german light cruisers of world war ii: emden, konigsberg, karlsruhe, koln, leipzig, nurnberg
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Theship’s8.8cmL/45gunsdominatethisviewofKönigsbergduringaninspectionbyseniorofficers
Copyright©Bernard&GraefeVerlag,Bonn,1983,1994Englishlanguageedition©LionelLeventhalLtd,2002
ThiseditionfirstpublishedinGreatBritainin2014bySeaforthPublishing,
Pen&SwordBooksLtd,47ChurchStreet,BarnsleyS702AS
www.seaforthpublishing.com
BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationDataAcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritish
Library
ISBN:9781848321946EPUBISBN:9781473850095PRCISBN:9781473850279
ThisvolumeistranslatedfromEmden:EinName–fünfSchiffe,firstpublished1983,
andDieLeichtenKreuzerKönigsberg,Karlsruhe,Köln,Leipzig,Nürnberg,
firstpublished1994,byBernard&GraefeVerlag,BonnFirstpublishedintheEnglishlanguagebyGreenhillBooks,Lionel
LeventhalLtd,2002
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproducedortransmittedinanyform
orbyanymeans,electronicormechanical,includingphotocopying,recording,orany
informationstorageandretrievalsystem,withoutpriorpermissioninwritingofboththe
copyrightownerandtheabovepublisher.
TranslatedfromtheGermanbyGeoffreyBrooksPrintedandboundinChinathroughPrintworksInternationalLtd
ContentsForewordIntroductionDataArmourArmamentFireControlSystemMachineryRefitsTheSpähkreuzerProgrammeScaleDrawings
Emden
Königsberg
Karlsruhe
Köln
Leipzig
NürnbergConclusions
ForewordThis fifthvolumeof theseries ‘GermanNavyHeavyShipTypesandClasses’introduces the six light cruisers of the Kriegsmarine—Emden, Königsberg,Karlsruhe, Köln, Leipzig and Nürnberg—and is a companion to four earliervolumes featuringbattleshipsof theBismarck class andScharnhorst class, the‘pocket-battleships’ of the Deutschland class and the heavy cruisers of theAdmirral Hipper class. It explains the development stage, provides a detailedreview of important facts and figures and recounts the full service history ofeachofthesixshipsseparately,supplementedbydocumentaryreferences,WarDiaryextractsandcombat reports.The textconcludeswithacriticalepilogue.Also provided are detailed sketches, technical tables and a comprehensiveselection of photographs, most of which are from private collections notpreviously published in this compact form and many of which appear in anEnglish-languagepublicationforthefirsttime.Without thesupportandassistanceofhelpers thisbookcouldnothavebeen
compiled.Valuablereferences,adviceandsupportingdocumentswereprovidedbyPublicOfficialGalle(whoplacedthegeneralplansandotherdocumentsofKönigsberg at my disposal), and A. Didrichs and F. Bavendamm, who madecopieswherenecessary.Toallgomygratefulthanks.Unlessotherwisestated,allplansandsketcheswerepreparedbyKlaus-Peter
Schmolke(whoservedaboardLeipzigasNo1ElectricalEngineerOfficerfrom12 July 1943 until the capitulation). Photograph sources were: P. K. KoopCollection; Marine/Kriegsmarine Werft, Wilhelmshaven; Naval CommandNorth Sea Station; Deutsche Werke, Kiel; A. Klein; Schmolke; Keystone;Dressier;theMANArchive;theRoyalAirForce;theRoyalNavy;theUSNavy;Spiess; former Maschinenobermaat Simon Collection (Emden); and formerKadettenkorporalPogodaCollection(Emden).
GerhardKoop
Introduction
On16April1919theGermanAdmiraltywasinstructedtosetupa‘ProvisionalReichsmarine’, this measure being legitimised by the elected Reichstag on30July 1920. TheWehrgesetz (Armed Forces Law) was passed on 23March1921.ThescuttlingoftheHighSeasFleetatScapaFlowon21June1919wasadirect consequence of the dictated terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty.Subsequently, any newGermanwarship had to replace a ship condemned forscrap drawn from a list of the most modem remaining after the scuttling. Infulfilmentof thepeace treaty, theNavywas tobehackeddown to impotency.Variousnavalofficeswerecloseddownormerged.The conditions of the Treaty of Versailles were harsh. The Navy was
restricted to a standing force of 15,000men and a few obsoletewarships.Asregards lightcruisers, theReichsmarinewaspermitted tohavesix.Thesewerenot to displace more than 6,000metric tonnes, and the armament was not toexceed15cm(5.9in)incalibre.Whenoneoftheexistingsixcruisershadbeeninservicefortwentyyears,itcouldbereplacedbyanewvessel.Adestroyerwasalight cruiser if its displacement was in excess of 800 tonnes. Germany wasallowedsixteendestroyers,andsixteentorpedo-boatsnotexceeding200tonnes,allofwhichcouldhereplacedbynewshipsafterfifteenyears’service.The question regarding the need for aNavy at allwas considered for some
time.Alongwith thecolonies, theVersaillesTreatyhaddeprived theReichofvarious territories. Large areas had passed to France andPoland.By virtue oftheselosses,theprovinceofEastPrussiahadbeenseparatedfromtheReichandisolated. It seemed advisable to protect communications by sea, and for thisreasonParliamentwasinduced,withsomeeffort,tovoteforthemodernisationoffouroldbattleships,fivesmallcruisersandafewtorpedo-boats,andtorecruitpersonnel.The latterwas not easy.The confusionof the revolutionary period,navaldemobilisationand the lossofmany formernavalmen toFreeCorpsorother political groups made the establishment of a new permanent coreproblematic,andtheChiefsoftheNavalCommand,especiallyAdmiralRaeder,workedhardtoputtogetheraselectionwhichwaslatertobe,intermsofhumanmaterial,thefirmbasefortheReichsmarineandKriegsmarine.TheReichsmarinewas a collection of old and obsolete shipswithout battle
value but useful for training new personnel. The light cruisers had oil-firedsteamreciprocatingmachineryofmixeddomesticandforeignmanufacture.The
choiceof those tobe inserviceatanyparticular timewasmade fromArcona,Medusa, Thetis, Niobe, Nymphe and Amazone of the Gazelle class from the1897–1904period,plusBerlinandHamburgoftheBremenclassfrom1902–04.Several were substantially rebuilt, but they nevertheless remained old ships.(OnlyMedusaandArconaeventuallyservedintheSecondWorldWar,bothasfloating flakbatteries.)The rumpof the torpedo-boats lookedmodern, but thelargesttwelvehadturbineswithoutgeareddriveandtheremainderweremostlycoal-fired.Takinganoverallviewofthesesmallcruisersandtorpedo-boats,itisclearthatGermanyhadbeenreducedtothestatusofsomethinglessthanathird-ratenavalforce.Allpretensionstonavalpowerhadbeensweptaway.
TheNewShipSoon after the reinstitution of the Reichsmarine, the Planning Office begandeliberations for the first replacement small cruiser. This question was notwithoutexternaldifficultiessincetheVersaillesTreatyforbadetheconstructionofwarships inprivateGermanyards.ThemajorStateyard,KaiserlicheWerft,Danzig,wasnowinaFreeCitywhichnolongerformedpartoftheReich.TheyardatKielhadbeenrenamedDeutscheWerke,splitupandpartlyprivatised,andonlyasmallpartwascontinuingtofunctionasthenavalarsenal.TheformerKaiserlicheWerftatWilhelmshavenwasnomorethanaremnantofwhatithadoncebeen.Moreover,hyperinflationwasbeginningtomakeitselffelt.TheReichsmarineappliedforfinancefor theconstructionofacruiser inthe
1920NavalEstimates,andthiswaseventuallyapprovedinMarch1921.Whentheinitialdesignworkwastakeninhand,anewproblemcametolight:theShipTestInstitutehadbeencloseddownon1September1920andtheNavyhadnoexperimentalinstallationformodeltesting.Thismeantthatrecoursewashadtoexisting Imperial Navy designs and plans abandoned at the conclusion ofhostilities.The design selected for Cruiser ‘A’ was scheduled ‘Erzatz [Replacement]
Ariadne,OfficeDesign1920’andwasbasedontheplansforKarlsruhe (ii)ofthe former Cöin class, ‘Replacement Niobe, Office Design 1914”, the shiphavingbeenlaunchedin1916.ThebuildingcontractwasplacedprovisionallyattheWilhelmshavenyard,confirmationfollowingon7April1921,YardNumber100.Thefinalblueprintswerenotdelivereduntil20February1922afterthefirstkeel material had been laid. This was the first large warship to be built inGermany after World War I; the design was the final Imperial Navy cruiserdevelopmentupdatedtoallowforlessonsandexperiencesdrawnsubsequently;forexample,inthemainframethesidesat8.96mwere20cmhigherbecausetheupperdeckafthadbeenraisedtothatlevel.During the construction of Cruiser ‘A’ the Washington Disarmament
Conferencetookplace,itspurposebeingtolimitthenavalarmsrace,especiallywith regard to capital ships and cruisers. The participants were the majorvictorious powers of theGreatWar—theUnitedStates,Britain, France, Japanand Italy. Germany was, naturally, not invited. This Conference decidedamongst other things the numbers and size of future warships based ondisplacement.TheImperial(orLongorWashington)ton,equivalentto1,016kg,became thebasisofa ship’s ‘standard’or ‘type’displacement.This ‘standard’displacementwas theweight of the ship equipped to sailwith all ammunition
andarmamentandhermachineryready,pluswaterforthecrew,inboilersandpiping but excluding fuel and feedwater. The previous standard, ‘designed’displacement, as understood by German naval architects, had also includedapproximatelyone-thirdtotwo-fifthsofthefuelandwateraboard.Theeffectofthetwochanges—thestandarddisplacementbasedonlongtons
instead of metric tonnes—meant that what had previously been designated a6,000-tonne light cruiserwas now a 5,280-tonne cruiser. The newEmden fellwellwithintheVersaillesTreatylimitsandtheplannersannouncedchangesindesignaccordingly,sothattheeight15cmgunswouldbearrangedinfourtwinturretsonthecentreline,enablingallgunstofireonthebroadside;therewouldbefourdouble-bankedsetsoftorpedotubesontheupperdeck;theboilersweretobealloil-fired;theturbineswouldbegeared;andbeltarmourwouldbefitted.
EmdenleavesNoIIILockEntrance,Wilhelmshaven,on14November1928;atthequaysideisanewtorpedo-boatoftheAlbatrosclass.Arecentrefithasgiventhecruiserashort4mpoleandcompassstationabovethemastcrosstreeandanafterfirecontrolwithrangefinderatthefoot.Thegunscouldbedirected
fromtheforetoporinbatterygroups.
MainframeofEmden.
The Allied Control Commission (NIACC) would not approve the first twodesign changes and the eightmain guns reverted to an arrangement of singlegunhouseswiththeresult thatonlysixcouldfireonthebroadside.QuiteapartfromtheobjectionsoftheNIACC,therewerefinancialproblemsandshortagesofmaterial. The French occupied theRuhr,wherewere to be found themainsuppliers to the shipbuilding industry—and not only armoured steel but alsoKruppguns.Germanindustryelsewherewasinadesolatestate,groundunderbythewoefullyhighreparationswhichbroughtintheirtrainrisingunemploymentandhyperinflationleadingultimatelytotheedgeoftheabyss.Thekeelwaslaidon8December1921andconstructionproceededhaltingly.
There was a general lack of materials, particularly profiled steel which wasessentialfortheinnerstructureofthehull.Thebuildingofawarshipisalwaysacompromise. The main characteristics requires are combat strength (hittingpowerplusresistance);speed;andcruisingrange.Allcannotbesatisfiedatthesametimeandtothesameextent,andsooneeithergetsapowerfullyarmedshipwithahighspeed,orawell-armouredshipwhichismuchslower.However,inacruiser, armour does not have the same priority as in a capital ship, and theproblem for German ship designers was how to pack the latest advances intechnologyintoalightlyarmouredcruiserwithadisplacementofnomorethan6,000longtons.Fromtoday’sviewpointthesolutionwasrelativelysimple.Uptillthattimetheusualmethodofconstructionhadbeenbyriveting,andGermanshipbuildersexperimentedonEmdenwiththeelectricalweldingprocess.Ithadbeen known and applied for some time previously, but never before on thisscale. All main longitudinal bulkheads and the outer plating were riveted aspreviously,butelsewhereweldingwasemployedwhereverpossible.Theuseoflightmetals in combinationwithwelding led toweight savings of about 8–10percenttakenoverthehullasawhole.Predominantly,normalshipbuildingsteelwas employed, and armour was an alloy of KC (Krupp Cemented) or KNC(KruppNon-Cemented)plates.The hull was built to the longitudinal frame system and had seventeen
watertight compartments. The frames were set 1,350mm apart. Fuel bunkerswerelocatedinthedoublebottomwhichextendedover56percentoftheship’slength.Thecollisionbulkheadwasatframe106.Thisprovidedtheshipwithalonger closed bow and assured good sea keeping qualities despite the tallcommand tower and higher bridge structure. Command relay, damage controlandventilationwereallnewlydesignedinthelightofwarexperience.
IncomparisontotheKarlsruhe(ii)design,crewaccommodationwasgreatlyimproved, not only by the longer foreship and superstructure but also by thespace releasedwhen thenumerous coal bunkersweredone awaywith (theoilbunkerswerelocatedprincipallyinthedoublebottom).Theengineroomwasanadvancedespitehavingfourof its tenboilerscoal-
fired.Thisarrangementwasfollowedmainlytoeconomiseonfuelcostsduringoverseascruises.Gearedturbines,replacingthepreviousdirectdrive,gavemorefavourablepropellerrevolutionsandareductioninfuelconsumption.Acentrallongitudinalbulkheadseparatingtheturbineroomshadbeendispensedwithandthe modernisation of the engine room area resulted in a more compactarrangementwithshorterpiping.This led toa reducedarmour requirement forthe central hull. The relocation of the condensers below the last turbine stagereducedthedimensionsoftheturbinesets,withcommensuratesavingsinengineroomfloor space.All these improvementswereattendedbysubstantialweightsavings.KönigsbergClassChiefNavalArchitectEbrenburg’s1924/25designforthesethreeshipsfollowedtheprovensystemoflongitudinalbulkheads.Becauseofthedisplacementlimitthehullwas85percentwelded,lightmetalbeingusedwhereverpossible.Therewere sixteen comprehensively subdivided watertight compartments, the hullbeingprotectedbya lightwaterlinearmour.Thedoublebottomextendedover72percentofthelengthofthehull.The cruisers represented a completely new type. Their size and main
armamentwerelimitedbytheTreatyofVersailles,butweightsavingsenablednine15cmguns tobemounted in three triple turrets togetherwitha relativelystrong flak armament and four triple torpedo tubes. The developmentwas theforerunner of the Panzerschiffe, or pocket-battleships, packing the greatestpossible punchwith the ability to absorb punishment. The speed of 32kt wasequivalenttothebestfortheperiod.Rangewaspoor,butwasimprovedbytheaddition of a cruise diesel during construction. This afterthought producedtechnical problemswhich led to a third shaft for the diesel drive being fittedaboardLeipzigandNürnberg.EffortstosaveweightandkeeptheshipswithinTreatylimitationsresultedin
thesides,decks,bulkheadsandframesof the three ‘K’classcruisersbeingonthe thin side.Fractures and tears amidships followedpassage inheavy seasorwhenthegunswerefired,andtheproblemhadnotbeeneradicatedbythetimeLeipzigandNürnbergenteredservice.
Differences inhull formand the arrangementofweapons andmachineryofthe‘K’classincomparisonwithEmdenillustratehowthelatterwasessentiallyashipoftheoldImperialNavyCöinclasswhilethe‘K’classrepresentedafreshdevelopment altogether. Emden’s length-to-beam ratio was 10.6, that of theKönigsberg class 11.12. The long, flat aftership of the latter ended with aninclined stem. Leipzig and Nürnberg were shorter on the waterline and thelength-to-beam ratio was 10.17. The draught was shallower and the last twoshipshadacruiserstern.Asregardsthechoiceofcalibre,thevictoriouspowersallowed15cmgunsbut
forbade pairing off in twin turrets aboard Emden, so they were eventuallymountedsinglyinoldgunhouses.Overthenextfewyearstheprohibitionseemstohavefallenawayandthe‘K’classwerefittedwithnine15cmgunsinthreetriple turrets. In addition to advantages of ammunition storage and supply,comparedtofourtwinturretstherewasaweightsavingleadingtoareductionintheoveralllengthandbeltarmour,whichwasinturnafurtherweightsaving.LeipzigandNürnbergThese last two ships, designed in 1927 and 1933 respectively byChiefNavalArchitectBlechschmidt,exhaustedGermany’sallowanceoflightcruisersunderthe Versailles Treaty. As usual, both were built to the longitudinal bulkheadsystem, thehullsbeing90percentwelded,withadoublebottomlengthof83per cent. The displacement infringed Treaty limitations considerably, whereasthatofthe‘K’classhadbeenonlymarginallyinexcess.Theusualexcuse—thatthe extraweightwasonly the armour—wasoffered, although the fact that theextraweightwasalsoequivalenttothatofallthegunswasnotmentioned.Bothshipswereshorteronthewaterlineandbeamierthanthe‘K’class.Thebroaderbeammadeadifferentarrangementpossiblefor theengineroom:for thesamenumberofboilerstherewerejustthreeboilerrooms,sothatallgasfluescouldbe trunked together intoonefunnel (the ‘K’class,with fourboiler rooms,hadtwofunnels).Theformofthemainframealsodiffered:thearmourdeckofthe‘K’ class ran from side to side and met the upper edge of the belt armour,whereasonLeipzigthearmourdeckcurveddownshortofthesidestomeetthebeltarmourinsidethelateralbulges.ThiswasevenmoremarkedonNürnberg.A new feature of these last two light cruisers was the central shaft for dieseldrive, which was designed to overcome the difficulty aboard the ‘K’ classwhereindrivehadtobeeitherturbineordieselbutnotbothsimultaneously.By the time Nürnberg was complete, the advantages of the 1935 Anglo-
GermanNavalAgreementwerealreadybeingenjoyedtothefull.Forexample,
theweightof thefiredirectionsystemalonewasgreater thantheweightofallEmden’s guns at commissioning, and displacement was up by 130 tons overLeipzig.About80tonsofthiswascompensatedforbylessbunkerage.Cablingaccounted for 50 tons and provided numerous switching possibilities for theguns in any eventuality, although history proved this to have been an entirelyunnecessaryinnovation.The initial difficulties andbreakdowns involvingLeipzig’s dieselmachinery
and that of the gunnery training motor ship Bremse led to many erroneousconclusionsbeingdrawn.Thehigh-pressure/hot-steamlobbytookfulladvantageof the confusion. TheKriegsmarine turned its back on diesel drive for largeshipsforthecriticalperiod,anditwasnotuntil1938thatrealisationdawnedthattheGermanNavyhadtakenafalsepath.
DataEmden
BuildingDetails
Approved 1921NavalEstimates
Builder MarineWerft,Wilhelmshaven
Yardnumber 100
Contractplaced 7.4.1921
Keellaid 8.12.1921
Launched 7.1.1925
Commissioned 15.10.1925
Measurements
Grossregisteredtons 4,844
Netregisteredtons 2,464
Displacement(standard) 5,600tons
Displacement(designed) 6,056tons
Displacement(operational) 6,990tons
Length(waterline) 150.5m
Length(overall) 155.1m
Beam 14.3m
Draught(designed) 5.15m
Draught(operational,maximum) 5.93m
Draught(basedonstddisp.) 5.38m
Heightofsides 8.96m
Increaseindraughtpercm 17.3tonnes
Length/beamratio 10.6
Beam/draughtratio 2.68
MainArmament8×15cmSK/L45 in single gunhouses, replaced in 1942byTK-15destroyer-type gunhouses. (Original scheme with IW5 barrels in four twin turrets notapprovedbyNIACC.)Magazinecapacity60 rounds.Maximumrange17.6km.Maximumelevation40°.Maximumdepression–10°.
SecondaryArmament2(later3)×8.8cm/L45singlemountedflak/C32,magazine1,200rounds; from1938/1943 additionally 4 × 3.7cm singlemounted flak/C30 plus two 20mmquadruplesand3–7×20mmMG/C30singles.Accordingtounconfirmedcrewreports,in1944Emdenreceived3×10.5cmSKC/32gEflaktoreplacethethree8.8cmandwasthenalsoequippedwith2×4cmFlak28Bofors,2×3.7cmFIC/30Uand20×20mmFIC/38.
TorpedoesandMines4×50cmtubesintwinmountings(8×53.3cmasoriginallydesigned,butnotapprovedbyNIACC).Torpedostockfrom1934:12torpedoes.Capacityfor120mines.
Armour
Horizontalarmourdeck 20mm;40mmovermagazines
Armourdeckslopes 20–40mm
Collisionbulkhead 40mm
Ammunitionsupplyshaft 20mm
Commandtower(horizontal) 20mm
Commandtower(vertical) 50mm
Commandtower(companionway) 100mm
Maingunhouses 20mm
Beltarmouramidships 50mm,decreasingtowardstheends
Machinery
Six Schulz oil-fired single-ended boilers, heated surface 3,009m2, and fourSchulz coal-fired watertube boilers, operating pressure 16ats, heated surface1,629m2, these latter four converted to oil-firing in 1934 with heated surface1,800m2.Locatedinfourboilerrooms.TwoBBCMannheimturbinesetswithwheelgearing,eachsetdrivingoneshaft.Twoturbinerooms.Twothree-bladedpropellersof3.75mdiameter.HPturbine2,435rpm,LPturbine1,568rpm.Shaftrevolutions295/min.
AuxiliaryMachineryThree420kWdieselgenerators.
FuelBunkerage
Coal875tonnes;heatingoil300m3normal,859m3maximum;afterconversiontopureoil-firing1,266m3.Range5,290nmat18kt,6,750nmat14kt.Afterconversion:5,300nmat18kt.Designedrating45,900shpat295rpmfor29kt;maximumoutputat46,500shp=29.4kt.Performanceweightpershp28.1kgs.MIweight (ship’smachinery and electrical plant, inc. all auxiliarymachinery,pipingandcables)basedondesigneddisplacement=1,290tonnes.MIIweight(auxiliaryboilers,ruddermachinery,capstans,boats,aircraftcranesandcommunicationssystems)basedondesigneddisplacement=248tonnes.
DamageControlRingsystemofpumpspassingthroughallimportant(battle)compartments.Twopumpswithoutputof600m3/hr.Twomain1,200m3/hrseawatercoolingpumpsfor turbines could be linked in. Auxiliary pumping unit: 4 × 60m3/hr bilgepumpsandoneof42m3/hr.
OtherInformationOnerudder.Sixboats(laterfive,plustwomotorised).Complement:19officersand464men(later20officers,445menand162cadets).
Emden:arrangementoffuelbunkersafterconversiontooil-firing.
KönigsbergClass
Mainframe,Königsbergclass.
Mainframe,Karlsruheafterconversion,1940.
LeipzigandNürnberg
Leipzig Nürnberg
Builder Marinewerft,Wilhelmshaven DeutscheWerke,Kiel
Orderplaced 1928 16.3.33
Yardnumber 117 234
Laiddown 18.4.28asCruiser‘E’ 4.11.33asCruiser’F’
(ReplacementAmazone) (ReplacementNymphe)
Launched 18.10.29 8.12.34
Commissioned 8.10.31 3.11.35
Buildingcosts(RM) 38m 40m
Measurement 5,825grt;1,815nrt 6,264grt;1,958nrt
Heightofsides 9.00m 9.00m
Displacement(type) 6,614tonnes 7,150tonnes
Displacement(designed)
7,385tonnes 8,060tonnes
Displacement(operational)
8,427tonnes 9,040tonnes
Displacement(official) 6,000tons(6,750tonnes)
6,000tons(6,650tonnes)
Length(waterline) 165.8m 170.0m
Length(overall) 177.1m 181.3m
Beam 16.3m 16.4m
Draught(designedwaterline) 5.05m 4.75m
Draught(maximum) 5.69m 5.79m
Machineryoutput(turbines) 60,000/65,585shp 60,000/66,075shp
Machineryoutput(diesel) 12,400/12,600bhp 12,400/12,600bhp
Propellerrevolutions 309/400rpm 291/400rpm
Speed(maximum,unforced,turbines) 31.9/32.0kt 32.0/32.3kt
Speed(diesel) 16.5kt 16.5kt
Range 3,780nm/15kt 3,280nm/15kt
2,980nm/21kt 2,260nm/21kt
2,220nm/27kt 1,700nm/27kt
940nm/32kt 922nm/29.9kt
Bunkerage 1,235m3heatingoil 1,152m3heatingoil
348m3diesel 348m3diesel
Ship’sboats 8 8
Aircraft 1catapult,2×He60Cfloatplanes,oneoncatapult,theotherdismantledbelowdeck
Crew 26officers,508NCOsandmen
Asflagship +6officers,20men +17officers,66men
Later 30officers,628men
Finally 24officers,826men 26officers,870men
ConstructionandWeightGroupings(perWitte)
Leipzig
Ship’shull(tonnes) 2,557
Armour(lessturrets)(tonnes) 774
Mainmachinery(tonnes) 1,637
Auxiliarymachinery(tonnes) 394
Gunsandequipment(tonnes) 640
Torpedoesandequipment(tonnes) 56
Aircraftinstallationandequipment(tonnes) 20
Generalequipment(tonnes) 126
Nauticalinstruments(tonnes) 7
Mastsandspars(tonnes) 9
Emptyshipwithequipment(tonnes) 6,220
Ammunition(tonnes) 164
Torpedoes(tonnes) 23
Consumables(tonnes) 43
Crew(tonnes) 51
Effects(tonnes) 42
Provisions(tonnes) 71
Typedisplacement(lessfreshandwashing
water)(tonnes) 6,614
Drinkingwater(tonnes) 47
Washingwater(tonnes) 56
Feedwater(tonnes) 100
Heatingoil(tonnes) 500
Dieseloil(tonnes) 47
Lubricatingoil(tonnes) 17
Aviationspirit(tonnes) 4
Designeddisplacement(tonnes) 7,385
Feedwater(tonnes) 98
Heatingoil(tonnes) 581
Dieseloil(tonnes) 262
Lubricatingoil(tonnes) 72
Freshwaterreserve(tonnes) 29
Totaldisplacement(tonnes) 8,427
Mainweightgroupings:Leipzig
Ship’shull(%) 54.2
MI 22.2
MII 5.3
Crew,effects,provisions 2.2
Equipmentandconsumables 2.2
Freshandwashingwater 1.4
Feedwater 1.4
Fuel 7.8
MI = Main machinery and connections, condensers, gear couplings, shaftconnections, propellers, auxiliary machinery, conduits and piping used inconnection with the operation of the main machinery, exhaust/funnel cap,equipment, etc., boilerswith armatures, and oil andwater in themain engineplant.MII=Auxiliaryboilerplant,ship’sheatingsystem,washinganddrinkingwaterdesalinationplant, laundry,ablutions,kitchengear,etc., ship’spumps,primaryelectricalplant, lighting,cables,steeringassembly,capstans,boats’windlasses,room fans, weapons systems, refrigerating plant, searchlights, signal lamps,commandelements,gyrocompass,mileagelogs,sirensandworkshops.
Mainweightgroupings:Leipzig
SIplusSII–IV(tonnes) 2,557
Equipment,consumables,crew,effects(tonnes) 481
Armour(lessturretarmour)(tonnes) 774
Mainmachinery(MIplusequipment)(tonnes) 1,637
Fuelandlubricatingoilplusfeedwater(tonnes) 1,681
Auxiliarymachinery(MIIplusequipment)(tonnes) 394
Weaponswithequipmentandammunition(tonnes) 903
Designeddisplacement(tonnes) 7,385
Fulldisplacement(tonnes) 8,427
SI(ST52andST45plusarmourandbarbettes
(tonnes) 774
SII=Metalworkers(tonnes) 1,886
SIII=Caprenters(tonnes) 55
SIV=Painters(tonnes) 50
Weightofship(tonnes) 3,331
S=weightofcompartmentedhull–SI=buildingsteelandturretarmour,but
notwaterlinearmour,plusSII–IV.
Constructiondetails:Nürnberg
Length/beamratio(Leipzig10.17) 10.43
Beam/draughtratio 3.44
Longitudinalprismaticcoefficient(δ) 0.52
Coefficient,finenessofwaterplane(α) 0.71
Midshipsectioncoefficient(β) 0.85
Ratioδ/α 0.74
Ratioδ/β 0.62
ArmourThearmourofthethree‘K’classcruiserswasofthethencurrentinternationalstandardforlightcruisersandsimilartothematerialusedpriortoWorldWarIfor ‘protected small cruisers’ but improved in the light ofwar experience andnewalloys.Cutsinarmourweremadetokeepthethreeshipswithinthe6,000-ton Washington Treaty weight limit. An armour deck 20–40mm thick andlacking the usual slope stretched across the beam from side to side.A 20mmcollisionbulkheadwaspositionedwellforward.Theso-calledtorpedobulkheadwas15mmthick.The50–70mmbeltarmourstretchedlengthwisefrom‘C’turrettoapointabout30mshortofthestem,andthecitadelareawasenclosedwithin70mmbulkheads at each end.All facesof the15cm turretswereprotectedby20–30mmarmour.Thebarbettesweregiven30mmandthecommandtowerhadthicknessesfrom30to100mm.DuringherconversionKarlsruhewasgivenasecondouterskinofwotanhart
10–14mmplateandanewupperdeck16mmthickofthesamematerial.Therewerefourmagazines.Twomagazines,belowthearmourdeckandplatformdeckrespectively, served ‘A’ turret;Nos3and4magazinesbelow thearmourdeckserved‘B’and‘C’turretsrespectively.The armour scheme inLeipzig andNürnberg differed little from that in the
three earlier ships but was better arranged. The material—Krupp nickel-steelPz240—wasthebestforthetime:wotanhardandsoftdidnotbecomeavailableuntilNürnbergwasbuilding,andthisshipwasinconsequencebetterprotected.Themaximumdeckarmourwas20mmthick(25mmattheslopes)whilethe
battlemasthad30mm,50mmand100mm.Beltarmouratthedesignedwaterlinevariedfrom18mmto50mm,andtheturretshadsimilarprotectionto thethreeearlier ships. In Nürnberg there were small differences: the shaft to thecommandtowerwas60mm, theforwardrangefinder15mm, theforetop20mmand the flak fire control 14mm. The 15cm turret had a greater thickness ofarmour,asdidthebarbettes(60mm)andtheirfoundations(30mm).
Nürnberg:arrangementofarmour.Thicknessesinmm.
ArmamentThemainarmamentof the ‘K’class cruisers consistedofnine15cmSKC/25gunsinthreetripleturretsonLC/25turntablechassis.Flakcalibresinitiallywere8.8cm,3.7cmand2cm.Thereweretwelve53.3cmtorpedotubes.
MainArmament:15cmSK/L60–C/25SK = Schnell-lade/Schnellfeuerkanone (quick-loading/quick-firing gun). L =lengthofgunbarrel expressed inmultiplesof calibre; thus15cm/L60=barrellengthof900cm.
Calibre 149.1mm
Muzzlevelocity 960ms
Barrellength 60cal/9.08m
Lengthofbarrellining 57.5cal/8.57m
Lengthofbreechchamber 1.39m
Designedgaspressure 3.85atmospheres
Volumeofbreechchamber27.7m3
Barrellife 500rounds
Recoilenergyat0°elevation 52tonnes
Lengthofgrooving 7.067m
Depthofgrooves 1.75mm
Typeofgrooves Parabolic,45/30cal
Widthofgrooves 6.14mm
Noofgrooves 44
Weightofbreechandbarrel 11.97tonnes
Maximumrange 25,700m
Chassis
Barrelelevation/depression +407–10°
Rotation ±360°=720°
Poweredelevationspeed 6°/sec
Poweredrotationspeed 6–8°/sec
Weightofguncradles 2.44tonnes
Weightofgunbeds 54.26tonnes
Weightofsightingequipment 3.5tonnes
Weightofelectricalmachinery 11.12tonnes
Weightofturretarmour 24.8tonnes
Totalweight 136.91tonnes
Armour Front30mm,sides20mm,roof20mm;materialsteel420
Ammunition
Weightofprojectile 45.5kg
Weightofcharge(nose-fused) 3.892kg
Weightofcharge(base-fused) 3.058kg
Weightofcharge(AP) 0.885kg(Fp02)
Filling Fp02
Lengthofprojectile(base-fused) 4.5cal=680mm
Lengthofprojectile(nose-fused) 4.5cal=655mm
Lengthofprojectile(AP) 3.7cal=555mm
Weightofcartridgecase 33.4kg
Lengthofcartridgecase 1,192mm
Propellant 20.4kgRPC/32orRPC/38*
Detonator C/27
ShellCharacteristics(From files and Guidelines for Determining Ranges for Engagements andChoiceofShell,OKM1940)
Range25,700mwith19.3kgpropellantC/32.At10°elevation,range14,100m.Nose-fused shells could penetrate a 60mm thickness of armour at 3,200mand20mmat11,200m.
15cmC/25SK/L60intripleturretwithturntablechassisC/25.Key:1.Gunner,indirectfire,traverse.2.Gunner,directfire,traverse.3and9.Periscopes.4and8.Turretcommander.5and7.Auxiliaryammunitionlifts.6.Cartridgeejectiongear.10.Mainammunitionlift.11.Targetrecognitioncrewman.12.Lockcrewman.13.Gunner,indirectfire,aimer.14.Gunner,directfire,
aimer.
DifferencesinNürnberg
Chassis
Poweredbarrelelevation 6–8°/sec
Poweredrotationspeed 7.6°/sec
Weightofguncradles 2.457tonnes
Weightoffoundations 4.23tonnes
Weightofgunbeds 55.54tonnes
Weightofsights 4.42tonnes
Weightofelectricalmachinery 12.5tonnes
Weightofturretarmour 31.5tonnes
Totalweight 147.15tonnes
Armour Front80mm,sides20mm,roof20–35mm,rearwall35mm
The after turrets of theKönigsberg class shipswere situatedoff-centre, ‘B’ toportand‘C’tostarboardofthecentreline.Thiswastoenablebothrearturretstobe traversed to firemuch finer over the bowduring a pursuit.Theoretically itwas quite a good idea but in practice the muzzle blast would probably havedamaged the ship’s superstructure. The normal centreline arrangement wasrestoredforthetwolaterships.
Flak*The 8.8cm L/75 C/25 flak on the C/25 double chassis was characterised bybarrelswide-setduetothehighaxisstabiliserandexternalfusegear.Speedofelevationortraversewastooslowat10°/sec(althoughthelater10.5cmflakwasevenslower).TheweaponwastestedaboardKölnandfoundunsatisfactoryafterwhich the class received two 3.8cm L/45 on a C/13 central pivoting chassis.From1933Köln had four and fromabout 1935Königsberg only twoof theseflaks, but from 1935–36 Köln and Karlsruhe had six. In 1940 Königsbergreceived six more weapons of this type. During her conversion Karlsruheexchangedher8.8cm flak for the10.5cm twin flakwhichwas then ingeneralservicewithFleetunits.The three ‘K’ class cruisers each had eight 3.7cm L/83 C/30 flak on C/30
doublechassisandeight2cmL/65C/38onC/30singlemountings.For1945itwasplannedtofitaboardKöln—theonlysurvivoroftheclassafterApril1940—ten3.7cmandtwenty-four2cmkgC/28intwinmountings,butintheendshereceived eight of the former, eighteen of the latter and fourBofors (28) 4cm.Therewereunfulfilledplansforten3.7cm43Mandtwelve2cmLM44twins.FlakaboardLeipzig initiallycomprisedtwo8.8cmL/45,increasedbytwoin
1934andfinallyreplacedbysixtwin-mounted2cmL/76.From1941untilaboutOctober1944shewasequippedwitheight3.7cmandfourteen2cmflak;attheendthishadbeensupplementedbyfourmore3.7cmandeightmore2cm.OnenteringserviceNürnbergcarriedeight8.8cmL/76andeight3.7cm,both
ondoublechassis.Herinventoryof2cmflakwasvariedupwardsregularly.Aswithallnaviesofthetime,shipboardantiaircraftarmamentwasgenerally
inadequate in theKriegsmarine.Even theRoyalNavy admitted that the aerialdanger had been underestimated. US Navy exercises early on had providedreliable evidence, and the SpanishCivilWar also indicated the danger, and itwas the latterexperiencewhichpersuadedtheRoyalNavytoconvert their ‘C’
class light cruisers into AA cruisers. By the outbreak of war a considerablenumberoftheseAAshipswereinservice,andmanymerchantvesselswerealsoprovidedwithantiaircraftweapons.The British considered that heavy AA guns were inadequate and favoured
lighter-barrelled models. Not until the loss of Königsberg to British dive-bombersdidtherealisationofthedangerofbombsandaerialtorpedoesfinallydawn in Germany. There was a relatively fast rethink about defences and ahandfulofantiquatedcruisersandprizeswereconvertedintoflakships.PerhapsitwouldhavebeenagoodideatohavefollowedtheBritishexampleandaddedEmden,Köln,LeipzigandNürnbergtotheirnumbers.
8.8cmFlakL/45inMPLC/13
Calibre 88mm
Muzzlevelocity 790ms
Recoilenergyat0°barrelelevation 13.2tonnes
Weightofbreechandbarrel 2.5tonnes
Weightofshell 9kg
Weightofpropellant 2.35kg
8.8cmSKC/32L/76ontwin-mountedC/32
Calibre 88mm
Muzzlevelocity 950ms
Lengthofbarrel 76cal/6.69m
Lengthofbarrellining 72cal/6.34m
Designedgaspressure 3.15atmospheres
Barrellife 3,200rounds
Recoilenergyat0°barrelelevation 7.8tonnes
Weightofbreechandbarrel 3.64tonnes
Maximumrange(surfacetarget) 17,200m
Maximumrange(aerialtarget) 12,400m
Chassis
Barrelelevation ±807–10°
Rotation ±360°=720°
Manualgunelevation 3.6°/sec
Poweredgunelevation 10°/sec
Weightofguncradle 1.775tonnes
Weightofbed 0.815tonnes
Weightofchassis 6.275tonnes
Weightofsights 0.745tonnes
Weightofelectricalmotor 1.28tonnes
Weightofsplintershield 5.83tonnes
Totalweightofchassis 23.65tonnes
Armourprotection Front12mm,sides10mm
Armourmaterial Wotanhard(WhnA)
Ammunition
Weightofprojectile 9kg
Weightofcharge 3.1kg
Lengthofprojectile 0.397m
Totalweightofprojectile 15kg(withlengthof0.932m)
3.7cmSKC/30twin-mountedC/30
Calibre 37mm
Muzzlevelocity 1,000ms
Muzzleenergy 38megatonnes
Lengthofbarrel 83cal/3.074m
Lengthofbarrellining 80cal/2.96m
Designedgaspressure 3.45atmospheres
Barrellife 7,500rounds
Recoilenergyat0°elevation 1tonne
Lengthofgrooves 2.554m
Typeofgrooves Cubicparabola50/35
Numberofgrooves 16
Weightofbreechandbarrel 243kg
Maximumrange(surfacetarget) 8,500m
Maximumrange(aerialtarget) 6,800m
Maximumrange(tracer) 4,800m
Ammunition
Weightofshell 0.742kg
Weightofcharge 0.365kg
Filling Fp02
Lengthofshell 0.162m
Weightofcartridgecase 0.97kg
Lengthofcartridge 0.381m
Propellant RPC/32
Totalweight 2.1kg
Totallength 0.5165m
Fuse NosefuseEC/30
NosefuseC/34
TracerC/34
Burningperiodoftracer 12sec
Rateoffire 160rds/barrel/min(theoretical),80rds/barrel/min(inpractice)
Chassis
Barrelelevation +857–10°
Rotation ±360°=720°
Manualelevation 37sec
Manualrotation 4°/sec
Weightofrotatableunit 243kg
Weightofcradle 71kg
Weightofbed 2.162tonnes
Weightofsights 87kg
Weightofelectricaldrive 630kg
Totalweight 3.67tonnes
2cmFlakC/30onC/30chassis
Calibre 20mm
Muzzlevelocity 835ms
Barrellength 65cal/1.3m
Lengthofbarrellining 65cal/1.3m
Designedgaspressure 2.8atmospheres
Barrellife 22,000rounds
Recoilenergyat0°elevation 250kg
Lengthofgrooving 720mm
Weightofbreechandbarrel 64kg
Maximumrange(surfacetarget) 4,900m
Maximumrange(aerialtarget) 3,700m
Chassis
Barrelelevation +857–11°
Weightofrotatableunit 43kg
Weightofchassislesssights 282kg
Totalweight 420kg
Ammunition
Weightofprojectile 134g
Lengthofprojectile 78.5mm
Weightofcharge 39.5g
Totalweight 320g
Totallength 203mm
Rateoffire 280rds/barrel/min(theoretical),120rds/barrel/min(inpractice)
4cmFlak28(Bofors)
Calibre 40mm
Muzzlevelocity 854ms
Barrellength 2.249m
Lengthofgrooving 1.932m
TorpedoesAll five latter ships were equipped initially with twelve 50cm torpedo tubesmountedasfourtriplesets,twoeitherside.Thecalibrewaschangedto53.3cmin 1934. In 1940 one triple set aboard Köln, and in 1941 two sets aboardNürnberg,wereunshipped.In1944alltubesaboardLeipzigweredismounted.
MinesDependingonthetypeofmine,allcruiserscouldcarryupto120minesmountedontemporaryrailsaft.
Königsberg’smainarmament:‘B’and‘C’turrets.
*RPC/38=Rauchpulver1938,powdertypeanditsyearofmanufacture.
†Ahectometre,one-tenthofakilometre,wastheusualrangemeasurementfactorinGermangunnery.Toavoidconfusion,however,rangeshavegenerallybeenexpressedaskilometresandfractionsofkilometreselsewhereinthisbook.*Theterm‘flak’,acontractionofFliegerabwehrkanone,isusedthroughoutthisbooktodescribeGermanantiaircraft(AA)weapons.
FireControlSystemAllfivecruisersweresuppliedwiththree6mrangefinders.Thesewerelocatedone each on the foretop and in the forward and after fire control positions(except Köln from 1939, when a rangefínding radar replaced the forwardrangefinder.) Three 3m rangefinders were located one either side of thebattlemastandthethirdintheafterfirecontrolposition.Theseservedthenon-centralisedflakandtorpedobatteries.TheequipmentonLeipzigandNürnbergwasofanimprovedstandard.
RadarIn1904Hillsmeyer lodged the firstGermanpatent foraprimitive radar,but itwas not until 15 January 1934 that theReichsmarine carried out the first seatrial,aboardtheauxiliaryWelle.Theunitworkedonthe13.5cmfrequencywithan output of 300MW.Rangewas from two to four kilometres.A second trialaboardWelleon24October1934achievedarangeof12km.Theequipmentwasnotreliable,however,andtheGEMAcompanywascommissionedtobuildasetonthe50cmwavelength.Thiswasfittedinsideabox-shapedstructureonKöln’sbridgeandprovideda fixedviewof theareaaheadof theship. In trialson26September1935thegunnerytrainingshipBremsewaspinpointedatarangeof8km. AboardWelle later a landmass was picked out 20km distant. A 60cmwavelength development followed, which led in turn to the standard 81,5cmfrequencyunitknownasSeetaktwithanoutputof368MHz.AswithallGermanradar,itwasplaguedwithproblemscausedbycondensationandvibration.Five60cm sets were ordered in 1937–38 and fitted experimentally aboardKönigsberg,AdmiralGraf Spee, the old torpedo-boatG10 and the trials boatStrahl.In1938,31unitsofthe81,5cmprototypewereordered,andtheseweredeliveredbetweenOctober1939andDecember1940.Theywereknownas‘DTI’, then ‘DT 101’ and finally FuMG 39G(gL). Impulse output was 1kW, thekeying frequency1.000Hz (later 500Hz).TheFuMG39G(gL), known later astheFuMO21,wasearmarkedfordestroyersand,initially,thelightcruisers.Thedimensionsof the characteristic ‘mattress’were1.9×4m.Amodelwas fittedaboardNürnberginthesummerof1941.
AviewfromtheforemastoverKönigsberg’sbridge,showingthe6mrangefínderfor‘A’mainturret.
OnlyKölnofthethree‘K’classcruiserswasgivenradarduringthewar.AnFuMO21wasfittedinplaceof the6mrangefínderontheforwardfirecontrolplatform.ItispossiblethatitwasreplacedlaterbyanFuMO24/25.Thislatterunitworkedonthe81.5cmwavelengthandhadarangeofupto20km(surface)or30km(aerial).Itwasaccuratetowithin70m.LeipzigreceivedanFuMO24/25duringrepairsinAugust1943,the1.9×4m
antennabeinglodgedonanoutriggerontheforwardfaceofthebattlemast.Onan arm above it was fitted an FuMB 6Palau antenna, and at the side of theforetopSumatraFuMB4aerials.TheFuMO21 fittedonNürnberg in1941wasunshipped in the summerof
1944andthepositiongivenovertoflak.TheshipwasthenequippedsimilarlytoLeipzig,differencesbeingthattheSumatraaerialwasfixedontheforetopitselfwhilethemainmastabaftthefunnelwasstrengthenedbyatripodbaseinordertocarrya2.2×2.4mFuMO63Hohentwiel-Kaerial.
MachineryKönigsbergClass
Six oil-fired Schulz-Thornycroft double-ended watertube boilers with naturalcirculationsuppliedtheturbines’steamrequirement.Theboilerswerelocatedinfour rooms with eight control stands. Rooms I and II were located incompartmentsVIIIand IXrespectively,eachwith twoboilers trunked throughtherearfunnel; roomsIIIandIV, incompartmentsXandXIrespectively,hadoneboilerapiecetrunkedthroughtheforwardfunnel.
The total heating surface was 2 × 1,250m2 plus 4 × 1,010m2 = 6,540m2,operatingpressure16atmospheres.Thefourlargerboilershad22,theotherpair18Körtingburners.FortheboilersinroomsIandII,steamproductionwas70tonnes/hr, steam volume 5.8m3 and water volume 17.2m3; there were 3,600tubes,andtheboilerweightwas72tonnes.Eachboilerroomwasfittedwithonemainandonereservesteam-drivenfeed
pump, a feedwater pre-heater and an upper surface pre-heater built into thepressure pipes of the feedwater pump and heated by exhaust steam from theauxiliary machinery. The heating surface in boiler rooms I and II was about78m2,andabout48m2inboilerroomsIIIandIV.BoilerroomsIandIIeachhadfour,roomsIIIandIVeachtwoventilatorsworkedbytheturbinessupplyingairfor combustion at the required pressure. This also helpedmaintain a good airflowintheboilerroomsandkeptroomtemperaturestolerable.Thereweretwo2-cylindersteampumpsineachboilerroomtowork theoilheatingplant.Thetwo forward boiler rooms each had two fuel oil pre-heaters and the after tworoomsoneeach.Thesepre-heaterswerenormallyheatedbywaste steamfromthe auxiliary machinery, although fresh steam directly from the boilers couldalsobeused.A2-cylinderpump forward and aft brought up fuel oil from thebunkers.
DriveMachineryThetwopropellershaftswereturnedbytwoHPandtwocruisinggearedturbinesets.TheHPandcruisingturbinesetcouldworkjointlyoreitheronealone.Themanufacturers were Schichau forKönigsberg, Krupp Germania forKarlsruheandBlohm&VossforKöln.
Königsbergclass:Arrangementofturbineanddieselpowerplant.Key:1.Rudder.2.Shafts.3.Cruisingdiesels.4.Turbinerooms.5.Auxiliarymachineryroom.
Königsbergclass:Arrangementofboilers.Key:1.Twodouble-endedboilers.2.Onedouble-endedboiler,a.Mainfeedpump.b.Reservefeedpump.
The turbine plant was distributed over four rooms, two each side of alongitudinal bulkhead. The twoHP turbines setswere housed in compartmentVIIforwardandtheLPturbinesetsincompartmentVfurtheraft.TheHPmainturbineaboardKarlsruhehadcruisingstagesdisengagedathigh loadings.ThereversingturbineswereintegratedintothehousingoftheLPturbines.Theships’maximumspeedwas32ktat370rpm,andthemaximumforcedendurancespeed29ktat310rpm.
CruisingDieselIn addition to themain turbines the three shipswere fittedwith aMANTypeW10 V 26/33 reversible, compression-free, 10-cylinder, 4-stroke,900PSe/1,600shp cruising dieselwith a cylinder diameter of 260mm, a pistonstroke of 330mm, an average piston speed of 9.9ms, an average effectivepressure of 1.15kg/cm2, an output per litre of 5.13PSe and an output of5.5kg/PSeat900rpm.*Thesewereextremely lightlybuiltmotorsdesigned foranotherpurposeandnotincludedintheoriginalbuildingplans:theyhadprovedsosuccessfulandreliableonthetestbenchthatitwasdecidedtoincludethemasanafterthought.Theweightincreasewasnotgreat,andthemotorsextendedtheships’radiusofactionandguaranteedaneconomiccruisingperformance,ifonlyat 10.5kt. There was little space available in the stem, and the unit waseventuallysqueezedintocompartmentIV.Athighspeedthemotorsweredeadweightastheycouldnotbedouble-coupledwiththeturbinestodrivetheshafts.MotoroutputtotheshaftswastransferredthroughaVulcanreductiongear.
Königsbergclass:Dieselplant.Key:1.Dieselengineport.2.Dieselenginestarboard.3.Portshaft.4.Starboardshaft.5.Starboardexhaust.
6.Portexhaust.
RudderandPropellerThe ships were equipped with a single rudder. Each of the two shafts had athree-bladed iron-bronze propeller, counter-rotating (starboard turningclockwise,portanticlockwise).Propellerdiameterswere4.1mforKönigsberg,3.35mforKölnand3.4mforKarlsruhe.Fromthetablesitwillbenoticedthat,despiteaslightlylessermaximumengineoutput(68,350shpagainst68,485shp),a higher speed—32.461kt as against 32.278kt—was obtainedwith the smallerpropeller.Allmileage trialswereheldoffNeukrugwith abottomof60–65m.Theweatherwasgood,withseastate2andwindstrength3–4.Karlsruhe’strialswereheldinJanuary1930andthoseofKölninApril(withthe4.1mpropeller)andMay1930(3.7mpropeller).Diesel trialswere very satisfactory, speeds of 10–10.5kt being recorded for
94–97rpm.Only the total fuel consumption couldbe estimatedon these trials.Theworkshoptestsresultedinaspecificconsumptionof180–185g/PSe.
LeipzigandNürnbergAlthoughsimilar ingeneral to the‘K’classpowerplant,substantialdifferencesincludedtheadditionofacentralshaftservedexcusivelybythediesel.
BoilersSixdouble-endedwatertubeboilerswithnaturalcirculationwerelocatedinthreeboiler rooms, the aftermost of which had a heating surface of 1,054m2 witheighteen boilers each of 2.5mm bore. The forward rooms each had a 926m2
heating surfacewith sixteen burners. The total heating surface inLeipzig was2,906m2andinNürnberg5,510m2.Theoperatingpressurewas16atmospheres(Nürnberg 17), the maximum fuel consumption 7.2 tonnes/hr, the maximumsteamproduction72tonnes/hr,theheatingsurfaceloadingabout6.85kgfuel/nrproducingabout70kgsteam/m2heatingsurface,theweightofboiler,jacketandfittings47.41tonnes,thewatercontentat0°C14.67tonnesandthetotalboilerweight62.24tonnes.TürbineMachineryAlthough the turbineswereofuniformtype(Leipzig’smanufacturedbyKruppGermania and Nürnberg’s by Deutsche Werke, Kiel), many difficulties werecaused by the variety of auxiliary machinery which had resulted, during theperiod when Leipzig was being built, from the efforts made at that time tobroaden the base of industrial production inGermany.On these two ships thedieselscouldbecoupledupwiththeturbinessothatallthreeshaftsturnedatthesametime.Aboard Leipzig each turbine set consisted of an HP and a dual-flow LP
turbine with a two-stage Curtis wheel. The reverse turbine had a two-stageCurtiswheelandfourpressurestages.Thetransmissionratiowas1:795.AboardNürnberg each turbine set consisted of an HP turbine and two LP
turbines,withtheunusualfeatureofhavingacondenserattached.Eachturbinesetproduced33,000hpandweighed79.5tonnes.Thedrivemachineryweighed35.25tonnes,andturbineoutputwas3.48kg/hp.
DieselsWhereas the twoshaftsof the ‘K’classwere turnedeitherby turbinedriveordieselsasselectedandnotbothtogether,athird,centralshaftaboardLeipzigandNürnberg enabled the turbines to work the two outer shafts and the diesel todrive the central propeller in unison. A light cruiser with three screws wasunusual.Whereoneofthetwomethodsofpropulsionhadbeendisengagedanditwasrequiredtodouble-couple,allshaftshadtobebroughttoastandstillforabouttenminuteswhilethechangewasmade.Inwartimethiswasacalculatedrisk.Althoughnot directly the cause of the collision, inOctober 1944Leipzighadbeenadrift in the swept channeloffGotenhafen for tenminuteswhile theturbineswerecoupledin.Afewminutesafterresuming,shewasrammedbytheheavycruiserPrinzEugen inmistanddarkness.(SeesectionunderLeipzigforfurther details). The great advantage of the dieselswas that they replaced thecruisingturbines.Leipzig’splantcomprisedfourMANM7Zu30/44double-acting,7-cylinder,
two-strokedieselswithoutcompression.Cylinderdiameterwas300mm,pistonhub440mmandmotorrevolutions600rpm,andaveragepistonspeedwas8.8ms,average effective pressure 5.7kg/cm2 and efficiency per litre 7.38PSe. Therewere also twoMANM7 Z23/34 auxiliary motors, cylinder diameter 230mm,pistonhub340mm,revolutions750rpmandaverageeffectivepressure4kg/cm2.Nürnberg’s plant was similar but the motor type was MAN M7 Zu 32/44,cylinder diameter 320mm, piston hub 440mm and average effective pressure4.9kg/cm2.Nürnberg’stwoauxiliarymotorswereofthesametypeasLeipzig’sbuthadanoutputof1,450PSeand725rpmandanaverageeffectivepressureof4.75kg/cm2.The diesels for Nürnberg were supplied in February 1935 and were an
improved version of those installed aboard Leipzig following an anti-dieselcampaignby thepro-turbine lobby.Therehadbeendifficultieswith theplantsinstalledaboardLeipzigandthegunnerytrainingshipBremse,butthesewereinthenatureofthings.DieselswereaninnovationaboardlargewarshipsandhadtobeofthelightestpossibleconstructionwithaneyetokeepingtheshipwithinTreatylimits.TheLeipzig diesels continued tobe troublesomeand theproblemswerenot
finally eradicated until the outbreak of war in 1939. A MAN documentsummarisesthecareersoftheLeipzigandNürnbergdiesels:
CruiserLeipzig
Modificationscarriedoutonthecruising-dieselunit
General
Contractplaced 27.3.28
Fourmotors M7Zu30/44
Maximumoutputeachmotor 3,100PSeat600rpm
Twoauxiliarymotors M7Z23/34,725rpm
Installationcommenced 20.5.31
Commissioned 8.10.31
Firstdieseltrials 9.5.32
Acceptancevoyage 16.6.32
Refit(exchangeofallcylindercentrepartsandhubsformainandauxiliarymotors,mercurysuppressor)
13.11.33–12.2.34
Removalofmotors 15.3.35
Refit(mainandauxiliarymotorpistonshafts,driverods,crossheadswithnuts,bothsuperchargers,alllubricatingoil,coolingoilandseawaterpumps
11.36–15.2.37
Exchangeofthreecrankshaftsfrommainandoneauxiliarymotor 12.38–3.39
AsimilarreportwasmadeoutforLeipzig:
CruiserLeipzig
Modificationsmadetocruisingdieselunit
General
Contractplaced 3.6.33
Fourmotors M7Zu32/44
Outputeachmotor 3,100PSeat600rpm
Twoauxiliarymotors M7Z23/34
Outputeachmotor 1,450PSeat725rpm
Launched 8.12.34
Firsttrial 10.9.35
Terminationofone-yearguarantee 11.4.37
CylinderhubsandjacketsOn the test stand the zinc protection for the fresh water cooler hubs was notcompletedsatisfactorily,theareaaffectedbeingtheinnersurfaceofthecoolingwater jacket for the M Zu 32/44 motor. Post-zinc work will continue asscheduled13.2.35.Zincprotectionofthemantleaffectedwasremovedandthecasingparkerisedonwaterside16.3.35.ThedieselsofbothshipsworkedthecentralshaftthroughaVulcangearing,
and the two cruisers were the first German warships of this size to have acontrollable-pitchpropeller,which,itwashoped,wouldprovideaspeedof18ktforanoutputof12,000hponthecentralshaftandimprovespeedwhenusedinconjunctionwith the turbines. Therewere two settings—2.3m for high speed,and3.35m.Thedesignedpitchwas2.65m.TheLeipzigpropellerwasbasedonadesignwhichhadnotpreviouslybeentestedaboardship.Althoughsoundonthetest bench, itwas found impracticalwhen fitted and eventually gaveway to afixedpropeller.AsimilarunitaboardNürnberghadbeenbuiltatWilhelmshavenand provedmore satisfactory, although it had only two possible settings, highand cruising speed and the ship had to stop engines to make the adjustment.Therefore tovary thepitchof thepropellersor coupleup/decouple the centralshaft,theshafthadtobestationarywiththebrakeon.Thepropellerpitchcouldnotbevarieduntil the shipwasmaking less than10kt through thewater.Thewholeproceduretookaboutfifteenminutes—aseveredrawback.Inpracticethesystemwasnotproven.Asinglerudderwasfitted.
ElectricalInstallationThereweretwoelectricmotorrooms(E-Werke)locatedincompartmentsIV(E-WerkI,portandstarboard)andXIII(E-WerkIII,portandstarboard),theunitsineachroombeingseparatedbydividingwalls.Theprimaryinstallationconsistedoftwo250kWturbogeneratorsof3,000rpmandtwo90kWdieselgeneratorsof1,300rpm.Thefouraggregateswerespreadoverthreecontrolstationssothatifan individual E-Werk flooded there would be no danger of a total failure ofelectrical supply (the war proved otherwise). The generators were 6-cylinder,four-stroke,simpleworking,air-injectedMaybachmotorssupplying220VDC.Cylinder diameter was 140mm, piston hub 180mm and endurance output137.5PSe (maximum150PSe).Thediesel generator revolutionswerehigh andmotoroutput,at7kg/PSe,low.The installations aboard Leipzig andNürnberg had a greater capacity than
those on the three earlier cruisers. Leipzig’s comprised three electric motorroomseachwithoneturbo-andonediesel-generatorof180kW,Nürnberg’sfourelectric motor rooms each with two 300kW turbogenerators and two 350kWdieselgenerators.
AuxiliaryMachineryAllshipswerefittedwithtwodesalinationunitsintheauxiliarymotorroomandincompartmentVI(starboardandport)belowthearmourdeck,plusa third inthe ’tween deck. Two oil-driven watertube boilers with a heating surface of90m2wereusedinharbourorwhenusingdieseldrivealone.The refrigeratingunit—capableof producing five tonnesof icehourly from
water at 30°C—and magazines used carbonic acid for temperature stability.Magazinetemperaturesweremaintainedwithinthe0°-30°Crange.The rudders of each ship were served by one or two independent motors,
dependingonwhetherturbineordieseldrivewasinuse.Amanualstationwasavailableifnecessary.Allbowandstemcapstanswereelectricallyoperated.Eachshipcarriedone
stem and three bow anchors lodged in side cluses (after her major refit thestarboard bow anchor aboardKarlsruhe rested in a deck cluse). Bow anchorsweighed4tonnes(thesternanchorwaslighterbyone-halftotwo-thirds),chainweightwas 1,575kg, and length of chain 225mplus 75m reserve. For foreigncruisesa600kgkedgewascarriedforshallow-wateranchoringandotheruses.
OneofLeipzig’sdouble-actionMANM7Z30/44two-strokedieselmotorsbeingassembledattheAugsburg-Nurembergfactory.
* Unless otherwise stated, the German term ‘PSe’ (Pferdestärke = diesel horsepower) has been left asoriginal(1PSe=0.9860hp).
TheSpähkreuzerProgrammeOn 27 January 1939 Hitler approved the gigantic naval building programmeknownas theZ-Plan.At the lightcruiser level itwasproposedtoaugment theexistingsixlightcruiserswithwhichthisbookdealsbytheadditionofsixteenlightcruisersof8,000tonnesdisplacementand22Spähkreuzer(reconnaissancecruisers)of6,000tonnesfullloaddisplacement.TheSpähkreuzerprojectbeganinMarch1940andwasbasedonType1938
plansforthedestroyersZ40-Z42.TheSpähkreuzerwereessentiallyscaled-updestroyers,largerandmoreheavilyarmedthantheWorldWarIcruiserEmden.ThecontractforSP-1,totheBlohm&Voss,Hamburg,design,wasplacedwithGermaniaWerft,Kiel,on17February1941andthekeelwaslaidon20Augustthat year as Yard No 642. Machinery for all six vessels was ordered inDecember 1941, but the project was cancelled the same month and the keelmaterialscrapped.
SpähkreuzerSP-1–SP-3
Displacement(standard) 5,037tonnes
Displacement(fullload) 5,900tonnes
Length(overall) 152.2m
Length(waterline) 145.0m
Beam 14.62m
Draught 4.66m
Watertightcompartments 17
Armament 6×15cmgunsinthreetwinturrets;4×8.8cm;8×3.7cm,12×2cm;tentorpedotubesinfivetwinmountings;upto50mines
Machinery Turbines(77,500shp)plusdiesel(14,500hp)
Speed(turbines) 35.5kt
Bunkerage 850tonnes
Range 8,000nmat17kt
Boats 5
Crew 18officers,520men
Leipzigattheendofhercareer.
ScaleDrawings
Emdenin1926.Key:T1andT2=turbinerooms;K1-K4=boilerrooms.
Emden,1926–34.
Emden,1934–35.
Emden,1935—42.Bowheraldicshieldremovedonoutbreakofwar.
Emden,1942–45.Notedegaussingcoilalonghull.
Königsberg:top,appearanceabout1930;bottom,after1939–40refits.
Karlsruhe:top,about1935–36;centreandbottom:aftermajorrefit1939–40.
Köln:top,about1935–36;centreandbottom:aftermodifications,fromabout1941–42.
Köln:camouflagescheme1941—42,fromasketchcopiedfromaphotographtakenagainstthelight,whichmakesthehullappeardarkerthanusual.
Köln:camouflagescheme,1943.
Leipzig:top,appearanceabout1933;centre,aftermodifications,about1936;bottom,asin1943–44.
Leipzig:camouflagescheme,1941.
Leipzig:camouflagescheme,1941–42.
Nürnberg:appearanceoncommissioning.
Nürnberg:top,camouflagescheme,spring1941;centre,1941–42(starboard);bottom,1941–42(port).
Nürnberg:top,camouflagescheme,1943(starboard);bottom,camouflagescheme,1943(port).
EmdenThe contract for Light Cruiser ‘A’ (Replacement Ariadne)—the first majorwarship built by Germany after the First World War—was placed at theMarinewerft, Wilhelmshaven, on 7 April 1921, the hull being launched asEmdenon7January1925.ThenamehadbeenstronglyadvocatedbyAdmiralLorey, Director of the Museum für Meereskunde in Berlin. The baptismalspeech was delivered by the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Zenker, and thewidowofFregattenkapitänMüller,commanderofthelightcruiserEmdensunkin 1914, named the ship.Despite the cold and heavy rain therewas the usualenormous turnout for a warship launching. Government ministers and manyotherdignitariesattended.ThehonourguardmarchedthroughDockyardGate1at 1030 past the paraded future ship’s company. On the stroke of eleven thecruiser’shulltrundleddowntothewatermountedonakeelsledge.EmdenwascommissionedbyKapitänzurSeeForsteron15October1925and
theusualacceptanceprogrammewascarriedoutbydockyardspecialistsandthewarshiptestingbranch.Thefirst trialswererunin theNorthSea,others in theBaltic from Kiel and Pillau. In engine trials the cruiser made 29.1kt at45,900shp; the top speed recordedwas29.4kt.During trials it becameevidentthat the gunnery control position in the unusual tulip-shaped foretop was tooconfined and that various other features of the original design wereunsatisfactory.Inherfirstrefit,thecruiser’sbattlemastwasshortenedby7manda23mlongpolemastwasaddedattherearoftheredesignedforetop.Theafterfunnel was raised by 2m so that both funnels stood 19m above the designedwaterline, anda flyingbridgewas fitted to connect thebridgeproperwith thebattlemast.AttheendofJanuary1926Emdenparticipatedinexercisesasflagshipofthe
BSN(CommanderNorthSeaForces)andthencontinuedworkingup.On19/20Septembershepaidher firstvisit to theportofEmden,where thecommanderpresented the town with a memorial tablet bearing the names of the Emdenfallen.Atthistimeitwasbeingdecidedthatthecruisershouldengageintheroleforwhichshehadbeendesigned,andon14November1926,afterembarkinganadditional102cadets,shedepartedforherfirstmajorcruise,ofsixteenmonths’duration.
PrewarServiceFirst cruise (full circumnavigation): Spain, Canary Islands, St Helena, CapeTown, Zanzibar, Mombasa, Indian Ocean to Saban and Padang, the CocosIslands(whereamemorialservicewasheldinsightofthewreckoftheWorldWar IcruiserEmden), Java,Celebes, Japanand theAleutians,Alaska,Seattle,Mexico,Ecuador,Peru,Chile,CapeHorn to theFalklands (where amemorialservicewasheldforthoselostaboardVonSpee’sfourcruiserson8December1914),Argentina,Brazil,Haiti, theAzoresandWilhelmshaven,arrivingon14March 1928. The cruise was a political success. Although other Germanwarships, such as the old cruiser Berlin, were also showing the flag abroad,Emden was a new ship and impressions mattered, particularly in the ThirdWorld.Afterarefitthesecondforeigncruisebeganon5December1928underEmden’ssecondcommander,FregattenkapitänArnaulddelaPerière.Secondcruise(fullcircumnavigation):Cartagena(Spain),Naples,Greece,Suez,Aden,Mombasa,NetherlandsEastIndies,Australia,NewZealand,Fiji,Samoaand Hawaii, San Diego, Central America and Panama, returning toWilhelmshaven on 13 December 1929. As Karlsruhe was not ready for herscheduledcruise,Emdentookherplaceandlefton13January1930.Thirdcruise:Madeira,USEastCoast,NewOrleans and Jamaica, returning toWilhelmshavenon13May1930forrefit.On11October1930FregattenkapitänWitthoeft-Emdenbecame the cruiser’s third commander; hewas a survivor ofthefirstEmden,havingbeenherTorpedoOfficer.ThecruiserwasreassignedtotheNavalTrainingInspectorateandpreparedforherfourthmajorcruise,leavingfortheFarEaston1December1930.Fourth cruise:Mediterranean, Suez, Ceylon, Siam, Philippines, China, Japan,Guam,Batavia, theCocos Islands,Durban,Angola, Freetown,Canary IslandsandSantander,returningtoWilhelmshavenon2December1931.On1 January1932Emdenwas released from theTraining Inspectorate and
rejoined the Fleet where, under her fourth commander, FregattenkapitänGrassmann(appointedinMarch),sheparticipatedinvariousexercisesandmadegoodwill calls along the Baltic and Danish coasts. On 20 February 1933, incompany with the new light cruiser Leipzig, she left Wilhelmshaven for theAtlantic,wherethetwoshipsheldagunneryexerciseofftheWestAfricancoast.OnherreturntoGermany,Emdenwasdecommissionedon1Aprilforamajorrefit in which her four coal-fired boilers were converted to oil-firing. Herpermanent ship’s company transferred to the pocket-battleship Deutschland,commissioningthesameday.
Emden was recommissioned by Fregattenkapitän Karl Dönitz on 29September1934,seventeenmonthslater.Thelossofcoalbunkersfollowingthechangeover to all-oil-fired boilers created space which was used foraccommodationandstorage.Thenumberofengineroompersonnelwascutby39.Outward changes involved shortening both funnels by 2m; eachwas veryslightly canted at the forward rim.The formermainmasthadbeen cut to littlemore than a stump to carry the searchlight platforms. Outriggers were fittedeithersideoftheafterfunneltosupport theradioaerials,whichwereformerlystrung in themainmast crosstrees.The foretop staffwas now8m in height.Aderrickwithadeckhouseforwardhadbeenerectedonthestarboardsideofthemainmast.Thenewship’spermanentcompanywastrainedintensivelyinthetwo-month
periodbeforethenextoverseasvoyagebeganon11November1934.Fifth cruise: Canary Islands, Cape Verde, South Africa, Seychelles, Ceylon,India,MediterraneanandSpain, returning toWilhelmshavenon14June1935.Fregattenkapitän Bachmann was appointed the cruiser’s sixth commander inSeptember 1935. Emden embarked on her next foreign cruise on 23 October1935.Sixth cruise: Bermudas,West Indies, north coast of South America, Panama,Hawaii,USWestCoast,Panama,USEastCoast,CanadaandSpain,returningtoWilhelmshavenon11June1936.KapitänzurSeeLohmannwasappointedthecruiser’s seventh commander in August 1936, and Emden sailed on her nextforeign cruise on 10 October 1936. She had aboard 650 men, including fourmidshipmenand160cadets.Seventh cruise: Sardinia, Varna/Black Sea, Constantinople, Suez, Port Said,Ceylon,Singapore,Bangkok,Borneo,Japan,China,Sumatra,EastIndies,EgyptandthenSpain,returningtoWilhelmshavenon23April1937.FregattenkapitänBiirknerassumedcommandinJuly1937.ThenextvoyagebeganinNovember1937.Eighth cruise: Indian Ocean area. The seventh and eighth voyages had beenplanned for longerbutwere curtailed for two reasons.Abroad, hostility to theGermanregimewasgrowing,andmanyvisitshadbeencancelledbyhoststates.The original causesof resentment against Germany were the 1935 Nurembergracelaws,whichthe1936BerlinOlympiadhaddonelittle tomitigate,andtheother was the Spanish Civil War, where German warships patrolled coastalwatersaspartofaninternationalnon-interventioncommission.WhilstreturningfromtheshortIndianOceanvoyage,thesituationhadbecomesufficientlytense
for Emden to be placed under the orders of the BdP (Befehlshaber derPanzerschiffe,CommandingAdmiralPocket-Battleships) in theMediterranean.ShepatrolledoffvariousSpanishportsanddidnotcompletethecruiseuntil23April 1938. A ninth voyage, to the United States, was eventually cancelledfollowingadverse foreignreaction to incidentsculminating inKristallnacht. InJune1938KapitänzurSeeWeverbecamethecruiser’sninthcommander.Ninthcruise:EmdensailedfortheMediterraneanon26July1938,returningtoWilhelmshavenon10October.ShesailedagaininearlyNovember,layfrom12to 18 November at Varna, Bulgaria, for the dedication of the memorial tofourteen crewmembers ofUB 45, lost when the submarinewasminedwhileleavingtheporton6November1916;KingBorisofBulgariavisited theship.On19NovemberEmdenproceededtoIstanbul,wherethecrewtookpartinthestatefuneralfortheTurkishStatePresidentKemalAttatürk.ThecruiserreturnedtoWilhelmshavenon15December1938.In various refits since 1936 themainmast stump had acquired an 11m tall
pole,whiletheradioaerialoutriggersontheafterfunnelhadbeendiscardedinfavourofamastwithstrutsandgaff.Athird8.8cmflakgunhadbeenadded,thethreeweaponsbeinggroupedinatriangularformationontheboatdeck.Inmid-1938thesickle-shapedstemwasreplacedbyastraight,slightlyrakedversion.
WorldWarIIIn May 1939 Kapitän zur See Lange was appointed the cruiser’s tenthcommander. On the outbreak of war on 1 September 1939 Emden wastransferred from the Training Inspectorate to the BdA (Befehlshaber derAufklärungsstreitkräfte, Commanding Admiral Naval Scouting Forces),VizeadmiralDensch,who aboard his flagshipNürnberg led a large task forceconsisting of the light cruisers Königsberg, Leipzig and Köln and numerousdestroyers,minelayersandsmallercraft.HismissionwastoextendtheWestwall(orSiegfriedLine)byminingtheGermanBightseawardsfromtheDutchcoastto the Skagerrak. The original intention of theWestwall was to guarantee toHitler’s neighbours to his west that he had no territorial ambitions in thatdirection.Theoperationlastedfrom3to20September.TheGermanforcewasbasedatWilhelmshaven,whereitreturnedregularlytoresupplyandshipmines.On the afternoon of 4 September tenBlenheim bombers ofNos 107 and 110Squadrons RAF approached the Jade estuary with orders to attack Germanwarships found in the roadstead or harbour. The aircraft divided into twoformations of five. Three of the five aircraft of No 107 Squadron were shotdownbyflakoverWilhelmshavenandafourthcrashedbetweenthequaywalland the foredeck ofEmden (whichwas berthing in themain harbour), killingnineofthecruiser’screwandinjuringtwenty.Duringrepairworkadegaussingsystemwasfitted,thecablingofwhichran
along theuppersideof thebeltarmourabove thewaterline.Thecruiser’s flakwas also being increased continually, 3.7cm singlemounted weapons andnumerous 2cm guns, some the quadruple Vierling, being installed. Trainingdutiesthenresumedoverthewinterof1939.On12March,togetherwiththeheavycruiserLützowandtheoilerNordmark,
EmdenputintothefrozenportofSwinemünde,whereshewasurgentlyneededinsupportofOperation‘Weserübung’,theoccupationofNorway.*Group5forOslo consisted of the new—and not fully worked-up—heavy cruiserBlücher,theflagshipofVizeadmiralKummetz,Lützow,Emden,thetorpedo-boatsMöwe,Albatros andKondor, themotorminesweepersR17 toR24 inclusiveand thewhalecatchersRau7andRau8.Duringthenightof5AprilEmdencarriedoutsearchlightexerciseswithBlücherandthefollowingeveningembarkedher610occupation troopswithmunitions and equipment atSwinemünde.Blücher andEmdenleftwiththethreetorpedo-boatsat0600on7April,andonceatseathecrewwas informed of the impending operation.On the 8thLützow joined thegroup,takingstationasternofBlücher,theforcethensteeringnorththroughthe
GreatBeltforOsloFjord.At midnight the German ships passed the entrance to Oslo Fjord, but the
element of surprise had been lost. Soon the Norwegians began to douse allcoastal lightsandbeacons,patrolvessels toportandstarboardbegantoMorseenquiries,andwarningshotswerefiredfromthebatteriesatRauöyandBoläme.Itwasmistyandvisibilitywaspoor.KummetztookthequestionabledecisiontopassthedangerousDröbakNarrowsatfirstlightathalf-ahead.At0525Blücher,theleadingship,washitby28cmshells,setonfireanddisabled.†Uponseeingthe initial attackonBlücher andashisownshiphad received three15cmhitsandwas being raked by lightweapons fire,Kapitän zur See Thiele,Lützow’scommander,assumedcontrolofthegroupandwithdrewtheforceatmaximumspeed astern, since forcing the Narrows seemed impossible. After areconnaissance, the invasion troops aboard Lützow and Emden weredisembarkeddownfjordatSonsbuktenforalandassaultontheDröbakdefences.After a numberofLuftwaffe attacks,Lützow andEmden tookup covering firepositionsat1555whiletwotorpedo-boatsandfourR-boatswentcloseinshoretoland naval infantry to take the Dröbak batteries, which eventually gave upwithoutafight.Surrendernegotiationsalongthefjordlastedwellintothelateevening,andit
was not until 0845 on 10 April that Lützow, Emden, Möwe and the R-boatspassedatspeed through theKaholmNarrows tomakefast inOslo threehourslater. Emden was then used as a wireless communications and liaison centrebetween the three branches of service atOslo, returning toGotenhafen in theBaltic as part of the BdA force once the Norwegian situation had beenconsolidatedinthesummer.InAugust1940KapitänzurSeeMirowbecamethecruiser’seleventhcommander.Thesurviving lightcruisers—Nürnberg,Leipzig,KölnandEmden—wereall
relegatedbyOKMto trainingstatuswitheffect from7February1941anddidnotreturntobattle-readinessuntilSeptemberthatyear.AftertheinvasionoftheSoviet Union the possibility was appreciated that the Russian Fleet mightattempttobreakoutfromKronstadttointernmentinSweden,andforthisreasonthe so-called German ‘Baltic Fleet’, consisting of the battleship Tirpitz, thepocket-battleshipAdmiralScheer, the four lightcruisersandnumeroussmallerwarships,was assembled underVizeadmiralCiliax.Once itwas clear that theRussiansdidnothavethisintention,theBalticFleetwasdividedintotwoparts,EmdenandLeipzigformingGroupSouthbasedonLibau,wheretheyremainedatreadinesstosupport theGermanadvancethroughtheBalticStates.Between25and27SeptemberthetwocruisersgavecoveringfiretoassistGermantroop
landingsontheEstonianislandofÖsel,bombardingRussianartillerypositionson theSworbepeninsula.The twocruisersavoided torpedoattacksbyRussianMTBsandasubmarine.*InNovember 1941, when the Fleet Training Squadronwas formed,Emden
returned to training duties. Conditions resembled peacetime, for in the BalticGermany had control of air and sea. Between June 1942 (Kapitän zur SeeSchmidt took command of the cruiser in July 1942) and November EmdenunderwentamajorrefitatWilhelmshaven.Inplaceofthelowersearchlightonthe battlemast an FuMB radar mattress was installed on a slightly enlargedplatform. On 7 November, in the presence of Grossadmiral Raeder, Emdenbecame the first warship to pass through Entrance IV (‘Raeder Lock’) at itsceremonialopening.Sheremainstodaythelargestwarshipevertohavepassedthoughthelockchamber.Although the ship achieved 26.9kt in engine trials off Neukrug, a major
engine overhaulwas indicated, for she had been in service for almost sixteenyears and despite the changeover from coal-to oil-firing retained her originalengines. Nevertheless, the financial and military situation made thepostponement of amachinery refit inevitable. In September 1943Kapitän zurSee Henigst was appointed her thirteenth commander, relinquishing toFregattenkapitänMeisnerinMarch1944.On 19 September 1944, as flagship of C-in-CMinelayers operating out of
Horten,Norway,EmdenhelpedlaySkagerrakMinefieldXXXW‘Klaudius’.On1 October, in company with the destroyers Karl Galster, Richard Beitzen,FriedrichIhnandZ30,EmdenlaidSkagerrakMinefieldXXXIIb‘Caligula’,thegroup being under constant air attack duringwhich a torpedo passed below adestroyer amidships. On 5 October the same group laid Skagerrak MinefieldXXXIIa ‘Vespasia’. The mines were shipped aboard the destroyers atFrederikshavnandsharedoutamongst thevariousunitsatHorten.ThecruiserKölnarrivedon14October1944with90minesshippedatSwinemiindeforthe‘Augustus’field,buttheprogrammewasnowabandonedbecauseofincreasingenemyairraids.UntiltheendoftheyearEmdenranvarioustroopshipandconvoyescortsin
OsloFjord.On10DecembersheranagroundandwasholedincompartmentII,andthisdamage,combinedwiththegeneralconditionofhermachinery,ledtorepairsatSchichauWerft,Königsberg.However,workproceededataveryslowtempo.On23January1945,whenRussiantroopsclosedaroundthecity,OKMordered the ship to be prepared to sail, and after the coffins ofFeldmarschall
von Hindenburg and his spouse had been disinterred and brought aboard thecruiser, Kapitän zur See Kähler, the ship’s fifteenth and last commander,appointedinJanuary,headedforPillauwithtugassistanceat0300onthe25th.After unloading the coffins and undergoing further makeshift repairs, EmdentookaboardherquotaofrefugeesandwoundedandsailedforKielononeshafton 1 February, arriving safely after a six-day voyage at the mercy of Sovietsubmarinesandaircraft.In theDeutscheWerke shipyardatKielEmdenwas subjected tocontinuing
airraids.On11Marchtheforwarddeckhousingandporttorpedotubesetweredamaged by incendiaries. On 3 April the forward funnel was destroyed by adirecthit.On9April,whenBritishaircraftdropped2,634tonnesofbombsonKiel, theheavycruisersAdmiralScheer andAdmiralHipperwerewrecked.AnearmissasterndamagedEmden’sstemwithsplinters.During thenightof13April Emden was seriously damaged in an air raid, and she was towed nextmorningtoHeikendorfBaywitha15-degreelisttoport.Oncethehullhadbeensealed, the cruiser was grounded in the shallows and deconimissioned on 26April.On3May1945shewasscuttledwithexplosives.Overthenextfiveyearsthewreckwasbrokenupinsituandscrapped.
ThelightcruiserEmden(i),displacing3,664tons,waslaunchedatKaiserlicheWerft,Danzig,on26May1908andenteredserviceon10July1909.On17September1910shearrivedattheGermancolonyofTsingtao,China,onattachmenttotheGermanFarEastCruiserSquadron.KorvettenkapitänKarlvonMüllierassumedcommandinMay1913.Shewasthemostfamousandsecondmostsuccessfulofthe
GermanregularwarshipraidersoftheGreatWar.PuttingtoseafromTsingtaoon31July1914,shetookGermany’sfirstmerchantprizeon4August.SubsequentlysherangedtheoceansfromtheMarianastotheMaldives,sinkingorcapturingfifteenmerchantvesselsof66,023grt.ShealsoaccountedforoneRussiancruiserandaFrenchtorpedo-boat.On9Novemberherpresencewasreportedbytheshorestationon
DirectionIslandandthemorepowerfulAustralianlightcruiserSydneywasdetachedfromanearbytroopconvoytoinvestigate.Atwo-hourlongbattleensued,duringwhichEmdenwasbadlydamaged.Hisshipafireandindangerofsinking,hercommanderhadlittlechoicebuttorunheragroundonNorthKeelingIsland.AswastheGermannavaltraditionofthetime,vonMüllerrefusedtostrikehisflagdespitebeingunabletocontinuetheengagement,andthiscausedmorecasualtiesthanwouldotherwisehavebeenthecase.Emden’sdeadnumbered129navalpersonnelandfivecivilians,includingthreeChinese.ThecruiserreceivedtheIronCrossanduponallhercrewwasbestowedtheuniquehonourofaddingtotheirsurnames‘-Emden’.ThelastknownsurvivorofEmden,engine-roomPettyOfficerHeyoAden-Emden,waspresentatthelaunchofthefrigateEmdenon17December1980attheBremerVulkanYard.Armament:Ten10.5cmandeight5.2cmguns,twotorpedotubes.Dimensions:118.3×13.5×5.5m.Machinery:Two3-cylindertripleexpansionsteamenginessuppliedbytwelvecoal-firedboilersprovidingatopspeedof24kt.
Crew:18officersand343men.
Emden(ii)waslaunchedon1February1916atAGWeser,Bremen,andenteredserviceon16December1916.AsflagshipoftheNorthSeatorpedo-boatflotillas,shetookpartintheGermantrooplandingsontheeasternBalticislandsbetween12and23OctoberandgavecoveringfireatOselandDagö.AfterhostilitiesshearrivedwiththeHighSeasFleetatScapaFlowon29November1918.Hercrewattemptedtoscuttlethecruiserthereon21Junethefollowingyear,buttheBritishsucceededingettingherintoshallowwater.In1922Emden(ii)wasawardedtoFrance;shewasscrappedatCaenin1926.Armament:Eight15cmandtwo8.8cmguns,fourtorpedotubes.Dimensions:151.4×14.3×6.3m(max).Machinery:TwoturbinesdrivenbytwelveSchulzwatertubeboilersproducing31,000shpfor27.7kt.ThephotographshowsEmden(ii)inNovember1918atWilhelmshavenpriortointernment;notethedispositionofthefoward15cmguns,andthatshehasaslimmer,moreeleganthullformascomparedtoEmden(i).Acharacteristicofthesenewlightcruiserswastheirraisedforefunnel.Thetwo8.8cmgunswerelocatedbetweenthemainmastandthe
afterfunnel.
EmdenintheearlystagesofconstructionattheReichsmarineWerft,Wilhelmshaven.
Emdenshortlybeforeherlaunchon7January1925.Despitethestrongbreezeandrainthereisahugecrowdtowatchtheceremony.Liningtheforedeckrail,dockyardmenstandreadytoletfalltheanchorsassoonasthehullisafloatsoastoimpedeherprogressacrossthebasin.Justabovethewatercanbeseenthestabiliserkeel;laterunitswerefittedadditionallywithananti-rolldeviceintheformofextendiblefloats.At
theheadofthetwotemporarymastsfliestheensignoftheReichsmarine,ablack/white/redhorizontaltricolourwithablackIronCrossatitscentre.
Atthecommissioningquay,Wilhelmshaven.OnthequarterdeckthecrewisparadedandanhonourguardpresentsarmsastheensignisraisedtosignalthatEmdenhasenteredservice.Thetallrailstanchionsareforthecanvassunawningaft.AsternofEmdenisapartlysubmergedfloatingdock,behindwhichisDrydock
VI.
Emden’sbows.TheReichsmarineensignfliesatthejack.Thetautstaysarefortheforwardcanvassunawning.AttheforepeakisthesymbolicIronCrossawardedtothefirstcruiserofthenameandengravedinthesamemannerasallawardedduringtheGreatWar:above,theImperialCrown;atthecentre,theletter‘W’forKaiserWilhelmII;andbelow,theyearofaward,1914.TheIronCrosswasintroducedduringthe
WarsofLiberationin1813.Theheraldicdeviceisthecoat-of-armsofthetownofEmden.
Theship’sbell—probablythefirstofthethree—wasacopyofthatcarriedaboardtheWorldWarIcruiserEmden,castanddonatedbytheMarinevereinPrinzAdalbert.Thefirstbellcrackedandwasreplacedbyabronzecopy.Thiswasmelteddownin1942,anironversionbeingsubstitutedwhichnowhangsinthe
SenateHalloftheMarineunter-stiltzungkommandoatWilhelmshaven.
Theviewfromthebattlemastoverthebridgedeck.Ontheforedeck,justvisibleabaftthewaterdeflectors,isapartoftheleading15cmgunandandsuperfiringB’gunhouse.Intheforegroundisthecommand
positionwithrangefinder,withperiscopebeadsprojectingabovetheroof.
Emdenasoriginallycompleted,duringmachinerytrialson12January1926.Theslim,tubularforemastwithitstulip-headedforetopwasunique.Themaingunnerycontrolstationwithrangefinderwaslocatedthereandwasfoundtobeunacceptablycramped.Anumberofotherfeatureswerefoundunsatisfactory,
leadingtoarefitpriortothecruiserundertakingherfirstoverseasvoyage.
Emdenafterthisfirstrefit:noticetheshorterbattlemastwithdifferentforetopandtallpolemast;theafterfunnelraisedtoheightoftheforefunnel;andtheflyingbridgebetweenthebattlemastandthebridgedeck.Atthebaseofthebattlemastisoneofthetwodouble-bankedsetsoftorpedotubes.Onthemaindeckbetweentheafterfunnelandthemainmast,a15cmgunoccupiesthepositionintendedoriginallyforthesecondtorpedotubemounting.Theraisedpositionbetweenthefunnelsisacharthouseforcadettraining.TherewasacloseaffinitybetweenEmdenandtheWorldWarIcruiserKarlsruhe:Emden’sdesignwas
basedontheblueprintsforthisvesselbecausetheShipTestingInstitute,whoseworkwasindispensabletonavalarchitects,hadbeencloseddownafterthewar.
Thisphotographclearlyshowsthearrangementofthetwoafter15cmguns.Outboardoftheaftermostisthefoldingpropellerguard.ThecruiserliesalongsidetheBlücherbrückeatKiel,theusualanchoragefortrainingships.Toweringaboveherbowarethemastsoftheill-fatedsailtrainingshipNiobe,lostwith
manycadetsinafreaksquallintheBalticin1932.
AstarboardviewofEmdenatanchor,hernavalensignsetattheensignstaffandjack.
Preparationsforanoverseascruise.AlongsidethecruiseristheLangerHeinrichfloatingcrane,thelargestintheGermanNavy;thishassurvivedtwoworldwarsandisstillinserviceatBremerhaven.Inthe
background(left)istheoldbattleshipZähringen,convertedforuseasagunnerytarget.
Emden,watchedbywell-wishers,abouttoenterthelockchamberpriortoleavingonhersecondcircumnavigation,5December1928.OffherbowistheoldbattleshipSchlesien,flyingtheflagofa
Konteradmiralatherforetop.
AfterEmdenhadmooredinthelockchamber,FleetCommanderVizeadmiralOldekopcameaboardforthedepartureceremony…
…anddeliveredanaddresstotheparadedcrewandcadets.Behindhimistheship’scommander,FregattenkapitänArnaulddelaPerière.Theofficerwiththelight-colouredgreatcoatlapelsistheCO
TrainingInspectorate,VizeadmiralForster,thecruiser’sfirstcommander.
Aboveandbelow:Eachforeigncruisewasattendedbymuchofficialleavetaking.Hereanadmiralispipedaboardandreceivesthehonourguard’s‘presentarms’.
Aboveandbelow:HeavyseasinBiscayandtheAtlanticcurlingalongthedecks.Severalcrewmenhavebeencalledouttore-securetheflailingportmooringboomwhichhasworkedfree.
EmdenatVillagraciainnorthernSpain,herfirstportofcallduringhersecondoverseascruise.Thisphotographwastakenon23December1928andshowstheshipdressedoverallandfiringasalutetomark
thebirthdayoftheQueenofSpain.
Gunnery(top)andtorpedo(middle)trainingforcrewandcadetsduringthecruise,withpracticetorpedoesretrievedbytheships’boatsafterrelease.Inthephotographonthelefttherangefinderoftheforwardfire
controlandthetwoforwardgunhousesengageatargettoport.
EmdenatNaples:aviewfromthecitadeltowardsVesuviusandtheBay.Thecruiserismooredsterntothebreakwater.
GunneryandtorpedoexerciseswerecarriedoutoffArgostolia,Greece,withtheprewarcruiserBerlin.OnceEmdenandthethree‘K’classcruiserswereinservice,theoldshipsweregraduallywithdrawn.Here
BerlinheadsforGermanyattheconclusionofthejointexercise.
EmdenatConstantinople.ThisimposingviewfromtheGermanEmbassygivesanimpressionofthesizeofconnectingstraitbetweentheMediterraneanandBlackSea;forcenturiestheRussianshavestriventogainpossessionofthisstrategicwaterway.IntheroadsteadtotheleftofEmdenistheancientTurkishwarship
Medjidieh,launchedin1903intheUnitedStates.
EmdenbeingcoaledbynativelabouratPortSaid,herfirstportofcallawayfromtheEuropeancontinent.Stowageofthecoalbelowdecksandcleaningtheshipafterwardswaslefttothecrew.
PassingthroughtheSuezCanalwithawningsset.Althoughthesemadenodifferencetothetemperature,theykeptthesunoffthedeck,providedshadeandmadeconditionsbelowmoretolerable.
AsultanisreceivedaboardatMombasawithfullmilitaryhonours.Everyonewhohasmadeaforeignvoyageaboardawarshipknowshowmuchthesegesturescontributetofriendshipandunderstanding.
Exercisingthe8.8cmflakcrews.Thesetwoweaponswerelocatedbetweentheafterfunnelandthemainmast.BetweenthetwogunsisaventilatorunitandabaftthefunneltheradioD/Fcentrewithloop.
WhiletheshipwasatPortVictoriaintheSeychelleson31May1929,SkagerrakDaywasmarkedbyamemorialservicetothedeadoftheBattleofJutland.Herethecrewisassembledonthequarterdeck.The
ChurchParadeflagfliesabovethenationalensignatthestaff.
TheImperialNavyensignishoistedattheforetopsignalyard—anothertraditionmaintainedintheKriegsmarine.Viewingslitsforgunnerypersonnelintheforetop,theriggingfortheradioaerialsandthe
twosearchlightplatformsareseen.Ontheforwardfaceofthefunnelareavaneandsiren.
EmdenalongsideacoalingwharfatSabanginSumatra.Coalwasdeliveredaboardinhoppersonaconveyorbelt—simplerandlabour-saving,butnotnecessarilycleaner.
EmdencrewsportsdayatEndeh,Flores,May1929.
EmdenindrydockatAuckland,NewZealand,forathree-daydefoulingandrepaintinginJune1929.Theinitialreceptionbythetownspeoplewasunfriendlyifnotactuallyhostile.Theexcellentconductofthecrewandseveralfavourableoccurrencesledtoaswingtotheotherextreme,andmanynewfriendshadbeenwon
bythetimetheshipsailed.
ManycontactswererenewedintheformerGermanSamoanpossessionsandprotectorates.ThecruiserisseenhereanchoredatPago-Pago.
AhighpointwasthevisittoApia,wheretheresidentsoftheformerGermanprotectorate(1900–18)dispensedwithformality—andsomanybananasweregiftedtotheshipthatitwasaproblemtoknow
wheretostowthemall!
AmeetingwithoneofthecruisersoftheUSOmahaclassintheapproachestoSanDiego.
Emdenmooring,themanoeuvrebeingwatchedcriticallybyherAmericancounterparts.
AstreamofvisitorstoEmdenattheSanDiegoquayside.
Well-wishersstandshouldertoshouldertowaveEmdenoffonherdeparture,9September1929.
ThenextportofcallwasPanama.
EnteringoneofthePanamaCanallockchamberstoreachtheAtlantic.Thecruiserisalreadywarpedtooneofthetowinglocomotivesashore.
EmdenapproachingtheBayofBiscay,11December1929,intheaftermathofahurricane.Theafterrangefinderiswellsecuredagainsttheelements.Thecruiserhasalist,suggestingthatbothwindandsea
areonherbeam.ThewaveheightandspindriftindicateawindstrengthofForce9–10.
Aboveandbelow:OnceEmdenwasintheEnglishChannel,thehomecomingstreamerwasmadeupandhoistedtothetoppoleofthebattlemast.
EmdenleavingNoIIILock,Wilhelmshaven,on13January.InthebackgroundistheLangerHeinrichfloatingcraneandabeamanoldbattleship,probablySchlesien,flyingthecommandflagofthe
BefehlshaberderLinienschiffe(CinCBattleships).
Forthethirdcruise,thecruiser’sfirstcall—assooftenbeforeandsubsequently—wasFunchal,Madeira.Herethecommander’spinnacesetsoffforthequay.
ABritishadmiralispipedaboardbyaboatswain’smateandreceivesthesaluteofthecommander.BehindKapitänzurSeedelaPerièreistheladderreceptionparty(thenumberofmeninitvariedasaccordingtotherankandstatusofthevisitor).Intheforegroundthehonourguardpresentsarms.Theadmiralwearsthe
internationaldressuniformoffrockcoat,cockedhat,epaulettes,medalclaspandsabre.
Stokingthecoal-firedfurnaces.Therating’susualheadwearwasthe‘man-o’-war’;thesidecapwasnotgenerallyintroduceduntilaftertheoutbreakofwar.
EmdenatFlensburg-Mürwik.AfterfouroverseascruisesshereturnedtoFleetdutyforaperiod.Thecathedrallikeedificeonthehillisthenavalcadets’trainingschool.
Wreathedinsmoke,thewhiteensignishoistedonthemainmast;ondeckarecrewmeninBritishuniform;andEmdeniscareenedtoport,hermaingunsatmaximumdepression.ThecruiserisstarringintheU-boat
filmMorgenrot(Daybreak),oneofthenumerousnavalmoviessopopularbetweenthewars.
ShortlybeforeEmdendecommissionedforamajorrefiton18March1933,thecruiser’sfirstcommander,VizeadmiralForster,nowCONorthSeaStation,presentedtheshipwiththenameplatefromtheWorldWarIraiderEmden.SevenformercrewmenlivinginWilhelmshavenattendedtheceremony.BehindForsterisFregattenkapitänGrassmann,commanderatdecommissioning.NoticetheImperialNavyensignwhichcoveredtheplaque;itwasretainedaboard.OtherhonoursbesidestheIronCrossattheforepeakandthe
nameplatewereplaquesinscribed‘IndianOcean’,‘Penang’,‘CocosIslands’and‘Ösel’,affixedtothefaceofthebridgestructure.
Thecruisertowardstheendofher1933–34refit,undergoingboilertrials.AboveheristheboomofLangerHeinrich.
Emdenre-entersservice,29September1934,hercrewparadedaftandofficersandhonourguard(withweaponsat‘present’duringtheflag-raising)onthesuperstructuredeck.Thecommanderstandsonaraisedpodium.Thewaterlinebeltarmourisforwardoftheextendedpropellerguard.Thecruiser’snameplatecanbeseenabovethethirdscuttle.Onthecounteratthestemistheeagleandwreathedswastikaemblem—allvesselsbelowlightcruisersizecarriedthisonthebridgeface—butontheoutbreakofwarallheraldicshieldsandemblemswereunshipped.ItwastheusualpracticeintheGermanNavythatwarships
undergoingextensiverefitweredecommissioned,inmostcasestheship’scompanybeingremusteredaboardanotherunitenteringservice,usuallythesameday.
EmdeninNoIIILockchamberpriortodepartureon10November1934;thequaysideisthickwithwell-wishers.Ontheoppositesideoftheharbourcanbeseenthepocket-battleshipsAdmiralScheerandAdmiral
GrafSpee.
Emdenreceivingasend-offinNoIIILockentranceatthestartofhervoyage;off-watchmenwaveback.OntheoppositequayisthelightcruiserLeipzigwithparadedcrew.OnEmden,noticethestumpmainmast(whichnowservedonlyasasearchlightpost),thenewderrickandraisedhousingandtheshorterfunnels.
Theemissionofblacksmokehasbeenmuchreducedsincethechangeovertooil-firing.
EmdenatCapeTownforamidsummerChristmasandNewYear1934,withawningserected.Receptionswerealwaysheldonthequarterdeck.
EmdenpassingthroughtheKielCanal.Theoldsteampinnacewithwhitefunnelsuggeststhatthephotographwastakenfromoneofthepre-dreadnoughtbattleships,SchlesienorSchleswig-Holstein.
ThesixthoverseascruisetotheAmericasandHawaiilastedfrom23October1935to11June1936.HeretheGovernoroftheAzoresisreceivedaboardwithfullceremonyatthefirstportofcall,Angrado
Heroismo.
On7November1935,duringthecruise,thecrewwasmusteredonthequarterdecktobereadanOrderoftheDaysignedbyHitler.Anhonourguardwaspresenttomarkachangeofnavalensign—theintroductionoftheReichWarFlagaboardship.TheOrderread:‘SoldiersoftheWehrmacht.WitheffectfromtodayIpresenttothereconstitutedWehrmachtforgeneralserviceusethenewReichWarFlag.Theswastikaisthe
symbolofunityandpurityofthenation,animageoftheNationalSocialistworldview,thepledgeoffreedomandstrengthoftheReich.TheIronCrossistoremindyouoftheuniquetraditionsofourarmed
forces,whosevirtuesandexampleinspireyou.TheReichcolours—black,whiteandred—bindyoutoloyalserviceuntodeath.Itisyourpridetoservethecolours.TheformerReichWarFlagwillbehonourably
withdrawn.Ireservetomyselftherighttoorderitflownoncertainmemorialdays.’
EmdenbeingtowedintoalockchamberbyoneofthetypicalPanamaCanallocomotivesduringatransitinDecember1935.
Asalwayswhenoverseas,thecommander—aswereallvisitorsofrank—wasaffordedadegreeofceremonydependingonstatuswhenboardingordisembarkingtheship.Thecaptainwasentitledtoanhonourguardwithdrummer;anadmiralmeritedatrumpetertoo,plusboatswain’swhistleandaladder
receptionparty.FollowingKapitänzurSeeBachmannishisADC,wearingaiguillettes.
DuringearlyJanuary1936EmdencalledatSanJosé,Guatemala.Thecrew,includingbrassband,travelledbytraintothecapitalforcertainnationalfestivities.HereKapitänzurSeeBachmanntakesthesalute
togetherwithvariousdignitaries.
EmdenatMontrealbetween12and18May1936.NoticetheReichnationalflagatthejack;thisflagwasflownattheensignstaffbyGermanmerchantvessels.
EmdenatPort-au-PrinceflyingtheReichWarFlagandWhiteEnsignathalfmast,toobserve,onHitler’sorder,thepassingoftheBritishheroofJutland,AdmiraloftheFleetJohnJellicoe,on20November1935.
Theburialtookplaceonthe25th.
EmdenonherreturntoGermanyon11–12June1936,passingKarlsruheboundforKielandextensiverepairs.Bothcruisershavetheircrewsparadedattheships’rail.
Asalwaysforoverseascruises,therewasabigsend-off.ThetwoadmiralsaretheCinCNorthSeaStation(IIAdN)andtheHeadoftheTrainingInspectorate.Theofficeratthefarleft,wearingaiguillettes,isan
Admiral’sADC.Thisiswinteruniform:thewhite-crownedcapwaswornfrom20Aprilto30September.
Aboveandbelow:AnEmdencrewmanhasdiedfarfromhome.Thecoffinisplacedonthequarterdeckwithanhonourguard—hereacadetandarating—bearingaside-armintherighthand.Afterthereligious
servicethebodyiscommittedtothedeepinkeepingwithnavaltradition.
ThelastoverseascruisewastotheMediterranean.Between12and18November1938atVarna,Bulgaria,EmdentookpartinaceremonydedicatingamemorialtothecasualtiesofU45,sunkintheBlackSeain1916.WearingtheraincoatisKingBorisofBulgariaduringashipboardvisit;behindhim,wearingawhite
belt,ishisnavalADC.
Theofficercorpsofthecruiserinformaldress—frockcoat,cockedhat,epaulettes,medalclaspandsabre.TheepaulettetasselswerewornbytheranksofOberleutnantzurSeeandabove.Theofficerseventhfrom
therightisanavalofficialandwearsanavalcapwithsilverinsigniaandsilvercordchinstrap;navalofficersworegoldlaceandinsignia.TenthfromtherightisKapitänzurSeeLohmann,commanderof
Emdenfrom1936to1938.
Emdenin1937–38withhernewbowform.
Emden(left)atwarinthewakeoflightcruiserKönigsbergduringBdAexercisesintheBalticbetween1and3November1939.
EmdenintheBaltic,probablyin1941.
TheshipphotographedintheNorwegianskerriesthe1940–41.Theradarunithasnotyetbeeninstalled,andthecruiserwearsthecamouflagepatterninforceforallwarshipsoperationalintheBalticareauntil1942.Thedazzleschemeusedfrom1942untilthewar’sendwasadarkirongreywithstemandbow
sectionsinlightgreytodeceiveenemyobserversastotheship’slength.
ThewreckofEmdenatKiel,photographedbetween3and14April1945.Theshipispartiallycoveredbycamouflagenetting,butthescaleofthedestructionisneverthelessobvious—largeholesforward,heavydamageamidshipsandtheforefunnelknockedaway.TheshipwastowedintoHeikendorfBay,grounded
andscuttledwithexplosiveson3May1945.
*GermanydependedonsuppliesofScandinavianironoreimportedinherfreightersloadingatNarvik.ItwasthelegitimatepracticeoftheseshipstomaketheirwaysouthwardsthroughNorwegiancoastalwatersso as to afford themselves immunity from attack under international law. Following earlier incidentsinvolvingtheprizeCityofFlintandtheoilerWesterwald,thestormingofAltmarkbyBritishdestroyersatJössingFjordon16February1940wasthelaststraw.Inthesubsequentdiplomaticexchanges,Norwayhadcondemned theBritish action as illegal.However, asNorwayhad instructed herwarships at the time toobservetheincidentandnotinterfere,thusfailingtoactasrequiredunderinternationallaw,HitlerdecidedthatNorwaywouldnotprotecthisironorefreighterseitherwhenthefirstincidentsoccurred.Thusinvasion
wasessential.—G.B.
† Her rudder machinery failed. She had to be anchored to avoid drifting on the rocks and was thentorpedoedbytheshorebatteriesonKaholm.Theresultingfireswereuncontrollableandafteramagazineexplodedamidshipsshewasabandoned,sinkingat0732.*TheSworbepeninsulaprojectssouthfromtheEstonianBalticislandofÖselatthemouthoftheGulfofRiga. It had been occupied by a garrison of 4,000Russian troops since June 1940. In order to dislodgethem, the Germans launched Operation ‘Weststurm’. The 162nd Infantry Regiment encountered heavyresistance on 22 September 1941 and artillery support was requested from seawards. Leipzig, Emden,torpedo-boatsandminesweepersbombardedRussianlandinstallationsintheSalmi-MeldrisectorfromLyuBayonthe25thand27thofthemonth.Onthe27th,duringitswithdrawal,theforcewasattackedwithoutsuccessbyfourRussiantorpedo-cutters,oneofthelatterbeinghitandsunkbyfriendlyfire.ThesubmarineSC-377missedLeipzigwithtwotorpedoes.—G.B.
KönigsbergThe building contract for Light Cruiser ‘B’ (Replacement Thetis) was placedwithMarinewerft,Wilhelmshaven, in1925underYardNumber108.The firstkeelmaterialwaslaidon12April1926andthehullwaslaunchedon26March1927asKönigsberg.TheBürgermeisterofKönigsbergdeliveredthebaptismalspeech, and Frau Loof, widow of the commander of the earlier cruiserKönigsberg,performedthenamingceremony.On 17 April 1929 Fregattenkapitän Wolf von Trotha commissioned
KönigsbergintotheReichsmarine,theship’scompanytransferringaboardfromthe cruiser Nymphe, which had decommissioned the previous day. After theusual trials andworking-up,Königsberg represented the GermanReich at theBarcelona World Exhibition between 18 and 26 October under a newcommander,FregattenkapitänRobertWitthöft-Emden(appointedinJune),andshejoinedtheFleeton17December1929.
PrewarServiceOn1January1930theofficeofBdA(BefehlshaberderAufklärungsstreitkräfte,CommandingOfficerNavalScoutingForces)wascreatedandKönigsbergtookherplaceasflagshipofagroupconsistingofKöln,severaltorpedo-boatflotillasand aminesweepinghalf-flotilla.Between2April and19 June, as flagship ofVizeadmiralGladisch,BdA,and incompanywithotherGermanwarships, shepaidagoodwillvisittoSpainandtheMediterranean.CallsweremadeatVigo,Almeria,Catania,Argostolion,Split,PortMahonandLisbon.In September 1930 Fregattenkapitän Hermann Densch was appointed the
cruiser’s third commander. Structural changes to the ship during the yearincluded theplacingofaplatformforwardof thebattlemastat the levelof thelowerbridgedeck.Inatwo-monthrefitatthebeginningof1931,thetallpolemastattheforetop
was shortened, although the long signal yards were retained. The afterdeckhousewasgivenasinglestoreyextensionatitsforwardend.On19Maythatyear Königsberg took part in the Fleet celebrations before Reich PresidentHindenburg on the occasion of the launching of the pocket-battleshipDeutschlandatKiel.Duringasummercruise,withmanoeuvresbetween15Juneand3 July,variousNorwegian fjordswerevisited. In earlyAugust the cruiserparticipated in competitive exercises atKiel before ‘showing the flag’ off theBalticresortofScharbeutzon15–16August.Duringa refit the followingwinter theextension to theafterdeckhousewas
enlargedforwardbyonedeckwithagallery.Inadditionto theusualexercisesandvisitsalongtheGermancoast,between11and17JuneKönigsbergvisitedStockholm in company with five torpedo-boats. Fregattenkapitän Otto vonSchraderbecamethecruiser’sfourthcommanderinSeptember.The1933NewYearnavalparadewasbroadcastfromaboardKönigsberg.The
cruiserformedpartofthereviewhonouringthevisitofHitlertoKielon22–23May. In company with the old battleship Schleswig-Holstein, she visited theNorwegianfjordsbetween26Julyand6August.From14to18Augustshetookpart in the Fleet torpedo exercises with Schleswig-Holstein, Schlesien andHessen,thelightcruiserLeipzig,torpedo-boatsandminesweepers.Ina1934refittheportcraneandgearwerereplacedbyabarcrane,andtwo
8.8cmsingleflakgunsinstalledontheroofoftheafterdeckhouse.Theplatformerectedin1930waslandedandtheplatformonthelowerbridgedeckenlargedinstead.Thebridgedeckwaslengthenedasfarbackastheforefunnel.On9July,
as flagshipofKonteradmiralKolbe,BdA,KönigsbergmetLeipzig in the JadeandmadethefirstGermannavalgoodwillvisit toBritainsincetheGreatWar,mooringatPortsmouthfromthe11thto15thofthemonthandreturningtoKielon the 20th via the Irish Sea and Fair Isle. Later in July that year the cruisercalledatRevaland theEstonian islandsbefore takingpart in theautumnFleetManoeuvres. Fregattenkapitän Hubert Schmundt was appointed her fifthcommanderinSeptember.Anaircraftcatapultwasfittedduringadockyardlayupearlyin1935.Atthe
beginning of February the shipmade a round voyage fromWilhelmshaven toBremenviatheChannelandthenorthofScotland.KönigsbergtookpartinNavyWeek atKiel in June and in the Fleet gunnery exercises on 19August in thepresenceofHitleraboardthestateyachtGrille.ThePolishportofGotenhafenwas visited from 22 to 25 August. A full schedule of exercises occupied theremainderoftheyear.Ina1936winterrefittheaerialboomsontheafterfunnelwerereplacedbya
polemastwith crosstrees.Theafterdeckhousewasconvertedandenlarged sothattherangefindercouldbesitedfurtheraft,andaraisedflakfirecontrolcentrewaserectedforwardofthedeckhouse.Alightpolemastwassetattheforwardwall of this structure, slightly off-centre to starboard, while 8.8cm twinmountingsreplacedthesinglemountedflak.On 23 February 1936 Königsberg’s function as the BdA flagship was
terminatedandthecruiserwasredesignatedGunneryInspectorateTrainingShip.Thefirstgunneryclasseswereembarkedon3March.Asaresultoftheoutbreakof civil war in Spain in July, the German government sent warships to thepeninsula for the protection and evacuation of German citizens there. On 25NovemberKönigsberg leftKielandthreedayslaterrelievedKölnatElFerrol,commencinganticontrabandpatrolsoffCadiz.AcallwasmadeatMelilla.ThecruiserspentChristmasatLagosinPortugalandon26Decemberintervenedtorelease the German steamer Palos, which had been seized by Red Spanishforces.Asareprisal,theRedsteamerMariaJunquerawasconfiscated.On15January1937thecruiserarrivedatKielandresumedhertrainingrole
after a short overhaul.Kapitän zur SeeRobinSchall-Emdenwas appointed asherseventhcommanderinFebruary.AvisitwasmadetotheNorwegianfjordsbetween12and28June.Thecruiserbeganathree-monthrefiton5December,and between 1937 and 1939 experiments were made with various radar-rangefindingdevicesontheroofofthebridgeporch.Aftertheusualenginetrials,trainingdutieswereresumedon4March1938.
KönigsbergwasatKielaspartof theNavalReviewheldon22August in thepresenceofHitlerandtheHungarianregentAdmiralHorthyontheoccasionofthelaunchingoftheheavycruiserPrinzEugen.KapitänzurSeeErnstScheurlenwasappointedcommanderinNovember.Afterattending the launchingof theheavycruiserSeydlitz atBremenon19
January1939,KönigsbergunderwentashortrefitandthencontinuedasatargetshipfortheU-boatSchool.From11to15MayshevisitedWasainFinlandandfromthe17thto19thVisbyonGotland.KapitänzurSeeKurt-CaesarHoffmannserved as commander between June and September, when Kapitän zur SeeHeinrichRuhfuswasappointedhertenthandlastcaptain.
WorldWarnAt theoutbreakofwarKönigsbergwas returned to theBdAand from3 to20September,incompanywithNürnberg(flagshipBdA,KonteradmiralDensch),Leipzig,Köln,Emden andnumerousminelayers, destroyers and torpedo-boats,she took part in the hurried minelaying operation to extend the Westwall(Siegfried Line) from the Dutch coast to the north of Denmark. From 1 to 3November,withothercruisers,KönigsbergparticipatedinaBdAexerciseintheBaltic before rejoiningNürnberg and torpedo-boats of the 6th Flotilla in theGerman Bight, where on 12 and 13 November the group formed a receptionforcetoescorthomeGermandestroyersreturningfromaminelayingoperationintheThamesestuary.On19Novembersheenteredtheyardsforarefit.In her final refit the bridge and helm position wings were shortened and
reinforced and a degaussing system was installed. Königsberg was inactiveduringthewintermonthsof1939onaccountofthesevereweather.Noenginetrials,battle trainingorgunnerypracticewerepossible, and30per centof theship’scompanywasfreshtothecruiserwhenshelefttheyards.At the beginning of March the first preparations were taken in hand for
‘Weseriibung’, the invasionofDenmarkandNorway. InitiallyKönigsberghadbeenlistedwithWarshipGroup5(Oslo),butshechangedplaceswiththeheavycruiser Blücher, which was even less battle-ready. Together with sister-shipKöln,thegunnerytrainingshipBremse,the1stE-BoatFlotillawithtenderCarlPeters, the torpedo-boats Leopard andWolf and the armed trawlers Alteland(Schiff9)andKoblenz(Schiff18),KönigsbergformedWarshipGroup3withtheobjectiveofcapturingtheNorwegiannavalbaseandportofBergen.Thewholeoperation had the highest degree of secrecy.NavalCommandNorthSea gavetheDirectorofFitting-Out,KapitänzurSee(Ing.)Zieb,thetaskofplanningthenecessarymeasuresatWilhelmshavenNavyYard.Forembarking troopsandequipmentZiebchoseanchoragesnotoverlooked
from the city. These were sealed off for ease of control.Within the harbour,security was enforced by a naval artillery detachment. Transport trains wererouted to dockyard trackswell outside the city andunloadingbays chosen foreaseofswitching.Railwaycranesunloadedheavyequipmentandeightyelectrictrucks cartedmaterial to the ships.Broad gangwayswere put in place for theembarkation of Army personnel and sufficient cordage and wire were madeavailable to lash down field kitchens, motor-cycles and such like. Quaysidelighting was strictly controlled. On the issue of a specific codeword, alltelephonesbar twounder special supervisionweredisconnectedandall ferries
baroneconfinedwithspecialorders.TheKaiserWilhelmbridgeandinnerlockgatewereopenedtwohoursbeforethefirsttrainsarrivedandnotshutuntiltwohoursaftertheshipssailed.
GeneralcoursesofWarshipGroups3(Bergen)and4(Kristiansand),8–9April1940.
On 2 April Köln, Königsberg and Bremse occupied their appointedanchorages.On the 3rd and 4th the 8,000-ton tankersKattegat andSkagerraksailed for Narvik and Trondheim respectively. On the evening of 7 April thetransport trains arrived in quick succession. All troopswere aboard shipwiththeirequipmentby2300,andtheshipssailedatmidnight.Atotalof1,900menhad been embarked. Aboard Königsberg were Vizeadmiral von Schrader,Admiral-DesignateCommandingNorwegianWestCoast and his Staff;OberstGrafvonStolberg,CO159thInfantryRegiment,andstaff;639menofthe69thInfantryDivision;andabout100menofthe126thNavalArtilleryDetachment.The whole plan went off smoothly and secrecy was excellent.* The group
headedtoseaat18kt—thetopspeedoftheslowestship,Bremse.OnceintotheGermanBight the crewswere informed of the destination. The firstLuftwaffeescorts appeared during the morning. Later the two torpedo-boats and CarlPeters joined the convoy as antisubmarine protection. Mist and decreasingvisibilitymadeprogressdifficult.Noneoftheshipswasequippedwithradar.DuringtheafternoonGroupWestwarnedoflightBritishforcesbetweenthe
Shetlands and Bergen. The shipboard B-Dienst (wireless monitoring crew)picked up radio traffic between twoRoyalNavy light cruisers and destroyers.Towards1800, offStavanger, thenorthboundGermangrouppassedwithin60miles of the incoming eastbound British 2nd Cruiser Squadron with elevendestroyers.At2140theE-boats,comingupfromHeligoland,tookstationintheformation,andonapproachingNorwegianwatersallhoisted theWhiteEnsignasarusetodeceiveNorwegiancoastalforces.TheNorwegianshadbeenalerted,however,andhadextinguishedtheircoastallightsandradiobeacons,leavingtheGerman force to navigate upfjord throughwaters strewnwith numerous smallislands and rocks, many submerged at high water, without a pilot—a featrequiringgreatnavigationalskill.KonteradmiralSchmundtorderedareductioninspeedto7kt,thetorpedo-boat
Leopard leading, followedby theE-boats.TheypassedMarstein at 0200, andfortyminuteslaterthetwoarmedtrawlersarrivedtodisembarkfromKönigsbergthenavalartillerytroopswhoweretotackletheKvarventorpedobatteriesattheheadofByFjorddirectlybeforeBergen.ThemajorityoftheinfantryweretobelandedfromE-boats.TheirknowledgeofthelocationandstrengthofNorwegianpositionswasvague.TheforcestoppedandtheE-boatscamealongside,butthetrooptransferwasinterruptedbyaninquisitivepatrolboat.Theexplanationwasaccepted,buttheGermanshipswerereportedshortlyafterwardsbyotherpatrol
vessels. The deception succeeded to the extent that aNorwegian torpedo-boatreturned its only torpedo tube to the ‘rest’ position.However, itwas not longbefore the Norwegian government ordered its coastal stations to fire on allGermanwarshipsinNorwegianwaters.At0430 the codeword ‘Weserzeit’wasbroadcast, ordering the executionof
Operation ‘Weserübung’ forthwith. Köln and Königsberg began transferringtheir troops into E-boats and ships’ launches alongside, speed being of theessence, for the German force was supposed to be off Bergen at 0515.Konteradmiral Schmundt had decided to storm the port as the result ofinformationthatGroup5hadencounteredresistancefromshorebatteriesinOsloFjord.Köln was the first to set off, and in company with Wolf and Leopard
approached By Fjord. Here she was caught in the beams of a number ofsearchlights and bombarded by the 21 cm guns of theKvarven battery. Theyscored no hits and Köln did not reply. Once into the port of Bergen, Kölnanchored to disembark the remainder of her troops, the two torpedo-boatsfollowing suit alongside thequay.Ashortwhile laterBremse andCarlPeterslimpedintoharbourafterrunningthegauntlet.Bremsehadtakenaserioushitinthesternandtwohitsalongthewaterline;herinnardsdevastated,shehadfourdeadand14wounded.CarlPetershadtakenahitonhermastandhaddeadandwoundedfromflyingsplintersamongstherArmypersonnel.Afterherfirstcontingenthadbeentransferredaccordingtoplan,Königsberg
workedupto22ktinpursuitoftheotherunits.AttheentrancetoByFjordshewasilluminatedbysearchlightsontheHabsöbendandtakenunderfireatonceby the21cmbatteries.Shedidnot replyuntil hit, and then respondedwithallbarrels.ThefirsthithadpenetratedthestarboardsideatcompartmentX,boringahole35cmindiameterimmediatelyabovethewaterlineatframe107/108andexplodinginupperwallpassageX.9.3.Splinterstorethebulkheadsofadjacentfuel bunkers, E-plant III and boiler room II, causing substantial damage,flooding and fire in the E-room. Casualties were limited to burns cases. Theshorebatterieshadseveraltargetstooccupytheirattention,andduringpausesinfiringattemptsweremade togeta fixon thepositionsof theNorwegiangunsfromtheirmuzzleflashesagainstthedarkcliff.Thesecondhitstruckasternneartheforwardpairof3.7cmflakguns,killingthreeandwoundingseventeenoftheguncrews.Thethirdhitstruckclosetothesecond,passingthroughtheafterdeckandexplodingonthestarboardsideinthecompartmentXIIImessdeck,guttingit completely. Later it was considered possible that the second and third hitswerethesameshellwhichhadsplitonstrikingthedeck.
The visible external damage was a hole 2.5m by 0.6m on the starboardafterdeck,whiletheleadingfunnelhadtwoholes0.25mindiameterandE-plantIVexhaustshaftwasdestroyed.Therewasfloodingbelowdecksandtheforetophad to be shut down because of smoke, fire control being transferred to theforwardcommandposition.Whiletemporaryrepairsweremade,thecruiserranintoPuddeFjordat22ktand tookupstationabout500masternofKöln, fromwhere she could continue firing at theKvarven andHellenbatterieswhileherwoundedwere shipped to a dressing station ashore.Attempts to restore steamwere hindered by flooding in the boiler rooms and the cruiser drifted slowlythrough the harbour, unable to anchor because the capstans had no electricalpower.Onceshesucceededindroppinganchor,herstemwascaughtbythetidalstreamand thecruiser collidedwithaSwedish steamer.Thishappened just asthe Hellen batteries began to straddle her with 21cm shells. This battery wassilencedbyfullsalvosfromKölnandKönigsberg,bombingbyHe111aircraftandfinallycapturebyArmyunits.
CourseofWarshipGroup3(Bergen),9April1940.
By midday the town of Bergen, the port and surrounding defensiveinstallations were in German hands. The 60–80 merchant vessels in theroadstead were examined by prize commandos and enemy-owned ships wereimpounded.At1700KonteradmiralSchmundtheldacommanders’conferenceatwhich the return ofwarships toGermanywas discussed.Köln and the twotorpedo-boatswereundamagedandwouldsailnextevening.CarlPeters,theE-boats and the two armed trawlers would remain at Bergen. Königsberg andBremse were not sufficiently seaworthy and would be detached to AdmiralCommanding NorwegianWest Coast as floating batteries to oppose expectedBritishlandings.Between1430and1740offshoreapowerfulBritishforcewasmetby47Ju88and41He111bombers.HitswereobtainedonthebattleshipRodneyandthecruisersDevonshire,GlasgowandSouthampton.ThedestroyerGurkhawassunk.FourJu88swerelost.During the evening, while refuelling the torpedo-boatWolf and unloading
material into theaviationsupportshipBernhardvonTschierschky,KönigsbergcameunderfirefromlightweaponsonanhighpointinwesternPuddeFjord.AfterathoroughmechanicalinspectionofthecruiserbytheGroupEngineer,
Konteradmiral Schmundt accepted that Königsberg would need a furthertwenty-fourhoursatBergenforrepairsandwouldsailonthenightof10April.In the lateevening twelveWellingtonbombersattackedKöln andKönigsberg,butalthoughbombsfellwithin50mofthelatternofurtherdamagewasinflicted.AtnightfallbeaconswerelitonvarioushighpointsaroundBergentomarkthearea inGermanhands andKönigsbergmooredwithher starboard side againstSkottegrunds Quay, thus enabling her broadside to bear on the north channelentrancetotheroadstead.TheE-boatsweresecurednearbyasfloatingtorpedobatteries. A British reconnaissance aircraft was seen but the night passedrelativelyquietly.About100crewmenwerecommandeeredtolandbatteriesandthe railway station. The engine room personnel worked feverishly at theshipboardrepairswhiletheremainingcrewsleptattheirbattlestations.At0737on10Aprilanaircraft resemblinganHe111wasseencircling the
harbour, and at 0800 a British attack came. Fifteen Royal Navy Skua dive-bombers from 800 and 803 Naval Air Squadrons at Hatston in the OrkneyIslands, each carrying a single 1001b bomb, fell on various ships in Bergenharbour.Königsbergwas the target forseveralaircraftwhich,afterpenetratingherflak,wereabletoplacetheirbombsfairlyprecisely.Thecruiserreceivedatleastthreedirecthitsandthreenearmisses.
Becauseofthespeedatwhichtheattackoccurred,thesequenceisnotcertain.Thefirstbombhitthequaysidethenpenetratedship’ssideatcompartmentVIII,explodinginthe’tweendeck.Theholewassolargethatcrewmembers,bodiesandstretchercaseswereable topass throughitdirectlyfromship toquayside.Thesecondbomb(whichmayinfacthavebeentwo)passedthroughthesignalbridgeontheportsideandfellintotheseanearE-plantIV,tearinga3m2holeinthehull at thewaterlinewhen it exploded.The thirdbombpassed through theauxiliaryboilerroomandexplodedin’tweendeckcompartmentVIIandattheneck of the funnel. The fourth bomb hit upper deck compartment VI, passedthroughtheExecutiveOfficer’squartersandexplodedinthe’tweendeckabovetheauxiliarymachineryroomonthestarboardside.Thefifthbombwasanearmisswhich fell astern to port, although the explosion caused hull damage aft,and thesixthbombpassed through theupperdeckandexploded in the ’tweendeckincompartmentIX.The cruiser assumed a list to port and the order to prepare to abandon ship
followedalmost at once.After all roomshadbeen searched forpersonnel, thedeadandwoundedwerebroughtouttothequaysidefollowedbylightweapons,flak ammunition and other valuable equipment from the upper deck.Königsberg’ssituationatthistimewasverycritical.BoilerroomIIIhadflooded,probablyasaresultoftheleakplugsbeingblownoutofplacebyabombblast.Water had also reached boiler room II, apparently by way of a damagedtransversebulkhead.Thismeantthatallfourboilerroomswerefloodedtosomedegree. The turbine and auxiliary machinery rooms and armour deck wereundamaged. Fatalities were restricted to the ’tween deck and the radiotransmittingroomincompartmentXII.Therewasnoelectriccurrentbecausetheboiler rooms and electrical plant had had to be shut down and the dieselgeneratorhadnotbeenrepairedaftertheshellhitthepreviousday.ThismeantthataraginginfernoincompartmentVIIIandadjacentroomscouldnotbeputout, all attempts usinghand extinguishers andothermeans havingbeen foundineffective. As a damage limitation exercise the torpedo tubes were swungoutboardtopreventfirereachingthewarheads.Theshipboardaircraftcouldnotbe flown off. Before the shipwas finally abandoned allmagazine doorswereopened to allow flooding. Small explosions occurred amidships when firereachedtheaviationspiritandreadyflakammunition.Theship’scompanyleft thecruiser inanexemplarymannerandparadedby
divisions for roll call about 100m from the quayside. The air attack claimedeighteen dead and 23 injured, twelve seriously. The ship’s list graduallyincreasedandKönigsbergturnedturtleandsankwithherflagflyingat1051on
10April1940.During 1941 shipyard specialists arrived fromWilhelmshaven with vessels
and gear to commence salvagework. The hull was sealed, drained and, oncerefloated, towed by Norwegian tugs to Hagenaes Bay and anchored. Thesuperstructureunderwaterwascutawayandthehullrightedusingfourwinchesandtwenty-six100-tonnepontoons.Thewreckwasscrappedoverthecourseofthenextfewyears.
ThelightcruiserKönigsberg,3,390tons,waslaunchedatKaiserlicheWerft,Kiel,inDecember1905andenteredserviceon6April1907.Ontheoutbreakofwarshewasusedasaraiderandsankoneship,
Ellerman’sCityofWinchester(6,60lgrt)andamotorlighter.On20September,outsideZanzibarharbour,KönigsbergfoundtheBritishcruiserPegasus(2,135tons)repairingboilersandsankherafterashort
action.AshisownshiprequiredanoverhaulFregattenkapitänLooffnowenteredtheRufijiDelta.BecauseofsandbanksattheentrancethechannelwasinaccessibletoBritishcruisersonaccountoftheirgreaterdraught,butoncetheyhadreachedthedeltaKönigsbergwastrapped.Sheremainedthereforthenexttenmonths,fulfillingherroleoftyingdownalargerenemynavalforceurgentlyrequiredelsewhere.Three
heavy-gunmonitorssentfromBritainjoinedtheforceandactionbetweenKönigsbergandBritishnavalandairunitseventuallybeganon6July1915.Onceshewasbeyondrepair,thecruiserwasscuttledon11July.Armament:Ten10.5cmguns,ten3.7cmautomaticcannonandtwotorpedotubes.Machinery:3-cylinder
tripleexpansionsteamenginessuppliedbyelevencoal-firedboilers,speed24.1kt.Dimensions:114.8×13.2×5.2m.Peacetimecomplement14officersand308men.ThephotographshowsKönigsbergonFleetdutypriorto1911.Noticetheheraldicshieldattheforepeak;later,simplerdeviceswerefittedeithersidenearthebowanchor.The3.7cmautomaticcannonwerelocatedinthebowrecessesandtheswallow’snests
behindfoldingscreens.
ThelightcruiserKönigsberg(ii),5,440tons,waslaunchedatAGWeserBremenon18December1915andenteredserviceon12August1916.AsflagshipofKommodorevonReuter,IIReconniassanceGroupNorthSeaStation,thecruisertookpartintheÖseloperationoffLithuania.AftertheArmisticeinNovember1918theshipbroughtKonteradmiralMeurertoBritainfornegotiations.Decommissionedon31May1920,thecruiserwashandedovertoFranceaspartialreparationon20JulyandenteredservicewiththeFrenchNavyon6Octoberthesameyear,nowrenamedMetz.Shewasscrappedin1936.Armament:Eight15cmguns,two8.8cmflak,4torpedotubes.Machinery:steamturbinesdrivenbytwelvecoal-firedwatertubeboilers,
45,900shp,speed27.8kt.Dimensions:145.8×14.2×6.32m.Complement:17officersand458men(26moreasflagship).Thephotographwastakenin1918andshowsthecruiserindrifticeintheBaltic.
Thenewhullonthestocksbeforelaunching,26March1927.Theheraldicshieldisconcealedbyadrapeofflag-cloth.Intheforegroundisthebaptismalpulpit.Thetwogreatanchorswillarresttheprogressofthe
shiponcesheisafloat.
Aviewofthebaptismalpulpitimmediatelybeforethelaunching.
Thecruiserslidesintohernaturalelement.Alongtherailisthecanvasbearingtheship’sname,onthestemattheforepeaktheheraldicdevice.
Intheharbourbasintugsturnthehullandbringtheshiptoheranchorage.Thisphotographwastakenfromashipyardcraneinthefitting-outbasinattheWilhelmshavenNavyYard.Totherightisthecanalleading
fromtheshipbuildingharbourintothebasin.
Thecruiserfittingoutinoneofthedrydocks.‘B’and‘C’15cmturretsarealreadyinstalled.
Königsbergfittingout.OnthehookofthegiantLangerHeinrichcraneisthebarbettefor‘A’turret.Nearerthecameraistherecentlylaunchedsister-shipKöln.
Königsbergapproachingcompletionindrydock:astarboardviewfromforward.
Königsbergnearscompletion.BetweenherhullandthequayisKöln,showingthe15cmbarbetteof‘A’turretandthefoundationsforbattlemastwiththeforwardcommandcentreinposition.Inthebackground
(left)istheoldpre-dreadnoughtHannoverinfrontofDocksIV–VI.
Aboveandbelow:17April1929:thecommissioningofKönigsbergalongsidethefitting-outquayatWilhelmshavenNavyYard.ThelightcruiserNymphehaddecommissionedearlier,hercrewtransferringtothenewship.Left,theflagvisibleatNymphe’sjackstaffindicatesthattheshiphasbeendecommissioned;
above,navalcoloursbeingraisedatKönigsberg’sensignstaff.
Battlehonoursofearliershipsbearingthenameweredisplayedprominently.
Above:Theprowofthenewcruiser.Thedeviceattheheadofthestemwaslaterremovedandreplacedbyaheraldicshieldmountedeithersideofthebow.
Below:Königsberg’scorpsofofficersandlowerdeckofficersonthedayofcommissioning.Theconceptof‘lowerdeckofficers’wasabolishedinthe1930sandreplacedwithaunifiedWarrantOfficercorps.
Königsbergrunningmachinerytrialsoverthemeasuredmile,asindicatedbythesignalflagsatthepolemast.
Thecruiserheelingheavilytostarboardduringturningcircletrialsathighspeed,7August1929.
Königsbergcareenedtoport,probablyfortechnicalworkonthestarboardside.Thissortofphotographisoftenexplainedincorrectlyasaninclinometertest.
KönigsbergatStockholminJune1932.Intheforegroundheraccompanyingtorpedo-boatsaremooredintwopacks.
Königsbergatanavalreviewin1931,thepennantoftheBdA(CommanderReconnaissanceForces)attheforetop.Herensignhasbeenretouched.Asternliealightcruiserandalineoftorpedo-boats.
InJuly1934GermanwarshipsmadeanofficialvisittoaBritishportforthefirsttimesincetheGreatWar.HereKönigsberg(right)andLeipzigareseenalongsideatPortsmouth.
InAugust1935KönigsbergvisitedthePolishportofGotenhafen(Gdynia),wherethecruiserisseenalongsidetherailwayterminusquay.
KönigsbergleavingWilhelmshavenNoIIIEntrance.
Exercisesandtraining:astern-bowrefuellingmanoeuvreasseenfromthetorpedo-boatFalke.
AsternviewofKönigsbergdressedoverall.
Thesunnysideofnavalcruises—fineweather,asmoothsea,thecrewsunbathingontheforedeck.Thisviewforwardshowsthe15cmbarrelsof‘A’turret,anchorcapstansandchains.
KönigsbergatherbuoyatKiel,thecrewatworkwashingandretouchingthepaintwork.Inthebackgroundishersister-shipKarlsruhe.
‘A’turretfiringafullsalvoahead.Notethecollapsedrailstanchionsandthegreatbillowofpowdersmoke.
Aviewof‘B’and‘C’turretsfromastern,portside.Herethecruiserispassingthroughthelock;thetwosignalmenwithflagsatoptheturretssuggestsomeformoftrickymanoeuvre.
Exercisingthemainarmamenttoportathighspeed.‘A’turrethasjustfired.
Attheendoftheexercise,criticismandaclosingaddressfromtheGunneryOfficer.
Flak.Initiallythesewere8.8cmC/13gunsonacentralpivotingchassis,lateranimprovedmodelofthesamecalibre.
The8.8cmflakfromanotherangle,thecrewsunderinstructionbeforeanexercise.Flakwasclassifiedasalightweapon;mediumweaponswerecalibresupto20cm(7.87in).
Emphasiswasplacedonnightfiring—oneofthepositivelessonsoftheGreatWar.Thisinvolvedintensivesearchlighttraining.Thisisaviewforwardtothestarboardsearchlightposition;leftalongsideistheafter
commandposthousing;andattheforetopisanavigationallantern.
Theengineroomcontrolcentre.Acommand-relayratingstandswithatelephoneamidstnumerousmonitoringinstruments.
Theelectricalcontrolroom.
From1935,‘K’classcruiserswerefittedwithanaircraftcatapultlocatedbetweenthetwofunnels.ThephotographshowsthearrangementaboardKönigsbergwithaHeinkelHe60floatplaneonthecatapultandanewcraneshippedforloweringandretrieval.Abafttheafterfunnelmantlemoreaerialoutriggershave
beenfitted.
TheHeinkel60beingretrievedbycrane.
AstarboardviewoftheHeinkel60andcatapult.
AsternviewofKönigsbergin1936.Onthequarterdeckadivisionalparadeistakingplace.Thsshipislyingtoabuoy,heraccommodationladderhasbeenletdown,andthepropellerguardisextended.Atthe
foretopshewearsanadmiral’scommandflag.Notethedarkpaintworkontheturrettops.
Aviewfromthesameangletwoyearslater.Theaerialoutriggersabafttheafterfunnelhavebeenreplacedbyapolemastwithcrosstrees.
Aboveandbelow:Königsbergin1938aftertheforwardfirecontrolplusrangefínderhadbeeninstalledimmediatelyforwardofthebattlemast.Thisstructureincludedatestsiteforaprimitiveradarroom,the
staticantennabeingfixedtotheforwardfaceofthehousing.Theradarimagerelayedthefieldaheadonly.Thetwophotographsshowtheequipmentfromdifferentperspectives.
KönigsbergfailedtoreturnfromtheinvasionofNorway.WhilstlyingalongsidetheGermanBridgeatBergenshewashitbyBritishSkuadive-bombersandsankatthequayside.Thisphotographshowsthe
cruiseronfireandlistingtoportimmediatelyafterbeinghit.
Shortlyafterwardsthecruisersettledwithanincreasedlist.IntheforegroundisaJu52floatplanewithapparentlyunconcernedflightcrewman.
AnotherviewoftheburningKönigsberg.
Königsbergstillafloat,asseenfromahead.
Thecruisercapsizedintenfathoms.Oneofherpropellersjutsoutofthewater.
Theend.Onthequaysideallthatremainsareafewstripsofcanvas.
Aboveandbelow:Salvageworkbeganin1941.Afterrefloating,thewreckwastowedfirsttoHagenaesandlatertoLaksvaag.Theupperphotographshowstheresurfacedhull,theloweraviewoftheleadingtugs
duringthetowtoHagenaes.
Aboveandbelow:Withthehelpoftwenty-six100-tonnepontoons—oneofwhichisseenontheleftintheupperphotograph—thehullwasstabilisedandthenraised.Atbottomrightoneofthetorpedotubesetscan
beseen.
Thetwopropellersandrudder.
Thehullfloatingkeel-up,seenfromahead.Intheforeground,theapertureattheforefootisfortheextendibleboomfromwhichtheparavaneswerestreamed.
*KonteradmiralZiebremainedasSeniorShipyardDirectoratWilhelmshavenuntil1950.Hestated thatshortlyaftertheendofthewarhewassummonedintothepresenceoftheSeniorBritishOfficer,CaptainR.N.Condor,towitnessthedecorationoffourdockyardworkers.TheywerefourEnglishmenwhohadbeenworkingattheyardpre-warandcontinuedtodoso‘asGermans’throughouthostilitiesdespitethe‘perfect’securitysystemanditspoliceorgans.Whenasked,all fourstated that theyhadhadnoknowledgeof theplansfor‘Weserübung’.
KarlsruheThe building contract for Cruiser ‘C’ (ReplacementMedusa)was placedwithDeutscheWerke,Kiel,in1925underYardNumber207.Thefirstkeelmaterialwas laid on 27 July 1926. The hullwas launched asKarlsruhe on 20August1927, thebaptismal speechbeingdeliveredby theBürgermeister ofKarlsruheandthenamingceremonyperformedbythewidowofFregattenkapitänKöhler,commanderofthefirstKarlsruhe,whichwaslostintheCaribbeanin1914.On15October1929shipyardpersonnelputthecruiserthroughherfirstmachinerytrials,afterwhichshetransferredtoWilhelmshavenforcompletion.Sheenteredservice there on 6November 1929 underFregattenkapitän EugenLindau, hership’scompanyboardingfromthedecommissioningcruiserBerlin.
PrewarServiceInthemonthsafterenteringserviceKarlsruheworkedupintheBalticandon15January 1930maintained a speed of 29kt for three hours. From the outset thecruiser was scheduled as a cadet training ship, and on 24 May she leftWilhelmshaven for her first overseas cruise. Her route took her through theMediterraneantoEastAfrica,roundingtheCapeofGoodHopetoSouth-WestAfricaandacrosstoSouthAmerica,theshipreturningviaSpaintoKielon12December.The‘K’classcruiserswerenotbuiltforuseintropicalseas,andtheiruseastrainingships—especiallyKarlsruhe—wasanexpedient.Inlongperiodsatsea,particularlyinthePacific,theshipoftenranshortoffreshwaterandtheextremelyhighhumidityledtoventilationproblemsintheenginerooms.Theperiodsbetween foreign cruises—Karlsruhe sailedon fourmore—were
used for recruit training, general exercises, trials and shipyard overhauls.Structuralchangesincludedreplacingthetallpolemastbyastaffattherearofthe foretop and installing singlestorey deckhouses between the funnels andforward of the after deckhouse.Kapitän zur See Erwin Wassner became thecruiser’s second commander in September 1931. On 30 November that yearKarlsruheleftWilhelmshavenonhersecondcruise.Shecarriedaboard524men—30 officers, 27 warrant officers, 58 cadets and 409 other rates and civiliantradesmen. Her route took her to the West Indies (when visiting Cuba aWindflügelflugzeug—’wind-wingaircraft’,orhelicopter—wasseenfor thefirsttime and a note made)Mexico, Venezuela, the Panama Canal, Honolulu andNorthAmerica,south toCapeHornandnorth toNewYork, thenKiel.Beforethe cruiser put in on 8 December 1932, Admiral Raeder and KonteradmiralSchultze, Commander Training Inspectorate, came aboard to inspect the ship.This was standard practice for all German warships returning from a foreigncruise.AfterabriefstayatKielKarlsruhemovedtoFlensburg-Mürwik,wherethe cadetswere disembarked to undergo their final examinations at theNavalCollege. In December Fregattenkapitän Freiherr Wilhelm Harsdorf vonEndemdorfwasappointedthecruiser’sthirdcommander.During 1933 the bridge-deck platforms were enlarged and two additional
8.8cmflaksinglemountingswereinstalledeithersideoftheafterdeckhouse.On6October1933KonteradmiralSaalwächter,CommanderTrainingInspectorate,visited the cruiser, and after Fleet Commander Admiral Forster made hisinspection on 14 October Karlsruhe sailed for East Asia via Suez, then toHonolulu,thePacificCoastoftheUnitedStates,Panama,BostonandviaSpaintoGermany, anchoring in theSchilligRoads to collectAdmiralRaeder on 15
June1934forthelastlegofthevoyagetoKiel.KapitänzurSeeGüntherLütjenswas appointed the fourth commander of the cruiser in September. Structuralchanges involved replacing the portside derrick and gear by a bar crane anddiscarding the stylised eagle and swastika emblems abaft the rearmost scuttleseithersideofthehullinfavourofasingleemblemonthecounter.AfterstabiliserkeeltestsattheNavalArsenalon5October1934,Karlsruhe
cast off on the 22nd for her fourth overseas cruise via the Azores to SouthAmerica,thentoCapeHornandtothePacificcoastsofAmerica.AtCallaothecruiser took part in the celebrations to mark the 400th anniversary of thefoundingof thePeruvianstate (25January-6February)beforemakingpassagethroughthePanamaCanal tovisitportsontheAtlanticseaboardof theUnitedStates.KarlsruhereturnedtoKielon15June1935.Inashipyardrefittheaerialbooms on the after funnel were replaced by a mast with crosstrees and thebattlemast platformswere further enlarged.A catapultwas installed and trialswithafloatplanewereheldinKielBayon23September,buttheaircraftwasnotcarriedonthefifthvoyage.Thecruiser’sfifthcaptain,KapitänzurSeeLeopoldSiemens,tookcommand
in September and after the usual inspectionsKarlsruhe sailed on 21 Octoberwith606menaboard.AtTenerifeon7November thecruiserbecame the firstGermannavalunittohoistthenewReichWarFlag.ShenextvisitedSãoTomé,Lobito,DurbanandPortVictoriaintheSeychelles.The voyage continued to Batavia, Indonesia, Ilo-Ilo, Hong Kong and
Nagasaki(wheretheguncrewsweregivenaneight-dayexercise),andtoKobeuntil12March.Whenthecruisersailedthatday,thebarometerwasfalling.Asshe got further into the Pacific thewind rose gradually to Force 9 and fiercesquallsswepttheocean.Hugerollingseasthreatenedtocapsizetheship,causingher toheave-to for safety.On the14th the stormabated for a fewdays,but itreturnedwithavengeanceonthe18thwhenwindsofhurricaneForce12wererecorded.Theshiprolledandyawedalarmingly,poundingandgroaningat theseams,andeventuallyalongitudinalframebuckled;othersfollowedonthenightof19March.Atthelevelof theboatdeckafissurestretchedfromonesideofthe hull to the other, passing through the commander’s cabin.When the shipplunged this rentgapedopen20mm,andwhether thecruiserwouldsurviveorbreak apart and founder with all aboard rested in the hands of the gods. Thehurricanereachedtheheightofitsfuryon20March,bywhichtimeKarlsruhe,lowonfuel,washeadingforshelterintheAleutians.*Thestormblewitselfoutonthe21st,andthecruiserreachedDutchHarboron
the 23rd. She spent five days patching up with shipboard tools and left on 7April to repairat theSanDiegoUSnavalbase,where thecrackswereweldedand extra I-beams bolted externally to provide additional support to thedeformedhull.Sheleftforhomeon17April,callingatBalboa,PanamaandStThomas and anchoring off Wilhelmshaven on 8 June for the usual formalinspection.Hitlercameaboardonthe11th.ThecadetsdisembarkedatFlensburgbetween17and19June,leavingKarlsruhefreetoentertheyardsatKielforascheduledrefitandtocompleterepairstothestormdamage.Theneardisasterledtotheterminationofhercareerasacadettrainingship,andshewasplacedatthedisposal of the BdA on 1 July. Structural changes involved the erection ofdeckhousesbetweentheforefunnelandbattlemastandbetweenthecatapultandforefunnel. The after deckhouse was enlarged stemwards as a flak directioncentrewithrangefinder.Asmallpolemastwasfittedoff-centretostarboardonthe forward bulkhead of the housing, while 8.8cm flak twins replaced theoriginal singlemountings. Signal wings were added to the bridge deck and aplatformwasinstalledaftofthebattlemastnearthesearchlightpodium.On9Septemberthecruiserrantheusualtrialsafterleavingtheyardsandthen
beganworkingup in theBaltic. Following the outbreakof civilwar inSpain,KarlsruhewasoneoftheGermanwarshipsappointedtopatroltheSpanishcoastto assist refugees and control contraband. On 27 December 1936 she left forSpanishwatersandon1JanuaryrefuelledatElFerrol.ThecruiserpenetratedtheMediterraneanasfarasMelillaandthenpatrolled
the Atlantic coast between Tangiers and El Ferrol, returning to Kiel on 22February.On17June1937shesailedagainforElFerrol,butwasrecalledwhentheGermanNavywithdrewitsunitsfromtheinternationalcontrolarrangementfollowingtheRepublicanattacksonDeutschlandandLeipzig.KarlsruhearrivedatKielon30June.Throughouttheremainderoftheyearsheexercisedandrantrials, takingpart in theFleetmanoeuvres in thecentralBalticbetween20and25September.On 20 May 1938 Karlsruhe was decommissioned for a major refit at
Wilhelmshaven.Thiswasoccasionedby theexperiencesof the three ‘K’classcruisersovertheyears,particularlyasregardstheirrelativelyweakconstruction,poor stability and the lessons learned from the neardisaster in the Pacific in1936. The major alterations were as follows. The foretop was reduced fromdouble-tosinglestorey, thestaffon theforetopwasreplacedbyamastand thesearchlightplatformonthebattlemastwasraised,anewplatformbeinginstalledbelow it.The lowerplatformat the rearof thebattlemastwasalso raised.Theafterfunnelwasshortened,andslightlycantedcapswerefittedtobothfunnels.
The derrick post with searchlight stations was unshipped and searchlightplatformswereerectedabreastthefunnels.Alargebent-armcranewasinstalledonthestarboardsideandastraight-armcraneontheportside.Atallermainmastwith long tripod legs was fitted. The starboard hawsehole was sealed andreplacedbyadeckcluse.Twin10.5cmweaponsreplacedthe8.8cmtwinflaksanda10.5cmsinglewasfittedontheaftsuperstructuredeck.Finally,anti-minegearwasfittedattheforefoot,withashaftfortheextensionpole.Theremovalof thecruisingdiesel reported inonepublication is improbable since thepost-refitblueprintsshowitinplace.
WorldWarIIKarlsruhewasrecommissionedbyKapitänzurSeeFriedrichRieve,herseventhandlastcommander,on13November.Enemyactivityandtheseverewinterof1939/40 curtailed the usual programmeof trials andworking-up.Virtually thewhole company was fresh to the ship, and shortly before Operation‘Weserübung’inearlyApril1940theBdAreportedthatKarlsruhewasnotfullycombatworthy.In aminor refit in1940 the ship receivedadegaussing systemand theport
cranewasreplacedbyamodelsimilartothatonthestarboardside.Duringthepreparationsfor‘Weserübung’thecruiserwasatBremerhaven.Rievehadbeendesignated commander of Warship Group 4, tasked with landing occupationtroopsatKristiansandandArendal.KonteradmiralSchenk,AdmiralNorwegianSouth Coast, travelled aboard her as a passenger. At 2230 on 7 April trooptransportsarrivedat thequaysideandabout1,200menweredetrained.OherstWachsmuth’s Staff and units of the 210th Infantry Regiment embarked onKarlsruhe and her escorts, the torpedo-boats Seeadler and Luchs. A coastalartillerycompanywasshippedontheE-boattenderTsingtauandamotor-cycletroopboardedthetorpedo-boatGreifforArendal.OtherunitsoftheGroupweresevenE-boatsofthe2ndFlotilla.Fourmerchantshipsofthe1stNavalTransportGroup,Wiegand, Kreta, August Leonhardt andWestsee, had left Stettin forKristiansandonthe6th.At 0500 on 8 AprilKarlsruhe sailed north from Bremerhaven in company
with Luchs and Seeadler at 21kt, passing west of Heligoland, while Greif,TsingtauandtheE-boatsheadedtowardsSylt.Theweatherwasclearwithlittlebreeze and the seaswere calm.BeyondHornsReef the visibility deteriorated,allowingKarlsruhe and her two escorts to increase speed to gain a reserve oftime.When visibility dropped to 300m,Luchs andSeeadler, sailing abeamofKarlsruhe,fellinlineasternofher.Atsixthatevening,withtheshipsploughingtowards the rendezvous point with the remainder of the Group north ofHanstholm, visibility was down to to 30m in patches and the three vesselsmaintainedcontactbyaudiblefogsignals,radiobeaconsbeingusedtofixtheirposition. From 2115 navigation lights were set, and by midnight ultra-short-wavecontacthadbeenestablishedwithGreif,TsingtauandtheE-boats.Speedwasmaintainedat21kt throughthefogsinceKapitänzurSeeRievewantedtobeclosetoKristiansandby0345sothatthelandingscouldbebeginpunctuallyat0515on receiptof thecodeword ‘Weserzeit’.Thecurtainof fogbecamesothicksothateventhepilotlightshadtobeturnedonfororientationpurposes.
Around 0200 signalswere received reporting heavy searchlight activity andgunfire in Oslo Fjord and that the NorwegianAdmiralty had extinguished allcoastal lights and radio beacons. At 0300 on 9 April visibility was zero, butforty-fiveminutes laterKarlsruhe sounded the 200m line threemiles south ofthefjordentrance.Onaccountofthefogandthedifficultinshorewaters,itwasadjudged imprudent toattempt todisembark troopsand thesquadronsailedupanddownofftheharbourentrancewaitingfordawn.At0442themistsbegantoliftalittleandsomelowislandswereseen.At0517,withfoghornsblaring,thegroupsetcoursefortheharbourentrance,theirnavigationbeingconfirmedbyalight buoy and land being sighted at 0557. Just after 0600 the squadron wasspottedbyalow-flyingseaplanewhichignoredtheGermans’recognitionsignal.KapitänzurSeeRievenotedinthecruiser’sWarDiary:‘Thefogrobbedusoftheelementofsurprise.Itwasalreadyanhourafter“Weserzeit”andpastdawn.TheNorwegianreconnaissanceaircraftwoulddefinitelyhavereportedus.Inthecircumstances I abandoned the plan, which had already been postponed oncefrom0415, todisembark theArmyandnavalcoastalartilleryunits into sixE-boats in the innerskerries.’Insteadthe torpedo-boatsLuchsandSeeadlerwereorderedtopreparetolandtheirtroopsonOdderöy,arockfortresswithrelativelyhighcliffswhichlaydirectlytoseawardoftheportofKristiansand.OnOdderöywerebelievedtobefour24cmhowitzersandtwo21cm,six15cmandsix6.5cmguns; amile andahalf to the eastwas the islandofGleodden, equippedwiththree15cmandtwo6.5cmgunscoveringthenavalbaseofNarvikeninTopdalsFjord, andwhichhada clear fieldof fireonall approachingvessels.Near theGrönningen light a pilot boat was seen leading a German steamer, Seattle(7,399grt);shortlyafterwardsOdderöyfiredsomeredsignalflares,towhichtheGermans responded by increasing speed and bringing their gun crews toreadiness.TheNorwegiansopenedfireonKarlsruheanda21cmshelllandedjustahead
ofherstem.ThisconvincedRievethatanattempttoforcehiswaythroughcouldendindisaster,and7kmshortofOdderöyheboreoff tostarboard to lengthentherangewhilehisowngunnersattemptedtolocatetheenemyemplacements.OntheGermans’firstapproach,theNorwegiansopenedfirewithallbatteries,
their shells straddlingKarlsruhe. Because of her head-on approach, her afterturretsweremasked:all thatcouldbebroughttobearwerethethreebarrelsof‘A’turret,some10.5cmheavyflakgunsandthesamecalibremainarmamentofthe twotorpedo-boats.Firewas initiallynotreturned.AlthoughtheNorwegianshootingwasirregularandinaccuratefortheshortrange,itrepresentedadanger.ThetacticalsituationoftheGermangroupwasnotfavourable.Therestricted
watershamperedthefiringoffullbroadsides,andcontinualcoursechangesweredecided upon behind a curtain of smoke. When the first German aircraftappeared and bombed Odderöy and Gleodden, Karlsruhe joined in with ‘A’turret. This coincided with the loss of Seattle. The blockade-runner had leftCuraçao on 4March and after eluding theNorthern Patrol hadmade TromsöbeforeanchoringinKristiansandFjordpriortosailingthelastlegtoGermany.Notrealisingwhatwasafoot,theGermancaptainmistooktheGermanwarshipsforBritishandtriedtoescape.HecameunderthefireoftheNorwegiancoastalbatteries, was hit by a shell from a Norwegian torpedo-boat moored atKristiansand and was then bombed by German aircraft. The ship finished upagroundandburning,laterdriftingouttotheskerriestosink.At0655Karlsruhemadea renewedattack, firingher after turrets througha
smokescreenassheturnedtoport.TheshipboardaircraftwascatapultedofftoreportontheeffectsofthebombingofthetwoNorwegianstrongpoints.WhentheGermanshipswerewithin6.5kmofOddenöytheisland’sbatteriesopenedaheavy fire, straddlingKarlsruhe and Tsingtau. Because of the expenditure ofammunitionduringthehead-onapproaches,shellswerebeingpassedmanuallyfrom the after turrets to ‘A’ turret. At 0723 the German ships turned off tostarboardheadingnorth-east,whichallowedKarlsruhetofireherfullbroadside;theotherGermanunitsalsofired inpassing.When theLuftwaffemadea freshappearance,theGermannavalforcewithdrewbehindasmokescreen.At0750thetorpedo-boatsLuchsandSeeadlerwereorderedtolandtroopson
OdderöywhileKarlsruhegavecoveringfire.ThetwoboatspassedGrönningenandOksöy at high speed before running into a thick fog bank and had to berecalledbyMorselamp.
TheoccupationofKristiansand,9April1940.
The fourth approach began at 0925 through thick fog,Karlsruhe narrowlyavoidingareefbythrowingherrudderhardtoportandputtingherportenginefullahead.Afterthisscarethegroupturnedbackagain.Thefogbegantoliftatabout1000andthecoastalartillerymendisembarked
fromTsingtau into E-boats alongside.At about the same timeGreif signalledthat Arendal was in German hands. This broke the tension, and Karlsruhereceived orders to proceed into Kristiansand. The German squadron passedOdderöy, eerily silent, at high speed and anchored in the inner harbour of theport. At 1220 assault troops reported the surrender of the Oddenöy batteries.Karlsruhedisembarkedhertroopsintotorpedo-boatsandE-boatsalongside.At 1700 Oberst Wachsmuth reported that the city had fallen and that
Karlsruhe’staskhadthereforebeencompletedsatisfactorily.AllGermannavalunitsparticipatingintheinvasionofNorwaywereunderinstructionstosailforGermanyasearlythesamedayascircumstancesallowed,andat1900on9Aprilthecruiserweighedanchor forhomeat21ktescortedbyLuchs,Seeadler andGreif.Visibilitywasgood,windlightnorth-easterlyandtheseafairlycalm.At1930 the commanderof the submarineHMSTruant saw tohis surprise ‘threedestroyers [actually the three torpedo-boats] with a ‘K’ class cruiser in theirmiddle’.Theywere runningathighspeedonazig-zagcourse.Thesubmarinewas in an unusually favourable shooting position and fired a fan of fourtorpedoes at the cruiser froma rangeof4,000m.The submarine thendived to100m,wheresheescapedthesubsequenthuntbythetorpedo-boats.Karlsruhe’s,WarDiaryrecords:
1900 Sunny,lightwind,calmsea.GroupEastordereddeparturewhile still light: (1) Sail earliest aftermission completed.(2) If possible pass east of Skagen before dark. Mydecision:Sailat21kttoenableT-boatstozig-zag.
1951 Course147°, 21kt.After leavingFjord, zig-zag coursebyKarlsruhe.
1958 Fanoffourfromstarboard.Order:Fullaheadboth,hardtoport.OnetoipedohitcompartmentV/VI.Immediately12°list to starboard. Both engines and rudder out of action.Ship lies adrift. Order ‘Make smoke’ not carried out assmoke unit not readied. First report by ExecutiveOfficer
(IO) to Commander: ‘Several sections out of action.Situation very bad. Suggestion: T-boats alongside toevacuate some of the crew. All life-saving apparatusreadied for use. Motorised boats cannot be lowered aselectrical plant out of action!’ Second Report IO toCommander: ‘Compartments III–VII flooded.CompartmentVIIImakingwater.Allpumpinggearoutofaction.Shipsinkingslowly.’Decision:Evacuationofcrewsince ship cannot be saved. Secret papers destroyed orbroughtaboardT-boats.Severalsubmarinealarms.Openedfire with machine guns and fired torpedoes. T-boats alsogivingsubmarinealarm,droppingdepthchargesandfiringwith 2cm weapons. Ship’s company abandoned cruiserwithgreatdisciplineandtakenaboardSeeadlerandLuchs.
2110 After crew had left ship, Commander and NavigationOfficer transferred from Luchs to Greif, which had noKarlsruhecrewmenaboard,towitnesssinking.
2114 Luchs and Seeadler made for Kiel on orders of BSN[CommanderCoastalDefenceForcesNorthSea].
2230 SeauptorailofKarlsruhequarterdeck.
2245 AsKarlsruhecouldnotbesaved,Igaveordertosinkshipwithatorpedo.
2250 First torpedo hit Karlsruhe in bow compartment XV,second torpedo at base of mast. After a few minutesKarlsruhesankbythebow,starboardside.
At the fatalmoment,Karlsruhewas heading south fromKristiansandFjordtowards the Skagen lightvessel. She and her three escort vesselsweremaking21kt and zigzagging. Itwas known thatBritish submarineswere active in theSkagerrakandextralookoutshadbeenposted,butthedangerwasthoughttobeoff Oslo Fjord because of the number ofmerchant sinkings and confirmatoryreports made by reconnaissance aircraft. At 1958 Luchs, on the cruiser’sstarboardbeam,gaveasubmarinealarmonbearing90degrees.KapitänzurSeeRieveorderedhardtoportandbothaheadfull,butbeforetheorderscouldbeputintoeffecthesawthetwotorpedoesracingtowardshisship.Oneexplodedintothe starboard side at compartment V/VI. The cruiser lost way quickly andassumedalisttostarboardof12°.TheIOsprintedtowardsthesternandabove
compartmentIVreceivedtheChiefEngineer’sreportthattheroomscontainingthemainstarboardturbine, theauxiliarymachinery, theruddermechanismandthe port and starboard electrical plant were flooded. Access aft beyondcompartmentVIwasnotpossible.TheIOreportedtothecommanderthattheshiphadreceivedaveryserioushit
and that she was settling slowly. On his second passage through the ship heobservedthatwaterwasrisingincompartmentVIII,thatboilerroomIhadbeenevacuatedandthatthemagazinesincompartmentIIIwereflooding.Thepumpsappeared to be ineffective. For these reasons, only fifteen minutes after thetorpedo struck Rieve was convinced that Karlsruhe could not be saved.Compartments III–II were flooded: the ship’s double bottom had been rippedopen and repairwas impossible; and the pumpswere not operational becausetherewasnocurrent.Thecruiserhadsettledsodeeplybythesternatthispointthatwaterwaspouringintotheshipthroughthestarboardscuttlesandmorethan2,500 tons of seawater was washing around below decks. Accordingly hedecidedtoabandontheship,andlatergaveGreiftheordertodeliverthecoupdegrâcewithtorpedoes.ThereportsregardingthesinkingoftheKarlsruheweresiftedthroughinthe
various command centres and the following opinions and judgements werehandeddown:
IntheWarDiaryofthecruiserKarlsruheafterthetorpedohitIfindnomentionof:
(a)immediateattemptstohaveaT-boattaketheshipintowandgethertowardsthenearbyVp-boatsandM-boatsofthe2ndMinesweepingFlotillaforassistance;(b)attemptstosalvagevaluableweaponsandequipment;
(c)considerationsastohowKarlsruhe,whichwasstillafloatthreehoursafterbeingtorpedoedandneeded another two torpedoes before she eventually went down, might have been towed intoKristiansandorgroundedintheshallowsatJammerBucht.
ThesequestionshavestilltobeexaminedbytheBdAandFleetCommander…[Signed]Carls
[AdmiralCarls,CONavalGroupEast]
Konteradmiral Schmundt,BdAandRieve’s immediate superior,wroteon3May1940:
…Theactualconditionoftheshipcannotbeestablishedbecauseshesank.Thedamageinflictedonher can only be assessed from the written opinions of crew members, and inaccuracies in thesereportswilldistortourreflectionsonthemattertoday…Itmustnotbeforgottenthatherewehaveashipstillintheinitialstagesofworking-upafteralengthyperioddecommissioned,whichwasbynomeansbattle-readyandwasonlybeingusedoperationallyunderurgentnecessity.Nodoubtafullytrainedcrewwouldhavehandledthecircumstancesmoresure-handedlyandwithgreaterconviction.Ifwearetalkingofthe‘coldbloodedhandling’ofasituation,itisnotamatteroflackofcouragebut
ofbelieftechnicallyinwhattheyweredoing.Thestateofreadinessoftheshipwassuchthaterrorsandomissionshadtobereckonedwithfromtheveryoutset…fromstatementsmadesubsequentlyaboutthestateofthemachinery,ifithadbeenproperlyhandledandtheweatherremainedasitwastheshipprobablywouldnothavefoundered…itwasonthebasisofthereportsmadebyhisIOandChief Engineer that the commander saw the situation of his ship as hopeless… the commanderhimselfisconvincedthatalthoughtheT-boatleaderofferedhimatow,heisnotaccountablefor[notaccepting]it.
[Signed]Schmundt
On 30 July 1940 the Fleet Commander, Vizeadmiral Lütjens, delivered adevastatingcondemnationoftheKarlsruhe’scommander,IOandcrew:
The measures taken after the ship was torpedoed, especially damage control, show a series ofinadequaciesanderrorswhichcannotbeblamedon themissing later stagesof shipboard training.What was really lacking was the central direction of the damage control parties by the IO. Hisopinionthattheshipwasdoomedprovedincorrect,foralthoughnomeasureswhateverweretakentokeepherafloat,sheactuallywasstillafloat twohoursafterbeing torpedoedanddidnotsinkuntiltwomoretorpedoeshadbeenfiredintoher.
Thedecisionof thecommander toscuttlehisshipwasbasedonhisIO’sreport that thecruiserwasgoingtosink.Forthatreasonhedismissedtheoffertotakethecruiserintowsincethattohimwouldhaveputthetowingboatsinjeopardyfromafreshsubmarineattack.Evensalvagingvaluableweaponsandequipment fromonboard tooksecondplace toavoiding lossesandcasualtiesaboardotherunitsassistingintheendeavour.
Fromstatementsmadebycrewmembersinvolved,thepictureemergesthatatowwouldprobablyhavesucceeded.Iwouldnothavethoughtthecommanderblameworthyif,atthetimeandplaceinquestion, he firmly believed that his ship was sinking quickly, and having refused the, for him,hopeless towing and salvage efforts for the purposeof savingother vessels and lives, he took thegravedecisiontoscuttlehisownship.Ontheotherhand,inagreementwithCommanderGroupEast,IwouldhaveapprovedanattempttohaveT-boatstakethecruiserintowdespitetheexistingdangerfromsubmarines.
ThereportbytheIOthattheshipwasinasinkingconditionwasnotcorrect.IftheIO,insteadofallowinghimself tobe influencedbyvariouscentresaboardship,had takenchargeof thedamagecontrolanddirectedthenecessaryoperations,perhapshemighthavetakenadifferentviewofthingsandmadeadifferentreport.IfIabsolvehimfromblameitisbecause,aswasthecasewiththewholeship’s company, training and experience was lacking. But yet I cannot disabuse myself of theimpressionthatthewillwaslackingtocometogripswiththesituationandsosavetheship.
[Signed]Lütjens
These reportswere all forwarded to theCinC,GrossadmiralRaeder,whoseobservationswererecordedthusbyanaide:
My opinion: The necessary effort to save the ship was not made. The impression of a hopelesssituationandthefearofassumedenemypresencewhichmighthaveledtofurthercasualtiesofferanexplanation for the commander’s decision but do not justify it. The attempt to bring the ship inshouldhavebeenmade.
ThelightcruiserKarlsruhe(i),4,900tons,wasthemostsuccessfulWorldWarIregular-cruisercommerceraiderintermsofthenumberofmercantilevictimsandtonnagesunk.ShewaslaunchedatGermaniaWerft,Kiel,on11November1912andenteredserviceon15January1914.On14June1914shesailedfromKiel
fortheEastAmericanStation,relievingDresdenatPort-au-Princeon25July.On4AugustFregattenkapitänKöhlerwasorderedtoworktheshipasacommerceraider.IntheCentralAtlanticbetween18Augustand28October1914Karlsruhecapturedseventeenmerchantvesselstotalling
76,618grt.Ofthese,sixteen,of72,225grt,weresunkandFarn,4,393grt,wasusedasasupplytenderuntilinternedatPuertoRicoon12Januarythefollowingyear.Ontheeveningof4November1914,whilesteamingnorthfromtheAmazondeltatobombardBarbados,theshipwasdestroyedbyaninternal
explosion,probablyinthetorpedoroom;263menwerelost.The146survivorsarrivedinGermanyon6December1914aboardthesupplyshipRioNegro.Armament;12×10.5cmgunsandtwotorpedotubes.Machinery:steamturbinessuppliedbytwelvecoal-firedandtwooil-firedwatertubeboilers,speed28.5kt.Dimensions:139×13.7×6.2m.Complementinwartimeover400men.ThephotographshowsKarlsruhe
onFleetdutyinearly1914.Theringsonthefunnelswereoverpaintedpriortosailing.
ThenextlightcruisernamedKarlsruhewaslaunchedatKaiserlicheWerft,Kiel,on31January1916andenteredserviceon15Novemberthatyear.SheservedwiththeFleetandtookpartintheÖseloperationin1917.On19November1918thecruiserproceededtoScapaFlow,whereshewasscuttledbyhercrewon21June1919.ShewassimilartoKönigsberg(ii)exceptforherexperimentalHP-turbinewheel-drive.ThephotographshowstheshipinternedatScapaFlowincompanywiththebattlecruisersVonderTann(left)
andHindenburg(right).
ThelaunchingofthenewcruiserKarlsruheatKielon20August1927tookplacebeforeahugenumberofspectators.Inthisphotographthehullisafloat,andafterbeingtakenintowbyharbourtugsismanoeuvred
tothefitting-outquay.
Karlsruheon15October1929,passingthroughtheKielCanaltoWilhelmshavenforcompletionworkandcommissioning.Theshipyardflagfliesattheforetop;themercantileflaghoistedattheensignstaff
indicatesthatthecruiserisnotyetinservice.
KarlsruheinaWilhelmshavenlockaftercommissioning.Noticethedark-paintedfunnels.Thephotographgivesagoodviewoftheunorthodoxalignmentof‘B’and‘C’turretsoffthecentreline.Inaccordancewith
Germannavaltradition,‘C’turretborethenameSMSGoeben.
ShortlybeforeleavingKiel,acutterisraisedtodavitsamidships.Totheleftisstowedtheportsideboat-mooringboom.
KarlsruhepassingthroughalockchamberatWilhelmshaven,30November1931,atthecommencementofheryear-longoverseastrainingcruisetotheWestIndies,CentralAmerica,HawaiiandtheUnitedStates.
Accompaniedbynumerousmotorlaunches,KarlsruhesailsfromKielon21October1935.Shewasabsentforeightmonthsonthis,herfifthforeigncruise.Abafttheafterfunnelapolemasthasreplacedtheformeraerialoutriggers.Thecatapultinstallationhadbeenunshippedtoimprovestability.Thecharacteristic
featureofKarlsruhe,distinguishingherfromKönigsbergandKöln,wasthetwo-storeyforetop.
Aboveandbelow:InMarch1934KarlsruhevisitedtheUSnavalbaseatSanDiego.ThesetwophotographsofherarrivalweretakenfromAmericanaircraft.
Suchphotographsasthesewerenotnormallyreleasedforpublicationinpre-warGermany.ThisaerialviewofKarlsruheamidshipsshowsthebattlemastwithtwo-tieredforetopandrangefínder.Abovethebridgeisthebattlecommandcentrecomprisingtheforwardfirecontrolandrangefínder.Totherearisthesignaldeck.Inanopenbaybelowtheupperdeckislocatedthestarboardforwardtorpedotubemounting.
Betweenthefunnelstheboatdeckwithcradlescanbeseen,andonthebattlemastandeithersideoftheafterfunnelaresearchlightplatforms.Thebridgeplatformsarescreenedwithawningsagainstthestrong
sunlight.
Karlsruheseenfromtheair,locationanddateunknown.Ontheoppositesideofthepierfouraccompanyingtorpedo-boatsaremadefast.Thenavalensignwornbythelatterindicatesadatepriorto
1935.
KarlsruheatCristobalon20April1935.Noticethenewbar-craneontheportside.
AtDurban.OnthequaysidetheSouthAfricanpublicqueuestovisittheship.Canvasawningsprotectthedecksagainstthestrongsun.Thisphotographwastakenbefore1933sincethestemlackstheeagleand
swastikaemblem.
Shipscustomarilyflewahomecomingpennantwhenreturningfromlongforeigncruises—andthelongertheabsence,thelongerthepennant.HereKarlsruhe,signalflagsflutteringandhercrewparadedalongthe
portrailinrevieworder,isseenfromthepocket-battleshipDeutschland.
MakingfastattheBlücherBridge,wherenumerousfamilymembersofcadetsandcrewawaitthehomecoming.Thefirstlineshavebeensecuredaboardandtugsslowlyedgethecruisertothequayside.
Ontheforecastlepreparationsareinhandtocastoffatthebeginningofanotherlongforeigncruise.LiningthequaysideisamusiccorpsfromtheLuftwaffe,andoff-watchcrewmenparadethestarboardrailinreview
orderatattention,eyesright,asahigh-rankingofficerleavesthecruiser.
KarlsruheatKielon12June1936,flyingahomecomingpennantafterthefifthoverseascruise.Thecrewparadesthestarboardrailwhileapinnacecontainingapartyofhigh-rankingofficerssetsofftoinspectthe
ship.
NavyWeek,Kiel,June1936:Karlsruhebedeckedfromstemtosternwithsignalflags,withtheReichWarFlagatthetopmast.IntheforegroundistheprowandbowspritofthetrainingbarqueGorchFock.
Karlsruheafterherrefit,showingoneofhermodemderricks.Theformersearchlightplatformswerelandedandreplacedbysmallerplatformsonbothfunnels.
Aboveandbelow:Between20May1938and13November1939KarlsruhewasdecommissionedforamajorrefitattheWilhelmshavenNavyYard.Thesetwophotographsshowthecruiseraftercompletionoftheconversion.Thetwo-tierforetophasbeenreplacedtoconformwiththatofhertwosistersandatripodmainmasthasbeeninstalledabafttheafterfunnel.Thisfunnelhasbeenshortened,andbotharenowfitted
withaslightlyrakedcowl.Modemlightweaponshavebeenmounted.
KarlsruheofftheNorwegiancoastinApril1940.IntheforegroundisoneoftheE-boatsattachedtoherbattlegroup.
KarlsruheoffKristiansand.E-boatsarrivealongsidetodisembarkinvasiontroopstakenonboardbythecruiserinBremerhaven.
Lateintheeveningof9April1940,offKristiansandwhenreturningtoGermany,KarlsruhewastorpedoedbytheBritishsubmarineTruantandsobadlydamagedthathercaptaindecidedsheshouldbesunkbyherescort.Thisphotographisoneofthelastofthecruiser.Oneofherthreeescortingtorpedo-boatsisintheforeground.Thecruiserseemstobeslightlydownbythestem,withasmalllisttostarboard,andthe
photographmaythereforehavebeentakenaftertheBritishtorpedoattack.
*TheReichwas short of foreign currency and avoidedpurchasing fuel in foreignports or from foreigncompanies and ships. On these overseas cruises a chartered German tanker (in this caseMittelmeer)accompaniedthewarship.Thiswasusefulforlearningthetechniquesofrefuellingatsea,aswasnecessaryforaworldpowerpossessingnonavalbases.
KölnThe contract for Cruiser ‘D’ (Replacement Arcona) was placed withMarinewerft,Wilhelmshaven, under Yard Number 116, the first keel sectionsbeing laid on 7August 1926.Kölnwas launched on 23May 1928 before theusualvastcrowdfor theseoccasions, thenumerousguestsofhonour includingthe Mayor of Cologne, Dr Konrad Adenauer (in 1949 the first postwarChancellor ofWest Germany), who delivered the baptismal speech. The shipwas named by the widow of Kapitän zur See Meidinger, commander of thecruiserCöinsunkin1914.Becauseof thedifficulteconomicsituationthenewcruiserwasnotcompleteduntil late in1929.On15January1930KapitänzurSeeLudwigvonSchrödercommissionedKöln,hership’scompanytransferringaboardfromtheold lightcruiserAmazone.StokerNeumann, theonlysurvivorfromCöin,wastheguestofhonourattheceremony.The first engine trials were run in the Jade from 4 February and the
seaworthiness inspectionwas carried out byKonteradmiralGladisch,BdA, inearlyApril. InherBalticperformancetrialsKöln reachedaspeedof32.5kton25April.Working-upculminatedinanAtlanticvoyageforengineandgunnerytrialsfrom28October;callsweremadeatLasPalmas,theCapeVerdeIslandsandonwardtoTenerifeincompanywithKarlsruhebeforeVigowasvisitedasthe last stop before the return to Wilhelmshaven on 5 November. Structuralchangesduringtheyearincludedtheadditionofasinglestoreyextensiontotheforward part of the after deckhouse; the erection of a singlestorey deckhousebetween the funnels; the replacementof the8.8cmsingle flakby8.8cmtwins;andtheinstallationofflakdirectionequipmentabafttheafterdeckhouse.
PrewarServiceOn20June1931KölntookpartintheNavalReviewtomarkthelaunchingofthe pocket-battleship Deutschland. On the arrival of Reich President vonHindenburgthewholeFleetfireda21-gunsalute.On14Junethecruiserleftfora short summer cruise to theNorwegian fjords.Köln participated in the Fleetmanoeuvresbetween29Juneand3July,andlaterintheyearbetween2and11September.Inminorrefitsduringtheyearthetallpolemastwasshortenedandfitted with longer signal yards, but it was later replaced altogether by a staffprojectingabovetherearoftheforetop.Theusualprogrammeoftrainingandexercisesbeganwithgunnerytrialsoff
LasPalmas during a three-weekAtlantic cruise beginning on 7 January 1932.The shipwas inspected twice between 30March and 4April, by theBdAondetachmentfromtheFleetandbytheCommanderNavalTraining.On26May,atWilhelmshaven,AdolfHitler,thenmerelyleaderoftheNSDAP,wasreceivedaboardthecruiser.Nobreachofprotocolwascommitted.HitleroftenstayedatnearbyRüstringenwithSenatorHeinrichPickerbetweenelectioncampaigns.On26July1932,whileexercisingherguncrewsintheBaltic,KölnassistedintheattemptstosalvagethesailtrainingshipNiobeintheFehmarnBelt.Thebarquehadcapsizedandsunkinstrongwindswithmanycadetsaboard.Duringtheyearone8.8cmflaktwinwaslandedandasignalwingwasadded
to the bridge deck. The extensions to the after deckhouse and the deckhousebetweenthefunnelswerediscarded.InSeptember1932FregattenkapitänOttoSchniewindbecameKöln’ssecond
commander. The Fleet Commander was aboard between the 16th and 21st ofthatmonthforabriefvisittoStavanger,Norway.Thecruiserthenspentamonthin drydock. After steaming trials she prepared for her first world cruise, forwhichshe lefton8December.HerfirststopwasCaraminal,Spain,wheresheremaineduntil27December.Theworldcruiseproceededas follows. In January the shipvisitedMessina,
AlexandriaandSuez;inFebruaryMadrasandSabang;inMarchJava,FremantleandAdelaide;inAprilFortPhillipsbay,MelbourneandHobart;inMaySydneyandFiji;inJuneRabaul,GuamandKobe(wherefrom3to5Julyshespenttimein drydock); later in July Dairen, the former German colony of Tsingtau andChina;inAugustShanghai,MakassarandCelebes;inSeptemberSingapore,theStraits of Malakka and Sumatra; in October Colombo and Port Said; and inNovember Crete (meeting up with Karlsruhe), Corfu and then Taranto, theStraits of Messina and Gibraltar, remaining at Vigo from 30 November to 7
December.On12DecemberAdmiralRaederandCommanderNavalTrainingembarked
for theentry intoWilhelmshaven,where, inEntranceIII lockchamber,ahugewelcomeledbyReichChancellorAdolfHitler,ReichswehrMinisterBlombergandentouragewerewaiting.On18DecemberKöln disembarkedher cadets atFlensburg-Mürwikandthenenteredtheyardsforarefit.On1January1934KölnwasreturnedtoFleetduty.Sherantheusualengine
trialsafter leavingtheyardson22Marchunderher thirdcommander,KapitänzurSeeWernerFuchs.On7 JuneKöln and thepocket-battleshipDeutschlandsailed for gunnery exercises in the Western Atlantic. Visits were paid toMadeira,CascaisandLisbonbefore theships returned toWilhelmshavenon9July.WhileatmooringsatKielon4Augusttheship’scompanysworetheoathofallegiancetoAdolfHitlerfollowingthedeathofReichPresidentHindenburg.TheremainderoftheyearwasspentinroutinedrillintheNorthSeaandBalticbefore the cruiser entered theWilhelmshavenyardson2November for a refitwhichlasteduntil27December.Structuralchangesincludedtheinstallationofaplatformon the battlemast forward, at the level of the lower bridge deck, andlengtheningtheboomoftheportsidederrick.Throughout1935KölnexercisedclosetoGermanwatersintheNorthSeaand
Baltic.On26and27JulyHitler,whowasveryinterestedinnavalartillery,spenttwo days aboard the cruiser observing gunnery exercises in Eckemförde Bay.From27Septemberuntil8NovemberKölnwasindrydockatWilhelmshaven,and she spent the next fewmonthsworking back to full efficiency. Structuralchangeshadincludedthefittingofaplatformatsearchlightlevelattherearofthe battlemast, raising the signal wings on the bridge by half a deck andextending the bridge deck to abaft the battlemast. An aircraft catapult wasinstalledbetweenthefunnels,andtheportsidederrickandgearwerereplacedbya shipboard crane for aircraftwork. The after deckhousewas rebuilt to largerdimensions,with a polemast of increased height and the after rangefínder re-sitedfurtherafttomakewayforanelevatedflakdirectionpost.Thishadalightpolemastforwardandoff-centretostarboard,tobridgeheight.Thetwin8.8cmgunswerereplacedbyanewermodel.Theoutriggerson theafter funnelwerediscarded and rigged on a short-legged tripod mast. The ship’s fourthcommander,FregattenkapitänOttoBackenköhler,wasappointedinOctober.Between20Februaryand4March1936Kölnwasgiventheunusualtaskof
fishery protection, anchoring inMalanger and other Norwegian fjords. On 15April, in company with Nürnberg and Leipzig, the cruiser exercised in the
Atlantic, calling at Madeira and Lagos, Portugal, before returning toWilhelmshaven on 8May.Between 28 and 30MayKölnwas present atKielwith the major part of the Fleet for the dedication by Hitler of the navalmemorialatLaboe.On18JulycivilwarbrokeoutinSpain,andGermanwarshipsweregiventhe
task of evacuating German citizens from the danger area, although assistancewasnever refused toothernationalities requesting it.On27JulyKölnand the2ndTorpedo-Boat Flotilla leftWilhelmshaven for Spain,where they patrolledthe Biscay coast, returning toWilhelmshaven on 26 August. The cruiser wasdrydockedbetween3and22SeptemberandwaspresentatWilhelmshavenforthelaunchingofthebattleshipScharnhorston3October.Onthe5thKölnmadeherseconddepartureforSpanishBiscayports,returningtoKielon1December,whereshewasdrydockedthesamedayuntilthe9th.An InternationalNon-InterventionCommission came into existence in 1937
in which the warships of four nations (Britain, France, Germany and Italy)agreed tomaintain a general control of allotted sectors off the Spanish coast.Germanyaccepted responsibility for the stretchbetweenOropesaandCabodeGata,Almeria.On5January1937KölnsailedincompanywithDeutschlandforherthirdpatrolinSpanishwaters.Severeicingwasencounteredinwinterstormsin theBayofBiscayAfteroperatingoffCapeOrtegal, thecruiserworkedintotheMediterraneanas farasMelillaon theNorthAfricancoastandreturned toWilhelmshavenon15March.On29May,off Ibiza,DeutschlandwasattackedbyRepublicanaircraft and
badlydamaged.Casualtieswere31deadand110injured,71ofthemseriously.On7JuneKölnsailedonherfourthpatroltoSpainandmadestopsatElFerrol,LagosandCadizbeforearrivingatGibraltaron24JunetocollectDeutschland’swounded. These disembarked at Wilhelmshaven on the 29th. Köln thendrydockedatKielforarefitfrom30Juneto19July,sailingon30JulyforherfifthandlastSpanishpatrol.Afteravisit toLagosKölnmadea tourofItalianports and exercised off Cadiz before putting back to Wilhelmshaven on 8October.ThecruiserdrydockedatKielbetweenthe20thand26thofthemonth.In refits theaircraft catapultwas replacedbyanewdeckhouse.Theshipboardcrane was landed and the smaller version switched sides with the starboardderrick. The platform at searchlight height to the rear of the battlemast wasremoved.KapitänzurSeeTheodorBurchardibecameKöln’sfifthcommanderinOctober.From21February1938Kölnheldafour-dayexerciseintheNorthSeawith
Küstenflìegergruppe 406 before taking up fishery protection duties off theNorwegian coast, visiting Kristiansand between 7 and 9 March wearing theReichsdienstflagge(ReichServiceFlag)attheforetop.Thedutiesconcludedon13March.KölnwasatKielandformedpartoftheNavalReviewon22Auguston the occasion of the launching of the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen in thepresenceofHitlerand theHungarianRegent,AdmiralHorthy.Aftera ten-dayrefit at Deutsche Werke, Kiel, at the beginning of September,Köln returnedthereon31OctoberandremaineduntiltheNewYear.In February 1939 Köln was at Hamburg for the launch of the battleship
Bismarck. On 23 March the cruiser formed part of the large Fleet operationwhich restored Memel to the Reich, and in May she accompanied all threepocket-battleships, the battleship Gneisenau and numerous destroyers andtorpedo-boatsonamajorAtlanticexercise.Köln thenvisitedLisbon, returningon17MaytotheBaltic.
WorldWarIIOn25August1939Köln leftKielaspartofVizeadmiralDensch’shugenavalforcetotakeupawaitingpositionbetweenBornholmandtheBayofDanziginavainattempttopreventthebreak-outofPolishnavalunitsfromtheBaltic.On1September, togetherwithLeipzigandNürnberg, thecruisermovedbackintotheNorthSea,wherebetween3and18SeptembershehelpedlaytheWestwallmine barrier between the Dutch coast and the Skagerrak On 8 October, incompany with nine destroyers,Köln escorted the battleshipGneisenau on ananti-shippingforay into thenorthernNorthSea.Nothingwasachievedand thegroupreturnedtoKielonthe10th.On1and2NovembersheexercisedaloneintheBalticbefore joining forceswithLeipzig and the6thTorpedo-BoatFlotillaforanticontrabandpatrols in theSkagerrak.On12DecemberKöln sailedwithLeipzig andNürnberg (flagshipofnewBdA,KonteradmiralLütjens) toescorthomefivedestroyersreturningfromaminelayingsortieofftheTyne.*Kölnwastheonlycruiserofthethreetoescapebeingtorpedoed,andLütjenscameaboardher for thevoyagehome.Shecontinuedashis flagshipuntilMay1940,whenKonteradmiral Schmundt replacedhim.Therewereno further activities in theyear, although at Christmas Fleet Commander Admiral Marschall visited theshipwithDeputyFührerRudolfHess.Theseverewinterof1939/40 restrictedFleetmovementsgenerally.Kapitän
zurSeeErnstKratzenbergbecamethecruiser’ssixthcommanderinJanuary.AttheendofMarchKölnpreparedatWilhelmshavenforOperation‘Weserübung’,forwhichshewasflagshipofKonteradmiralSchmundt,BdA,leadingWarshipGroup 3 to Bergen.† Köln reached the inner anchorage at Bergen unscathedbefore dawn on 9 April and at 0706 all her turrets returned the fire of theSandvikenbattery.By0835 these emplacementswere inGermanhands.Oncethedisembarkationoftroopshadbeenaccomplishedsuccessfully,Kölnweighedanchor and formed up with the torpedo-boats Leopard and Wolf. Personnellosseswere sufferedduring an attackbyWellingtonbombersbefore the smallgroupsailedat2000on9April,thecruiserstreamingherbowprotectiongeartopassthroughwatersminedbytheNorwegianminelayerTyr.Becauseofenemyair activity, the group anchored in Mauranger Fjord overnight and sailedeventually at 1845 the next day. Before dawn on 11 April the destroyersHermannSchoemannandRichardBeitzencameupfromtheGermanBight,andallfiveunitsreachedWilhelmshavensafely.There were no further missions during the year andKöln remained in the
Baltic.From26Juneto10AugustshewaslaidupatDeutscheWerke,Kiel,and
onceOperation ‘Seelöwe’—the proposed invasion ofGreatBritain—had beencancelledinSeptembershecontinuedherrefitatGotenhafenfrom19Novemberuntil well into 1941. Structural changes included the removal of the aftertorpedo-tube mountings and the installation of a degaussing system. A 15m2
wooden helicopter pad wasmounted on the roof of ‘B’ turret.Köln emergedfrom the yards on 28 March 1941. Kapitän zur See Friedrich Hüffmeier, aformer commander of Scharnhorst, was appointed the cruiser’s seventhcommanderinMay1941.The aeronautical engineerAntonFlettner had first published his ideas for a
helicopterin1924buthadfailedtointeresttheLuftwaffeintheconceptsinceitappeared to them too slow for useful operational work. The German Navyrecognised itsvalueasanaval scoutandobserveraircraft from thebeginning,funding Flettner’s work from 1938 onwards. In that year he had six modelsunderconstruction, the firstFI265having itsmaiden flight inMay1939.Themachine had a single engine driving two intermeshing, contra-rotatingmotorsthroughagearbox,oneither sideofwhich twin-bladed rotorswere locatedonshafts.This led to a larger andmore refined version, theFI 282Kolibri,withseatsfortwopilots.Its150hpSiemensundHalskeSH14Adriveprovidedatopspeed of 150kph.Germanywas the pioneer in helicopter development, and in1942 the Kolibri became the first helicopter anywhere to enter operationalmilitaryservice.Itwasveryagile,andina20-minutetrialproveditcouldeludetwo attacking fighters. The FI 282 was the most advanced helicopterdevelopmentduringWorldWarII.Inearly1941testingofthethirtyprototypescommencedaboardwarships,includingKölnintheBaltic,theminelayerDracheintheMediterraneanand,from17April,theex-YugoslavrepairshipZmaj.Thetrials exceeded all expectations and were continued in the Baltic into 1942aboardKölnandin1943fromthesubmarine-chaserUJ1210,thetrainingboatfor theAntiSubmarineSchool.When funds finallybecameavailable formass-production in 1944 the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe ordered 1,000, but onlyaboutthirtycouldbecompleted.*Inearlyautumn1941KölnwasattachedtotheNorthernGroupoftheBaltic
Fleet,which comprised the battleshipTirpitz, the cruisersAdmiral Scheer andNürnberg,threedestroyersandfivetorpedo-boats.On23SeptemberKölnsailedfromSwinemündefortheAalandSeatoblockadetheRedFleet,returningonthe29th. Between 12 and 21 October her guns bombarded Russian positions insupport ofGerman landings on the island ofDagö.North of the island on 13October thecruiseravoided torpedoes firedby theRussiansubmarineSC-323.On14OctobershebombardedtheEstonianislandofRistna.Theseverewinter
of1941/42,inwhichtheBalticportsfrozeover,putanendtofurtheractivitiesfortheyear,andKölntransferredtotheNorthSea.KorvettenkapitänHellmuthStrobelbecameKöln’seighth(acting)commander
inMarch 1942. Between 5 February and 23May the cruiser fitted out in theWilhelmshaven yards. Structural changes included the removal of the lowersearchlight platform on the derrick post and the fitting of a rangefínder radaraerialtoreplacethe6mrangefinderontheforwardfirecontrolstand.Followingdischarge from the shipyard Köln worked up under her ninth commander,Kapitän zur SeeMartin Baltzer, for her forthcoming employment in Norway.Shesailedon13JulyandafteranintermediatestopatOsloarrivedon6AugustatNarviktorelievetheheavycruiserLützow.On10SeptemberKölnmoveduptoAltaFjord.Becauseofherpoorseakeepinginheavyconditionsshewasnotveryusefulforoperationsandwastheremainlytomakeupthenumbers,rarelystrayingfarfromhervariousanchorages.KapitänzurSeeHansMeyerbacameher tenth commander in December 1942, but following Hitler’sdecommissioning order of 6 JanuaryKöln returned to Kiel, where her ensignwashauleddownon17February.ThelongretreatontheEasternFrontneededKriegsmarinesupportseawards,
andnumerousdecommissionedunitswerereturnedtoservice.InJanuary1944afresh ship’s companywasmustered forKöln and the cruiserwas towed fromKieltoKönigsbergdockyardtobemadeseaworthy.Shewasrecommissionedon1Aprilbyhereleventhcommander,FregattenkapitänHellmuthStrobel,butdidnotemergefromtheyardsuntil1July,whenshewasattached to theTrainingDivisionasacadettrainingship.On11thOctober1944sheloaded90minesatSwinemündeandsailedtoOslo
Fjord in company with the destroyers Richard Beitzen and Friedrich Ihn.Korvettenkapitän(Ing)Heye,Köln’slastChiefEngineer,recollectsthecruiser’sfinalmonths:†
OnSaturday30September1944 I relinquishedmypost tomysuccessoratHohenschwangau,andafterafifteen-dayjourney—mymarchingorderswereembellishedwithtwelvevisas—IfoundKölnon14OctoberatHorten,thenavalbaseattheentrancetoOsloFjord.ShehadbeenreactivatedafteralongperiodoutofcommissionandbelongedtotheFleetTrainingGroup.Shewasaclapped-outlightcruiserbuiltbefore1930.Allherwiringwastohavebeenreplacedin1939;onlyhersister-shipKarlsruhe had had it done by the timewar came.Consequently therewas about 200kmof brittlecabling,andelectricalmalfunctionsweredailyoccurrences.Mypredecessorhadbroughtthistotheattentionofthecommander.Thelatterhadneversubmittedanofficialdefectreportduringthewarand took the Chief Engineer’s complaints personally. The Chief had been drafted and I was hisreplacement!
Two days aftermy arrival he packed his bags and that same evening I had to prepare for theminelayingoperation.Köln,EmdenandthedestroyersKarlGalster,RichardBeitzenandFriedrich
Ihnwere to lay the ‘Augustus’minefield. Four air raids by between 25 and 40 bombers over theperiod15–20Octoberputpaidtotheoperation.
Ilookedattheship’scompany.IknewnoneofmywatchengineersorERAs.Theshipwasover-crewed.Therewere900menaboardcomparedwithapeacetimecomplementof520.Evenafterthechange of cadets there were still about 800, of which 260 were seamen branch and 90 engineercadets.TheofficercorpswasoverstrengthandIhadtwelvesubordinateengineerofficersinsteadofthe usual six—mostly youngmenwhohad been trained forU-boats butwere no longer required.Therewereevenjuniorlieutenantswhohadbeenretrainedinsixmonthsfromcoastalartillerytotheseamanbranch.Mywatchofficers had all comeup through the ranks.TheExecutiveOfficer hadentered the Imperial Navy in 1916 but had little shipboard experience. This meant that thecommander and I were the only officers aboard who had gone through the normal, unforcedpeacetimenaval trainingcourse.Howdifferent thingswere fromtheheadyyearsof1941—engineplant liable to breakdown at any moment, an officer corps simply thrown together, disgruntledwarrantofficerswhohadnotbeenabletoobtainacommission.
In theweeksafter theabandonedminingoperation theship just lay in thefjordwith theminesstillonhersidedecks,changinganchorageeacheveningoncetheBritishreconnaissanceaircraftofthe day had gone home. We ran a few troopship escorts in the fjord. We were stringent aboutconservingfuel.InNovember1944,afteragroundingatFrebergviknearHorten,wewentintothefloatingdockatOslo.TheExecutiveOfficerwas summonedashoreon somepretext and taken toAkershus fortress. Apparently he had been involved in the 20 July [Bomb] Plot in some way.Fortunatelyforhimhedidnotcometotrialbeforethewarended.Welandedour90mines.
At Frederiksstad on the night of 13December, towards 1900,Beaufíghters fromNo 5Group,BomberCommand,attacked.Ourflakopenedup,and,aftertheusualTannenbaum,thebombscamedown—nodirecthitsbutalotofnearmissesaboutI0mfromthehull,causingenginedamagewhichtheOsloyardcouldnotrepair.Duringtheattackwehadonlyoneboilerwithsteamupandthecruisedieselswerecoupledtothepropellershaftssothatwecouldmakeaquickgetawayinanemergency.The anchor was heaved in straight away, the machine telegraph put to ‘Slow ahead’. Nothinghappened. There was insufficient air pressure to start up the diesels.Meanwhile the bombswerewhistling down. The electrical plant had finally had it andmore or less just collapsed. Even theemergency lightingwasonlya feebleglimmer.Usingpocket flashlights, the stokers lit theboilerswith all jets and forced the steam up (something that was permitted only in an emergency andignoringallsafetyregulations),andwithinafewminuteswehadfullsteampressuretosail.Astherewasnocurrent,theturbinescouldn’tbecoupledtothedriveshafts(whichwerestillhookeduptothediesel).
Theairraidlastedabouttwentyminutes.Finallywegorcurrentfromthegeneratorsandmovedoff.Weusedacruisingcompassbecause it tookawhile toget thegyrocompassworkingafter anelectricalfailure.Therewasamagneticcompassbutforsomereasonthiswasn’tworking.
TheBritishattackedagainafewminutesintotheNewYear.Againtheyregisterednodirecthits,butmanynearmissescausedseriousblastdamage,forcingustodrydockagaininOslo.Anarmyofsentriesarmedtotheteethsurroundedtheshiptoprotectheragainstsabotage.Asitwasveryfoggy,theyfiredoffavolleyintotheaireverysooften.TherepairsatOslowereunsatisfactory,andon4JanuaryweheadedforWilhelmshaven.
On27JanuaryKapitänzurSeeStrobelwasorderedtotheEastandthenewExecutive Officer, Korvettenkapitän Fritz-Henning Brandes, became thecaretaker commander. The author returned to Wilhelmshaven shortly beforeKöln’send.Thedayswerefilledwithcontinualairraidwarnings,whenthecrew
wouldrepair toa largebunker in thevicinity.Thiswasitselfhiton30March,with dead and injured amongst civilians and dockyard workers. An air raidwarninghadbeengivenandthefirstbombsfellveryquicklyafterwards.Beforethe‘AllClear’hadbeengiven,thecrewwasorderedtotheshiptofightfiresandsalvagepersonaleffectsfromthestemofthecruiser.Althoughthefireswerenottooserious,itwasnotpossibletoentertheaftersectionbecausethecruiserhadahuge list and was in danger of capsizing. Therefore everybody got ashore asquickly as possible. The author lost everything except the uniform he waswearing at the time. The crewwere found quarters in theRoonBarracks andgiven clearing-up work over Easter. After being kitted out afresh on 5 April,theyleftWilhelmshavennextdayforCuxhaven,finishingupatMiirwik.FromtheretheyfoughtonlandatNeustrelitz.Thecruisersankonanevenkeelintheyardbasinandwasdecommissioned
on5April.Aparty of technicians andweapons personnel remainedbehind atWilhelmshaven. As the cruiser was upright, with ‘B’ and’ C’ turrets abovewater,flyingcableswererunoutand‘B’turretwasmadereadybymeansofamakeshift wooden platform. These 15cm guns bombarded enemy tankformationsandpositionsintheVarelareaforafewdays.Afterthecapitulationthewreckwasbrokenuppiecemealwhentheshipyard
was being dismantled. The remains were raised for scrap in 1956 during therebuildingofthenavalarsenal.
ThelightcruiserCöin(i),4,362tons,waslaunchedatGermaniaWerft,Kiel,on5June1908andenteredserviceon16June1911.Herearlycareerwasuneventful.AttheoutbreakofwarshewasflagshipofKonteradmiralLeberechtMaass,CommanderTorpedo-BoatsintheJade.On28August1914shesailedtowardsHeligolandtoassistapatrolsurprisedbyasuperiorBritishnavalforce.InthickfogshecameupagainsttheBritishbattlecruiserLionand,findingthatescapewasnotpossible,acceptedbattlewithher10.5cmguns.ShewasoverwhelmedandsunkalongwiththelightcruisersMainzandAriadne.Atotalof411menwerelostaboardCöin.Theonlysurvivor,astoker,waspickedupafter72hoursinthewater.Armament:12×10.5cmand4×5.2cmgunsandtwotorpedotubes.Machinery:steamturbinesfiredby
fifteencoal-firedboilers,speed26.8kt.Dimensions:130×14×5.73m.ThephotographshowsthecruiserinatransitoftheKielCanalbeforethewar.
ThelightcruiserCöin(ii),5,620tons,waslaunchedatBlohm&Voss,Hamburg,on5October1916,butbecauseofshortagesofrawmaterialscompletionwasdelayedandshedidnotenterserviceuntil17January1918.On19NovemberthecruisersailedtoScapaFlow,whereshewasscuttledbyhercrewon21June1919.ShewassimilarinconstructiontoKarlsruhe(i)buthadeightcoal-firedandsixoil-firedwatertube
boilers,givingaspeedof29.3kt.Armament:8×15cmgunsand3×8.8cmflak,fourtorpedotubes.Dimensions:149.8×14.2×6.43m.Complement:17officersand542men.Thisaerialphotographshows
thecruiserenroutetoScapaFlow.
LaunchdayforthenewcruiserKöln,23May1928:representativesoftheWilhelmshavenNavyYardwelcometheguestsofhonour.FromtheleftareVizeadmiralBauer(obscured);AdmiralZenker,
CommanderNorthSeaStation:KonteradmiralFranz,C-in-CNavalCommand(obscured);andGroener,SeniorShipyardDirectorandReichswehrMinister,whoisinconversationwiththeshipyardworkscouncil—(lefttoright)Watermann,Rust,PeekesandKrökel.KrökeldiedinNeuengammeconcentrationcamp
duringthewar.
Theguestsofhonour:lefttoright,Zenker,GroenerandtheMayorofCologneDrKonradAdenauer,laterthefirstpostwarChancelloroftheGermanFederalRepublic.
Immediatelybeforethenamingceremony,thehull,dressedwithflagsfromstemtostern,isreadytoslidedowntheways.Inthebackgroundcanbeseenthesister-shipKönigsbergfittingout;totheleftofher,in
DrydockV,istheoldbattleshipSchleswig-Holstein.
Kölntrundlingdowntothewater.OnSlip1(right)aretheframesofanothernewcruiser,Leipzig.
Kölnfittingout.Intheforegroundthreenewtorpedo-boatsareunderconstruction—Wolf,LeopardandJaguar.
AviewacrosstheshipbuildingbasintoKölnfittingoutintheshadowofshipyardcranes.Hermainturretshavenotyetbeenshipped.OnSlipway1thehullofLeipzigiswelladvanced.Noticetheunderwaterbulge,
whichwasnotafeatureoftheKönigsbergclass.
Kölnwith‘A’turretnowinstalled,theroofcoveredbyatarpaulin.Thebridgeandbattlemasthavebeenriggedwithsignalyardsandaerialbooms.
ThesimultaneouscommissioningofKölnanddecommissioningoftheoldImperialcruiserAmazone,theshipslyingstern-to-stem.Theceremonyiscompletedbyloweringtheensignofthelatterandraisingthatof
theformer.Thecrewtransfersfromoneshiptotheother.
Afterthejointceremony,KölnfliestheensignandjackwhileAmazoneliesdesertedatthequayside.
Aftertheshipenteredservicetheusualintensivetrainingandworkingupbeganunderthesupervisionofthevarioustechnicalcommissions.Thephotographdepictsthecruiserinturningtrialsat32kt.Theresultsofthesetrialsweretabulatedsothatcommandersandwatchofficersknewthelikelybehaviouroftheship
inmostgivencircumstances.
TheflagofthecruiserCöin,sunkintheBattleoftheHeligolandBight,occupiedaworthypositionwithinthenewship.
AgeneralviewofKölnduringturningtrials.
Thewakeatfullspeed—alwaysanimpressivepicture.
InOctober1930representativesfromthecityofColognevisitedthecruiserandtheBürgermeisterofCologne,DrKonradAdenauer,tooktheopportunitytoaddresstheship’scompanyonthequarterdeck.
ThewarflagoftheImperialGermanNavyfliesfromtheforetoppolemaston31May1931—SkagerrakDay—commemoratingtheBattleofJutland.
Aforwardviewfromstarboard,showingthecruiser’ssheer.Inthelargebayamidshipsatorpedotubemountingcanbeseen.
Thetraditional‘rowingoff’ofahigh-rankingofficerontransferout—hereExecutiveOfficerKorvettenkapitänSchenk,atWilhelmshavenNavyYard,29September1930.SchenkhadbeenNavigationOfficer,thenExecutiveOfficer,ofthecruiserAmazonefrom26September1927until15January1930,and
ExecutiveOfficerofKölnsincecommissioning.
‘A’turretguncrew.ThethreemainturretsaboardKölnwerenamedHelgoland(‘A’),DoggerBank(‘B’)andSMSGoeben(‘C’).
Kölnstoppedbutnotanchored.Intheforegroundacutterreturnstothecruiserafter‘manoverboard’drill;shehascorrespondingsignalflagsaloft.Attheforetoppoleshefliesanadmiral’scommandflag—
presumablytheBdA(CinCNavalScoutingUnits)isaboard.
Kölnduringa1931navalreview.
ThisaerialphotographofWilhelmshavenNavyYardtakenon6November1931showsKölnagainsttheeasternquay(top)oftheshipbuildingbasinduringaminorrefit.OnSlipway1oppositeisthehullframeof
thenewpocket-battleshipAdmiralScheer.
Aboveandbelow:On26May1932thecruiserreceivedanunexpectedvisitorwhentheNSDAPPartyleaderAdolfHitlercameaboardduringanelectioncampaign:inthecentrephotographHitlerisseenincompanywithKapitänzurSeeSchröder,Köln’scommander;inthebottomphotographheiswithhis
retinue(including,thirdfromtheright,hispublicitymanPutziHanfstängel).
ItistraditionalthattheGrosseWacheguarddetachmentissuppliedbynavalpersonnel—preferablyaship’scompany—onSkagerrakDay,31May.In1934thedetachmentwasprovidedbythecruiserKöln,anditis
seenheremarchingthroughaBerlinthoroughfare.
NavyWeek,Kiel,1935.OneithersideofthejettyareKölnandthepocket-battleshipAdmiralScheer.
NavyWeek,Kiel,June1935.Fortheinstructionofthenumerousvisitorsapracticetorpedoisfired.Inthebackground,right,isthegunnerytrainingshipBremse.
KölnattheAlaskaanchorage(todayNordhafen),Wilhelmshaven,inthesummerof1935.ImmediatelyaheadofherbowistheoldbattleshipSchlesienandinthedistanceisthepocket-battleshipDeutschland.
KölnpreparingtoleaveEntranceIII,withanhonourguarddrawnuponthequay.
Thecruiserfromadifferentangle.Onthequaysidealargecrowdofonlookers,includingfamilymembers,hasassembledtowavefarewell.
KölnatMessinaon8January1933,dressedoverallontheoccasionofthebirthdayoftheItalianQueen.The8.8cmflakfiringthesalutewasthemodellaterdeemedunsatisfactoryandunshipped.Firingaguninsaluteisanoldtraditionoriginatingfromthepracticeofwarshipsfiringofftheircannonwhenenteringaforeignharbourasameansofshowingtheirpeacefulintentions.Theceremonialofhonouringforeign
dignitariesdevelopedfromthisinduecourse.Headsofstateandprincesalwaysreceiveda21-roundsalute,asdidthenationalcolours;grandadmiralsorofficersofequalrankcouldexpecta19-roundsalute,andsoondownwards.Avice-consulwasentitledtoonlyfiverounds.Theextenttowhichawarshipwouldbebedressedoverall,orthesizeofhercoloursandfromwhereflown,wasdeterminedbysimilarprotocol.
KölninIndiawithboatloadsofcallersalongside.
KölnleavingSydney,May1933.
Shortperiodsindockwereprogrammedintooverseascruises,primarilyfordefouling.ThephotographshowsKölnindrydockatKobe,Japan,inJuly1933.
KölnarrivingatEntranceIII,Wilhelmshaven,herhomecomingpennantsetattheforetop.
MakingfastinEntranceIII,Wilhelmshaven,12December1933,beforeanhonourguardandhugecrowdsofwell-wishers.Theship’scompanyhasassembledontheupperdeck…
…foraveryimportantvisit:ReichChancellorAdolfHitlerinspectsthecruiser.OneithersideofHitlerareAdmiralRaeder,CinCNavy,andReichswehrMinisterGeneralBlomberg,followedbyotheradmiralsand
Partychiefs.
HitleraddressesKöln’screwonthequarterdeck.
HitlerspentmoretimewiththeNavythaniscommonlybelieved.InAugust1935hewasaboardKölntoobservegunnerydrill.TohisrightisKonteradmiralBoehm,BdA.
Kölnindrydock.Althoughcradled,allshipsindrydockweregivenadditionallateralsupport.Hereagoodviewoftheportsidestabilisingkeelisprovided.
Theportpropellermeasuredagainstacrewman.
Exercisewhileunderwayatsea:Kölnmakingsmokeathighspeed.
Firingpracticeasseenforwardfromthebattlemast.‘A’turrethasjustfiredtowardsatargetfineonthestarboardbow;therangefinderisofcoursealsotrainedinthatdirection.Noticethedark-paintedturretroofanditstwoprojectingperiscopeoptics.Thewhitecircleistheusualpre-waraircraftrecognitionsymbol.AstherailstanchionshavenotbeenloweredthiswasprobablyanAbkomm-schiessen,i.ethefiringoflive
ammunitionofasmallercalibrethroughaspecialbarreljacket.
Afterturrets‘B’and‘C’firing.Boththesephotographswereprobablytakenduringacruiseinwarmerclimes.KölnwasattachedtotheinternationalcontrolsystemsetupduringtheSpanishCivilWar,and
duringthisperiodgunneryexerciseswereheldintheAtlantic.
Aboveandbelow:‘B’and‘C’turretsfiring,photographedfromadifferentangle.
Köln’sflak.ShewasthefirstlightcruisertoreceivethenewlydevelopedC/32twinmounting,butthisprovedunsatisfactoryandwaslanded.Thetubeattheloweredgeofthepictureisthestarboardcruising
dieselexhaust;whennotinuseitwasstowedontheupperdeck.
ExamplesoftheAmericansingle-floatVoughtV85GCorsairaircrafthadbeenpurchasedintheUnitedStatesin1934,butafterunsatisfactorytrialsin1938theHeinkel60wasselectedbytheKriegsmarineasits
shipboardaircraft.HereKöln’sHe60isseenperchedonthecatapultinstallation.
TheReichWarFlagwasflownattheforetoppolemaston1January(NewYear),18January(ReichFoundationDay),30January(dayofHitler’sseizureofpower),1March(ReturnoftheSaartotheReich),20April(AdolfHitler’sbirthday),1May(Workers’Day),31May(SkagerrakDay;theoldImperialEnsignwasflowninsteadoftheReichWarFlag),29August(FoundationofthePrussian-GermanNavy,1859),andtheSundayafterMichaelmas(HarvestThanksgivingDay).Otheranniversarieswerealsoobserved—theincorporationofAustriaintotheReich,RemembranceDayinMarch,andothersasdirectedbyOKM,NavalStationCommandorotheroffices.Thiscustomwasobservedbylandstationsandallnavalunits
irrespectiveofwhethertheywereatseaorinaGermanorforeignport.
TorpedopracticeinEckernförderBay.
Physicaltrainingonthequarterdeck.
TheFührersPartyDeputy,RudolfHess,visitinganNCO’smessroomaboardthecruiser,Christmas1939.Seated(left)isFleetCommanderAdmiralMarschall.
KölniceboundinKielerFördeduringthewinterof1939/40.
Theicewassothickinthewinterof1939/40thatcommunicationwiththeshorecouldbemaintainedbymeansofabeatentrack.RunningfromKölnamidshipsis‘ErnstBaeckerWay’,namedaftertheExecutive
Officer.
AllthreeKönigsbergclasscruiserstookpartintheNorwegiancampaigninApril1940,butonlyKölnsurvived.HerethecruiserisseenenteringGrandHarbour,Wilhelmshaven,on11April1940.Barrage
balloonsaloftofferadefenceagainstlow-flyingaircraft.
Kölnmooringwithtugassistance,11April1940.
KölnintheBalticin1940duringaBdAexercise.ThisphotographwasprobablytakenfromNürnberg;notice,onthedecking,thenowstandardswastikaairrecognitionsymbol.
AftertheattackonRussia,Kölnwasattachedtotheso-calledBalticFleetintheautumnof1941andbombardedSovietinstallationsduringlandingsontheBalticislands.Here‘B’turrethasjustfired.
UnitsoftheBalticFleet,autumn1941:thebattleshipTirpitz(left)andthelightcruiserKöln,with,inthebackground,adestroyer.
IceboundinKielerFördeduringthewinterof1941/42,Kölnwearsthetypicalcamouflageofthetime.
In1942KölnwastransferredtoNorwegianwatersforafewmonths.Sheisseenherewithherflakgunsmanned.
AnAlliedaerialphotographofthecruiserataVaettenFjordanchorage.Thenetdefencesareclearlyevident.Kölniscloseintotheshoreandapparentlyundercamouflagenetting.Incombinationwithcertain
materialsthisaffordedradarprotectionandconfusedreconnaissancefliers.
KölninNorway:aportsideviewofthecruiserwearingtheusualcamouflageliveryforthesewaters.
Theendcameforthecruiseron30March1945attheWilhelmshavenNavyYard,whenshewasavictiminoneoftheheaviestairraidsonthecity.Mooredattheeasterncomeroftheshipbuildingbasin,shesettled
onthebottomastheresultofseveralnearmisses.Thisphotographwastakenon19April1945.
ThewreckasseenbyBritishandPolishtroopsontheirarrivalinWilhelmshavenon7May1945.
Twophotographsofthecruiserfromdifferentperspectives.Suppliedwithmakeshiftwoodenplatformsandelectricalcabling,‘B’and‘C’turretscontinuedtoengageenemytankformations.
Germanprisonersunloadingmunitions.
Aboveandbelow:Worktodismantlethewreckbeganshortlyaftertheendofthewar.Theviewleft,fromacrane,lookstowardsthesiteoveraSovietfreighter,oneofseveralwhichshippedouttheSoviet
entitlementtothedockyardinventoryandmuchelsebesides.TheremainderofthewreckwasremovedafterWilhelmshaven’snewnavalarsenalwascompletedin1956.
*ThedetailsofthisfiascoarerecountedinthecareernotesforNürnbergandLeipzig.
†ForfurtherdetailsofthisoperationseethecareernotesforKönigsberg.*BycommandoftheFührer,anFa226transporthelicopterflewasecretoperationfromBerlintoDanzigbetween26Februaryand5March1945,returningtoWerdernearBerlinon11March1945afteraflightof1,675km.
†HeyewasChiefEngineerofthedestroyerErichKoellner,sunkatNarvikon13April1940.SubsequentlyhewasCOfor threeyearsat the2ndNavalNCOTrainingSchool,Hohenschwangau—thefirstandonlyKriegsmarinetechnicalcollege.Theauthorwastrainedthere.
LeipzigThe keel of Cruiser ‘E’ (Replacement Amazone) was laid on 18 April 1928underYardNumber117at theMarinewerft,Wilhelmshaven,and thehullwaslaunched as Leipzig on 18 October 1929. Amongst the guests at the latterceremonywereeightsurvivorsofLeipzig(i),whichhadbeenlostattheBattleoftheFalklandsin1914.ThebaptismalspeechwasdeliveredbytheBürgermeisterofLeipzig,DrRothe.ThewidowofFregattenkapitänHaunnamedthecruiserwith thewords ‘We need a sign to save the Fatherland.On the orders of theReichPresidentInametheeLeipzig!’On8October1931theshipwascommissionedatWilhelmshavenbyherfirst
commander,Kapitän zurSeeHans-HerbertStobwasser.Working-up, sea trialsandcrewtrainingcommencedatonce.
PrewarServiceDuring 1932 the cruiser worked up in the Baltic, with numerous visits to theyards at Wilhelmshaven and Kiel for adjustment work and completion. TheAcceptanceCommitteecameaboardon16June.Between6and16SeptemberLeipzigtookpartintheautumnFleetexercises.Trialsandexercisescontinuedthroughout1933.Therewereforeignvisits to
Funchal,Madeira, from 27 February to 2March (during the Atlantic trainingcruise, 21 February-15 March), to Hangö, Finland, between 23 and 28 June(during thesummer trainingcruise,19June-10July)and toAarhus,Denmark,from5to9July,whereonthe7ththeDanishking,ChristianX,andentouragevisitedtheship.A21-gunsalutewasfired.A 19-gun salutewas fired on the occasion of the visit byReichChancellor
AdolfHitler.Vice-ChancellorvonPapen,Goering,GoebbelsandotherpoliticalleadersatKielon22Maytoobserveanightgunneryexercise.LeipzigtookpartintheautumnFleetexercisesbetween11and22September.On25SeptemberKorx’ettenkapitänOttoHormelbecamehersecondcommander.The usual routine of exercises, yard visits and training was continued into
1934.Visitswerepaidfrom11to15JulytoPortsmouthandfrom26to29JulytoReykjavik.Between14and17DecemberLeipzigmooredonBuoyA5atKielfor the removal by floating crane of the deckhouse between the funnel andbattlemasttomakewayfortheaircraftcatapultinstallation.Thehorizontalaerialgaffsonthefaceofthefunnelwereremovedandtwolargersemiuprightpylonserectedonrearofthefunnel.Fleet exercises with the pocket-battleship Deutschland, the old battleship
Schlesien,thelightcruiserKölnandthe3rdTorpedo-BoatFlotillawereheldintheGermanBightbetween25Mayand3June1935,whentheBdAraisedhisflag aboard Leipzig. During August she was the flagship of KonteradmiralBoehmasvariousgunnery, torpedo,minelayingandsearchlightexerciseswereheldwithotherFleetunits.Hitlercameaboardforafewdaysinmid-Augusttoobservethemanoeuvres.On9SeptemberFregattenkapitänOttoSchenkbecamethecruiser’sthirdcommander.Laterintheyeartheaerialgaffsattherearofthefunnelwerelandedandreplacedbyapolemastwithcrosstrees.On14April1936,incompanywithNürnberg(flag,BdA)andKöln,Leipzig
exercisedintheAtlantic,brieflyalsowiththeKdFlinersDerDeutsche,SierraCordoba andOceana. Las Palmas was visited between 23 and 26 April, andLagosinPortugalbetween29Apriland3May.Catapultexerciseswerebegun
on2May.Onthe8thofthemonththeshipboardHeinkel60capsizedandwaslost.Leipzig returned toWilhelmshaven on 8May and took part in theNavalReviewon28and29MayatKielattendedbyAdolfHitler.ShewasatWilhelmshavenon19August1936whenorderscameforraising
steam.Civilwarhadbrokenout inSpain thepreviousmonthandLeipzigwasrequired for coastal protection duty.On 3August the French government hadproposed the setting up of an international Non-Intervention Commission inwhichthewarshipsoffournations(Britain,France,GermanyandItaly)wouldmaintainageneralcontrolofallsectorsoftheSpanishcoast,andon24Augustthe four powers signed an agreement to come into effect in 1937. TheKriegsmarinewouldaccept responsibility for theMediterraneancoastbetweenOropesa and Cabo de Gata (Almeria). The purpose of the German navalpresencewas theprotectionofGerman livesandproperty,andcommunicationwas maintained with Republican and Nationalist harbours withoutdiscrimination.Refugeeswereacceptedforevacuationwithoutenquiry.On20August 1936Leipzig,Nürnberg (flag,BdA),AdmiralGraf Spee and
fourtorpedo-boatssailedforBiscayviatheEnglishChannelandon23AugustputintoPortugalete.On1SeptemberLeipzigcalledatSanSebastiantocollectrefugees for transport to St-Jean-de-Luz in France. Her offshore patrolsalternatedwith stops, in addition those ports alreadymentioned, at Gijon andCorunna.On9Septemberthetorpedo-boatsWolfandJaguarcamealongsidetotakeoffrefugees.DuringSeptembercoastalpatrolscontinuedas farwestas theAtlantic,with
repeatedvisitstoCorunna,toCaraminalandtotheCommanderoftheSpanishFleetatElFerrol.On26September,offSantander,LeipzigsightedunitsoftheRedSpanishFleet—theoldbattleshipJaimeI,thecruisersLibertadandMigueldeCervantes and fourdestroyers.The followingday sixblacked-outwarshipswerecloselywatchedoffCapeMachiaco.On8OctoberKölnarrivedtorelieveLeipzig,andthelatterarrivedatWilhelmshavenonthe10thforascheduledrefitlastinguntil3February1937.Trialswere run in theBaltic followingdischarge from theyards, andon10
MarchLeipzigsailedtorelieveKölnatElFerrol.Afterafewdaysofshipboardrepairs at El Ferrol and in the Bay of Barquero, the cruiser rounded thepeninsula, visitingAlgeciras andCeuta between 25 and 30March.Her patrolincludedMallorca,CadizandTangiersbeforeanchoringatMalagaon12AprilandtheSpanishenclaveofMelillaontheNorthAfricancoastthenextday.SheremainedonstationintheMediterraneanuntil15May,otherportsvisitedbeing
Ibiza, Algiers, Cartagena, Formentera and Valencia. Her commander’s WarDiaryfortheperiodshowsavarietyofactivityrangingfromboardingderelicts,contraband control, monitoring movements of Republican warships andobservationofshore installationsandshipping.ThecruiserreturnedtoKielon19MayviaBiscayandtheChannel.LeipzigsailedfromKielforSpainon1June1937andmadearoundvoyage
takinginIbiza,CadizandTangiersbetween9and14June.On15and18Junethecruiser was the target for two mysterious torpedo attacks, apparently by asubmarine,theresponsibilityforwhichwasneveradmitted.AsaconsequenceofthisandtheseriousattackonDeutschlandat Ibizaon29MaybyRedaircraft,GermanywithdrewfromtheinternationalNon-InterventionCommitteeandtookno further part in the official coastal patrols, although shemaintained a navalpresenceinSpanishwatersuntilthecivilwarendedin1939.ThecruiserlefttheMediterraneanon19June1937andmadestopsatCadiz
andLagosonthereturntoBiscay,dockingattheDeutscheWerke,Kiel,from29Juneuntil4August.Theusualpatternoftrainingdrillsandexercisesensued.On17SeptembertheBdA,KonteradmiralDensch,hoistedhisflagaboardLeipzigfor the big Wehrmacht manoeuvres between 20 and 25 September. On 11OctoberthecruiserenteredtheBalticforvariousexercisesandroutineprotocolvisits and remained there for the rest of the year. Kapitän zur See WernerLöwischbecamethecruiser’sfourthcommanderinOctober.A full programme of training, exercises and shipyard lay-ups occupied the
first eight months of 1938. On 22 August Leipzig formed part of the NavalReview before Hitler and the Hungarian Vice-Regent Admiral Horthy on theoccasionofthelaunchingoftheheavycruiserPrinzEugenatKiel;shewasalsoatKielon8and9DecemberforthelaunchoftheaircraftcarrierGrafZeppelin.During the year the angular crane on the port side was replaced by one ofstraight design. The cruiser entered Deutsche Werke, Kiel, for a refit on 17Decemberandremainedthereuntil15March1939.For therestorationofMemel to theGermanReich,AdmiralRaederflewhis
flag on Leipzig between 22 and 26 March for the round voyage fromSwinemünde,whereonthe26ththecruiserfireda21-gunsalutefortheFührerto mark the successful conclusion of the operation. Kapitän zur See HeinzNordmannbecamethecruiser’sfifthcommanderinApril.On 17 April, in company with the pocket-battleship Deutschland, the
battleship Gneisenau, the 3rd Destroyer Division, the 6th and 7th U-BoatFlotillas,thetenderErwinWassnerandtheoilerSamland,Leipzigsailedforthe
easternAtlanticontheonlylarge-scaleGermanforeignnavalexercisebetweenthewars.CallsweremadeatPontevedraandCorunna, thecruiser returning toKiel on 18May. In the remaining three months of peace Leipzig engaged inintensiveexercises,mainlywithNürnbergandKölnbutalsowithGneisenauanddestroyersinmid-August.
WorldWarIIOn23AugustalargeforceunderVizeadmiralDensch,BdA,receivedorderstotakeupblockadingstationsattheBalticexitstodeterPolishunitsfromescapingtotheWest.AstheGermanshipswerenotallowedtoshoot,theblockadewasineffective and Densch was unable to prevent the passage of three Polishdestroyers through the Danish Narrows to Britain. In the first two weeks ofSeptemberfivePolishsubmarinesalsobrokeout,threebeinginternedinSwedenandtwoarrivinginBritain.On 25 August Leipzig’s ship’s company was informed of the situation by
KapitänzurSeeNordmannandwarwatcheswereintroducedonboardship.On2SeptemberLeipzigandothervesselsofVizeadmiralDensch’sforcetransferredintotheNorthSeatolayaminebarrierwhichrepresentedtheseawardextensionoftheWestwall(orSiegfriedLine).LeipzigworkedthroughoutSeptemberoutofWilhelmshaventogetherwithNürnbergandtheyachtGrille,joinedonthe19thand20thbythetorpedo-boatsSeeadlerandWolf.Theoperationwasconcludedon the29thof themonthand thecruiser repaired to thewesternBaltic,wheresheremainedexercisinguntilmid-November.Onthe17thofthatmonth,whilein transit through the Holtenau Lock for Brunsbüttel, she collided with thegunnerytrainingshipBremse,butthedamagewasnegligible.On21November,together with Köln and three destroyers, Leipzig escorted the battleshipsScharnhorstandGneisenauasfarastheSkagerrakontheirmissiontorolluptheNorthernPatrol,andsheremainedonanticontrabandpatroluntilsheescortedthebattleships home on the 25th. On a number of occasions Leipzig and othercruisers had escorted homewards across theGerman Bight groups of GermandestroyersreturningfromminelayingmissionsalongtheBritishEastCoast:alloperationswere successful until the fiascoof 13December,whenLeipzig andNürnbergweretorpedoedbyHMSubmarineSalmon.*In his report,Kapitän zur See Nordmann stated that at 1125 that morning
Leipzigwas runningat28ktwhena trailofbubbleswas seenapproaching theship,andsoclosethatthetorpedocouldnotbeavoided.Heorderedhardtoport,butalmostatonceaviolentexplosionoccurredintheareaofframe89justabaftthebulkheadbetweenboilerroomsIandIIandabout3–4mbelowthewaterline.The boiler rooms flooded at once to the level of the armour grating, and herefourteenmen drowned—two petty officers, onemidshipman, nine stokers andtwodamagecontrolratings.Theenginerevolutioncountersshowedthattheportturbine stopped immediately, while the other slowed to a stop over the nextfifteenminutes. The diesel-driven central propeller continuedwith revolutions
for15kt.Therudderobeyedthehelmhaltinglyandwouldnotremainwhereputbut returned to midships. Manual helm was ordered. The torpedo hit onNürnbergwasobserved,andafewminuteslatersheandKölndisappearedfromsightonawesterlyheading.AboardLeipzigspeedwascutto10ktforfearofthedamagedbulkheadgivingway.At 1225Nordmann requested from theBdAa destroyer escort, but the fact
thathisradiolocationequipmentandbothgyrocompasseswerenotfunctioningwas problematical. At 1315 a German reconnaissance aircraft arrived; fifteenminuteslater,whenNürnbergandKölnreappeared,Leipzigtookupclosestationon the latter for antiaircraft protection, since her own flak was only partiallyoperational; and at 1345 the group was joined at by the destroyers RichardBeitzen and Bruno Heinemann. At 1530 the BdA, Konteradmiral Lütjens,orderedLeipzigintoBrunsbüttel.At 0605 the following morning Nordmann signalled GroupWest: ‘Leipzig
torpedohit compartmentsVIII-IX,onlyoneboilerworking, difficulty steeringmanual rudder, two large lateral holes, one main longitudinal bulkhead tornopen,request twopowerful tugsat1300toassistprogressatestuary.’At0702GroupWestreplied,‘LeipzigrepairWilhelmshaven.’Leipzig proceeded until daybreakwith the two destroyers leading andKöln
astern. When the destroyers Friedrich Ihn and Hermann Schoemann arriveddirectly from the dockyard,Köln took station ahead of Leipzig with the fourdestroyersabeam.Between0730and0815 theescortwas further strengthenedbyF7,F9,sixmotorminesweepersofthe3rdR-BoatFlotilla,fourboatsofthe2ndMinesweeping Flotilla and several aircraft.At 0951Kölnwas ordered byGroupWesttomakeforWilhelmshavenatonceandwasdetachedathighspeedwith Friedrich Ihn and Hermann Schoemann as escorts. The antisubmarinescreennowformedaroundLeipzig(seeaccompanyingdiagram).At 1235 a violent explosion occurred in the escort vesselF 9 about 800m
ahead off the starboard bow. Assuming F 9 to have been mined, Nordmannordered‘Hardtoport,stopdiesel.’Almostimmediatelyatrackwasreportedonthe starboard bow, the torpedo passing about 50mahead.Leipzig’s dieselwasrestarted for full ahead. F 9 foundered quickly on her port beam, the sternstandinguprightinthewaterforabouttwentysecondsbeforesinking.ThemotorminesweepersR36andR38pickedup34survivors.Inhisreport,KapitänzurSeeNordmannwascriticalofthestarboardescorts:
Whereas it must be recognised that despite the unpleasant sea conditions for small boats the R-Flotillaszealouslyexecuted theirzigzagsandneededno instruction,after the successfulattack the
escortvesselsonthestarboardsideshouldhaveheadedatonceforthesuspectedshootingpositionofthe submarine and dropped depth charges. Instead they scattered without making any attempt tocome to grips with the attacker and left the endangered starboard side of Leipzig completelyunprotected.Todemoralise the submarine I ordered, on theultra-short-waveband, ‘Escort vesselsstarboardsidedropdepthcharges.’Thisresultedinonedepthchargebeingdroppedbyanunknownminesweeper.Tosummarise, itmustbesaid that theescortsasantisubmarineescortsdidnotmeetexpectations.Tojudgebythetrackofbubbles,thesubmarineattackedfromthestarboardbow.Asthecruiserhadlimitedmanoeuvrability,toturnalongtheorderedapproachcoursefortheJadewouldhaveplacedthecruiserfavourablyforanattackbythesamesubmarine[HMSubmarineUrsula]‘,byheadinginsteadfortheElbe,Leipzigshowedthesubmarineherstern.ThereforeIheadedfortheElbe.Becauseofthedangerofthebulkheadgivingway,speedwaskeptdownto1Okt.Itmustbeaddedthattheescortsgavenofurthercauseforcomplaintontherunin.
FormationoftheantisubmarineescortforLeipzig,14December1939.
At1429theconvoypassedLightshipHandat1728anchoredintheroadsteadatBrunsbüttel. The cruiser proceeded toDeutscheWerke shipyard atKiel forrepair.On8January1940aBdACourtofInquiryconvenedaboardthecruiserinthe
shipyard to investigate the circumstances surrounding the torpedoing. In hisreportAdmiralMarschall, the Fleet Commanderr, came down heavily againstNordmann:
…TheantisubmarineescortformationchosenbyLeipzigwasunsuitable.TheboatsfittedwiththevaluableS-Gerät [hydrophone installation] could not use them, the formationwasmuch too tight
and,despitethenumberofavailableunits,failedintheirtask.Theyamountedmerelyto‘aheapofescorts’anddidnotmake the submarine’sobjectiveparticularlydifficult.Thecorrect thingwouldhave been an echelon formation with the hydrophone-equipped boats sailing about four to fivekilometresaheadof theconvoy, thedestroyersandminesweepersbuildinga lineofdefenceaboutthreekilometresoffthedamagedshipwithonlytheR-boatsascloseescort,zigzaggingabout600to1,000maway.Furthermore,commandoftheescortshouldhavebeenplacedinthehandsofthemostseniorFlotillacommander…
… The measures taken by Leipzig and her escort after the 14 December torpedoing wereinadequate.Itwasaserioustacticalfailurethatthelargenumberofescortsonlymanagedtodroponedepth charge. As the leading ship, Leipzig should have issued clear and unequivocal orders forengaging theenemy… itwasessential togive the submarinealarmbyall availablemethods (notmerely,aftera longdelay,byaflaghoist ‘Submarine tostarboard’).Therewerenosirensorstarsfiredoff, no indicationof distanceoff or bearingof the attacking submarine, andnoorder to anyescortinparticulartocarryoutadepth-chargeattack.ThereforeIdonotupholdthecriticismsoftheantisubmarine escort levelled by Leipzig’s commander, but Imust censure the cruiser in that themeasurestakeninhandfortheenergeticuseoftheescortforcewereinsufficient…Idonot,byanymeans,underestimatethedifficultiesconfrontingtheseriouslydamagedcruiseronthewayhome…andIaccept that thecommander’sworriesweresoconsiderablethathandlingtheescortforcewasratherthrustintothebackground.Accordingly,allthemoreproperandrightitwouldhavebeenforthecommander to relievehimselfof theburdenofdirecting theantisubmarine forcebydelegatingcommandtothemostseniorFlotillacommanderpresent…
Later,AdmiralRaeder,CinCKriegsmarine,observed:‘Theuseofcruiserstoescortdestroyersorotherlightforcesinthemannerundertakenon13December1939provedunsuitableandinappropriate.’The cruiser was decommissioned on 27 February. Orders came down that
neitherhertopspeednorfullbattle-readinessneedberestored,andamajorrefitscheduled for October 1940 was cancelled. Leipzig was relegated to trainingduties and the two boiler rooms devastated by the torpedo hitwere rebuilt ascadets’ dormitories with bunks. Externally, the after torpedo-tube mountingswere unshipped and a degaussing system was fitted. The cruiser wasrecommissionedwithanewpermanentship’scompanyasa trainingvessel forthenavalgunneryandtorpedoschoolsunderhersixthcommander,KapitänzurSeeWernerStichling,atDanzigon1December1940followingherfirstenginetrials.DuringDecember she completed and fitted out, took aboardmunitions,adjusted her radio installation, ran her acceptance voyage and calibrated herguns.During the first half of 1941 the ship underwent a number minor refits,
including the removal of the catapult installation and, from4March, the aftertorpedo tubes.Thesemodificationsalternatedwith theship’s trainingdutiesaspartoftheTorpedoSchoolFlotilla.On11JuneLeipzig,fivedestroyers,twoU-boatsanda largeair escort setoff fromKiel, accompanying theheavycruiserLützow (exDeutschland)asfarasNorwayonthefirststageofhercommerce-
raidingvoyagetotheIndianOceancodenamedOperation‘Sommerreise’.Afterthenaval escorthadput intoOsloFjord,Lützow continuedalone,but shewastorpedoedbyanaircraftoffEgersundandhadtoabandonhermission.On7JulyLeipzigreturnedtoGermanyledbytheSperrbrecherBelgrad.OnherarrivalatTravemünde shewas inspectedbyKonteradmiralThiele,ChiefofStaff to theFleet.ThecruiserlayatCopenhagenfrom12Augustto1Septemberandafterdegaussing tests at Travemünde sailed in company with Nürnberg toSwinemündeon21September.Leipzigwasbynowvirtuallybattle-ready, andon the 24th she arrived at Libau for the ‘Weststurm I’ and ‘II’ operations, inwhich,withEmden,threetorpedo-boatsandE-boatssheformedSouthGroupofthe so-called Baltic Fleet. Between 25 and 27 September South GroupbombardedSovietlandtargetsandartillerypositionsontheSworbepeninsulainsupport of theGerman troop landings on the Estonian island ofÖsel. On the27thsheavoidedtorpedoesfromtheRussiansubmarineSC-317andattacksbyRussianMTBs.*OnherreturntoKielthecruiserenteredDeutscheWerkeuntil20 October, during which time she spent eight days in drydock. Between 22October and 11November sheworked out ofGotenhafen, assisting the heavycruiserAdmiralScheertoworkup.Gunneryandtorpedotrainingexercisesthencontinueduntiltheyear’send.Throughout1942Leipzigwasengagedintrainingdutiesandexercisesinthe
central Baltic. On 14 April she was appointed flagship of KonteradmiralLitzmann,CommanderFleetTrainingShips.New15cmgunbarrelswerefittedatStettinbetween15Apriland7May.AttheendoftheyearthecruiserentereddrydockatDeutscheWerke,Libau,wheresheremaineduntil13January1943,not leaving the yards until 15 February. During the period her seventhcommander, Kapitän zur See Friedrich-Traugott Schmidt, was aboard fromAugusttoSeptember1942,whentheship’seighthcommander,KapitänzurSeeWaldemarWinther,tookoveruntilFebruary1943.Leipzig was included in the general decommissioning of heavy units
deprecatedas‘worthlessanduseless’byHitlerfollowingtheBarentsSeafiascoof 30December 1942, and her ensignwas hauled down atLibau on 4March1943.Inthedeterioratingmilitarysituationworkexistedevenforaworn-downcruiser,however,andafteranewpermanentship’scompanyhadbeenmusteredLeipzigwasrecommissionedon1Augustandbeganworkingupatonce.On10August a potentially serious fire in boiler room III was swiftly extinguished.Steaming, flakexercisesandshipyard trialswere followedbyabriefperiod indrydocktorepairtheportpropelleron7September.Trainingdutiesresumedinthe Bay of Danzig with courses for helmsmen, engineering and navigation
cadets.KapitänzurSeeWalterHülsemannbecamethecruiser’sninthcommanderin
October.During theair raidonGotenhafenon9OctoberLeipzig joined in theair defence with her flak batteries. In refits during the year the two forwardtorpedotubemountingswerelandedandanFuMO25radaraerialwasfittedonthe battlemast. Between 15 and 25 December the main gun barrels wereunshipped at Gotenhafen, and the cruiser was laid up in the port from 20Decemberuntil5January1944fortheChristmasperiod.OnChristmasDaytheship’spinnacehelpedintherescueoperationsforthecrewofSperrbrecher30.During January 1944 Leipzig underwent an overhaul at Deutsche Werke,
Gotenhafen, which included the refitting of the new 15cm main gun barrels.Training courses continued aboardwhilst in the shipyard andworking up. AtSwinemündeVizeadmiralMeendsen-Bohlken,FleetCommander, inspected thebattle-readiness of the ship on 23 August. Kapitän zur See Heinrich Spörelbecame the ship’s tenth commander on 26 August. After an outbreak ofcerebrospinal meningitis was confirmed at Swinemünde on 30 August, thecruiser went into quarantine at Misdroy until 12 September but suffered twoshipboarddeathsfromthedisease.On15SeptemberconvoyexerciseswereheldwithAdmiralScheer,andon the26thof themonthLeipzig ranseveralescortsfortrooptransportsbetweenGotenhafenandSwinemünde.Onthe30th,ledbythreeminesweepers, shesailedforHelawith theU-boat tenderTsingtauandaU-boatasternandon4OctoberexercisedofftheportwithAdmiralHipper,KölnandtheoldbattleshipSchlesien,proceedinginconvoyfortheSchichaushipyardat Danzig. Between 9 and 14 October Leipzig was anchored at Gotenhafen,wherethedisastrouschainofeventsculminatinginthecollisionwiththeheavycruiserPrinzEugen on 15October had their inception, as described in a veryclearmannerinKapitänzurSeeSpörel’simmediateaccidentreport:
WhenI tookcommandofLeipzigon26August1944thegeneralwarsituationseemedgrave.ThecollapseontheEasternFrontwasevident.TherepercussionsintheWehrmachtfollowingtheeventsof 20 July 1944 [the date of the Bomb Plot] were making themselves felt. The crippling of theKriegsmarine,particularlythatoftheU-boatarm,washavinganunfavourableeffectonmoraleatalllevels.
Isoondiscoveredthatthemoodaboardshipwassubduedanddiscontented.Thiswaspartlyduetoacompletelyunsatisfactorybattle-readinessinspectionon20AugustwhichtheFleetCommanderhadorderedtoberepeated.Thecausesbehindthisfailurewereprobablytobefoundinthefactthatsincethetorpedoingof13December1939theshiphadspenttwolongperiodsoutofcommission,she had only been repaired where absolutely necessary, and the ship’s company had, with fewexceptions,beendrawnfromthePersonnelReserveonthelastcommissioning(1August1943)andwascompletelydisorganised.SomeoftheofficerscamefromCoastalArtilleryandhadneverbeenaboard a ship; others had been discarded for incompetence or as misfits and landed. By way of
example,myExecutiveOfficer (IO) had been the commanding officer of aminesweeping flotillarelieved of command because of his inability to handlemen.TheNavigationOfficer (NO)was aformerharbourpilotatDanzigandknewnothingaboutwarships.Hehadsurvivedanattemptbymypredecessortodismisshim.AnotherofmyofficerswasaKapitänleutnantwhohadnotcomeuptostandard as aU-boatwatchkeeping officer. Therefore I had few officers uponwhom I could relyunconditionally.ExceptedfromthisstatementaretheChiefEngineer,KorvettenkapitänGrundmann;theNo1GunneryOfficer,KapitänleutnantPlass;theWirelessOfficer,KapitänleutnantKönig:andLeutnant zur See Boldemann. Most of the warrant officers and knowledgable mates were good,althoughonlyafewhadanybattleexperience.WithsuchacorpsofofficersandNCOsitwassoonobvious that itwouldbeverydifficult to get a lame ship battleworthyor even carry out a simpleoperationsuccessfully.
Theotherranksweremadeupof80percentcadetsandwereverygood.Thisencouragedmetoreallycometogripswiththeproblem.BesidestheGunneryOfficer,WirelessOfficerandmyself,noofficerhadshipboardbattleexperience.ThismeantthatIhadtostartfromthebeginning—somethingof an advantage, as it subsequently proved. Through constant contact with the crew, includingaddressesovertheship’sloudspeakers,Isucceededingainingtheirconfidence,givingthemprideintheir ship, making her into a fighting unit and to bolstering their self-confidence. Thus after sixweeks Leipzig passed the repeat battle-readiness inspection to the satisfaction of the FleetCommander, although theNavigationOfficer failed socompletely that theAdmiralorderedme tosubmitadraftingrequestonhisbehalf.
On11October1944thecruiserwasinDanzigshipyardforabriefrefitwhenIreceivedbadnewsfromhomeandobtainedcompassionateleavetovisitTorgauhospitaluntil15October.Imadesurethatmy IOandADCknewhow to contactme inTorgau should theneed arise.Onmyarrival atTorgauIreportedtothemilitarycommanderandcalledineverydayofmyleavetoseeiftherewereanymessagesforme.Ileftthereon14October.MytrainconnectionhadbeenbombedatErfurtsoIhadtotakeadetourviaBrombergandgottoDanzigsevenhourslateonthe15th.Oneofmyofficersmetmeon theplatformwith a telexcontainingorders forLeipzig to sail at1500 thatday to loadminesatSwinemünde.Wehad to travelon toGotenhafen,where the shiphadberthedatmidday.WhenIgotthereIwasmetbyKorvettenkapitänKopp,AdmiralStaffOfficer,whotoldmethatFleetCommandhadmadeseveralenquiriestoestablishwhyLeipzighadnotconfirmedhersailingorders.Iexplainedmyownmisfortunesand,ashehadbeenappointedmynewNavigationOfficer,askedwhyhehadnottakenuphisdutiesaboard.Herepliedthathehadbeenorderedtowaituntilhisownrelief arrived fromNorway. Until then I would have to sail with the present Navigation Officer.TherewasnothingIcoulddoaboutthis,butIaskedKopptoinformhiscommandingofficerthatIcouldnotpossiblycarryoutaminelayingoperationwithoutacompetentnavigator.
MyChiefEngineerwaswaitingatTrainingCommandtotellmethattheIOhadorderedhimnotto raise steam. I Morsed the order to the ship at once and we then boarded. I learned, to myconsternation, that the sailing order had been received on 12October. The IO andADC had notconsidered it important enough to contact me at Torgau because they expected me back in themorningofthe15th.
Fleet Command was pressing us to sail, and so there was no time to go through the usualdeparture routine, checkmineor submarinewarningsnor findout thegeneralwar situation in theBaltic,andIwasstillgettingchangedwhenLeipzigweighedanchorat1745.Wetookstationbehinda Sperrbrecher and left Gotenhafen with the IO in charge on the bridge. As there was not yetsufficient pressure in theboilers for turbinedrive, the shipwasmotoringonher central propeller,driven by the cruise diesel. I ordered the ship closed up atwar stations, andwhen I came on thebridgetheWirelessOfficerhandedmeasignalwarningthattheheavycruiserPrinzEugen,returningfromMemel,wouldbe enteringGotenhafen at about2000.Standingorders stated that the second
copyofasignalhadtobegivensimultaneouslytotheNOonthebridgeandthenpassedonbyhimtotheIO.Unfortunately,thesecondcopyofthissignalwasinterceptedbytheIOandneithertheNOnortheofficerofthewatchsawit.ThustheyknewnothingaboutPrinzEugen.TheWirelessOfficerreferred to some earlier signals, of which a German U-boat’s report of a torpedo track off Helaconcernedmemost.IwentoutonthebridgeandmentionedittotheNO.Itwas1942andwewerebearing293degreesoff theHela light.At thatmoment theengine roomreported ‘Steamup inallboilersandouterpropellersreadytocouple in.’At thesametimethesignaldeckreportedthat theSperrbrecherwasturningback.Iorderedtheofficerofthewatchtostopthediesel.TheWOaskedthe NO on what side he should pass the midchannel buoy dividing swept channel No 76 intowestbound(port)andeastbound(starboard)lanes.WeweremakingforSwinemünde,whichwastoourwest.TheNOsaid,‘Itdoesn’tmatter.’Icontradictedhimandpointedout,‘Youareobligedtopasstoportofitbutnowitistoolate.Gorounditonthestarboardsideandbringtheshiptoastopthere.’ I thought itwasoutrageous that aKapitänleutnantwhohad served as aWO foryears andmust have known these waters better than I from his U-boat service knew nothing about simplenavigation.Itookovercommand,andafterpassingthebuoystoppedtheshipafterascertainingfromobservations of the buoy that there was no tidal stream running. The wind was south-south-east,Force1–2,withvariablevisibility andmistpatches. I expected the stop to last about tenminutes.While waiting for the outer propellers to be coupled in I discussed with the NO what measuresshould be taken to reduce the danger of submarine attack in the swept channel, since we wereprohibited fromzigzaggingwhile in it. I came to theconclusion that inwaterswith irregular tidalflow a ship should proceed at varying speeds and instructed the NO to prepare his courseadjustments,whichhewouldthenpassinaseriesoforderstotheWOfromthecharthouse.TheNOsaidthathedidnotknowhowtodothis.Ihadnochoicebut togotothecharthouseandgivetheinstructiontoacompetentwarrantofficercoxswain.
At1958 the completionof the coupling-inwas reported tomevia thevoicetube. I ordered thecruiserto15ktandextinguishedtherunninglightsonaccountofthesubmarinedanger.AstheshipwasstraddlingthemidchannellineIpointedthebowanextra3degreestostarboard.*
TheWarDiaryentryat2001states laconically: ‘HeavycruiserPrinzEugencollided into compartment X, port side, at angle of 35 degrees. Location ofincident: 54° 35.3′N18° 54.2′E.’TheExplanatoryNotes to theLeipzigWarDiaryrecord:
At1958shipgotunderwaywithordersfor15ktoncourse90°,whichmeantshewasnotathwartthechannel.PrinzEugenhadnavigationlanternssetdimlyandintheconditions[ofdarkandmist]theycould not be seen. It was thus not possible to judge her angle of approach. Only her mastheadsteaminglightswerevisible.Accordingly,theLeipzigWOactedcorrectlybyattemptingtoavoidthesteaminglightsdeadaheadbyturninghardtostarboard.AboardPrinzEugentheofficersweretakenby surprisewhenLeipzig’s navigation lanterns came on suddenly.PrinzEugenwasmaking 20kt,whichwasexcessiveforthesweptchannel;Leipzigranfoulofheratabout9kt.Assoonasshesawthe lanterns,Prinz Eugen set herNight SignalApparatus to three red and threewhite alternatinglights,whichmeans‘Myenginesarefullastern.’Havingregardto theshortdistanceinvolved, theeffectofreversingengineswasnegligible.
Thetwoships,dovetailedtogether,werefinallywrenchedapartat1400on16October.PrinzEugen’sbowshadcarvedintoLeipzigbetweenthebattlemastandthe funnel almost to the centreline, andheld the light cruiser fast betweenhercentre keel plate and upper deck ‘rather like a shark with its prey,’ as
FregattenkapitänSchmalen-bach,PrinzEugen’sGunneryOfficer,described it.ForawhilemuchofLeipzig’sweightwasrestingonPrinzEugen’scentralkeelplatesandwasnotreduceduntiltheheavycruiserwastrimmeddeep.ThebowhadboredintoboilerroomIII,tearingawaythebulkheadbetweenboilerroomsII and III. The ship being closed up at war stations prevented a worsecatastrophe. As it was, the collision claimed 19 dead and 30 injured aboardLeipzig.LeipzigwasbroughtintoGotenhafen’sBasinVwithtugassistancebutcould
not dock and so went into the 70,000-tonne floating dock instead, where sheremaineduntil30December.Aproper repairwasoutof thequestion, and thecrewsettomakingtheshipseaworthyusingimprovisedtoolsandmaterials.Thedamagewassoserious,however, that thecruiserwas finallycondemned tobeused a traininghulk for cadets.Becauseof thenowdaily air raids she limpedregularly to different spots about the harbour. Spörel left the cruiser inNovember 1944 and the IO, Korvettenkapitän Hagen Kiister, supervised theship’sbusinessuntilJanuary1944.On2February1945KorvettenkapitänWalterBachbecameLeipzig’seleventh
andlastcommander.BecauseofthedeterioratingmilitarysituationintheEast,instructions had been issued to get the cruiser seaworthy at all costs. As theshipyardhadvirtuallyceasedtofunction,ablindeyewasturnedtoanymeansofimprovisation,andmeasuresincludedexpropriation;forexample,theoriginsofa powerful dieselmotor and several generatorswere never established.On 13FebruaryLeipzigmovedfromBasinVtoBasinIunderherownpower.On16Februarythegunswereexercisedwithtworoundsperbarrel.From17Februaryto4Marchtheshipworkedupintensivelyandcaredformanyrefugees.On 9March, at 16km distant, the Russians were within range of Leipzig’s
15cmgunsand‘C’ turret fired53 rounds, including22atassemblyareasnearTuchum. The Russians targeted Leipzig, forcing her to change her positionfrequently.Between14and24March,fromvariouslocationswithintheportofGotenhafen or at sea beyond the range of Russian artillery,Leipzig fired 92015cm shells, causing massive damage, particularly to enemy artillery. On 17March the 7th PanzerDivision signalled, ‘We thank you for your outstandingshooting.’Theship’sflakwasverysuccessfulandmadetwoconfirmedkillsofRussian aircraft. Decorations were awarded to crewmembers byVizeadmiralRoggeon23March.By 24March there was no more 15cm ammunition to be had and Leipzig
moved to Hela to embark about 500 refugees and Army wounded before
weighinganchor at about1930 for the longanddangerousvoyagewestwards.Shewasaccompaniedbysixmerchantvesselsandafewsmallescortsandcouldmake6ktthroughwaterspatrolledbySovietsubmarinesandbelowskiesacrosswhich the enemy air forces had total air supremacy. On the first nightsubmarineswereseenvisuallyandalsodetectedbyhydrophone.Atorpedowasavoided by a sharp turn to starboard. Russian reconnaissance aircraft flewoverhead.Thefirstairattackarrivedonthe26thwhensixSoviettorpedoaircraftcameinfromastern.Whiletheflakputupacurtainoffire,thestemwasangledtowardswhicheveraircraftseemedtobemakingarun.Thiswasdoneinordertoreducetheship’sprofile.Oncewithinrangeofthelightflak,theaircraftalwaysturnedaway.Althoughmanysubmarinealarmswereprobablyfalse,onthenightof27March,attheentrancetothesweptchannel,aSovietsubmarinemadeanattackwhileRussian aircraft circled overhead.Amerchant vesselwas slightlydamaged by the aircraft and a torpedo crossed theLeipzig’s wash about 20mastern. Weather favourable to the German convoy—fog and mist—began toclosein,andonthe29ththecruisermooredatApenrade.Leipzig remained in theDanish portwith her ship’s company until 30 June
1945, when she joined a British escort for Wilhelmshaven. Here she wasdecommissionedon20December1945.BecauseofherdesolateconditionshewasnotwantedbyanyofthevictoriouspowersandwasfoundemploymentatWilhelmshaven as an accommodation hulk forminesweeper crews.On 9 July1946threetugstowedhertotheSkagerrak,whereonthe20thshewasdestroyedbyscuttlingchargesat57°53’N6°13’E,south-westofFarsund.
TheWorldWarIlightcruiserLeipzig,3,276tons,waslaunchedatAGWeser,Bremen,on21March1905andenteredservicewiththeFleeton20April1906.AttheoutbreakofwarshewasattachedtotheFarEastCruiserSquadronbasedonTsingtau,China.On1NovembershetookaminorpartintheBattleofCoronelofftheChileancoast,obtainingahitonthelightcruiserGlasgowbeforelosingcontactinthedarkness.On
8December1914,intheBattleoftheFalklandIslands,Leipzigfoughtonformorethanthreehours,obtaininganumberofhitsonbothenemyships,untilherammunitionwasexhausted.Sherefusedtostrikeherflagandwasbombardeduntilshesignalledherhopelessplightanhourlater,finallysinkingat2122,sixhoursafterbattlecommenced.Cornwallrescuedherfifteensurvivors,includingsixofficers.Armament:10×10.5cmguns,twotorpedotubes.Machinery:steampistonenginescoupledtoturbinessuppliedbyten
coal-firedwatertubeboilers,speed22kt.Dimensions:110.6×13.3×5.6m.Complement:14officersandupto287men.Thephotographshowsaflag-bedeckedLeipzigatajettyinaneastAsianport.ThelightcruiserLeipzig(iii)waslaunchedatAGWeser,Bremen,on28January1918butwasincompletewhenscrappedin
1921undertheArmisticeprovisions.HerdetailsweregenerallyasforKönigsberg(ii).
Leipzigatlaunch.Afterthenamingceremony,thebowshieldisunveiledandthecanvassheetbearingtheship’snameisunfurled.
Slowly,thenincreasinglyquickly,thehullslidesdowntothewater.TotheleftisHannover,oneoftheoldpre-dreadnoughts.
Thecruiserfittingout.‘B’and‘C’turretsarealreadyshipped,andthelongdeckhouseisstillunroofedtopermitthedeliveryofmaterialtothelowerdecks.
Theship,neartocompletion,indrydockforathoroughinspectionandafinalcoatofpaintbelowthewaterline.
WilhelmshavenNavyYardfromtheair,28August1931.InDrydockIarethefisheryprotectionvesselsElbeandWeser,inDrydockVisthegunnerytargetshipZähringerr,alongthesouthquayoppositearetheoldtorpedo-boatsG8andG70;inDrydockVIareminesweepers;beforeDrydocksIVtoVIaremoderntorpedo-boats;andonSlipway1canbeseenthepocket-battleshipAdmiralScheerunderconstruction.
Leipzigisseenacrosstheways.
Leipzigphotographedbeforeenteringservice.
Thenewcruiserwascommissionedceremoniallyon8October1931.Thephotographshowstheraisingofthenavalensign.Thelargetripodframebelongstotheshipboardfloatingcrane.
LeipzigproceedingtoEntranceIII,4November1931,withanadmiral’sflagflutteringattheforetoppole.
LeipzigundertowthroughtheharbourcanalatWilhelmshavenNavyYard,14April1932.BeyondherstemistheLangerHeinrichfloatingcrane;intheleftbackgroundistheoldbattleshipHannover.
LeipzigattheAlaskamoorings(todayNordhafen),1June1936;toherrightliestheoldbattleshipSchleswig-Holstein.ThebarracksdatefromtheKaiser’stime.ThelargebuildingsaretheHarbourBarracks
andShipyardBarracks,thesmallerblockthelaterGrafSpeeBarracks.
Themainfirecontrolofthecruiserwaslocatedintheforetop.Theredpennantindicatesthatthecruiserisengagedinfiringpractice.
Thesinglefunnelwithaerialboomsmountedattherearofthemantle.Searchlightpositionsarefittedeithersideofthefunnel.Intheforegroundisadavit.
AsternviewofLeipziginthelockchamberin1934.Theship’scompanyismusteredonthequarterdeck.
Leipziginthefitting-outbasinatWilhelmshaven.AttheCateringOfficeQuayisthepre-dreadnoughtbattleshipSchleswig-Holstein.
Leipzigatsea.
LeipzigenteringtheBalticportofSwinemünde.Noticethesimilarityofthebridgestructure,tubularbattlemastandnightfirecontrolcentretothoseofthecruiserKönigsbergandthepocket-battleship
Deutschland.
Alookaftfromtheforetop,affordingagoodviewoftheafterturretsandboatstations.Ship’sboatsalwaysapproachalongsidefromasternandarestowedaboardbow-forward.Noticealsothesearchlightpositions.
AlongsideisT155,oneoftheoldImperialNavytorpedo-boats.
InJuly1934ReichsmarinewarshipsvisitedaBritishportforthefirsttimesincetheGreatWar.ThisphotographshowsLeipzigenteringPortsmouth.
AviewofthecruiseratPortsmouth:beyondherisKönigsberg,flyingthepennantoftheBdA.
LeipzigmooredatKiel.Flutteringfromthesignalhalyardsofthebattlemastis‘thelaundry’.
EachyeartheReichsmarineheldarowingraceknowninNavycirclesasthe‘Kutterrees’(‘CutterMadness’)atKielerFörde,whenmostunitsenteredatleastoneboat.ThephotographshowsLeipzigbeing
passedbynumerouscompetingcuttersduringoneoftheraces.
ThelightcruiserEmdeninOctober1937attheGazelleBridge(laterrenamedBonteQuay),Wilhelmshaven,preparingtoleaveonalongforeigncruise.Leipzig’screwparadeinsaluteatthestarboard
railoftheirship.
LeipzigatKiel.Noticethenewpolemastfixedtothefunnelmantle,replacingthepreviousbooms.
LeipzigduringFleetgunneryexercisesin1938,herflakgunsmannedandtorpedotubestrainedabeamreadytofire.Thenew-issuebluesidecapisbeingwornbycrewmembersforthefirsttime.
LeipzigintheWilhelmshavenroadsteadbetweenFleetmanoeuvreson19June1938.HernewshipboardcraneandHeinkel60floatplaneonthecatapultbetweenbattlemastandfunnelareseenforthefirsttime.
DuringtheSpanishCivilWarthecruiserrantrialswiththeAmericansingle-floatVoughtCorsair.
Leipzigduringarefuellingdrillknownas‘towedandbeingtowed’.Notethetauthawseratthebow.
AtKiel.Apinnaceapproachingfromasternsteersfortheaccommodationladderamidships,andasecondpinnaceismadefasttotheboomforward.Leipzig’scompanyisparadedattheportrailandtheReichWar
Flagfliesattheforetop.
AgunnerymechaniconboardthecruiserKölnjusthappenedtobeondeckwithhiscameraassmokebegantoenvelopLeipzigfollowingthetorpedohitobtainedonherbytheBritishsubmarineSalmonon13
December1939.
LeipzigwearingcamouflageintheBaltic,1941.
Leipzigwasneverfullyoperationalagainfollowingthetorpedoingof13December1939,andinOctober1944,intheBaltic,shewasrammedamidshipsinfogbytheheavycruiserPrinzEugen.Thesephotographs
showthetwoshipsdovetailedtogether.Notethevariousradarantennasonthecruiser’sbattlemast.
Manyhourspassedbeforethetwocruiserscouldbeseparated.InthisphotographPrinzEugenisbeingdraggedclearbythestern.AlongsideLeipzigisatorpedo-boat,whileasalvagetugawaitsordersinthe
background.
ThemilitaryfuneralfortheLeipzigcrewmenkilledinthecollisionwithPrinzEugen.
LeipzigatoneofherberthsatGotenhafen,March1945.
‘B’and‘C’turretsbombardSovietlandpositions.
On25March1945LeipzigleftHelaathertopspeedof6ktwith500refugeesaboard.Intheensuingthree-dayvoyageshenavigatedherwayacrossthemine-infestedBaltic,survivingSovietairandsubmarineattack,toputinatApenradeinDenmarkunscathed.Thisphotograph,takenfromthebridgeplatform,
showsthecruiser’sslightlisttoportonarrival.
LeipzigremainedatApenradeuntilthecapitulation.Thisisthemidshipssiteoftheramming,thegapsealedtemporarilywithplanking,boardsandothermaterials.
Inmid-May1945LeipzigwasbroughttoWilhelmshavenpendingadecisionastoherfate.Inthisphotograph,takenon9July1946,sheisbeingtowedfromtheBonteQuaypasttheKaiserWilhelmBridge
andtheoldsoutherncentreoftheshipyard.
Itisdoubtfulfromtheselastphotographs—whichshowthehullridingrelativelyhighinthewater—thatthecruiserwasatthistimeloadedwithgasshellsandotherunwantedmunitionspriortobeingscuttled.
Threetugs,includingEnakandHerns,edgethecruisertothequaysideatEntranceIII(TirpitzLock)tomakefastforthelasttime.Notice,onthequarterdeck,thetwo2cmflakgunswithsplintershielding.
AsternviewofLeipzigandthetugD2inthelockchamber.
Thelockgateopen,Leipzigistowedstern-firstintothechamber.
Leipziganchoredatthelocationwheresheistobescuttled.Noticethetautchainoftheportanchor.Asternisthetugbringingthedemolitionparty.
Leipzigseenfromabeam,starboardside,withtugastern.
Havingreembarkedthedemolitionsquad,thetugmakesofftoasafedistance.
Aboveandbelow:Concealedwithinamassivebillowofsmokeasthescuttlingchargesexplode,thecruiserLeipzigmeetsherend,20July1946.
*TheseeventsarecoveredmorefullyinthecareerdetailsforNürnberg.
*SeethefootnoteconcerningthisactioninthecareerdetailsforEmden.*DespiteSpörel’scriticismofhisofficers,andtheabsenceofamapshowingthesweptchannel,hisseemstohavebeenthefatalerror.Thecruiser’sWarDiarydoesnotassertthatLeipzigwasinthecorrectchannel;itmerelystatesthatthecruiserwasnotatrightanglesacrossthewaterway.Spörelstatesthat,ashisshipwasstraddlingthelinebetweentheportandstarboardchannels,heincreasedherheadingtostarboardbyanextra3degrees,thusdrivingherforwardataslightangleintothewrongchannelassheworkedupto15ktinmistandfog.Whatpossessedhimtomaketheerrorhedoesnotexplain,andnobodyonthebridgequestioned his order in the three minutes remaining beforePrinz Eugen loomed out of the mist in hercorrectchannel,headingforLeipzigat20kt.—G.B.
NürnbergThe building contract forCruiser ‘F’ (ReplacementNymphe)was lodgedwithDeutscheWerft,Kiel,on16March1933underYardNumber234,thefirstkeelsections being laid on 4 November that year. Nürnberg was launched on 8December 1934, the twentieth anniversary of the sinking of the light cruiserNürnberg(i)duringtheBattleoftheFalklandIslands.BürgermeisterNiebelofNuremberg delivered the baptismal speech, and Frau Lehfeldt, daughter ofFregattenkapitänvonSchönberg,commanderofNürnberg (i),namedtheship.Kapitän zur See Hubert Schmundt commissioned the cruiser on 2 November1935andhertrialsandworking-uptookplaceovertheensuingmonths.
PrewarServiceOn 9 AprilNürnberg was appointed flagship ofKonteradmiral Boehm, BdA(BefehlshaberderAufklärungsstreitkräfte,CommanderNavalScoutingForces).On 14 May she left for Atlantic exercises with Leipzig and Köln, visitingTenerifeandLisbonbeforereturningtoKielon8May.Ontheoccasionofthededication of theNavalMemorial atLaboe,Nürnberg lay atKiel between 28Mayand1Juneandformedpartofthenavalreview.Between3and19JuneBdAmanoeuvreswereheld in theBalticwithKöln,
Leipzig,atorpedo-boatflotillaandminesweepers.Onthe6thand7ththegroupput into Swinemünde, and while off Skagen from 12 to 14 June the CinC,AdmiralRaeder,cameaboardfromthestateyachtGrille.ThecruiserwasintheyardsthroughoutJuly1936,themonthwhencivilwarbrokeoutinSpain.On 19 August a German naval force consisting of the pocket-battleship
AdmiralGrafSpee,thelightcruisersNürnberg(flagshipBdA),Leipzigandfourtorpedo-boats sailed for Spanishwaters to relieveKonteradmiral Karls, BdSp(Befehlshaber der Spanienstreitkräfte, Commander of Naval Forces Spain).After calls at Barcelona andAlicante,Nürnberg relievedKöln off Cadiz. Thesquadron returned on 9 October to Kiel, where Kapitän zur See Theodor-HeinrichRiedelbecameNürnberg’’%secondcommander.In November the cruiser proceeded to Arosa Bay, and she remained in
Spanishwatersuntil16December,whenshereturnedtoGermanywithAdmiralScheerandthe3rdTorpedo-BoatFlotilla.DuringJanuaryandFebruary1937theBdAhoistedhiscommandflagaboard
Admiral Scheer while Nürnberg spent two months having a scheduled refitfollowed by sea trials and crew training. On 24 April the cruiser departed topatrol off Cadiz, Konteradmiral Boehm, BdA, reembarking on the 29th.NürnbergberthedatKielon19May.LatethatmonthNürnbergandKarlsruheengaged in exercises with U-boats and Luftwaffe units, and in June in Fleetmanoeuvres.On17JuneNürnbergsailedwithAdmiralGrafSpeeandthe4thT-BoatFlotillaon a round trip to relieveAdmiralScheer andLeipzig offLagos,Portugal (the latter ships having been instructed to withdraw on account ofunexplained submarine torpedo attacks). At the beginning of August thesquadrontowhichNürnbergwasattachedalsoreturnedtoGermany.InSeptembertheonegreatWehrmachtexercisewasheld.Atseathepocket-
battleships Deutschland and Admiral Graf Spee, the cruisers Nürnberg,Karlsruhe and Leipzig, destroyers, torpedo-boats and other units were in the
North Sea (6th–16th) and Baltic (17th-25th). On the 27th Nürnberg enteredDeutscheWerke atKiel for a refitwhich lasted until 20November.Her thirdcommander, Kapitän zur See Walter Krastel, took over in October. Radioinstallation and tuning work, trials and a gunnery exercise off Kiel precededanotherrefitwhichtookplacefrom18December.From4 to18January1938 thecruisercarriedoutgunnerypracticewith the
Luftwaffe andother exercises, extended intoMarch.Nürnberg tookpart in theFleetDisplay at Swinemünde on 13March before engaging inBdA exercisesfrom the14th to the23rd; abattle-readiness inspectionwas carriedoutby theBdAonthe24thand25th.AttheendofMarchNürnbergenteredtheyardsforanrefit lastingintoJune,andshesailedforNorwayonthe29thforaoverseastraining cruise, visiting Romsdal Fjord and Andalsnes. On 13 and 14 JulytorpedopracticewasheldinEckemförderBay,andfrom19to27JulyatorpedoexercisewasmountedinLübeckBaywith the threepocket-battleships, theoldbattleship Schleswig-Holstein, the cruisers Köln and Leipzig, destroyers,torpedo-boatsandothervessels.From8AugustNürnberg,AdmiralScheer,AdmiralGrafSpee,Leipzig,Köln
andthe2ndDestroyerDivisioncarriedoutgunnerydrillwithliveammunitioninthecentralBaltic.Onthe22ndNürnbergtookpartintheNavalReviewbeforeHitlerand theHungarianRegentAdmiralHorthy tomark the launchingof theheavy cruiser Prinz Eugen. Between 23 August and 3 September the cruiserexercisedwithKdF(‘StrengthThroughJoy’)linersintheBalticandNorthSea,andfromthe14thtothe17thofthemonthengagedinFleetmanoeuvres.During November there were two changes of command: Kapitän zur See
HeinzDegenhardtwasappointedforashortperiodbeforeKapitänzurSeeOttoKlüber took over as the cruiser’s fifth commander.On 8DecemberNürnbergvisitedKieltocelebratethelaunchoftheaircraftcarrierGrafZeppelin,andonthe15ththecruiserranspeedtrialsoverthemeasuredmileintheBayofDanzigbeforespendingChristmasatmooringsatKiel.From5January1939NürnbergexercisedaloneintheBaltic.On4February
she left Swinemünde for Hamburg, where with Admiral Scheer and torpedo-boatssherepresented theFleetat the launchingof thebattleshipBismarck.Onher return toKiel there followed a brief lay-up in the yards before theMarchBdA exercises. For the reincorporation of Memel into the Reich, Nürnbergsailedwiththethreepocket-battleships,Leipzig,Köln,eightdestroyersandninetorpedo-boatsonthetwo-daymissioncommencingon23March,HitlerhavingembarkedaboardDeutschland.AftervisitingMemelfromthe22ndtothe24th,
NürnbergcruisedintheBalticfor threedaysandranmachinerytrialsoverthemeasuredmileatPillau.From6to10MayshecalledinatGöteborginSwedenandGeirangerFjord,Norway.VizeadmiralDensch,BdA,inspectedtheshipon17May.Followingflakandgunnerypracticewith liveammunitionon5June,the remainder of the month was spent in a large-scale Fleet exercise withGneisenau, Admiral Scheer, Admiral Graf Spee, Leipzig, Köln, destroyers,minesweepers,escortsandU-boats,followedbyagunnerypracticewiththetwolight cruisers alone and a short engine overhaul. On 1 JulyNürnberg was atBremen for the launch of the heavy cruiserLützow, afterwhich she exercisedwithFleetunitsuntilmid-August.
WorldWarIIAt theendofAugust1939KonteradmiralDensch,withNürnberg as flagship,spreadataskforceof38warships,includingLeipzig,Köln,destroyers,torpedo-boats and numerous support vessels, across the western and central Baltic topreventtheescapeofPolishnavalunits.On2September,whenitwasobviousthat‘thebirdhadflown’,sheenteredtheNorthSeaandonthe3rd,incompanywith Leipzig, destroyers and torpedo-boats, began work mining the GermanBight from the Dutch coast to the Skagerrak so as to extend the defensiveWestwall seawards. On 4 and 5 September the state yacht Grille and moredestroyers and torpedo-boats joined the force. The operation, based atWilhelmshaven, continueduntil 20September,whenNürnberg returned to theBaltic.On1 and2NovemberNürnberg andLeipzig practisedmeetingat sea, after
whichtheformerwentintotheyardsforashortrefit;KonteradmiralLütjenshadreplacedDenschasBdAon21October,andassoonasNürnberg rejoined theFleeton9NovemberhehoistedhisflagtoherforetopandheadedfortheNorthSea. On 12 NovemberNürnberg, Köln and six torpedo-boats came out frombehind the Westwall minefield to meet six destroyers returning from aminelayingsortieintheThamesestuary—amissionrepeatedon17November.Asimilaroperationon12Decemberendedinadisastrousfiasco.Sincealightcruiserratesmorehighlythanadestroyer,thelogicofusinglight
cruiserstoprotectdestroyersmustfirstbeexplained.AsstatedbyLütjensinhisreport,althoughtheproperescortforadestroyerisatorpedo-boat,bothT-boatflotillas were in the shipyard for refit or engine overhaul respectively; onlySeeadler and Jaguarwere operational, and thesewere in theBaltic. The onlydestroyers operational in the whole Fleet were the five engaged in theminelaying, although itwas ‘hoped’ that twomore could be repaired in time.AdmiralMarschall,FleetCinC,statedinhisreportthatalthoughitwascleartohimfromtheoutsetofthisoperationthatthepresenceofBritishsubmarinesinthe North Sea presented a threat to the cruisers, the risk was justified on thefollowinggrounds:
(a)UntilthenBritishsubmarineshadhadnosuccess;(b)itwaspreferabletohaveacruisertorpedoednowandagainratherthanthat smalleractive-dutyunits shouldgain the impression thatcruisers justlayatanchorwhilesmallerunitswerethrownintoactionagainstallmannerofsuperiorforceswithoutanysupport;and
(c)themoraleofcrewssuffersseverelyinthelongruniftheyarealwayscleartosailbutneverreceiveorderstodoso.
Thusthedrawbacksofthistypeofoperationhadtobeaccepted,therebeingnosuccessfulwarfarewithoutrisk.Fivedestroyersoperatingintwogroupssucceededinlaying240minesoffthe
Tyne during the night of 12December. They then headed for the rendezvouswith the three cruisers. After Bruno Heinemann had beaten off three Britishaircraftatabout1030thefollowingmorning,shemetupwiththeflagdestroyerHermann Künne and Friedrich Ihn, Richard Beitzen and Erich Steinbrinck.These fivedestroyersweresightedbyGermanreconnaissanceaircraftataboutthistimeinGridSquare3741onaheadingtothenorth-east,thethreeGermancruiserswithwhichtheyweretorendezvousbeingnorthofthemandbelowthehorizon.At 1730 the previous eveningNürnberg,Leipzig andKöln had left Schillig
Roads for the north-west comer of themine barrage.Vizeadmiral Lütjens hadorders fromNavalCommandWest to rendezvous therewith the five returningdestroyersatabout1130nextmorning.At0837on13DecemberLeipzig’sandNürnberg’s aircraft were catapulted off to fly antisubmarine escort while thecruiserssteeredvariouscoursesintheformationofatrianglewith1,200mlongsides.Windwasvariable,Force2–3,seastate2,cloudybutwithgoodvisibility.At about the timewhen the five destroyers hadmet up andwere about 60
miles southof the cruisers, the cruisers’ aircraftwere released to the islandofSylt.IthadbeenarrangedthattwoHeinkel115floatplaneswouldreplacethem,butthesedidnotarriveoverthecruisersuntil1125,aboutfiftyminuteslater.At1040asuspicioussteamerwassightedbythecruisers.TheKölnWarDiary
statesthat‘Atfirstthesteamerseemedtobeheadingeast,butasweapproachedshe was heading west. It could not be determined if she was attempting todisguise hermovements.With reference to the submarine attack shortly after,thesuspicionofcooperationwiththeBritishsubmarinearises.’TheWarDiaryalsorecordedthat‘TheletterTwastransmittedtwiceatavery
loud volumeon themerchant vessel short-wave frequency, 36m, at 1020, andthreeTswithavery longdashforeachcharacterweresentbetween1034and1036.’ The steamer was ordered to stop and Leipzig lowered a boat toinvestigate. The vessel was the DanishCharkov, wearing neutrality markingsand appearing on the German Free List. Upon receiving this information,Lütjensgaveordersthatthesteamerwasnottobesearched.At1110theGermancruiserslefttheCharkovandresumedtheirtriangularformationathighspeed.
At 1115 an unidentified aircraft was sighted in the clouds byKöln. At thesecond sighting the aircraft signalled theword ‘Max’ byhand-lamp.Thiswasnot theGermanrecognitionsignalof theday,whichwas‘U’.Theaircraftwasidentified as a Lockheed, keeping out of flak range.A fewminutes later twolow-flying aircraft approached the cruisers. These were two Heinkel 115floatplanes,which fired two red stars, the correct signal.Thismust have beenseenbytheLockheed,forinthelaterairattacktheBritishaircraftfiredoffredstarsforthebenefitofNürnberg.At1118Kölnnoted that thecode ‘TT’was sent twiceon the36mshipping
wavelength and observed, ‘From our wireless location monitoring, this is thesteamerCharkovwarningofherownpresenceinthevicinityorisforthebenefitof theenemysignalscentre.As the transmission isbeingmadeonshort-wave,directcooperationwithsubmarinesandaircraftisimprobable.’At1120 thepositionof the fiveapproachingdestroyerswas reportedby the
two German He 115 aircraft to be about 40 miles west-south-west of thecruisers.Lütjensorderedthethreecruiserstosteer240°tomeetthedestroyers.The scenewas now set for the disaster at 1125.At thatmoment,Leipzig’s
lookout reported sighting two vessels on the horizon where the Germandestroyerswereexpectedtoappear,andthetwoHeinkel115floatplanesarrivedover the cruisers to replace the shipboard aircraft sent off to Sylt. The seniorobserverofthelatterreported:
Onnearing thecruisersonanorth-westcourse, Icommenced theexchangeof recognitionsignals,‘U’.AfterIhadgiven‘U’twiceweturnedoffalittletostarboardinordernottooverflythecruisersdirectlywhileawaitingadefiniteresponseinrecognition.Aswedidso,weallsawthetracksofafanofaboutfivetorpedoesheadingforLeipzig-Aligningmyaircraftalongthecourseofthetorpedoes,IgaveaU-boatwarningatonce—theMorsecharacter‘U’repeatedseveraltimes.
AfewsecondslateratorpedostruckLeipzigamidshipsontheportsidewithaloud explosion and a great column of water rose up, followed by a largedeveloping cloud of smoke. The observer’s report continued: ‘Above the spotfromwhere thesubmarinehad firedwedropped twoSC250s,which failed toexplode although our height and attitude were correct. After that we saw thesubmarineshowinghisperiscopeandheadingnorth-eastandgunnedit.’InLütjens’reportthesenioraircraftobserverwassharplycriticised.Theuse
of the Morse character ‘U’ to warn a surface warship of a submarine is notGerman naval procedure. The textbook instructionwas to firewhite stars andindicate the submarine’s position by dropping a buoy and flying tight circlesoverthelocation.TheMorsesignal‘U’wastheaircraftrecognitionsignalofthedayandwouldthereforenothavebeeninterpretedbythecruiser’sofficersasa
submarinewarning.AboardLeipzig thetrackofanapproachingtorpedowasseen500moff,and
thiswastoolatetoavoidimpact.Theorder‘Hardtoport’hadjustbeenputintoeffectwhenthetorpedohitamidships.AboardNürnbergandKöln,1,200mdistant,therewasanimmediatesuspicion
that Leipzig had incorrectly identified enemy aircraft as friendly, for fromNürnberg the aircraft seemed to be in a classic attack position andKöln alsorecordedthatithadatfirstbeenassumedtobeanaerial torpedoattack.Attheorder‘SignalGreen9’NürnbergandKölnexecutedatum-awayathighspeed,but as the turn was still completing two torpedoes were seen approachingNürnbergonthestarboardquarterrunningparalleland15–20mapart.Thehelmwasputhardtoport,butthecruiserrespondedonlyslowlybecauseshestillhadway on to starboard, and one of the torpedoes struck the starboard side wellforwardalongsidecompartmentsXIV/XV.Calculations showed that Leipzig andNürnberg received one torpedo each
fromafanofthree,thethirdhavingmissedNürnberg.FourtofiveminutesafterNürnbergwashit, threemoretorpedotracksweresightedasternofthecruiser.These exploded harmlessly on the sea bed, one about 500m astern, and twoabout the same distance away to port. Shortly afterwardsNürnberg sighted apartially surfaced submarine directly astern about 5km off. ‘C’ turret openedfire, causing the submarine to dive after about 20 seconds. The wirelessmonitoring section reported that the submarine was Salmon, with six bowtorpedo tubes. Following the hit,Nürnberg reduced speed to about 12kt, laterincreasing to 18. Her flak fire control was out of commission but herseaworthinesswasnotaffected.Aboard the approachingGerman destroyers the detonations and smoke had
beenobservedaboardHermannKünne andFriedrich Ihn.Thebearingwas sofarofftherendezvouspoint,however,thatthedestroyerleaderdecidedthattheactivity did not involve the cruisers and must be between aircraft and asubmarine.Forthisreasonthedestroyerselectednottoapproachthesiteoftheactivity.Between1130and1210NürnbergandKölnfollowedanescapepatternwhich
involvedproceedingclockwiseinasquare,followedbyasouth-easterlyheadingonexiting.Leipzigwasoutofsightbutalsoheadingsouth-east,making12ktonhercruisediesel,allherboilerfurnaceshavingbeenextinguished.
Sailingformationatcommencementofoperation,12December1939(perBdAreport).
Thefivedestroyerswererequiredurgentlytogiveantisubmarineprotectiontothedamagedcruisersbuthadnotmaterialisedcontrarytoexpectations.Asignal,‘1126,NürnbergandLeipzigtorpedoedGridSquare3747.BdA.’,hadnotbeentransmittedbecauseofadefectiveaerialandsimultaneoustelegraphisterror,andasthedestroyerleader(FdZ)hadnotreceivedthissignal(sincehehadnottunedin on the long-wave close zone in accordance with standing instructions), at1137 Vizeadmiral Lütjens requested the rendezvous through the Fleet short-wave band. For the critical ten-minute period after the attack, completeconfusionhadreignedashore,butevennowthedestroyersremainedunawareofwhatwasamiss.Between1212and1222threeHampdenbombers—probablythosebeatenoff
ninetyminutesorsoearlierbyBrunoHeinemann—attackedNürnberg.Thefirst
bombrunresultedinflakdamagetotheattackerandwasnotpressedhome.OneofthetwoHe115escortaircraftreported:
Nürnbergwas shootingwith all her flak batteries. I had received the order fromKöln ‘StaywithNürnberg.’ I flew close escort toNürnberg. This was at quite low altitude because a Lockheedbomberoccasionallycameoutof thecloudsand thecruiser thenfiredat itaboveme. I receivedaMorse message fromNürnberg-. ‘Request battle group to drive off that contact keeper.’ Shortlyafterwards,two50kgbombsfellasternofthecruiser’sstarboardside.Afterthat,thecontactaircraftdisappeared.
Thiswas the second bomb run.One bomb fell about 40m directly astern, theother 20m off, abeam the after turret.On the third run both bombs fell about800m astern ofNürnberg and exploded after a delay. Skilfulmanoeuvring byKapitän zur SeeKlüber and a very heavy flak defence ensured thatNürnbergescapeddamage.Theaircraftmadeoffat1246.Theothertwocruiserswerenotattacked.More than an hour after Nürnberg and Leipzig had been torpedoed, the
destroyershadstillnoteffectedtherendezvous,andasitseemedtoLütjensthatanavigationalproblemmustexisthedecided towireless theFdZhisposition,course and speed and a homing signal as from 1245 and sent off the aircraftcircling Leipzig to scout for the destroyers. The aircraft failed to establishcontactbecauseofpoorvisibility.At1250theFdZdetachedFriedrichIhn(boilertrouble)andErichSteinbrinck
(waterinfueloil)whileheproceededwithHermannKünne,BrunoHeinemannandRichardBeitzen to theoriginal rendezvousposition.A fewmoments laterhis telegraphists intercepted a message from an aircraft with the call-sign‘S4EH’ reporting damage to a light cruiser.Thiswas the first he knewof theincident,andhedecidednottorecallthetwodetacheddestroyerssincehisforceofthreewouldbesufficienttocoveronedamagedlightcruiser.Lütjens had repeated his 1245 signal at 1250 and 1303, at which time
Nürnberg andKöln sightedLeipzig and closed towithin twonauticalmiles toexchange information byMorse lamp,Köln being given the job of providingLeipzig with flak cover. At 1340 the three German destroyers were seensteamingup;RichardBeitzenandBrunoHeinemanntookupstationonLeipzigwhileNürnberg received the protection ofHermannKünne withKöln off theport quarter. Three low-flying aircraft aircraft circled the group. As it wasconsidered possible that enemy submarines or destroyers might infiltrate theGermanBightbehindtheminebarrierforanightattack,strictradiosilencewasimposed.Nürnbergcouldmake15ktandreachcoastalwatersbynightfallandthuswas
sentonwithonlyHermannKünneforescort,thetwoshipssteering135°hominginontheHomumcoastalbeacon.Hercasualtieswerefifteenslightlywoundedfromthetorpedohit.In his report of 6 February 1940Admiral Saalwächter, CinC Naval Group
West, criticised Lütjens for (a) stopping to investigate the steamer Charkov,whichmayhavegiventheBritishsubmarinecommandertheopportunitytolineuphistorpedoattack;(b)hispoorhandlingoftheaerialforcesgenerally;and(c)exposing the undamaged cruiser Köln to danger by not detaching her oncesufficient escort forces had assembled to see home the damaged Leipzig. AirCommanderWest was advised regarding the use of unauthorised methods ofwarningofsubmarineattack.Inmattersdirectlypertaining toNürnberg inhis reporton themissioncited
earlier,AdmiralMarschallcondemnedthetriangularsailingformationasbeingmore favourable for submarine attack than close formation, especially whereescort forceswere absent.He criticisedLütjens for stopping to investigate theCharkovwhenLütjenshadmadeitclear that themonitoringofcommercewasexcludedonthisoperation.Marschall remarked that two aircraft flying antisubmarine patrol for three
cruiserswasaverymoderateescort.HesympathisedwiththeflierswithregardtothemostunfortunatecoincidencethattheMorseletterofimprovisedwarning,‘U’for‘Unterseeboot’,wasthesameletterofthedayasforaircraftrecognitionpurposes. The aircraft had seen the torpedoes heading for Leipzig and wassupposed to give warning by firing off white stars, circling the spot andattempting tobomb the submarine all at the same time.AirCommanderWestwouldbeadvisedaccordingly.Nürnberg and theFdZwere responsible for theerrorinsignalsprocedures.*
Battlesketch,BdA,13December1939(fromAppendix4,BdAReport).
TheshipyardrepairstoNürnbergkeptheroutoftheNorwegiancampaigninApril. During this period two sets of torpedo tubes aft were unshipped and adegaussing system was fitted. On 18 April Konteradmiral Schmundt wasappointedactingBdAandraisedhispennantaboardNürnberg in theshipyard,remaining aboard until 3 June. After release andworking up her engines, thecruiser rejoined the BdA squadron and, escorted by the torpedo-boats Jaguarand Falke, proceeded to Trondheim, where Konteradmiral Schmundtdisembarked. Between 14 and 19 June, in an operation codenamed ‘Nora’,Nürnberg, the destroyerErich Steinbrinck and the 2ndMinesweeping Flotillaescorted the troopship Levante transporting the 3rd Mountain Division fromTrondheim to Elvegardsmoen and returning with the paratroop force relievedthere.On25JulyNürnbergandthedestroyersHansLody,FriedrichIhn,PaulJacobi and Karl Galster sailed from Trondheim for Kiel as escort for thedamaged battleshipGneisenau. On 26 July they were joined by the torpedo-boatsLuchs,Kondor,Jaguar and litis, and the samedayLuchswas torpedoedandsunkbytheBritishsubmarineSwordfishwiththelossof89lives.On 1 August the post of BdA was redesignated BdK (Befehlshaber der
Kreuzer, CinC Cruisers). Nürnberg remained flagship of a squadron whichconsistedof theheavycruisersPrinzEugen,AdmiralHipper,AdmiralScheer,Lützow(exDeutschland),thelightcruisersKölnandEmdenandtheFleettenderGazelle.KapitänzurSeeLeoKreischbecametheNürnberg’ssixthcommanderinAugust.No furtheroperationswere found for thecruiser,which,withotherlargenavalunits,remainedonstandbyshouldOperation‘Seelöwe’,theinvasionofBritain,proceed.On4DecemberOperation‘Frankfurt’,aplannedminelayingsortieforNürnberg,Kölnandsix torpedo-boats in theKattegatandSkagerrak,wascancelledbecauseofunfavourableweather.Earlyin1941OKMissuedaninstructionreclassifyingthefoursurvivinglight
cruisers,Nürnberg,Köln,LeipzigandEmden,astrainingships‘withnofurtheroperational deployment as from 7 February 1941’, and aboard Nürnberg theBdKhauleddownhiscommandflagon18February.KapitänzurSeeErnstvonStudnitz became the seventh commander of the cruiser inMarch. During theyear the 6m rangefinder was replaced temporarily by an FuMO 21 radarmattress.Followingtheopeningof thecampaignagainst theSovietUnionon22June
1941thecruiserwasrecalledtooperationstoformpartoftheBalticFleet.On23 September the battleship Tirpitz, the heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer,
Nürnberg, Köln and destroyers left Swinemünde for the Gulf of Finland tointercept Russian warships if they attempted to intern in Sweden. AdmiralScheerwasdamagedbyadepth-chargeexplosionondeckon25Septemberanddroppedout.On the27th the remainderof thegroup, accompaniedby a largeforceofminesweepersandsmallcraft,appearedofftheAbo-Alandskerries,buttheRedFlagFleethadnointentionofleavingKronstadtandwhentheoperationwascalledoffinOctoberNürnbergrevertedtoherroleasatrainingcruiser.From the beginning of 1942 the aircraft and catapult installation was
discardedandtheFuMO21aerialonthebridgewasreplacedbyanFuMO25ona battlemast mounting. The cruiser was used mainly as a training ship untilNovember, when she was called upon to replaceAdmiral Scheer, which wasreturninghomefromNorwayforanurgentrefit.NürnbergarrivedatNarvikon2 December and subsequently shifted round the various anchorages, but wasotherwisenotused.In1943Nürnbergwasincludedinthegeneraldecommissioningofallheavy
navalunitsandreturnedtoGermanyinMaytoresumeherroleasatrainingshipintheBaltic.KapitänzurSeeGerhardtBöhmigbecamehereighthcommanderinJune.During1944anFuMO63Hohentwiel aerialwasmountedon theafterpole
mast.Nürnbergcontinuedasa trainingshipuntil theautumn,whenanyvesselafloatwhichwastoanyextentoperationalbecameneededurgently.Initialdutieswereconvoyandescorttasksuntilthesituationbecamedisastrousafewweekslater. In October 1944Kapitän zur See HelmuthGiessler becameNürnberg’sninthandfinalcommander.On 3 January 1945 Nürnberg and the minelayers Linz and Elsass left
Swinemünde to set a field off the southern tip of Norway. On the 5th, whilelaying,Elsasswaslostwith87handsafterstrikingoneofherownmines.Onthe13th and 14th the ‘Titus’ minefield was laid in the Skagerrak, after whichNürnbergescortedvariousrefugeetransportsthroughthemine-freechannel.On24 January Nürnberg was in Oslo Fjord with the minelayers Linz andLothringen,andonthe27thshereachedCopenhagen,wheresheremaineduntilthecapitulationsincenofuelwasavailable.Following the surrender to British forces in northern Germany on 5 May,
Danishresistancefightersattemptedtoseizethecruiser,andbothsidessufferedlossesinaviolentquaysideshoot-out.On6MaythefirstBritishnavalvesselsarrived,but theBritishdidnot takechargeof theGermanwarshipsandcrewsuntilthe22ndofthemonth,whenorderswerereceivedforthemtobebrought
fromCopenhagentoWilhelmshaven.On24MayaconvoyconsistingoftheheavycruiserHMSDevonshire,Prinz
Eugen and Nürnberg, the light cruiser HMS Dido and the destroyers HMSQuiberon and Savage left Copenhagen, the two British heavy units departingfrom the convoy on the 25thwith a signal to the seniorGerman officer ‘AufWiedersehen until better times.’ Two minesweepers replaced the Britishcruisers.On26MayNürnbergenteredWilhelmshaventhroughEntranceIIIandmade fast at the Seydlitzbrücke alongside the accommodation ship MontePascoal.UnderthetermsofthePotsdamAgreementthevictoriouspowershadagreed
that the German Fleet was to be shared amongst themselves by 15 February1946. At the end of Novemver 1945 the British Admiralty had receivedinformationpointingtothepossibilitythat theGermanswereplanninga large-scalesabotage,particularlyagainstthoseunitsassignedtotheSoviets,eitheratChristmasorinanycasebeforetheshipswereatreadinesson5January1946.Accordingly, arrangements weremade to ‘pounce’ on the ships without priornotice on some day after 18 December 1945, and this took the Germans bysurprise.On2JanuaryNürnberg,wearingtheflagofSovietVice-AdmiralRailand the Soviet naval ensign, set off fromWilhelmshaven for Libau via Kiel.WheninthelockchamberwiththetargetshipHessen, theseawardgateoftheRaeder Lock refused to open. The personal efforts of Konteradmiral KurtWeyherandsuggestionsfrommanyotherpeoplewereunsuccessfulinclearingthejam,andNürnbergandHessenhadtobemovedbytugstotheTirpitzLocksand taken through as soon as some smaller ships had left. Apart from thisincident—a subtle piece of sabotage ‘done so cleverly that nothing could beproved’—there were no other last-minute defects and ‘the whole partyeventually steamed away in tolerably good order’, according toRearAdmiralHuttoninhisreporttotheBritishNavalCinCGermany.TheGermanshipswereescortedbyHMSHambledontoBrunsbüttelandthen
byHMSHoldernessasfarasRussianterritorialwatersat55°07′N13°13′E,whereRussianescortstookover.AtLibautheGermancrewleftNürnbergandreturnedtoWilhelmshavenaboardthedepotshipOttoWünsche.Nürnbergwascommissioned into theSovietNavyasAdmiralMakarov and
wasusedmainlyasatrainingship.Thetorpedotubes,lightflakandsearchlightplatforms around the funnel were removed and Russian electronic equipmentwasinstalled,butotherwiseheroutwardappearancehardlychangedduringherservice.Shewasdecommissionedin1960andscrapped.
TheWorldWarIlightcruiserNürnberg,3,469tons,waslaunchedattheKaiserlicheWerft,Kiel,on28August1906andcommissionedon10April1908.AttheoutbreakofwarinAugust1914Nürnberg
(FregattenkapitänvonSchönberg)formedpartofVizeadmiralvonSpee’sEastAsiaCruiserSquadron.On8September,incompanywiththetenderTitania,thecruiserwasdetachedtodestroythewirelessstationandtranspacificcableonFanningIslandnearChristmasIsland.AttheBattleofCoronelon1November1914NürnbergarrivedonthescenelatebutfinishedoffthecrippledarmouredcruiserMonmouth.On8
December1914theCruiserSquadronapproachedtheFalklandIslandsintendingtoinvade;fromtheislandsarmedoccupationtroopswereseenliningthedecksofGneisenauandNürnberg.UnknowntovonSpee,avastlysuperiorBritishsquadronconsistingofthebattlecruisersInvincibleandIndefatigableandfour
smallercruiserswereanchoredatPortStanley.VonSpeefledandtheBritishforceputtoseainpursuit.Assoonasthetwobattlecruisersbegantoendangerhislightcruisersduringthechase,vonSpeedecidedtotakeontheheavyunitswithScharnhorstandGneisenau,soallowingthethreesmallershipstoescape
independentlyiftheycould.Nürnbergwaspursuedandengagedbythe9,800-tonarmouredcruiserKent.TheGermanshipwasinpoorconditionmechanicallyandcouldmakenomorethan22kt.Herlightweight10.5cmgunswerenomatchforKent.Thetwoshipsfoughtforabouttwohours.At1826Nürnbergwasoutofammunitionandalmostadrift,buttheensignwasnotlowereduntil1857.Shesankat1937,andintheheavyseastherewaslittlehopeofrescuingmanyofhercrew;intheend,theBritishpickeduptwelve,ofwhomfivelaterdiedaboardKent.Kentherselflosteightdead.Armament:10×10.5cmandeight5.2cmguns,twotorpedotubes.Dimensions:116.8×13.3×5.24m.Machinery:tripleexpansionsteamengines
drivenbyelevencoal-firedwatertubeboilers,speed23.4kt.Finalcomplementincludingreservists:about360.ThephotographshowsNürnberginlightgreyliverybeforeherdepartureforEastAsia.
ThelightcruiserNürnberg(ii),5,440tons,waslaunchedatHowaldtswerke,Kiel,on4April1916andcommissionedon15February1917.ShewasinternedatScapaFlowin1918and,havingsurvivedthe
attemptofhercrewtoscuttletheshipon21June1919,wasexpendedbytheRoyalNavyasatargetshipon7July1922.Armament:8×15cmguns,2×8.8cmflak,fourtorpedotubes.Machinery:steamturbines
drivenbyeightcoal-firedandsixoil-firedboilers,speed27.5kt.Dimensions:145.8×14.2×5.96m.InthephotographtheshipisseenleavingGrandHarbouratWilhelmshavenboundforScapaFlowon17
November1918.
Thefirsthullframesofthenewcruiser,Nürnberg(iii).
Thelaunchingceremonyviewedfromaslipwaycrane.Totherightisthehonourguard,behindwhichavastthrongofspectatorshasgathered.
Nürnbergentersthewatersofthebasin.
Takenintowbytugs,thehullissteeredtowardsthequayside.
Nürnberginanadvancedstageoffitting-out,her15cmturrets,battlemast,funnelandsearchlightplatformsmounted.Noticethelightantitorpedobulgeatthewaterline.Theshipisunladenandrideshighinthewater.
Aportsideviewofthecruiserfittingout.
Nürnbergcompletedandreadytoenterservice.
Aboveandbelow:On2November1935thenavalensignandcommander’spennantwerehoisted,signallingthatNürnbergwasincommission.TheensignwasreplacedafewdayslaterthroughouttheFleet
bytheReichWarFlag.
Aboveandbelow:NürnbergseenfromaheadoneitherbowwhileleavingKiel.Shehasalreadybeenfittedwithapolemastandcrosstreesabaftthefunnel,andtheshipboardaircraftequipmentandHeinkel60
floatplane.Theantitorpedoblisterisclearlyvisibleonthewaterline.Inthelowerphotographthecruiser,asflagshipoftheBdA,wearstheappropriatecommandflagattheforetop.
NürnbergatKielwithlivelytrafficatthejackladderamidships.Theportmooringboomisextended.Crewmembersworkontheportanchor.
LargeGermanKdF(‘StrengthThroughJoy’)passengershipswereoftenfittedintonavalexercises.HereNürnberg’screwparadetheupperdeckwhilepassingoneoftheseliners.
ThelightcruisersNürnberg,Leipzigandoneofthe‘K’classinstarboardechelonformation,seenfromthequarterdeckofthepocket-battleshipDeutschlandduringanavalexercise.
Nürnberg(right)inSpanishwatersin1936,seenfromthesternofatorpedo-boat.TheshipatleftistheFrenchdestroyerTartu.
Abroadsideviewofthecruiser.TheReichWarFlagissetattheforetop.
Nürnbergwiththetorpedo-boatTigeralongside.
AmidshipsviewshowingtheHeinkel60floatplanewithnationalmarkings.Alongsideisafleettanker.
NürnbergwiththepassengerlinerDerDeutscheabeam.
Nürnbergduringnavalexercisesin1938.Noticetheminelayingrailsoverhangingthestern.
NürnbergapproachingHamburgforthelaunchofthebattleshipBismarck,February1939,hership’scompanyparadingtheupperdeck.Noticetheratherhighbridgewithits6mrangefinder—acompromise
solutionbecauseofthepoorviewaffordedbyhavingthebattlemastandcommandcentresetfurtheraftthanaboardLeipzig.
‘B’and‘C’turretstraversedtoport.Projectingabove‘B’turretarethetwinexhaustsofthecruisediesel;incontrasttothe‘K’class’sdemountablepipes,aboardLeipzigandNürnbergtheywerefixed.
Gunnerypractice:B’and‘C’turretsfiringabafttheportbeam.
Aboveandbelow:Theengineroom.
Aboveandbelow:Shipsofthissizewerefittedwithfullyequippedworkshopssothatevencomplicatedrepairscouldbecarriedoutaboard.Thesetwophotographsshowtheengineroomworkshop.
NürnberginNorwegianwatersinJune1940withanArado196floatplane,thenow-standardissueforlargerGermanwarships.DuringthisperiodtheaircraftflewcoveringpatrolsforArmyunitsashore.
AnotherviewoftheshipinNorwegianwaters.
Inautumn1941NürnbergwasattachedtotheBalticFleet.Thisphotograph,takenfromadestroyer,showsthecruiser(right)beingfollowedbydestroyersZ26andZ27.
AphotographtakenfromTirpitzduringthesameperiodasthepreviousillustrationshowsNürnbergandKölnabouttocrossthebattleships’swake.
Aboveandbelow:NürnbergatSwinemündein1941,showingtheBalticcamouflagepatternfromthreedifferentperspectives.
ThisphotographofNürnberg,starboardside,demonstrateshowdisruptivecamouflagebreaksuptheship’scontours.Noticetheradarantennajustbelowtheforetop.
NürnbergatFlensburgin1942.Asmokescreenisbeinglaidovertheharbourfollowinganairraidalarm.
NürnbergseenfromasternatFlensburg,1942.Theadditionalliferaftssecuredtotheturretside(left),thecruisedieselexhaustsbehind‘B’turretandthecatapultinstallationareclearlyvisible.
In1942NürnbergwastransferredtoNorway,wheresheisseenhereinsidehernetdefences.InthebackgroundistheheavycruiserAdmiralHipper.
NürnbergwearingtypicalcamouflageforNorwegianoperations.Noticetheadditionalradarantennasmountedonthebattlemastandtheantennasoftherangefindingradarattheforetop.
ThemidshipssectionofNürnberg,portside,1942.
Lookingoverthebowfromthebridge.Noticetheplatformwithanadditional2cmquadrupleflak.
‘B’turretin1942.Theshieldingontheturretroofisfortheadditional2cmflakmountedthere.
Aviewovertheportsidedeck,superstructureand8.8cmtwinflak.
Thebridgeandbattlemast.Onthelatteristheradarmattress,attheforetoptheaerialsfortherangefindingradar.
Signallerson‘A’turretroof,bridgeprojectionandbridgeproperundersemaphoreinstruction.Noticetheradarmattress.
Lookingforwardfromthequarterdeck.‘C’turret,withsquareMarxliferaftssecuredtotheturretwall,hasbeenturnedtostarboardinordertoembarkammunition.
Inadditiontotheradarantennasonthebattlemastandattheforetop,NürnbergnowcarriesaHohentwielaerialontheaftpolemast.Theaftertorpedo-tubemountinghasbeenleftashore.
AnAlliedphotographtakenon26July1943showingNürnbergwithinabarrierofnetsatSwinemünde.Totherightisafreighter,inthebasinnumerouslighters.
Nürnbergafterthecapitulation,alongsideaCopenhagenquaysideandprotectedagainstattackbybarbed-wirebarriers.
BringingammunitionashoreinCopenhagen.
AssemblingfordeliverytoWilhelmshaven:aviewfromtheheavycruiserPrinzEugentoNürnberg(right)andtheBritishlightcruiserDido(left).
DuringthevoyagetoWilhelmshaventwoLiberatorbombersofCoastalCommandpassoverhead.
EnteringalockchamberatWilhelmshavenbywayofEntranceIII.AtleftisoneoftheBritishescortdestroyers.
NürnbergattheBonteQuay,Wilhelmshaven.Noticetheanti-minedegaussingcoilalongtheship’sside.
NürnbergattheBonteQuaywiththedestroyerZ6(TheodorRiedel)alongside.
Nürnbergonmorningof2January1946astheSoviet-crewedcruiserheadsforthelockonthefirststageofhervoyagetoLibau.
Aboveandbelow:ThecruiserenteredEntranceIV(RaederLock)incompanywiththetargetshipHessen(anoldImperialbattleship).Adelayoccurredwhenthelockgatetoseawardcouldnotbeopened.These
twophotographsshowthecruiserinthelockchamber.
Aboveandbelow:Becauseofthedefect,whichwascausedbysabotage,thetwoshipshadtoleaveEntranceIVandproceedinsteadbywayofEntranceIII(TirpitzLock),onetoeachlockchamberundertug
assistance.D4isWapelandD35Wachtel.
Aboveandbelow:TirpitzLockopensandbothNürnberg,underherownsteamandflyingthepennantofVice-AdmiralRail,SovietNavy,andHessen,undertow,reachtidalwater.RailwasGerman-bornandhad
servedasanofficerintheImperialGermanNavyintheFirstWorldWar.
Aboveandbelow:NürnbergheadsfortheSchilligRoadsonhervoyageofnoreturntotheSovietUnion.
*ForfurtherdetailsfromofficialreportsregardingthismissionseeunderLeipzig.—G.B.
ConclusionsAsthefirstnewcruiserofthepostwarReichsmarine,EmdenwasdesignedandbuilttomodifiedplansfortheCöinclasscruisersofthedefunctImperialNavy.ManufacturingcapacityinGermanyimmediatelyafterthewarwassodesperatethatitwasplannedtoequipthenewhullwithsecond-handboilersandenginesfrom the scrapyard, but these and similar ideaswere prohibited by theAlliedNavalControlCommission (NIACC).The completedEmden complied strictlywiththelimitationsoftheVersaillesTreaty.Shewastheonlypartiallycoal-firedGermanunitabovetorpedo-boatsizebuiltafterWorldWarIandwasdesignedforuseprimarilyasatrainingcruiser.ThefivelaterGermanlightcruiserswere‘childrenoftheirtime’—theresult
ofwhat designers had found possible to engineerwithin the limitations of theWashington Agreement and a vast improvement onEmden except as regardsseaworthiness.Therewereminorinfringementsofthelimitations,unintentionalorotherwise,butifthesewereidentifiedbythecontrolorgansandNIACCtheywere tolerated.Thegreatweaknessof the ‘K’cruisers—Königsberg,Köln andKarlsruhe—wastheirlightconstruction.ThefaultlaynotwiththedesignersbutintherestrictionsoftheVersaillesTreaty.The military requirement was for big hitting power, an ability to take
punishment, great range and long endurance at sea; a compromise had to bemadesomewhere,andaccordinglytheshipslackedsteadfastness.Indifficultseaconditions the weaknesses showed. On a number of occasions, Köln’s,superstructure had to he reinforced: the failure of welded seams at joints andcomers,especiallyaround the funnelsandon theupperdeck,alsooccurredonhersister-ships.Earlyon,speedrestrictionswereimposedinbadweather,whileinreallysevereweathertheshipshadtofindshelter.Theirlargelength-to-beamratio meant that they rolled immoderately and ran the risk of capsize inextremelyheavyconditions.Inthespringof1936KarlsruhebarelysurvivedthisfatewhensheencounteredahurricaneinthePacificandthreatenedtobreakintwo. She had to be bolted over at SanDiego to keep her in one piece for thetransatlanticcrossinghome.Asaresultoftheseweaknesses,thethree‘K’classcruiserswereconfinedtotheNorthSeaandBaltic.LeipzigandNürnbergwereequallysuspect.Of the six ships, onlyEmden was oceanworthy: eventually the otherswere
onlyallowedtostraybeyondhomewaters(e.g.toSpain)subjecttorestrictions,
andessentiallytheiroperationswerelimitedtofine-weatherperiods.Atalltimestheforwardandafterfuelbunkershadtobeemptiedfirst,andtheirfuelwassoimportant for stability that the amount aboardwas not permitted to fall below680m3 (150m3 inNürnberg).Thismeantover-firequentrefuelling,whichruledoutoperationsbeyondcoastalwatersinwartime.Thustheshipswereuselessascommerceraiders.When designingwarships naval architects set aside an allowance known as
the‘AdmiraltyReserve’forweightincreasescausedbylatermodifications.Thiswas not available on the five later light cruisers since the architects had builtright up to the 6,000-ton displacement limit. Additions such as the aircraftcatapult,newfirecontrolsystemsandnewweaponsincreasedthetopsideweightof individual ships. At commissioningKönigsberg was 354 tonnes in excess,Karlsruhe 247 tonnes, Köln 277 tonnes and Leipzig 382 tonnes. Withoutquestion,thisaffectedtheirstabilityandwasthereasonwhythe‘K’cruisershadtounshiptheircatapults.Thethree‘K’classcruiserswereexpectedtoremaininserviceuntil1947–48
andmajorrefitswerescheduledtoimprovestabilityandseakeeping.Karlsruhewasthefirstandonlyunittoentertheyard,excessdemandandtheoutbreakofwarputtinganendtomajorconversionplansfortheotherfourcruisers.Shewasfittedwithasecondoutershellstretchingfromkeel toupperdeckabout70cmoutsidetheoriginalside.Thenewplatingwasaverystrongmaterialofarmourquality.Sidebulgeswouldhave increasedmetacentricheight to reduce rollingandmaketheshipamorestablegunplatforminexchangeforsettlingdeeperinthecaseofflooding,butthearchitectsdecidedagainstit.The engine rooms of the latter five ships were generally uncomplicated,
reliable to operate andmodem in their arrangement. All five ships had steamturbines with a cruising diesel. In the ‘K’ class cruisers the two shafts weredrivenbyeitherturbineordieselbutnotbothtogether;inLeipzigandNürnbergthedieselhadaseparatecentral shaft. Ineithercase,however, theshiphad tostopanddriftwhileanychangeoverwasmade.Inwartimethiscouldhefatal,aswas demonstrated by the collision betweenLeipzig andPrinz Eugen during acouplingchangeoveroffGotenhafenin1944.*The Versailles Treaty forced German designers to spread the engine room
space over a greater area than was normal. Of the sixteen compartments, theship’smachineryoccupiedhalfinthe‘K’classcruisersThelightcruiserswereneverabletomeetthemodestdemandsmadeofthem.
At the outbreak of war Emden and the three ‘K’ class ships were already
practically worn out, Leipzig was past her best and Nürnberg was onlyoperationalwithinlimits.September1939foundtheGermanNavyunprepared,inupheavalandhalf-waythroughaphaseofreconstruction.TheCommander-in-Chief,AdmiralRaeder,hadpilotednaval thinkingsince1928andstampedhisauthorityinsuchamannerthatonecanalmosttalkofa‘RaederEra’asonedoesof a ‘Tirpitz Era’. Raeder did not lead from the front but had comprehensivestaff and administrative experience.Hewas convinced that inwar theNavy’sprioritywas to guarantee the flow of imports of rawmaterials intoGermany.Commercewarfarewassecondarytothis.TheGreatWarhaddemonstratedtheextenttowhichGermancruisersoperatingbeyondEuropeanwatersdependedonsupply.Coaling stations had been carefully set up before thewar, butBiritishcapitalandinfluenceconvincedmostneutralstoadoptastricterinterpretationofneutrality as regardsGerman colliers than anticipated. All German cruisers atlargewereeventually trackeddownandsunkor fellvictim tomisfortune.Themerchant raiders—heavily armed steamers masquerading under innocentdisguises—weremoresuccessfulforawhile,butthewidespreadintroductionofwirelesstelegraphymadetheirjobincreasinglydifficult.NearertohomeitwaslefttotheU-boatstoattempttoachievevictorybyblockadingGreatBritain,butunrestricted submarinewarfarewashamperedbyhaving too fewboats for thetask.†*Asthevariousreportsquotedhereinshow,thecollisionoccurredasaresultofLeipzigproceedinginthewrong laneof the swept channel severalminutes after the changeover.Nevertheless, beingadrift for tenminuteswhile thechangeoverwasmade, in anareawhereanenemysubmarinealertwas in force,musthavecontributedtothecommander’serror.—G.B.
†TheauthormadethepointinhisPocketBattleshipsoftheDeutschlandClassofthisseriesthatwarfareagainstmerchantshippingonthehighseasisthebusinessoflightcruisers,andwhathesaidbearsrepetitionhere.TheRoyal andUSNavies had themselves found an8in armament tooponderous for the task. Forcommerce raidingbeyondcoastalwaters, all sixGerman lightcruiserswerecompletelyunsuitable.Withthe exception of the pocket-battleships,German heavy units did not have sufficient radius of action foreffectiveoperationsand reliedon frequent refuelling.AdmiralScheerprovedwhatcouldbeachievedfarfrom homewith adroit handling and a well-organised system of supply. Instead of the heavy and lightcruiserswithwhichitequippeditself,theGermanNavymighthavebeenbetterservedbyaclassofwell-armoured, fast, diesel-driven light cruisers for commerce raiding. Consideration was only given to thequestion too late. InNovember 1933Admiral Raeder had decided in favour of the high-pressure steamturbineforwarships.Yearsofpolemicensued,andnotuntil1938didthesubjectofsteamturbineordieselbecome topical again,when themajoritywasnow in favourofdiesel.Butyearswhichcouldhavebeendevotedtothedevelopmentofanimproveddieselwerelost.MAN-Dieselhadcontinuedtheworkprivately,buttheylackedtheactivesupportoftheKriegsmarine,whichhadgiventhenodtosteam.Thusin1938theGerman Navymade a belated return to designing diesel-driven warships, but after the outbreak of warplanning was suspended except for an experimental destroyer, for which contracts were placed withDeschimagBremenon25November1942underYardNumber1109,withthreeotherstofollow.
Theprototype,describedmorefullyintheauthor’sDieDeutschenZerstörerofthisseries,wasZ51ofType1942(2,720tonsoperationaldisplacement;dimensions114.3×11x4.3mmaximum;mainarmament
4×12.7cmguns insinglegunhouses twoforeand twoaft,20flak,eight torpedo tubes;sixMANV12Z32/44double-actingtwo-strokedieselseachof12,600hp;,threeshafts;topspeed36kt;bunkers553tonnes;complement247officersandmen).Thedimensionsandmainarmamentweresimilartothoseofthepre-WorldWarIsmallcruisers.Undoubtedly thisdevelopmentwasagreatstepfor theNavyand thedesignwas evidence of marked ‘oceanic’ thinking initiated by the lack of pure cruisers. With its diesels thisdestroyer/cruiser would have had a great range analogous to that of the Deutschland class pocket-battleshipsandTypeIXU-boats.Butbythenitwastoolate.—G.B.
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