「邁向東協經濟共同體:投資自由化、保障與 最新投資趨勢」國際 … ·...
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「「邁邁向向東東協協經經濟濟共共同同體體::投投資資自自由由化化、、保保障障與與
最最新新投投資資趨趨勢勢」」國國際際研研討討會會圓圓滿滿落落幕幕 編輯部
由中華經濟研究院台灣東協研究中心主
辦,萬國法律事務所、台灣服務業聯盟協辦之「邁
向東協經濟共同體 :投資自由化、保障與最新投資
趨勢」國際研討會於 2014 年 10 月 29 日假中華
經濟研究院蔣碩傑國際會議廳舉行,邀請國內外
東協領域之重要學者、專家、企業人士擔任會議
講者,共同分析東協區域整合下之投資自由化現
況與趨勢。本次會議共吸引約 250 位企業人士、
政府官員、相關領域學者及研究生到場聆聽,現
場發言及討論相當踴躍。
在第一場次「邁向東協經濟共同體:投資自
由化與外人直接投資(FDI)趨勢」中,怡安風
險管理顧問集團大中華區包毅宏(Owen Belman)
行政總裁表示,中國大陸對外投資金額快速成
長,東協地區即為主要投資目的地之一。而未來
東協吸引外資將可能有以下四點特色:第一,相
對廉價工資優勢;第二,賦稅及金融誘因;第三,
天然資源與人力資源;第四,資本移轉。中華經
濟研究院台灣東協研究中心徐遵慈主任則建議
我政府應推動與東協國家洽簽 FTA/ECA/BIA 等
P.1 ◆「邁向東協經濟共同體:投資自由化、保障與最新投資趨勢」國際研討會圓滿落幕
P.4 ◆臺泰雙邊經貿關係與未來展望
P.10◆AEC 2015: Taiwan Industry Response
P.22◆ASEAN, AEC and Emerging Issues in Investment: What Role For Malaysia
P.42◆Investment Protection and Dispute Settlement in ASEAN Comprehensive Investment
Agreement (ACIA)
P.51◆Triangularity in India-China-Japan Relations: Implications for East Asia
本本 期期 目目 錄錄
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2 東協瞭望 010
協定,並尋求與東協國家建立產業、人力資源或
投資基金等方面之合作;對於產業界而言,徐主
任建議應成立「東協─臺灣商會」,並針對東協
不同國家、不同產業之特性擬訂個別化拓銷策
略。
圖 1 「邁向東協經濟共同體:投資自由化、保障與最
新投資趨勢」國際研討會會場
在第二場次「檢視東協國家投資保障與投資
爭端機制」中,越南工貿部工業與貿易資訊中心
黎國方(Le Quoc Phuong)副主任指出,ACIA
將可為東協投資者帶來六大效益,包括投資自由
化、非歧視原則、透明化、投資保障、爭端解決
機制等。而 ACIA 特別強調投資保障與爭端解決
功能,提供東協投資者夠完善的投資保障環境,
以及更多元的爭端解決機制。新加坡 Rajah &
Tann 法律事務所 黎耀輝(Lai Yew Fei)合夥律
師則針對東協投資爭端解決進行案例分析,認為
當前 ACIA 架構下的東協投資爭端解決有幾項重
要趨勢值得各界關注,包括:第一,投資者大多
選擇曾對地主國做出重大裁決之法庭做為仲裁
地點;第二,投資者聲請補償可能純粹是施壓策
略;第三,一些新的訴訟或仲裁資金係由企業所
資助;第四,委任律師往往依據判決金額收取不
同費用。
圖 2 「邁向東協經濟共同體:投資自由化、保障與最
新投資趨勢」國際研討會會場
在第三場次「投資東協:新趨勢與新議題」
中,馬來西亞經濟研究院羅希(Zakariah Abdul
Rashid)執行長認為,東協是一個充滿活力的經
濟區域,未來十年內東協經濟成長與投資商機將
快速增加,而 AEC 與 ACIA 將對外人投資帶來更
大吸引力,馬來西亞則可在此波浪潮下成為外人
資東協的重要區域樞紐。中央研究院經濟研究所
黃登興研究員則提到,東協經濟整合進程非常快
速,但未來仍有許多問題有待解決,例如在東協
會員國經濟發展高度落差下,東協能否建立單一
市場與生產基地?在東協與東亞其他國家之物
流系統、政治制度、社會制度等方面仍具高度差
異下,東協能否進一步融入區域生產鏈?此類問
題皆為未來東協經濟整合所需面臨的重要挑戰。
圖 3 「邁向東協經濟共同體:投資自由化、保障與最
新投資趨勢」國際研討會會場
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本中心辦理「東南亞經貿工作推廣平台第三次會議」 3
在第四場次「跨國企業投資東協之經驗與策
略」中,聯昌證券有限公司北亞及南亞區企業融
資部科亞董事總經理對於臺商投資東協提出建
議,認為東協經濟成長快速且擁有龐大內需市
場,臺商應可透過投資、建立夥伴關係、併購等
方面展開東協市場布局,但也需特別留意東協存
在的主要問題,例如東協各國經濟發展落差、國
情環境差異、區域整合仍在發展階段等。中華民
國對外貿易發展協會陳廣哲研考委員指出,東協
擁有豐富的天然資源、人口紅利,且平均薪資仍
低於中國大陸,而東協主要國家成長快速,擁有
年輕且人數逐漸成長的中產階級,皆為臺商投資
的主要誘因。臺北市電腦商業同業公會國際合作
辦公室胡天盛執行長認為,臺商投資東協應先做
好五項準備,包括觀察與研究當地市場、尋找合
作夥伴、擬定財務規劃、人力資源管理、解決語
言問題、優先釋出善意等。
圖 4 「邁向東協經濟共同體:投資自由化、保障與最
新投資趨勢」國際研討會會場
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4
臺臺泰泰雙雙邊邊經經貿貿關關係係與與未未來來展展望望
中華經濟研究院台灣東協研究中心輔佐研究員 葉俊廷
一、前言
泰國係我國在東南亞地區相當重要之經貿
夥伴,在我國政府積極推動臺商對東協國家之海
外布局下,我國與泰國之間的貿易與投資關係蓬
勃發展。2013 年,泰國係我國第 14 大貿易夥伴,
第 10 大出口市場,以及第 16 大進口來源國。另
一方面,自 1959~2014 年 6 月,我國對泰國累
計投資件數為 2,201 件,累計投資金額約 134.98
億美元,係泰國當地累計第 3 大外人直接投資來
源國。
我國與泰國之人力資源互動也相當頻繁,其
中以勞工與教育互動最為顯著。此外,由於我國
與泰國在許多產業擁有互補特性,例如貿易便捷
化、農產品、中小企業、綠色經濟、智慧財產權、
文創產業等,皆為我國與泰國值得進一步拓展雙
邊合作關係之重要產業。
二、臺泰雙邊經貿關係現況
表 1 臺灣與泰國雙邊關係與簽署協議
項目 雙邊關係
臺灣 泰國
外交 無邦交,但互設有辦事處
駐泰國臺北經濟文化辦事處 泰國貿易經濟辦事處
貿易現況
臺泰雙邊貿易總額約100.89億美元(2013年)
臺灣對泰國出口額約63.36億美元(2013年)
臺灣自泰國進口額約37.52億美元(2013年)
泰國係我國第14大貿易夥伴,第10大出口市場,以及第16大進口來源國(2013年)
我國係泰國第12大貿易夥伴,第19大出口市場,以及第11大進口來源國(2013年)
投資地位 臺灣為泰國第3大投資國(累計至2014年6月),僅次於日、美
重要經
濟合作
會議
官方
1.「臺泰經濟(工業)合作會議」:由我國經濟部及泰國工業部召開之部長級會議,於2010年10
月召開第三屆會議。
2.「臺泰局長級經貿諮商會議」:「第一屆臺泰局長級經貿諮商會議」於2013年5月20日至22日在
臺北召開,由我經濟部國貿局局長與泰國商業部貿易談判廳長率團出席。
民間 「臺泰經濟合作會議」:由中華民國國際經濟合作協會、泰國工業院共同召開,於 2012年8月舉
辦第三屆會議。
雙邊經貿協定
1. 1996年4月30日簽署《中泰投資促進及保障協定》。
2. 1999年7月9日簽署《駐泰國臺北經濟貿易辦事處與駐臺北泰國貿易經濟辦事處避免所得稅雙
重課稅及防杜逃稅協定》。
3. 2003年7月24日簽署《臺泰農業合作協定》。
4. 2007年5月8日簽署《加工出口區與泰國土地工業管理局瞭解備忘錄》。
5. 2010年11月6日簽署《國合會與泰國皇家計畫基金會農業技術合作協定》。
6. 2012年12月3日修訂《駐泰國臺北經濟貿易辦事處與駐臺北泰國貿易經濟辦事處避免所得稅雙
重課稅及防杜逃稅協定》。
資料來源:駐泰國臺北經濟文化辦事處、外交部、經濟部國際貿易局,暨本研究整理
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臺泰雙邊經貿關係與未來展望 5
在出口貿易方面,我對泰國之出口貿易額從
2004 年的 33.18 億美元,成長至 2013 年的 63.36
億美元,增加約 30.18 億美元,成長幅度達
90.96%。觀察近 10 年我國與泰國之出口貿易趨
勢,可發現我對泰國出口大致呈正向成長,除
2007~2009 年全球經濟因受美國次貸危機及歐
債危機之影響出現衰退外,2010~2013 年都呈現
大幅度成長,出口表現超過 2007 年以前的水準,
顯示泰國對我出口貿易之重要性與成長潛力。
(參圖 1)
在進口貿易方面,我國對泰國之進口貿易額
從 2004年的 27.84億美元,成長至 2013年的 37.52
億美元,增加約 9.68 億美元,成長幅度達
34.77%。我國自泰國進口受到全球景氣低迷之影
響,在 2007~2009 年面臨衰退,其餘年度則大
致呈現正向成長,惟 2012 年我國自泰國進口金
額再度衰退。整體觀察,我國自泰國進口貿易之
發展趨勢尚稱平穩,全年進口額大約維持在 23
~44 億美元左右,並於 2011 年達到 43.93 億美
元的高峰,惟其成長幅度遠低於我國對泰國出口
貿易之成長幅度。(參下圖 1)
資料來源:財政部關務署
圖 1 2004~2013年我國對泰國進出口貿易額
在投資方面,近十年我國對泰國投資呈現 U
型發展趨勢,同樣也受到 2007~2009 年國際經
濟環境不佳之影響,導致我國對泰國投資金額與
投資件數在此期間面臨衰退。從趨勢上來看,
2005 年我國對泰國投資金額達到近十年高峰,約
4.18 億美元,至 2010 年則衰退至近十年谷底,
約 1.40 億美元,隨後雖在 2012 年達到近十年次
高水準,惟 2013 年卻又大幅衰退至 2.30 億美元。
2004~2013 年,我國對泰國投資金額共計減少
0.39 億美元,衰退 14.50%。而在投資件數方面,
2004 年我對泰國投資件數為 53 件,至 2013 年投
資件數減少為 41 件,整體投資件數呈現下降趨
勢。(參下圖 2)
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6 東協瞭望 010
資料來源:The Board of Investment of Thailand (BOI)
圖 2 2004~2013年我國對泰國投資金額與投資件數
在泰籍勞工人數方面,近十年泰籍勞工在臺
就業人數呈現下滑趨勢,2004 年泰籍勞工人數仍
10.53 萬人,至 2013 年則已下降至 6.17 萬人,衰
退幅度達 41.39%。(參下圖 3)探究泰籍勞工在
臺灣逐漸減少之原因,從供給面來觀察,近 10
年來泰國經濟好轉,使出國工作之勞工數量較
少,當泰國國內就業機會多時,勞工即會挑選在
國外所從事的工作。1從需求面來看,泰籍勞工在
臺多從事製造業與營造業,屬產業外勞之範圍。
然我國近年來大型公共工程數量減少,在產業外
勞中重大投資外勞數量減少之情況下,泰國在臺
勞工亦因此減少。
1 欣悅人力資源管理顧問股份有限公司引自中央通訊
社。2011。《泰國東北漸發展 臺灣可能漸缺泰勞》
http://urweb27.vipcase.net/html/front/bin/ptdetail.pht
ml?Part=news06&Rcg=110165
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臺泰雙邊經貿關係與未來展望 7
資料來源:勞動部
圖 3 2004~2013年泰籍勞工在臺就業人數
若從泰國在臺學生人數之變化觀察,近十年
間泰國學生在臺人數逐年上升,僅 2012 至 2013
學年有小幅下降。2003 至 2004 學年期間,泰國
學生在臺人數為 279 人,而 2013 至 2014 學年時
已達 972 人,近十年期間成長超過 3 倍之多,目
前泰籍學生在臺就學人數已達到近十年高峰。
(參下圖 4)
資料來源:教育部
圖 4 2004~2013年泰籍學生在臺就學人數
此外,我國教育部為因應國際化與低出生
率,將臺灣高等教育學生招募推廣至東南亞地
區,目標係將臺灣塑造為提供東南亞地區高等教
育之關鍵地區,以吸引東南亞大量優秀學生至臺
灣求學,相關做法與臺泰雙邊合作之內容包括:
(一)辦理臺灣高等教育展與臺泰高等教育論
壇;(二)推動臺泰菁英 600 專案;(三)成立
泰國臺灣教育中心。
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8 東協瞭望 010
三、臺泰重要合作領域與方向
針對我國與泰國之雙邊產業合作,主要包
括:貿易便捷化、農產品貿易、中小企業、綠色
經濟、智慧財產權、文創產業等方面進行研析,
探究兩國未來在該等領域之可能合作方向與利
益。
(一)貿易便捷化
貿易便捷化議題係推動我國與泰國雙邊貿
易關係不可缺席的一環,具體內涵可包括關務機
關加強合作,審慎考量業者關心事項,包括關稅
制度及其相關規章之透明性與適用性;研議雙邊
可行性研究時,研究制定關務合作條款或經濟合
作章節之可行性。而臺泰未來可針對雙邊貿易與
投資活動建立法制化規範,降低我國業者與泰國
業者在貿易與投資時所需負擔的營運成本,促進
雙邊經貿互動;同時,臺泰亦可研擬推動簽署關
務合作協定或備忘錄,針對雙方海關之間的法制
化合作建制,改善我國與泰國在進出口貿易之通
關時效、透明性、簡化所需文件等,使臺泰雙邊
經貿合作進一步深化。
(二)農產品貿易
從臺泰間農業合作互動模式及泰國農業發
展情況可看出,我國與泰國在農業上具有不同優
勢,並應具有互補關係。我國擁有優良之農業技
術,泰國則具有農產品外銷供應能力與豐沛之農
產品物種原。因此,臺泰雙邊農業合作可藉由我
國資金及技術協助改善泰國農業生產技術、提升
農業部門產值,而我國則可由泰國進口初級農產
品原料,透過調製加工提升產品附加價值,並利
用與泰國農產品種原保存等相關資訊交換,做為
日後與泰國進行材料與技術交流之參考資料。此
外,臺泰間之雙邊農業合作會議之持續進行將可
為農業議題提供交流平臺,促進兩國農業貿易、
技術與資訊等面向之交流。
(三)中小企業
我國與泰國早在 APEC 架構下已建構相當
程度之合作基礎,也為臺泰加強中小企業雙邊合
作塑造友善利基。由我國所倡議成立的「APEC
中小企業危機管理中心」於 2010 年 5 月正式成
立,現由我國經濟部中小企業處處長葉雲龍擔任
該中心執行長,並邀請泰國「亞洲災防中心災害
風險管理系統部」主任 Aslam Perwaiz 擔任該中
心專家成員。在具體合作內容方面,由於我國在
中小企業方面擁有長期且深厚的發展經驗,而泰
國中小企業亦為該國產業結構中相當倚重的主
要領域,雙方應可針對中小企業建立技術移轉、
技術協助、能力建構等合作,或鼓勵我國業者與
泰國業者進行合資,透過結合臺泰中小企業的發
展資源,提升雙方在該領域的發展潛力。
(四)綠色經濟
我國在綠色經濟發展方面具有一定優勢,於
環保技術開發上,相對優於東南亞國家。2在臺泰
綠色經濟合作上,綠色產業之推動為泰國國家經
濟社會發展計畫中的重點項目之一,而再生能源
比例的提升更為泰國政府所重視。對此,我國在
綠色產業技術上之發展優勢,應將符合泰國國家
發展所需,並可為我國業者拓展泰國或東南亞之
綠色產業市場。臺泰未來推動綠色經濟雙邊合
作,應可加強技術與研發合作、設置共同發展組
織或基金、共同推動對第三國家市場出口、以及
互相提供投資優惠以及市場進入之優惠待遇等。
2 行政院經濟建設委員會。2005。〈臺灣邁向綠色經濟
的優勢與潛力〉。
http://ebooks.lib.ntu.edu.tw/1_file/CEPD/109/taiwan%
20toward%20a%20green%20economy@288570.8075
6229616@.pdf
-
臺泰雙邊經貿關係與未來展望 9
(五)智慧財產權
我國與泰國未來在智慧財產權方面的合
作,主要應包括:第一,遵循 WTO 規範下之
TRIPS;第二,對現有各項規定,雙方能夠彼此
理解,同時提供平等的相關法令規章及政策性研
究活動機會以增加兩國國民權益;第三,適時並
有效地交換最新資訊,俾確保智慧財產權保護及
創新的利益;第四,雙方加強行使智慧財產權相
關法規,尤其是對貨品輸出入及服務業權益造成
侵害者;第五,擴展雙方智慧財產權領域,加強
推動研發創新;第六,加強區域性智慧財產權保
護,支持多國間之適用與調整。
(六)文創產業
泰國政府已將創意經濟視為國家發展的關
鍵,在其國家經濟振興方案「泰堅強計畫」中納
入創意經濟計畫,在國家經濟與社會發展計畫
中,也將創意經濟列入優先發展項目等。我政府
雖將「文化創意產業」列為國家發展重點之一,
但未見具體成效,雙方應可加強臺泰之合作與交
流。未來我國與泰國應可就文創產業加強文創政
策交流與人才培育合作、投資文創產業相關投資
之優惠、加強對於創作與商標之保護、推動共同
創立區域品牌、共同發展影視產業、數位內容、
遊戲軟體等合作。此外,我國亦可考慮在曼谷設
立文創發展與產品展示中心,以泰國做為進入東
協市場的橋頭堡。
四、結語
臺泰雙邊經貿關係密切且悠久,除了貿易、
投資活動以外,在勞工、教育、觀光、文化交流
等眾多領域亦有深遠之互動與合作基礎,未來雙
方如能進一步推動雙邊經貿合作,不僅有助鞏固
雙邊關係,重振兩國貿易與投資盛況,更可望為
彼此在區域整合中尋找新的合作機會,創造經濟
上之雙贏局面。
-
10
AAEECC 22001155:: TTaaiiwwaann IInndduussttrryy RReessppoonnssee Kristy Hsu
Programme Director
Taiwan ASEAN Studies Center, Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research
I. The Economic Landscape
of ASEAN in 2015
I.1 The AEC 2015 in Shaping
On 7th
October 2003, the ASEAN Leaders adopted
the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)
in Bali, Indonesia, to establish an ASEAN Community
by 2020. On 13th
January 2007, the ASEAN Leaders at
their 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, the Philippines,
further affirmed their strong commitment to accelerating
the establishment of the ASEAN Community by 2015.
The Leaders believed “the strengthening of ASEAN
integration through the accelerated establishment of an
ASEAN Community will reinforce ASEAN’s centrality
and role as the driving force in charting the evolving
regional architecture.”1
The ASEAN Community will comprise of three
pillars -- the ASEAN Political-Security Community
(APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and
the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). All
three will be closely intertwined and mutually
reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace,
stability, and shared prosperity in the region.
With respect to the second pillar -- the ASEAN
Economic Community (AEC), the ASEAN Leaders
agreed to transform ASEAN into a region with free
movement of goods, services, investment, skilled labour,
1 Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the
Establishment of an ASEAN Community by
2015, 13 January 2007.
http://www.asean.org/news/item/cebu-declaratio
n-on-the-acceleration-of-the-establishment-of-a
n-asean-community-by-2015
and freer flow of capital by 2015. The AEC envisages
four characteristics, including a single market and
production base, a highly competitive economic region, a
region of equitable economic development, and a region
fully integrated into the global economy.2
According to the ASEAN Economic Community
Blueprint, in order to enable ASEAN businesses to
compete internationally, to make ASEAN a more
dynamic and stronger segment of the global supply chain
and to ensure that the internal market remains attractive
for foreign investment, it is crucial for ASEAN to look
beyond the borders of AEC. In order to achieve the goal
of integration into the global economy, the Blueprint
points out two approaches: coherent approach towards
external economic relations and enhanced participation
in global supply networks. In the former approach,
ASEAN shall work towards maintaining ASEAN
Centrality in its external economic relations, including,
but not limited to, its negotiations for free trade (FTAs)
and comprehensive economic partnership (CEPs)
agreements (ASEAN 2007).
To stock-take and assess the latest development of
the AEC, at the ASEAN Summit in 2013 in Brunei
Darussalam, ASEAN leaders reviewed the work of the
three areas of the AEC. According to the ASEAN
Secretariat, an average of 82.5 percent of all action lines
towards the ASEAN Community 2015 have been
completed or are being implemented — representing 78
2 Declaration on the ASEAN Economic
Community Blueprint, November 20th
, 2007.
-
AEC 2015: Taiwan Industry Response 11
percent for the political security, 79.7 percent for the
economic and 90 percent for the socio-cultural pillars.3
As the year of 2015 is approaching, ASEAN’s
post-2015 vision is also being more frequently discussed.
In October 2013, ASEAN Leaders adopted the “Bandar
Seri Begawan Declaration on the ASEAN Community
Post-2015 Vision” during the 23rd
ASEAN Summit in
Brunei Darussalam. The Leaders tasked the ASEAN
Community Councils to expedite their work on
developing the ASEAN Community’s post-2015 vision,
and instructed that realising a politically cohesive,
economically integrated, socially responsible, and a truly
3 Post ASEAN Summit Highlights- ASEAN
Leaders to intensify efforts towards ASEAN
Community 2015, ASEAN Secretariat News,
October 16th
2013.
people-oriented, people-centred and rules-based ASEAN
would be the central elements of a Post-2015 Vision of
the ASEAN Community.4
ASEAN had experienced robust economic growth
in the past decades, notably its “golden decade” of the
late 1980s and early 1990s before the Asian Financial
Crisis in 1997/1998. It continued to grow at an average
rate of around 5 percent in the 2000s until it was hit
again by the Global Financial Crisis and succeeding
global volatility since 2008. Comparatively, ASEAN
GDP grew moderately in the 2000s (see Table 1).
4 The Leaders requested the ASEAN Coordinating
Council (ACC) to further develop the central
elements of the post-2015 vision for
endorsement by the ASEAN Summit in 2014,
and for the ACC to establish a Working Group
of the ACC at the level of Senior Officials of the
three pillars to oversee the overall process of
developing this post-2015 vision by the 27th
ASEAN Summit, with progress reports
submitted to the 24th, 25th and 26th ASEAN
Summits. See the Bandar Seri Begawan
Declaration on the ASEAN Community
Post-2015 Vision.
http://www.asean.org/images/archive/23rdASE
ANSummit/bsb%20declaration%20on%20the%2
0asean%20communitys%20post%202015%20vis
ion%20-%20final.pdf
http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news
-
12 東協瞭望 010
Table 1: Average GDP and GDP Per Capita Growth (in percent)
GDP Growth 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2011
Brunei -1.65 3.17 1.35 2.08 0.94
Cambodia 8.49 6.46 7.18 9.36 6.80
Indonesia 6.93 7.83 1.06 4.71 5.86
Lao PDR 4.47 6.19 6.17 6.33 7.99
Malaysia 6.70 9.47 4.99 4.76 4.57
Myanmar -1.98 5.90 8.35 12.87 10.30
Philippines 4.74 2.19 3.59 4.60 4.75
Singapore 8.69 8.57 5.84 4.83 6.33
Thailand 10.34 8.50 0.87 5.45 3.09
Vietnam 4.16 8.21 6.96 7.51 6.83
ASEAN (Aggregate) 7.02 7.48 2.82 5.09 5.14
GDP Per Capita Growth 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2011
Brunei -4.37 0.35 -1.08 -0.03 -1.26
Cambodia 4.54 3.14 4.89 7.83 5.59
Indonesia 4.98 6.15 -0.29 3.40 4.73
Lao PDR 1.60 3.38 4.00 4.67 6.40
Malaysia 3.66 6.68 2.46 2.51 2.84
Myanmar -3.60 4.42 6.96 12.20 9.52
Philippines 2.03 -0.17 1.33 2.50 2.96
Singapore 6.38 5.50 3.37 3.06 2.93
Thailand 8.44 7.55 -0.27 4.30 2.38
Vietnam 1.96 6.11 5.64 6.35 5.67
ASEAN (Aggregate) 4.84 5.63 1.28 3.74 3.94
Source: UNCTAD Stat (2013)
The high economic growth rate of ASEAN is
correlated with high investment rate and a higher share
of international trade to national output. Many ASEAN
Member States show relatively high trade orientation,
particularly Malaysia, Thailand, Viet Nam and, to a
lesser extent, Cambodia. Among them, Singapore,
Malaysia and Thailand are the main ASEAN participants
in regional production networks or global value chains
(GVCs), and since recent years Vietnam’s increasing
participation in the production networks further makes
ASEAN a more important integral part in the rise of the
“Asian Factory”.
ASEAN integration efforts accelerated
tremendously in the past two decades from the ASEAN
tariff preferential arrangements (PTA) of the 1980s. In
1992 ASEAN endorsed the establishment of the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA), paving the way for deeper
economic integration within the ASEAN region and
broader cooperation with external countries. The six
ASEAN older Members – Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia,
-
AEC 2015: Taiwan Industry Response 13
Philippines, Singapore and Brunei -- agreed to reduce the
common effective preferential tariff (CEPT) rates to
0%–5% by 2008. At the Fifth ASEAN Summit in 1995,
the deadline was advanced to 2005, and later to 2003.
In 1995 ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Framework
Agreement on Services (AFAS), and later the ASEAN
Investment Area (AIA) in 1998, aiming to expand their
economic cooperation from merchandise trade to
services and investment. With ASEAN’s expanded
membership to its four new Members – Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV countries),5
these
economic agreements were adopted in its ten Member
States.
The outbreak of Asian financial crisis in 1997/1998
hit the fast growing economy of most ASEAN Member
States, and changed ASEAN’s plans of economic
integration – shifting from focusing on internal
cooperation towards an outward looking partnership with
East Asian countries.6 Since the early 2000s, ASEAN
gradually expanded economic cooperation with its six
Dialogue Partner countries. On the one hand, ASEAN
successfully concluded bilateral ASEAN+1 free trade
agreements (FTAs) with its six Dialogue Partner
countries, starting from China in 2004, South Korea in
2006, Japan in 2008, and India, Australia and New
Zealand in 2009.7 As of 2009, these 6 countries have
5 Viet Nam joined in 1995, followed by the Lao
PDR and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in
1999. 6 On 17 December 1997, ASEAN leaders in Kuala
Lumpur adopted “ASEAN Vision 2020”,
emphasizing its aim to build ASEAN as a
“ ...outward looking, living in peace, stability
and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in
dynamic development and in a community of
caring societies”. 7 Among the ASEAN+1 FTAs, Australia and New
Zealand together negotiated and singed with
ASEAN the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free
Trade Area (AANZFTA). The AANZFTA
Agreement is the first region-to-region FTA for
both ASEAN and Australia and New Zealand.
separately or jointly developed ASEAN+1 FTAs with
ASEAN. On the other hand, ASEAN cooperation under
the ASEAN+3 framework was formalized and
strengthened, and expanded to ASEAN+6 in the East
Asia Summit (EAS) in December 2005, and later to
ASEAN+8 by inviting the United States and the Russian
Federation in 2011.
Among the five ASEAN+1 FTAs, four FTAs have
completed and entered into effect, except for the
ASEAN-India FTA (AIFTA). The FTAs with China,
Japan and South Korea respectively marked the
establishment of networks of ASEAN-centered FTAs in
the Northeast Asia. Later on the FTA networks expanded
to Asia Pacific countries –Australia and New Zealand –
and further to India in South Asia. ASEAN has
successfully played as a platform bridging Northeast and
Southeast Asia and South Asia by connecting these
ASEAN+1 FTAs in these sub-regions.
According to a Mid-Term Review of the
Implementation of the AEC Blueprint conducted in 2012,
the Mid-Term Review highlights a number of significant
achievements of ASEAN towards AEC 2015 (Intal,
Ponciano et al, 2014). The most significant achievement
would be the tariff reduction. Intra-ASEAN tariffs
(CEPT) have drastically come down under the decade
long integration. For the ASEAN-6, the percentage of
items with zero tariff in CEPT rose from 40 percent in
2000 to 99.11 percent in 2012, while the percentage of
zero tariff in CEPT for CLMV countries rose from about
10 percent in 2000 to 67.6 percent in 2012. Averagely,
the ASEAN-6 tariff rate has been virtually zero (0.05
percent) since 2010, and the rate for CLMV countries is
1.69 percent in 2012 (see Figure 1). The elimination of
tariffs, supported by political commitments of ASEAN
Leaders, makes the integration of ASEAN a success
story
-
14 東協瞭望 010
Source: ASEAN Tariff Database 2013
Figure 1: Average CEPT Rates in ASEAN Countries: 2000-2012
ASEAN has also progressed significantly in the
services liberalization and investment liberalization.
According to the results of the ASEAN Business Outlook
Survey 2014 conducted by the American Chambers of
Commerce in ASEAN, the report indicates ASEAN has
incremental improvements in most factors affecting
investors’ satisfaction of local environment in many
ASEAN Member States (Intal, Ponciano et al, 2014).
According to the Mid-Term Review of the
Implementation of the AEC Blueprint, ASEAN is
moving towards the goals of the AEC 2015 Vision.
However, there are still main challenges ahead for
ASEAN as follows:
1. There are still large number of poor and
marginally non-poor in most of the ASEAN member
states. It is estimated that there were around 100 million
people in ASEAN who were still poor (1.25 $ PPP per
capita per day) in the late 2000s. Eliminating the number
of the poor is the dominant key challenge facing ASEAN
now and beyond 2015.
2. ASEAN’s overall competitiveness is still weak
and needs to improve. In a study of labour productivity
growth and total factor productivity growth during
1996-2011 for ten ASEAN Member States as well as
China, India, Korea, Taiwan, Japan, USA and Latin
America, The results show robust growth in labour
productivity, particularly in Cambodia, Viet Nam, and
Indonesia, and the Philippines. However, the growth of
total factor productivity has been very modest or even
negative for most of ASEAN Member States. The
study shows that ASEAN needs to improve its total
productivity growth performance relative to its East
Asian neighbors, in order to improve its competitiveness
and move up the global value chains (GVCs).
-
AEC 2015: Taiwan Industry Response 15
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database (2013)
Figure 2: Labour Productivity and TFP Growth in ASEAN and Selected Partners (Annual Average)
I.2 Competitive
Liberalization in East
Asia: TPP vs. RCEP
At the 19th
ASEAN Summit in November 2010, the
ASEAN Leaders adopted the ASEAN Framework for
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
In November 2012, at the 21st ASEAN Summit, ASEAN
Leaders announced the commencement of RCEP
negotiations in early 2013 and aim to complete them by
the end of 2015. The RCEP will comprise of 16
participating countries, namely ASEAN Member States,
China, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India.
The leaders commit to achieve a “comprehensive,
high-quality and mutually beneficial economic
partnership agreement establishing an open trade and
investment environment in the region to facilitate the
expansion of regional trade and investment and
contribute to global economic growth and
development”.8
8 Joint Declaration on the Launch of Negotiations
for the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership, November 20th
2012 in Phnom Penh,
Cambodia.
Since the announcement of the RCEP negotiations,
the world’s largest FTA in terms of population has
attracted increasing attention from within and around the
region. The total of RCEP participating countries’
combined output reached USD 21.3 trillion in 2013,
which accounts for nearly 30 percent of world output.
With regards to trade and investment flows in RCEP
economies, in 2013 total trade of RCEP participating
countries amounted to USD 10.7 trillion, equal to 29.0
percent of global trade, while total FDI inflows to RCEP
participating countries reached USD 339.8 billion, equal
to 23.4 percent of global FDI inflows.9
ASEAN’s decision to promote the RCEP was
regarded by many people a response to the US-led TPP
which may threaten ASEAN’s integrity and its central
role in leading the regional economic integration. With
every ASEAN Member State participating as original
member, the RECP is emphasized as an ASEAN-driven
9 Joint Media Statement, the Second RCEP
Ministerial Meeting, 27 August 2014, Nay Pyi
Taw, Myanmar,
http://www.asean.org/images/Statement/2014/au
g/2nd%20RCEP%20Minsterial%20Meeting%20
JMS%2028FINAL29.pdf
-
16 東協瞭望 010
or ASEAN-led regional initiative and regarded as a peer
to the TPP. On the other hand, the RCEP is planned to
include ASEAN+ 6 countries, and may potentially
expand to the US and Russia in the future if the two
negotiate an FTA with ASEAN. The RCEP integration
process encompasses a population and international trade
volume lager than that of the TPP, making it
economically more attractive than the TTP.
RCEP is not only important to achieve AEC
Blueprint’s second pillar of becoming a Competitive and
Dynamic ASEAN, it is also important in the Blueprint’s
fourth pillar -- Towards Full Integration into the Global
Economy. According to a report tasked by ASEAN
Secretariat on the future of the AEC 2015, the report
raises the importance of the RCEP, regarding it
ASEAN’s most important initiative in stepping up
further regional integration in East Asia as well as
ASEAN’s major expression of a global ASEAN(Intal,
Ponciano et al, 2014). It is largely perceived that both
RCEP and TPP can be pathways to East Asian economic
integration and the eventual formulation of a Free Trade
Area of Asia Pacific (FTAAP).10
The integration of the
current 16 RCEP participating countries and expansion
of its geographical coverage with its open accession
clause to enable new members in the future will
contribute to ASEAN’s ambition to have a larger voice
in the regional and global economy.
The TPP has evolved from the P411
to P9 and then
to the current 12 negotiating members (Australia, Brunei
10
For example, in 2010 APEC Leaders adopted
“Pathway to FTAAP”, recognized “FTAAP
should be pursued as a comprehensive free trade
agreement by developing and building on
ongoing regional undertakings, such as
ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, among others” . Pathway to FTAAP,
Yokohama, Japan, 14 Nov 2010. 11
The trade agreement began in 2005 as the
Trans-Pacific Strategic Partnership Agreement
(TPSEP) with 4 members – Singapore, Brunei,
Chile and New Zealand.
Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico,
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States, and
Vietnam). The agreement became strategically
important when in November 2009 the President of the
United States Barak Obama announced an intention to
participate and to conclude an “ambitious,
next-generation, Asia-Pacific trade agreement that
reflects U.S. economic priorities and values.” In the
past few years, several Asian Pacific economies have
expressed, formally or informally, their interests in
joining in the agreement, including Thailand, Philippines,
Korea and Taiwan. However, the TPP adopts very
restrictive rules in accepting new members. One of the
rules is that an interesting country or economy needs to
“demonstrate its full commitments to liberalization”
before it is admitted by consensus of all existing TPP
members to participate in the accession negotiations.
There are four ASEAN Member States participating
in the current TPP negotiations: Singapore, Brunei,
Malaysia and Vietnam. Among them, Singapore and
Brunei are the original members in the TPSEP, while
Malaysia and Vietnam participated in the negotiations
since 2009. When the TPP concludes among the current
12 members, the combined market potential would
attract more countries to follow suit. Although some
ASEAN Member States consider the high standards of
the TPP barriers for them to participate for the moment,
they may consider participation when they think they are
better prepared later. If more ASEAN Member States
turn their attention to the TPP, it may undermine the
RECP.
Facing TPP’s original timeline to complete
negotiations by 2013, the RCEP also sets a very tight
timeline to conclude its negotiations by end of 2015.
Furthermore, the TPP adheres to APEC’s open
regionalism, and has an open accession clause that
allows accession by “any other APEC economies or
countries” in the future. The RCEP also follows suit and
-
AEC 2015: Taiwan Industry Response 17
sets an open accession clause to open for “any other
ASEAN FTA partner countries or any other extra
economic partners in the region”. Contrast to APEC’s
open regionalism, ASEAN has been a closed forum and
has never adopted an open accession clause in its FTAs.
The open accession clause in RCEP reveals the influence
of the TPP. It also reflects ASEAN’s efforts in
considering expansion of economic integration beyond
its Dialogue partner countries.
In terms of economic incentives or potential gains,
it is often argued that RCEP will have larger economic
gains to individual ASEAN Member States and its FTA
partners. Firstly, with China and India participating in the
RCEP, the population and market size of RCEP will
provide larger economic gains than the TPP. Secondly,
the flexibility and respect for participating members’
different nature, instead of the “one size fits all”
approach adopted in the TPP, makes RCEP negotiations
easier than the TPP. Last but not least, RCEP will build
on the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs, meaning less
adjustment costs for ASEAN Member States.
II. The Changing
Taiwan-ASEAN Economic
and Trade Relation
Since the 1980s, scarcity of natural resources
and increasing land and labour costs had driven
Taiwanese firms to relocate their manufacturing
facilities in Southeast Asia and China. In the
meantime, Taiwan began to undertake industrial
re-structuring and upgrading by promoting ICT and
electronics industry and more value added services
at home in order to differentiate from its
competitors in the Asia Pacific region.
In the past decades, Taiwan’s FDIs in Southeast
Asia have undergone significant changes in different
periods of time. According to statistics, prior to the
middle to late 1990s, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia
remained the top three destinations of Taiwan’s outbound
FDIs in the region, accumulated FDIs in these three
countries accounting for up to 85% of the total FDIs in
the region. Most of the FDIs focused in manufacturing
sectors, aimed at exporting to North America and other
international markets. Most of the investors were small
and medium sized companies. It was only until around
middle of the 1990s that Taiwanese investors,
particularly larger companies, began to seriously look
into the potentials of the domestic markets of certain host
countries and then adjusted their investment decisions
and strategies accordingly.
In the same period, Taiwan’s FDIs began to move to
mainland China since the 1990s, followed by a gradual
shift of certain labour intensive manufacturing sectors,
such as furniture, textile, garment and footwear
industries, to Vietnam and Cambodia, among others.
Despite the government’s “Go South” policy in the
1990s trying to encourage investors to choose Southeast
Asia over China, the trend never returned to the region,
except for Vietnam and Singapore. In Vietnam,
Taiwanese investment first focused in labour intensive
manufacturing industry in South Vietnam, then expanded
to more capital- and technology-intensive industry in
North Vietnam, while in Singapore investment mainly
focused in services industry.
Due to political rivalry across the Taiwan
Straits since 1949, Taiwan government had not
opened up investment to China until 1992 when the
then President Lee Tung Hui decided to officially
relax bans on cross straits economic exchanges and
allowed trade with and indirect investment in
China.12
During the period 1990-2012, the
12
The government of Taiwan had adopted a
No-Engagement policy with China since 1949
until Present Lee relaxed the bans and allowed
Taiwanese citizens to visit China and indirect
trade and investment in 1992.
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18 東協瞭望 010
government had approved more than 40,000
investment projects in China, total reported volumes
reaching USD124.5 billion. It is informally
estimated that, if unreported or indirect investment
included, investment in China by Taiwanese firms
may well reach USD250 to USD300 billion,
accounting for more than 70 percent of Taiwan’s
total overseas investment. The high concentration,
together with the fact that exports to China
(including via Hong Kong) comprise of around 40
percent of Taiwan’s total exports, indicates the
dependence on China is not only an economic issue
but also a national security issue.
The production networks or value chains
established by Taiwan-invested manufacturing
operations in China and Southeast Asia not only
have created millions of jobs across those countries
but have also helped develop manufacturing
industries and made possible economic restructuring
in some host countries. For example, in the 1990s,
more than 200 Taiwanese electronics firms invested
in Penang, Malaysia, and helped establish one of the
most important electronics industrial clusters in
Southeast Asia at that time.
In China, Taiwanese firms have also
contributed significantly to the development of
several industries, ranging from textiles and
garment, footwear, toys to electronics and electrical
machinery. Benefitted from capital, technology and
management knowhow brought by Taiwanese firms,
China was hence able to establish production
networks which later became the base for its
successful development of GVCs today.
It is important to note that there is a close
correlation between Taiwanese FDI in Southeast Asia
(and India) and Taiwanese FDI in China. Starting
from mid-2000s when investment environment in
China began to appear less favorable, some
Taiwanese firms began to look outside China in
search of both overseas investment destinations and
new markets in order to diversify dependence on
China. Wage increase, shortage of labour in
Southeast coastal provinces of China and
enforcement of new labour and environmental laws
all drove an increasing number of Taiwanese firms
away from the once “World Factory”. Some
Southeast Asian countries, particularly the
“emerging markets” such as Vietnam, Indonesia and
Cambodia, and India hence began to entice these
investors with their abundant labour force and
comparably low wages. The sharp growth contrasted
with the consecutive decline of FDI flows to China
since 2009 implies that Taiwanese firms are
“returning” to Southeast Asia.
According to data of host countries in ASEAN,
the total volume of FDI stock from Taiwan to
ASEAN as of June 2014 amounted to around USD
83.63 billion. However, as this amount does not
include the Taiwanese investment via third country
or by a holding company registered in a third
country, it is estimated that the real investment from
Taiwan, directly and indirectly, may be significantly
larger. For example, according to Ministry of
Planning and Investment in Vietnam, Taiwanese FDI
stock totaled USD 27.61 billion. Taiwan’s informal
estimation was around USD 40.0 billion. Therefore,
Taiwanese investment is ASEAN has been largely
under-presented due to the incomplete statistics.
According to ASEAN statistics, as of June of 2014,
Taiwanese FDI stock ranks as No. 3 in Thailand, No.4 in
Malaysia and Vietnam, No. 6 in Cambodia, and No. 9 in
the Philippines and Indonesia.13
Although Taiwan is still
13
Department of Investment Service, Ministry of
Economic Affairs, at
http://www.dois.moea.gov.tw/asp/relation3.asp
-
AEC 2015: Taiwan Industry Response 19
a principle investor in Southeast Asia, it lags far behind
major competitors such as Japan and Korea, and faces
growing threats from China, a late comer but catching up
at full speed.
According to ASEAN statistics, Taiwan ranked
as the 9th
among the top 10 of ASEAN largest source
of FDI. During 2011 and 2013, Taiwanese FDI
accounted for around 1.0 percent of ASEAN’s total
FDI inflows (see Figure 3).
Source: ASEAN Secretariat.
Figure 3: Top 10 Sources of FDI inflows in ASEAN (2011~2013)
The investment in the region has boosted bilateral
trade and other economic activities between Taiwan and
ASEAN countries. Among Taiwan’s exports to ASEAN,
a significant share is made by Taiwanese manufacturers
importing from Taiwan machineries, raw materials,
components, spare parts and semi-finished products
needed for local product assembly for re-exporting to
international markets. However, on the other hand,
growth of imports from Taiwan has slowed down in
recent years, attributing mainly to higher level of
localization and establishment or re-structuring of
regional supply chain by Taiwanese investors in
collaboration with local manufacturers.
In addition, Taiwanese investors have repeated
faced with trade and investment barriers and all kinds of
obstacles in administrative procedures in their operations
in certain ASEAN countries. Lack of harmonization in
technical regulations, customs procedures, product
standards, among others, increase their transaction costs
and reduce their competitiveness.
III. Taiwan’s Response:
Emerging Trends
Taiwan has developed close ties with ASEAN
Member States in the last three decades. The
interconnected trade and investment flows have formed
deep economic interdependence and de facto integration
in the region. Most of all, Taiwanese investments in
ASEAN have enabled the investment-driven trade, or
trade-investment-nexus, between Taiwan and ASEAN
and, and in some cases between China, thus benefiting
both Taiwan and ASEAN in participating in the regional
product networks. However, in response to accelerated
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20 東協瞭望 010
development in the ASEAN-centric integration,
including the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs that are
implemented since early 2000s, and the new initiatives of
the RCEP and the TPP currently under negotiation, more
Taiwanese firms are planning or considering relocation
of operations into ASEAN. To be more specific, three
types of relocation are now taking place: relocation from
Taiwan into ASEAN, relocation from China into ASEAN,
and relocation within ASEAN region from more
advanced countries to CLMV countries.
The second trend of the emerging investment
activities is the development of Taiwanese-based
industrial zone or industrial parks in the host countries.
This includes a number of Taiwan industrial zones or
parks under development or in plan in Indonesia,
Myanmar, Vietnam and Cambodia. Taiwan-based
industrial zones would facilitate Small and Medium
Sized Taiwanese companies to invest overseas, and most
of all, facilitate development of sector-specific industrial
clusters in the host countries.
Thirdly, in the past years Taiwanese services sector
has followed the manufacturing industries and their
clients to set foot in ASEAN. The financial services and
logistics and transportation are among the most active
investors, due to maturated domestic market in Taiwan.
Because of the restrictions in services sector in most
ASEAN Member States, most of the service companies
choose to invest in joint venture or through M&A.
In early 2014, President Ma Ying Jeou of Taiwan
announced that Taiwan will try all efforts to join the TPP
and the RCEP in order to help Taiwan industry to
compete with their Korean and Japanese competitors on
a level playing field. The decision is based on the fact
that both the TPP and the RCEP have an open accession
clause that enables new member economies to accede on
a consensus base. However, given the accession clause,
the path to the TPP and RCEP is full of political and
economic barriers.
There are growing concerns that Taiwan will be
excluded and discriminated in the regional integration.
While ASEAN moves toward an economic and political
community, Taiwan has to work with ASEAN and its
Member States to promote a new partnership that would
respond to common interests and shared prosperity.
ASEAN also needs to work with Taiwan in order to
further benefit from Taiwan’s outward investment trends
and unique role in regional/global value chains.
IV. Conclusions and the
Way Forward
ASEAN has played a key role in driving the
economic integration within the region and with external
trading partners surrounding the region. The AEC 2015
Vision is not yet fully fulfilled, but ASEAN has managed
to make significant achievements, particularly the
elimination of tariffs and other forms of non-tariff
barriers among ASEAN Member States and with its FTA
Partner countries. Beyond 2015, ASEAN is going to
expand economic integration to its Dialogue Partner
countries through the negotiations of the RCEP.
Therefore, for countries such as Taiwan that does not yet
have an FTA with ASEAN, and may not be part of RECP
in the near future, Taiwan cannot afford to be excluded
from the ASEAN-centric integration. The changing
investment climate in China also drives the investment
activities in ASEAN. The emerging trend of Taiwanese
companies “returning” to ASEAN explains the
importance of ASEAN to Taiwan.
There are different approaches of Taiwanese
companies’ investment plans, including more investment
activities in CLMV countries, development of
Taiwan-based industrial zones or clusters, more frequent
use of M&A, among others. All the investment plans
should be based on knowledge of investment regulations,
-
AEC 2015: Taiwan Industry Response 21
careful study and well-schemed business plans and
adequate risk assessment. Most of all, the government
should provide assistance and support to companies
planning to invest in ASEAN and ensure the host
countries will provide adequate investment protection
and facilitation.
Bibliography
ASEAN Secretariat. ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat,
2007.
ASEAN Secretariat. ASEAN Community in Figures 2012. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2013.
Available at:
http://www.asean.org/images/2013/resources/statistics/web_ACIF2012_e-publish.pdf
Asian Development Bank. Asian Development Outlook 2014 Update. Manila: ADB, 2014.
Asian Development Bank. 2014. ASEAN 2030: Toward a Borderless Economic Community.
Manila: ADB, 2014.
Fukunaga, Y., and I. Isono. ‘Taking ASEAN+1 FTAs towards the RCEP: A Mapping Study’,
ERIA Discussion Paper Series 2013-02. Jakarta: ERIA, 2013.
Intal, Ponciano, et al, ASEAN Rising: ASEAN and AEC Beyond 2015, Jakarta: ERIA, 2014.
Pal, Pathapratim, Arpita Mukherjee, and Kristy Tsun-Tzu Hsu. Enhancing Trade, Investment and
Cooperation between India and Taiwan. New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2013.
The Conference Board. 2013 Productivity Brief: Key Findings. New York: The Conference
Board, Inc, 2013.
UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2013– Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for
Development. Geneva: UNCTAD, 2013.
UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2014– Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan. Geneva:
UNCTAD, 2014.
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22
AASSEEAANN,, AAEECC AANNDD EEMMEERRGGIINNGG IISSSSUUEESS IINN
IINNVVEESSTTMMEENNTT::
WWhhaatt RRoollee ffoorr MMaallaayyssiiaa?? Dr Zakariah Abdul Rashid
Executive Director
Malaysian Institute of Economic Research
Introduction
National policy-makers in ASEAN have
accepted that there are considerable benefits to be
accrued from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),
especially in manufacturing. FDI has the advantage
that brings with it financial capital, management
know-how, product knowledge, manufacturing and
other processes, distribution networks, brands and
marketing skills. All this saves the recipient
country the time, effort and risks involved in
creating all these requirements for export
competitiveness. FDI also helps to diversify the
economy away from primary production, upgrading
the existing manufacturing sector through raising
productivity, and increasing efficiency through
exposure to greater competition. Further, it is
always the case that there are more employment
opportunities that are created. Therefore, an
important component of the growth strategies of
most ASEAN countries is to attract foreign
investment.
It has been noted that despite numerous
attempts and initiatives to create an appropriate
investment climate for foreign investors, ASEAN
continues to struggle in raising inward FDI beyond
levels achieved prior to the Asian financial crisis
of 1997–98. In fact, looking at ASEAN’s share
of the stock of global FDI over the past three
decade, it can be observed that this share rose to a
peak of more than 5% just before the financial
crisis of 1997. Although this figure has been
rising over the past few years, ASEAN’s stock of
world FDI has not as vibrant as in the pre-1996
levels. In terms of the annual flow of FDI,
ASEAN’s share has ebbed significantly in the
2000s from an average of 8% in the mid-1990s
before recovering to about 6% in 2010.
An area of concern is ASEAN’s declining
proportion of both stock within and flow of FDI
into developing countries. ASEAN accounts for
around 15% of developing countries’ total stock of
FDI for the last decade and this is lower than its
peak of 20% before the financial crisis. Its share of
annual FDI flows has experienced a dramatic
decline, hovering at around 14% in 2010 as
compared to 37% in 1990.
Further, there is increased competition for FDI
in ASEAN. In the 1990s the ASEAN countries
were leaders in pursuing the policy of export -led
growth policies. With the opening up of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and following
that of India, there is stiff competition to ASEAN
in claiming the FDI share. The economic rise of the
PRC and India has attracted the attention of
investors eager to take advantage of the massive
economies of scale offered by the huge and rapidly
growing consumer markets in these giants whose
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ASEAN, AEC AND EMERGING ISSUES IN INVESTMENT:
What Role for Malaysia? 23
middle classes in particular are enjoying
substantial growth in spending.
In fact, the PRC has overtaken ASEAN in FDI
received in 2010 while its stock of total FDI is also
rising quickly. On the other hand, India still lags
behind ASEAN, but is picking up momentum and
could soon pose a much bigger threat to the
region’s share of world FDI. Further, with the new
government in place in India, with its
outward-looking policies and its assurance to open
up to foreign investment, there is every possibility
that India will join the fray in laying a claim to
FDI.
Indeed, other developing countries have also
started developing export-led strategies by opening
up their industries to foreign investors. Specific
cases are Brazil and the Russian Federation, both
of which have undertaken market reforms and
provided investors with new options and this will
further threaten ASEAN’s share of total FDI.
The AEC Blueprint as a
Catalyst to Raise FDI
Bhaskaran argues that there is a gap between
the capacity to deliver high returns in some key
ASEAN economies and the low investment rates
that they actually achieve. Although returns on
investment have been reasonable, ASEAN is unable
to break out of a downward trend in overall
investment. Using data on comparable rates of
return on investments by US corporations across
the world, Bhaskaran points out that ASEAN’s
return on capital has indeed declined below the
levels in the early 1990s but is still not lower
relative to the world average despite a sharp fall in
the returns premium after the global crisis of 2008.
Analysing the return performance for US
multinational companies (MNCs) in Asia, he shows
evidence that ASEAN has held up well, even as the
PRC and India have improved. He makes the
following points:
First, return on capital is not the sole determinant of
investment decisions;
Second, ASEAN’s fortunes are highly tied to the
global economy: a big decline in world economic
health affects the profits of firms in ASEAN more
negatively than in other economies such as the PRC
and India.
Third, investors demand risk premiums for
investing in ASEAN countries as theoretically there
should not be an outflow of investments if returns
are higher than or matches other economies outside
the region.
These observations suggest that efforts to
enhance the investment climates of the region
should focus on reducing country risks for firms in
ASEAN economies in order to attract and retain
investment.
The AEC was endorsed by ASEAN leaders at
the Bali Summit in October 2003 as one of the
three pillars of the ASEAN Community vision. In
general, the AEC aims to integrate ASEAN into the
global economy and create a single market and
production base where goods, services, capital and
labor flow freely, so that equitable development
can be realized within the region. The successful
construction of the AEC will have tremendous
implications for investment flows into and within
ASEAN by expanding the economies of scale and
scope in the region. In 2007, ASEAN leaders
agreed to push forward the AEC deadline to 2015
and approved the AEC Blueprint, which provides
-
24 東協瞭望 010
detailed outlines and commitments to achieve the
unified market. The AEC Blueprint has four major
components:
1. Single Market and
Production Base
Free flow of goods including the elimination of
tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs), rules of origin
harmonization and rationalization, trade facilitation,
customs integration (including the ASEAN Single
Window), and standards and technical barriers to
trade (including mutual recognition arrangements,
or MRAs). Trade in goods receives the most
attention, in part because it includes areas relevant
to the entire AEC project (such as customs and
other areas of trade facilitation).
Free flow of services through a progressive increase
in sectoral coverage, a commitment to advance
mutual recognition of professional qualifications
and services, and financial services liberalization
through an ASEAN-X formula.
Free flow of investment, particularly FDI, building
on the process initiated by the ASEAN Investment
Area (AIA). The AEC will integrate several
agreements pertinent to FDI, such as investment
protection, and emphasize the cornerstones of the
AIA (i.e., national treatment, investment facilitation
and cooperation, and promotion). This will be done
under the ASEAN Comprehensive Agreement on
Investment (ACIA).
Freer flow of capital, as a means to strengthen
ASEAN capital market development and harmonize
capital market standards and practices in order to
facilitate cross-border transactions. It also envisions
greater capital mobility and liberalization, through
an emphasis on orderly processes and guarantees of
safeguards to maintain stability.
Free flow of skilled labor, especially to facilitate
FDI and trade in services, through MRAs and
concordance of skills and qualifications. More
rapid liberalization of the 12 priority integration
sectors — wood- based products, automotives,
rubber-based products, textiles and apparels,
electronics, agro-based products, fisheries,
e-ASEAN, healthcare, air travel, tourism and
logistics.
2. Competitive Economic
Region
Establishment of a clear competition policy to
ensure a level playing field in the integrated
ASEAN market.
Consumer protection, including the creation of an
ASEAN Coordinating Committee on Consumer
Protection.
Regional commitments in intellectual property
rights protection, based on the ASEAN IPR Action
Plan (2004–2010) and accession to the Madrid
Protocol.
Infrastructure development to improve transport
links, narrow development gaps, and enhance
regional information infrastructure.
Sectoral cooperation in energy and mining to create
stable supplies and enhance efficiency.
Taxation rationalization, featuring a bilateral
network that would avoid double taxation.
Approaches to e-commerce, to be implemented
through the e-ASEAN Framework Agreement.
3. Equitable Economic
Development
Fostering SME development in ASEAN, with an
emphasis on taking advantage of ASEAN’s
diversity.
Enhancing the goals of the Initiative for ASEAN
Integration launched in 2000, to narrow
development gaps between older ASEAN–6
-
ASEAN, AEC AND EMERGING ISSUES IN INVESTMENT:
What Role for Malaysia? 25
members and the newer ASEAN members
(CLMV).
4. Integration into the
Global Economy
ASEAN is to work toward “ASEAN Centrality” in
external foreign economic relations (including in
the area of free trade areas and other preferential
arrangements with non-partners).
Enhanced participation in global supply networks,
with a strong dedication to the adoption of best
international practices and standards.
The AEC Blueprint provides a comprehensive
framework to increase investment because it
contains many mutually reinforcing measures that
will improve the investment climate of individual
countries as well as the region as a whole. For
example, sectoral cooperation will allow
resource-rich but ill-equipped countries to learn
and absorb technology from more developed
members, increasing both its human and capital
stock. A single market and production base will
allow for more efficient allocation of resources via
the phasing out of uncompetitive firms and better
flow of information and also increase potential
economies of scale through a bigger market.
The study by Aldaba and Yap (2009) is useful
in identifying the impacts of FDI flows. First, they
underscore the importance of ACIA. This is a
more comprehensive agreement to foster
investment than previous agreements. It provides
a wide range of investment provisions on
investment liberalization, most-favored-nation
status, national treatment, and investment
protection, promotion and facilitation. With the
initiatives to lift foreign ownership restrictions,
sector restrictions and performance requirements it
can be expected that there will be an increase in
FDI. Also, deeper integration features, such as the
legislation and harmonization of standards,
competition and custom laws, intellectual property
rights and dispute settlement mechanisms, will
improve the region’s investment climate
particularly in services.
Second, the establishment of AEC and the
improvement of trade flows will significantly raise
the level of vertical FDI in the region. This is
because the development of complex networks due
to the fragmentation of production and trade in
parts and components will dominate intra-regional
trade and investment.
Third, a larger market will prove more
attractive for foreign MNCs. The effect of
regional integration through AEC will create a
larger market, which will attract MNCs to invest in
the region. It can be expected that regional
integration may affect FDI by generating growth,
although the causation for the positive relationship
between FDI and economic growth is uncertain.
Finally, Aldaba and Yap (2009) draw on
evidence from elsewhere to show that regional
agreements tend to have a positive impact on FDI.
They point out that the EU, NAFTA and Mercosur
have had a positive impact on FDI inflows and
indeed that economic integration in these regions
promoted investment.
The AEC Blueprint is meant to and will
encourage the integration of ASEAN. It is
comprehensive and it has disciplines that will
encourage member states to show progress in key
areas. However, there are challenges. These are
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26 東協瞭望 010
of a political nature arising from vested interests
and fear of competition. The main problem,
however, is the fact that ASEAN member states
come from diverse levels of economic development;
and there are historical factors, territorial disputes
and misunderstandings that sometimes hinder
cooperation.
Despite the shortcomings, it is important to
realize that such top-down initiatives such as the
AEC encourage bottom-up integration processes,
which will allow the region to emerge increasingly
like a single market over time. Indeed, as far as the
private sector is concerned they are always
interested in investment; and will welcome a
more closely interlinked ASEAN. They have
realized the need to provide support to the AEC’s
ambitious plans in order to tap into the value of
economic integration.
For instance, Air Asia is working toward its
goal of a single ASEAN aviation authority by
setting up an office in Jakarta to engage with the
ASEAN Secretariat. CEOs from major private
sector companies like CIMB Bank, Bangkok Bank,
Air Asia and the Ayala Group have jointly
launched the ASEAN Business Club (ABC) in
order to engage in ASEAN community building
efforts. The advantage of regional integrations is
seen, for example, in Singaporean and Malaysian
banks and telecommunication firms have invested
heavily in the region. Siam Cement is gearing up to
invest 75% of its 2012–16 investment fund to
acquire assets in ASEAN countries. As
Bhaskaran points out, even companies outside
ASEAN have started to take notice of ASEAN as
an integrated region. He cites the example of
Shin Shin-Etsu Chemical, Japan’s largest chemical
producer, which has invested US$64 million to
build two chemical plants in Viet Nam with the
hope of serving a large base of customers in the
region.
ASEAN as a Single Market
and Production Base
One of the four primary objectives of the
coming ASEAN Economic Community is to
become a single market and production base with
five core elements: the free flow of goods, services,
investment, and labor, and the freer flow of capital.
In turn, the objective of the ASEAN
Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) that
came into effect on 29 March 2012 is to bolster
ASEAN investment by establishing a free, open,
transparent and integrated investment regime for
domestic and international investors throughout the
ASEAN member states that supports the economic
integration of the region before and after the
ASEAN Economic Community integration in 2015.
The ASEAN Secreariat published the ACIA
Guidebook in 2013 which details the strengths and
benefits of the Agreement for potential investors.
Two earlier ASEAN investment frameworks,
the ASEAN Investment Area agreement (AIA) and
the Investment Guarantee Agreements (IGA), make
up the foundation of the ASEAN Comprehensive
Investment Agreement. The ACIA improves on
the two earlier agreements in a number of areas by
means of:
Adopting international best practices that help
protect investors and their investments and
providing increased protections
Following recent trends in international investment
practices that encourage less restrictive investment
regimes
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ASEAN, AEC AND EMERGING ISSUES IN INVESTMENT:
What Role for Malaysia? 27
Including portfolio investment and intellectual
property as well as broader definitions of investors
and investments
Allowing third-country nationals to benefits from
the ACIA
Encouraging a higher level of transparency in
investment rulemaking
Adopting Investor-State Dispute Settlement
mechanisms (ISDS) and promoting alternative
dispute resolution methods.
Liberalization, Protection, Facilitation, and
Promotion are the ACIA’s four pillars, and to
achieve the end goal of the ASEAN Economic
Community by 2015, its guiding principles
include:
Achieving a free and open investment environment
in the region through progressive investment
liberalization and improving the transparency and
predictability of investment rules, regulations and
procedures conducive to increased investment
Benefiting domestic and international investors and
their investments based in ASEAN and providing
enhanced protection to investors and their
investments
Promoting the ASEAN region as a whole as an
integrated investment area that has favourable
conditions for domestic and international
investment
Maintaining and according preferential treatment
among Member States with no back-tracking of
commitments made under previous agreements
Granting special and differential treatment and other
flexibilities to Member States with no back-tracking
of commitments made under previous agreements
Openness to expand the scope of the ACIA to cover
other sectors in the future
The overall goal of the ASEAN
Comprehensive Investment Agreement is to
establish a free, open, transparent and integrated
investment regime for domestic and international
investors throughout the ASEAN region, and the
ACIA’s benefits include investment liberalization,
non-discrimination, transparency, investor
protections, and Investor-State Dispute Settlement.
Therefore, the benefits will be as follows:
a. Investment Liberalization
The Agreement liberalizes cross border
investment in five sectors: manufacturing,
agriculture, fishery, forestry, mining and quarrying,
and the services incidental to each. Each ASEAN
member state submitted a list of reservations for
these sectors, and anything not on the list is subject
to national policy, liberalized and open to ASEAN
investors. Each member state is then responsible
to reduce or eliminate their reservation list in
accordance with the three phases of the Strategic
Schedule of the AEC Blueprint.
To help promote the ASEAN rgion as an
integrated investment area that has favourable
conditions for domestic and international
investment, all member states agree through the
ACIA to:
Create the necessary environment to promote all
forms of investment and new growth areas in
ASEAN
Promote intra-ASEAN investment, particularly
investments from ASEAN-6 (Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand)
into the less developed ASEAN countries
Nurture the growth and development of Small and
Medium Enterprises
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28 東協瞭望 010
Promote joint investment initiatives focusing on
regional clusters and production networks
b. Non-Discrimination
Equality in treatment for ASEAN investors
and their investments is another important function
of the ACIA. The Agreement’s National
Treatment and Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment
principles obligate the ASEAN member states to
not discriminate and treat ASEAN investors less
favourably than either local or foreign competitors.
Under National Treatment, an ASEAN country
agrees to treatment investors from any ASEAN
country no less favourably than it would treat its
investors in the admission, establishment,
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct,
operation and sale or other disposition of
investments in its territory. Under
Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, all ASEAN
investors must be treated equally and this includes
investors from non-ASEAN countries. In
addition, member states cannot impose any specific
nationality requirements on senior management
unless there is an official published reservation,
and if a member state requires the board of
directors in a foreign company to be of a particular
nationality or be residents, it cannot impair the
ability of the investor to control its investment.
The ACIA also guarantees no performance
requirements and cannot impose conditions like
minimum local contents, export requirements, or
trade balancing requirements.
c. Transparency
Another of the ACIA’s guiding principles is to
improve the transparency and predictability of
investment rules, regulations and procedures
conducive to increased investment. These
include:
Harmonized investment policies that lead to
investment policy convergence
Streamlined and simplified procedures for
investment applications and approvals
Dissemination of information on rules, regulations,
policies and procedures affecting investors and their
investments within ASEAN
d. Investor Protection
The ACIA also provides enhanced protection
to investors and their investments including fair
and equitable treatment, full protection and
security, no unlawful expropriation, compensation
in cases of strife, and free transfer of funds. The
ASEAN member states have agreed to give all
covered investments under the ACIA fair and
equitable treatment, to not deny justice in any legal
or administrative proceedings according to the
principles of due process, and that the host country
will not make arbitrary decisions and follow it
rules and regulations.
e. Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Another valuable component of the ACIA is its
Investor-State Dispute Settlement mechanisms
(ISDS) and the promotion of alternative dispute
resolution methods. ASEAN investors can
resolve disputes by using domestic courts and
tribunals, through international arbitration
including ICSID, UNCITRAL, and other agreed
rules, and by means of alternative dispute methods:
mediation, conciliation, and consultation &
negotiation. A disputing investor must show that
it incurred a loss or damage by reason of or arising
out of the breach of the host ASEAN member state
of its obligations under ACIA relating to the
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ASEAN, AEC AND EMERGING ISSUES IN INVESTMENT:
What Role for Malaysia? 29
management, conduct, operation or sale or other
disposition of a covered investment. For any
disagreements about ACIA interpretation other
than investment disputes, all parties must use the
existing ASEAN State-to-State dispute settlement
mechanism under the ASEAN Protocol on
Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism.
Trade Agreements and
ASEAN
ASEAN has achieved formidable economic
development since 1990. In all ASEAN member
states (AMS), both poverty rate and gap are
reducing substantially and the share of the middle
income class is also rising. This is possible due to
significant economic progress and transformation
with high growth particularly in 1985-96, which
was considered as the region's golden
decade. However, the growth moderated in
2000s. Indeed, AEC has been instrumental in
bring about this development.
However, there are still many challenges such
as the prevalence of large number of poor and
vulnerable people in most AMSs, mixed record of
income inequality and still much to be desired with
respect to the level of competitiveness.
AEC thus promises many hopes, which can be
realized provided that it is fully functioning. But
what matters most is to keep the ambition and
momentum of the economic community transcend
2015 target. For this, ASEAN does not need to
reinvent the wheel for the regional grouping vision
transcending 2015, the 1997 ASEAN vision 2020,
has provided the necessary impetus. ASEAN
vision of 2020 sees the region as concert of
robustly growing middle income and high income
AMSs, an economic community of dynamic
development, which is not only inclusive, resilient,
sustainable and people-centred but also strong,
outward-looking and globally engaged.
Built upon the vision, ASEAN beyond 2015
envisages by 2030 the "ASEAN Miracle" will be
realized, wherein ASEAN economy will achieve
sustained high growth, eliminating dire poverty
and the prevalence of middle class population. It
will also be competitive and dynamic, making it
highly attractive to investors. The region will also
be markedly more resilient.
The ASEAN Miracle can be realized provided
it puts in place a strong foundation and is
supported by the necessary pillars. One of the
pillars to achieve ASEAN miracle is the region has
to be globally engaged wherein it will be well
integrated into the global economy, drives further
regional integration in East Asia, and raises
ASEAN's voice internationally. As globalization
is inevitable and the region is gradually integrated
into the world economy, ASEAN certainly not only
needs to develop a coherent approach towards
external economic relations but also sets a strategy
to enhance participation in global supply network.
The most outstanding attempt to achieve
regional integration that is linked to the wider
global market is the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement. RCEP
is a framework that builds on the existing
ASEAN+1 FTAs and it allows the participation of
all AMS. An open accession clause allows the
participation of ASEAN FTA partner to participate
at the pace that they choose and it allows for other
external partners to join subject to the mutual
approval of all AMS.
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30 東協瞭望 010
Further, RCEP takes the ASEAN-way in that it
is based on a consensus approach, with all AMS
agreeing to any decision that is taken. This
provides flexibility in convergence to desired goals,
while also acknowledging the different levels of
development and the divergence in backgrounds
and interests. Nevertheless, there is a common
interest among all AMS to raise the level of growth,
development and
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