deniable ring authentication

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Deniable Ring Authentication

Moni Naor

Weizmann Institute of Science

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AuthenticationOne of the fundamental tasks of cryptography• Alice (sender) wants to send a message m to Bob

(receiver).• They want to prevent Eve from interfering

– Bob should be sure that the message he receives is the message m Alice sent.

Alice Bob

Eve

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Is authentication transferable?

• Shared key authentication: non-transferable• except in a limited sense.

• Key idea of modern cryptography (Diffie and Hellman): can make authentication (signatures) transferable to third party - Non-repudiation.– Essential to contract signing, e-commerce…

Digital Signatures: last 25 years major effort in– Research

• Notions of security• Computationally efficient constructions

– Technology, Infrastructure, Commerce, Legal

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Is non-repudiation always desirable?Not necessarily so:• Privacy of conversation, no (verifiable) record.

– Do you want everything you ever said to be held against you?

• Bob pays for the authentication, shouldn't be able to transfer it for free

• Perhaps can gain efficiency

In this talk - merge two approaches for privacy• Deniable Authentication• Ring Authentication

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Talk• Authentication

– Traditional– Deniable– Ring

• Some Old Protocols:– Interactive Authentication (Dwork, Dolev, Naor)– Deniable Authentication (Dwork, Naor, Sahai)

• Some New Ones:– Deniable Ring Authentication– Threshold scheme– Dealing with Big Brother

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Deniable AuthenticationWant to come up with an (perhaps interactive) authentication

scheme such that the receiver keeps no receipt of conversation. This means:• Any receiver could have generated the conversation itself.

– There is a simulator that for any message m and verifier V* generates an indistinguishable conversation.

– Similar to Zero-Knowledge!– An example where zero-knowledge is the ends, not the means!

Proof of security consists of Unforgeability and Deniability

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Ring Signatures and Authentication

Can we keep the sender anonymous?Idea: prove that the signer is a member of an ad hoc set

– Other members do not cooperate– Use their `regular’ public-keys

• Signature keys [RST], Encryption [This Talk]

– Should be indistinguishable which member of the set is actually doing the authentication

Bob

Alice?? Eve

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Related Notions

Deniability has many meanings…• Undeniable signatures(Chaum and van Antwerpen 89, GKR)

– Chameleon signatures (Krawczyk and Rabin 98).• Group signaturesThe signature is intended for ultimate adjudication by a third

party (judge).– Not deniable if secret keys are revealed!

• Designated verifier proofs

• Ring Signatures [RST] ad hoc sets (users choose their keys)

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Ring Signatures [RST]

Rivest, Shamir and Tauman proposed Ring Signatures:• Signature on message m by a member of an ad hoc set of

participants– Using existing Infrastructure for signatures

• For a generated signature the source is (statistically) indistinguishable

• Non-repudiation - recipient can convince a third party of the authenticity of a signature

• Non-interactive - single round • Efficient - if underlying signature is low exponent RSA/Rabin

– Need Ideal Cipher for combining function

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Deniable Ring AuthenticationWant the properties of Ring Signatures but• With deniability - no third part authentication

– Willing to trade with interaction - essential without model changes• Use Public Encryption Keys

• Some of the keys maybe badly formedUnforgeability and Deniability - as before plus Source Hiding:

– For any verifier, for any arbitrary set of keys, some good some bad, the source is computationally indistinguishable among the good keys

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Security of Authentication Schemes

The Golswasser-Micali-Rivest classification of signature schemes can be applied to interactive authentication schemes:

The classification is according to:• Attacks• What it means to breakStrongest type: Existential unforgeable against adaptive chosen

message attack– Adversary can choose any sequence of messages m1, m2 … and receive an authentication on them.

If he then succeeds in convincing an honest verifier that some m’ not in m1, m2 … then he has broken the system

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Ring Authentication Setting

• A ring is an arbitrary set of participants including the authenticator

• Each member i of the ring has a public key Ei.– Generated according to some protocol– Good players follow it, bad ones the adversary fixes.– Example: signature, Encryption

• To run a ring authentication protocol both sides need to know E1, E2, …, En - the public key of the ring members

...

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Deniable Ring AuthenticationCompleteness for any good sender and receiver possible to complete the

authentication on any message Unforgeability Existential unforgeable against adaptive chosen message

attackDeniability

– For any verifier, for any arbitrary set of keys, some good some bad, there is simulator that can generate indistinguishable conversations.

Source Hiding:– For any verifier, for any arbitrary set of keys, some good some bad,

the source is computationally indistinguishable among the good keys

Source Hiding and Deniability – incomparable

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The Protocols

• Some background Protocols• Main Protocol for deniable ring authentication• Extended Protocol for Threshold Schemes• A protocol for deniable ring authentication in the

presence of big brother

All the protocols are based on encryption

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Encryption

• Assume an encryption scheme E• Public key K – knowing K can encrypt message m

– generate Y=EK(m)

– With corresponding secret key, given Y can retrieve m

• Process is probabilistic: to generate EK(m) choose random string

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A Public Key Authentication Protocol

[DDN,DN]P has a public key K of an encryption scheme E.To authenticate a message m:• V P : Choose r {0,1}n. Send EK(m r)

• P V : Verify that prefix of plaintext is m. If yes - send r.

Is it Unforgeable? Is it Deniable?

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Encryption: attacks and security

• Non-malleable security - whatever is computable in an encrypted form about the plaintext given the ciphertext is computable without it.

• Chosen ciphertext attacks - the post-processing mode:– Adversary has access to decryption box. Challenge ciphertext is

known when the attacks takes place (but cannot submit it...).• Strongest type of cryptosystem (?):

– non-malleable against chosen ciphertext attacks in the post-processing mode. (Non-Malleable and Semantic Security are equivalent under this attack).

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Encryption: Implementation

• Under any trapdoor permutation - rather inefficient [DDN].• Cramer & Shoup: Under the Decisional DH assumption

– Requires a few exponentiations.• With Random Oracles: several proposals

– RSA with OAEP - same complexity as vanilla RSA [Crypto’2001]– Can use low exponent RSA/Rabin

• With additional Interaction: J. Katz’s non malleable POKS?

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Security of the schemeUnforgeability: depends on the strength of EK .• Sensitive to malleability:

– if given EK(m r) can generate EK(m’ r) - can forge messages.• The protocol allows a chosen ciphertext attack on EK.

– Even of the post-processing kind!• Can prove that any strategy for existential forgery can be

translated into a CCA strategy on E• Works even against concurrent executions.Deniability: does V retain a receipt??

– It is for honest V– Need to prove knowledge of r

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Sender Receiver

Commit Phase

Reveal Phase

Sender ReceiverX

Regular Commitments

Receiver can verify X

Sender is bound to X

X

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Encryption as Commitment

When the public key K is fixed and known EK(x) can be seen as commitment to x

To open x: reveal , the random bits used to generate EK(x).

Perfect binding: from unique decryption For any Y there are no two different x and x’ and and ’ s.t.

Y = EK(x,) = EK(x’ ,’)

Secrecy: no information about x leaked to those not knowing private key corresponding to LInsecure for others

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Concurrency

Whether protocols remain secure when executed concurrently:– No online coordination between the good guys– Adversary controls schedule

Is a major issueSolutions:

– Timing– Added rounds– Non black-box?– Shared random string

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Fiat-Shamir Heuristic

Remove interaction by oracles• Can convert a public coin identification protocol into a

signature scheme using random oracles

• Can such a protocol be converted into a signature scheme?

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Deniable Protocol [DNS]

P has a public key K of an encryption scheme E.To authenticate message m:• V P: Choose r {0,1}n. Send EK(m r) - random bits used secret

• P V: Send EK(r) - random bits used secret

• V P: Send r and - opening EK(m r)

• P V: Open EK(r) by sending .

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Security of the scheme

Unforgeability: as before - depends on the strength of EK

can simulate previous scheme (with access to DK )Important property: EK(r) is a non-malleable commitment (wrt

the encryption) to r (need unique opening).Deniability: can run simulator `as usual’:• Extract r by running with E(r’) and rewinding• Expected polynomial time• Need the semantic security of E - it acts as a

commitment scheme

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Ring Signatures and Authentication

Want to keep the sender anonymous by proving that the signer is a member of an ad hoc set – Other members do not cooperate– Use their `regular’ public-keys

• Encryption [This Talk]

– Should be indistinguishable which member of the set is actually doing the authentication

Bob

?Alice Eve

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Ring Authentication Setting

• A ring is an arbitrary set of participants including the authenticator

• Each member i of the ring has a public encryption key Ei.– Everyone that knows Ei can encrypt a message m and send Ei

(m).– Only i, that knows the secret key of Ei ,can decrypt Ei (m)

• To run a ring authentication protocol both sides need to know E1, E2, …, En - the public key of the ring members

...

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A not so good Ring Authentication Protocol

Ring has public keys K1, K2, …, Kn of an encryption scheme To authenticate message m with jth decryption key:• V P: Choose r {0,1}n. Send EK1

(m r), EK2(m r), … EKn

(m r)

- random bits used i

• P V: Decrypt EKj(m r) and Send

EK1(r), EK2

(r), …, EKn(r) - random bits used i

• V P: Send r and i - opening EKi(m r)

• P V: Verify consistency and open all EKi(r) by revealing i

.

Problem: what if not all suffixes (r‘s) are equal

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The Ring Authentication Protocol

Ring has public keys K1, K2, …, Kn of an encryption scheme

To authenticate message m with jth decryption key:• V P: Choose r {0,1}n. Send EK1

(m r), EK2(m r), … EKn

(m r)

- random bits used i

• P V: Decrypt EKj(m r) and Send

EK1(r1), EK2

(r2), …, EKn(rn) where

r1 + r2 …+ rn = r

• V P: Send r and i - opening EKi(m r)

• P V: Verify consistency and open all EKi(ri) by revealing i

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Security of the scheme

Unforgeability: as before (assuming all keys are well chosen) since EK1

(r1), EK2(r2), …, EKn

(rn) is a non-malleable commitment to r

Source Hiding: which key was used (among well chosen keys) is – Computationally indistinguishable during protocol– Statistically indistinguishable after protocol

Deniability: Can run simulator `as before’: • Semantic security of one of the Ei‘s - is sufficient that

EK1(r1), …, acts as a commitment scheme

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Comparison with Ring Signatures [RST]

Disadvantages• Ours Requires interaction

– But stronger notion of deniability

• Communication proportional to ring (subset) size (as compared to single element)

Advantages• Works with any (strong

enough) encryption– unwilling participants cannot

avoid it if they want good encryption

• Provable in the `real’ world – – no random oracles or ideal

ciphers– No additional primitives

• Extensions to threshold

•Assuming random oracles - comparable to RST (up to multiplicative factors)

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Extension: Threshold and Other Access Structures

Instead of convincing a verifier that a single member of the ad hoc subset confirms the message want:– At least k members – More complex access structures

Can use secret sharing (for any access structure) without any member revealing their keys

Idea: split r according to the shares

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Extended Protocol

Ring has public keys K1, K2, …, Kn

To authenticate message m with subset T of decryption keys:• V P : Choose r{0,1}n and split into shares x1, x2, … xn

Send EK1(m x1), …, EKn

(m xn)

• P V : For each jT decrypt EKj(m xj) and reconstruct r

Send EK1(r1), EK2

(r2), …, EKn(rn) where

r1 + r2 …+ rn = r

• V P: Send r and i for all i{1..n} - opening EKi(m xi)

• P V: Verify consistency of all xi and open all EKi(ri).

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Deniable Ring authentication In the Presence Big Brother

Suppose that the adversary knows the private keys of all usersThen the protocol is not source hiding anymore:In Step 1 can encrypt different r’s and read them out in step 2

Why would they be known:– Identity Based Encryption– Revocation Schemes – Subset cover protocols.

• Enables covering any subsets by a relatively small number of keys!

Idea: use regular commitment W protocol and add a proof of knowledge to obtain non-malleability

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In the Presence Big Brother

Subset has public keys K1, K2, …, Kn To authenticate message m with jth decryption key:• V P : Choose r{0,1}n and Send EK1

(m r), …, EKn(m r)

• P V : Decrypt EKj(m r) and reconstruct r and choose

(r01,r1

1) , (r02,r1

2) … (r0m,r1

1m) s.t. r = r0i+r1

i

Send (W(r01 ) ,W(r1

1 )), (W(r02 ) ,W(r1

2 )), … (W(r0m ),W(r1

m)) • V P: Choose m random bits b1 , b2 , … , bm • P V : Open W(r0

b1 ) , W(r0b2 ) , … , W(r1

bm)) • V P: Verify the opening. Open EK1

(m r), …, EKn(m r)

• P V: Verify consistency of EKi(m r) and open the remaining W(ri).

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Open Problems• What is the communication complexity required of deniable

authentication? Is it possible to exchange o(|S|) bits (if the set is known)? – Low Communication is possible in principal

• Is source hiding alone easier than deniability– Is it possible in the shared key world (at reasonable costs)?

• What is the precise security requirement from E in the main protocol?– Katz’s NM POK

• In the access scheme is it possible for the members to be mutually untrusting wrt deniability

• Where is the border between possible and impossible in deniability• Fiat-Shamir heuristics• Social/legal implication to PKI?

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Concurrency in Timing Model [DNS]

Timing based (,) assumption for <: If one processor measures , the second , then finishes after .

To achieve concurrent deniability add timing constraintsP requires that Step 3 message be received within (local time)

from Step 1P delays Step 4 message until time from Step 1

1234< <

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...Concurrency

• Can achieve -knowledge (zero-knowledge where the simulator knows the distinguishing probability)

• Open Problem: Can Goldreich’s new simulator be used to show 0-knowledge?

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What Are Zaps A zap for a language L is a• Two-round witness indistinguishable proof system for showing XL

1. verifier prover2. prover verifier

• First round message can be fixed ``once and for all” (before X is chosen)

• The verifier uses public coins– Single round non-constructively

Theorem: Zaps for L exists if NIZKs for L exist (~ and vice versa)

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Tool: Timed Commitments [BN]

• Regular commitment

• Potential forced opening phase

X ReceiverSender

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Sender Receiver

Commit Phase

Reveal Phase

Sender ReceiverX

Regular Commitments

Receiver can verify X

Sender is bound to X

X

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Forced Open Phase

SenderX

Receiver

Receiver extracts X (+proof) in time T

Commitment is secure only for time t < T

Potential ForcedForced OpeningOpening

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Requirements

• Future recoverability - verifiable following commit phase• Decommitment - value + proof. Ditto for forcibly recovered

values. Can act as genuine proof of knowledge to committed value• Immunity to parallel attacks

Construction based on ``generalized BBS.” Uses several rounds to prove consistency of commitment [BN].

We will substitute with a zap.

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2-round Timed Deniable Auth.

Public key: keys K1 and K2 and string of zapTo authenticate m• Verifier prover:

– Choose r, y0, y1 {0,1}n. Send EK1

(m r), C(y0), C(y0)

Give zap of validity of at least one using . Random string for zaps

• Prover verifier: – Checks zap proof and decrypt r – Send Y=EK1

(r) Z= EK2(s) and zap using that either

(i) r = DK1(Y) or

(ii) DK2(Z) {y0, y1}

Timing requirement: verifier receives response within

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References

• [Dolev, Dwork, Naor] Non-malleable Cryptography, SIAM J. Computing, 2000 (prelim. version STOC’91)

• [Dwork, Naor] Method for message authentication from non-malleable cryptosystems, US Patent 1996.

• [Dwork, Naor, Sahai] Concurrent Zero-Knowledge, STOC’98.

• [Boneh, Naor] Timed Commitments, Crypto’2000.• [Dwork,Naor] Zaps and their Applications, FOCS’2000.• [Naor] Deniable Ring Authentication, Crypto 2002

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Comparison with Designated

Verifier/recipient

• No need for verifier to have a public-key• How to verify the independence of the keys of the

verifier? Interaction...