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Lear - Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazioneLear - Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione
Economic Foundation & Analysis
TrentoSummerSchoolonAdvancedEUCompetitionLaw&Economics
PaoloBuccirossi
Moena,June15,2015
Lear - Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazioneLear - Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione
Foundation
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione 3
Notionsofefficiency
§ Allocativeefficiency:a(static)propertyofamarket (thesystemthroughwhichtheexchangeofproductsoccurs)
§ Productiveefficiency:a(static)propertyoftheproductionprocess (i.e.thesystemthroughwhichgoodsandservicesareproducedanddistributed)
§ Dynamicefficiency:apropertyofthesystemofproductionandexchangetobeassessedovertime
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione 4
Allocativeefficiency
§ Allocativeefficiency
§ Allconsumersthatderivefromtheconsumptionofaproductabenefitlargerthanthesocialcostofproducingthesamegoodareallowedtoconsumetheproduct
§ Allconsumersthatderiveabenefitlowerthanthesocialcostofproducingthesamegoodareexcludedfromtheconsumptionoftheproduct
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione 5
Productiveefficiency
§ Outputisproducedwiththeminimumamountofinput(technicalefficiency),and
§ Outputisproducedattheminimumcost(economicefficiency)
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione 6
Dynamicefficiency
§ Innovation
§ New(moreefficient)productionprocesses§ Newproducts(betterqualiy,moredifferentiated)§ Newdistributionsystems(e.g.ecommerce)
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione 7
Competition(Rivalry)andthemarket
• Competitionisacharacteristicofthe“market”(exchangesystem)• Itdetermines:
• Who(firms), onthesupply side,willactuallysell theproduct• Who(consumers), onthedemandside,willactuallybuy theproduct• Whichtransactionswilltakeplaceandwhichwillnot(howmuchof theproductwillbeexchanged)
• Competitionaffectstheallocation ofscarceresources
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione 8
Marketsand(price)signals
• Marketssend(price)signals
• Sellersandbuyersmaketheirdecisionsbasedonthesesignals
• (Perfect)competition=sellersandbuyersindividually donothavethepower toalterthesignal
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione 9
Competitionasaselectionmechanism
Competitivesignalsperformaselection function:
1. Selectsellerswiththelowestproductioncost
2. Selectbuyerswhohavethehighestevaluation
3. Selectthetransactionsthataresociallydesirable
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione 10
Marketpower
§ Marketpower:theabilityofoneormorefirmstopriceabovetheperfectlycompetitivelevel
§ LernerIndex𝐿 =
𝑝 −𝑚𝑐𝑝
§ L=0(perfectcompetition);L=1(maximummarketpower)§ Marketpowerdeterminesaninefficientallocationof
resources
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione 11
Productiveefficiencyandcompetition
§ Competitionandproductiveefficiency
§ Economiesofscale
§ Moreefficienttoconcentrateproductionwithin“few”firms,possiblyone(naturalmonopoly) D
MC1MC2
Q2 Q1
p2
p1 AB
p
Q
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione 12
Dynamicefficiencyandcompetition
§ Competitionanddynamicefficiency
§ Twoeffectsofcompetition§ Escapecompetitioneffect§ Schumpeterianeffect
§ Innovationdependsonincentives
§ Inverted-Urelationship
Inno
vatio
n
low
high
low highCompetition
Lear - Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazioneLear - Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione
Analysis
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Aframeworkforassessingmarketpower
§ Marketpowercanexistinavarietyofcontexts:§ insomemarkets,asingleundertakingmaypossessmarketpower(unilateraleffects)
§ inothermarkets,anumberofundertakingsmaycollectivelypossessmarketpower(coordinatedeffectcs)
§ Itisnecessarytohaveaconceptualframeworktoassesswhether andtowhatextentmarketpowerexists
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Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
The“old”economicassessmentframework
§ Thetraditionalapproachforassessingmarketpowerreliedonthecausallinkbetweenstructure–conduct–performance
§ Mainfocusonstructuralfactors
15
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Structuralanalysis:steps
§ Step1:Definearelevantmarket(productandgeographic)
§ Step2:Analysethesupply-sidestructureofthemarket§ Numberofcompetitors§ Marketsharesandconcentrationindexes§ Verticalintegration;etc.
§ Step3:Assessbarrierstoentry(potentialcompetition)
§ Step4:Assesscountervailingbuyerpower(ifany)
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Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Moderneconomicapproach:developingatheoryofharm
§ Inthelatestyears,antitrustauthoritiesfocusedonarticulatinga“theoryofharm” behindacompetitionconcern
§ The theoryofharmisastory thatexplainswhyanagreementbetweentwoormorefirmsorapracticeengagedbyafirmmayharmcompetitionandadverselyaffectconsumers
§ Itdoesnotonlytakeintoaccountthestructuralfeaturesofthemarketbutalsotheincentivesandtheabilityofthefirmsinvolved
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Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Theoryofharm:elements
Awelldevelopedtheoryofharm:§ shouldarticulatehowcompetitionand,ultimately,
consumerswillbeharmedbythepracticeunderexamrelativetoanappropriatelydefinedcounterfactual
§ shouldbeconsistentwiththeincentivesandtheabilityofthepartiesinvolved
§ shouldbeconsistentwiththeavailableeconomictheory§ shouldbeconsistentwiththeavailableempiricalevidence
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Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Theoryofharm:statements
Atheoryofharmandthejustificationsofthevariousnodesofthestorywillmakeemergetwocategoriesofstatements:1. Factualassertions:description– andpossiblyquantification
– ofaneconomicphenomenon§ e.g.XandYaretheclosestcompetitors;consumersface
highswitchingcosts;demandpriceelasticityis1.6
2. Logicalpropositions:areasoningthat,onthebasisofasetofpremises,(i.e.somefactualassertions),derivesaconclusion§ e.g.switchingcostswouldpreventanewentrantfromreachinganefficientscaleandwouldimpedeentry
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Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Theoryofharm:testingthestatements
§ Ingeneralafactualassertioncanbeeithertrue orfalse§ Whenafactualassertioncontainsestimatesitis
impossibletoexpresssuchaclear-cutopinionandthejudgementitcanonlyconcernthereliability orrobustnessoftheestimates
§ Alogicalpropositionisvalid orinvalid§ internalconsistency:conclusionsmustlogicallyfollow
fromthepremises§ economictheory:conclusionarerelatedtothepremises
byanestablishedorsoundeconomictheory
20
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Someexamplesofunsatisfactorytheoriesofharm:marginsqueeze
§ Whatisthepropercounterfactual?§ Alowerwholesaleinputprice(constructiverefusaltodeal)?§ Anhigherretailprice(predation)?
§ Verydifferentstatementstobetested…Ifpredation:§ needtoestimateavoidabledownstreamcostsandprove
“sacrifice”§ foreclosureunlikelyifnotdominantindownstreammarket§ someevidenceofrecoupmentnecessary§ noneedtoprovetheindispensabilityofinput
§ Implications§ Remedies(totallydifferentfordomco,rivalsandconsumers)§ Damages– ifpredationonlylossofprofit,passingonarguments
irrelevant,etc.
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Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Someexamplesofunsatisfactorytheoriesofharm:on-linesalesban(PierreFabre)
§ PierreFabre:20%ofthemarketforhigh-endcosmetics§ Defactobanofon-linesales§ ECJ(preliminaryruling):inthecontextofaselective
distributionsystem,acontractualclauserequiringsalesofcosmeticsandpersonalcareproductstobemadeinaphysicalspacewhereaqualifiedpharmacistmustbepresent,resultinginabanontheuseoftheinternetforthosesales,amountstoarestrictionbyobjectwithinthemeaningofthatprovision
22
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Someexamplesofunsatisfactorytheoriesofharm:on-linesalesban(PierreFabre)
§ therearelegitimaterequirements,suchasthemaintenanceofaspecialisttradecapableofprovidingspecificservicesasregardshigh-qualityandhigh-technologyproducts,whichmayjustifyareductionofpricecompetition infavour ofcompetitionrelatingtofactorsotherthanprice (par.40)
§ Theaimofmaintainingaprestigiousimageisnotalegitimateaimforrestrictingcompetition(par.46)
§ Whatisthetheoryofharm?§ Reducingintra-brandcompetition?§ WhatisthePierreFabreincentiveofdoingso?
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Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Someexamplesofunsatisfactorytheoriesofharm:on-linesalesban(PierreFabre)
§ Manufacturer’sprofitsΠ=(w – c)*Q(p,s)
§ w =wholesaleprice;c =manufacturer’smarginalcost;Q(p,s) =downstreamdemand,whichdependsonp =retailpriceands=demandenhancingfactors,suchasancillaryservicesorbrandimage
§ ManufacturerisbetteroffifQ(p,s)ishigher;generallysoareconsumers
§ Ifaselectivedistributionsystemis“efficient”thismeansthatitimpliesacombinationofp ands suchthatQ(p,s)ishigher,eventhoughitentailsanhigherp
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Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Someexamplesofunsatisfactorytheoriesofharm:on-linesalesban(PierreFabre)
§ Whatistheconsumerwelfareconsequencesofon-linesalesiftheyincreasepricecompetition?
25
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Theoryofharm:broadcategories
§ Individualtheoriesofharmarenumerousandspecifictothecaseatstake
§ However,mostdrawonalimitednumberofcommonpotentialsourcesofcompetitiveharm:§ Softeningcompetition/unilateralmarketpowerOneormorefirmshavealowerincentivetocompeteaggressivelyandcanunilaterallyexercisesmarketpower§ CollusionTwoormorefirmscoordinatetojointlyexercisemarketpower§ ForeclosureA firmreinforcesorprotectsitsmarketpowerbyexcludingequallyefficientcompetitorsfromthemarket
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Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Softeningcompetition
§ Oneormorefirmsundertakeapracticesuchthatlowerstheirincentivestocompeteaggressively
§ Examples§ Mergerbetweentoclosecompetitors:unilateraleffects
§ Bestpricingpolicies§ PriceMatchingGuarantee§ Parityclause
§ Softeningcompetitiontheoryofharmisbasedonanalterationofastaticgame
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Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Collusion
§ Coordinationofmarketstrategies(prices,outputetc.)suchastoraiseprofitsandharmconsumers
§ Coordinationoccursthroughadynamicinteraction(repeatedgame)
§ 3Problems:§ Coordinationproblem:findingthetermsofcoordination§ Enforcementproblem:curbingfirms’incentivetodeviate
throughapunishmentmechanism§ Externalstability:impedingdisruptiveactionsbyfringe
competitorsand/orbuyers
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Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Foreclosure
§ Raisingrivals’costsstrategy- RRC§ thedominantfirmimpedestheaccesstoanessentialinputortoamoreefficientinput
§ Loweringrivals’demandstrategy- LRD§ theincumbentreducesthedemandthatisavailabletonewentrantstillisnolongerprofitableenteringthemarket
§ Outputstrategy§ thedominantfirmdoesnotaffectneitherthecostorthedemandofcompetitors,butmightchooseitsoutputlevelsoastobringpriceatalevelthatwouldmakeentryunprofitable
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Lear - Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazioneLear - Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione
Case#1:GE/Instrumentarium
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
GE/Instrumentarium
§ AcquisitionbyGeneralElectricCompany(US)ofsolecontrolofInstrumentariumOYJ (Finnish)
§ Productmarket:Variousinstruments(perioperativemonitors,patientmonitors,criticalcaremonitors,allofthemseparate)
§ Geographicmarkets:national
§ Theoryofharm:Unilateraleffects,eliminationofaclosecompetitor
31
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Somequestions
§ WhatkindofevidencedidtheCommissionexaminetoassessthe“closenessofcompetition”betweenGEandInstrumentarium?
§ Whentendersareinvolved,sometimeeachtenderisdefinedasaseparaterelevantmarket.Whythisisnotthecasehere?Howdidtheexistenceoftenderingproceduresaffectedtheassessmentofthecase?
32
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Marketfeatures
§ Stableandmaturemarket
§ Tenderingprocedures(withdetailedspecificationsand“mosteconomicallyadvantageous”proceduresratherthan“lowestprice”)§ About60%to100%salesaremadethroughatenderingprocedure
§ Theanesthesiologist(primaryuserofthisequipment)playsanimportantroleinmakingthechoiceofaperioperativepatientmonitor
33
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Overview
§ Marketshares(perioperativemonitors)§ Highcombinedmarketshares§ Stablemarketsharesofthemergingparties§ Lowermarketsharesofcompetitors
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Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Actual competition
§ Here,tenderingproceduresdonotfundamentallyaffectthevalueofmarketsharesasastrongindicationsofthemergedentity’smarketpower.§ Valueofeachcontractwonislowandthenumberoftendersis
high§ Customizationisrestricted,thespecificationofthetender
alreadydeterminewhetheragivensupplierwillsubmitabidornot
§ CustomersappeartobewillingtoswitchincaseofSSNIP
§ Marketsharesreflectrealpurchasingdecisionsbycustomersinagivenhear,henceareinformativeofmarketpower
35
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Closeness ofcompetition
§ Suppliersselectauctionsinwhichtheyparticipateanddonotbidwhentheybelievetheyhavenochanceofwinning.
§ Themorefrequentlytwofirmsfaceeachother,themorelikelyitisthattheirpricesaresubstitutes.§ in3,355tenders,themergingpartiesencounteredeachotherin[50-60]%§ Facednocompetitorin[20-30]%§ Asinglecompetitorin[20-30]%§ Whenfacingothercompetitors,in[30-40]%ofthe cases,themergingpartiesfaced
neitherSiemensnorPhilipsbutonly variousfringeplayers
§ Themergermayresultinareductionofthenumberofsignificantplayersfromtwotooneinonetenderoutofthree.
§ WhenbothInstrumentarium&GEarepresent,Philipsbidslower(strongercompetition!)
36
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Closeness ofcompetition
§ Runner-upanalysis:§ SupposeGE&Instrumentarium areclosecompetitors,onewouldexpecttoseeGEasthesecond-placedbidderforalargenumberofthosebidswonbyInstrumentarium andvice-versa
37
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Other analyses
§ Theaveragediscountofferedwhenbothnotifyingpartiesarepresentishigher(lowerprices)§ (Econometricmodellingtoassesstheimpact)
§ Fringeplayerandpotentialcompetition§ Repeatrunner-upanalysistoassessthestrengthofcompetition
38
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Other risks
§ Barrierstoentryandexpansion§ Importanceofinnovationasaparameterofcompetition(mergingpartieswerethemostinnovativesuppliers)
§ Importanceofdistributionnetwork(tooffersupportoverthewholelifecycle)
§ Lackofcountervailingbuyerpower§ Inpurchasingdecisions:“PerformanceandQualityarethemostimportantcriteriafollowedbyServiceandProductdurability.Priceisobviouslylessimportant”.
§ Fragmentedcustomerbase(limitedvalueoftendersàlowerpricesensitivity)
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Lear - Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazioneLear - Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione
Case#2:AngloAmericanPLC/LafargeS.A
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
AngloAmericanPLC/LafargeS.A
§ Horizontal jointventurebetweenAngloandLafargeintheproductionofcement aggregates,asphalt andready-mixconcrete(RMX)
§ Theory ofharm:Coordinatedeffects inthemarkets forthesupply ofbulkcement inUK
41
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Competitiveassessment
Mergerwithcoordinatedeffectsinthemarketforbulkcement§ Themoreanindustryisalreadycharacterisedbythe
coexistenceoffactorswhichfavouracollusiveoutcome,themoreriskytoallowamerger
whichkindofevidencehasbeencollected?§ Threeconditionsneedtobesatisfiedforcollusiontobe
possible§ Coordinationhastobecontinuous?Pricehastobe
monopolistic?
42
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Competitiveassessment:firstcondition
o Ability:(Pre– merger)o Highconcentration(4UK
producers)o Limitedcapacityexpansion
(onlyTarmac)o Structurallinkso Homogeneousproducto Similarcoststructureo Priceannouncementletters
o Ability:(Postmerger)o Fourtothreecement
producers(fivetofourRMXsuppliers)
43
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Competitiveassessment:firstcondition
o Monitoring(Pre– merger)o Highdegreeoftransparency
ontotalproductionofcement,capacityandcompanies’ownmarketshares(how?Wasitsufficientknowingitsownmarketshare?)
o Monitoring(Post–Merger)o Increasedmarketinformation
(verticalintegrationplayedarole,why?)
44
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Competitiveassessment:secondcondition
Internalsustainability(pre-merger)
o Highcapitalinvestmentandriskofaggressivecompetition
o Highcross– sales:repatriationofcementvolumesassignallingorpunishmentmechanism
o Lafargewaslimitedinrepatriationbecauseitwasnotalargecementbuyer
Internalsustainability(postmerger)
o JV,largeproducer,strongerincentivetocoordinate
o Greaterflexibilityandoptionsofpunishmentbyincreasingsimilaritiesinverticalintegration
o Greateruseofrepatriationassignal
45
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Competitiveassessment:thirdcondition
Externalsustainability(pre-merger)
o Competitivefringeo Nothreatfromimportso Highbarriertoentryo Nobuyerpowero Firmswithnoincentivefor
coordination:TarmacBUT..
Externalsustainability(post–merger)
o ByremovingTarmac,thatwaspartofthecompetitivefringeandhadastrongincentivetoexpanditsoutput,theJVwouldincreasetheexternalsustainability
46
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Conclusions
TheCCconcludedthattheproposed JVwouldmakecoordinationinthebulkcementmarketsignificantlymorelikelytoemerge (iftherewerenopre-existingcoordination)oriftherewerepre-existingcoordinationwouldincreasemateriallyitseffectivenessandstability
47
Lear - Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazioneLear - Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione
Case#3:TomTom/TeleAtlas
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
TomTom/Tele Atlas§ TomTom’s acquisitionofsolecontrolofTeleAtlas:verticalmergerinthe
industryofportablenavigationdevices(PND).
§ Upstreammarket (TeleAtlasandNavteq mainly)Productmarket:navigabledigitalmapdatabasesGeographicmarket:worldwide
§ Intermediatemarket (TomTom andGarmin)Productmarket:navigationsoftwareGeographicmarket:EEA,butworldwideinscope
§ DownstreammarketProductmarket:portablenavigationdevices,i.e.PNDs.Geographicmarkets:nationalinscope
§ Keytopic:foreclosure49
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Somequestions
§ Whatwastheconcernofcompetitors?§ Whichhypothesesofinputforeclosurehavebeen
explored?§ HowdidtheCommissionassess:
§ whetherthemergedentitywouldhavetheability post-merger toforecloseaccesstoinputs;
§ whetheritwouldhaveincentives todoso;§ whetheraforeclosurestrategywouldhaveasignificantdetrimentaleffect
inthedownstreamPNDmarket?
50
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Assessment – ability topost-mergerforeclose?
§ Hypothesestoexplore:§ byincreasingprices§ byprovidingdegradedmaps
ordelayedupdates
§ Indicatorstoassess§ marketpower§ importanceoftheinput
(map)forthedownstreamproduct(PND)
§ possiblecounter-strategies
51
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Marketshares
Allportableend-users PNDs
TomTom [30-40] [30-50]
MioTech& Navman [10-20] [10-20]
Garmin [10-20] [10-20]
MEDION [0-10] [0-10]
MyGuide [0-5] [0-5]
52
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Assessment – ability toforeclose post-merger
§ Marketpower:TeleAtlassellsmapdatabasesabovemarginalcostandhasamarketshareofmorethan50%intheupstreammarket,NAVTEQbeingtheonlyotherproviderofnavigabledigitalmapdatabaseswithasimilarcoverageandqualitylevel
§ Importanceofinput:mapsareacriticalcomponentforPND§ Possibleforeclosingstrategy:mayberaisingprices(thehypothesis
of“gaming”withmapformatsappearsunlikely)§ Lackofeffectivecounterstrategies,because:
- Entryunlikelytobetimely- LongtermcontractsbetweenTeleAtlasandGarmin(and,toalesserextent,others)wouldpreventtheformerfromforeclosingaccesstoinput.However,Garminrepresentsonly20%ofthemarket.
53
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Assessment – incentivetoforeclose post-merger
§ Supposetheverticallyintegratedentitystopssellingitsmapdatabasestodownstreamcompetitors.Whatisthelikelyeffectonitsprofits?§ Checkprofitsbothupstreamanddownstream!
§ Lossesupstream§ Profitsdownstream(?)
§ Neteffect?§ Theextenttowhichdownstreamdemandislikelytobedivertedawayfromforeclosedrivals;and
§ Theshareofthatdiverteddemandthatcanbecapturedbythedownstreamdivisionoftheintegratedfirm
54
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Assessment – incentivetoforeclose post-merger
§ Thecostoftheinput(map)hasaverylowweightonthecostofPND.Eveninpassontocustomersishigh,thechangeincostwoulddetermineonlyasmallincreaseinsalesforthemergedentity.
§ EvidencethatsomePNDsupplierswouldbereluctanttopassoncostincreases
§ Garminisprotectedfrompriceincreasesandthiswouldfurtherreducethediversionfromcompetitorstomergedentity
55
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Assessment – effects onthedownstreammarket
§ Nodetrimentaleffects
§ Likelyefficiencies(mergerspecific)§ Internalizationofdoublemarkup§ Volumediscountsarecommonintheindustry,butaretoolimitedtosubstantiallyeliminatedoublemark-upà henceefficienciesaremergerspecific
§ Otherefficiencies:alignedincentivestodevelopbettermaps,faster
56
Lear – Laboratoriodieconomia,antitrust,regolamentazione
Conclusion
§ “Themergedentitylackstheincentivetostopsupplyingmapdatabases toitsdownstreamcompetitors.Inaddition,anyforeclosurestrategytoincreasepricesordegradequalityforTomTom’s competitorswouldnothaveasignificantanticompetitiveeffect inthedownstreamPNDandnavigationsoftwaremarkets.Thisconclusiondoesnotrelyonlikelyefficienciesresultingfromtheproposed operation.However,theconclusionisstrengthenedfurtheronceefficienciesaretakenintoaccount”
57
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