confessing to an immoral act: consequences to moral

CONFESSINGTOANIMMORALACT:

ConsequencestoMoralBeliefsandDispositions

JoelCooper

PrincetonUniversity

Whataretheconsequencesofconfessingtoanimmoralact?Inthispaper,wewill

considerthedilemmaofpeoplewhoconfesstoimmoralactsthattheydidnotcommit.

Inlawenforcement,analltoocommonoccurrenceisforpolicetoconvincesuspectsto

confesstoacrimethattheyactuallydidnotcommit.Instancesofphysicallycoerced

confessionsnotwithstanding,ourfocusisontheuncoercedconfessioninwhichthe

accusediscajoledtoadmittoacriminalaction.Peoplemaybeaccusedofmoral

transgressionsinanynumberofsituationssuchascheatinginschoolorcommitting

fraudintheworkplace.Inthispaper,wewillpresentevidencethatsituationalevents

canleadinnocentpeopletomakefalseconfessions.Wewillthenpresentaviewofthe

psychologicalconsequencesoffalseconfessions.Wewillfocusonpeople’sbeliefthat

theyactuallycommittedthemoraltransgressionandwewillconsiderthedownstream

consequencestotheirself‐attributionsofdispositionalmorality.

OnJuly8,1997policeinNorfolk,VAapproachedUSNavysailorDaniel

Williamsandbroughthimtothepolicestationforquestioningregardingthemurder

ofhisneighbor,MichelleMoore‐Bosko.Afterseveralhoursofinterrogation,

WilliamsconfessedtomurderingMichelle.Thatconfessionwastheprimary

evidenceleadingtoaconvictionforcapitalrapeandmurder.Inhisconfession,

Williamsexplainedhowhebludgeonedhisneighborwithashoe.Whenitcameto

lightthatthevictimhadnotbeenbludgeonedbuthadbeenstrangled,Williams

signedanewconfessionthathehadstabbedandstrangledMoore‐Bosko.The

jurors’judgmentofWilliams’guiltwasnotaffectedbythechangeinthereported

methodofkillingMoore‐BoskoorbythefactthatWilliamsrecantedboth

confessions,claimingthathehadbeencoercedbythepolice.

WeknownowthatDanielWilliamsneitherrapednorkilledhisneighbor.At

trial,hesaidthesametothe12menandwomenwhoservedasjurors.Whywould

jurorsdisbelievehisswornverbalstatementonthewitnessstand,preferringto

maketheirjudgmentsbasedonarecantedconfession?Insomeways,thejurors’

decisionwasaneasyone.Wedonotbelievethatpeoplewouldconfesstocrimes

theydidnotcommit,especiallygiventheextremityoftheconsequencesthatfollow

fromaconfession.Sadly,thedatatellusotherwise.Inthecriminaljusticesystem,

casessuchasDanielWilliamsandseveralothers(Pratkanis&Aronson,2001)make

forpoignantreading.Analysesofconvictionsthatwereultimatelyoverturnedby

subsequentevidencerevealthatapproximately15%werebasedonfalse

confessions(BedauandRadelet,1987;Garrett,2008;Gudjonsson&Sigursdsson,

1994).

FALSECONFESSIONSOUTSIDETHECOURTROOM

Itisnotonlyaccusedperpetratorsofcrimeswhoarepressuredtoconfessto

actionstheydidnotcommit.Intheordinarybusinessoflife,peopleoccasionally

admittotransgressionsthatareuntrue.Sometimes,theconfessionismadeto

protectsomeoneelse.Achildinschoolmayadmittobreakingherteacher’svasein

ordertoprotectherbestfriendwhomshebelievedreallybrokeit.Aparentmay

taketheblameforachild’snotdoinghishomeworkonaparticularnightinorderto

mitigateanypunishmentforthechild.Onotheroccasions,peoplemayconfesstoa

behaviorbecausetheysuccumbtosocialpressure.Ateenagerinapick‐up

basketballgameagreesthathesteppedontheout‐of‐boundslinebecauseseveral

otherplayersmaketheaccusation.Althoughhebelieveshisfeetwereentirelyin

bounds,hegivesuptheball(i.e.,confessestosteppingontheline).Hisconfessionis

aresultofsocialinfluenceandhisdesiretoallowthegametocontinue.Another

reasonforfalseconfessionisthattheanticipatedconsequenceofnotconfessingis

greaterthantheconsequenceofconfessing.Achildwhofalselyconfessestohis

teacherthathebroketherulesbyspeakingduringaquietperiodmayanticipate

feweradverseconsequencesthantruthfullyrevealingthatitwastheclassbullywho

transgressed.Inthischapter,wetakethepositionthatfalseconfessionshave

consequencesforhowpeopleviewthemselves.Becausefalselyconfessinginvolves

intrinsicallymoraldecisions,suchconfessionsmayalterpeople’sviewsoftheirown

senseofmoralityaswellassubsequentmoralbehavior.

AttributionsofMoralDispositionsaboutOthers

Thenotionofhowpeoplemakeattributionsaboutotherpeople’spersonal

characteristicshaslongbeenthefocusofsocialpsychologicaltheorizing(Heider,

1958;Jones&Davis,1965;Kelley1972).Oureffectivelynavigatingthesocialworld

isincreasedtotheextentthatweunderstandotherpeople’spropensitytoact

consistentlyacrosssituations.JonesandDavis(1965)referredtosuch

understandingsas‘dispositions’anddelineatedmanyoftheprinciplesweuseto

inferpeople’sdispositionsfromanobservationoftheirbehaviors.Theprinciplesof

correspondentinferencesapplytomakingdispositionalinferencesaboutpeople’s

attitudes,kindness,maliciousness,oranyothertraitrelevanttoaperson’sactions.

Ifwewishtogaugeaperson’slevelofhelpfulness,forexample,wecanassessany

occasionsinwhichwehaveobservedthepersonactinahelpfulmanner.According

toJonesandDavis,weengageinasystematicprocessthatallowsustomakea

reasonableguessaboutaperson’intentiontoactinahelpfulmannerandusethe

intentiontoinferadisposition.

Consideracollegestudentwhoisthoughttohavecheatedonan

examination.Theunfairadvantagethatthestudentreceivedcanbedealtwithin

anynumberofwaysbutwewouldnotbesurprisedtoseesuchastudentsuspended

fromschool.Thestudent’sbehaviorsuggestsalevelofmoralityinconsistentwith

whatisexpectedfromcollegestudents.Theattributionofimmoralityaspersonal

dispositionsuggeststhatthestudentcannotbetrustedinsubsequentsituationsin

whichmoralbehaviorisexpected.Theattributionofadispositionallowsusto

predictthelikelihoodoffuturebehaviorthatrequiresethicsandmorality,whichin

turnpromptstheseparationofthisstudentfromhisschool.

Howdoweknowifthestudentintheaboveexampleactuallyengagedinthe

immoralbehaviorofwhichhestandsaccused?Ifwedidnotactuallyobservethe

behavior,wemayrelyonasecondlevelofbehavior–namely,thestudent’sverbal

statementaboutwhetherhedidordidnotcheat.Ifthestudentweretoconfessto

cheating,wewouldhavelittledoubtthattheimmoralbehavioroccurred.The

attributionofimmoralitywouldnotbedifficulttomake.

Itisimportanttounderstandwhywewouldbeconfidentthatthestudent

whoconfessedtocheatingisethicallychallenged.Althoughvarioustheoriesof

attributionconvergeonsimilarsetsofprinciples,ouranalysiscanbeguidedby

correspondentinferencetheory(Jones&Davis,1965;Jones,Kanouse,Kelley,

Nisbett,Valins&Weiner,1972).Attributionsofdispositionsoccurasafunctionof

people’sbehavior,providedthatwebelievethebehaviorisinformative.Thetwo

importantvariablesincorrespondenceinferencetheoryarethenumberof

noncommoneffectsofaperson’schosenbehaviorweightedbytheirsocial

desirability.Thatis,doesthebehaviorofconfessingproduceuniqueeffects

(comparedtonotconfessing)andarethoseeffectssomethingthatmostpeople

wouldenjoyhaving?Confessingtoanimmoralacthassevereconsequencesand

thoseconsequencesaremarkedlyundesired.Itisstraightforwardtodrawthe

correspondentinferenceandassumethatapersonwhoconfessestocheatingisa

cheater–i.e.,hasanimmoralcharacterdisposition.

Behaviorsthatarecoercedarenotinformativeforthepurposeofmakinga

dispositionalattribution.Theattributionanalysisthatresultsincorrespondent

inferencescannotproceedwhenbehavioriscoercedbecausetheactordidnot

intendtocreatethebehaviororitseffects.Yet,decadesofresearchhaveshownthat

observerssuccumbtothecorrespondencebias(Gilbert&Jones,1986)orthe

fundamentalattributionerror(Ross,1977).Despiteviolatingthelogicalrulesof

attribution,peoplehaveatendencytomakedispositionalinferencesonthebasisof

behavior,evenwhenthebehaviorwascoerced.Intheclassicresearchon

correspondencebias,JonesandHarris(1967)informedparticipantsthatanother

universitystudenthadwrittenanessayinfavorofCubanPresidentFidelCastro.

Dependingonexperimentalcondition,someparticipantsweretoldthatthestudent

hadchosentowriteinsupportofCastrowhereasothersweretoldthatthestudent

hadbeenassignedtheposition.Althoughparticipantsattributedhighestpro‐

Castroattitudestothestudentwhochosetowriteonthatside,theyalsoattributed

pro‐Castroattitudestothosewereassignedthetask.Thestudent’sbehaviorinthe

latterconditionshouldnothaveprovidedevenaclueabouthisattitudetoward

Castro.Nonetheless,peopleengagedinthecorrespondencebiasandmadeattitude

attributionsbasedonthecoercedbehavior.

JurorsandtheCorrespondenceBias.AccordingtoKassinandWrightsman

(1980:1985),themostdamningevidencegivenincourtisaconfession.Sincemost

casesthatarepresentedtojuriesinvolvenot‐guiltypleas,theconfessionsin

questionhavetypicallybeengiventopolicepriortotrial.Defendantsoftenclaim

thattheirconfessionswerecoercedorgivenunderduress.Suchexplanationsare

rarelysuccessful(Leo,2008;Leo&Ofshe,1998).SauerandWilkens(1999)found

thattheoverwhelmingmajorityofpotentialjurorsreportedthattheybelievedthat

suspectswould“almostneverconfess”tocrimestheydidnotdo.Leo(2008)quotes

aLosAngelesPoliceDepartmentpsychologistwhoasserted“Noamountof

badgeringwouldprompttheaveragepersontoadmittodoingsomethingthatawful

–ortoadmittoanycrime”(p.197).

Thefactisthatdefendantsdosuccumbtopressuretoconfesstoimmoraland

illegalactionsthattheydidnotcommit.Forthepast80years,theUnitedStates

courtshaveforbiddentheintroductionofconfessionsthatwerecoercedbyphysical

means.InBrownv.Mississippi(1936),theSupremeCourtreversedaguiltyverdict

onthegroundsthattheconfessionwasextractedviabruteforceandthatsuch

tacticsareaviolationofdefendants’rightstodueprocess.Asstandardsevolved

overthedecades,confessionsareadmissibletotheextentthatajudge,and

sometimesajury,findsthattheconfessionwasgivenwillingly,knowinglyandinthe

absenceofphysicalorpsychologicalcoercion.

Oneissuethattheadversariallegalsystemmustfaceisthatpoliceoften

questionsuspectswithanarrayofpsychologicaltechniquesdesignedtoelicit

confessions.Avarietyofproceduralmanualsdetailthepsychologicaland

environmentalpressuresthatcanhelpproduceconfessionsfromsuspects.Inbau,

Reid,BuckleyandJayne(2001)outlineanine‐stepprocedurethatiswidelyusedby

policetoelicitconfessions.Thesestepsincludeconvincingasuspectthatfirm

evidencealreadyexiststoconvictthemofthecrimeandthenworkingwiththe

suspecttogeneratemoralexcusestojustifythecrime.AccordingtoKassin&

McNally(1991),policeinterrogationtechniquescanbecategorizedintotwomain

approaches–minimizationandmaximization.Theformerreliesonthe

interrogator’screatingasenseofcamaraderiewiththesuspect.Theinterrogator

expressessympathyandunderstanding,offersface‐savingexcuses,putstheblame

onexternalfactorsanddownplaystheseverityoftheoffense.Thelattertechnique–

maximization‐‐utilizesintimidationtoscarethesuspect,exaggeratesfalse

incriminatingevidenceandthemagnitudeoftheconsequencesthatwilloccurinthe

absenceofaconfession.Becausepeopledonotbelieveanindividualwould

confesstosomethingheorshedidnotactuallydo(Sauer&Wilkins,1999),the

impactofaconfessiononjurors’attributionsofguiltismaximal.They

underestimatethesocialpsychologicalfactorsatplayduringtheinterrogation,

basingtheirultimatejudgmentontheeffectofconsequenceoftheconfession

instead.

TheEffectofFalseConfessionsontheConfessor.

Whatissometimeslostindiscussionsoffalseconfessionsistheeffectof

confessionsontheperpetrator.Intermsofthesocialpsychologyofattributions,

doesmakingaconfessionhaveanimpactonpeople’sownjudgmentofwhetherthey

actuallyengagedintheactivitytowhichtheyconfessed?Somecelebratedlegal

casessuggestthattheanswerissometimesyes.Eighteen‐year‐oldPeterReilly

returnedhomeonenighttofindhismotherhadbeenmurdered.AfterReillycalled

thepolicetoreporttheincident,thepoliceinterrogatedhim.Theyclaimed(falsely)

thatReillyhadfailedhislie‐detectortest.Analysisofthetranscriptsofhis

confession(Barthel,1976)showedReillyprogressingfromdenialtoconfusionto

self‐doubt.“Well,itlookslikeIreallydidit,”hetoldpolice.Twoyearsafterhis

conviction,conclusiveevidencewasuncoveredthatexoneratedhim.Hewasnot

nearhishomeonthenightofthemurder.

RecallthecaseagainstDanielWilliamswhoconfessedtothemurderofhis

neighbor.AlthoughWilliamswasconvictedonthebasisofhisconfession,he

continuedtomaintainthathisconfessionwasfalseandthathewasinnocentofthe

crime.Adifferentstorycanbetoldforco‐defendantJosephDick,whowasaccused

ofbeingMr.Williams’accomplice.Dickalsoconfessed.However,heinternalized

hisconfession,comingtobelievethathehadactuallybeenwithWilliamswhenthey

rapedandmurderedMsMoore‐Bosko.Herepeatedhisconfessionincourtand

testifiedagainstDanielWilliams.TheNorfolkdefendantswerereleasedfromprison

whenDNAevidenceshowedthatneitherWilliamsnorDickhadanythingtodowith

thecrimes.

FalseConfessionsandself‐perception.

KassinandKiechel(1996)addressedtheunderlyingissuethatrenders

confessionsexceptionallypowerfulincourts.Wouldanyoneactuallyconfesstoa

transgressionthatheorshedidnotcommit?Toprovidesomeexperimental

evidencetothisdebate,KassinandKeitelaskedwhetherpeoplewhofind

themselvesaccusedoftransgressionsapartfromthecriminaljusticesystemcould

besystematicallypersuadedtomakefalseconfession.Theysuggestedthattwo

elementsinpoliceinterrogationsseemtobepresentwhenfalseconfessionsare

obtained.Oneisthecreationofdoubtabouttheeventsthattookplaceandthe

secondisthecreationofabeliefthattheaccusershaveproofofthesuspect’sguilt.

Inacleverexperimentallaboratoryprocedure,KassinandKiechel(1996)

hadundergraduatesparticipateingroupsoftwoinwhattheythoughtwasa

reactiontimetask.Onememberofthepairwasactuallyaconfederateofthe

experimenter’s.OneachtrialoftheRTtask,theconfederatereadalistofwordsand

theparticipantwastotypethemintoacomputer.Theexperimenterexplainedthat

itwasimperativethattheparticipantnottouchtheALTkeythatwasadjacenttothe

spacebarbecausethatwouldcausethecomputertocrashandthedatatobelost.

Afteraminute’sactivity,thecomputerseemedtocrash.Theexperimenterhurried

intoexaminethecomputerandaccusedtheparticipantofhavingpressedthe

forbiddenkey.Initially,allparticipantsdeniedtheallegation.Inthehigh

vulnerabilitycondition,theparticipantswererenderedlesscertainofwhattheyhad

orhadnotdonebecausethetypingtaskwasconductedatafreneticpace.Inthelow

vulnerabilitycondition,itwasconductedataleisurelypace,allowingparticipantsto

beverycertainofwhattheyhadtyped.Thesecondvariableofinterestwas

whethertheparticipantbelievedtherewasincriminatingevidence.Thiswas

manipulatedintheformoftestimonygivenbytheconfederate.Inthefalsewitness

condition,theconfederateadmittedthatshehadseentheparticipanthittheALT

keythatterminatedtheprogram.Intheno‐witnesscondition,thesameconfederate

saidshehadnotseenwhathappened.

Toelicitcompliancewiththeaccusation,theexperimentertoldthe

participanttosignastatementthatheorshehittheALTkey.Theywerenotasked

iftheybelievedtheirconfession,butonlytomakeoneastheexperimenter

demanded.Theresultsshowedthatwhentherewasnoallegedwitnessandthe

paceofthetypinghadbeenslow,65%oftheparticipantsrefusedtosign.Onthe

otherhand,whenthepacewasquickandthusthetransgressionlesscertain,65%

agreedtosign.Thatpercentageroseto100%whentheuncertaintywascombined

withthewitness’testimony.WhathappenednextinKassin&Kiechel’sstudy

assessedthedegreetowhichpeopleactuallybelievedthattheyhadtransgressed.

Anotherstudentconfederate,posingasthenextparticipant,approachedthe

participantandaskedwhatthecommotionwasabout.Theparticipants’responses

wererecordedandassessedforwhethertheystatedunequivocallythattheyhadhit

theALTkey.Althoughnooneinthecertain‐nowitnessconditionadmittedto

havingcommittedtheforbiddenbehavior,65%ofparticipantswhowereinthefast‐

pacedconditionwithanaccusingwitnessfreelystatedthattheyhadcommittedthe

behavior.

BelievingYour(False)Confession:AnEmpiricalStudyonAttributionsofMorality.

Underwhatconditionsdopeoplebelievetheirfalseconfessions?From

KassinandKiechel’s(1996)work,webelievethatpeoplecanbeinfluencedtomake

falseconfessionsandthatpeoplesometimesbecomeconvincedoftheveracityof

thoseconfessions.Inthecurrentwork,weexaminetheconsequencesof

confessionsforpeople’sself‐attributions.Ifpeopleconfess,doesitaffecttheir

attributionoftheirowndispositions?Aretheylikelytousetheobservationoftheir

ownbehaviortodrawinferencesabouttheleveloftheirownmorality?

Wespeculatethatpeopleusetheirconfessionsasevidenceoftheir

dispositionsbutonlytotheextentthattheyfeeltheyhadachoiceinmakingtheir

confessions.Thisisconsistentwithanalysesfromcognitivedissonancetheory

(Festinger,1957),self‐perceptiontheory(Bem,1972)andattributiontheory

(Kelley,1972).Totheextentthatpeopleperceivetheirbehaviortobefreely

chosen,thenthatbehaviorisinfluentialindeterminingtheirinternaldispositions.

Facedwithknowledgethattheydescribedatransgression(i.e.,confessed),people

determinewhetherthatdescriptionwascoercedbytheenvironmentorwhetherit

wasgivenfreely.Ifthelatter,thenitbecomesinformationindeterminingone’sown

dispositions.

WeextendedKassin&Kiechel’sresearchtoanareaofmoralconcern–

namely,cheating.Weestablishedasituationinwhichstudents’performanceonan

examcouldbeimprovediftheytookextratimetocompletethequestions.We

accusedthestudentsofhavingcheatedontheexamand,usingtechniquesdrawn

frompolicemanuals(Inbauetal,2001),toinducestudentstoconfesstohaving

cheated.Wethenassessedthedegreetowhichthestudentsbelievedthattheyhad

actuallycheated.Finally,inadifferentcontext,weusedanindividualdifference

questionnairetoassessstudents’assessmentoftheirownreality.Wepredicted

thatwecouldinducestudentstoconfesstocheatingwhen,infact,theyhadnotdone

so.Wealsopredictedthatstudentswouldcometobelievethattheirconfessions

weretruetotheextentthattheyfelttheyhadachoicetoconfess.Finally,we

predictedthatifstudentsconfessedtocheatingandbelieved(falsely)thattheyhad

committedtheact,theywouldattributetothemselvesalowerlevelofethicaland

moraldisposition.

Inourempiricalstudy,undergraduatestudentsvolunteeredforastudy

investigatingmentalmodelstoimprovemathematicalabilities.Attheoutset,

participantsweretoldthatitwasimportanttogetanassessmentoftheircurrent

levelofmathematicsproficiency.Tothatend,theywouldtakeadifficultexamin

mathematicsandtheirscoreswouldbepublishedalongwiththescoresofallother

studentstakingtheexam.Thestudentsweregiven15minutestocompletethetest

onthecomputer.Theexperimenterexplainedthattheyshouldworkuntilthey

werefinishedbutthattheyabsolutelyshouldnotgobeyondthetimeprovided.The

experimenterstatedthathewouldleavethestudentalonewithhisorherworkand

wouldreturninabout15minutes.Thestudentwastoldtousetheclockthatwas

prominentlydisplayedonthecomputerastheofficialtimer.

Theallegedtransgression:Theexperimenterwaited17minutesbefore

returningtotheroom.Whenenteringtheroom,henotedthathehadintendedto

comebackafter15minutessothathecouldmonitorthestudent’sadherencetothe

rulesbut,unfortunately,ranlate.Heaskedparticipantswhethertheyhadusedthe

extratimeforanythingrelatedtothemathematicstest.Inacontrolcondition,the

student’sdenialthattheyhadusedextratimewastakenatfacevalue.Every

studentdeniedtakingextratime,whichwasanhonestandaccurateportraitofwhat

theyhaddone.

AccusingthePerpetrator:Afterinquiringaboutthestudentusingextratime,

theexperimenterconfrontedthestudentwiththenotionthatheorshemusthave

usedthetimetoworkonthemathtest.Heexplainedthattheusingextratime

includedsuchthingsaslookingoveryourwork,makingchangesorjustcontinuing

toworkafterthetimerreachedzero.Theexperimenteradoptedoneofthree

interrogationtechniquesadoptedfromthepoliceinterrogationhandbook.

NoChoiceConfession:Theexperimenterinthenochoiceconditiontoldthe

studentsthat,consideringtheyhadextratimeavailable,itwasrequiredthatthey

signastatementsayingthattheyhadusedtheextratimeonthemathexam.The

experimentertookresponsibilityforhavingallowedtheextratimebutexplained

thatwhensuchaneventhappens,heisrequiredtogetthestudenttosignaroutine

statementacknowledginguseofextratime.Onlythen,heexplained,canthestudy

continue.

ChoosingtoConfess:Minimization:Minimizationisaninterrogation

approachinwhichtheinterrogatoroffersunderstandingoftheallegedsituation,

offersface‐savingexcusesanddownplaystheseverityoftheoffense.Tothatend,

theexperimenterexplainedthatitwasnotamajorviolationiftheparticipantused

extratime,evokingthenotionthatitwasacommonandjustifiableoccurrence,and

thatsituationswiththiskindoftemptationoftenleadtopeopleviolatingtherules.

Hejustneededtheparticipanttoacknowledgethatheorsheusedextratimesothat

hecouldcodethedatadifferentlyforsubsequentanalysis.Theexperimenterstated,

“Ofcourseyoudonothavetosignthestatement,butitwouldbeveryhelpfulifyou

do.”

ChoosingtoConfess:Maximization.Inthiscondition,participantsweretold

thatcheatingonatest,eveninalaboratory,wasaviolationoftheuniversity’shonor

code.Thepenaltiescouldbesevere.Studentsweretoldthatitwouldbemuch

bettertosignastatementconfessingtouseextratimebecausethatwouldallowthe

datatobecodeddifferentlyandstillbeused.Ontheotherhand,failuretoadmitto

usingextratime‐‐iftheyhadactuallyusedit–wouldresultinsevereconsequences.

Moreover,theexperimenterrevealedthathehadhardevidencebecausethevideo

cameraonthecomputerhadrecordedtheentiresession.Heindicatedthathe

wouldcheckthevideoifthestudentdidnotadmittothetransgression.Thestudent

wasthengiventhechoiceaboutwhethertosigntheconfession.

MakingtheFalseConfession.Thevideocameraonthecomputerhad

actuallybeenusedduringthesession.Thevideosrevealedthatnoone,inanyofthe

conditions,hadactuallyviolatedthe15‐minutelimitation.Nooneinthecontrol

conditionadmittedtousingextratime.However,thedatainFigure1showthe

resultsforparticipantsinthethreeexperimentalconditions.Nineteenoftwenty

participantsinthenochoiceconditionscompliedwiththeexperimenter’s

instructiontosignaconfessionforatransgressionthattheydidnotcommit.Inthe

choiceconditions,72%oftheparticipantsagreedtoconfess,withthehighest

numbercominginthemaximizationcondition.Theminimizationand

maximizationconditionsdidnotdiffersignificantlyfromeachother.

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐

Figure1

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐

BelievingtheFalseConfession.Afterparticipantseitherdidordidnotsign

theirfalseconfessions,theexperimenterindicatedthathewouldhavetoterminate

thestudy.Heintroducedthestudy’s“principleinvestigator”whotoldparticipants

thatheneededtoaskthemquestions.Hefirstinquiredaboutwhetherthe

participantshadagreedtosignastatementabouttheirhavingusedextratime.He

thenadministeredaquestionnairethatincludedthecrucialitem,“Howmuchdoyou

believethatyouusedextratimeincompletingthetest?”Thequestionnairealso

asked,“Howmuchchoicedidyoufeelinconfessingornotconfessing?”Allitems

werefollowedby7‐pointscales.

Figure2presentstheresultsofthedegreetowhichstudentsreported

believingthattheyhadactuallyusedtheextratimethattheyhadconfessedto.The

resultsshowthatsigningaconfessionhadanimpactonbeliefbut,asexpected,the

effectvariedbycondition.Themeanbeliefinthecontrolconditioninwhichpeople

hadbeenaskediftheyusedtheextratimebutwerenotaskedforaconfessionwas

1.05.Inthenochoicecondition,thereportedbeliefwasminimallyandnon‐

significantlyhigher(M=1.15).Students’beliefsintheirowntransgressionswere

significantlyhigherinthechoiceminimization(M=2.9)andthechoicemaximization

conditions(M=2.3).Thechoiceconditionsweresignificantlydifferentfromtheno‐

choiceconditionandmarginallysignificantlydifferentfromeachother(p<.11).

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐

Figure2

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐

Notsurprisingly,students’perceptionsofthedegreeofchoicetheyhadto

signaconfessionwerehigherinthechoicethanintheno‐choiceconditions.

However,itisinterestingthatstudentsperceivedmorechoiceintheminimization

thanthemaximizationcondition.Inotherwords,whenthreatenedwithsevere

consequencesforfailingtoreportatransgression(eventhoughtheyhadnot

transgressed),theysawtheirownfreedomasmoreseverelylimitedthanwhenthe

inducementswereminimal.Inaddition,thedegreeofbeliefthattheyhadactually

usedextratimewascorrelatedwiththeamountofdecisionfreedomtheythought

theyhad(r=.44).

ImpactofConfessionsonDispositions.Onedayfollowingtheexperimental

procedure,studentwerecontactedbye‐mailandaskediftheywerewillingtofill

outsomequestionsaspartofanongoingsurveyofpersonalityinstruments.No

mentionwasmadeofanyconnectiontothefalseconfessionstudy.Ifparticipants

agreed(94%oftheoriginalparticipantsagreed),theywereaskedtorespondonthe

computertoa10‐itemversionoftheRosenbergSelf‐Esteemscale.An11thitemwas

addedtothescale,whichstated,“IfeelIamanethicalperson.”Theresultsshowed

thatstudentswhohadsignedaconfessionandbelievedthattheyhadchoicetosign

theconfessionscoredlowerontheethicalpersonquestion(M=2.2vs.M=1.7,p

<.02)andlowerontheSESoverall(M=16.65vs.M=18.88),p<.05.)

IMPLICATIONSOFFALSECONFESSIONS:AchangeinMoralThinking

Thenewempiricalworkdescribedinthischapterdemonstratesthatpeople

canbeinducedtoconfesstoimmoralactions,evenwhentheyactedinamoral,

ethicalandlegalfashion.Fromtheperspectiveofathirdperson,confessionsof

immoral,unethicalbehaviorwillalmostcertainlybegristfortheattributionmill,

allowingsocialperceiverstoconcludethattheconfessordidindeedactinan

immoralwayandthatimmoralitycanbeascribedasapersonaldisposition.

Ifweourselvesareinducedtoconfesstoanimmoralbehavior,itisnot

apparentthatwewoulduseourfalseconfessionasevidencethatcommittedthe

immoralactorthatweareimmoralpeople.Ontheotherhand,varioustheories

includingcognitivedissonance(Cooper,2007;Festinger,1957)suggestthat

behaviorcanhavedramaticimpactonattitudesandbeliefs,providedthatitappears

tohavebeenfreelychosen.Ourresultssupportthelatternotion.Peoplewhowere

accusedofanactionthattheydidnotcommitwerenonethelesspersuadedto

confesstohavingcheated.Iftheybelievedthattheirconfessionwasmadewith

personalfreechoice,theyweremorelikelytobelievetheirownconfessionsrather

thantrusttheirmemoriesforwhattheyhadactuallydone.Andthosefreelychosen

confessionshadconsequences:Peoplenotonlybelievedthattheyhadacted

immorallybutalsoshowedalowersenseofself‐esteemandaloweredbeliefintheir

ownsenseofmoralcharacter.

Theimpactoffalseconfessionsonpersonalbeliefsissystematic.First,a

behaviormustbeelicitedthatconfirmsthetransgression.Thedegreeofcoercion

needstobeminimal.Thejustificationforconfessingmustalsobeminimal.Recall

thatthemaximizationstrategyinwhichtheconsequencesoffailingtoconfesswere

emphasizedsuccessfullyproducedconfessionsbutdidnotproducemuch

internalization.Rather,theminimizationstrategyledtopeoplebelievingthatthey

hadfreelychosentosigntheirconfessions,which,inturn,ledtobeliefchange.

Aninterestingquestioniswhetherfalseconfessionsleadtogreaterimmoral

behaviorinthefuture.Inthecurrentwork,falseconfessionsundertheappropriate

circumstancesledpeopletomakedispositionalattributionsaboutthemselvesthat

implyapossiblecascadeoffuturebehaviors.Usingadissonanceanalysis,Aronson

andCarlsmith(1962)showedthatpeopleprefertoactconsistentlywiththeirself‐

expectations,evenifthoseexpectationsareforfailingperformances.The

suggestionthenisthathavingpeopleconfesstoimmoralactsthattheyhadnot

actuallycommittedwillnotonlyloweraperson’smoralself‐esteembutalsoaffect

themoralityoffuturebehavior.

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Figures

Figure1.Percentageofparticipantswhosignedafalseconfession.

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NoChoice

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Maximization

Figure2.Participants’meanbeliefsinthesubstanceoftheirconfessions.

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1.5

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Maximization