedgod-beliefsfromrawgod-

beliefs?Atthispointwecanonlyspeculate,butIthinkBoyer’sandDawkins’sworkmakes

itreasonableforustosupposethatourrefinedgod-beliefsaretheresultofalonglineof

culturallytransmittedreligiousbeliefsthathavebeenpassed,withsignificantoverall

variation,fromonegenerationofourspeciestothenext.

Thestorywouldneedtobesomethinglikethis:We(humans)beganwiththe

intuitivebyproductgod-beliefsprovidedtousbyourcognitivemechanisms.Atsomepoint,

ourancestorsbegantotellexplanatory,religiousstories.Thesestorieswouldhave

providedanswersandexplanationsforunexplainedphenomena,wouldhaveexplainedour

ancestors’placeintheworld,wouldhaveprovidedthemwithasenseofmeaning,and

wouldhaveunifiedvariouscultures.Thesestorieswereadaptive,specifictothe

environmentinhabitedbyagivenpeoplegroupandspecifictothecontingenthistorical

eventswithwhichagivenpeoplegroupwasrequiredtoreconciletheirexistence.Aswe

learnedaboutourenvironment,aboutourselves,andaboutthevariousgodsthatwe

believedin,thesereligiousstorieswouldhavemorphedovertime.Thevariationinthe

contentofmemesoverevolutionaryhistoryprovidedfodderfortheprocessesand

pressuresofnaturalselectionandadaptation,buttheconstancyofourconceptual

templatesacrosstimeandcultureskeptourgod-beliefsand“godconcepts,”toanimportant

degree,anchoredtotheiroriginalcopies.Asaresultofthislongprocess,weareleftwith

thegod-beliefspossessedbybelieverstoday,theworldover.Eachcultureholdsitsown

uniqueevolutionaryhistory,inevitablyprovidinguswiththediverselandscapeofreligious

storiesandworldviewsthatwefindinmoderntimes.

Therearevariousconventionstowhichwemightappealtohelpexplainthe

formation,development,andspreadofreligiousbeliefsacrosstime.Forinstance,societies

throughouttimehavetransmitteduniquecreationmythsandfolklores,andtheyhavetold

storiestotransmitnotonlythesemyths,butalsothehistoryofthegivensociety.

Accordingtomyaccount,primitiveversionsofthesemythsandfolkloreswouldhavebeen

heavilyinformedbyrawgod-beliefs,bythereligiousnotionsnaturallydeliveredtothemby

theircognitiveprocesses.Indeed,primitiveculturestoldstoriesabouttheirhistoriesthat

werelacedwithreligiousconcepts,non-naturalevents,anddivinecharacters,totheextent

thatinmanycasesitisdifficulttodeterminefactualhistoryfrommeremyth.Early

societiessawtheirhistoriesinlightofthesereligiousnarratives.Associetiesgrew,spread,

madeconquest,andestablishedtradewithotherpartsoftheworld(orregion),their

storiesspread.Withtheriseofmoreadvanced(andwritten)language,religiousideas

wouldhavebecomemoreeffectivelycommunicable.Withtheriseofreligiousinstitutions

andcentersoflearning,religiousconceptsandstorieswouldhavebeensolidified,

canonized,andpreservedforlatergenerations.Withtheriseofreligiouskingdomsand

states—ortheirmoreprimitivecounterparts—religiousbeliefandparticipationwould

havebecomeasourceofgroupidentity,andparticipationinthereligiousidentityofa

societymayhavebeencompulsory(ensuringthespreadofreligiousideas).

Thisisallconjectural,butwecanprobablyonlytellthesketchofanevolutionary

storyintryingtoaccountforaphenomenonthatissoancientandvariedas“religion.”

Throughoutevolutionaryhistory,therewouldhavebeenanextraordinarynumberof

evolutionaryeventsandpressures.However,Ihavesetouttoexplainthemechanismsat

workineachstageofthatprocess,soastoshowthatsuchanadmittedlyvaguestoryis

plausible.ForreasonsIwilldiscussshortly,Irejectoutofhandthelanguageusedby

Dawkinsinhischaracterizationofreligiousbeliefasa“virusofthemind”—aparasitic

maladaptationthatexiststothedetrimentofbelievingindividualsandcultures.Asifthe

pervasivepresenceofreligiousbeliefsinthehumanexperiencewerenotenough

evidence30,thereisanenormousbodyofresearchandliteraturethathighlightsthe

adaptivebenefitsofgod-beliefs(moreonthis,shortly).

30Granted,manyharmfulvirusesarepervasive,andthismightseemtoserveasacounterexampletowhatIjustsaid.However,biologicalvirusesinnaturehaveintereststhatareservedbytheharmthatiscausedtotheirhosts;biologicalvirusescanexisttoourdetriment,anditistotheiradaptiveadvantagetodoso.Cultural“viruses,”ontheotherhand,aregivenlifebytheirhost(thebeliever)duetothebenefitsthatareconferredtothebeliever.Weshouldexpectthat,overtime,maladaptivecultural“viruses”wouldbeselectedagainst,andthatourpsychologieswouldbesoconstitutedbyevolutionarypressuresastopropagatebeneficialviruses.

B.Group-LevelSelection

BiologistandanthropologistDavidSloanWilsonhasdonesignificantworktoshow

thatreligion—asamoralsystemthatfacilitatesspecificgroupbehaviors—isaproductof

whathecalls“multilevelselection”(Wilson,2003).Herejectstheideathatthe

phenomenonofreligionasweknowittodayistheresultofevolutionbynaturalselection

operatingstrictlyatthegeneticlevel.Instead,headvocatesforagroup-levelselection

modelinorderexplainvarioussocieties’religiousworldviews:

Amiddlegroundisbecomingestablishedinwhichgroupsareacknowledgedtoevolveintoadaptiveunits,butonlyifspecialconditionsaremet.Ironically,inhumangroupsitisoftenreligionthatprovidesthespecialconditions.Religionreturnstocenterstage,notasatheologicalexplanationofpurposeandorder,butasitselfaproductofevolutionthatenablesgroupstofunctionasadaptiveunits—atleasttoadegree.31

Inhiswork,Wilsonadvocatesforthereturnofgroupselectionasaviablewayofthinking

aboutthedevelopmentofcultures,societies,andorganisms.Herecountsthefalling-outof

thisparticularviewamongevolutionarybiologistsinthelatterhalfofthetwentieth

century:

Althoughmanysocialscientiststaketheorganismicconceptofsocietyforgranted,evolutionarybiologistsinthe1960srejectedgroupselectionsostronglythatitbecamehereticaltothinkof“societyasanorganism”…forhumansoranyotherspecies…Theillusionofadaptationatthegrouplevelcanbeexplainedintermsofindividualsincreasingthefitnessoftheirgenesinthebodiesofothers,reciprocalexchange,orevenmoreself-servingbenefitssuchasdownrightdeceptionandexploitation.32

Wilson,though,takesissuewiththishardlineevolutionarybiologicalapproach.

31Wilson,2003,pg.6.32Ibid.,pg.12.

Thegroupselectiondynamicentersinwhenweconsiderthatmuchofreligious

belief—andthebehaviorthatresultsfromit—isstrictlysocial.Religiousbeliefsdetermine

howindividualmembersofacommunityoughttotreatoneanother,howtheyoughtto

regardthemselves,andhowtheyoughttotreatthoseoutsideoftheircommunity.

Religiousbeliefhaspracticalimplicationsintheareasofmorality,publichealthand

hygiene,andthestructuringofsociety.Whenthetraitunderconsiderationisanon-social

behaviorthataltersthefitnessoftheindividualalone,itisnotappropriatethatwe

considerthattraittobeaproductofgroup-levelselection.Butwhenthetraitunder

considerationisasocialbehavior(pertainingtogroupmorality,health,structure,etc.),

thentheindividual’sfitnessisnotproperlyconsideredinisolation;thetraitsoftheothers

inits“trait-group”mustbeconsidered.Forsocialbehaviors,thefunctioningofthesocial

groupasawholemustbeconsidered.Wilsonpositsthisintimaterelationbetweentraits

andgroupsinhismultilevelselectiontheory.33Alongthesedimensions,groupsare

consideredorganismsintheirownright,completewithgrouptraitsthatareupfor

selection.

Becausereligiousbeliefstendtofacilitatethemoralsystemsandorderofagiven

society,thereligiousbeliefsofgroupsasawhole—beliefsthatleadtosocialandpro-social

behaviors—areupforselectionatthegrouplevel.Totheextentthatsuchreligiousbeliefs

positivelyaffecthowthegroupfunctions,positivelycontributetothesurvivalofthegroup

relativetoothergroups,andfacilitatethetransmissionofreligiousbeliefsthrough

biologicalreproductionorthroughculturalreproduction(i.e.,theconversion/assimilation

ofotherpopulations),thereligiousbeliefsareproperlyregardedassuccessfulstrategies

33Ibid.,pg.15.

fortheirrespectivegroups.Towhateverextentreligionfacilitatesgreatergroupcohesion

andthereproductivesuccessofthegroup’sindividuals,agroup’sreligionisappropriately

conceivedofasanadaptivelyadvantageousstrategy.Boththegenesandthebeliefsofthe

groupsthatemployrefinedgod-beliefsasadaptivelyadvantageousstrategiesshouldbe

expectedtobefavoredinfuturegenerations.Groupsthatutilizeeffectivereligiousbelief

systemsasculturaladaptationsareexpectedtosucceeddisproportionatelywell.The

culturaltraitsofthesegroupsareselected,andthegroupsbecomesuccessfuladaptive

units.Whenthishappens,accordingtoWilson,asocietyorgroupbecomesa“higher-level

organisminitsownright.”34Aslongasweconceiveofreligionasaphenomenonthat

successfullyfacilitatesgroupbenefit,religionshouldbeconsideredanadaptationdesigned

bytheforcesofculturalevolutionandgroup-levelselection.

Wilsongoestobatagainstthetoo-narrowexplanationsofreligiousbelief

conventionallytakenbyevolutionarybiologistsandpsychologists.Hethinksthestoryis

morecomplicated,andthatsomeevolutionarystoriesdonotleaveroomforlearning,

development,andsoforth:

[What]wemustunderstandfromanevolutionaryperspectiveisthatmoralsystemsincludeanopen-endedculturaldimensioninadditiontoaninnatepsychologicaldimension.Ourgeneticallyevolvedmindsmakeitpossibletohaveamoralsystem,butthespecificcontentsofmoralsystemscanchangewithingroupsandvarywidelyamonggroups,withimportantconsequencesforsurvivalandreproduction.35

[Thealgorithmofevolutionarypsychologistsisasfollows:]Foranyparticularfeatureofhumanbehaviorandpsychology,trytounderstanditasageneticallyevolvedadaptationtoafeatureoftheancestralenvironment.Thentrytoimaginethepsychologicalmechanismasaspecializedmodule…Mycomplaintisnotthatthe[described]algorithmiswrongbutthatitispartial,seemingtoexcludethe

possibilityoflearning,development,culture,andotheraspectsofhumanmentalityasopen-endedprocesses.36

WhatWilsoncallsforisamodelofourpsychologythatallowsfor“open-endedprocesses.”

BorrowingfromPlotkin(1994),hearguesthatweoughttounderstandourcognitive

processesas“Darwinmachines,”asevolvedsystemsthataccommodateevolutionwithin

theirownstructures.HeciteshumanrationalthoughtasanexampleofaDarwinmachine,

asitgeneratesandprocessesnovelrepresentationsinternally.Religionasweknowit

today,Wilsonargues,isnotaphenomenonforwhichourancientenvironmentsand

evolvedcognitivemechanisms(and,therefore,genes)arefullyresponsible.Rather,

modernmanifestationsofreligion(refinedgod-beliefs)areevolutionarilyrecent

developmentsthatcomeinresponsetoevolutionarilyrecentenvironmentsandselection

pressures—andthisdevelopmentofreligionislargelycultural,ratherthangenetic.

Religiousbeliefsareproperlyconceivedofastheoutputsofour“Darwinmachine”rational

belief-formationprocesses.Theevolutionofculturalbeliefsystems,then,isnotoccurring

atthelevelofourgenesorcognitivemechanisms,butratheratthelevelofcultural

knowledge.37

Wilson’sviewsaresummarized,withanemphasisontherolethatgroupselection

playsintheemergenceof“organismicgroups”:

Organismicgroupsdonotautomaticallyevolvebutrequireaprocessofgroupselection.Groupselectioncanbeapotentevolutionaryforce,despiteitswidespreadrejectionduringtheageofindividualism…Moralsystemshaveaninnatepsychologicaldimensionbutalsoanopen-endeddimensionthatallowshumanhistorytobeseenasafast-pacedevolutionaryprocesswithculturalratherthangeneticmechanismsofinheritance.38

36Ibid.,pg.29-30.37Wilson,2003,pg.31,35.38Ibid.,pg.36-37.

Moralsystemsincludebothaninnatepsychologicalcomponentandanopen-endedculturalcomponentthatenablesgroupstoadapttotheirrecentenvironments.Beliefinsupernaturalagentsandotherelementsthatareassociatedspecificallywithreligioncanplayanimportantroleinthestructureandfunctionofmoralcommunities.39

JustasWilsonconcedesthatthedevelopmentofmoralsystems(andreligions,inasmuch

asreligionsfacilitatemoralsystems)isduetobothan“innatepsychologicalcomponent”

andan“open-endedculturalcomponent,”weshouldgrantthattheemergenceofgroupsas

adaptiveunitslikelyincorporatesasimilarcombinationof“innatestuff”and“open-ended”

stuff.Weprobablydohaveadaptivelyadvantageousinnatetendenciesthatleadus,as

individuals,toformintosocialgroupswithotherindividuals,quiteindependentfrom

religioussystemsorbeliefs.Forexample,kin-selectionandreciprocalaltruism

mechanismsprobablyserveasthecognitivefoundationforgroup-orientation,whilethe

cultural-leveladaptationofreligion(i.e.,religionasafacilitatorofmorality)hasonly

reinforcedourpropensitytobuildsocietiesandliveourlivesingroups.Wilson’spoints

contributewonderfullytoourunderstandingofreligioussystemsasgroupadaptations

designedtosolveevolutionarilyrecentproblems.Thereisnoneedforan“either/or”

approachtoallofthis;inaccountingforwhyhumansaresocialcreatures,itisprobable

thatevolutionarybiologistsandevolutionarypsychologiststellanimportantpartofthe

story(adaptationistexplanationsthatexplorethebenefitofkin-selectionandreciprocal

altruismmechanismsatthelevelofindividuals),whilethesocialscientistsandWilsontell

theremainderofthestory(multi-levelselectionexplanationsthatexplorethebenefitof

religionatthelevelofsocieties).

39Ibid.,pg.44.

Boyer(2009)provideshisowntakeonculturalevolution,inspiredbytheworkof

culturalanthropologists:

…whatweobserveasculturalrepresentationsandpracticesarevariants(ofculturaltraits),foundinroughlysimilarformsinaparticularplaceorgroupbecausetheyhaveresistedchangeanddistortionthroughinnumerableprocessesofacquisition,storage,inference,andcommunication.40

TheyrecounttheworkofBoydandRicherson(1985):

…thespreadofspecificvariantsofculturalrepresentations(suchasaparticularreligiousbelieforconceptrepresentedbyahumanmind)isseenaspartlyanalogoustothespreadofallelesinagenepool.Inparticular,thetoolsofpopulationgeneticscanbeappliedtothespreadofculturaltraitsandallowustopredicttheirspread,givensuchparametersastheinitialprevalenceofatrait,thelikelihoodoftransmission,andvariousbiases.41

ThisismuchlikeWilson’sproposal.AlsodiscussedistheworkofDanSperber(2000),in

whichtheculturaltransmissionofbeliefsispresentedinan“epidemiologicalmodel.”In

suchamodel,theprocessofbelieftransmissionishighly“entropic”—thatis,the

communicationofbeliefsproducesalargenumberofdifferentrepresentationsinalarge

numberofdifferentminds.Thatthereissomecommonalityamongthesedifferent

representationsdemandsexplanation,andtheexplanationisfoundinthefactthatpeoples’

“inferencesareguidedbytacitprinciplesthathappentobeidenticalinallnormalminds”

(Boyer&Bergstrom,2008).ThissoundsakintoAtran’s(2002)accountof“evolutionary

landscapes”andBoyer’s(2001)theoryaboutconceptualtemplatesandrelatedautomatic

inferencesystems.Allinall,thesebodiesofwork(alongwithmemetheory)providea

compellingcaseforthepositionthatculturalevolutionexplainsthetransmissionand

developmentofourvariousrefinedgod-beliefs.40Boyer,2009,pg.290.41Boyd&Richerson,1985,pg.113.

Notallreligionsarecreatedequal.Thistruthgivesstrengthtoa“multilevel

selection”hypothesislikeWilson’s.Somereligiousbeliefslendtotheirrespectiveculture

greatadaptiveadvantage,andotherreligiousbeliefsdonot—itisthisdisparitythatgives

theprocessesofselectionattheculturallevelsomethingtoworkwith.Inadditiontothe

memetheorypresentedbyDawkinsandBoyer(whichhelpsustounderstandhow

religiousbeliefschangeconceptuallyacrosstimeviaculturaltransmissionandviathe

variousmechanismsinplacethataffecthowwellweretaincertaintypesofbeliefs),

Wilson’s“multi-levelselection”takeonreligiousbeliefsgoesalongwaytowardaccounting

forthevastlydiversebodiesofgod-beliefsthatweobserveacrosshumanculturesacross

Assuch,Ibelievethatwecanreasonablyconcludethatthediversityofgod-beliefsin

humanexperienceislargelyexplainedby:

1. Thebyproductrawgod-beliefsprovidedbyourRGCMs,

2. Theprocessesofculturalevolutionandmultilevelselection,andtheadaptive

advantageconferredtoaculturalgroupbyitsrespectiverefinedgod-beliefs

(thisincludesmemetheoryandthedifferentratesofsuccessof“copyme”

programsintheculturaltransmissionofgod-beliefs),and

3. Themanifoldofhumanexperience(i.e.,acrosstime,peoplehaveexperienced

theworldinradicallydifferentenvironmentsandwithradicallydifferent

historicalcontingencies).

Eachoftheseisacrucialfactorinunderstandingtheorigin,development,anddiversityof

ourgod-beliefs.

C.AdaptiveCost/BenefitAnalysis

Onewaytoproceedinconsideringthenotionthatourvariousgod-beliefsmaybe

adaptations(eitherculturalorbiological)istoperformacost/benefitanalysisofsorts.We

needtoweighthecostsofreligionagainstthebenefitstodetermineifwecanplausibly

believethatreligioussystemsmighthaveconferredadaptivebenefittotheirrespective

adherents.Fortunately,thebodyofresearchinthisparticularareaisrich.Withafew

exceptions,theliteratureindicatesthatwehavegoodreasonforbelievingthatreligious

beliefsandsystemsareadaptationsatthegrouplevel,andthatrefinedgod-beliefsalso

conferadaptivebenefitstoindividualbelievers.Beforeweproceedintothedetails,itwill

beusefultokeepinmindthatourgod-beliefsareoperatingattwodifferentlevels—the

intuitivelevelandthereflectivelevel.AtthereflectivelevelarewhatIhavetermedour

refinedgod-beliefs;thesearethemoresophisticated,inferential,andsociallyoriented

beliefs.AttheintuitivelevelarewhatIhavetermedourrawgod-beliefs;thesearethe

byproductsofournormalcognitiveprocesses.Wehaveconceivedoftheserawgod-beliefs

asthebarefoundationsfortheconstructionofrefinedgod-beliefs.Betweenthesetwo

levels,thereisa“cognitivegap”;theformerareevolutionarilyancientandcognitivelyeasy,

whilethelatterareevolutionarilyrecentandtendtobemuchmorecognitivelydifficult.

Thesetwo“levels”warrantdifferentempiricalapproaches.Anthropologistsand

socialscientistsofreligionhavemadethesocietal-levelrefinedgod-beliefsthetargetof

theirwork,whileevolutionarypsychologistsandcognitivescientistsofreligionhave

targetedthecognitive-level,rawgod-beliefswiththeirwork.Sincethesocialreligious

beliefsareevolutionarilyrecent(recent,thatis,relativetotheevolutionarilyancient

intuitionsofferedtousbyourRGCMs),thestudyofmodernreligioussystemsisrelevantto

understandingtheiradaptivebenefit.Sincethecognitivereligiousbeliefsare

evolutionarilyancient,thestudyofmodernreligioussystemsisquiteirrelevantto

understandingtheunderlyingcognitivemechanisms(unlessweareconsideringhowour

rawgod-beliefsmighthavegivenrisetoourrefinedgod-beliefs);thepsychologicalstudyof

therelevantcognitivemechanisms,though,doesgiveusvaluableinsightintohowourraw

god-beliefsmayhavehelpedustosurviveancientenvironments.Bothapproaches—the

cognitiveandtheanthropological—ultimatelyappealtoevolutionaryprocesses.

So,Inowofficiallypropose:“Refinedgod-beliefsareadaptivelyadvantageous,both

forindividualorganismsandforgroups.”42Thenextpartofthepaperwillserveto

examinethisproposition.Bynomeanswillthissectionbeacomprehensiveexaminationof

theadaptivecostsandbenefitsofreligion.Rather,Iwillhitthemaintalkingpointsofthose

whoadvocateforthefitness-enhancingnatureofourgod-beliefs.Iwilldomybesttoavoid

evolutionary“just-so”stories—convenient,adhocexplanatoryhypothesesthatoftencome

underfirefromthecriticsofevolutionarytheory—andwillinsteadsticktothetaskof

showingthereasonabilityofbelievingthatreligiousbeliefsarefitness-conferring

adaptations.

C-1.Cost,orInvestment? Onthefaceofthings,god-beliefsasweknowthemtoday—systematizedworldviews

withvaluesandgoalsthatareseeminglyopposedtohumans’adaptiveadvantage—seem

incrediblymaladaptive.Manyreligioussystemsestablishmoralboundariesintheareasof

procreation,bodilydefense,andtheaccumulationofpersonalresources,andthisseemsto

beasure-firestrategyforevolutionaryfailure.Yet,herewearetoday,withentirelistsof

42Inallcases,refinedgod-beliefsaretransmittedculturally.

thoushallnot’sthatplacerestrictionsonthingslikeextra-maritalsex,violence,and

materialabundance.Atfirstglance,thisseemsanunwiseevolutionarystrategy.Afterall,

inthenaturalworldthewinnersarethosewhocanreproducesuccessfully(relativeto

others),killtheirenemies,andnotstarvetodeath.

Thatconsidered,ifwearetoproposethatgod-beliefsareadaptations,ratherthan

maladaptations,wemustcontendthatthebenefitstoreligiousbelieversoutweighthe

apparentcosts.BoyerandBergstrom(2008)havedonejustthat,attackingtheapparent

costshead-on:

Astrikingcharacteristicofmostreligiousthoughtandbehavioristhattheydonotseemtoconferanydirectfitnessadvantageonthepractitioners.So,fromanevolutionaryviewpoint,mostreligiousphenomenamightseemtobeeithermaladaptiveoradaptivelyneutral.43However,evolutionarybiologyalsodocumentsspecificwaysinwhichfitnesscostscanbecomeadaptive.Thisisparticularlysointhecaseofsignaling,anareaofintenseworkinrecentevolutionarybiology…Signalingrequiresthecoevolutionofsenderandreceivercapacities…biologistshavefocusedespeciallyoncostlysignals,whicharereliablebecausetheyaredifficulttofakeandtherebyprovidedirectindicesofthefitnessqualitiestheyaresupposedtoadvertise.44

BoyerandBergstromhaveproposedthat,whilereligioniswhattheycalla“costlysignal,”

thesuccessfulperformanceofsuchacostlysignalactuallyleadstogreateradaptivebenefit

atsomelaterpoint,asa“delayedreward.”Theypointout,“Cooperationoftenrequiresthat

peoplesacrificeanimmediatebenefitforadelayedreward.”So,theirnotionofreligious

beliefasacostlysignalonlyworksifweunderstandreligiousbeliefinthecontextofintra-

grouprelationships.Theirconceptionofreligiousbeliefsascostlysignalshelpsusto

43Boyer&Bergstrom,2008,pg.115.44Ibid.,pg.115.

understandtheadaptivebenefitsofreligionintermsoftheadaptivebenefitsofgroup

membership,relations,andcooperation.

BoyerandBergstrom(2008)discussthecostsandbenefitsoftheperformanceof

suchcostlysignals:

Inamoregeneralway,religiousthoughtandbehaviorwouldseemtomobilizecognitiveresourcesawayfromsurvivalandreproduction,beingfocusedonnonphysicalimaginedagency.Assumingthatreligiousactivityiscostly,doesitprovidesignals?Toalargeextentitdoes,giventhatmostactivityofthiskindisbothpublicandformalized,sothatpeople’scommitmentstothelocalritualsystemareobservablebyall(Sosis2003).Onthebasisofacomparativestudyofsmallcommunities,Sosisshowedthatcostisindeedanimportantfactor.Religiousgroupsthatrequireagreaterinvestmentincostlyritualstendtoremainmorecohesive…45

Iftheirstoryiscorrect,itindicatesthatgroup-membershipandtheadaptivebenefits

thereofaremoreadvantageoustotheindividualthanaretheindividual’sabilitiesto

cognizeaboutnon-religiousthings(likesurvivalandreproduction).Theydonotsayitso

boldly,buttheproposalisessentiallysomethinglike:thepreciousresourcesspenton

religiousthoughtandritualareadropinthebucketcomparedtotheresourcesgainedby

groupidentity,intra-grouptrust,reciprocatedaltruism,sharedresources,etc.Atthevery

least,thecostsareeventuallyoutweighed.So,perhapssuchcostlyreligioussignalsare

bestregardednotasbeingadaptivelybeneficialorcostly,butasbeingadaptiveinvestments.

Religioussignalingisanespeciallyeffectivemechanismforcommunicatinggroup

identification,becauseareligioussignaltendstobeabindingsignal.Inonesense,religious

signalsare“binding”justinthattheytendtobecostly.Costlyreligioussignalstieoneto

one’sreligiouscommunityinimportantways—significantresources,time,andenergyare

spentinparticipatinginagroup’sreligiousidentity;costlysignalsarehardertofakethan45Ibid.,pg.116.

inexpensivesignals.46Wecanregardreligioussignalstobe“binding”inanothersense

whenweunderstandwhat,exactly,isbeingcommunicatedbythesignalerinhisorher

participationinagivenreligiouspractice.Signalingone’saffiliationwithaparticular

religionisnotlikewearinganamebadge—itcommunicatessomuchmorethanjustassent

toaparticularreligiousworldviewandadesiretoreapthebenefitsofgroupmembership.

Religioussignalingcommunicatessharedvalues,sharedpriorities,one’sintentionto

belongtothegroup,one’sintentiontomakesacrificesforthegroup,one’sintentionto

treattheotherindividualsofthegroupasofone’s“in-group,”etc.So,signalingreligious

affiliationis“binding”inthesensethatitallowsotherstoexpectcertainthingsofthe

signaler.

Signalingreligiousaffiliationis“binding”inonefinalaspect:religiousbeliefholdsa

privilegedplaceinpeoples’livesandinsociety.One’sreligiousbeliefsencompassthe

individual;asociety’sreligiousbeliefsactasguidingprinciples,corevalues,andsocial

norms.Signalsbasedonnon-religiousideologycouldverywellbeusedtocommunicate

groupidentity;itseemsreligioussignaling,however,enjoysauniqueabilityto

communicatetoothersthewaythatoneseesoneselfandone’srelationshiptotheworld,to

thedivine,andtootherpeople.Truly,religioussignalingisdifficult(andrisky)tofake,asit

46“Inexpensivesignals,”intherealmofreligiousbelief,mightincludethingslikeverbalcommitment,mereprofessionofabelief,etc.“Costly”religioussignalsincludethingslikeparticipationincommunityritual,spendingvaluableresourcesandtimedemonstratingone’sdevotiontoareligioussystem,denyingone’sdesiresandinterestsincommitmenttoareligioussystemthaturgespro-socialoraltruisticbehavior,etc.Itisthese“costly”signalsthatmakereligiousidentificationhardtofake.Sure,anyonecancommitverballytoabeliefsystem.Theideaisthatone’saccesstogroupmembershipwouldbecontingentonone’swillingnesstospendtheresourcesonthesesignals.“Costly”signalsarehardtofake,asreligionstendtobedemanding.Thecostsofbeing“foundout”mightincludeostracismorthewithholdingofthebenefitsofgroupmembership.(Orthingslikebeingstonedtodeath,orbeingburntatthestake.)

signalscoremetaphysicalcommitments.Groupsthatsignalgod-beliefsinreligiousritualor

inreligiousorganizationenjoyanaddedbenefitofbeingpronouncedlytight-knit

(Norenzayan&Shariff,2008)—thishelpstoexplainwhyreligionandthesignalingof

religiousaffiliationwerefavoredoveralternativekindsofsociety-organizingbeliefsystems

andthesignalingassociatedwiththem.

God-beliefsmightalsobeappropriatelyconceivedofasasocialgatekeeper.Ifthe

abilitytosuccessfullysignalareligiousworldviewiswhatconferstoyouthecrucial

benefitsofbelongingtothelargergroup,thenthosebenefitsarenotconferredifthesignal

isnotsent.Religiousandritualadherencemight,inaliteralsense,beatickettothe

adaptivebenefitsofgroupmembership—bothinourevolutionarypastandinthepresent.

Itmightbeworthclarifyingthatthe“rituals”thatserveascostlysignalsmaybeas

“primitive”asthingslikeinitiationrites,oras“modern”asthingslikechurchattendance.

Nomatterwhereoneisalongthespectrumofculturalreligiouspractices,theideaisthat

suchasignalisinitiallycostly,buttheneventuallyyieldsareturn.Allofthisisnottosay

thattherearenot,infact,costsassociatedwithourgod-beliefs(particularly,ourrefined

god-beliefs).Rather,itisjusttheclaimthatthebenefitsofsuchbeliefs—thebenefits

associatedwithgroupmembershipandinclusion—cometofaroutweightheinitialcosts

bothofbelievingacertainwayandsignalingthosebeliefs.

C-2.Health&WellBeing Anotherapproachindeterminingtheadaptivebenefitofreligionandgod-beliefsis

inthedirectpsychologicalstudyofmodernreligiousadherents.Whateverbenefitorcost

canbefoundinthestudyofmodernreligiosityisusefulforus,inasmuchasthesecosts

andbenefitstellusaboutthecostsandbenefitsofthereligioussystemsofourevolutionary

past.Towhateverextentpresentdayreligiousbeliefsarelikethebeliefsofourancestors,

suchpsychologicalstudiesmaycontributetoansweringthequestionofwhetherornot

religionisanadaptation.PsychologistKennethPargament(2002)hasconductedresearch

inthisarea.Heliststheconditionsunderwhichreligiousbeliefsconferwell-beingorharm

totheiradherents:

Someformsofreligionaremorehelpfulthanothers.Areligionthatisinternalized,intrinsicallymotivated,andbuiltonabeliefinagreatermeaninginlife,asecurerelationshipwithGod,andasenseofspiritualconnectednesswithothershaspositiveimplicationsforwell-being.Conversely,areligionthatisimposed,unexamined,andreflectiveofatenuousrelationshipwithGodandtheworldbodespoorlyforwell-being,atleastintheshortterm.47

PargamentfocusedhisresearchonthemodernAmericanreligiouslandscape,butIbelieve

hisfindingsalsogiveusstructureforunderstandingtheadaptivecostsandbenefitsof

othernon-Westernornon-modernreligions.

TherearecertainkeythemesinPargament’sfindingsthatcanserveascriteriafor

evaluatingtheadaptiveadvantageordisadvantageofreligiousworldviewsthatlookquite

differentfromWesterntheism.Suchcriteriaincludethesuccessfulinternalizationof

religiousbeliefs,theintrinsicmotivationofone’sreligiouspractices/behavior,asenseof

greatermeaningasderivedfromone’sreligiousbeliefs,asenseofspiritualsecurityas

conferredbyone’sreligiousbeliefs,andasenseofspiritualconnectednesswithothers.It

isupforempiricalresearchtodecidethis,butIwouldimaginethatevenabsentaliteral

conceptof“God,”ifagivenreligion,spiritualworldview,orculturalpracticemeetsthe

benefit-conferringstructureoutlinedbyPargament,wemightreasonablyexpectitto

conferthesamewell-beingandbenefitsthattheparticularreligionsPargamentstudieddid

47Pargament,2002,pg.177.

infactconfer.Giventhis,itisnotbeliefin“God,”perse,thatconferssuchbenefits;rather,

thepsychologicalbenefitsareproductsofthestructureofthereligion.Inprinciple,such

benefitscouldbehadwithastrictlysecularworldview,wereitasecularworldview

structuredsoastofacilitatethecommonthemesstudiedbyPargament.

Pargamentalsodrewconclusionsaboutwhichtypesofpeoplemostbenefitfromthe

typesofreligionhestudied:

Noteveryoneexperiencesthesamebenefitsfromreligion.Religiousnessismorehelpfultomoresociallymarginalizedgroups(e.g.,olderpeople,AfricanAmericans,women,poorpeople)andtothosewhoaremorereligiouslycommitted.Religiousbeliefsandpracticesappeartobeespeciallyvaluableinmorestressfulsituations…thatpushpeopletothelimitsoftheirownpersonalandsocialresources.SomeevidencealsosuggeststhatreligionisparticularlyhelpfultoRomanCatholicsdealingwithcontrollablelifestressorsandtoProtestantscopingwithuncontrollablelifeevents.48

Pargamentsummarizesthatthe“efficacyofreligiondependsonthedegreetowhichitis

wellintegratedintopeoples’lives.”Individualswhomostbenefitfromtheirreligionare

oneswhoareapartofasocialenvironmentthatencouragestheirfaith.Alsobenefitingare

thosewhoarebestabletoblendtheir“religiousbeliefs,practices,andmotivations

harmoniouslywitheachother.”Conversely,individualswhodidnotfitthose

descriptions—individualswhosereligiousidentityisnotsupported,whosereligionisunfit

fortheirproblems,andwhosebeliefsandpractices“lackcoherencewitheachother”—

receivedharm.Individualswhowereunabletofullyintegratetheirreligiousbeliefs

actuallysufferedintheirwell-being.

Pargament(2002)mentionsmarginalizedgroupsasthosepeoplewhobenefit

particularlywellfromreligion(becausereligiousbeliefsareembeddedmoredeeplyinto48Ibid.,pg.178.

theirculture)andstressfulsituationsasthoseeventsthatbestelicitparticularbenefitfrom

religiousbeliefs(becausefaithisaneffectivecopingmechanisminresponsetoevents

outsideofone’scontrol).Ashasalreadybeenmentioned,whatneedstobeempirically

studiediswhetherornotnon-religiousworldviewsconferpsychologicalwell-beingtotheir

adherents,ifthebenefit-conferringconditionsofthesereligiousbeliefsystems

(Pargament’sinternalization,intrinsicmotivation,coherence,etc.)aremetbythenon-

religiousworldviews.Itisunclearhowsalientafactorreligionitselfisinthese

psychologicalstudies—themoresalientfactorscouldbethesocialandpsychological

factorswehavediscussed.

OnewaytointerpretPargament’sfindingsisthatthepsychologicalwell-beingwas

notconferredbythereligiousbeliefsatall,butbytheabilityofanindividualtointernalize

theirchosenworldview,beapartofasupportivecommunity,comeupwithacoherent

worldview,etc.Onemightcontendthatitisnotreligiousbeliefitselfthatconfersadaptive

benefit,butratherthepsychologicalabilitytocopewiththeworldviewsprovidedbysuch

religiousbeliefs.Afterall,someofPargament’smostimportantfindingsdetailhowitisthe

peoplewhohavenotfullyintegratedreligionintotheirlivesthataremorepsychologically

atrisk.Anyhow,allofthataside,Pargamentwouldprobablyinsistthatthemostfitness-

enhancingreligionsaretheonesthatproducebelieverswhocanmeetthosecriteriafor

receivingpsychologicalbenefits;ifareligioncanfacilitatethepsychologicalwell-beingof

itsadherents,itisproperlyregardedasfitness-conferring.Thereligionsthatcannot

facilitatethosethingsactuallydopsychologicalharmtoadherents(i.e.,leadtheir

lukewarmadherentsintoresource-demandingcognitivedissonance).Theindividuals

withinsuccessfulreligionswhodonotmeetthevariousstandards(internalization,

intrinsicmotivation,etc.)alsosuffercostsaccordingly.

Thereisalsoanimportantrelationshipbetweenreligionandbehaviorsthatare

conducivetophysicalhealth.BiologistRobertTrivers(2011)discussesthisrelationship.

Herecognizesthatreligionsoftenencouragehealthybehavior,andhereferencesthe

effectsofreligiousbeliefonimprovedimmunefunction.Triversalsocitesthepositive

effectofmusiconimmunefunction.Medicineandmusicbothprovideplacebobenefitsto

some,andbothwere“originallyembedded”withinreligion.49However,manyofthehealth

benefitsofreligiousbeliefandaffiliationmightbeduetothebenefitsofpositivebeliefand

groupmembership,ingeneral,andnottoreligiousbelief,inparticular.But,insofaras

religiousbelieffacilitatesanindividual’spositivebeliefandmembershipinasupportive

group—i.e.,insofarasreligiousbeliefconferstothebelievertheadvantagesthatcomewith

thosethings—thenreligiousbeliefisrightlyconsideredtobeincrediblybeneficial.Trivers

alsodiscussesthepositiveimmuneeffectsofdisclosingtrauma,andhecontendsthat

religiousdisciplineslikeconfessionalsandprivateprayersmayeachfacilitatethis

benefit.50

Thesethingstakentogether,astrongcasecanbemadeforthepositiveeffectsof

religiononphysicalandpsychologicalhealth.Overthecourseofculturalevolution,we

wouldexpectthereligionsandculturalpracticesthatfacilitatepsychologicalandphysical

well-beingtobesuccessfulrelativetobeliefsystemsthatdonot.Aswehaveseen,one

issueofcontentionishowsalientafactorreligiousbeliefitselfactuallyis;itispossiblethat

themoreefficaciousfactorsarethingslikepositivebeliefandsupportivegroup49Trivers,2011,pg.279.50Ibid.,pg.287.

membership,ingeneral.Regardless,inasmuchasreligionfacilitatesbeneficialthingslike

positivebeliefandsupportivegroupmembership,religioncanitselfbeappropriately

construedasanadaptivelyadvantageousstrategy.

C-3.GroupCohesion&Pro-SocialBehavior

PsychologistsAraNorenzayanandAzimShariff(2008)discusstheadaptive

advantagesofreligiousbeliefs,relativetothedevelopmentoflarge-scalesocietiesandpro-

socialbehavior:

Religiousprosociality,thus,mayhavesoftenedthelimitationsthatkinship-basedand…reciprocity-basedaltruismplaceongroupsize.Inthisway,theculturalspreadofreligiousprosocialitymayhavefacilitatedtheriseofstable,large,cooperativecommunitiesofgeneticallyunrelatedindividuals.51Thecognitiveawarenessofgodsislikelytoheightenprosocialreputationalconcernsamongbelievers,justascognitiveawarenessofhumanwatchersdoesamongbelieversandnonbelieversalike.However,supernaturalmonitoring,tothedegreethatitisgenuinelybelievedandcognitivelysalient,offersthepowerfuladvantagethatcooperativeinteractionscanbeobservedevenintheabsenceofsocialmonitoring.52

Becausekinshipselectionmechanismsandreciprocalaltruismmodelsputabiologicalcap

onthesizeofsocialgroups,theriseoflargecommunitiesofgeneticallyunrelated

individualsneedsexplaining.NorenzayanandShariffproposethatitisreligiouspro-

socialitythat,infact,enabledsocietiestomovepasttherestrictionsplacedongroupsizes

bytherelativelyweakhumanabilitytomonitorgroupmembers’behavior;itwasthepro-

socialbehaviorthatresultedfromreligiousbeliefs,theyargue,thatfacilitatedtheriseof

largersocieties.Inshort:ifreligionprovidesaGodorgod-conceptthatservestomonitor

myneighbor’sbehaviorinawaythatIcannot,thenthatGodorgod-conceptwilleffectively

51Norenzayan&Shariff,2008,pg.58.52Ibid.,pg.58.

facilitatemytrustingmyneighbor,mygoodfaithtowardmyneighbor,andmycontinued

altruismtowardmyneighbor.Further,ifaGodorgod-conceptprovidedbyareligious

systemcanstandintofacilitateabehaviortowardstrangersthatmirrorsmybehavior

towardmykinortowardthosewhohaveactedaltruisticallytowardme,thensuchaGodor

god-conceptcanbeexpectedtocontributetothegrowthandstabilityofagroupentity.

NorenzayanandShariffdiscusstheeffectsofreligiousbeliefongroupcohesionin

particular:

…religiousbehaviorthatsignalsgenuinedevotionwouldbeexpectedtomobilizegreatercooperationandtrust,andwheninternalandexternalthreatstogroupsurvivalarehigh,religiousgroupswouldbeexpectedtooutlastsecularones…largesocietiesthathavesuccessfullystabilizedhighlevelsofcooperativenormswouldbemorelikelythansmalleronestoespousebeliefinmorallyconcernedgodswhoactivelymonitorhumaninteractions.53Attitudinalsurveysshowthatreligiousindividualsareperceivedtobemoretrustworthyandmorecooperative.54

NorenzayanandShariffconcludethat,towhateverextentreligiousbeliefcanbeeffectively

signaled,thenitmightenhancein-grouppersonaltrust,lowerthecostsofmonitoring

others’behavior,andtheneventuallyreinforceintra-grouppro-socialtendencies.Insmall-

scalesocieties,freeloadingisnotmuchofanissue,asthebehaviorsofindividualscanbe

easilymonitored.However,inlarger-scalesocieties,thebehaviorofindividualsismuch

moredifficulttokeeptrackof;assuch,inlarger-scalesocietiesfreeloadingisaweightier

issue.So,religionmightproperlyberegardedasasuccessfulanti-freeloadingadaptation,

bywhichcommittedindividualsarepressuredtocooperatenotbyotherindividuals,butby

God,god-concepts,orreligioussystemsofmoralnorms,obligations,andexpectations.The

costofsuchsignalsholdsthesignalersaccountabletotheircommitments.

ManyofNorenzayanandShariff’s(2007)conclusionsarebasedonresearchthey

conductedintheareaofreligiousprimesandeconomicgames.Theirfindingsare

fascinating:primingtheirsubjectsimplicitlywithGod-conceptsledtheirsubjectsto

allocatemoremoneytoananonymousstranger,relativetowhenaneutral(orno)concept

wasactivated.Theirconclusionsarethattheimplicitactivationofreligiousconceptsgave

individualsagreatertendencytowardpro-social,moralbehavior.Theyproposetwo

explanationsofthepro-socialbehavior(2007):(1)suchGod-conceptsareunconsciously

linkedtoconceptsofgenerosity,andwhenaGod-conceptisactivatedthereisan

“ideomotor”effect(apowerofsuggestion)ongenerosity,and(2)theactivationofaGod-

conceptactivatesinthesubjectsa“feltpresenceofsupernaturalwatchers.”Iseenoreason

whybothcannotbethecase;ifgod-conceptprimeshavean“ideomotor”effectonmore

generousbehavior,itmightbethatthegod-conceptprimeshavean“ideomotor”effecton

thenotionofanall-seeingwatcherandanypro-socialbehaviorassociatedwiththat.

Interestingly,thepro-socialeffectwasactivatedjustasstronglywhensubjectswere

primedwithconceptsassociatedwithsecularmoralauthority—governmentprimes,police

primes,lawprimes,etc.NorenzayanandShariff(2008)discussthesefindingsandtherise

ofmorally“reliable”secularinstitutions:

Althoughreligionscontinuetobepowerfulfacilitatorsofprosocialityinlargegroups,theyarenottheonlyones.Theculturalspreadofreliablesecularinstitutions,suchascourts,policingauthorities,andeffectivecontract-enforcingmechanisms,althoughhistoricallyrecent,haschangedthecourseofhumanprosociality.Consequently,activemembersofmodernsecularorganizationsareatleastaslikelytoreportdonatingtocharityasactivemembersofreligiousones…therearemanyexamplesofmodern,large,cooperative,andnotveryreligious

societies…that,nonetheless,retainagreatdegreeofintragrouptrustandcooperation.55

So,both“God-concept”and“secularmoralauthorityconcept”primesleadindividualsto

greaterpro-socialbehavior.Thisisamattertobesettledbyempiricalpsychologists,butit

seemsthatthecommonthreadbetweenthosetwokindsofprimesarethenotionsof

“authority”and“beingwatched.”RegardlessofwhethertheprimeisaGod-authorityora

secular-authority,itmightbetheactivationofan“authority”conceptthatissufficientfor

theactivationofthetendencytowardpro-social,morallyresponsiblebehavior.Thatwe

havesocial,moralauthoritiesthataresecularisadistinctlymodernphenomenon—it

mightbethatour“moralauthority”conceptsaresoconceptuallyrelatedtoour“God”

conceptsthattheactivationofa“secularmoralauthorityconcept”actuallyactivatesour

“God”concepts,too.Thereismuchgroundforinsightfulempiricalwork,here.Atthevery

least,thetwo(“God”conceptsand“secularmoralauthority”concepts)aresufficiently

related,suchthattheactivationofeachindividually,independentfromtheintended

activationoftheother,successfullyyieldspro-socialbehavior.

TheinformationprovidedbyNorenzayanandShariffgivesusgoodreasonto

supposethat“Godconcepts”mighthavehelpedtofacilitatetheriseoflarge,stable

societiesinourevolutionarypast.Theseconceptsarethoughttoengenderintra-group

trustandcooperation,andtheyarethoughttohavecontributedtotheemergenceof

particularkindsofgroupsthatwouldhavebeenmoresuccessfulthantheirrivals(i.e.,the

kindsofgroupsinwhichindividualsareprimedbytheircultureandreligionforpro-social

behavior).Contemporarystudiesofthesepro-socialreligiousprimes(andnowsecular

55Norenzayan&Shariff,2008,pg.62.

primes)areglimpsesintoourevolutionarypastthathelpustounderstandtheinner

workingsofourancestorsandtheirdevelopingsocieties.Further,theyreveal,tosome

extent,theevolutionaryeffectthatreligiousbeliefsandsystemsmighthavehadonthem

socially.

C-4.ReligionasCostly

Givencurrentevents,itmightseemstrangethatIamarguingthatreligiousbeliefs

areadvantageous,inanysense.Indeed,theresponsibilityformuchviolentconflictin

historicalandmoderntimesbelongstothosemotivatedbyreligiousreasonsorbyreligious

conflict.Crusades,Inquisitions,andwitchhunts,forinstance,werecarriedoutforthe

gloryofGod;theriseandfallofIslamickingdomsintheMiddleEasthasbeencharacterized

byreligiousconquestandSunni-Shi’aideologicaldisputes;thedistinctlymodernthreatsof

terrorism,violentreligiousextremism,andreligiouspersecutionarecarriedoutby

practitionersfromnearlyeveryprimaryworldreligion;entireminoritygroupsarewiped

fromexistenceinreligiously-motivatedgenocide;andreligiousconflictsteersmany

nations’geopoliticsandmilitaryengagement.

Inlightofthesethings,astatementlike,“Religiousbeliefisadaptivelyadvantageous,”

mightseemabsurd.Afterall,noneofthoseconsequencesofreligiousbeliefis

“advantageous”inanynormalsenseoftheword.Imustconcede,ofcourse,thatreligious

conflictisindeedcostly.Whenreligiousconflictbecomeswar,itisimpossibletodenythat

theeconomic,societal,andhumantollsof“religion”arefrighteninglyhigh.So,inorderfor

metomaintainthatreligiousbeliefsareadvantageous,Imustdosoinlightofthese

undeniabletruths.Myclaimmustbethat,despitetheseapparentcosts,god-beliefsyieldto

usanetadaptiveadvantage.

Wewillbeginwithreligiouswarandconflict.Itseemsimpossibletosaythat

religiousbeliefisadaptivelybeneficialtoindividualsengagedinreligiousconquest—beit

religiousconflictonthescaleoftheCrusades,orreligiousconflictbetweentwo

neighboringtribes.Clearly,sincerelyheldreligiousbeliefsaredetrimentaltoonewhodies

inreligiousconflict(assuming,ofcourse,thatitwasareligiousbeliefthatlandedthis

individualorhissocietyinviolentconflict).Religiousbeliefsareequallycostlytothe

culturethatiswipedouteitherbyforcedassimilationintoaninvadingreligioussocietyor

byacatastrophiclossofpopulationinviolentconflict.Putinverycrassterms,religious

beliefiscostlytothelosersofreligiousconflict.However,whatisreligiousbelieftothe

winnersofreligiousconflict?Iproposethat,forthevictorsofreligiouslymotivatedconflict,

religionisasuccessfultoolofconquest;itisaunifier,motivator,justifier,andcultural

symbol.Religionprovidesjustificationforgoingtowar(andforreapingthebenefitsof

war).Certainly,therearematerialandhumanlossestoallsidesinnearlyeveryviolent

religiousconflict;however,therearealsowinnersinmostsuchconflicts.Foragiven

society,forinstance,warisagreatmeansofmaterialgain—anenemy’sresources,an

enemy’spopulation,anenemy’sstrategiclocation,anenemy’sexploitedlabor,etc.

Itistruethatthewinnersofreligiouslymotivatedconflictalsosufferlossesof

resourcesandlife.Icangrantthis,however,andsimultaneouslymaintainthatreligious

beliefisadaptivelyadvantageousatthegrouplevel,aslongasthesocietyinquestiongains

morethanitloses—resources,location,ideologicalsupremacy,thepopulationofa

conqueredpeople,etc.Certainly,atleastsomereligiouslymotivatedconflictsin

evolutionaryhistoryhaveresultedinanetlossforareligiousgroup.However,myposition

(thatrefinedgod-beliefisawinningstrategy)dependsonlyonthepropositionthat

religiousconflictsresultedinanetgainforthoseinvolvedofthereligioussort.Inthisway,

refinedgod-beliefcanbeconceivedofasadaptive,eveninlightoftheresourceslostbythe

winningside.Itisworthnoting,too,thatwarriorscanbekilledandcropsburned(or

whatever),butthatreligiousconceptsandideasarenotsimilarlydestructible.Lossesthat

areshortofcatastrophictoareligiousgroupthathas“won”(orlost)agivenconflictmight

servetogalvanizetheirreligiousconcepts,stories,andculture.Whateverthecase,success

atwarisagreatwaytomitigatecompetitionwithneighboringgroups.Attheculturallevel,

warisalsoasuccessfulstrategyofideologicalconquest:howbettertoensurethespreadof

asociety’sbeliefsandvaluesthanbythatsociety’simpositionofitsbeliefsupon

neighboringpopulations?

Ifreligioncanbeproperlyconceivedofasamotivatorforwarandconquest,asI

believeitcan,andifthebenefitsofwartoasocietyandtoitsindividualssometimes

outweighthecosts,thenacasecanbemadethatreligiouslymotivatedwarisactually,inat

leastsomecases,beneficialtothecultureorsocietythatholdsthosereligiousbeliefs.56

Thus,thegenesandideologiesofthepeoplewhoholdtothosereligiousbeliefsenjoy

relativesuccessinthenextgeneration.Certainly,thecostsofreligiouswararemassive,

andthesecostsreflectnegativelyupontheadvantageousnessofreligiousbeliefto

whateverextentsincerereligiousbelieversarethelosersinagivenconflict.However,such

conflictsalsohavewinners,andthewinnersenjoybenefits;towhateverextentsincere

religiousbelievers(individualorgroup)“win”inagivenconflict,thebenefitsreflect

positivelyupontheadvantageousnessofthewinner’sreligiousbeliefs.Presumably,to

whateverextentgod-beliefsmakeasocietybetteratwar—forinstance,towhateverextent

56Thatis,inthesecasesreligionhelpstofurtherthesurvivalandspreadofthatculture.

fightingforreligiousreasonsemboldensanarmy,makesthearmyfearlessofdeath,etc.—

suchgod-beliefsyieldtothatsocietyevenfurtherbenefit.

Letitbeknownthatinusingtermslike“winner”and“successfulstrategy,”Iamnot

advocatingforreligiouswarorprovidingjustificationforreligiouswar—thatmuchshould

beclear!Rather,Imeantoshowthatthereismoretotherelationshipbetweenreligious

conflictandevolutionthanjustmassivecost;infact,therearewinners.Ialsothinkit

helpfultopointoutthatmassivelycostlyconflictisnotuniquetoreligiousbelief.Secular

andatheiststateshavecommittedatrocitiesagainsthumanitywithoutreligiousmotivation

orjustification;seeHitler’s,Stalin’s,andMao’scontributionstothebloodytwentieth

century.Thecarnagewroughtinthesesituationsisideological,butitisnotcharacterized

bygod-beliefs.Imentionthis,becausereligionhasfarfromcorneredthemarketinarmed

conflict;societiesareperfectlycapableoffindingreasonforgoingtowarwithother

societies,oroffindingjustificationfortheeradicationofminoritygroupsfromtheir

population,sansreligiousbelief.Certainly,theabilitytowageareligiouswar,andthe

justificationfordoingso,isabyproductofreligiousbelief;buthumansocietiesexcelat

wagingwarindependentofreligiousbelief.Itisamischaracterizationofgod-beliefs(andof

thehistoryofviolentconflict)tosaythatgod-beliefsaremaladaptationsthatgiverisetothe

humancapacitytokillandbekilledinwar.Tocharacterizegod-beliefsinthiswayalso

betraysanassumption—thatthe“religiouswars”weobserveinmoderntimesaretruly

religiousinnature.Granted,somereligiousconflictistrulyreligiousinnature;other

“religiousconflict,”however,ismoreplausiblypoliticalorgeopoliticalinnature,with

religiousideologyusedasajustificationforconflictorasatoolforrecruitmenttoacause.

Asidefromviolentreligiousconflict,theothercommonlyenumeratedcostsof

religiousbeliefincludetime,resourceallocationandopportunitycost,pain(physicalor

emotional),costlycommitmenttoritual,adherencetomoralnormsandstandardsthatare

adaptivelycostly,etc.(Sosis,2009).Onthesurfaceofthings,eachofthesecanindeedbe

understoodasacost.However,Ihavepresentedevidence(Norenzayan&Shariff,2008)for

theconclusionthatitwasgod-beliefsthathelpedenablehumangroupstogrowbeyondthe

relativelysmallgroupsizesofourdistantancestors,andIhavepresentedBoyerand

Bergstrom’s(2008)argumentthatreligiousbeliefisbestunderstoodasacostlysignal.

Eachofthecostslistedabove,inadditiontobeingunderstoodasevolutionarilycostly,may

beunderstoodasanevolutionaryinvestment.Iftheorganismsthatinvestinthesecostly

practicesreaptheadaptivebenefitsofgroupmembershipandstablegroupcohesion

(religionasacostlysignalthatyieldsapayoff),thensuchinitiallycostlypracticeswere

wiseadaptiveinvestments,indeed.Iftheorganismsandsocietiesthatarereligiousare

madestrongerandmorestablebytheirreligiousbeliefs,thentheinitialcoststhatcome

withparticipationinreligionarejustsubsumedbythebroadersuccessfulstrategyof

refinedgod-beliefthatisimplementedatthegrouplevel.Inbothcases,thebenefits

outweighthecosts.

4.Conclusions

Areourgod-beliefsevolutionarilycostlyorevolutionarilybeneficial?Ihavebuilta

caseforthenetadaptiveadvantageofrefinedgod-beliefs,byshowingtheeffectsthat

religionandreligiousbehaviorhaveonanindividual’saccesstogroupmembership

(religionasanadaptiveinvestment/costlysignal),groupcohesion(religionasafacilitatorof

theriseoflarge,stablesocieties),pro-socialbehavior(religionasamoralizingforce),

psychologicalwell-being(religionasasourceofindividualsecurityandwell-being),and

physicalhealth(religiousproscriptionsasconducivetophysicallyhealthybehavior).Those

whowouldarguethatourgod-beliefsaremaladaptiveneedtoshowthatthecostsofsuch

beliefsoutweighthebenefitsthatweresurveyedintheprevioussection.

Thecostsofreligiousbeliefthatareoftencited—religiousconflictandcostly

adherencetosocialnorms,forinstance—arenotnegligible.Indeed,manypeoplehavedied

orlosttheircultureinthenameofgod-beliefs,andthatseemsobviouslycostly.Ina

possibleworldinwhichtherewerenotraceofreligiousbelief,however,therewould

certainlybeotherreasonsforconflict(likescarcityofresources).Ihavearguedthatitwas

religionitselfthathelpedtofacilitatethedevelopmentofhumansociety.Insofaras

religionfacilitatesgroupcooperationandthebenefitsthatcomewithit(group

membership,groupcohesion,andaltruism),religionoughttoberegardedasimmensely

beneficial.Indeed,fortheretoberecognizablehumansocietiesorculturesinanother

possibleworldthatlacksgod-beliefs,someothersocietalgluewouldbeneededtostandin

for“religion”anditsroleinthecohesionofsociety.Inourworld,itwasreligionthatinfact

servedasthisglue.Intheimaginingofaworldwithoutreligiousconflict(andtherefore

withoutreligiousbelieforitsevolutionarybenefits),perhapswecanhaveourcakeandeat

it,too;butperhapswecannot.

Theoriginsofourgod-beliefscannotbeadequatelyexplainedbyappealtoselective

pressuresoccurringatthegeneticlevel.Thefoundationsofreligiousbelief—rawgod-

belief—arenotadaptationsthatwereselected-for.Rather,whatwasselectedwere

cognitivemechanismsthatyieldbyproductrawgod-beliefs.Thesemechanismscomposea

religion-generatingcognitivesuite,theRGCMsofwhichoperateinevolutionarily

unintendeddomainstoyieldtheirbyproducts.Thereligion-generatingcognitivesuite

facilitatestheformationofbyproductgod-beliefs,andthesebyproductsaredevelopedover

timebyculturesintorefinedgod-beliefs;theserefinedsystemsofbeliefaretheadaptively

advantageoustraitsofgroupsandcultures.Thatis,theyyieldcertainbehaviorsthatare

beneficialtobothgroupsandindividuals.Theprocessesofmulti-levelselectiondotheir

workontheseconsequentbehaviorsandgroup-organismictraits.Individualsand

societieswiththeproperkindsofreligiousstoriestotell(refinedgod-beliefs)wouldhave

yieldedadaptivelyadvantageousbehaviorsandsurviveddisproportionatelywell,relative

tothosewithouttherightkindsofadaptivelyadvantageousrefinedgod-beliefs.

IhaveadvocatedforafusionoftheByproductandAdaptationistaccountsforthe

phenomenonofreligiousbelief.Ihavearguedthatourrawgod-beliefsarethecognitive

byproductsofbrainsliketheonesthatwehave,andthatourrefinedgod-beliefsareformed

byhumanprocessesoflearning(including,forthetheist,revelation),rationalization,meme

transmission,andgroup-levelselection.Rawgod-beliefsarethearchitecturalspandrelsof

ourcognitivemechanisms—thespacesbetweenthe“arches”ofourcognition.Thecontent

ofourrefinedgod-beliefsisdeterminedbyculturalevolutionandthecontingenciesof

humanculturaltransmissionandstorytelling.Modernbeliefsystemsareindeedthe

productsofselection,butatthegrouplevel,ratherthanatthegeneticlevel.Thesespecific

beliefsystemsledgroupsandculturesinourevolutionarypasttobehaveincertainways;

theseparticularbehavioraltendenciesledtotheirgroups’successand,therefore,tothe

continuedtransmissionoftheirrespectiveculturalstoriesandtotheflourishingofthe

individualsofthesesocieties.

Itisamistaketoappealexclusivelytoadaptationiststoriesinexplainingthe

phenomenonofreligiousbelief,anditisamistaketoconceiveofrefinedreligiousbeliefsas

themerebyproductsofourcognitivestructures.Weneedultimatelytoappealtoboth

kindsofstories.Theadaptationiststoriesofferedbyevolutionarypsychologistsmightbe

abletoaccountforspecificcognitivemechanisms(theRGCMs),psychologicalprocesses,

andbelief-formationtendencies,buttheyfailtoaccountfortheoriginsoftheinitialcontent

ofourgod-beliefsinawaythatourbyproductstorycan.Itishighlyquestion-beggingto

positthatbeliefsthemselvesareselectableatthegeneticlevel,orthatreligiousbeliefs

themselves(thatis,thosebeliefsthataredemonstrablyculturallytransmitted)are

transmittablegenetically.Itisalsodifficulttoseehowadaptationiststoriesmightexplain

theconfluenceofthevaryingsystemsandcomponentsinvolvedinreligiousbeliefsand

systems—morality,ritual,beliefsinsupernaturalbeings,emotionalsymbolismand

experience,etc.—eachofwhichhasitsownuniqueevolutionaryhistoryapartfromreligion,

morebroadlyconstrued.Ifreligionjustistheconfluenceofthesevarioussystemsinan

evolutionarilyunintendedreligiousdomain,thenreligionoughttobeconceivedofasa

byproduct.However,thatrefinedgod-beliefsareculturaladaptationsisclear.

Oneisrighttoask,“Why,despitetheexplanatoryalternativestoreligionthatwe

haveathand,anddespitethecontradictionsinherenttomanyreligioussystems,dosuch

god-beliefspersist?”Wemightaddtothatquestion,“Whyarethesereligiousstoriesso

unified,andwhyaretheysoagreeduponwithinagivensociety?”Afterall,itseems

strange,giventheabilityoftheempiricalsciencestodebunkmanyofourreligiousclaims,

thatreligionremainsasubiquitousasitis.Ifreligionisproperlyconceivedofasa“virusof

themind,”shouldwenotexpectscienceandtechnologytoserveascapable“anti-viral”

medications?AsImentionedabitearlier,someofthesereligiousbeliefsactuallyfitquite

wellintotheintuitiveconceptualexpectationsthatwehavefortheworldaroundus

(although,successfulgod-beliefs,accordingtoBoyer(2001),willviolateconceptual

expectationstotheproperdegree).Indeed,weshouldexpectourrefinedgod-beliefs,ifthey

didevolvefromourintuitiverawgod-beliefs,toalignconsistentlywiththesereligious

biases.Thisconsonanceofourrefinedgod-beliefswithourintuitiveunderstandingofthe

worldaroundus(deliveredtousbyourRGCMs)shouldonlybeexpectedtoreinforcethe

variousreligiousbeliefstowhichpeoplehold.

Inexplainingthepersistenceofreligiousbelief,itisimportanttonotethat,while

ourscientificmethodhasmovedusbeyondneedingtopositbeliefinGod(orgods)inorder

topossesssatisfactoryexplanationsofthephenomenaweexperience,thestrong

Byproductclaimstillstands:that,byvirtueofthewayourbrainsarestructured,we

naturallyconceiveoftheworldintermsofgod-beliefs.Thescientificmethodandempirical

sciencescanleadustodisavowcertaingod-beliefs,butIfinditunlikelythatourempirical

pursuitswilleversuccessfullyoverridethebyproductbeliefsofthestructuresofour

brains;wecannot,afterall,convinceourowncognitivemechanismstostopforming

byproductgod-beliefs.Thatis,wecannotstepawayfromourowncognition(Kahneman,

2011).Perhapsreligiousbeliefpersists,becauseourautomaticrawgod-beliefspersist.To

expectreligiousbeliefnottopersististoexpectpeopletoignorethereligiousinclinations

deliveredtothembytheirbrains—thatthingsaredesigned,thatthereisagency“outthere,”

thattheobjectsofourperceptionhavementalstates,etc.—andtooperatebyworldviews

thatareveryunnaturalforpeoplewithbrainslikeourstohold.Ifthesereligiousbiasesare

aspervasiveasIhavemadethemouttobe,thenastrictlysecularworldviewisactually

inconsistentwithmuchofthehumanexperience.Bythat,Imeanthatitwouldbestrange

foronetodenyone’sreligiouslybiasedinclinations,ifweassumesufficientignoranceof

anynon-religiousexplanationforthephenomenathatwenaturallyexplainbyappealto

god-beliefs.Addtothisone’splacementinareligiousculturalcontext,anditisevenless

surprisingthatone’sgod-beliefspersistinthemidstofalternative,non-religiouswaysof

seeingtheworld.

Perhapsthemostobviousexplanationonemightofferforwhycertainreligious

beliefspersististhattheytellatruestoryaboutthewaytheworldactuallyis;or,itmaybe

thattheytellapartiallytruestoryaboutthewaytheworldis.Thisiscertainlypossible.It

isnotpossible,however,thateveryreligiousstoryexplainshowtheworldactuallyis,for

acrossreligiousstories(andwithincertainindividualstories)thereisgreatincompatibility.

Therearenumerousreligioustraditions,forinstance,thatclaimtoworshiptheone,true

(and,therefore,mutuallyexclusive)God.So,ifwearetoexplainwhyreligiousbelief

persistsbygrantingthattheymightpossiblybetruebeliefs,weneedtofigureoutwhich

religiousbeliefsaretrueandwhicharefalse.But,thoughinprinciplepossible,thatwill

takeusfarafieldofthescopeofthispaper.Instead,Iofferthatreligiousbeliefpersists,

becausereligiousworldviewsarecomposedofbeliefsthatpersistentlymeshwiththe

believers’experiencesoftheworldaroundthem.Thehumanexperienceyieldsapanoply

ofvaryingreligiousbeliefs,becausepeopleexperiencetheworlddifferentlyandform

religiousbeliefsaccordingly;thedifferingreligiousbeliefspersist,becausethebeliefs’

consonancewiththebelievers’experiencesoftheworldaroundthempersists.

Ifreligiousbeliefswereoutrageouslyandobviouslyfalseorself-contradictory,and

werethisoutrageousfalsityorself-contradictionobvioustothebeliever,weshouldexpect

thesebeliefsnottopersist.Similarly,itseemsthat,werethereligiousbeliefsincoherentor

conceptuallyabsurd,wewouldexpectthemnottobepropagated(muchasBoyer(2001)

insistedwithhismodelofintuitiveconceptualtemplates).However,religiousbeliefdoes

persist.Ibelieveweareanchoredtoourreligiousworldviewsbecause1)itismostnatural

forustoconceiveoftheworldinreligiousterms,asIexplainedearlier,andbecause2)

thesereligiousbeliefsandexplanationsareconsistentlyre-confirmedtousbyour

experiencesoftheworld(whichareeithertrulyreligiousinnature,merelyperceivedtobe

religiousinnature,orsimplydonotcontradictwiththereligiousexplanationswehave

formedforthem).Itisalsolikelythatourgod-beliefsenjoytheboonsofthevarious

familiarityandconfirmationbiasesatworkinourpsychologies.

Thepersistenceofourgod-beliefsmightalsobepartiallyexplainedbytheriseof

verycomplicated,rigorous,andsystematizedrefinedgod-beliefs.Suchextensivebelief

systemshavegivenrisetoentirefieldsofintellectualpursuit(theology,anthropology,

philosophyofreligion,etc.).Abelief,orbeliefsystem,shouldbeexpectedtopersistmore

easilywhereverwehavethesehighlyintellectualized,counter-intuitiveapproachestogod-

beliefs(rememberBarrett&Keil’s“ontologicalgap”and“theologicalcorrectness”).Such

approachestogod-beliefsspendconsiderableeffortexplainingawayanyseeming

inconsistencybetweenagod-beliefandthebeliever’sexperienceoftheworld,orany

incompatibilitybetweenagod-beliefandsomecontrarybodyofevidence.Ifabeliever(or

culture)ishelpedtoreconcilehisorhergod-beliefswithotherideasormattersoffactthat

arecontrarytohisorhergod-beliefs,suchreconciliationshouldbeexpectedtoaidinthe

beliefs’persistence.Manyrefinedgod-beliefsenjoythisstatusofhavingbeenreconciledto

bodiesofevidence(orideas)thataretothecontrary—thankstophilosophicaltheology,

theisticapologetics,andsoon.

Asforwhyagivensociety’sreligiousstoriesseemsounifiedandagreed-upon,I

believewecanpursueasimilarexplanation:weshouldexpectonetoassenttosome

degreetoanexplanatorystory,religiousornot,totheextentthatthereligiousstory

mesheswithone’sexperiencesofone’senvironment.Thefactthataparticularreligious

storymakessenseofalocalenvironment(or,dependingonthegod-belief,theentire

cosmos)serves,formany,asgoodreasonforbuyingintothatparticularstory.Giventhat

everyoneinaparticularenvironmentwillhaveverysimilarexperiencesofthat

environment,weshouldnotbesurprisedthatthereligiousexplanationsoftheir

environment—events,phenomena,thenaturalenvironment,theirplacementthere,etc.—

aresharedincommoninthewaythatreligionsseemtobesharedincommon.Theclaimis

notthatthepersistenceandunityofreligiousstoriesarerational,orthattheyoughtto

persistoroughttobeunified(although,theymayverywellberational,anditmaywellbe

thecasethatbelieversarejustifiedinmaintainingtheirbeliefs).Rather,myclaimisjust

thatthepersistenceandunityofreligiousbeliefsystemscanbeunderstoodbyappealto

theexperiencesofbelievingindividuals.

Theimplicationsfortheismofanevolutionaryaccountlikemineare,atthispoint,

unclear.Ontheonehand,thatreligiousbeliefisabyproductofourcognitivestructures

shouldgivethetheistpause,asshouldtheideathatGodorspiritsmaybethespandrelsof

evolutionaryprocessesandcognitivemechanisms.Ontheotherhand,however,allofour

cognitiveandbelief-formationfacultieshavetheirorigininevolutionaryprocesses.At

somelevelofgenerality,thefollowingholds:ifthetheistoughttobeconcernedaboutthe

justifiabilityandtruthofhisorhergod-beliefsinlightoftheirevolutionaryorigins,thenthe

theist(andnon-theist)alsooughttobeconcernedaboutthejustifiabilityandtruthofother

typesoftruthclaimswemakeabouttheworldinlightoftheirevolutionaryorigins.Tobe

sure,manyofournon-religiousbeliefsareempiricallyverifiableandtestableinwaysthat

ourgod-beliefsarenot,andthesestandardsofjustificationservetoisolateournon-

religiousbeliefsfrombeingunderminedbyanevolutionarystory.However,god-beliefs

mayhavetheirownstandardsofjustification:factorslikereligiousexperience,miracles,

andreliabletestimonymayreasonablybetakentoisolateatleastsomeofourgod-beliefs

frombeingunderminedbyanevolutionarystory.

Perhapsmyraw/refinedgod-beliefdistinctionwillproveusefultothetheistinthis

realm:itmaybethatabyproducttheoryoftheoriginsofreligiousbeliefsseriously

underminesthejustificationofrawgod-beliefs(becausetheyaredeliveredtousbytheoff-

line,automaticprocessesofourcognitivemechanismsfunctioninginanimproperdomain),

whileitfailstosimilarlyunderminethejustificationofrefinedgod-beliefs(becausethey

includeclaimsthataremoreintellectually,empirically,andinferentiallyinvolved).Itismy

hopethatfutureresearchinthisfieldwilltakeonamoreeven-handedtone,ratherthan

beginningwiththepresuppositionthat“Allgod-beliefsarefalse.”Certainly,god-beliefsare

notfalsemerelybecausetheiroriginscanbeexplainedbyappealtoevolutionaryprocesses.

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