사업명: 국가비밀문서 유통관리 기반구조...

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김 춘 수

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jbr@etri.re.kr

무선랜 보안 솔루션

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Agenda

• WLAN 개요

• WLAN 보안 취약점

– WEP

– 802.1x

– Summary

• WLAN 보안 Solutions

– TKIP

– Inner VPN

– Vendor

– Summary

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WLAN 개요

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Wireless LAN(1)

• IEEE 802.11 – 802.11, 802.11b, 802.11a, 802.11g

– IR(Infrared)

– SS(Spread Spectrum) • FHSS(Frequency Hopping SS)

• DSSS(Direct Sequence SS)

• OFDM(Orthogonal Frequency Modulation)

• WATM-WG(ATM Forum)

• SUPERLAN(WIN Forum)

• ETSI – HIPERLAN1

– HIPERLAN2

• Bluetooth

• MMAC-PC(Multimedia Mobile Access Communication)

• Home RF

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Wireless LANs(2)

Characteristics 802.11 802.11b 802.11a(g) HIPERLAN1/2

Modulation FHSS/DSSS(IR) DSSS OFDM OFDM

Carrier Freq. 2.4GHz 2.4GHz 5GHz(2.4) 5GHz

Max. Physical Rate 2Mbps 11Mbps 54Mbps(22) 54Mbps

Max. Data Rate(Layer 3) 1.2Mbps 5Mbps 32Mbps 32Mbps

MAC/Media Sharing CSMA/CA CSMA/CA CSMA/CA Central Resource Control/TDMA/TDD

Connectivity Connectionless Connectionless Connectionless Connection Oriented

Authentication No No No NAI/IEEE Addr./X.59

Encryption 40bit RC4 40bit RC4 40bit RC4 DES/T-DES

Fixed Network Support Ethernet Ethernet Ethernet Ethernet, IP, ATM, UMTS, PPP

Radio Link Quality Control No No No Link Adatation

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Wireless Network Architecture

Distribution System

AP (a)

Station (a1)

Server

Station (a2)

AP (b)

Station (b1)

Station (b2)

Ad-hoc

Station (ah1)

Station (ah2)

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Ad-Hoc Network

• No structure to the network

• No fixed points

• Communicate to every nodes

• Packet transmission order

Mobile Station

Mobile Station

Mobile Station

Mobile Station

Ad-HOC Network

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Ad-hoc Network(Bluetooth)

적용 방식

P2P Connection Multipoint Connection Personal Connected Bubble

활용 시기

2001 ~ 2003 ~ 2005 ~

상용 시스템

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Ad-hoc Network(HIPERLAN)

F F F

NF

NF NF

NF F : Forwarder NF : Non-Forwarder

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Infrastructure Network

• Fixed network access point

• Similar to cellular networks

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WLAN 보안 취약점

WEP

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무선 LAN 보안 기술

• 무선 LAN 위협

– 데이터 측면

• 서비스 이용자 : 같은 Hot Spot 지역에 위치한 다른 사용자들에게 자

신의 검색중의 정보 그대로 유출

– 네트워크 측면

• 동일 Hot Spot 지역에서 동일 AP를 통해 동시에 인터넷 접속 타인의

컴퓨터 환경 검색 가능

• 무선 LAN의 보안

– 데이터 보안 측면

• 스니퍼등을 통해서 무선랜 데이터 내용 자체를 몰래보는 행위를 방어

– 네트워크 보안 측면

• 승인된 사용자에게만 네트워크 접속을 허용

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무선 LAN 보안 기술

• 무선 LAN 국제 표준 IEEE 802.11 토대

• 무선 LAN에서의 AP와 단말간의 인증 및 암호화

• 무선 LAN의 MAC 계층에서 구현

• 상위계층에서의 보안은 응용에 따라 별도 구성

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무선 LAN 보안 기술

• 무선랜에서의 인증 방법

– SSID(Service Set ID)를 이용한 인증방법

– Open System 인증 방법

– Shared WEP Key 인증 방법

– EAP(Extensible Authentication Protocol) 인증 방법 (IEEE 802.1x)

– VPN (Virtual Private Network) 인증방법

• 무선랜에서의 암호 기법

– WEP : RC4 사용, 40비트

– WEP 2 : RC4 사용, 128비트

– TKIP : AES 128bit 블럭암호

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무선 LAN 인증 기법(#1)

• SSID를 이용한 인증

– 가장 간단한 방법(단순한 Text 형태로 전송)

– 인증방법이라기 보다는 네트워크 선택방법

SSIDa SSIDb

SSIDa

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무선 LAN 인증 기법(#2)

• Open System 인증 방법

– 무선랜 카드가 소유한 48비트 MAC 주소 이용

– 특정 MAC 주소 소유자만 접속 가능

– AP가 MAC 주소 리스트 보유

– 이동성이 없음

Authentication Request(Sqe #1)

Authentication Result(Sqe #1)

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무선 LAN 인증기법(#3)

• Shared WEP Key 공유 키 인증

– 공통적으로 가지고 있는 WEP 키 사용

– Challenge를 암호화한 결과값이 평문으로 전송

– Replay Attack에 대응방안 없음

Authentication Request(Sqe #1)

Authentication challenge(Sqe #2)

Authentication Response(Sqe #3)

Authentication Result (Sqe #4)

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WEP(Wired Equivalent Privacy)

• WEP의 개요

– 유선망과 동일한 수준의 비밀성을 제공하기 위한 Link Layer의

보안프로토콜

– IEEE 802.11에서 제안

– Prevent link-layer eavesdropping

– As secondary role WEP controls network access

– Uses RC4 stream cipher of RSA Data Security for encryption

– Key must shared by both the AP and stations

– Several vendors use 104bits keys

– Only a few have implemented WEP in H/W

– The MAC address are sent in the clear

– Key distribution/negotiation is not mentioned in the standard

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WEP(암복호화 과정)

Conc

Conc

Integrity Algorithm

PRNG Xor

WEP PRNG

Integrity Algorithm

ICV'=ICV

Mux

Xor

IV IV

k C

IV

k

C

P

P

WEP

ICV'

IV=24 bit, k=40 bit

IV(Initial Vector), ICV(Integrity Check Value)

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WEP(프레임 구조)

IV Plain Text ICV

RC4 encrypted

Message(Plain Text)

CRC

Keystream=RC4(iv,k)

XOR

ICV(Integrity Check Value)

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WEP Keys(802.11)

Header:Key3 EKey3(Data) Trailer

Header:Key1 EKey1(Data) Trailer

Key1:4329…

Key2:5346…

Key3:1064…

Key4:4590…

Key1:4329…

Key2:5346…

Key3:1064…

Key4:4590…

IV Message ICV

0~2304Byte 4Byte

IV Pad Key ID

24Bit 6Bit 2Bit

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WEP의 취약점(요약)

• The 802.11 standard does not specify how distribution of keys is to be accomplished.

• In practice, most installations use a single key

• Message Authentication : CRC-32 checksum

• www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/wep-faq.html (UC Berkeley) – Stateless Protocol : Key Stream Reuse

– Linear Checksum : integrity check

– IV reuse : IV space – 224 possibilities, Collision every 4s

– Encryption Oracle : Attack from Both Ends

– WEP Key Stored on the NIC

• WEP should not be counted on to provide strong link-level security end-to-end encryption Needed

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WEP의 취약점(IV Reused, Collision)

• 키수열 생성시 k, IV를 사용

• 키 수열 = RC4(k,IV)

• 암호문( C) = 키수열 xor 평문(P)

• 동일한 키 수열 사용 가능

• IV 선택에 대한 방법이 제시되어 있지 않음

– 일부 경우 IV는 초기화때마다 0으로 setting되며 매 패킷마다 1씩 증가

– 예) 11Mbps, 패킷당 1,500바이트 전송 경우 :

Collision : 1,500 * 8/( 11*10^6) * 2^24 = 18,000초 = 5시간

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WEP의 취약점(Linear Checsum)

• 메세지 변조 가능

– 무결성을 위하여 32비트 CRC checksum 기법 사용

– CRC는 Random 에러 검증용이며, 선형(linear) • 공격자는 A B로 송신하는 암호문 C와 IV값 획득

A (B) : (IV,C)

C = RC4(IV,k) (M||c(M))

• M’ = M 에 상응하는 C’ 생성(은 공격자에 의해 선정)

• 암호문( C ) 대신에 변조된 암호문(C’)을 B에게 전송

• B가 올바른 checksum을 가지고 변조된 평문(M’)을 수신하게 만듬

(A) B : (IV, C’)

• C’ = C (,c())라 하면, CRC는 선형이므로

C’ = C (,c( )) = RC4(IV,k) (M,c(M)) (,c( ))

= RC4(IV,k) ( M , c(M) c() )

= RC4(IV,k) ( M’, c(M ))

= RC4(IV,k) ( M’, c(M’))

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WEP의 취약점(Replay)

• Once sniffed, a WEP encrypted frame can be replayed again and again by an attacker

• This replayed frame will be decrypted and processed by STA & AP as the original one

• Specifically dangerous for stateless potocols(UDP:NFS,NTP….)

• Not only the original frame can be replayed, but it can be modified as well

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Leaking the WEP key

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IP Sec vs. 802.11

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WLAN 보안 취약점

802.1x

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IEEE 802.1x(1)

• Introduction

– Provide a means of authenticating and authorizing devices attached to a LAN port

– Provides an architectural framework on top of which one can use various authentication methods

• Purpose

– Specifies a protocol between devices desiring access to the bridged LAN and devices providing access to the bridged LAN.

– Specifies the requirements for a protocol between the Authenticator and an Authentication server (e.g. RADIUS).

– Specifies different levels of access control and the behavior of the port providing access to the bridged LAN.

– Specifies management operations via SNMP.

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802.1x(2)

• What 802.1X is not

– Purely a wireless standard – it applies to all IEEE 802 technologies (e.g. Ethernet First Mile applications)

– PPP over Ethernet (PPPOE) – only supports EAP authentication methods (no PAP or CHAP), packets are not encapsulated

– A cipher – not a substitute for WEP, RC4, DES, 3DES, AES, etc.

• But 802.1X can be used to derive keys for any cipher

– A single authentication method

• But 802.1X can support many authentication methods without changes to the AP or NIC firmware

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Definitions

• Authenticator

– The entity that requires the entity on the other end of the link to be authenticated.

• Supplicant

– The entity being authenticated by the Authenticator and desiring access to the services of the Authenticator.

• Port Access Entity (PAE)

– The Protocol entity associated with a port.May support functionality of Authenticator , Supplicant or both

• Authentication Server

– An entity providing authentication service to the Authenticator.Maybe co-located with Authenticator, but most likely an external server.

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802.1X Topologies

Authenticator/EtherNAS (e.g. Access Point or

Bridge)

Supplicant

Enterprise or ISP Network

Semi-Public Network / Enterprise Edge

AuthenticationServer

RADIUS

PAE

PAE

EtherCPE

Supplicant Non-802.1X

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EAP

• The Extensible Authentication Protocol (RFC 2284) – General protocol supporting multiple authentication methods – Provides a flexible link layer security framework – Simple encapsulation protocol – Few link layer assumptions

• Can run over any link layer (PPP, 802, etc.) • Does not assume physically secure link

– Methods provide security services

• Assumes no re-ordering • Can run over lossy or lossless media

– Retransmission responsibility of authenticator (not needed for 802.1X or 802.11)

• EAP methods based on IETF standards – Transport Level Security (TLS) (supported in Windows 2000) – Secure Remote Password (SRP) – GSS_API (including Kerberos)

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Ethernet Client

Switch

Radius Server

IEEE 802.1X Conversation

EAPOL-Start

EAP-Response/Identity

Radius-Access-Challenge

EAP-Response (credentials)

Access blocked

Port connect

Radius-Access-Accept

EAP-Request/Identity

EAP-Request

Access allowed

EAP-Success

Radius-Access-Request

Radius-Access-Request

RADIUS EAPOL

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Ethernet

Access Point

Radius Server

802.1X On 802.11

EAPOW-Start

EAP-Response/Identity

EAP Request (TLS Start)

EAP-Response(TLSClient_hello)

Access blocked

Association

EAP Success(TLS Session Key)

EAP-Request/Identity

EAP-Request(TLS Start)

EAP Response/Identity

EAP Response(TLS Client _Hello)

RADIUS

EAPOW

Station

Wireless

802.11 802.11 Associate-Request

EAP-Success (TLS Session Key)

Network AccessEnabled EAPOW-Key (WEP)

802.11 Associate-Response

WEP set in PC Card via NDIS OIDs

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802.1X authentication in 802.11

• IEEE 802.1X authentication occurs after 802.11 association or reassociation

– Association/Reassociation serves as “port up” within 802.1X state machine

– Prior to authentication, access point filters all non-802.1X traffic from client

– If 802.1X authentication succeeds, access point removes the filter

• 802.1X messages sent to destination MAC address

– Client, Access Point MAC addresses known after 802.11 association

• No need to use 802.1X multicast MAC address in EAP-Start, EAP-Request/Identity messages

– Prior to 802.1X authentication, access point only accepts packets with source = Client and Ethertype = EAPOL

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Advantages of IEEE 802.1X

• Open standards based

– Leverages existing standards: EAP (RFC 2284), RADIUS (RFC 2865, 2866, 2867, 2868, 2869)

– Enables interoperable user identification, centralized authentication, key management

– Enables automated provisioning of LAN connectivity

• User-based identification

– Identification based on Network Access Identifier (RFC 2486) enables support for roaming access in public spaces (RFC 2607).

– Enables a new class of wireless Internet Access

• Dynamic key management

– Improved security for wireless (802.11) installations

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Vulnerabilities of 802.1x

• Absence of Mutual Authentication

– Perform only a one-way authentication

– Expose the supplicant to potential Man–in-Middle attack

• The Man-IN-Middle setup for the attack

Typically 802.3

Supplicant

AP Authentication

server

802.11

802.11

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Vulnerability of 802.1x

• EAP Success Message MIM Attack

– Unconditional transfer to the Authenticated state irrespective of the current state,

– Cause the interface to provide network connectivity

– Adversary can get all network traffic from the supplicant

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Vulnerability of 802.1x

• Session Hijacking

EAP Request

EAP Response

EAP Success

Access Point Legitimate Supplicant

Supplicant Authenticated

802.11 MAC Disassociate Adversary spoofs

APs MAC address

Network Traffic

Adversary

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Proposed Solutions

• Per-packet authenticity and integrity

– Session hijack attack

• Lack of authenticity in management frame

– Add of integrity of data frame

• When Confidentiality is used

• Authenticity and Integrity of EAPOL messages

– Mim attack : The lack of authenticity of 802.1x messages

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Vendors Supporting 802.1X

• Microsoft, AirWave, Compaq, Dell, IBM, Intel, HP, Symbol, Toshiba, Telson, Wayport – http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2001/Mar01/03-

26XPWirelessPR.asp • 3Com

– http://emea.3com.com/news/news01/mar26.html • Agere

– http://www.networkmagazine.com/article/COM20010629S0009 – http://www.lucent.com/micro/NEWS/PRESS2001/080801a.html

• Enterasys – http://www.dialelectronics.com.au/articles/c4/0c0023c4.asp – http://www.computingsa.co.za/2001/03/26/News/new07.htm

• Intersil – http://www.intersil.com/pressroom/20010403_802_1xWindows_XPFINA

L_English.asp • Cisco

– Catalyst switches • http://www.redcorp.com/products/09084608.asp

– 802.11 access points • http://www.security-informer.com/english/crd_security_495312.html • http://cisco.com/warp/public/cc/pd/witc/ao350ap/prodlit/1281_pp.pdf

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Cisco Mutual Authendication

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WLAN 보안 취약점

Summary

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Summary

• 802.11 Security doesn’t meet any of its security objectives today • 802..11 Tge is working to replace

– Authentication scheme using 802.1x and kerberos – Encryption scheme using AES in OCB mode

• Some Hints – Always possible to setup IPsec/VPN – 128비트 블록암호를 사용 – 기밀성과 무결성을 동시에 해결 가능한 방법 – IV 재 사용 금지 : 메시지 키 개념 도입 – CRC checksum 메시지 인증을 위한 MAC 추가(블록암호) – 인증 프로토콜 재 설계 (replay attack 강한 프로토콜) – 비밀키 기반 인증 방식인 Kerberos 방식등 – 키 설정 방법 및 IV 발생방법등에 대한 구체적 방법

• 단기미봉책 – 키관리방안, IPSec, Firewall 등

• 업체의 제품 – 신뢰성 검증 미흡 – 대부분 단기 미봉책

• 좀더 심도있는 보안 연구 필요

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Sniffing 802.11

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WLAN 보안 Solution

TKIP

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Encryption Process

MIC Key TKIP sequence counter(s)

SA + DA +

Plaintext MSDU

Data

Ciphertext

MPDU(s)

WEP

Encapsulation

MIC

TTAK Key

Plaintext

MSDU +

MIC Fragment(s)

Phase 2

key mixing

Plaintext

MPDU(s)

WEP seed(s)

(represented as

WEP IV + RC4

key)

Phase 1

key mixing TA

Temporal

Key

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Decryption Process

MIC Key

WEP IV

Plaintext

MSDU

Ciphertext

MPDU

WEP

Decapsulation

Michael

TTAK Key

SA + DA +

Plaintext

MSDU

Reassemble

Key mixing

Plaintext

MPDU

WEP Seed

Phase 1

key mixing

TA

Temporal

Key

TKIP sequence counter

Unmix IV

In-sequence

MPDU

Out-of-sequence

MPDU

MIC

MIC

MIC =

MIC?

MPDU with failed

WEP ICV

MSDU with failed

TKIP MIC

Countermeasures

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WLAN 보안 Solution

VPN

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Inner VPN 개념

각종 서버

XecureVPN

Gateway

XecureVPN

AP

이동 단말기

(1) AP내부에 VPN 구현

(2) VPN Gateway활용

유선구간

무선구간

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Inner VPN

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WLAN 보안 Solution

Vendor

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Cisco’s Solution

• Mutual authentication – By Lightweight & Efficient Application Protocol-LEAP – Between a wireless client and a backend RADIUS

• Secure Key Derivation – Mutual challenge and one-way hashes

• Dynamic WEP keys – Dynamic per-user, per-session WEP key – Unique session key per users

• Reauthentication Policies – RADIUS server ACS2000 – Reauthentication more open – Get new session keys

• IV Changes – A per-packet basis

• Use other security solutions – VPN, Firewall

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3COM’s Solutions

• Layer 3 VPN solutions

– RADIUS-based authentication & authorization

– 128bits Dynamic session Key

• WEP에 근간을 둔 보안이 아니라 클라이언트와 라우터간의

VPN을 수행함으로써 WLAN의 보안을 처리

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NoWiresNeeded’s Solution

• AirLockTM Security Software

• Automated key exchange

• Encryption : RC4 and 128bit key

• Key agreement : Diffie-Hellman key agreement

• Authentication : public key mechanism, using 1024bit keys

• Also, supports IEEE standard WEP 40

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감사합니다.