jordi barrat

E-VOTING, TRANSPARENCY AND THE IMPORTANCE IN THE CERTIFICATION

PROCESSES

Dr. Jordi Barrat i Esteve

University of Alacant

jordi.barrat@ua.es

OUTLINE

I – Certification topics.

II – Electoral transparency: what does it mean?

III – Best (?) practices

IV – Transparency: key elements NDAs

V – Finish NDA. We can do it better!

VI – Concluding remarks

TRA

TRANPARANCEY

CERTIFICATION TOPICS

I – What is the certification of electronic voting devices?

II –Who should certify the e-voting machines?III – How should e-voting machines be certified?

Which criteria should we use?

IV – Should the results be disclosed?

TRA

TRANPARANCEY

TRANSPARENCY

ELECTORAL TRANSPARENCY

a) Democracy = Transparency. It is the only way to control our public institutions.

b) Currently everybody understand how our votes are tallied. The process is fully transparent. Citizens themselves have the control. They do not need technicians.

c) E-voting should provide the same degree of confidence and transparency, but often ...

BEST (?) PRACTICES: FRANCE

• February 3rd 2006 / The government rejected to disclose the certification reports of e-voting machines because this measure could dammage:

• “le secret industriel et commercial ... [et] compromettre le bon déroulement des élections”

• “the commercial and industrial secrecy ... [and] endanger the correct electoral management)

BEST (?) PRACTICES: BELGIUM

The certification report is only delivered to:

– Vendors

– Government

– Collège des Experts / Independent body, access to all the documentation, non-binding report after the elections.

Not bad, let's try to improve these practices ...

KEY ELEMENTS

Some key elements to ensure e-voting transparency during certification processes:

• Obviously the certification report, but also ...• Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA)• List of requirements to be certified

• Identity of the certification bodies

• Economic conditions

• ...

NDA: Non-Disclosure Agreement

USA Database:accurate-voting.org/contracts

Finland / Local Elections:www.effi.org/blog/2008-03-20-Tapani-Tarvainen.htmlwinston.effi.org/system/files?file=22413-NDA-muut.pdf

Austria / Student Federationwww.asit.at/pdfs/nds_asit.pdf

Finland / CASE I

“Companies do not warrant the accuracy or

completeness of any information disclosed under this

Agreement. All information is delivered on an 'as is'

basis, without a warranty of any kind” (§ 8-2)

Is it possibe to conduct a fair certification task with this

condition?

Finland / CASE II

“If the Confidential Information or the copies or reproductions of

it cannot be returned, the Consultant undertakes to promptly

destroy them. This obligation also includes any information or messages exchanged in relation to the Audit, including without

limitations any email messages or internal notes”(§ 7)

In case of disagreement, how will the correctness of the

certification task be proved afterwards? The evidences have to

be destroyed or returned to the e-voting vendor!

Finland / CASE III

“the openness and confidentiality provisions of the Act on the

Openness of Government Activities (621/1999) do not apply to the Consultant” (§ 4)

“Due to the Act on the Openness of Government Activities

Oikeusministeriö and TietoEnator have agreed that no other

documents, summaries or information, in any form whatsoever,

will be provided by the Consultant to Oikeusministeriö than the

Report” (§ 9-1)

Why should the Government not be interested in receiving more

information from the Consultant?

Concluding remarks

1.- Certification without transparency is a bad solution. It will not generate

enough citizen confidence in e-voting methods. Even with computer devices,

the citizenry has the right to know.

2.- Transparency goes far beyond the disclosure of the final certification report.

There are other key elements, like NDAs.

3.- The disclosure of NDAs should not be problematic and it will provide

sensitive data on the role of each stakeholder and the balance between public

and business interests.

4.- At least some NDAs are cleaaly biassed. Their way to protect the vendor's

interests does not allow a fair and public supervision of e-voting devices.

More details at:

[2009/2010] “El voto electrónico ante intereses contradictorios: la razón comercial

contra el principio democrático. A propósito de lo compromisos comerciales de

confidencialidad (CCC)”,

xxx, València: CEPS, forthcoming

III Congreso Internacional de Estudios Electorales, Salamanca: SOMEE, 2009.

(2008) “The Certification of E-Voting Mechanisms. Fighting against Opacity” in

KRIMMER, Robert / GRIMM, Rüdiger (eds.) Electronic Voting 2008, (Col. “Lecture

Notes in Informatics – LNI” / P-131), Gesellschaft für Informatik, Bonn, pp. 197-206.

www.e-voting.cc/files/barrat-i-esteve__certification-of-e-voting_197-206

(2007/2008) "Los procesos de certificación de los sistemas electrónicos de votación"

in Paloma BIGLINO CAMPOS (dir.), Nuevas expectativas democráticas y elecciones,

Iustel, Madrid, pp. 157-192 / also at Revista General de Derecho Constitucional, 4.

MANGE TAK!!MOLTES GRÀCIES!!

THANK YOU!!