bullington et al-1984-scandinavian journal of psychology
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Scandinavian Journal
of
Psychology,
1984, 25,
51-63
In t ro du ct io n t o phenom eno log ica l psych o log ical research
JENNIFER BULLINGTON and GUNNAR KARLSSON
Department
of
Psychology, University
of
Stockholm. Stockholm, Sweden
Bullington.
J. Karlsson,G . :
Introduction to phenomenological psychological research.
Scandinmian Journal
of
Psychology, 1984.25, 51-63.
This report presents an introduction
to
phenomenological psychological research.
A
brief
theoretical section on Hus serls phenomenological philosophy is followed by a comparison
between phenomenological psychology and traditional psychology and a tutorial example
of the phenomenological method in psychological research. The authors argue for the
necessity of a phenomenological descriptive approach to psychological research which
seeks to discover the meaning
of
various phenomena using the descriptions of subjects
experiences. The results
of
a phenomenological psychological study consist
of
a structural
description of the phenomenon in question, which basically describes the wh t and how of
a specific phenomenon rather than the explanatory
why .
G .
Karlsson. Department of Psychology, University of Stockholm. S-106
9
Stockholm,
Sweden.
INTRODUCTION TO HUSSERLS PHENOM ENOLOGY
Phenomenology started with the works
of
Edmund Husserl. For that reason we will begin
our
dicussion with Husserls phenomenology,
at
least briefly, in order to introduce the
main topic of this paper; phenomenological psychology. We will try to show how a
philosophical grounding in phenomenology can be the basis for an empirical human
science (as opposed to a natural scientific) approach to psychology.
Phenomenology is the systematic investigation of subjectivity. Subjectivity, for H usserl,
w a s the indubitable groun d of experience; that
I
am now having the experience of seeing a
blue thing, for example, is lived with a certitude
I
cannot doub t. Th e aim of phenomeno-
logy is to stu dy th e world as it appears to
u s
in and through con sciou sness. Th is is a radical
move away from the objective sciences which take a s their subject m atter the so-called
objective reality of the w orld, which is supposed to exist independently of conscious-
ness and subjectivity. Phenom enology wishes to examine the very ground of such a world,
which is precisely con scio usn ess an d human subjectivity. Husserls point concern ing the
natural sciences
w a s
that although the objective world described by physics and
chemistry is a de rived, constructed world, science wishes to place this constructed world
as prior
or
mo re rea l tha n the subjectively lived world. Husse rl did not wish
to
disparage the findings of the natu ral scienc es, but he maintained that they have no place in
phenomenology, which place s lived exp erienc e prior to scientific formulations abour lived
experience. It is for this reason that phenomenology makes no use
of
natural scientific
methods as such. Because our subject matter as phenomenologists is prior to scientific
formulations about an objective world, we cannot use these very formulations to
account for our field of inquiry.
If
we wish to stud y consciousne ss and sub jectivity, we
cann ot begin by assumin g th e objective reality of the world which conscio usne ss itself
posits. In order to study the realm of subjectivity, Husserl had to develop a completely
new method, which he called the phenomenological reduction.
T H E P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L R E D U C T I O N
The reduction is the cornerstone of phenomenology. Before we can begin our analyses
of
consciousness, we must perfo rm the reduction in order to take ourselves ou t of the
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S 2
J .
Bullington a n d G.
K a r l s s o n
Scand
Psvchol
ZS 1984)
"natural attitude". The natural a ttitud e is the way we take for grante d the existence of a
transcen den t world, which see ms to exis t independently of consciousness. Th is attitude
has a
long
philosophical history; it underlies
all
natural scientific causal explanations of
perception an d cognition. B asically, i t asse rts that there exists a world which impinges on
me (my "mind") and
caicses
me to have this
or
that experience (sensation). We may
further describe the natural a ttitud e as the way in which the world seem s to spread itself
out before
us,
apparently indifferent to our intending t o it. In sho rt, the natural a ttitude is
our belief in the existence
of
the real , t ranscendent world. I t is called the "natural"
attitude because it is our unrefle ctive, natural way of being in the world. To believe in the
reality character of
the
world ha s i ts roots
in
the very nature
of
perception itself.
To
have
something real primordially giv en, and to 'b ecom e aware' of it an d 'perceive' it in simple
intuition are one and th e sa m e thing" (Hu sser l, 1962, p.
45,
first published in German
1913). When we perform the phen ome nological reduction,
i t
is thi s belief in the re ality
character of the world wh ich we must susp end , o r "bracket". It is not that we doubt the
existen ce of the world
for
my direct experience informs me that the world,
of
course , is
always there), but by putting the tran scen dent object in brack ets, we are able to underline
the way
in
which the object appears to consciousness. Thus, the reduction is not a
destruction of the world, but rather, a way in which to focus upon the constituting
of
the
world.
According to Husserl, every such phenomenological reduction can also be an eidetic
reduction. An eidetic reduction is the move from the world of facts
(or
part iculars) to the
world
of
intended invariant m eanin gs or esse nce s). Briefly, the eidetic reduction is our
natural ability
to
intuit
or
prereflectively gra sp the ess ence of a thing through its particu-
lars. Ev ery phenomenological red uction aim s ultimately at an eidetic reduction , but every
eidetic reduction need not be a phenomenological reduction. We may grasp essences
through particulars
in
the n atural attitude . H owever, every time we perform
a
phenomeno-
logical reduction and attempt to do phenomenology, we must make this eidetic move as
well.
To
sum up. in the natu ral attitud e the world that lies in front of us conceals the ac ts of
consciousness which posit the world. In the phenomenological attitude (by implementing
the phenomenological reduction) we can discover two poles of consciousness; noesis and
noema, which make
up
the mo st unique feature
of
cons ciousn ess; namely, intentionality.
Basically, "intentionality" m ean s that conscio usne ss is always con sciousn ess
of
some-
thing.
Let us assume that we have now performed the phenomenological reduction. Under the
reduction we can discern tw o poles
of
expe rience: the subjective pole which H usserl calls
noesis-the acts
of
consc iousne ss, and we also discover the correlate
of
every con scious
act , which Husserl
calls
the noema-the objec t a s intended, as meant, as perceived.
Noesis always refers to the po siting acts,
or in
metaphorical language, to the "streaming"
of consciousness towards the world. On the othe r han d,
the
noema refers to that-which-is-
posi teainte nded . The noem atic pole is that which we used to call the "real world" in the
natural attitude. Husserl 's analyses show that what we used to call the "real object"
presents i tself to con sciousness as a flowing of views, each one flowing and blending into
the next .
For
this reason we can
also
call the noem a
a
"system
of
appearances" . T o clarify
the noema with an exam ple, let
us
say that
I
now have the exp erience of this cu p in front
of
me. What my perceptual experience gives me is
a
perspectival view of the cu p from here
and now.
I
can now see the front
of
the cup.
I
perceive that it
is
round, although
I
cannot
see the back
of
the cup. As
I
move around the cup , I can now see the back, w hich
I
could
not see before. All these pe rspectiva l views point to a whole beyond any one perspect ive.
Th is whole, this system
of
appe arance s is the noema. Th ese appearances mutual ly confirm
one an other and go together coherently
to
give me the whole cup at onc e. This is a paradox
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54
denta l phenomenology. But for now, suflice to say that all essences are grasped und er the
reduction by means of imaginary variation and are direct, intuitive affirmations.
J .
Bull ington and G Karlsson
S a n d
J
Psycho1 5
(1984)
PHENOM ENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
VS.
TRADITIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
Before we
go
into the method and subject matter
of
phenomenological psychology, we
would like to briefly contrast phenomenological psychology with traditional psychology.
By traditional psychology we refer to the experimental tradition in psychology dating
from W. Wundt. Wundts aspir ation in seeking to establish psychology a s a natural scienc e
remains even today in conte mp orary psychologys scientific ideals. Suc h ideals are
reflected in the
so
called objective method which psychology adopted from the natural
sciences. Due to the succe sses made in physics and ch emistry, psychology believed that
by adopting their quantitative method, psychology could establish its credibility in the
academic community. The natural scientific project w a s to
explain
phenom ena in term s of
causal laws. Consequently, traditional psychologys guiding principle was also to explain
psychic phenomena following the principles laid out by the natural sciences. A phenom-
enon
w a s
thought to be relevant t o the s tudy
of
psychology only if it could be measured
and tested in some way by these natural scientific means. The contrived laboratory
conditions which became synonymous with psychological research had less and less
in
common with everyday, lived experiences of human subjects. In this way the bias of a
methodology came
to
eclipse the psychologists interest in phenomena which were inac-
cessible through this method, such as the study of consciousness and subjectivity. Th e
psychologist
as
a natural scientist seeks to discover
or
invent abstract, exp lanatory causal
connections between events to account
for
psychological phenomena. The human being is
observed as
a
thing among o ther things, disregarding the unique psychological status of th e
human being. Such physicalistic models move away from concrete subjective experiences
into
abstract, derived formulas, which are
often
unrecognizable in the subjects naive
experience (Giorgi,
1 9 7 0 ~ ) .
Phenomenological psychology takes its app roach from philosophical phenomenology. In
adopting Husserls to the things themselves, phenomenological psychology seeks to
develop
a
rigorous scientific method which would enable the researcher to thematize or
make explicit the immediate lived experience of
a
phenomenon,
as
it is lived, without
resorting to ad h oc, superimp osed theories
about
phenomena. Such an aim brought ab out
a qualitative, descriptive method. This method uses:
1 )
subjects naive, spontaneous
descriptions of phenomena, (2) the psychological phenomenological analysis of the data
and (3) the community
of
researchers
as a
collaborative pool. Com parable to th e verifica-
tion of results in the quantitative approach, we find in the qualitative phenomenological
method , the phenomenological criterion of sp ontaneous, intuitive assent
upon
reading the
findings of a phenomenological stu dy. R esearchers present their findings to eac h othe r, to
the community, and sometimes to the subjects themselves. The problem of subjective
bias do es not
ar ise
for phenomenological psychology in its traditional form ulatio n, since
phenomenology recognizes the subjectivity of the researcher as the very access to the
meanings and themes which constitute the qualitative, descriptive findings. However, the
phenomenological psychological researcher should always be
on
guard against natural
attitude presuppositions which may not have been properly thematized and bracketed by
the researchers reduction. The criteria for a piece of phenomenological psychological
research
are:
a)
idelity to the phen omen a and
b)
a
rigorous phenomenological reduction.
Thus, phenomenological psychology as a human science (as opposed to a natural
scienc e) takes fidelity to the ph enom enon a s it is lived a s its guiding principle in the
formu lation of
a
method . Phenomenological psychologys approach do es not equ ate being
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Scand J Psych01 25 (1984) Phenomenological psychology 55
scientific with being naturally scientific. Rat her than necessarily transforming mean-
ings into quantitative expressions, as natural science does, phenomenological psychology
seeks to ffirmand e lucid ate the pre-reflectively lived world. Given that the rese arch er has
followed these directives, what is the nature of phenomenological psychologys data? It is
the
meaningful, descriptive expression of the subject which will provide the researcher
with the themes and generalities concerning lived phenomena.
Phenomenological psychology, true to its phenomenological origins, sees the world as
already replete with meanings. These meanings are lived everyday, yet may remain
implicit and unthematized. Phenomenological psychological research seeks to make ex-
plicit and thematic these unreflectively lived meanings. Even in traditional psychological
research we may see how these lived meanings are operating; for example, when the
researcher sets up
an
experiment, decides to investigate this or that phenomenon, change
this
or
that variable etc. Such an eidetic (essential) understanding must be present in any
researcher, for how else would he have any direction to his research? Such meanings and
eidetic understandings
are
not explicitely acknowledged in traditional psychological re-
search. The traditional researcher in psychology is himself using intuitions and eidetic
understandings without the rigor of the phenomenological reduction.
The phenomenological psychologist does not concern himself unduly with facts
because he chooses to stay at the level of meaning. His emphasis is always upon the
meaning-for-subject of a phenomenon, whether that phenomenon happened once
or
one
hundred times, at home, or at work etc. In reading 10 descriptions (protocols) from
different subjects on anxiety, for example, the researcher will undoubtedly find a variety
of situations in which anxiety occurred. However, he will also find
a
common theme
or
structure of the meaning of anxiety which will arise from the analysis of these different
protocols. For exam ple, although he may find that anxiety was experienced at school, a t
work
or
on
a
vacation, he does
not
necessarily imbue these facts with psychological
meaning. W hat may emerge from the study as imp ortan t, could be, for exam ple, that in all
these situations the subjects were experiencing an insecurity ab out the ir capability to do
something that mattered to them. As phenomenological psychologists we do not hypoth-
esize beforehand abo ut wh at psychological con stituents
or
meanings we will find, but we
do allow our intutions to pick out thematically relevant material from the protocols. We
may use, ju st for an exa mp le, the above fictional constituent of insecurity rathe r than
at sc hoo l at w ork on vacation bec aus e we intuitively grasp its thematic signifi-
can ce from the totality of the protocol and the sy nthe sis of all 10 protocols. Because of the
insistence upon the priority of meaning, phenomenological psychology considers the
natural scientific accumulation of facts to be an inappropriate task for our purposes.
N o
matter how numero us the facts may be, no matter how sophisticated o ur techniques
of
measuring become , facts canno t leap across the abyss into meanings. As Sartre put
it, In sho rt, psychologists d o not realize that it is jus t as impossible to get essence by
accumulating accid ents (facts
our
comment) as to reach
1
by adding figures to the right of
0 99
(Sartre, 1948, p.
5 .
A common misunderstanding of phenomenological psychology is to confuse it with
introspectionism (W und t Titchner). Briefly, the differences between introspectionism
and phenomenological psychology can be enum erated as follows:
(1) n classical introspectionism, the
S
is asked to observe his impressions upon
receiving certain stimuli. H e is asked to red uce his impressions to the simplest elemen ts
such as sensations, feelings, images and to locate their attributes such
as
intensity,
duration etc. Phenomenological psychology rules out any s uch assum ptions about the
nature of mindconscio usness.
(2) In introspectionism, the
S
is asked to stick to the facts and not to include any
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56
meanings he
may
associate with the stimuli, whereas phenomenological psychology is
precisely interested in the study of these meanings.
(3)
The
S
n introspectionistic e xpe rime nts had to be well trained in orde r to know wh at
kinds of self-observations were acceptable to the researcher. For phenomenological
purposes, the
S
is asked to freely report upon all his experiences pertaining to the
phenomenon in question and uncen sored description s from subjec ts are the raw data for
phenomenological psychology.
An othe r school of psychology which is often associated with phenomenological p sycho-
logy is gestalt psychology. Although there are similarities between the two, the relation-
ship is
a
complex one, and there is no real agreement among phenomenologists about
gestalt psychologys relationship to phenom enology. It is beyond the sc ope of this paper to
describe the differences here
in
detail. However, a few words may be said about the main
difference between the two approaches. While gestalt psychology does place an emphasis
upon w holes-as-given (as opposed to the traditional atomistic psych ology), gestal t psycho-
logy maintains the superiority and priority of physicalistic causes of psychological exper-
iences. They remain in a natural attitude insofar
as
they em brace objectivistic theories
abou t phenomenon (See Merleau-Ponty, 1963).
J Bullington and
G. Karlsson
Scand
J
Psycho1
25 (1984)
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGYS METHOD
At this point we would like to de mo nstrat e the specific method used in a phenomenological
psychological undertaking. Although Hu sserl himself worked mainly with phenomeno logi-
cal transcendental philosophy, he did allow that
a
phenomenological psychology running
parallel to his philosophy was possible. T he difference between phenom enological philos-
ophy and phenomenological psychology has to do with the two different bracketings or
reductions. Under the philosophical
or
transcendental reduction, both the object pole
(world) and the subject p ole (con scio usn ess) are derealized
or
bracketed. This enabled
Husserl to study consciousness-as-such; not any particular con sciousness, but the struc-
tures necessary and sufficient for any c onsciou sness. What remains after the transcend en-
tal reduction is the transcendental ego. This is the positing ego; that is, the ego which
constitutes both the world and the mu ndane , situated ego. For example, in the phrase I
am aware of myself winning a game ofchess. Husserldistinguishes between two different
egos.
I
refers to the transcend ental ego, while the second ego, m yse lf, is the
psychological, mundane ego which is situated in the world. This psychological ego is
perspectival and present to consciou sness in and through its appearan ces, jus t like any
othe r mundane object. There is
a
deb ate within the phenomenological movem ent abo ut the
possibility and validity of
a
trans cen den tal, purely reflective ego which lies outs ide both
the world and the psychological ego. Our main interest as psychologists, however, is the
seco nd ego, the mundane, psychologically situated ego. This is the ego which rem em bers,
desires, has wishes and fears etc. n the case of the psychological phenomenological
brac ketin g, we bracket t he object pole (we put its reality statu s into susp ensi on), but we
leave the psychological ego exactly
as
it is in the world. We d o not susp end its particular-
ities beca use this is what we wish to stud y. We are interested in this situated eg o which h as
desires and fears. The psychological phenomenological reduction takes us out of the
natural atti tude by subsuming the object u nde r subjectivity (object-as-meant) and leaves us
with
a
situated co nsciousn ess intending m eanings. From Husserls standpo int (which
claims the validity of a transcendental ego), we
as
phenomenological psychologists must
adm it the following paradox: T he I which we study (the my self ) which constitutes
th e world is also itself situated in the world. It is both constiuting and con stitut ed. We find
no
difficulty in accepting this premise beca use ou r interests a re
not
philosophical.
For
our
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Scand J Psycho1 25 11984) P h e n o m e n o lo g i ca l psy hology 57
purposes, we need only to discover th e meanings which a re intend ed by the situated ego in
their psychological significations.
A common confusion about the phenomenological method concerns the researchers
use of intuitions t o arrive a t
a
theoretically unbiased und erstan ding of the data (textproto-
cd) .
How is
a
theo retically unbiased understanding possible? In ord er to und erstan d
such a notion, we must first become clear about what a theory is. According to FQlesdal
and Walloe, a theory is a se t of propositions whose inter relatedn ess is made explicit. It
is
therefore characteristic of a theory that it makes clear how the different propositions
which are inclu ded in it depe nd upon each oth er (F#llesdal Wall0e,
1977,
p. 53,
our
translation from Norwegian). The theory becomes the basis upon which the data is
analyzed. What
is
important here is that the
final
comprehension
of
the data on the part of
the researcher is depen dent upo n these previously formulated pro positions. As phenomen-
ological psyc holo gists, we maintain that we d o not make an y use
of
theories in our
understanding
of
the data. T his does not mean,
of
cour se, that th e researcher co nfronts his
data as a blank; we are not unbiased in the sense that we can transcend language and
culture. B ut to be in a culture and partak e of its common p reunderstanding s and meaning-
ful
expressions
is
not the s am e thing as to assert and attemp t
to
prove co nstructed models
or theories. For examp le, take the experience of reading a novel. If one reflects upon o nes
own experience, we think everyone would agree that the understanding
of
what one has
read does not depend upon theories
(in
the above defined sense) about what one has
read. Ra ther, the re ader of the text already sha res a common world with the autho r which
enables him to g rasp the meaning
of
the text.
To
say that the reader has understood
what he has read is to assu m e the possibility of expr essing and grasping m eanings through
the m edium of a shared cultur e and language.
We have chosen t o call the researchers grasping of meaning in the subjects descrip-
tions intuition sticking to the language
of
Husserl (1962). However,
our
intuition is
not Husserls intuition of grasping essences (transcendental philosophy), but is grounded
in
language and cultur e and i s therefore an intuition of
a
hermeneutical kind. (See Ricoeur
1981,
Titelman
1979.)
At this point we shall address the question; what kind of results d o we come up with in
our
research? W herea s Hu sserl discovered es sence s, phenomenological psychology dis-
cove rs psychological signif cation s (generalities). T hes e psychological significations
or
meaning constitu ents are th e theme s which emerge as the structure of a lived psycho-
logical phenomenon.
A
str uct ure understood phenomenologically is that comm on
thread which runs through unique manifestations of the same phenomenon. A meaning
constituent discovered in
a
protocol analysis of
a
psychological phenomenon would be a
part
of
the phenom enon in interaction with other pa rts
or
constituents which in turn
make up the phenomenon in question. It is thus not the case that the phenomenological
psychologist merely p oints o ut d isjointed, unrelated significations, but rather, h e see ks
to
discover the
way
in which
parts or
constituents of
a
protocol relate
to one
another
in a
gestalt. T his gestalt we call
a
general structure. It may
also
tur n ou t that we find two
or
more gestalts which we call typologies of the same phenomenon. We will demonstrate
in practice how
our
analy ses proceed. Th e following method
was
developed by Amedeo
Giorgi at Duquesn e U niversity (see Ciorgi,
19706, 1975,
Wertz, in press).
E X A M P L E O F T H E P H E N O M E N O L O G IC A L P S Y C H O L O G IC A L M E TH O D
The raw data
for
ou r s tudies consist of reports (descriptions) given by subjects of their
experiences
of a
given phenomenon. The format
of
such descriptions can be gathered as
retrospective protoco ls (running narrative), interviews,
or
think-aloud protocols. In this
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58
J .
ullington and
G.
Karlsson
Scand J Psycho1 25
(1984)
paper we will address retrospective protocol analysis, although the method
of
analysis
applies to any type of text. Phenomenological psychology does not exclude the laboratory
set up per se, but the laboratory situation would be used in a phenomenological way:
namely, the subjects own description of his experience while going through the experi-
ment would constitute our data.
For
purposes of clarity, we
will
from now on describe our
method as
it
applies to a retrospective protocol obtained from one subject.
After having decided what we wish to investigate, we approach subjects with the
following instructions: Describe a situation in which you felt (in this case lonely).
Describe the situation, how you felt and what you did
in
as much detail as possible.
Include all details which come
to
your mind. Describe it in as much detail
so
that someone
who
has
never had the experience would understand it after your description.
A
good
protocol is one which is free from psychological jargon or other privileged disciplinary
biases. Such a protocol would be a spontaneous recounting of lived experience, rather
than a self-reflective, explanatory account. We present the following loneliness protocol
and thereafter the following analysis which will be used
in
our discussion to illustrate the
method.
This situation happen ed to me som etime in the recent past, and the circumstances surround ing it were
that the person I
was
living with had moved back to New York, and he told me that he was going to
call me at
OO on
his particular Su nday night to let me know what had happened with him in New
York. 1
myself had been
out
of town and had com e back earlier
on
this particular Sunday. Upon my
arrival
I
discovered that my landlord w a s putting in a heating unit, and the apartment w a s torn apart,
it
was
cold. 1 looked around and saw all his things laying around the apartment. just e xactly whe re he
had left them. I didnt feel at home in the apartment. I felt very uprooted. Without him, I didnt feel
like
I
belonged here. I tried
to
read earlier in the evening, but
I
couldnt concentrate.
1
kept looking at
the clock anticipating his phone call. He didnt call at
I 1 0 0 I
tried to continue t o read. H e didnt call
a t 11.15, a t
11-30
or at 11.45. By
12.00 1
was getting upset, and by
12.15 I
felt jus t horrible. T his w as
a
very crucial phone call for
our
relationship.
I
hadnt had any contact with him since he left for New
York a week ago or so.By this time in th e evening
1
was afraid that he didnt care abo ut me , this o ne
person whom Id been devoting myself to, at the cost of all others, didnt care about me. I looked
around the room, and I thought abo ut living alone here in Y and
1
thought. I havent got a friend
in the world. I tried to think of my friends, I thought, there are people othe r than this person who
know you. you have friends, you have a family. But at that moment they didnt seem real to me. I
couldnt sha ke the feeling that I
was
hopelessly alone. Fo r a while I considered calling his gran dmoth-
er
in New
York,
n case something terrible had happe ned to him. But since it was past midnight and
I
figured it was too late to call, I gave up the idea. And besides
I
still thought he would call. I paced
through the apartm ent, wringing my han ds and feeling very physically agitated. He
finally
called me at
1 00 at night. I felt furious at him, but
after
we talked some I felt calmed down and at home with
myself again.
We divide our analysis of the protocol into 5 steps for pedagogical purposes. Different
researchers may vary the method by a step
or
two, but in essence the phenomenological
psychological analysis contains t he following 5 steps.
S t e p
I
Our first step is to perform the phenomenological reduction.
For
our purposes, as
psychologists, we wish to read the text with an open, theoretically unbiased attitude.
However, we must maintain a psychological focus of interest as we read. (We do not, for
example, read this protocol on loneliness as a sociological text.) We read the text through,
as
many times
as
necessary
in
order to get
a
grasp
of
the
whole text
in
light of the
particular phenomenon we are investigating. We proceed from initial readings to a more
systematic reading where we focus upon discriminating the meaning units that emerge
from
the text. Breaking up the text into meaning units constitutes step 2.
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25
1984) P h e n o m e n o lo g i ca l
psychology 59
S t e p
2
Meaning unit discriminations are divisions of the entire running text into discrete units
of
meaning each of which can stand on
its
own as expressing relevant meaning. We have a
sense already of wh at is relevant by having read the text a number
of
times. We mark
these meaning unit divisions directly on the description in those places where we sense a
shift in the meaning in the expression of the subject, or a transformation of the situation.
Consider the following excerpt from our loneliness protocol as an example of a naturally
occurring break in meaning:
I
myse lf had been out of town and had com e back earlier on this particular Sunday. Upon my arrival,
1
discovered that my landlord
was
putting in a hea ting unit, and the apartment w a s tom apart,
it w a s
cold.() I looked around and saw all his things laying around the apartmen t, just excactly as he had
left them.(5)
We divided th e meaning unit as we did becaus e the first two se ntenc es, although they
contain several ideas, both express
one
psychological meaning, which we could summa-
rize
as
the subjects relation
to
the s tate
of
the apar tment
(4).
Th e last sentence contains
a
new psychological meaning, namely, the introduction of the absent other into the cold,
disarranged apartm ent
(5).
We do
not
interpret these breaks in meaning, we
do
not
impose them, but we do allow
our
intuitions to guide our understanding of th e shifts in
meaning which sp ontaneously em erge upon reading the protocol.
S t e p
3
Step number three is the transformation of these meaning units from the language
of
the
subject into th e research ers language, which focuses upon the significations expressed in
relation to the phenomenon under investigation. Here a word must be said about the
language we use
as
phenomenological researchers.
As
has been hinted at, phenomenology
started out without having any read-made language. This pertains to phenomenological
psychology as well. The language that we use as researchers, first
of
all, reflects the
understanding of the whole protocol. Thus we can let the understanding
of
the entire
protocol influence the transform ations of a particular meaning unit. Th ere are n o laws or
rules about the use of the language, but one should, of course, be mindful not to use a
language th at h as vague
or
multiple connotations. The community to whom o ne addr esses
the stud y is anothe r facto r to take into account in the choice of the researcher language. If
it is phenomenological community
one
is addressing, there may be certain expressions
which have a meaning for them, but not for ano the r audience, and vice versa. T he use of
a n
expert language can often be dangerous. For instance, the expression neurotic
compulsion
is
obv iously theoretically loaded. T his is why a naive, everyday language is
preferable until we have created a bias free, descriptive vocabulary. The difficulty in
comm unicating our results (phenomenological structu res) is cited by D e Boer:
Ordinary language is completely attuned to
the
sphere
of
normal interests, i.e. to objects, and can
describe adequately only this primary objectivity. The phenomenologist must use words that are
attuned
to
the natural attitude. n other words, the un natu ral reflective thought-stance is forced
to
speak the language of the
natural
direction
of
thought. This,
of
course. causes certain difficulties in
communication. One condition for understanding
a
phenomenological analysis
is
that one must be
able
to
transpose himself into
the
typical phenomenological attitude
. (1978,
p. 130 .
A s
we transform the language of the subject into the researchers language, we do not seek
to make the subjects expressions conform
to
any prior hypothesized psychological
constructs. By remaining open to the description, we allow ourselves to be surprised by
whatever cons tituents we may find in
a
protocol. Ou r transformations into the language of
the researcher is necessary to our project becau se the d escriptions of the subjects lived
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60
J .
Bullington and G . Karlsson
Scand J Psycho1 25 1984)
experiences are
not
primarily psychological (nor primarily sociological, biological etc.).
It
is the project of phenomenological psychology to tease out the psychological meanings.
We must go beyond phenomenal level (what is directly lived) to the phenomenological
level (in our example, the psychological logos of loneliness). The subjects descriptions are
phenomenal
in
that they describe what is directly and unreflectively lived. The phenomen-
ological move is that reflective stance taken under the reduction which uses phenomenal
descriptions
in
order to arrive at a structural understanding of experience; the logos of
phenomena. We present only the first five meaning unit transformations here for reasons
of brevity.
Con stituents prese nt in description
1. This situation happened to S in the recent
past.
2.
S
states that the person she
wa s
living with
moved back to New York.
3. The o ther had m ade plans with S o call her
on
a particular da y at a particular time to tell
S what had happened with him in New York.
4.
S
herself had been out of town and amved at
the apt . on the day of the phone call. S dis-
covered that the apt.
was
tom apart by land-
lord repairs. It was cold.
5 .
S ooked around the apt. and saw all of this
persons
hings laying around, just exactly
where he had left them.
Constituents of description expressed
i n
terms revelatory of loneliness
1
2 .
S stated that the circumstances of this occa-
sion of loneliness centered around the ab-
senc e of a significant oth er with whom S had
been living. This other left the S and moved
back t o where he he had been living sometime
prior to living with
S.
3.
S and the other had made plans (a pledge
or
promise) that the other would call
S
on the
phone at a particular time on a particular
night. S xpected to find out from this phone
call what had happened 10 the other since
they last saw each other.
4. S came back from out of town to this apt.
where she and the other had lived together,
on the day of the phone call. Upon amval S
found the apt. in an une xpected s tat e of disar-
ray due to repairs being performed in her
absence.
5 .
S urthermore experienced the a pt . as remind-
ing her of the absent other.
We keep the subjects language (slightly modified, I changed to subject etc.) on the
left hand side and put our transformations directly opposite on the right, to ensure that we
do not lose sight of the subjects original expressions.
We use descriptions of experiences as access into the structure of phenomena, which by
definition must be a more narrow, abstract description. It must be remembered that the
only framework the phenomenological psychologist uses
in
making
his
transformations is
to trace out the implicit (or in some cases, explicit) meanings which he finds in the
protocol(s) themselves. The researcher makes no use of theoretical models because they
merely hinder his discovering what the protocol has to offer. Psychological sensitivity on
the part of the researcher is used to elucidate rather than define the phenomenon being
investigated.For example, we take the subjects language here: I looked around and saw
all his things laying around the apartment, just exactly where he had left them and
transform it into: S furthermore experienced the apartment as reminding her of the
absent other. W e include the word furthermore here because in the overall context of
this protocol, this sentence follows directly a sentence about the
Ss
feeling disoriented
and cold in the apartment. Besides being cold and tom apart, the apartment furthermore
reminded her of the absent other. Both meaning units
(4
and
5
taken together reveal the
Ss reaction to being in that apartment then, under those particular conditions. We arrived
at our transformation here by asking ourselves in imaginary variation, what did it mean in
the context of the entire protocol that the subject looked around and saw all his things
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Scand J Psycho1 25 (1984) Phenomenological psychology 6
laying around the apartm ent , just exactly whe re he had left them? Does she mean that
this state of disarray crea ted a n extr a cleaning burden for her? S uch a transfo rmatio n is not
substantiated in the text . Could her sentence mean that she experienced anger towards the
absent other for not cleaning u p
his
things before
h e
left? Possibly, but we must always
return to the language of the subjec t. We intuit that the phrase just ex actly wh ere he left
them do es not exp ress ang er. The transformations take on their significance in relation to
the en tire proto col o n loneliness.
Step 4
Our next step
as
researchers
is to
synth esize our transformed meanings units into a
situated s truc ture, which re ads like a synopsis of the specific meaning co nstituen ts foun d
in the protocol. A structure, we recall, is a gestalt-like contexture in which the parts
(meaning constituents) relate
to
each other in an interdependent way. T h u s , the full
understanding of a phenomenon
s
not the result of a mere enumeration
of
const i tuents,
but rather, the way in which eac h constituen t relates to each other con stituent. As can be
seen below, the si tuated stmcture is a running text of the transformed meaning units. In
order to reach this stru cture, the researcher may omit
or
shift the transformed meaning
units
in
ord er to be st exp ress psychological significations. He may also wish t o refer back
to the raw data
S s
language) at this point in order to ensure that nothing has been
overlooked. T he si tuated struc ture is the ana lysis of Qne protocol in its specificness. In this
way we have
at our
disposal an easy-to-read, coherently organized text to compare with
our other protocols in the sam e study .
We presen t here the c om plete situated structure of the loneliness protocol we have used
as an example.
Loneliness for this subject
w as
experienced when
S
eturned
to
an apartment where she had been
living with
a
recently departed, significant other. The Ss experience of the apartment as being in a
state of disarray contrib uted to the
Ss
feeling that she was not at home . (This word contribut-
ed is an example of the way phenomenological psychology is sometimes forced to use everyday
language
to
expre ss meaningful associations which we have no phenomenologically descriptive word
fo r at this time.) The perception of the others posse ssions
still
left in the apartm ent rem inded the S of
the absence of this other. T he other had made an agreement (a pledge) to call the S on a particular
night at a particular time.
S
xperienced time, as she was in the apartment,
as
pointing towards the
expected phone call. This
was a
crucial phone call for their relationship. When the other had not
called at the appointed time
nor
after a certain period
of
waiting,
S
felt that this other did not
reciprocate her care and devotion. S began to imagine
her
future without this othe r. S felt herself
to be
in a world without friends. S
was
unable
to
make her friends and family real. The only reality for S
at
that moment
was
the unrealized phone call and the absent others lack of care for her. S could not
herself actively investigate why the o the r had failed to call her (by calling his relative) bec ause she felt
that it was too late to call. She felt physically agitated as she waited passively for this phone call.
When the phone call finally arrived, S xpressed an ger towards the other, but eventually regained he r
feeling of being at home with herself in the apartment.
Step 5
Our final step , then is to move from a collection
of
situated structu res (m any protocols of
the sam e phenom enon wri t ten by different subjects) to what we call a general structure
(see below), which inc orpo rates those essential con stituents
of a
phenomenon which run
acros s all the situa ted struc tures . However, it may turn out that we can not collapse all
our
si tuated structures un der on e general structure. In su ch a case we f ind various types of
the phen om eno n wh ich we call typologies. We prefer, in these ca ses, to write out
general typologies rather than at temp t to force the data under o ne general structure. O ur
criterion for making typologies rath er than one general structure conc erns the nature
of
the
specific co nstituen t(s) in que stion. If those co nstituen ts differ in an essential way from th e
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62
J . Bullington and G.
Karlsson
Scand
J
Psycho1 25 1984)
other protocols, we would be doing violence to the spirit of phenomenology to exclude or
ignore those protocols which do not fit with the others. What we find
in
typologies are
varied structures of the same phenomenon which demand to be treated separately and
in
their own right. It should be stated that before the researcher decides upon typologies on
the basis of one
or
more errant constituent(s1, he should return to the raw data to ensure
that he did
not
overlook those essentially different constituents in the other protocols.
Although in practice
we
do not move from one situated structure to a general structure,
we found it necessary to do so here for didactic reasons. Even this single protocol
analysis, however, can reveal for us a fuller understanding of what loneliness is. Our
general structure reads as follows:
Ss loneliness refers to the absence of a specific significant person. Other people are not able to
compensate for the absence of the missed person. The S eels at a loss not at home) until contact
can be made with the absent other. S ells a detachment from the world and is not able to share her
loneliness with friends or family. S experiences that the action which is required to abate the
loneliness has to be initialed by the absent other. This passivity is justified by an internalization of
norms
hat makes
Ss
situation unchangeable, as far as the
Ss
sense of initiative is concerned.
Our
general structure tells
us
that loneliness
in
this protocol
w a s
more than the factual
absence of the person whom the subject missed. We found that this one protocol ex-
pressed a psychological constituent of passivity which wa s lived by the subject as a
waiting. What the subject called
a
waiting we may term passivity because
our
position as researchers allows us to step back reflectively and view her entire protocol as
an expression of loneliness. We saw how her passivity
w a s
manifested in her inability to
call friends and relatives, her unwillingness to actively investigate the reason for the delay
of the call, and finally, her entire temporal experience expressed a passivity
in
that her
present w a s focused upon the call which would amve
in
the future. We furthermore saw
a
connection between the passivity constituent and what we called an internalization of
norms (phenomenally lived as the Ss justification for her continuing to wait) which was
expressed by the subject as
it
was
too
late to call the grandmother.
Hopefully this brief discussion has provided the reader with a basis for further thought
and discussion. Our results
as
any other scientific results) point to further thematizations
and investigations. Even in
our
general structures we come up with findings which open up
a
field for further reflections and research.
We would like to thank Amedeo Giorgi, arlLesche, William Phillips, Ola Svenson and anonymous
reviewers
for
discussions and valuable comments
on
earlier drafts. This study was supported by a
grant to Ola Svenson from the Swedish Councilfor Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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