marcos and society
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133408
Sir Jomar Cuartero, R43
Research Paper
Marcos and Society
ABSTRACT
Ferdinand Marcos, ex-President of the Philippines, is guilty of a
variety of well-documented crimes, including the embezzlement of
public funds, human rights abuses and any number of unknown
illegalities. This paper will seek to examine the social and cultural
values and norms held uniquely by the Filipino people which allowed
Marcos to exploit Philippine society. This paper will seek to prove
that certain Filipino values were not only necessary to the success of
Marcos’s actions, but also acted as an auxiliary enabler, almost an
accessory, to these Marcos-directed crimes. It will also seek to prove
that Marcos deliberately manipulated these values under the complete
knowledge of what his policies, including certain propagandist
creations, were capable of doing. The paper will seek to do this by
providing professional analysis by other academics as well as various
historical facts as data which will then be processed and interpreted
to formulate an argument. This paper will also attempt to apply
certain theories and models to the actions of both the Filipino people
collectively, the condition of democracy and Marcos’s beliefs and
actions to further the argument. The first argument will cover Frank
Lynch’s concept of “social acceptance” and the Filipino hiya while the
second argument will cover the utang na loob and the culture of
Patronage in the Philippine context, all of which will be in regards
to Marcos’s actions, policies and directives. This will include,
though will not be limited to, a short history of these Philippine
social values as well as in what setting and sense they were
influenced.
After repeated research, consistent revision and constant improvement,
this paper has sufficient evidence and rationale to propose and verify
its thesis that Marcos did indeed take advantage of social factors and
that these social factors were, in vice versa, crucial to Marcos’s
success. Six frequently used words in this paper will be: the utang
which refers to a debt of gratitude, hiya which is “shame”,
“manipulation”, “social”, “cultural” and “values”.
INTRODUCTION
On December 30 of 1965, Ferdinand Emmanuel Edralin Marcos became the
10th President of the Republic of the Philippines. Though debate
remains on the overall effect or even the intention of Marcos-era
policies, what is undisputed (and which this paper holds to be true)
is that during the two decade-long tenure of President Ferdinand
Marcos, there existed a “state of infidelity”, a national condition
wherein a regime-sanctioned adulterism of the public funds (and by
extension, public trust) existed in nearly every aspect of government
service, virtually transforming the democratic Philippine republic
into a Marcos-led kleptocratic police-state . During his 21-
uninterrupted years in the office of the Chief Executive, Marcos was
accused of advocating and being directly involved in widespread public
corruption, cronyism, the embezzlement of government funds and human
rights repressions [1]. These criminal acts eventually factored into the
peaceful people-backed ouster that led to Marcos’s self-exile in 1986
[2].
This paper will be examining some of the individual philosophies of
thought, via a socio-analytical approach, leading to the enactment of
various articles of legislation, both tangible and intangible in
design, during the Marcos-era and their effects on prevailing
Philippine social orders under the framework of the “New Society”, a
general term used by this paper to encompass all economic, cultural
and security-related policies as well as singular actions advocated
and encouraged by the Marcos administration in order to encourage
communal change and to justify increasing militarization against a
growing insurgency. What was the state of the Philippine liberal
democracy under Marcos? How did this change over time? What particular
cultural values were exploited by Marcos and his allies to allow them
to abuse their positions of authority with impunity? What sort of
political or social philosophy did Marcos use to justify his actions?
These are some of the questions that this paper seeks to answer by
proving that Marcos manipulated popular Filipino cultural ideals, such
as that of nationalism, “Filipinism”, and the long-held tradition of
utang na loob, among others, on a grand scale by utilizing populist
cultural policies to deliberately mislead the Filipino public and
divert attention away from the human rights abuses, policy misstepping
and the large-scale inefficacy of his governance; thus providing a
basis from which assorted intellectuals interested in events crucial
to the later development of the modern Philippine political polity and
contemporary society in general, specifically the events leading up to
the EDSA Revolution.
Such a study using a uniquely cultural and psychological approach by a
neophyte new to the academic field has not, insofar as known, been
undertaken previously; hopefully contributing to the broad expanse of
existing literature and historical analysis on the Marcos regime and
the Marcos persona itself.
Propaganda and the Emotional Society
Marcos, throughout his career, has consistently fabricated fictions
regarding his life, his work and even his wife. According to the
estimable Sterling Seagrave in his book “The Marcos Dynasty”,
Ferdinand Marcos has repeatedly lied about his past, providing
flattering images of his life to highly-paid biographers, detailing
himself as a “superbright child of a poor but honest family” as well a
WWII war veteran with an impeccable record, among others. It is later
revealed, though not widely-known, that a US Army investigation found
Marcos’s WWII claims to be false and even “criminal” and that his
father was not only a powerful Chinese magistrate but a “leading
member of one of the six richest and most powerful clans in the
islands”. [1] This explains the relative ease with which Marcos rose to
Congressional office as well as his later connections within the
wealthy Chinese business community, an interest group crucial to the
success of Marcos’s economic banditry.
But how did Marcos manage to persuade millions of Filipinos that such
outright falsehoods were actually undeniable facts? Seagrave mentions
that several biographies written about Marcos by high-profile
journalists helped to consolidate the myth, but also notes that such a
propagandist endeavor could not have succeeded without the support of
a supremely-powerful group, a group which helped to popularize the
biographies and newspaper articles as realities. This group is the
United States government, a nation with a foreign policy keen on
sustaining whatever pro-West regime decided to support them in their
Cold War efforts against Communism. Seagrave, and several other
authors acknowledge that Marcos’s administration would never have
lasted so long without the public or secret approval of the United
States. However, this paper holds that although foreign influence and
external supporters are major contributors to Marcos’s regime and by
extension the confabulation of Philippine society; Philippine society
itself is an important factor.
Analysts and academics agree that Philippine society is, by nature,
emotional [2]; that is, the heavy inclination by a collective group
towards considering emotional elements as determinants in dealing with
various problems or issues. A crucial aspect of this is the almost-
constant sensitivity to the feelings and thoughts of others that a
Filipino has, what Frank Lynch calls “social acceptance”. Lynch
describes this as “the emphasis placed on pleasant interaction (…) and
the means taken to assure it” wherein “one is taken by one’s fellows
for what he is, or believes he is, and is treated in accordance with
his status”. Lynch clarifies by differentiating between American
social acceptance and the Philippine version by arguing that while the
average American “achieves peace (…) by agreement to disagree”; the
average Filipino is more likely to achieve peace by simply blurring
the differences between two opposing views or by “agreement not to
disagree – at least openly”. Lynch furthers the idea by saying that
the “Filipino sees no reason why conflict should be courted when
silence or evasive speech” will do; essentially arguing that Filipinos
prefer to avoid conflict rather than confront it. To refuse conformity
to this perception of social acceptance (for example, by being deliberately
blunt in slandering another) does have its consequences. Hiya, as Lynch
describes, “is a universal social sanction… (that) enforces conformity
with all aspects of the social code” and is the Filipino equivalent of
“shame”. [3] In essence, it is that “uncomfortable feeling that
accompanies awareness of being in a socially unacceptable position”.
Though some will counter that Lynch’s “study” is from an age long
past, saying that many of the characteristics of Philippine culture
and society mentioned by Lynch have revolted from past
generalizations; one contends that the idea of social acceptance is
central to the functioning of Philippine society and is one of the
primary aspects of the aforementioned Filipino “emotionality”.
Assuming the predominance of this uniquely Filipino character, it is
easy to see the inability of the Philippine political culture and
society in general to correctly respond to Marcos’s blatant
propaganda. Seagrave says that even the most respected journals in the
United States began quoting from one particularly successful biography
[4]; “After that, who was to challenge the authenticity of the Marcos
legend?” (Seagrave, 4) Given the inherent trust most Filipinos have
towards the validity of overseas written works in contrast to their
own local papers [5], Filipinos found their beliefs justified in the
publication of these Marcos biographies. So, to the average Filipino
mind, Marcos was something akin to the Philippines’s global
ambassador, a physical manifestation of the best and brightest that
the Philippine islands could offer to the international beauty pageant
of liberal, pro-West Third World leaders. With emotions and
nationalistic pride forefront in the Filipino mindset, how could
anyone possibly criticize Marcos, another Filipino, after being cited
in so many foreign papers and periodicals referring to him as nothing
short of a war hero? Marcos received massive public approval boosts
from the publishing of these printed fantasies, swinging votes in
Marcos’s direction at a critical stage during the 1965 Presidential
Elections.
And since the Filipino will not insist on an idea or upon a course of
action without a modicum of relative popular support or at least the
knowledge that whatever deed the individual undertakes or act he
condones will not place him in a socially-awkward or socially-
disadvantaged position with respect to the rest of his particular
social class (the idea of the “social class” also prevalent in
Philippine tradition), any critics, both in the academic field or in
the household, more or less had their opinions quashed; or were simply
ignored by the majority (the latter event occurring to those brave few
who did decide to publish their views in writing). Or, more likely,
they may have simply chosen to remain silent. Faultfinders kept their
opinions to themselves out of the subconscious fear of hiya, or because
they did not see sufficient incentive to overcome their natural state
of peace by supporting a dissenting view with respect to the Filipino
preference of non-confrontation. Thusly, these detractors could only
watch helpless as Marcos rose to the Office of the President in spite
of their reservations in him. In fact, given time, those detractors
most likely ended up altering their opinions of Marcos to conform to
the rest of society’s version of Marcos. It was only during the
decline in Marcos’s popularity that mentions of Marcos’s dishonesty
began appearing in discussions within the House of Representatives.
The Establishment and the Etiquette of Bribery
Scholars agree that, since the colonial era, Philippine society (and
with independence, the state) has been dominated by the concept of
Patronage - an “informal relationship between persons of unequal
status and powers, which imposes reciprocal obligations of a different
kind on each of the parties” [6]; and this phenomenon has been carried
over into contemporary times, exploited countlessly by any number of
politicians and by opportunistic businesspeople to curry favor, expand
their respective power bases, and to gain wealth (often through
unscrupulous, extortive measures). Varying degrees of Patronage exist,
affecting interactions within the political, economic, and social
arenas, going so far as to influence the fine arts and cultural
sectors. In a classic political example, a regional governor attempts
to solicit the support of local community leaders during the period
before local elections. These local community leaders will then
deliver votes of their respective communities, and the regional
governor (upon winning) will then reward the local leaders with
positions of power and influence or via some other method of payment
(the most blatant form being a monetary reward – direct bribery).
Marcos and his Establishment (the Marcos-led oligarchy) were not
exceptions to this, and, arguably, the success of their actions and
policies can largely be attributed to their expert manipulation of
this particular social circumstance.
However, while the idea of Patronage has been well-documented and
exhaustibly detailed in various academic papers transnationally (the
phenomena not limited to the Philippine setting) [7], what is not as
well-known is that there exists a distinctively Filipino trait which
has specifically fathered Patronage within the Philippine context,
ingraining Patronage into the activity of modern social orders and
allowing it to subsist in nearly every level of society; inevitably
shaping person-to-person relationships and altering political dynamics
of power and authority. This cultural trait bears nearly identical
features as to that of Patronage, but is genuine and exceptional in
its own manner.
Marshall Sahlins calls this cultural phenomenon, in the general sense,
“reciprocity” [8]. Scholars broadly describe it as “referring to the
non-market exchange of goods or labor ranging from direct barter
(immediate exchange) to forms of gift exchange where a return is
expected eventually. However, there are dissenters, some arguing that
the idea of “reciprocity” is so broad and so general, it could “mean
almost anything” making it “meaningless”. [9] But this paper holds that
reciprocity is a quantifiable if abstract concept, a valid approach in
studying an observable social occurrence. Reciprocity and, by
extension, the “gift exchange economy” [10] (which relates to a more
direct, physical trade of goods) has been extensively discussed in
anthropological circles, with thinkers like John Locke and Adam Smith
viewing it as vital to the function of a free-market economy [11]; while
a whole plethora of literature exists on the subject.
However, in fulfillment of this research paper’s limitations, we will
seek to undertake a more Filipino-specific approach; and thus we refer
to Mary Hollnsteiner’s work on reciprocity and her studies regarding
its utility and function in small-town Filipino environments.
Hollnsteiner further details reciprocity in the overall sense as being
“that principle of behavior wherein every service received, solicited
or not, demands a return, the nature and proportion of the return
determined by the relative statuses of the parties involved and the
kind of exchange at issue” [12]. Hollnsteiner classifies reciprocity
into three separate categories: contractual reciprocity, quasi-
contractual reciprocity, and the utang na loob (Hollnsteiner, 23-4). But
for the purposes of this paper, the term utang na loob will be used to
describe the theory of reciprocity and the ideas entailed therein as
well as its associated political ramifications, with respect to the
Filipino setting.
Utang na loob, literally meaning “debt from within”, or more colloquially
as “debt of gratitude”, correspondingly takes off from the provided
definition of Filipino reciprocity. The difference lays in the
reasoning that while reciprocity can refer to any “non-market exchange
of goods… where an eventual return is expected” as mentioned, utang na
loob is characterized by “unequal repayment with no prior agreement,
explicit or implicit, on the form or quantity of the return.” This
means that no actual physical discussion occurs between the client and
the patron as to when (after the client receives a good or a form of
service from the patron) the client must return a demanded service
expected by the patron, though the patron does not explicitly demand
anything. Such a system could only possibly function so extremely in a
highly emotional society, to which the social structure of the
Philippines overwhelmingly qualifies. The client and the patron both
recognize their duties towards performing a particular service, and
subconsciously accept their roles in the hierarchy of reciprocity and
the utang.
However, the utang by itself is not inherently evil or “bad”, but its
nature gives it the capacity to be auxiliary to the firm establishment
of Patronage in the traditional and civil operation of Philippine
society. This is due to the fact that the component attributes of both
Patronage and the utang are nearly indistinguishable: both cater to a
patrimonial relationship between two groups or individuals, both are
common occurrences in day-to-day economic and social cycles, and
neither are fundamentally criminal or immoral, though they can be
devised to purpose in such a manner.
But Patronage and the utang are not simply evolved from matters of
nothing. The roots of these social principles are found within
Philippine history and its extreme transitions through varying degrees
of statehood, radically transforming from that of an archipelago of
scattered communities into that of a Spanish colony; until becoming an
American client-state and then finally achieving independence (though
on a limited basis), but without developing the stable political
culture founded on democratic ideals necessary to progress beyond its
imperialist past, in contrast to nations with unwavering ideals of
egalitarianism like the modern United States or the past French
Republic. Baluyut notes that reciprocity was transformed “within the
context of colonial convention” where the land-holding elites, also
known as caciques, “greatly diminished the peasantry’s bargaining
position, paving the way for a national oligarchy”. And, with the
advent of American occupation, the patron-client relationship was only
enhanced, granting the “native elite” with opportunities “to expand
its power base”. (Baluyut, 2-4) Essentially, the Philippines has
lacked a single self-determinant group or event from which to merge
far-flung regions with vaguely disparate cultures and traditions into
a distinct whole (such as a Founding Father figure); thus preventing
the Philippines from becoming a truly joined nation.
And, not unaware of these cultural, social and historical phenomena,
Marcos set out to begin performing a “service” for the Filipino
people, with no less than his controversial wife Imelda leading the
cultural “rediscovery”. Though veritable mountains of literature have
been written about Marcos and his governance, similar hills of written
works have set out to examine and profile the First Lady. To the
interest of many, Imelda has done what Seagrave describes as something
“no other Filipino First Lady had ever done”; she became active in
national affairs. One of her biographers, Kerima Polotan, described
Imelda’s later actions in a single sentence – “She would sow beauty
where she could”. (Seagrave, 189) Thusly, in 1966 and at the behest of
his wife, Marcos signed Executive Order 30 which officially created
the Cultural Center of the Philippines. Marcos appointed Imelda as
chairperson of the CCP’s seven-member Board of Trustees, and, under
her, the CCP instituted numerous programs, including the creation of
the National Artist’s Award. (Baluyut, 11- 6, 26-7) Imelda also
assumed other personal social welfare programs, such as the Save-a-
Life-in-Every-Barrio project, Christmas bags, “home gardens and
disaster relief” (Seagrave, 190).
But these policies were not without criticism and were most certainly
not devoid of classic Marcos misdirection. In February of 1969,
Senator Benigno Aquino “vociferously attacked Ferdinand and Imelda
Marcos”, alleging that the CCP was an “illegal agency” for its lack of
Congressional approval since the creation of a cultural body was a
legislative function, something that the Executive was incapable of
doing. Aquino was, of course, duly ignored by the soon-to-be
totalitarian Marcos regime which dodged legal challenges under the
constitutional protection of immunity. (Baluyut, 21-3) Jaime Ferrer
also acknowledged that vices and venalities were already present in
the first years of the Marcos administration, noting that during many
such Imelda-led “drives for the poor”, all checks were made out to
Imelda and deposited in her name and were thusly “not used for the
poor”. When word got around of Imelda’s thievery, companies and
philanthropic groups sent goods instead, but that Imelda still
withheld food bags for a day or so (even during disasters) until “each
could be tagged ‘A Gift from the First Lady.’” (Seagrave, 190) Even
the funding for the CCP and related projects was processed via shady
dealings from questionable sources, with 3.5M dollars of the
Philippine’s veteran education fund realigned for the CCP with the
approval of the American government. Dozens of unvouchered, entirely
discretionary grants were also provided by the Johnson administration
to the Marcoses for their continued support of the United States and
its Cold War efforts, hidden under masks of being intended for
different military, social or state projects, eventually totaling
195.4M dollars. Even stranger, very little of this amount seems to
have reached its “supposed” destination, mysteriously disappearing
into government-controlled banks run by personal friends of the
Marcoses. (Seagrave, 191-5)
So, as the principal architects of several policies envisioned to
instigate a social “revolution” by centralizing the “idea of the
Filipino”, the Marcoses (and his allies by extension), in the eyes of
the common man, became the “patrons” of the arts and protectors of the
Filipino heritage. What many failed to notice was that Marcos had no
genuine ambition to transform Philippine society into a legitimate and
genuine democratic state. However, this fact was, arguably, nearly
invisible at first. In his writings, Marcos separately references to
egalitarian ideals, saying that to establish such a liberal society,
Filipinos must use their “communal, humanist value system” to “serve
the ends of the democratic revolution.” He even speaks of the
importance of social institutions, while advocating the incorporation
of “values indigenous to the client society” in a framework for
universal values. [14] This is, in essence, in line with what Kamrava
describes as a “viable democracy”, a state “upheld by a liberal
democratic constitution, and built on an entrenched tradition of
societal autonomy.” [15] These assorted intellectual texts probably
provided a basis from which a groundswell of Marcos support could
legitimately spring, and most likely did enough to appease Marcos’s
Western supporters of his continued loyalty to American policy.
But Marcos contradicts his own self-proclaimed dedication to the
“genuine” democratic ideal when he broadly endorses the Philippine
political culture for being “populist, personalist, and
individualist”, manifesting itself in the “politician”. He justifies
this by describing the relationship between the average politician and
the average Filipino, noting that the Filipino normally sees the
politician as the “provider” of all things, someone who anyone can
approach for any want or need beyond their own ability. [16] This
effectively becomes an ideology contrary to the characteristics of a
viable democracy, sponsoring what Kamrava calls a “subject political
culture” where “there is a one-way, downward flow of influence from
the political top to the social base, and society's norms and values
toward the larger body politic are at best passive and at worst
nonexistent” (Kamrava, 77). Therefore, contrary to creating the
Philippines in the image of a viable democracy as Marcos proposes,
Marcos actually wanted to create a “delegative democracy”, a type of
quasi-democracy where “the protection and integrity of democracy are
delegated to one man (…) where the importance of every other
institution of democracy - the parliament, political parties,
electoral procedures, etc. - pales in comparison to that of the
presidency." (Kamrava, 98) This is, without a doubt, the
quintessential manifestation of the culture of Patronage and the
political avatar of the social utang.
Thusly, Marcos became the de facto and de jure “patron” of the people,
while the latter devolved into a mere “client” in the two-party
relationship of patronage. The policies took propaganda-like form
through various mass-information mediums such as education, cultural
works and the fine arts. This particular Marcosian pursuit of social
reformation through political action has come to be collectively known
as the “Bagong Lipunan (New Society)”, the collective phrase used to
describe all Marcos-era policies used in justification for a rapid
“democratization” of the Philippines, eventually culminating in human
rights abuses called “salvaging”, a process in which various secret
police arms systematically kidnapped, jailed, tortured and murdered
political opponents of the Marcos regime under direct orders from
Marcos and his subordinates. These human rights abuses were only
discovered after the fall of the Marcos regime when the veil of
blanket propaganda was lifted and the widely-rumored abductions were
confirmed.
And so, through varying methods of money laundering and the long-term
embezzlement of public funds, Marcos was able to create a “grand
gift”, or some would say a bribe, to the Filipino people in the form
of the CPP and its attached social development programs, altogether
fashioning a society that felt emotionally gratuitous to the Marcos
administration, a people who felt they owed an utang towards the
Marcoses in spite of the latter’s blatant, unabashed and total
betrayal of the Filipino public and their trust. In fulfillment of
society’s utang, the Filipino people once again elected the Marcoses to
the same position in the next general elections in spite of the
government’s utter failure in upholding its promises; the people even
widely supporting the declaration of martial law in 1972; a
proclamation that threatened the very democratic principles that the
country was supposed to be founded on, fooled by the Marcoses’ clever
exploitation of existing cultural norms and values in order to enrich
themselves and their close allies. People saw their continued support
of Marcos as their duty, and followed through with it as such. Any
criticisms were once against either ignored or shouted down, the hiya of
society restricting the behavior of the anti-Marcos minority against
the overwhelming majority of Filipinos, even though Marcos was
murdering the very constituents he was supposed to protect.
CONCLUSION
After more than two decades of some of the worst forms of corruption
in the history of the Philippines and the frequent mockery of the
democratic ideal, Marcos fled the country. The millions who were tired
of Marcos’s crimes, his inefficiency, and the utter lack of either
social or economic progress rose up in a popular revolution and
Marcos, with advice from his foreign supporters, exiled himself to
Hawaii.
But this paper holds that Marcos was not solely to blame. Marcos did
not threaten the Filipino people with the sword (at least initially)
nor did he formulate his policies against overwhelming opposition.
Instead, Marcos administered his poison by offering a metaphorical fig
leaf to the Filipino people, packaging his sins under wraps of gift
paper and ribbons. With the subtle social norms of the utang, hiya, and
social acceptance at the fore, the Filipino people unilaterally chose
to support and sustain the crimes of the Marcos regime, either
knowingly or unknowingly providing their assent; or, at least refusing
to oppose the Establishment in any manner meaningful enough to create
valid change. Arguably, the Philippine political and social cultures
and its appendages can be said to be accessory to the mismanagement of
domestic, fiscal and foreign policy that characterizes the Marcos
administration, creating the avenue with which the Marcoses could
mislead and trick the Filipino people. It acted as the key exploited
to access the secrets of Philippine society, and Marcos turned this
key so successfully that for 21-years, his power went nearly
unchallenged by any significant resistance. Social acceptance and hiya
prevented the tiny minority from moving the vast majority, while the
long-standing utang and the different systems of Patronage prevented the
majority of the Philippine population from seeing through Marcos’s
skillfully laid shroud of lies and half-truths and peer into the
regime-sanctioned delinquencies and felonies that characterized the
era under Martial Law.
However, this paper does have its own limitations, which it accepts.
This paper does not sufficiently cover some of the other important
aspects of Marcos’s rule, such as by providing further scrutiny on
things such as the nature of oligarchical rule in the Philippines, the
damaging effects of many of Marcos’s economic and social policies, the
political black-ops within the Philippine-American relationship during
the Cold War, and the greater application of the numerous political
models (Kamrava’s 6 different democracies, etc.) to the state and
circumstance of the Philippine democracy, nor does it cover the
various other unmentioned social factors which contributed to Marcos’s
success (and there are many). Future papers should take into account
that while the Marcos-era is full of possible research topics and
thesis arguments, one should remain specific, narrowly-anchored and
consistent lest he fall into inefficient broadness inherent in certain
novice academic writings.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.) For Every Tear A Victory, by Hartzell Spence. Seagrave says
that it is Spence’s biography which spoke of a “heroic Marcos
legend”, more than anything that began altering public
perceptions in both the Philippines and the United States,
lending Marcos a “ring of validity”; and the book was widely
supported by the United States government, in line with their
foreign policy. The book was published in 1964, nearly around the
same time as the run-up to the Presidential elections.
2.) Though many would doubt this, it is clear that many
Filipinos are more inclined to respect the claims and “facts” of
information provided by foreign particulars that agree with their
own opinions (or the opinions they’d like themselves to believe)
more than they would the statements of local papers. This “trust”
probably stems from the Filipino’s mistrust in their own
government and their own local media centers; though this
conviction may be misplaced given that foreign publications are
just as likely to “lie” (knowingly or unknowingly) as local
publications given just the right amount of pressure.
3.) Seagrave, Sterling. The Marcos Dynasty. New York: Harper & Row
Publishers, 1988. Print, p.3-8
4.) Based on appraisals from “Four Readings on Philippine
Values”, especially the essays “Social Acceptance” by Frank Lynch
and “Reciprocity in Lowland Philippines” by Mary R. Hollnsteiner.
5.) Lynch, Frank. Four Readings on Philippine Values. Quezon City: Ateneo
de Manila University Press, 1968. Print, p. 3, 6, 16
6.) Baluyut, Pearlie Rose S. Institutions and Icons of Patronage. Manila:
UST Publishing House, 2012. Print, p.3
7.) For further details, see “Comparative Studies in Society and
History” by Joel-Kahn or “Politics, Patronage, and Class Conflict
in Central Luzon” by Willem Wolters.
8.) Sahlins, Marshall. Stone Age Economics. Chicago: Aldine &
Artherton Inc., 1972. Print, p. 185-9
9.) Cheal, David. The Gift Economy. New York: Routledge, 1988.
Print, p. 1-19
10.) Graeber, David. Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value : the false
coin of our own dreams. New York: Palgrave, 2001. Print, p. 217
11.) Weiner, Annette. Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping While
Giving. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. Print, p.
28-33
12.) Hollnsteiner, Mary. Reciprocity in the Lowland Philippines. Quezon
City: 1968. Print, p. 22
13.) Rafael, Vicente. Patronage and Pornography. Durnham: Duke
University Press, 2000. Print, p. 296
14.) Marcos, Ferdinand. An Ideology for Filipinos. Manila: Marcos
Foundation Inc., 1983. Print, p. 7-20
15.) Kamrava, Mehran. Cultural Politics in the Third World. London: UCL
Press, 1999. Print. p.97
16.) Marcos, Ferdinand. The Democratic Revolution in the Philippines.
Manila: Marcos Foundation Inc., 1977. Print, p. 51-60
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