do voters only see what they want to see?: the relationship between political ideology and research...
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Anthony Torretti
S. Nichols
PSCI 301
May 16th, 2012
Do Voters Only See What They Want to See?:
The Relationship Between Political Ideology and Research Source Choice
I. Introduction
In a democracy, members of the general public are tasked with making at least some decisions
that can change the fate of a nation. Ideally, a voter would do her best to stay informed on issues of
importance. This can be a difficult task in today's media environment. For television viewers, a news
broadcast that fits their ideology is just a few channels away. Internet users have an even wider array of
sources to choose their political reality from. With such diverse perspectives and biases populating the
information age, this raises a somewhat troubling question: does the average voter seek clarity on
confusing political issues, or does the voter settle for whatever position is expressed by the rhetoric he
is most comfortable with? How influential is this rhetoric in leading a biased voter into forming her
opinion? Such questions are of vital importance when trying to understand modern democracies. Critics
of mass media often lament about how corporate news media has polarized the electorate; but if we
look at this polarized news media as a commodity, shouldn't there also be equal concern expressed over
the demand for it? The purpose of this research, ultimately, is to verify the existence of consumer-side
bias in the consumption of political information, and how that bias shapes information consumption
and the opinions people form from that information.
While there have been a number of studies on the role of selective exposure in the context of
political information, there are a few factors that differentiate this piece of research from those that
precede it. For one, the studies that precede this have focused on what role selective exposure plays in
media choice rather than trying to verify its existence. (Arceneaux et. al, 2012) (Robert & Dennis,
2005) This is a somewhat problematic, as it has been shown in other media research that the influence
of selective exposure is not absolute. (Donsbach, 2009) Thus, this research and experimental model
will focus on verifying the role of selective exposure, and measuring what extent it plays, in political
media choice.
II. Theory and Hypothesis
This notion that the individual is drawn towards reinforcements of his views while avoiding
contradictions of those views is known as cognitive dissonance, and dates back to research by Festinger
in 1957. (Westerwick & Klienman, 2011) While this theory started out as a general psychological
concept, it was gradually adopted by scholars of media and communications. Today, it is more
commonly known as selective exposure theory and serves as the theoretical basis of this research.
(Donsbach, 2009)
According to the selective exposure theory, a media consumer only exposes herself to messages
that she is comfortable with. Everyone has their way of perceiving reality, and cognitive
dissonance/selective exposure theories suggest that the individual seeks to validate this reality while
avoiding anything that invalidates it. In the context of elections and media, a voter with a specific
ideology will seek media and information that validates his political philosophy, while avoiding media
information that invalidates it. Thus, if such a voter were presented with a political issue and given the
choice to research a political issue from sources of varying ideology, her primary source choice will be
one that best reinforces her ideology. Furthermore, if she has no previous concept of the issue
presented, she will ultimately abide by whatever policy position is rhetorically framed in her ideology.
Thus, the hypotheses of this research are two-fold and are as follows.
In a comparison of voters prompted to research a political topic:
- Those with a more intense political ideology will choose more intensely partisan
sources than those with more ambivalent political views
- Those with a more intense political ideology are more likely to abide by the policy
position framed within their own ideological rhetoric when faced with an unknown
issue.
III. Data and Method
The data will be collected via a controlled experiment process of my own design. The process
uses a digital software interface, issued via a laptop or tablet device, to present the participant with a
policy question, followed by a series of links to differing perspectives on the issue. After the participant
has the opportunity to read one or more of these sources, the survey asks for the participant's opinion
on the issue at hand. Once that opinion is inputted, the survey presents a series of general opinion
questions in order to pinpoint where the participant falls on the politico-ideological scale. The variables
are recorded unobtrusively by the software, and include the participant's source choices, the time spent
on each source, the participant's opinion on the presented policy issue, and the participant's overall
political ideology.
When first presented with the survey, the participant is sent through a series of introduction
screens. (Figure A-B) These introduction screens serve to introduce the political issue, and set up the
tone under which the survey is taken. The introduction screen purports that the survey is being
conducted by Camdien Policy Institute, claiming that the data it gathers is then given to politicians and
campaign managers. This bit of misinformation helps give the survey a sense of importance,
encourcing the participant to give sincere, thoughtful answers in the hope of having actual influence on
the views of politicians. The participant is also introduced to the issue of “reapportioning nontangible
local assets into a unitary city fund”. The wordy and ambiguous nature of the terminology is deliberate.
By testing participants with a fictitious and ambiguous policy matter, we can make our observations
without the influences of the participant's personal experiences and perspectives on the policy subject.
Finally, as the participant is brought through the introduction screens, she is randomly assigned to one
of three groups.
After the introduction screens, the participant will be brought to a screen with a list of sources.
What sources he sees depends on what group he was placed in. Group 1 is the control group.
Participants in the control group are given only one source link: a basic summary of facts on the policy
issue. (Figure C) Group 2 is given five links, counting the summary of facts. These other sources range
in support and opposition of the policy measure, ranging from an extreme opposition of 1 and an
extreme support of 5. (Figure D) Political rhetoric of each source also ranges on a 1-5 scale, with 1
being the most fiscally moralist, and 5 being the most fiscally individualist. In mainstream U.S.
Politics, fiscal moralism is typically associated with liberalism, while fiscal individualism is associated
with conservatism. This distinction is important, because this allows us to control on actual ideology
rather than group identity, which is often confused with ones ideology when categorizing based on
traditional party structure. Participants in Group 3 are given a list similar to Group 2, but with one
variation: the opinions expressed by the differing sides of the fiscal-ideological spectrum are reversed.
(Figure E) In Group 1, the relationship between support and fiscal ideology is negative. As support
rises on the 1-5 scale, fiscal ideology descends in the moralist direction on the 1-5 scale. In Group 2,
the relationship is positive. In short, the moralist and individualist stances on the issue are flipped
between the two groups. This helps differentiate between opinions formed by respondents who've
attempted to analyze the issue, and respondents who simply fall in line with the rhetoric that fits their
ideology. In each group, the participant's source choices and time spent on each source is tracked.
After the participant is finished with the source list, the first survey question is posed as follows
(Figure E):
Based on what you've learned about the measure, how would you rate your support for
"funding reapportionment" policies such as CB 62A?
1 – Strongly Oppose, 2- Oppose, 3-Neutral/Unsure, 4-Support, 5-Strongly Support
This answer is then recorded, once again on a 1 to 5 scale, and the participant is presented with the
following survey questions (Figure F):
- Our national and state governments are faced with numerous fiscal problems at
this point. Many political leaders advocate large cuts to the budget whereas other
political leaders want to increase revenues. On a 1-5 scale, where would you place
yourself in that debate?
- A lot of political dialogue these days has revolved around what role corporations should
play in our economic recovery. The main conflict tends to be between those who believe
corporations being prosperous will help the economy recover, and those who believe that
corporations being responsible will be of better help. On a 1- 5 scale, which argument do
you more closely identify with?
-What fiscal role do you think government should play? Do you tend to see government as
the shaper of an ideal society or the provider for only the most basic societal needs? Rate
yourself on a 1 to 5 scale.
Each of these questions have five responses rated on a 1-5 scale. Responses scored with 1 are responses
that would be affiliated with fiscal moralism; whereas 5 responses would be affiliated with fiscal
individualism. The software then takes these responses and averages them, assigning the respondent an
overall fiscal-ideological identity for use in analysis.
IV. Results
When comparing the two variables of ideology and first source choice, we use gamma since
both the independent and dependent variables are on a 1-5 scale, and are therefore ordinal.
TABLE 1: Fiscal Ideology VS First Source Choice
# of Valid Cases (out of 158) Gamma Significance
69 0.67 0
Above, we see that the gamma yields a considerably positive relationship, and with a
significance of zero, the null hypothesis can be easily rejected. In essence, those with a fiscal-
ideological category of 1 were highly likely to choose the source that had an ideological slant of 1, and
so on. But is the high gamma caused by those with intense ideologies? Or is it all the moderate
individuals choosing the more neutral options that boosted this correlation? By establishing the base-
line source choice “3” as a missing variable, we can see how the outliers affected the gama.
TABLE 2: Fiscal Ideology VS First Source Choice (Neutral Source as Missing Variable)
# of Valid Cases (out of 158) Gamma Significance
16 0.7 0
Here, we see that the elimination of the neutral source actually increases the gamma, indicating
an even stronger correlation that exists among the outliers of fiscal ideology. Overall, the data present
seems to support the first hypothesis.
One potential weakness in the data present is the number of valid cases, or the number of
individuals who chose to read any source. While some lacking in participation was expected, the extent
to which participants chose to not read any source made a good amount of the data unusable in testing
the first hypothesis. There are a few explanations as to why so many declined. For one, choosing a
source was optional, and the importance of reading any of the source links was not emphasized.
Another possible explanation is that early participants were given a snack-size bag of chips as an
incentive to participate. Participants encouraged to participate in this way are, perhaps, more likely to
give minimal input into a survey.
Table: 3 Number of Sources Read VS Chip or Non-Chip Recipient (Chip Recipient = 1, Non-
Chip=0)
# of Valid Cases (out of 158) Gamma Significance
158 -0.63 0
The above chart indicates a highly negative relationship between chip reception and number of
sources read. Meaning that those who received chips were significantly more likely to give minimal
input than those not given chips.
The second hypothesis, fortunately, did not suffer from the same pitfalls, mainly because a
participant didn't need to actually read a source in order to be subject to the effects of narrative framing.
In the table below, we see how drastically different the opinions are of the individuals in the different
control groups.
Table 4: Fiscal Idealolgy VS Support/Opposition Among Experimental Groups
GROUP GAMMA SIGNIFICANCE CASES
Control -0.26 0.18 69
Moralist
Support/Individ Oppose
-0.96 0.02 38
Individ.
Support/Moralist
Oppose
0.9 0.05 37
While there is a negative relationship even within the control group, it is considerably low in
magnitude and the null hypothesis is stronger in that group than it is in either of the other groups. The
gamma is extremely strong in the other groups, in completely opposite directions. In short, participants
with the same ideology rating, but exposed to different headlines, gave completely opposing answers
when asked about support for the policy measure, and thereby lending extreme validity to the second
hypothesis.
V. Future Considerations
While the best steps were taken to rule out experimental error, the process was not without its
missteps upon reflection. For one, the survey did not put enough emphasis on the importance of making
at least one source selection. Had more participants been encouraged to make selections, the sample
size would have been considerably larger. The lack of diversity in the sample size may have also
limited the accuracy of the results. This survey was conducted primarily on college campuses at
California State University San Marcos, and Palomar College. Some attempts were made to conduct
the survey at locations such as Wal-Mart, but very few expressed interest in participation. As a result,
the experimental sample can be said to, at best, represent college-aged individuals but not the
population at large.
In addition to the missteps above, there are also improvements that could be made in the process
to ensure more accurate results in the future. For one, the use of a 1-7 scale as opposed to a 1-5 scale
would better capture the diversity of individual political ideology, and the use of a more complex series
of questions to determine the participant's fiscal ideology would better reveal the nuance that exists
among the fiscal views of participants. Furthermore, while attempts were made to create a sense of
importance in how the participant answered, it proved to be ineffective in motivating participants to
select sources and contemplate the issue. All in all, while the data that the experiment yielded managed
to support both hypotheses, we are a long way from being able to claim anything conclusive.
VI. Conclusion
Overall, the data yielded by the experiment managed to reinforce both hypotheses. Firstly, the
relationship between strength of ideology and source choice was shown to be positive when comparing
the two variables, but didn't draw from a large enough sample to reveal anything conclusive. On the
other hand, the relationship between ideology and opinion on the surveyed policy matter was affected
drastically by what survey group each participant was placed in. The nature of the experimental model
allows us to draw a couple of inferences from this result: Firstly, that participants were more influenced
by the rhetoric or headlines that appealed to their fiscal ideology, rather than any actual judgments the
participant made on the policy matter. If the latter were true, participants would've attempted to gain as
much information possible about the policy matter, and then make a judgment based on their policy
goals as dictated by their ideology. Instead, we see participants giving wildly diverging opinions based
on little to no reading.
One major issue the emerged was the lack of source-selection on the participant's end. While
there were a number of suggested causes, one cause that was able to be reinforced by the data was the
existence of increased satisficing caused by incentivization. It is probably that giving individuals an
incentive, and withholding that incentive until the experiment's completion, encourages participants to
give minimal input and participation into the experimental model.
Ultimately, while the hypotheses were reinforced by the data, the research presented here only
represents a remedial step in delving into the relationship between political or fiscal ideology and
selective exposure in news media. As the methodology is developed and refined, it may be possible to
find a definite answer to the question in the future.
Works Cited
Arceneaux, K., Johnson, M., & Murphy, C. (2012). Polarized Political Communication, Oppositional
Media Hostility, and Selective Exposure. Journal of Politics, 74(1), 174-186.
doi:10.1017/S002238161100123X
Donsbach, W. (2009). Cognitive dissonance theory—Roller coaster career. How communication
research adapted the theory of cognitive dissonance. In T. Hartmann (Ed.), Media choice: A
theoretical and empirical overview. 128-149. London: Routledge.
Robert, L. P., & Dennis, A. R. (2005). Paradox of Richness: A Cognitive Model of Media Choice.
IEEE Transactions On Professional Communication, 48(1), 10-21.
doi:10.1109/TPC.2003.843292
Westerwick, S., & Kleinman, S. (2011, March 16). Preelection Selective Exposure: Confirmation
Bias Versus Informational Utility. Communication Research, 39, 170-194.
doi:10.1177/0093650211400597
Supplements
Figure A and B: Introduction Screens
Figure C: Control Group Source List
Figure D: Group 1 Source List (Moralist Support/Individualist Opposition) Link Order Randomized
Figure E: Group 2 Source List (Moralist Oppose/Invidivualist Support) Link Order Randomized
Figure F: Baseline Source (3) “Summary of Findings”
Figure G: Extreme Moralist (1) Sources. TOP- Group 1 Source, BOTTOM- Group 2 Source
Figure H: Moderate Moralist (2) Sources. TOP- Group 1 Source, BOTTOM, Group 2 Source
Figure I: Moderate Individualist (4) Sources. TOP- Group 1 Source, BOTTOM – Group 2 Source
Figure J: Extreme Individualist (5) Sources. TOP- Group 1 Source, BOTTOM – Group 2 Source
Figure K: Survey Question on Proposed Policy Measure “Funding Reapportionment”
Figure L: Survey “Exit Polling” Used to Assess Fiscal Ideology
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