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Title:ThePhilosophyofSpiritualActivity

AModernPhilosophyofLifeDevelopbyScientificMethods

Author:RudolphSteiner

Translator:R.F.AlfredHoernle

ReleaseDate:October16,2017[EBook#55761]

Language:English

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THEPHILOSOPHYOFSPIRITUALACTIVITY

TranslatedWorksofRUDOLFSTEINER,Ph.D.

ANOUTLINEOFOCCULTSCIENCETHELORD’SPRAYER

THEGATESOFKNOWLEDGE

PHILOSOPHYANDTHEOSOPHYTHREEESSAYSONHAECKELANDONKARMA

THEEDUCATIONOFCHILDREN

THEOCCULTSIGNIFICANCEOFBLOOD

ATLANTISANDLEMURIA

THEWAYOFINITIATIONINITIATIONANDITSRESULTS

THEOSOPHYTHEMYSTICSOFTHERENAISSANCE

CHRISTIANITYASMYSTICALFACTTHEPHILOSOPHYOFSPIRITUALACTIVITY

THETHREEFOLDSTATEAROADTOSELF-KNOWLEDGE

THETHRESHOLDOFTHESPIRITUALWORLD

MYSTERYPLAYS(2vols.)INVESTIGATIONSINOCCULTISM

THEPHILOSOPHYOF

SPIRITUALACTIVITY

AModernPhilosophyofLifeDevelopedby

ScientificMethods

ByRUDOLFSTEINERPh.D.(Vienna)

BeinganEnlargedandRevisedEditionof“ThePhilosophyofFreedom,”togetherwiththeOriginalThesison“Truthand

Science”AUTHORIZEDTRANSLATIONBY

PROFESSOR&MRS.R.F.ALFREDHOERNLÉ

G.P.Putnam’sSons

London&NewYork

MADEINGREATBRITAIN

AUTHORIZEDTRANSLATIONEDITEDBYH.COLLISON

FirstPublished 1916SecondEdition,revisedandenlarged 1922

PrintedbytheBOTOLPHPRINTINGWORKS,GATEST.,KINGSWAY,W.C.2

EDITOR’SNOTE

ThefollowingpagesareatranslationofDr.Steiner’sPhilosophiederFreiheit,whichwaspublishedinGermanysometwentyyearsago.Theeditionwassoonexhausted,andhasneverbeenreprinted;copiesaremuchsoughtafterbutverydifficulttoobtain.

ThepopularityofDr.Steiner’slaterworksuponethics,mysticism,andkindredsubjectshascausedpeopletoforgethisearlierworkuponphilosophyinspiteofthefactthathemakesfrequentreferencestothisbookanditcontainsthegermsofwhichmanyofhispresentviewsarethelogicaloutcome.Fortheabovereasons,andwiththeauthor’ssanction,Ihavedecidedtopublishatranslation.

IhavehadthegoodfortunetohavebeenabletosecureasjointtranslatorsMrs.Hoernlé,who,aftergraduatingintheUniversityoftheCapeofGoodHope,continuedherstudiesintheUniversitiesofCambridge,Leipzig,Paris,andBonn,andherhusband,Mr.R.F.AlfredHoernlé,AssistantProfessorofPhilosophyatHarvardUniversity,U.S.A.,formerlyJenkynsExhibitioner,BalliolCollege,Oxford,theirthoroughknowledgeofphilosophyandtheircompletecommandoftheGermanandEnglishlanguagesenablingthemtoovercomethedifficultyoffindingadequateEnglishequivalentsforthetermsofGermanPhilosophy.

Iamgladtoseizethisopportunityofacknowledgingmyindebtednesstothesetwo,withoutwhomthispublicationcouldnothavebeenundertaken.

HARRYCOLLISON.

March1916.

EDITOR’SNOTETOSECONDEDITION

In1918Dr.SteinerpublishedarevisededitionofthePhilosophiederFreiheit.Forthetranslationofthenewpassagesaddedto,andoftheincidentalchangesmadein,thisrevisededitionIamindebtedtoMr.Hoernlé,nowProfessorofPhilosophyintheArmstrongCollege(Newcastle-upon-Tyne),UniversityofDurham.

Attheauthor’srequestIhavechangedthetitletoPhilosophyofSpiritualActivity,andthroughouttheentirework“freedom”shouldbetakentomean“spiritualactivity.”

Dr.Steiner’sPh.D.Thesison“TruthandScience,”originallypublishedasapreludetoThePhilosophyofFreedom,has,withhisconsent,beentranslatedforthiseditionandbeenaddedattheendofthisvolume.

March1921.

CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

PREFACETOTHEREVISEDEDITION(1918)XI

THETHEORYOFFREEDOM

I CONSCIOUSHUMANACTION 1II WHYTHEDESIREFORKNOWLEDGEISFUNDAMENTAL 14III THOUGHTASTHEINSTRUMENTOFKNOWLEDGE 24IV THEWORLDASPERCEPT 48V OURKNOWLEDGEOFTHEWORLD 73VI HUMANINDIVIDUALITY 101VII ARETHERELIMITSTOKNOWLEDGE? 109

THEREALITYOFFREEDOM

VIII THEFACTORSOFLIFE 137IX THEIDEAOFFREEDOM 146X MONISMANDTHEPHILOSOPHYOFSPIRITUALACTIVITY 178XI WORLD-PURPOSEANDLIFE-PURPOSE(THEDESTINYOFMAN) 190XII MORALIMAGINATION(DARWINANDMORALITY) 198XIII THEVALUEOFLIFE(OPTIMISMANDPESSIMISM) 213XIV THEINDIVIDUALANDTHEGENUS 250

ULTIMATEQUESTIONS

XV THECONSEQUENCESOFMONISM 259

TRUTHANDSCIENCE

I PRELIMINARYOBSERVATIONS 277II THEFUNDAMENTALPROBLEMOFKANT’STHEORYOF

KNOWLEDGE 280III THEORYOFKNOWLEDGESINCEKANT 291IV THESTARTING-POINTSOFTHETHEORYOFKNOWLEDGE 304V KNOWLEDGEANDREALITY 319VI THEORYOFKNOWLEDGEWITHOUTPRESUPPOSITIONSVERSUS

FICHTE’STHEORYOFSCIENCE 329VII CONCLUDINGREMARKS:EPISTEMOLOGICAL 347VIII CONCLUDINGREMARKS:PRACTICAL 351

APPENDICES

I ADDITIONTOREVISEDEDITIONOF“THEPHILOSOPHYOFFREEDOM”1918 357

II REVISEDINTRODUCTIONTO“THEPHILOSOPHYOFFREEDOM” 368

III PREFACETOORIGINALEDITIONOF“TRUTHANDSCIENCE” 374IV INTRODUCTIONTOORIGINALEDITIONOF“TRUTHANDSCIENCE” 381

PREFACETOTHEREVISEDEDITION(1918)

Therearetwofundamentalproblemsinthelifeofthehumanmind,tooneorotherofwhicheverythingbelongsthatistobediscussedinthisbook.Oneoftheseproblemsconcernsthepossibilityofattainingtosuchaviewoftheessentialnatureofmanaswillserveasasupportforwhateverelsecomesintohislifebywayofexperienceorofscience,andyetissubjecttothesuspicionofhavingnosupportinitselfandofbeingliabletobedriven,bydoubtandcriticism,intothelimboofuncertainties.Theotherproblemisthis:Isman,asvoluntaryagent,entitledtoattributefreedomtohimself,orisfreedomamereillusionbegottenofhisinabilitytorecognisethethreadsofnecessityonwhichhisvolition,likeanynaturalevent,depends?Itisnoartificialtissueoftheorieswhichprovokesthisquestion.Inacertainmooditpresentsitselfquitenaturallytothehumanmind.Anditiseasytofeelthatamindlackssomethingofitsfullstaturewhichhasneveronceconfrontedwiththeutmostseriousnessofinquirythetwopossibilities—freedomornecessity.Thisbookisintendedtoshowthatthespiritualexperienceswhichthesecondproblemcausesmantoundergo,dependuponthepositionheisabletotakeuptowardsthefirstproblem.Anattemptwillbemadetoprovethatthereisaviewconcerningtheessentialnatureofmanwhichcansupporttherestofknowledge;and,further,anattempttopointouthowwiththisviewwegainacompletejustificationfortheideaoffreewill,providedonlythatwehavefirstdiscoveredthatregionofthemindinwhichfreevolitioncanunfolditself.

Theviewtowhichweherereferisonewhich,oncegained,iscapableofbecomingpartandparceloftheverylifeoftheminditself.Theanswergiventothetwoproblemswillnotbeofthepurelytheoreticalsortwhich,oncemastered,maybecarriedaboutasamerepieceofmemory-knowledge.Suchananswerwould,forthewholemannerofthinkingadoptedinthisbook,benorealansweratall.Thebookwillnotgiveafinishedandcompleteanswerofthissort,butpointtoafieldofspiritualexperienceinwhichman’sowninwardspiritualactivitysuppliesalivinganswertothesequestions,asoftenasheneedsone.Whoeverhasoncediscoveredtheregionofthemindwherethesequestionsarise,willfindpreciselyinhisactualacquaintancewiththisregionallthatheneedsforthesolutionofhistwoproblems.Withtheknowledgethusacquiredhemaythen,asdesireorfatedictate,adventurefurtherintothebreadthsanddepthsofthisunfathomablelifeofours.Thusitwouldappearthatthereisakindofknowledgewhichprovesitsjustificationandvaliditybyitsowninnerlifeaswellasbythekinshipofitsownlifewiththewholelifeofthehumanmind.

ThisishowIconceivedthecontentsofthisbookwhenIfirstwroteittwenty-fiveyearsago.To-day,onceagain,IhavetosetdownsimilarsentencesifIamtocharacterisetheleadingthoughtsofmybook.AttheoriginalwritingIcontentedmyselfwithsayingnomorethanwasinthestrictestsenseconnectedwiththefundamentalproblemswhichIhaveoutlined.IfanyoneshouldbeastonishedatnotfindinginthisbookasyetanyreferencetothatregionoftheworldofspiritualexperienceofwhichIhavegivenan

accountinmylaterwritings,Iwouldaskhimtobearinmindthatitwasnotmypurposeatthattimetosetdowntheresultsofspiritualresearch,butfirsttolaythefoundationsonwhichsuchresultscanrest.ThePhilosophyofSpiritualActivitycontainsnospecialresultsofthisspiritualsort,aslittleasitcontainsspecialresultsofthenaturalsciences.Butwhatitdoescontainis,inmyjudgment,indispensableforanyonewhodesiresasecurefoundationforsuchknowledge.WhatIhavesaidinthisbookmaybeacceptableeventosomewho,forreasonsoftheirown,refusetohaveanythingtodowiththeresultsofmyresearchesintotheSpiritualRealm.ButanyonewhofindssomethingtoattracthiminmyinquiriesintotheSpiritualRealmmaywellappreciatetheimportanceofwhatIwasheretryingtodo.Itisthis:toshowthatopen-mindedconsiderationsimplyofthetwoproblemswhichIhaveindicatedandwhicharefundamentalforallknowledge,leadstotheviewthatmanlivesinthemidstofagenuineSpiritualWorld.Theaimofthisbookistodemonstrate,priortoourentryuponspiritualexperience,thatknowledgeoftheSpiritualWorldisafact.Thisdemonstrationissoconductedthatitisnevernecessary,inordertoacceptthepresentarguments,tocastfurtiveglancesattheexperiencesonwhichIhavedweltinmylaterwritings.Allthatisnecessaryisthatthereadershouldbewillingandabletoadapthimselftothemannerofthepresentdiscussions.

Thusitseemstomethatinonesensethisbookoccupiesapositioncompletelyindependentofmywritingsonstrictlyspiritualmatters.Yetinanothersenseitseemstobemostintimatelyconnectedwiththem.Theseconsiderationshavemovedmenow,afteralapseoftwenty-fiveyears,tore-publishthecontentsofthisbookinthemainwithoutessentialalterations.Ihaveonlymadeadditionsofsomelengthtoanumberofchapters.ThemisunderstandingsofmyargumentwithwhichIhavemetseemedtomakethesemoredetailedelaborationsnecessary.ActualchangesoftexthavebeenmadebymeonlywhereitseemedtomenowthatIhadsaidclumsilywhatImeanttosayaquarterofacenturyago.(OnlymalicecouldfindinthesechangesoccasiontosuggestthatIhavechangedmyfundamentalconviction.)

Formanyyearsmybookhasbeenoutofprint.Inspiteofthefact,whichisapparentfromwhatIhavejustsaid,thatmyutterancesoftwenty-fiveyearsagoabouttheseproblemsstillseemtomejustasrelevanttoday,Ihesitatedalongtimeaboutthecompletionofthisrevisededition.AgainandagainIhaveaskedmyselfwhetherIoughtnot,atthispointorthat,todefinemypositiontowardsthenumerousphilosophicaltheorieswhichhavebeenputforwardsincethepublicationofthefirstedition.YetmypreoccupationinrecentyearswithresearchesintothepurelySpiritualRealmpreventedmydoingasIcouldhavewished.However,asurvey,asthoroughasIcouldmakeit,ofthephilosophicalliteratureofthepresentdayhasconvincedmethatsuchacriticaldiscussion,alluringthoughitwouldbeinitself,wouldbeoutofplaceinthecontextofwhatmybookhastosay.Allthat,fromthepointofviewofthePhilosophyofSpiritualActivity,itseemedtomenecessarytosayaboutrecentphilosophicaltendenciesmaybefoundinthesecondvolumeofmyRiddlesofPhilosophy.

RUDOLFSTEINER.

April1918.

THETHEORYOFFREEDOM

CONSCIOUSHUMANACTION

Ismanfreeinactionandthought,orisheboundbyanironnecessity?Therearefewquestionsonwhichsomuchingenuityhasbeenexpended.Theideaoffreedomhasfoundenthusiasticsupportersandstubbornopponentsinplenty.Therearethosewho,intheirmoralfervour,labelanyoneamanoflimitedintelligencewhocandenysopatentafactasfreedom.Opposedtothemareotherswhoregarditastheacmeofunscientificthinkingforanyonetobelievethattheuniformityofnaturallawisbrokeninthesphereofhumanactionandthought.Oneandthesamethingisthusproclaimed,nowasthemostpreciouspossessionofhumanity,nowasitsmostfatalillusion.Infinitesubtletyhasbeenemployedtoexplainhowhumanfreedomcanbeconsistentwithdeterminisminnatureofwhichman,afterall,isapart.Othershavebeenatnolesspainstoexplainhowsuchadelusionasthiscouldhavearisen.Thatwearedealingherewithoneofthemostimportantquestionsforlife,religion,conduct,science,mustbecleartoeveryonewhosemostprominenttraitofcharacterisnotthereverseofthoroughness.Itisoneofthesadsignsofthesuperficialityofpresent-daythought,thatabookwhichattemptstodevelopanewfaithoutoftheresultsofrecentscientificresearch(DavidFriedrichStrauss,DeralteundneueGlaube),hasnothingmoretosayonthisquestionthanthesewords:“Withthequestionofthefreedomofthehumanwillwearenotconcerned.Theallegedfreedomofindifferentchoicehasbeenrecognisedasanemptyillusionbyeveryphilosophyworthyofthename.Thedeterminationofthemoralvalueofhumanconductandcharacterremainsuntouchedbythisproblem.”ItisnotbecauseIconsiderthatthebookinwhichitoccurshasanyspecialimportancethatIquotethispassage,butbecauseitseemstometoexpresstheonlyviewtowhichthethoughtofthemajorityofourcontemporariesisabletoriseinthismatter.Everyonewhohasgrownbeyondthekindergarten-stageofscienceappearstoknownowadaysthatfreedomcannotconsistinchoosing,atone’spleasure,oneorotheroftwopossiblecoursesofaction.Thereisalways,sowearetold,aperfectlydefinitereasonwhy,outofseveralpossibleactions,wecarryoutjustoneandnoother.

Thisseemsquiteobvious.Nevertheless,downtothepresentday,themainattacksoftheopponentsoffreedomaredirectedonlyagainstfreedomofchoice.EvenHerbertSpencer,infact,whosedoctrinesaregaininggrounddaily,says,“Thateveryoneisatlibertytodesireornottodesire,whichistherealpropositioninvolvedinthedogmaoffreewill,isnegativedasmuchbytheanalysisofconsciousness,asbythecontentsoftheprecedingchapters”(ThePrinciplesofPsychology,PartIV,chap.ix,par.219).Others,too,startfromthesamepointofviewincombatingtheconceptoffreewill.ThegermsofalltherelevantargumentsaretobefoundasearlyasSpinoza.Allthathebroughtforwardinclearandsimplelanguageagainsttheideaoffreedomhassincebeenrepeatedtimeswithoutnumber,butasaruleenvelopedinthemostsophisticatedarguments,sothatitisdifficulttorecognisethestraightforwardtrainofthoughtwhichisaloneinquestion.SpinozawritesinaletterofOctoberorNovember,1674,“Icallathingfreewhichexistsandactsfromthepurenecessityofitsnature,andIcallthatunfree,ofwhichthebeingandactionarepreciselyandfixedlydeterminedbysomethingelse.Thus,e.g.,God,though

necessary,isfreebecauseheexistsonlythroughthenecessityofhisownnature.Similarly,Godknowshimselfandallelseasfree,becauseitfollowssolelyfromthenecessityofhisnaturethatheknowsall.Yousee,therefore,thatformefreedomconsistsnotinfreedecision,butinfreenecessity.

“Butletuscomedowntocreatedthingswhicharealldeterminedbyexternalcausestoexistandtoactinafixedanddefinitemanner.Toperceivethismoreclearly,letusimagineaperfectlysimplecase.Astone,forexample,receivesfromanexternalcauseactinguponitacertainquantityofmotion,byreasonofwhichitnecessarilycontinuestomove,aftertheimpactoftheexternalcausehasceased.Thecontinuedmotionofthestoneisduetocompulsion,nottothenecessityofitsownnature,becauseitrequirestobedefinedbytheimpactofanexternalcause.Whatistruehereforthestoneistruealsoforeveryotherparticularthing,howevercomplicatedandmany-sideditmaybe,namely,thateverythingisnecessarilydeterminedbyexternalcausestoexistandtoactinafixedanddefinitemanner.

“Now,pray,assumethatthisstoneduringitsmotionthinksandknowsthatitisstrivingtothebestofitspowertocontinueinmotion.Thisstonewhichisconsciousonlyofitsstrivingandisbynomeansindifferent,willbelievethatitisabsolutelyfree,andthatitcontinuesinmotionfornootherreasonthanitsownwilltocontinue.Nowthisisthathumanfreedomwhicheverybodyclaimstopossessandwhichconsistsinnothingbutthis,thatmenareconsciousoftheirdesires,butignorantofthecausesbywhichtheyaredetermined.Thusthechildbelievesthathedesiresmilkofhisownfreewill,theangryboyregardshisdesireforvengeanceasfree,andthecowardhisdesireforflight.Again,thedrunkenmanbelievesthathesaysofhisownfreewillwhat,soberagain,hewouldfainhaveleftunsaid,andasthisprejudiceisinnateinallmen,itisdifficulttofreeoneselffromit.For,althoughexperienceteachesusoftenenoughthatmanleastofallcantemperhisdesires,andthat,movedbyconflictingpassions,heperceivesthebetterandpursuestheworse,yetheconsidershimselffreebecausetherearesomethingswhichhedesireslessstrongly,andsomedesireswhichhecaneasilyinhibitthroughtherecollectionofsomethingelsewhichitisoftenpossibletorecall.”

Itiseasytodetectthefundamentalerrorofthisview,becauseitissoclearlyanddefinitelyexpressed.Thesamenecessitybywhichastonemakesadefinitemovementastheresultofanimpact,issaidtocompelamantocarryoutanactionwhenimpelledtheretobyanycause.Itisonlybecausemanisconsciousofhisaction,thathethinkshimselftobeitsoriginator.Indoingso,heoverlooksthefactthatheisdrivenbyacausewhichhemustobeyunconditionally.Theerrorinthistrainofthoughtiseasilybroughttolight.Spinoza,andallwhothinklikehim,overlookthefactthatmannotonlyisconsciousofhisaction,butalsomaybecomeconsciousofthecausewhichguideshim.Anyonecanseethatachildisnotfreewhenhedesiresmilk,northedrunkenmanwhenhesaysthingswhichhelaterregrets.Neitherknowsanythingofthecauses,workingdeepwithintheirorganisms,whichexerciseirresistiblecontroloverthem.Butisitjustifiabletolumptogetheractionsofthiskindwiththoseinwhichamanisconsciousnotonlyofhisactionsbutalsooftheircauses?Aretheactionsofmenreallyallofonekind?Shouldtheactofasoldieronthefieldofbattle,ofthescientificresearcherinhislaboratory,ofthestatesmaninthemost

complicateddiplomaticnegotiations,beplacedonthesamelevelwiththatofthechildwhenhedesiresmilk?Itis,nodoubt,truethatitisbesttoseekthesolutionofaproblemwheretheconditionsaresimplest.Butlackofabilitytoseedistinctionshasbeforenowcausedendlessconfusion.Thereis,afterall,aprofounddifferencebetweenknowingthemotiveofmyactionandnotknowingit.Atfirstsightthisseemsaself-evidenttruth.AndyettheopponentsoffreedomneveraskthemselveswhetheramotiveofactionwhichIrecogniseandunderstand,istoberegardedascompulsoryformeinthesamesenseastheorganicprocesswhichcausesthechildtocryformilk.

EduardvonHartmann,inhisPhänomenologiedesSittlichenBewusstseins(p.451),assertsthatthehumanwilldependsontwochieffactors,themotivesandthecharacter.Ifoneregardsmenasallalike,oratanyratethedifferencesbetweenthemasnegligible,thentheirwillappearsasdeterminedfromwithout,viz.,bythecircumstanceswithwhichtheycomeincontact.Butifonebearsinmindthatmenadoptanideaasthemotiveoftheirconduct,onlyiftheircharacterissuchthatthisideaarousesadesireinthem,thenmenappearasdeterminedfromwithinandnotfromwithout.Now,becauseanidea,giventousfromwithout,mustfirstinaccordancewithourcharactersbeadoptedasamotive,menbelievethattheyarefree,i.e.,independentofexternalinfluences.Thetruth,however,accordingtoEduardvonHartmann,isthat“eventhoughwemustfirstadoptanideaasamotive,wedosonotarbitrarily,butaccordingtothedispositionofourcharacters,thatis,weareanythingbutfree.”Hereagainthedifferencebetweenmotives,whichIallowtoinfluencemeonlyafterIhaveconsciouslymadethemmyown,andthosewhichIfollowwithoutanyclearknowledgeofthem,isabsolutelyignored.

Thisleadsusstraighttothestandpointfromwhichthesubjectwillbetreatedhere.Haveweanyrighttoconsiderthequestionofthefreedomofthewillbyitselfatall?Andifnot,withwhatotherquestionmustitnecessarilybeconnected?

Ifthereisadifferencebetweenconsciousandunconsciousmotivesofaction,thentheactioninwhichtheformerissueshouldbejudgeddifferentlyfromtheactionwhichspringsfromblindimpulse.Henceourfirstquestionwillconcernthisdifference,andontheresultofthisinquirywilldependwhatattitudeweoughttotakeuptowardsthequestionoffreedomproper.

Whatdoesitmeantohaveknowledgeofthemotivesofone’sactions?Toolittleattentionhasbeenpaidtothisquestion,because,unfortunately,manwhoisanindivisiblewholehasalwaysbeentornasunderbyus.Theagenthasbeendivorcedfromtheknower,whilsthewhomattersmorethaneverythingelse,viz.,themanwhoactsbecauseheknows,hasbeenutterlyoverlooked.

Itissaidthatmanisfreewhenheiscontrolledonlybyhisreason,andnotbyhisanimalpassions.Or,again,thattobefreemeanstobeabletodetermineone’slifeandactionbypurposesanddeliberatedecisions.

Nothingisgainedbyassertionsofthissort.Forthequestionisjustwhetherreason,purposes,anddecisionsexercisethesamekindofcompulsionoveramanashisanimalpassions.If,withoutmydoing,arationaldecisionoccursinmewiththesamenecessitywithwhichhungerandthirsthappentome,thenImustneedsobeyit,andmyfreedomis

anillusion.

Anotherformofexpressionruns:tobefreemeans,notthatwecanwillwhatwewill,butthatwecandowhatwewill.Thisthoughthasbeenexpressedwithgreatclearnessbythepoet-philosopherRobertHamerlinginhisAtomistikdesWillens.“Mancan,itistrue,dowhathewills,buthecannotwillwhathewills,becausehiswillisdeterminedbymotives!Hecannotwillwhathewills?Letusconsiderthesephrasesmoreclosely.Havetheyanyintelligiblemeaning?Doesfreedomofwill,then,meanbeingabletowillwithoutground,withoutmotive?Whatdoeswillingmeanifnottohavegroundsfordoing,orstrivingtodo,thisratherthanthat?Towillanythingwithoutgroundormotivewouldmeantowillsomethingwithoutwillingit.Theconceptofmotiveisindissolublyboundupwiththatofwill.Withoutthedeterminingmotivethewillisanemptyfaculty;itisthemotivewhichmakesitactiveandreal.Itis,therefore,quitetruethatthehumanwillisnot‘free,’inasmuchasitsdirectionisalwaysdeterminedbythestrongestmotive.But,ontheotherhand,itmustbeadmittedthatitisabsurdtospeak,incontrastwiththis‘unfreedom,’ofaconceivable‘freedom’ofthewill,whichwouldconsistinbeingabletowillwhatonedoesnotwill”(AtomistikdesWillens,p.213ff.).

Here,again,onlymotivesingeneralarementioned,withouttakingintoaccountthedifferencebetweenunconsciousandconsciousmotives.Ifamotiveaffectsme,andIamcompelledtoactonitbecauseitprovestobethe“strongest”ofitskind,thentheideaoffreedomceasestohaveanymeaning.HowshoulditmattertomewhetherIcandoathingornot,ifIamforcedbythemotivetodoit?Theprimaryquestionis,notwhetherIcandoathingornotwhenimpelledbyamotive,butwhethertheonlymotivesaresuchasimpelmewithabsolutenecessity.IfImustwillsomething,thenImaywellbeabsolutelyindifferentastowhetherIcanalsodoit.Andif,throughmycharacter,orthroughcircumstancesprevailinginmyenvironment,amotiveisforcedonmewhichtomythinkingisunreasonable,thenIshouldevenhavetobegladifIcouldnotdowhatIwill.

Thequestionis,notwhetherIcancarryoutadecisiononcemade,buthowIcometomakethedecision.

Whatdistinguishesmanfromallotherorganicbeingsishisrationalthought.Activityiscommontohimwithotherorganisms.Nothingisgainedbyseekinganalogiesintheanimalworldtoclearuptheconceptoffreedomasappliedtotheactionsofhumanbeings.Modernsciencelovestheseanalogies.Whenscientistshavesucceededinfindingamonganimalssomethingsimilartohumanbehaviour,theybelievetheyhavetouchedonthemostimportantquestionofthescienceofman.Towhatmisunderstandingsthisviewleadsisseen,forexample,inthebookDieIllusionderWillensfreiheit,byP.Ree,1885,where,onPage5,thefollowingremarkonfreedomappears:“Itiseasytoexplainwhythemovementofastoneseemstousnecessary,whilethevolitionofadonkeydoesnot.Thecauseswhichsetthestoneinmotionareexternalandvisible,whilethecauseswhichdeterminethedonkey’svolitionareinternalandinvisible.Betweenusandtheplaceoftheiractivitythereistheskullcapoftheass ….Thecausalnexusisnotvisibleandisthereforethoughttobenon-existent.Thevolition,itisexplained,is,indeed,thecauseofthedonkey’sturninground,butisitselfunconditioned;itisanabsolutebeginning.”Here

againhumanactionsinwhichthereisaconsciousnessofthemotivesaresimplyignored,forReedeclares,“thatbetweenusandthesphereoftheiractivitythereistheskullcapoftheass.”Asthesewordsshow,ithasnotsomuchasdawnedonReethatthereareactions,notindeedoftheass,butofhumanbeings,inwhichthemotive,becomeconscious,liesbetweenusandtheaction.Reedemonstrateshisblindnessonceagainafewpagesfurtheron,whenhesays,“Wedonotperceivethecausesbywhichourwillisdetermined,hencewethinkitisnotcausallydeterminedatall.”

Butenoughofexampleswhichprovethatmanyargueagainstfreedomwithoutknowingintheleastwhatfreedomis.

Thatanactionofwhichtheagentdoesnotknowwhyheperformsit,cannotbefreegoeswithoutsaying.Butwhatofthefreedomofanactionaboutthemotivesofwhichwereflect?Thisleadsustothequestionoftheoriginandmeaningofthought.Forwithouttherecognitionoftheactivityofmindwhichiscalledthought,itisimpossibletounderstandwhatismeanteitherbyknowledgeofsomethingorbyaction.Whenweknowwhatthoughtingeneralmeans,itwillbeeasiertoseeclearlytherolewhichthoughtplaysinhumanaction.AsHegelrightlysays,“Itisthoughtwhichturnsthesoul,commontousandanimals,intospirit.”Henceitisthoughtwhichwemayexpecttogivetohumanactionitscharacteristicstamp.

Idonotmeantoimplythatallouractionsspringonlyfromthesoberdeliberationsofourreason.Iamveryfarfromcallingonlythoseactions“human”inthehighestsense,whichproceedfromabstractjudgments.Butassoonasourconductrisesabovethesphereofthesatisfactionofpurelyanimaldesires,ourmotivesarealwaysshapedbythoughts.Love,pity,andpatriotismaremotivesofactionwhichcannotbeanalysedawayintocoldconceptsoftheunderstanding.Itissaidthatheretheheart,thesoul,holdsway.Thisisnodoubttrue.Buttheheartandthesoulcreatenomotives.Theypresupposethem.Pityentersmyheartwhenthethoughtofapersonwhoarousespityhadappearedinmyconsciousness.Thewaytotheheartisthroughthehead.Loveisnoexception.Wheneveritisnotmerelytheexpressionofbaresexualinstinct,itdependsonthethoughtsweformofthelovedone.Andthemoreweidealisethelovedoneinourthoughts,themoreblessedisourlove.Here,too,thoughtisthefatheroffeeling.Itissaidthatlovemakesusblindtothefailingsofthelovedone.Buttheoppositeviewcanbetaken,namelythatitispreciselyforthegoodpointsthatloveopenstheeyes.Manypassbythesegoodpointswithoutnotice.One,however,perceivesthem,andjustbecausehedoes,loveawakensinhissoul.Whatelsehashedoneexceptperceivewhathundredshavefailedtosee?Loveisnottheirs,becausetheylacktheperception.

Fromwhateverpointweregardthesubject,itbecomesmoreandmoreclearthatthequestionofthenatureofhumanactionpresupposesthatoftheoriginofthought.Ishall,therefore,turnnexttothisquestion.

WHYTHEDESIREFORKNOWLEDGEISFUNDAMENTAL

ZweiSeelenwohnen,ach!inmeinerBrust,

Dieeinewillsichvonderanderntrennen;

Dieeinehält,inderberLiebeslust,

SichandieWeltmitklammerndenOrganen;

DieandrehebtgewaltsamsichvomDust

ZudenGefildenhoherAhnen.1

FAUSTI,1112–1117.

InthesewordsGoetheexpressesatraitwhichisdeeplyingrainedinhumannature.Manisnotaself-containedunity.Hedemandsevermorethantheworld,ofitself,offershim.Naturehasendoweduswithneeds;amongthemaresomethesatisfactionofwhichsheleavestoourownactivity.Howeverabundantthegiftswhichwehavereceived,stillmoreabundantareourdesires.Weseemborntodissatisfaction.Andourdesireforknowledgeisbutaspecialinstanceofthisunsatisfiedstriving.Supposewelooktwiceatatree.Thefirsttimeweseeitsbranchesatrest,thesecondtimeinmotion.Wearenotsatisfiedwiththisobservation.Why,weask,doesthetreeappeartousnowatrest,theninmotion?Everyglanceatnatureevokesinusamultitudeofquestions.Everyphenomenonwemeetpresentsanewproblemtobesolved.Everyexperienceistousariddle.Weobservethatfromtheeggthereemergesacreaturelikethemotheranimal,andweaskforthereasonofthelikeness.Weobservealivingbeinggrowanddeveloptoadeterminatedegreeofperfection,andweseektheconditionsofthisexperience.Nowherearewesatisfiedwiththefactswhichnaturespreadsoutbeforeoursenses.Everywhereweseekwhatwecalltheexplanationofthesefacts.

Thesomethingmorewhichweseekinthings,overandabovewhatisimmediatelygiventousinthem,splitsourwholebeingintotwoparts.Webecomeconsciousofouroppositiontotheworld.Weopposeourselvestotheworldasindependentbeings.Theuniversehasforustwooppositepoles:SelfandWorld.

Weerectthisbarrierbetweenourselvesandtheworldassoonasconsciousnessisfirstkindledinus.Butweneverceasetofeelthat,inspiteofall,webelongtotheworld,thatthereisaconnectinglinkbetweenitandus,andthatwearebeingswithin,andnotwithout,theuniverse.

Thisfeelingmakesusstrivetobridgeoverthisopposition,andultimatelythewholespiritualstrivingofmankindisnothingbutthebridgingofthisopposition.Thehistoryofourspirituallifeisacontinuousseekingafterunionbetweenourselvesandtheworld.Religion,Art,andSciencefollow,oneandall,thisgoal.Thereligiousmanseeksintherevelation,whichGodgrantshim,thesolutionoftheworldproblem,whichhisSelf,dissatisfiedwiththeworldofmerephenomena,setshimasatask.Theartistseeksto

embodyinhismaterialtheideaswhicharehisSelf,thathemaythusreconcilethespiritwhichliveswithinhimandtheouterworld.He,too,feelsdissatisfiedwiththeworldofmereappearances,andseekstomouldintoitthatsomethingmorewhichhisSelfsuppliesandwhichtranscendsappearances.Thethinkersearchesforthelawsofphenomena.Hestrivestomasterbythoughtwhatheexperiencesbyobservation.Onlywhenwehavetransformedtheworld-contentintoourthought-contentdowerecapturetheconnectionwhichwehadourselvesbrokenoff.Weshallseelaterthatthisgoalcanbereachedonlyifwepenetratemuchmoredeeplythanisoftendoneintothenatureofthescientist’sproblem.Thewholesituation,asIhaveherestatedit,meetsus,onthestageofhistory,intheconflictbetweentheone-worldtheory,orMonism,andthetwo-worldtheory,orDualism.DualismpaysattentiononlytotheseparationbetweentheSelfandtheWorld,whichtheconsciousnessofmanhasbroughtabout.Allitseffortsconsistinavainstruggletoreconciletheseopposites,whichitcallsnowMindandMatter,nowSubjectandObject,nowThoughtandAppearance.TheDualistfeelsthattheremustbeabridgebetweenthetwoworlds,butisnotabletofindit.Insofarasmanisawareofhimselfas“I,”hecannotbutputdownthis“I”inthoughtonthesideofSpirit;andinopposingtothis“I”theworld,heisboundtoreckonontheworld’ssidetherealmofperceptsgiventothesenses,i.e.,theMaterialWorld.Indoingso,manassignsapositiontohimselfwithinthisveryantithesisofSpiritandMatter.HeisthemorecompelledtodosobecausehisownbodybelongstotheMaterialWorld.Thusthe“I,”orEgo,belongsasaparttotherealmofSpirit;thematerialobjectsandprocesseswhichareperceivedbythesensesbelongtothe“World.”AlltheriddleswhichbelongtoSpiritandMatter,manmustinevitablyrediscoverinthefundamentalriddleofhisownnature.Monismpaysattentiononlytotheunityandtrieseithertodenyortoslurovertheopposites,presentthoughtheyare.Neitherofthesetwopointsofviewcansatisfyus,fortheydonotdojusticetothefacts.TheDualistseesinMind(Self)andMatter(World)twoessentiallydifferententities,andcannotthereforeunderstandhowtheycaninteractwithoneanother.HowshouldMindbeawareofwhatgoesoninMatter,seeingthattheessentialnatureofMatterisquitealientoMind?OrhowinthesecircumstancesshouldMindactuponMatter,soastotranslateitsintentionsintoactions?Themostabsurdhypotheseshavebeenpropoundedtoanswerthesequestions.However,uptothepresenttheMonistsarenotinamuchbetterposition.Theyhavetriedthreedifferentwaysofmeetingthedifficulty.EithertheydenyMindandbecomeMaterialists;ortheydenyMatterinordertoseektheirsalvationasSpiritualists;ortheyassertthat,eveninthesimplestentitiesintheworld,MindandMatterareindissolublyboundtogether,sothatthereisnoneedtomarvelattheappearanceinmanofthesetwomodesofexistence,seeingthattheyareneverfoundapart.

Materialismcanneverofferasatisfactoryexplanationoftheworld.Foreveryattemptatanexplanationmustbeginwiththeformationofthoughtsaboutthephenomenaoftheworld.Materialism,thus,beginswiththethoughtofMatterormaterialprocesses.But,indoingso,itisipsofactoconfrontedbytwodifferentsetsoffacts,viz.,thematerialworldandthethoughtsaboutit.TheMaterialistseekstomaketheselatterintelligiblebyregardingthemaspurelymaterialprocesses.Hebelievesthatthinkingtakesplaceinthebrain,muchinthesamewaythatdigestiontakesplaceintheanimalorgans.Justasheascribesmechanical,chemical,andorganicprocessestoNature,sohecreditsherin

certaincircumstanceswiththecapacitytothink.Heoverlooksthat,indoingso,heismerelyshiftingtheproblemfromoneplacetoanother.InsteadoftohimselfheascribesthepowerofthoughttoMatter.Andthusheisbackagainathisstarting-point.HowdoesMattercometothinkofitsownnature?Whyisitnotsimplysatisfiedwithitselfandcontenttoacceptitsownexistence?TheMaterialisthasturnedhisattentionawayfromthedefinitesubject,hisownself,andoccupieshimselfwithanindefiniteshadowysomewhat.Andheretheoldproblemmeetshimagain.Thematerialistictheorycannotsolvetheproblem;itcanonlyshiftittoanotherplace.

WhatoftheSpiritualistictheory?ThepureSpiritualistdeniestoMatterallindependentexistenceandregardsitmerelyasaproductofSpirit.Butwhenhetriestoapplythistheorytothesolutionoftheriddleofhisownhumannature,hefindshimselfcaughtinatightplace.Overagainstthe“I,”orEgo,whichcanberangedonthesideofSpirit,therestandsdirectlytheworldofthesenses.Nospiritualapproachtoitseemsopen.IthastobeperceivedandexperiencedbytheEgowiththehelpofmaterialprocesses.SuchmaterialprocessestheEgodoesnotdiscoverinitself,solongasitregardsitsownnatureasexclusivelyspiritual.Fromallthatitachievesbyitsownspiritualeffort,thesensibleworldiseverexcluded.ItseemsasiftheEgohadtoconcedethattheworldwouldbeaclosedbooktoit,unlessitcouldestablishanon-spiritualrelationtotheworld.Similarly,whenitcomestoacting,wehavetotranslateourpurposesintorealitieswiththehelpofmaterialthingsandforces.Weare,therefore,dependentontheouterworld.ThemostextremeSpiritualist,or,ifyoupreferit,Idealist,isJohannGottliebFichte.Heattemptstodeducethewholeedificeoftheworldfromthe“Ego.”Whathehasactuallyaccomplishedisamagnificentthought-pictureoftheworld,withoutanyempiricalcontent.AslittleasitispossiblefortheMaterialisttoarguetheMindaway,justaslittleisitpossiblefortheIdealisttodowithouttheouterworldofMatter.

WhenmandirectshistheoreticalreflectionupontheEgo,heperceives,inthefirstinstance,onlytheworkoftheEgointheconceptualelaborationoftheworldofideas.Henceaphilosophythedirectionofwhichisspiritualistic,mayfeeltempted,inviewofman’sownessentialnature,toacknowledgenothingofspiritexceptthisworldofideas.InthiswaySpiritualismbecomesone-sidedIdealism.Insteadofgoingontopenetratethroughtheworldofideastothespiritualworld,idealismidentifiesthespiritualworldwiththeworldofideasitself.Asaresult,itiscompelledtoremainfixedwithitsworld-viewinthecircleoftheactivityoftheEgo,asifitwerebewitched.

AcuriousvariantofIdealismistobefoundinthetheorywhichF.A.LangehasputforwardinhiswidelyreadHistoryofMaterialism.HeholdsthattheMaterialistsarequiterightindeclaringallphenomena,includingourthoughts,tobetheproductofpurelymaterialprocesses,but,inturn,Matteranditsprocessesareforhimthemselvestheproductofourthinking.“Thesensesgiveusonlytheeffectsofthings,nottruecopies,muchlessthethingsthemselves.Butamongthesemereeffectswemustincludethesensesthemselvestogetherwiththebrainandthemolecularvibrationswhichweassumetogoonthere.”Thatis,ourthinkingisproducedbythematerialprocesses,andthesebyourthinking.Lange’sphilosophyisthusnothingmorethanthephilosophicalanalogonofthestoryofhonestBaronMünchhausen,whoholdshimselfupintheairbyhisownpigtail.

ThethirdformofMonismisthatwhichfindseveninthesimplestreal(theatom)theunionofbothMatterandMind.Butnothingisgainedbythiseither,exceptthatthequestion,theoriginofwhichisreallyinourconsciousness,isshiftedtoanotherplace.Howcomesitthatthesimplerealmanifestsitselfinatwo-foldmanner,ifitisanindivisibleunity?

Againstallthesetheorieswemusturgethefactthatwemeetwiththebasalandfundamentaloppositionfirstinourownconsciousness.ItisweourselveswhobreakawayfromthebosomofNatureandcontrastourselvesasSelfwiththeWorld.GoethehasgivenclassicexpressiontothisinhisessayNature.“Livinginthemidstofher(Nature)wearestrangerstoher.Ceaselesslyshespeakstous,yetbetraysnoneofhersecrets.”ButGoetheknowsthereversesidetoo:“Mankindisallinher,andsheinallmankind.”

HowevertrueitmaybethatwehaveestrangedourselvesfromNature,itisnonethelesstruethatwefeelweareinherandbelongtoher.Itcanbeonlyherownlifewhichpulsesalsoinus.

Wemustfindthewaybacktoheragain.Asimplereflectionmaypointthiswayouttous.Wehave,itistrue,tornourselvesawayfromNature,butwemustnonethelesshavecarriedawaysomethingofherinourownselves.ThisqualityofNatureinuswemustseekout,andthenweshalldiscoverourconnectionwithheroncemore.Dualismneglectstodothis.ItconsidersthehumanmindasaspiritualentityutterlyalientoNatureandattemptssomehowtohitchitontoNature.Nowonderthatitcannotfindthecouplinglink.WecanfindNatureoutsideofusonlyifwehavefirstlearnttoknowherwithinus.TheNaturalwithinusmustbeourguidetoher.Thismarksoutourpathofinquiry.WeshallattemptnospeculationsconcerningtheinteractionofMindandMatter.Weshallratherprobeintothedepthsofourownbeing,tofindtherethoseelementswhichwesavedinourflightfromNature.

Theexaminationofourownbeingmustbringthesolutionoftheproblem.Wemustreachapointwherewecansay,“Thisisnolongermerely‘I,’thisissomethingwhichismorethan‘I.’ ”

Iamwellawarethatmanywhohavereadthusfarwillnotconsidermydiscussioninkeepingwith“thepresentstateofscience.”TosuchcriticismIcanreplyonlythatIhavesofarnotbeenconcernedwithanyscientificresults,butsimplywiththedescriptionofwhateveryoneofusexperiencesinhisownconsciousness.ThatafewphraseshaveslippedinaboutattemptstoreconcileMindandtheWorldhasbeenduesolelytothedesiretoelucidatetheactualfacts.Ihavethereforemadenoattempttogivetotheexpressions“Self,”“Mind,”“World,”“Nature,”theprecisemeaningwhichtheyusuallybearinPsychologyandPhilosophy.Theordinaryconsciousnessignoresthesharpdistinctionsofthesciences,andsofarmypurposehasbeensolelytorecordthefactsofeverydayexperience.Iamconcerned,notwiththewayinwhichscience,sofar,hasinterpretedconsciousness,butwiththewayinwhichweexperienceitineverymomentofourlives.

Twosouls,alas!residewithinmybreast,

Andeachwithdrawsfrom,andrepels,itsbrother.

Onewithtenaciousorgansholdsinlove

Andclinginglusttheworldinitsembraces;

Theotherstronglysweeps,thisdustabove,

Intothehighancestralspaces.

Faust,PartI,Scene2.

(BayardTaylor’stranslation.)↑

THOUGHTASTHEINSTRUMENTOFKNOWLEDGE

WhenIobservehowabilliardball,whenstruck,communicatesitsmotiontoanother,Iremainentirelywithoutinfluenceontheprocessbeforeme.Thedirectionandvelocityofthemotionofthesecondballisdeterminedbythedirectionandvelocityofthefirst.AslongasIremainamerespectator,Icansaynothingaboutthemotionofthesecondballuntilafterithashappened.ItisquitedifferentwhenIbegintoreflectonthecontentofmyobservations.Thepurposeofmyreflectionistoconstructconceptsoftheprocess.Iconnecttheconceptofanelasticballwithcertainotherconceptsofmechanics,andconsiderthespecialcircumstanceswhichobtainintheinstanceinquestion.Itry,inotherwords,toaddtotheprocesswhichtakesplacewithoutmyinterference,asecondprocesswhichtakesplaceintheconceptualsphere.Thislatterprocessisdependentonme.ThisisshownbythefactthatIcanrestcontentwiththeobservation,andrenounceallsearchforconceptsifIhavenoneedofthem.If,therefore,thisneedispresent,thenIamnotcontentuntilIhaveestablishedadefiniteconnectionamongtheconcepts,ball,elasticity,motion,impact,velocity,etc.,sothattheyapplytotheobservedprocessinadefiniteway.Assurelyastheoccurrenceoftheobservedprocessisindependentofme,sosurelyistheoccurrenceoftheconceptualprocessdependentonme.

Weshallhavetoconsiderlaterwhetherthisactivityofminereallyproceedsfrommyownindependentbeing,orwhetherthosemodernphysiologistsarerightwhosaythatwecannotthinkaswewill,butthatwemustthinkexactlyasthethoughtsandthought-connectionsdetermine,whichhappentobeinourmindsatanygivenmoment.(Cp.Ziehen,LeitfadenderPhysiologischenPsychologie,Jena,1893,p.171.)Forthepresentwewishmerelytoestablishthefactthatweconstantlyfeelobligedtoseekforconceptsandconnectionsofconcepts,whichstandindefiniterelationtotheobjectsandprocesseswhicharegivenindependentlyofus.Whetherthisactivityisreallyours,orwhetherwearedeterminedtoitbyanunalterablenecessity,isaquestionwhichweneednotdecideatpresent.Whatisunquestionableisthattheactivityappears,inthefirstinstance,tobeours.Weknowforcertainthatconceptsarenotgiventogetherwiththeobjectstowhichtheycorrespond.Mybeingtheagentintheconceptualprocessmaybeanillusion;butthereisnodoubtthattoimmediateobservationIappeartobeactive.Ourpresentquestionis,whatdowegainbysupplementingaprocesswithaconceptualcounterpart?

Thereisafar-reachingdifferencebetweenthewaysinwhich,forme,thepartsofaprocessarerelatedtooneanotherbefore,andafter,thediscoveryofthecorrespondingconcepts.Mereobservationcantracethepartsofagivenprocessastheyoccur,buttheirconnectionremainsobscurewithoutthehelpofconcepts.Iobservethefirstbilliardballmovetowardsthesecondinacertaindirectionandwithacertainvelocity.WhatwillhappenaftertheimpactIcannottellinadvance.Icanoncemoreonlywatchithappenwithmyeyes.Supposesomeoneobstructsmyviewofthefieldwheretheprocessishappening,atthemomentwhentheimpactoccurs,then,asmerespectator,Iremainignorantofwhatgoeson.Thesituationisverydifferent,ifpriortotheobstructingofmy

viewIhavediscoveredtheconceptscorrespondingtothenexusofevents.InthatcaseIcansaywhatoccurs,evenwhenIamnolongerabletoobserve.Thereisnothinginamerelyobservedprocessorobjecttoshowitsrelationtootherprocessesorobjects.Thisrelationbecomesmanifestonlywhenobservationiscombinedwiththought.

Observationandthoughtarethetwopointsofdepartureforallthespiritualstrivingofman,insofarasheisconsciousofsuchstriving.Theworkingsofcommonsense,aswellasthemostcomplicatedscientificresearches,restonthesetwofundamentalpillarsofourminds.Philosophershavestartedfromvariousultimateantitheses,IdeaandReality,SubjectandObject,AppearanceandThing-in-itself,EgoandNon-Ego,IdeaandWill,ConceptandMatter,ForceandSubstance,theConsciousandtheUnconscious.Itis,however,easytoshowthatalltheseantithesesaresubsequenttothatbetweenObservationandThought,thisbeingformanthemostimportant.

Whateverprinciplewechoosetolaydown,wemusteitherprovethatsomewherewehaveobservedit,orwemustenunciateitintheformofaclearconceptwhichcanbere-thoughtbyanyotherthinker.Everyphilosopherwhosetsouttodiscusshisfundamentalprinciples,mustexpresstheminconceptualformandthususethought.Hethereforeindirectlyadmitsthathisactivitypresupposesthought.Weleaveopenherethequestionwhetherthoughtorsomethingelseisthechieffactorinthedevelopmentoftheworld.Butitisatanyrateclearthatthephilosophercangainnoknowledgeofthisdevelopmentwithoutthought.Intheoccurrenceofphenomenathoughtmayplayasecondarypart,butitisquitecertainthatitplaysachiefpartintheconstructionofatheoryaboutthem.

Asregardsobservation,ourneedofitisduetoourorganisation.Ourthoughtaboutahorseandtheobject“horse”aretwothingswhichforushaveseparateexistences.Theobjectisaccessibletousonlybymeansofobservation.Aslittleaswecanconstructaconceptofahorsebymerestaringattheanimal,justaslittleareweablebymerethoughttoproducethecorrespondingobject.

Intimeobservationactuallyprecedesthought.Forwebecomefamiliarwiththoughtitselfinthefirstinstancebyobservation.Itwasessentiallyadescriptionofanobservationwhen,atthebeginningofthischapter,wegaveanaccountofhowthoughtiskindledbyanobjectiveprocessandtranscendsthemerelygiven.Whateverentersthecircleofourexperiencesbecomesanobjectofapprehensiontousfirstthroughobservation.Allcontentsofsensations,allperceptions,intuitions,feelings,actsofwill,dreamsandfancies,images,concepts,ideas,allillusionsandhallucinations,aregiventousthroughobservation.

Butthoughtasanobjectofobservationdiffersessentiallyfromallotherobjects.Theobservationofatable,oratree,occursinmeassoonasthoseobjectsappearwithinthehorizonofmyfieldofconsciousness.YetIdonot,atthesametime,observemythoughtaboutthesethings.Iobservethetable,butIcarryonaprocessofthoughtaboutthetablewithoutatthesamemomentobservingthisthought-process.Imustfirsttakeupastandpointoutsideofmyownactivity,ifIwanttoobservemythoughtaboutthetable,aswellasthetable.Whereastheobservationofthingsandprocesses,andthethinkingaboutthem,areeverydayoccurrencesmakingupthecontinuouscurrentofmylife,the

observationofthethought-processitselfisanexceptionalattitudetoadopt.Thisfactmustbetakenintoaccount,whenwecometodeterminetherelationsofthoughtasanobjectofobservationtoallotherobjects.Wemustbequiteclearaboutthefactthat,inobservingthethought-processes,weareapplyingtothemamethodwhichisournormalattitudeinthestudyofallotherobjectsintheworld,butwhichintheordinarycourseofthatstudyisusuallynotappliedtothoughtitself.

SomeonemightobjectthatwhatIhavesaidaboutthinkingappliesequallytofeelingandtoallothermentalactivities.Thusitissaidthatwhen,e.g.,Ihaveafeelingofpleasure,thefeelingiskindledbytheobject,butitisthisobjectIobserve,notthefeelingofpleasure.Thisobjection,however,isbasedonanerror.Pleasuredoesnotstandatallinthesamerelationtoitsobjectastheconceptconstructedbythought.Iamconscious,inthemostpositiveway,thattheconceptofathingisformedthroughmyactivity;whereasafeelingofpleasureisproducedinmebyanobjectinawaysimilartothatinwhich,e.g.,achangeiscausedinanobjectbyastonewhichfallsonit.Forobservation,apleasureisgiveninexactlythesamewayastheeventwhichcausesit.Thesameisnottrueofconcepts.Icanaskwhyaneventarousesinmeafeelingofpleasure.ButIcertainlycannotaskwhyanoccurrencecausesinmeacertainnumberofconcepts.Thequestionwouldbesimplymeaningless.Inthinkingaboutanoccurrence,Iamnotconcernedwithitasaneffectonme.Ilearnnothingaboutmyselffromknowingtheconceptswhichcorrespondtotheobservedchangecausedinapaneofglassbyastonethrownagainstit.ButIdolearnsomethingaboutmyselfwhenIknowthefeelingwhichacertainoccurrencearousesinme.WhenIsayofanobjectwhichIperceive,“thisisarose,”Isayabsolutelynothingaboutmyself;butwhenIsayofthesamethingthat“itcausesafeelingofpleasureinme,”Icharacterisenotonlytherose,butalsomyselfinmyrelationtotherose.

Therecan,therefore,benoquestionofputtingthoughtandfeelingonalevelasobjectsofobservation.Andthesamecouldeasilybeshownofotheractivitiesofthehumanmind.Unlikethought,theymustbeclassedwithanyotherobservedobjectsorevents.Thepeculiarnatureofthoughtliesjustinthis,thatitisanactivitywhichisdirectedsolelyontheobservedobjectandnotonthethinkingsubject.Thisisapparentevenfromthewayinwhichweexpressourthoughtsaboutanobject,asdistinctfromourfeelingsoractsofwill.WhenIseeanobjectandrecogniseitasatable,Idonotasarulesay,“Iamthinkingofatable,”but,“thisisatable.”Ontheotherhand,Idosay,“Iampleasedwiththetable.”Intheformercase,IamnotatallinterestedinstatingthatIhaveenteredintoarelationwiththetable;whereas,inthesecondcase,itisjustthisrelationwhichmatters.Insaying,“Iamthinkingofatable,”Iadopttheexceptionalpointofviewcharacterisedabove,inwhichsomethingismadetheobjectofobservationwhichisalwayspresentinourmentalactivity,withoutbeingitselfnormallyanobservedobject.

Thepeculiarnatureofthoughtconsistsjustinthis,thatthethinkerforgetshisthinkingwhileactuallyengagedinit.Itisnotthinkingwhichoccupieshisattention,butrathertheobjectofthoughtwhichheobserves.

Thefirstpoint,then,tonoticeaboutthoughtisthatitistheunobservedelementinourordinarymentallife.

Thereasonwhywedonotnoticethethinkingwhichgoesoninourordinarymentallifeisnootherthanthis,thatitisourownactivity.WhateverIdonotmyselfproduceappearsinmyfieldofconsciousnessasanobject;Icontrastitwithmyselfassomethingtheexistenceofwhichisindependentofme.Itforcesitselfuponme.Imustacceptitasthepresuppositionofmythinking.AslongasIthinkabouttheobject,Iamabsorbedinit,myattentionisturnedonit.Tobethusabsorbedintheobjectisjusttocontemplateitbythought.Iattend,nottomyactivity,buttoitsobject.Inotherwords,whilstIamthinkingIpaynoheedtomythinkingwhichisofmyownmaking,butonlytotheobjectofmythinkingwhichisnotofmymaking.

Iam,moreover,inexactlythesamepositionwhenIadopttheexceptionalpointofviewandthinkofmyownthought-processes.Icanneverobservemypresentthought,Icanonlymakemypastexperiencesofthought-processessubsequentlytheobjectsoffreshthoughts.IfIwantedtowatchmypresentthought,Ishouldhavetosplitmyselfintotwopersons,onetothink,theothertoobservethisthinking.Butthisisimpossible.Icanonlyaccomplishitintwoseparateacts.Theobservedthought-processesareneverthoseinwhichIamactuallyengagedbutothers.Whether,forthispurpose,Imakeobservationsonmyownformerthoughts,orfollowthethought-processesofanotherperson,orfinally,asintheexampleofthemotionsofthebilliardballs,assumeanimaginarythought-process,isimmaterial.

Therearetwothingswhichareincompatiblewithoneanother:productiveactivityandthetheoreticalcontemplationofthatactivity.ThisisrecognisedevenintheFirstBookofMoses.ItrepresentsGodascreatingtheworldinthefirstsixdays,andonlyafteritscompletionisanycontemplationoftheworldpossible:“AndGodsaweverythingthathehadmadeand,behold,itwasverygood.”Thesameappliestoourthinking.Itmustbetherefirst,ifwewouldobserveit.

Thereasonwhyitisimpossibletoobservethethought-processinitsactualoccurrenceatanygivenmoment,isthesameasthatwhichmakesitpossibleforustoknowitmoreimmediatelyandmoreintimatelythananyotherprocessintheworld.Justbecauseitisourowncreationdoweknowthecharacteristicfeaturesofitscourse,themannerinwhichtheprocess,indetail,takesplace.Whatintheotherspheresofobservationwecandiscoveronlyindirectly,viz.,therelevantobjectivenexusandtherelationsoftheindividualobjects,thatisknowntousimmediatelyinthecaseofthought.Idonotknowoff-handwhy,forperception,thunderfollowslightning,butIknowimmediately,fromthecontentofthetwoconcepts,whymythoughtconnectstheconceptofthunderwiththatoflightning.Itdoesnotmatterformyargumentwhethermyconceptsofthunderandlightningarecorrect.TheconnectionbetweentheconceptsIhaveiscleartome,andthatthroughtheveryconceptsthemselves.

Thistransparentclearnessintheobservationofourthought-processesisquiteindependentofourknowledgeofthephysiologicalbasisofthought.Iamspeakinghereofthoughtinthesenseinwhichitistheobjectofourobservationofourownmentalactivity.Forthispurposeitisquiteirrelevanthowonematerialprocessinmybraincausesorinfluencesanother,whilstIamcarryingonaprocessofthought.WhatIobserve,instudyinga

thought-process,is,notwhatprocessinmybrainconnectstheconceptofthunderwiththatoflightning,butwhatismyreasonforbringingthesetwoconceptsintoadefiniterelation.Introspectionshowsthat,inlinkingthoughtwiththought,Iamguidedbytheircontent,notbythematerialprocessesinthebrain.Thisremarkwouldbequitesuperfluousinalessmaterialisticagethanours.To-day,however,whentherearepeoplewhobelievethat,whenweknowwhatmatteris,weshallknowalsohowitthinks,itisnecessarytoaffirmthepossibilityofspeakingofthoughtwithouttrespassingonthedomainofbrainphysiology.Manypeopleto-dayfinditdifficulttograsptheconceptofthoughtinitspurity.AnyonewhochallengestheaccountofthoughtwhichIhavegivenhere,byquotingCabanis’statementthat“thebrainsecretesthoughtsastheliverdoesgallorthespittle-glandsspittle,etc.”simplydoesnotknowofwhatIamtalking.Heattemptstodiscoverthoughtbythesamemethodofmereobservationwhichweapplytotheotherobjectsthatmakeuptheworld.Buthecannotfinditinthisway,because,asIhaveshown,iteludesjustthisordinaryobservation.WhoevercannottranscendMaterialismlackstheabilitytothrowhimselfintotheexceptionalattitudeIhavedescribed,inwhichhebecomesconsciousofwhatinallothermentalactivityremainsunconscious.Itisasuselesstodiscussthoughtwithonewhoisnotwillingtoadoptthisattitude,asitwouldbetodiscusscolourwithablindman.Lethimnotimagine,however,thatweregardphysiologicalprocessesasthought.Hefailstoexplainthought,becauseheisnotevenawarethatitisthere.

Foreveryone,however,whohastheabilitytoobservethought,andwithgoodwilleverynormalmanhasthisability,thisobservationisthemostimportanthecanmake.Forheobservessomethingwhichhehimselfproduces.Heisnotconfrontedbywhatistobeginwithastrangeobject,butbyhisownactivity.Heknowshowthatwhichheobserveshascometobe.Heperceivesclearlyitsconnectionsandrelations.Hegainsafirmpointfromwhichhecan,withwell-foundedhopes,seekanexplanationoftheotherphenomenaoftheworld.

Thefeelingthathehadfoundsuchafirmfoundation,inducedthefatherofmodernphilosophy,Descartes,tobasethewholeofhumanknowledgeontheprinciple,“Ithink,thereforeIam.”Allotherthings,allotherprocesses,areindependentofme.Whethertheybetruth,orillusion,ordream,Iknownot.ThereisonlyonethingofwhichIamabsolutelycertain,forImyselfamtheauthorofitsindubitableexistence;andthatismythought.Whateverotheroriginitmayhaveinaddition,whetheritcomefromGodorfromelsewhere,ofonethingIamsure,thatitexistsinthesensethatImyselfproduceit.Descarteshad,tobeginwith,nojustificationforreadinganyothermeaningintohisprinciple.Allhehadarighttoassertwasthat,inapprehendingmyselfasthinking,Iapprehendmyself,withintheworld-system,inthatactivitywhichismostuniquelycharacteristicofme.Whattheaddedwords“thereforeIam”areintendedtomeanhasbeenmuchdebated.Theycanhaveameaningononeconditiononly.ThesimplestassertionIcanmakeofathingis,thatitis,thatitexists.Whatkindofexistence,indetail,ithas,caninnocasebedeterminedonthespot,assoonasthethingenterswithinthehorizonofmyexperience.Eachobjectmustbestudiedinitsrelationstoothers,beforewecandeterminethesenseinwhichwecanspeakofitsexistence.Anexperiencedprocess

maybeacomplexofpercepts,oritmaybeadream,anhallucination,etc.Inshort,Icannotsayinwhatsenseitexists.Icanneverreadoffthekindofexistencefromtheprocessitself,forIcandiscoveritonlywhenIconsidertheprocessinitsrelationtootherthings.Butthis,again,yieldsmenoknowledgebeyondjustitsrelationtootherthings.MyinquirytouchesfirmgroundonlywhenIfindanobject,thereasonoftheexistenceofwhichIcangatherfromitself.SuchanobjectIammyselfinsofarasIthink,forIqualifymyexistencebythedeterminateandself-containedcontentofmythought-activity.FromhereIcangoontoaskwhetherotherthingsexistinthesameorinsomeothersense.

Whenthoughtismadeanobjectofobservation,somethingwhichusuallyescapesourattentionisaddedtotheotherobservedcontentsoftheworld.Buttheusualmannerofobservation,suchasisemployedalsoforotherobjects,isinnowayaltered.Weaddtothenumberofobjectsofobservation,butnottothenumberofmethods.Whenweareobservingotherthings,thereentersamongtheworld-processes—amongwhichInowincludeobservation—oneprocesswhichisoverlooked.Thereispresentsomethingdifferentfromeveryotherkindofprocess,somethingwhichisnottakenintoaccount.ButwhenImakeanobjectofmyownthinking,thereisnosuchneglectedelementpresent.Forwhatlurksnowinthebackgroundisjustthoughtitselfoveragain.Theobjectofobservationisqualitativelyidenticalwiththeactivitydirecteduponit.Thisisanothercharacteristicfeatureofthought-processes.Whenwemakethemobjectsofobservation,wearenotcompelledtodosowiththehelpofsomethingqualitativelydifferent,butcanremainwithintherealmofthought.

WhenIweaveatissueofthoughtsroundanindependentlygivenobject,Itranscendmyobservation,andthequestionthenarises,WhatrighthaveItodothis?WhydoInotpassivelylettheobjectimpressitselfonme?Howisitpossibleformythoughttoberelevantlyrelatedtotheobject?Thesearequestionswhicheveryonemustputtohimselfwhoreflectsonhisownthought-processes.Butallthesequestionslapsewhenwethinkaboutthoughtitself.Wethenaddnothingtoourthoughtthatisforeigntoit,andthereforehavenoneedtojustifyanysuchaddition.

Schellingsays:“ToknowNaturemeanstocreateNature.”IfwetakethesewordsofthedaringphilosopherofNatureliterally,weshallhavetorenounceforeverallhopeofgainingknowledgeofNature.ForNatureafterallexists,andifwehavetocreateitoveragain,wemustknowtheprinciplesaccordingtowhichithasoriginatedinthefirstinstance.WeshouldhavetoborrowfromNatureasitexiststheconditionsofexistencefortheNaturewhichweareabouttocreate.Butthisborrowing,whichwouldhavetoprecedethecreating,wouldbeaknowingofNature,andwouldbethisevenifaftertheborrowingnocreationatallwereattempted.TheonlykindofNaturewhichitwouldbepossibletocreatewithoutpreviousknowledge,wouldbeaNaturedifferentfromtheexistingone.

WhatisimpossiblewithNature,viz.,creationpriortoknowledge,thatweaccomplishintheactofthought.Werewetorefrainfromthinkinguntilwehadfirstgainedknowledgeofit,weshouldneverthinkatall.Wemustresolutelythinkstraightahead,andthenafterwardsbyintrospectiveanalysisgainknowledgeofourownprocesses.Thusweourselvescreatethethought-processeswhichwethenmakeobjectsofobservation.The

existenceofallotherobjectsisprovidedforuswithoutanyactivityonourpart.

Mycontentionthatwemustthinkbeforewecanmakethoughtanobjectofknowledge,mighteasilybecounteredbytheapparentlyequallyvalidcontentionthatwecannotwaitwithdigestinguntilwehavefirstobservedtheprocessofdigestion.ThisobjectionwouldbesimilartothatbroughtbyPascalagainstDescartes,whenheassertedwemightalsosay“Iwalk,thereforeIam.”CertainlyImustdigestresolutelyandnotwaituntilIhavestudiedthephysiologicalprocessofdigestion.ButIcouldonlycomparethiswiththeanalysisofthoughtif,afterdigestion,Isetmyselfnottoanalyseitbythought,buttoeatanddigestit.Itisnotwithoutreasonthat,whiledigestioncannotbecometheobjectofdigestion,thoughtcanverywellbecometheobjectofthought.

Thisthenisindisputable,thatinthinkingwehavegotholdofonebitoftheworld-processwhichrequiresourpresenceifanythingistohappen.Andthatistheverypointthatmatters.TheveryreasonwhythingsseemsopuzzlingisjustthatIplaynopartintheirproduction.Theyaresimplygiventome,whereasIknowhowthoughtisproduced.Hencetherecanbenomorefundamentalstarting-pointthanthoughtfromwhichtoregardallworld-processes.

Ishouldlikestilltomentionawidelycurrenterrorwhichprevailswithregardtothought.Itisoftensaidthatthought,initsrealnature,isneverexperienced.Thethought-processeswhichconnectourperceptionswithoneanother,andweaveaboutthemanetworkofconcepts,arenotatallthesameasthosewhichouranalysisafterwardsextractsfromtheobjectsofperception,inordertomakethemtheobjectofstudy.Whatwehaveunconsciouslywovenintothingsis,sowearetold,somethingwidelydifferentfromwhatsubsequentanalysisrecoversoutofthem.

Thosewhoholdthisviewdonotseethatitisimpossibletoescapefromthought.IcannotgetoutsidethoughtwhenIwanttoobserveit.Weshouldneverforgetthatthedistinctionbetweenthoughtwhichgoesonunconsciouslyandthoughtwhichisconsciouslyanalysed,isapurelyexternaloneandirrelevanttoourdiscussion.Idonotinanywayalterathingbymakingitanobjectofthought.Icanwellimaginethatabeingwithquitedifferentsense-organs,andwithadifferentlyconstructedintelligence,wouldhaveaverydifferentideaofahorsefrommine,butIcannotthinkthatmyownthoughtbecomesdifferentbecauseImakeitanobjectofknowledge.Imyselfobservemyownprocesses.Wearenottalkinghereofhowmythought-processesappeartoanintelligencedifferentfrommine,buthowtheyappeartome.Inanycase,theideawhichanothermindformsofmythoughtcannotbetruerthantheonewhichIformmyself.Onlyifthethought-processeswerenotmyown,buttheactivityofabeingquitedifferentfromme,couldImaintainthat,notwithstandingmyformingadefiniteideaofthesethought-processes,theirrealnaturewasbeyondmycomprehension.

Sofar,thereisnottheslightestreasonwhyIshouldregardmythoughtfromanyotherpointofviewthanmyown.Icontemplatetherestoftheworldbymeansofthought.HowshouldImakeofmythoughtanexception?

IthinkIhavegivensufficientreasonsformakingthoughtthestarting-pointformytheoryoftheworld.WhenArchimedeshaddiscoveredthelever,hethoughthecouldliftthe

wholecosmosoutofitshinges,ifonlyhecouldfindapointofsupportforhisinstrument.Heneededapointwhichwasself-supporting.Inthoughtwehaveaprinciplewhichisself-subsisting.Letustry,therefore,tounderstandtheworldstartingwiththoughtasourbasis.Thoughtcanbegraspedbythought.Thequestioniswhetherbythoughtwecanalsograspsomethingotherthanthought.

Ihavesofarspokenofthoughtwithouttakinganyaccountofitsvehicle,thehumanconsciousness.Mostpresent-dayphilosopherswouldobjectthat,beforetherecanbethought,theremustbeconsciousness.Henceweoughttostart,notfromthought,butfromconsciousness.Thereisnothought,theysaywithoutconsciousness.InreplyIwouldurgethat,inordertoclearuptherelationbetweenthoughtandconsciousness,Imustthinkaboutit.HenceIpresupposethought.Onemight,itistrue,retortthat,thoughaphilosopherwhowishestounderstandconsciousness,naturallymakesuseofthought,andsofarpresupposesit,intheordinarycourseoflifethoughtariseswithinconsciousnessandthereforepresupposesthat.Werethisanswergiventotheworld-creator,whenhewasabouttocreatethought,itwould,withoutdoubt,betothepoint.Thoughtcannot,ofcourse,comeintobeingbeforeconsciousness.Thephilosopher,however,isnotconcernedwiththecreationoftheworld,butwiththeunderstandingofit.Henceheisinsearchofthestarting-point,notforcreation,butfortheunderstandingoftheworld.Itseemstomeverystrangethatphilosophersarereproachedfortroublingthemselves,aboveall,aboutthecorrectnessoftheirprinciples,insteadofturningstraighttotheobjectswhichtheyseektounderstand.Theworld-creatorhadabovealltoknowhowtofindavehicleforthought;thephilosophermustseekafirmbasisfortheunderstandingofwhatisgiven.Whatdoesithelpustostartwithconsciousnessandmakeitanobjectofthought,ifwehavenotfirstinquiredhowfaritispossibleatalltogainanyknowledgeofthingsbythought?

Wemustfirstconsiderthoughtquiteimpartiallywithoutrelationtoathinkingsubjectortoanobjectofthought.Forsubjectandobjectarebothconceptsconstructedbythought.Thereisnodenyingthatthoughtmustbeunderstoodbeforeanythingelsecanbeunderstood.Whoeverdeniesthis,failstorealisethatmanisnotthefirstlinkinthechainofcreationbutthelast.Hence,inordertoexplaintheworldbymeansofconcepts,wecannotstartfromtheelementsofexistencewhichcamefirstintime,butwemustbeginwiththosewhicharenearestandmostintimatelyconnectedwithus.Wecannot,withaleap,transportourselvestothebeginningoftheworld,inordertobeginouranalysisthere,butwemuststartfromthepresentandseewhetherwecannotadvancefromthelatertotheearlier.AslongasGeologyfabledfantasticrevolutionstoaccountforthepresentstateoftheearth,itgropedindarkness.Itwasonlywhenitbegantostudytheprocessesatpresentatworkontheearth,andfromthesetoarguebacktothepast,thatitgainedafirmfoundation.AslongasPhilosophyassumesallsortsofprinciples,suchasatom,motion,matter,will,theunconscious,itwillhangintheair.Thephilosophercanreachhisgoalonlyifheadoptsthatwhichislastintimeasfirstinhistheory.Thisabsolutelylastintheworld-processisthought.

Therearepeoplewhosayitisimpossibletoascertainwithcertaintywhetherthoughtisrightorwrong,andthat,sofar,ourstarting-pointisadoubtfulone.Itwouldbejustas

intelligenttoraisedoubtsastowhetheratreeisinitselfrightorwrong.Thoughtisafact,anditismeaninglesstospeakofthetruthorfalsityofafact.Ican,atmost,beindoubtastowhetherthoughtisrightlyemployed,justasIcandoubtwhetheracertaintreesupplieswoodadaptedtothemakingofthisorthatusefulobject.Itisjustthepurposeofthisbooktoshowhowfartheapplicationofthoughttotheworldisrightorwrong.Icanunderstandanyonedoubtingwhether,bymeansofthought,wecangainanyknowledgeoftheworld,butitisunintelligibletomehowanyonecandoubtthatthoughtinitselfisright.

ADDITIONTOTHEREVISEDEDITION(1918).

IntheprecedingdiscussionIhavepointedouttheimportanceofthedifferencebetweenthinkingandallotheractivitiesofmind.Thisdifferenceisafactwhichispatenttogenuinelyunprejudicedobservation.Anobserverwhodoesnottrytoseethefactswithoutpreconceptionwillbetemptedtobringagainstmyargumentationsuchobjectionsasthese:WhenIthinkaboutarose,thereisinvolvednothingmorethanarelationofmy“I”totherose,justaswhenIfeelthebeautyoftherose.Theresubsistsarelationbetween“I”andobjectinthinkingpreciselyastheredoes,e.g.,infeelingorperceiving.Thosewhourgethisobjectionfailtobearinmindthatitisonlyintheactivityofthinkingthatthe“I,”orEgo,knowsitselftobeidentical,rightintoalltheramificationsoftheactivity,withthatwhichdoesthethinking.Ofnootheractivityofmindcanwesaythesame.Forexample,inafeelingofpleasureitiseasyforareallycarefulobservertodiscriminatebetweentheextenttowhichtheEgoknowsitselftobeidenticalwithwhatisactiveinthefeeling,andtheextenttowhichthereissomethingpassiveintheEgo,sothatthepleasureismerelysomethingwhichhappenstotheEgo.Thesameappliestotheothermentalactivities.Themainthingisnottoconfusethe“havingofimages”withtheelaborationofideasbythinking.Imagesmayappearintheminddream-wise,likevagueintimations.Butthisisnotthinking.True,someonemightnowurge:Ifthisiswhatyoumeanby“thinking,”thenyourthinkingcontainswilling,andyouhavetodo,notwithmerethinking,butwiththewilltothink.However,thiswouldjustifyusonlyinsaying:Genuinethinkingmustalwaysbewilledthinking.Butthisisquiteirrelevanttothecharacterisationofthinkingasthishasbeengivenintheprecedingdiscussion.Letitbegrantedthatthenatureofthinkingnecessarilyimpliesitsbeingwilled,thepointwhichmattersisthatnothingiswilledwhich,inbeingcarriedout,failstoappeartotheEgoasanactivitycompletelyitsownandunderitsownsupervision.Indeed,wemustsaythatthinkingappearstotheobserverasthroughandthroughwilled,preciselybecauseofitsnatureasabovedefined.Ifwegenuinelytrytomasterallthefactswhicharerelevanttoajudgmentaboutthenatureofthinking,wecannotfailtoobservethat,asamentalactivity,thinkinghastheuniquecharacterwhichishereinquestion.

Areaderofwhosepowerstheauthorofthisbookhasaveryhighopinion,hasobjectedthatitisimpossibletospeakaboutthinkingasweareheredoing,becausethesupposedobservationofactivethinkingisnothingbutanillusion.Inreality,whatisobservedisonlytheresultsofanunconsciousactivitywhichliesatthebasisofthinking.Itisonlybecause,andjustbecause,thisunconsciousactivityescapesobservation,thatthedeceptiveappearanceoftheself-existenceoftheobservedthinkingarises,justaswhenan

illuminationbymeansofarapidsuccessionofelectricsparksmakesusbelievethatweseeamovement.Thisobjection,likewise,restssolelyonaninaccurateviewofthefacts.TheobjectionignoresthatitistheEgoitselfwhich,identicalwiththethinking,observesfromwithinitsownactivity.TheEgowouldhavetostandoutsidethethinkinginordertosufferthesortofdeceptionwhichiscausedbyanilluminationwitharapidsuccessionofelectricsparks.Onemightsayratherthattoindulgeinsuchananalogyistodeceiveoneselfwilfully,justasifsomeone,seeingamovinglight,wereobstinatelytoaffirmthatitisbeingfreshlylitbyanunknownhandateverypointwhereitappears.No,whoeverisbentonseeinginthoughtanythingelsethananactivityproduced—andobservableby—theEgohasfirsttoshuthiseyestotheplainfactsthatarethereforthelooking,inorderthentoinventahypotheticalactivityasthebasisofthinking.Ifhedoesnotwilfullyblindhimself,hemustrecognisethatallthese“hypotheticaladditions”tothinkingtakehimawayfromitsrealnature.Unprejudicedobservationshowsthatnothingistobecountedasbelongingtothenatureofthinkingexceptwhatisfoundinthinkingitself.Itisimpossibletodiscoverthecauseofthinkingbygoingoutsidetherealmofthought.

THEWORLDASPERCEPT

Theproductsofthinkingareconceptsandideas.Whataconceptiscannotbeexpressedinwords.Wordscandonomorethandrawourattentiontothefactthatwehaveconcepts.Whensomeoneperceivesatree,theperceptionactsasastimulusforthought.Thusanidealelementisaddedtotheperceivedobject,andtheperceiverregardstheobjectanditsidealcomplementasbelongingtogether.Whentheobjectdisappearsfromthefieldofhisperception,theidealcounterpartaloneremains.Thislatteristheconceptoftheobject.Thewidertherangeofourexperience,thelargerbecomesthenumberofourconcepts.Moreover,conceptsarenotbyanymeansfoundinisolationonefromtheother.Theycombinetoformanorderedandsystematicwhole.Theconcept“organism,”e.g.,combineswiththoseof“developmentaccordingtolaw,”“growth,”andothers.Otherconceptsbasedonparticularobjectsfusecompletelywithoneanother.Allconceptsformedfromparticularlionsfuseintheuniversalconcept“lion.”Inthisway,alltheseparateconceptscombinetoformaclosed,conceptualsystemwithinwhicheachhasitsspecialplace.Ideasdonotdifferqualitativelyfromconcepts.Theyarebutfuller,moresaturated,morecomprehensiveconcepts.Iattachspecialimportancetothenecessityofbearinginmind,here,thatImakethoughtmystarting-point,andnotconceptsandideaswhicharefirstgainedbymeansofthought.Theselatterpresupposethought.Myremarksregardingtheself-dependent,self-sufficientcharacterofthoughtcannot,therefore,besimplytransferredtoconcepts.(Imakespecialmentionofthis,becauseitisherethatIdifferfromHegel,whoregardstheconceptassomethingprimaryandultimate.)

Conceptscannotbederivedfromperception.Thisisapparentfromthefactthat,asmangrowsup,heslowlyandgraduallybuildsuptheconceptscorrespondingtotheobjectswhichsurroundhim.Conceptsareaddedtoperception.

Aphilosopher,widelyreadatthepresentday(HerbertSpencer),describesthementalprocesswhichweperformuponperceptionasfollows:“If,whenwalkingthroughthefieldssomedayinSeptember,youheararustleafewyardsinadvance,andonobservingtheditch-sidewhereitoccurs,seetheherbageagitated,youwillprobablyturntowardsthespottolearnbywhatthissoundandmotionareproduced.Asyouapproachtherefluttersintotheditchapartridge;onseeingwhichyourcuriosityissatisfied—youhavewhatyoucallanexplanationoftheappearances.Theexplanation,mark,amountstothis—thatwhereasthroughoutlifeyouhavehadcountlessexperiencesofdisturbanceamongsmallstationarybodies,accompanyingthemovementofotherbodiesamongthem,andhavegeneralisedtherelationbetweensuchdisturbancesandsuchmovements,youconsiderthisparticulardisturbanceexplainedonfindingittopresentaninstanceofthelikerelation”(FirstPrinciples,PartI,par.23).Acloseranalysisleadstoaverydifferentdescriptionfromthatheregiven.WhenIhearanoise,myfirstdemandisfortheconceptwhichfitsthispercept.Withoutthisconcept,thenoiseistomeamerenoise.Whoeverdoesnotreflectfurther,hearsjustthenoiseandissatisfiedwiththat.Butmythoughtmakesitcleartomethatthenoiseistoberegardedasaneffect.ThusitisonlywhenIcombinethe

conceptofeffectwiththeperceptofanoisethatIamledtogobeyondtheparticularperceptandseekforitscause.Theconceptof“effect”callsupthatof“cause,”andmynextstepistolookfortheagent,whichIfind,say,inapartridge.Buttheseconcepts,causeandeffect,canneverbegainedthroughmereperception,howevermanyinstanceswebringunderreview.Perceptionevokesthought,anditisthiswhichshowsmehowtolinkseparateexperiencestogether.

Ifonedemandsofa“strictlyobjectivescience”thatitshouldtakeitsdatafromperceptionalone,onemustdemandalsothatitabandonallthought.Forthought,byitsverynature,transcendstheobjectsofperception.

Itistimenowtopassfromthoughttothethinker.Foritisthroughthethinkerthatthoughtandperceptionarecombined.Thehumanmindisthestageonwhichconceptandperceptmeetandarelinkedtooneanother.Insayingthis,wealreadycharacterisethis(human)consciousness.Itmediatesbetweenthoughtandperception.Inperceptiontheobjectappearsasgiven,inthoughtthemindseemstoitselftobeactive.Itregardsthethingasobjectanditselfasthethinkingsubject.Whenthoughtisdirectedupontheperceptualworldwehaveconsciousnessofobjects;whenitisdirecteduponitselfwehaveself-consciousness.Humanconsciousnessmust,ofnecessity,beatthesametimeself-consciousness,becauseitisaconsciousnesswhichthinks.For,whenthoughtcontemplatesitsownactivityitmakesanobjectforstudyofitsownessentialnature,itmakesanobjectofitselfassubject.

ItisimportanttonoteherethatitisonlybymeansofthinkingthatIamabletodeterminemyselfassubjectandcontrastmyselfwithobjects.Thereforethinkingmustneverberegardedasamerelysubjectiveactivity.Thinkingtranscendsthedistinctionofsubjectandobject.Itproducesthesetwoconceptsjustasitproducesallothers.When,therefore,I,asthinkingsubject,referaconcepttoanobject,wemustnotregardthisreferenceassomethingpurelysubjective.Itisnotthesubject,butthought,whichmakesthereference.Thesubjectdoesnotthinkbecauseitisasubject,ratheritconceivesitselftobeasubjectbecauseitcanthink.Theactivityofconsciousness,insofarasitthinks,isthusnotmerelysubjective.Ratheritisneithersubjectivenorobjective;ittranscendsboththeseconcepts.IoughtnevertosaythatI,asanindividualsubject,think,butratherthatI,assubject,existmyselfbythegraceofthought.Thoughtthustakesmeoutofmyselfandrelatesmetoobjects.Atthesametimeitseparatesmefromthem,inasmuchasI,assubject,amsetoveragainsttheobjects.

Itisjustthiswhichconstitutesthedoublenatureofman.Histhoughtembraceshimselfandtherestoftheworld.Butbythissameactofthoughthedetermineshimselfalsoasanindividual,incontrastwiththeobjectiveworld.

Wemustnextaskourselveshowtheotherelement,whichwehavesofarsimplycalledtheperceptualobjectandwhichcomes,inconsciousness,intocontactwiththought,entersintothoughtatall?

Inordertoanswerthisquestion,wemusteliminatefromthefieldofconsciousnesseverythingwhichhasbeenimportedbythought.For,atanymoment,thecontentofconsciousnessisalwaysshotthroughwithconceptsinthemostvariousways.

Letusassumethatabeingwithfullydevelopedhumanintelligenceoriginatedoutofnothingandconfrontedtheworld.Allthatitthereperceivedbeforeitsthoughtbegantoactwouldbethepurecontentofperception.Theworldsofarwouldappeartothisbeingasamerechaoticaggregateofsense-data,colours,sounds,sensationsofpressure,ofwarmth,oftaste,ofsmell,and,lastly,feelingsofpleasureandpain.Thismassconstitutestheworldofpureunthinkingperception.Overagainstitstandsthought,readytobeginitsactivityassoonasitcanfindapointofattack.Experienceshowsthattheopportunityisnotlongincoming.Thoughtisabletodrawthreadsfromonesense-datumtoanother.Itbringsdefiniteconceptstobearonthesedataandthusestablishesarelationbetweenthem.Wehaveseenabovehowanoisewhichwehearisconnectedwithanothercontentbyouridentifyingthefirstastheeffectofthesecond.

Ifnowwerecollectthattheactivityofthoughtisonnoaccounttobeconsideredasmerelysubjective,thenweshallnotbetemptedtobelievethattherelationsthusestablishedbythoughthavemerelysubjectivevalidity.

Ournexttaskistodiscoverbymeansofthoughtwhatrelationtheabove-mentionedimmediatesense-datahavetotheconscioussubject.

TheambiguityofcurrentspeechmakesitadvisableformetocometoanagreementwithmyreadersconcerningthemeaningofawordwhichIshallhavetoemployinwhatfollows.Ishallapplythename“percepts”totheimmediatesense-dataenumeratedabove,insofarasthesubjectconsciouslyapprehendsthem.Itis,then,nottheprocessofperception,buttheobjectofthisprocesswhichIcallthe“percept.”

Irejecttheterm“sensation,”becausethishasadefinitemeaninginPhysiologywhichisnarrowerthanthatofmyterm“percept.”Icanspeakoffeelingasapercept,butnotasasensationinthephysiologicalsenseoftheterm.BeforeIcanhavecognisanceofmyfeelingitmustbecomeaperceptforme.Themannerinwhich,throughobservation,wegainknowledgeofourthought-processesissuchthatwhenwefirstbegintonoticethought,ittoomaybecalledapercept.

Theunreflectivemanregardshispercepts,suchastheyappeartohisimmediateapprehension,asthingshavingawhollyindependentexistence.Whenheseesatreehebelievesthatitstandsintheformwhichhesees,withthecoloursofallitsparts,etc.,thereonthespottowardswhichhisgazeisdirected.Whenthesamemanseesthesuninthemorningappearasadisconthehorizon,andfollowsthecourseofthisdisc,hebelievesthatthephenomenonexistsandoccurs(byitself)exactlyasheperceivesit.Tothisbeliefheclingsuntilhemeetswithfurtherperceptswhichcontradicthisformerones.Thechildwhohasasyethadnoexperienceofdistancegraspsatthemoon,anddoesnotcorrectitsfirstimpressionastotherealdistanceuntilasecondperceptcontradictsthefirst.Everyextensionofthecircleofmyperceptscompelsmetocorrectmypictureoftheworld.Weseethisineverydaylife,aswellasinthementaldevelopmentofmankind.Thepicturewhichtheancientsmadeforthemselvesoftherelationoftheearthtothesunandotherheavenlybodies,hadtobereplacedbyanotherwhenCopernicusfoundthatitcontradictedperceptswhichinthoseearlydayswereunknown.Amanwhohadbeenbornblindsaid,whenoperatedonbyDr.Franz,thattheideaofthesizeofobjectswhichhehadformed

beforehisoperationbyhissenseoftouchwasaverydifferentone.Hehadtocorrecthistactualperceptsbyhisvisualpercepts.

Howisitthatwearecompelledtomakethesecontinualcorrectionsinourobservations?

Asinglereflectionsuppliestheanswertothisquestion.WhenIstandatoneendofanavenue,thetreesattheotherend,awayfromme,seemsmallerandnearertogetherthanthosewhereIstand.ButthescenewhichIperceivechangeswhenIchangetheplacefromwhichIamlooking.Theexactforminwhichitpresentsitselftomeis,therefore,dependentonaconditionwhichinheres,notintheobject,butinme,thepercipient.ItisallthesametotheavenuewhereIstand.ButthepictureofitwhichIreceivedependsessentiallyonmystandpoint.Inthesameway,itmakesnodifferencetothesunandtheplanetarysystemthathumanbeingshappentoperceivethemfromtheearth;butthepictureoftheheavenswhichhumanbeingshaveisdeterminedbythefactthattheyinhabittheearth.Thisdependenceofourperceptsonourpointsofobservationistheeasiestkindofdependencetounderstand.Thematterbecomesmoredifficultwhenwerealisefurtherthatourperceptualworldisdependentonourbodilyandmentalorganisation.Thephysicistteachesusthatwithinthespaceinwhichwehearasoundtherearevibrationsoftheair,andthattherearevibrationsalsointheparticlesofthebodywhichweregardasthecauseofthesound.Thesevibrationsareperceivedassoundsonlyifwehavenormallyconstructedears.Withoutthemthewholeworldwouldbeforusforeversilent.Again,thephysiologistteachesusthattherearemenwhoperceivenothingofthewonderfuldisplayofcolourswhichsurroundsus.Intheirworldthereareonlydegreesoflightanddark.Othersareblindonlytoonecolour,e.g.,red.Theirworldlacksthiscolourtone,andhenceitisactuallyadifferentonefromthatoftheaverageman.Ishouldliketocallthedependenceofmyperceptualworldonmypointofobservation“mathematical,”anditsdependenceonmyorganisation“qualitative.”Theformerdeterminesproportionsofsizeandmutualdistancesofmypercepts,thelattertheirquality.ThefactthatIseearedsurfaceasred—thisqualitativedetermination—dependsonthestructureofmyeye.

Mypercepts,then,areinthefirstinstancesubjective.Therecognitionofthesubjectivecharacterofourperceptsmayeasilyleadustodoubtwhetherthereisanyobjectivebasisforthematall.Whenweknowthatapercept,e.g.,thatofaredcolourorofacertaintone,isnotpossiblewithoutaspecificstructureofourorganism,wemayeasilybeledtobelievethatithasnobeingatallapartfromoursubjectiveorganisation,thatithasnokindofexistenceapartfromtheactofperceivingofwhichitistheobject.TheclassicalrepresentativeofthistheoryisGeorgeBerkeley,whoheldthatfromthemomentwerealisetheimportanceofasubjectforperception,wearenolongerabletobelieveintheexistenceofaworldapartfromaconsciousmind.“Sometruthstherearesonearandobvioustothemindthatmanneedonlyopenhiseyestoseethem.SuchItakethisimportantonetobe,viz.,thatallthechoirofheavenandthefurnitureoftheearth—inaword,allthosebodieswhichcomposethemightyframeoftheworld—havenotanysubsistencewithoutamind;thattheirbeingistobeperceivedorknown;thatconsequently,solongastheyarenotactuallyperceivedbyme,ordonotexistinmymindorthatofanyothercreatedspirit,theymusteitherhavenoexistenceatallorelsesubsistinthemindofsomeEternalSpirit”(Berkeley,OfthePrinciplesofHumanKnowledge,

PartI,Section6).

Onthisview,whenwetakeawaytheactofperceiving,nothingremainsofthepercept.Thereisnocolourwhennoneisseen,nosoundwhennoneisheard.Extension,form,andmotionexistaslittleascolourandsoundapartfromtheactofperception.Weneverperceivebareextensionorshape.Thesearealwaysjoinedwithcolourorsomeotherquality,whichareundoubtedlydependentonthesubject.Iftheselatterdisappearwhenweceasetoperceive,theformer,beingconnectedwiththem,mustdisappearlikewise.

Ifitisurgedthat,eventhoughfigure,colour,sound,etc.,havenoexistenceexceptintheactofperception,yettheremustbethingswhichexistapartfromperceptionandwhicharesimilartotheperceptsinourminds,thentheviewwehavementionedwouldanswer,thatacolourcanbesimilaronlytoacolour,afiguretoafigure.Ourperceptscanbesimilaronlytoourperceptsandtonothingelse.Evenwhatwecallathingisnothingbutacollectionofperceptswhichareconnectedinadefiniteway.IfIstripatableofitsshape,extension,colour,etc.—inshort,ofallthatismerelymypercepts—thennothingremainsover.Ifwefollowthisviewtoitslogicalconclusion,weareledtotheassertionthattheobjectsofmyperceptionsexistonlythroughme,andonlyinasfaras,andaslongas,Iperceivethem.Theydisappearwithmyperceivingandhavenomeaningapartfromit.ApartfrommyperceptsIknowofnoobjectsandcannotknowofany.

Noobjectioncanbemadetothisassertionaslongaswetakeintoaccountmerelythegeneralfactthattheperceptisdeterminedinpartbytheorganisationofthesubject.Thematterwouldbefarotherwiseifwewereinapositiontosaywhatpartexactlyisplayedbyourperceivingintheoccurrenceofapercept.Weshouldknowthenwhathappenstoaperceptwhilstitisbeingperceived,andweshouldalsobeabletodeterminewhatcharacteritmustpossessbeforeitcomestobeperceived.

Thisleadsustoturnourattentionfromtheobjectofaperceptiontothesubjectofit.Iamawarenotonlyofotherthingsbutalsoofmyself.Thecontentofmyperceptionofmyselfconsists,inthefirstinstance,inthatIamsomethingstableincontrastwiththeevercomingandgoingfluxofpercepts.Theawarenessofmyselfaccompaniesinmyconsciousnesstheawarenessofallotherpercepts.WhenIamabsorbedintheperceptionofagivenobjectIam,forthetimebeing,awareonlyofthisobject.NextIbecomeawarealsoofmyself.Iamthenconscious,notonlyoftheobject,butalsoofmySelfasopposedtoandobservingtheobject.Idonotmerelyseeatree,IknowalsothatitisIwhoseeit.Iknow,moreover,thatsomeprocesstakesplaceinmewhenIobserveatree.Whenthetreedisappearsfrommyfieldofvision,anafter-effectofthisprocessremains,viz.,animageofthetree.ThisimagehasbecomeassociatedwithmySelfduringmyperception.MySelfhasbecomeenriched;toitscontentanewelementhasbeenadded.ThiselementIcallmyideaofthetree.Ishouldneverhaveoccasiontotalkofideas,wereInotawareofmyownSelf.Perceptswouldcomeandgo;Ishouldletthemslipby.ItisonlybecauseIamawareofmySelf,andobservethatwitheachperceptionthecontentoftheSelfischanged,thatIamcompelledtoconnecttheperceptionoftheobjectwiththechangesinthecontentofmySelf,andtospeakofhavinganidea.

ThatIhaveideasisinthesamesensematterofobservationtomeasthatotherobjects

havecolour,sound,etc.Iamnowalsoabletodistinguishtheseotherobjects,whichstandoveragainstme,bythenameoftheouterworld,whereasthecontentsofmyperceptionofmySelfformmyinnerworld.Thefailuretorecognisethetruerelationbetweenideaandobjecthasledtothegreatestmisunderstandingsinmodernphilosophy.ThefactthatIperceiveachangeinmyself,thatmySelfundergoesamodification,hasbeenthrustintotheforeground,whilsttheobjectwhichcausesthesemodificationsisaltogetherignored.Inconsequenceithasbeensaidthatweperceive,notobjects,butonlyourideas.Iknow,soitissaid,nothingofthetableinitself,whichistheobjectofmyperception,butonlyofthechangeswhichoccurwithinmewhenIperceiveatable.ThistheoryshouldnotbeconfusedwiththeBerkeleyantheorymentionedabove.Berkeleymaintainsthesubjectivenatureofmyperceptualcontents,buthedoesnotsaythatIcanknowonlymyownideas.Helimitsmyknowledgetomyideasbecause,onhisview,therearenoobjectsotherthanideas.WhatIperceiveasatablenolongerexists,accordingtoBerkeley,whenIceasetolookatit.ThisiswhyBerkeleyholdsthatourperceptsarecreateddirectlybytheomnipotenceofGod.IseeatablebecauseGodcausesthisperceptinme.ForBerkeley,therefore,nothingisrealexceptGodandhumanspirits.Whatwecallthe“world”existsonlyinspirits.Whatthenaïvemancallstheouterworld,ormaterialnature,isforBerkeleynon-existent.ThistheoryisconfrontedbythenowpredominantKantianviewwhichlimitsourknowledgeoftheworldtoourideas,notbecauseofanyconvictionthatnothingbeyondtheseideasexists,butbecauseitholdsthatwearesoorganisedthatwecanhaveknowledgeonlyofthechangeswithinourownselves,notofthethings-in-themselveswhicharethecausesofthesechanges.ThisviewconcludesfromthefactthatIknowonlymyownideas,notthatthereisnorealityindependentofthem,butonlythatthesubjectcannothavedirectknowledgeofsuchreality.Themindcanmerely“throughthemediumofitssubjectivethoughtsimagineit,conceiveit,knowit,orperhapsalsofailtoknowit”(O.Liebmann,ZurAnalysisderWirklichkeit,p.28).Kantiansbelievethattheirprinciplesareabsolutelycertain,indeedimmediatelyevident,withoutanyproof.“Themostfundamentalprinciplewhichthephilosophermustbeginbygraspingclearly,consistsintherecognitionthatourknowledge,inthefirstinstance,doesnotextendbeyondourideas.Ourideasareallthatweimmediatelyhaveandexperience,andjustbecausewehaveimmediateexperienceofthemthemostradicaldoubtcannotrobusofthisknowledge.Ontheotherhand,theknowledgewhichtranscendsmyideas—takingideashereinthewidestpossiblesense,soastoincludeallpsychicalprocesses—isnotproofagainstdoubt.Hence,attheverybeginningofallphilosophywemustexplicitlysetdownallknowledgewhichtranscendsideasasopentodoubt.”ThesearetheopeningsentencesofVolkelt’sbookonKant’sTheoryofKnowledge.Whatishereputforwardasanimmediateandself-evidenttruthis,inreality,theconclusionofapieceofargumentwhichrunsasfollows.Naïvecommonsensebelievesthatthings,justasweperceivethem,existalsooutsideourminds.Physics,Physiology,andPsychology,however,teachusthatourperceptsaredependentonourorganisation,andthatthereforewecannotknowanythingaboutexternalobjectsexceptwhatourorganisationtransmitstous.Theobjectswhichweperceivearethusmodificationsofourorganisation,notthings-in-themselves.Thislineofthoughthas,infact,beencharacterisedbyEd.vonHartmannastheonewhichleadsnecessarilytotheconvictionthatwecanhavedirectknowledgeonlyofourownideas(cp.

hisGrundproblemderErkenntnistheorie,pp.16–40).Becauseoutsideourorganismswefindvibrationsofparticlesandofair,whichareperceivedbyusassounds,itisconcludedthatwhatwecallsoundisnothingmorethanasubjectivereactionofourorganismstothesemotionsintheexternalworld.Similarly,colourandheatareinferredtobemerelymodificationsofourorganisms.And,further,thesetwokindsofperceptsareheldtobetheeffectsofprocessesintheexternalworldwhichareutterlydifferentfromwhatweexperienceasheatorascolour.Whentheseprocessesstimulatethenervesintheskinofmybody,Iperceiveheat;whentheystimulatetheopticalnerveIperceivelightandcolour.Light,colour,andheat,then,arethereactionsofmysensorynervestoexternalstimuli.Similarly,thesenseoftouchrevealstome,nottheobjectsoftheouterworld,butonlystatesofmyownbody.Thephysicistholdsthatbodiesarecomposedofinfinitelysmallparticlescalledmolecules,andthatthesemoleculesarenotindirectcontactwithoneanother,buthavedefiniteintervalsbetweenthem.Betweenthem,therefore,isemptyspace.Acrossthisspacetheyactononeanotherbyattractionandrepulsion.IfIputmyhandonabody,themoleculesofmyhandbynomeanstouchthoseofthebodydirectly,butthereremainsacertaindistancebetweenbodyandhand,andwhatIexperienceasthebody’sresistanceisnothingbuttheeffectoftheforceofrepulsionwhichitsmoleculesexertonmyhand.Iamabsolutelyexternaltothebodyandexperienceonlyitseffectsonmyorganism.

Thetheoryoftheso-calledSpecificNervousEnergy,whichhasbeenadvancedbyJ.Müller,supplementsthesespeculations.Itassertsthateachsensehasthepeculiaritythatitreactstoallexternalstimuliinonlyonedefiniteway.Iftheopticnerveisstimulated,lightsensationsresult,irrespectiveofwhetherthestimulationisduetowhatwecalllight,ortomechanicalpressure,oranelectricalcurrent.Ontheotherhand,thesameexternalstimulusappliedtodifferentsensesgivesrisetodifferentsensations.Theconclusionfromthesefactsseemstobe,thatoursense-organscangiveusknowledgeonlyofwhatoccursinthemselves,butnotoftheexternalworld.Theydetermineourpercepts,eachaccordingtoitsownnature.

Physiologyshows,further,thattherecanbenodirectknowledgeevenoftheeffectswhichobjectsproduceonoursense-organs.Throughhisstudyoftheprocesseswhichoccurinourownbodies,thephysiologistfindsthat,eveninthesense-organs,theeffectsoftheexternalprocessaremodifiedinthemostdiverseways.Wecanseethismostclearlyinthecaseofeyeandear.Bothareverycomplicatedorganswhichmodifytheexternalstimulusconsiderably,beforetheyconductittothecorrespondingnerve.Fromtheperipheralendofthenervethemodifiedstimulusisthenconductedtothebrain.Herethecentralorgansmustinturnbestimulated.Theconclusionis,therefore,drawnthattheexternalprocessundergoesaseriesoftransformationsbeforeitreachesconsciousness.Thebrainprocessesareconnectedbysomanyintermediatelinkswiththeexternalstimuli,thatanysimilaritybetweenthemisoutofthequestion.Whatthebrainultimatelytransmitstothesoulisneitherexternalprocesses,norprocessesinthesense-organs,butonlysuchasoccurinthebrain.Buteventhesearenotapprehendedimmediatelybythesoul.Whatwefinallyhaveinconsciousnessarenotbrainprocessesatall,butsensations.MysensationofredhasabsolutelynosimilaritywiththeprocesswhichoccursinthebrainwhenIsensered.The

sensation,again,occursasaneffectinthemind,andthebrainprocessisonlyitscause.ThisiswhyHartmann(GrundproblemderErkenntnistheorie,p.37)says,“Whatthesubjectexperiencesisthereforeonlymodificationsofhisownpsychicalstatesandnothingelse.”However,whenIhavesensations,theyareveryfarasyetfrombeinggroupedinthosecomplexeswhichIperceiveas“things.”Onlysinglesensationscanbetransmittedtomebythebrain.Thesensationsofhardnessandsoftnessaretransmittedtomebytheorganoftouch,thoseofcolourandlightbytheorganofsight.Yetallthesearefoundunitedinoneobject.Thisunificationmust,therefore,bebroughtaboutbythesoulitself;thatis,thesoulconstructsthingsoutoftheseparatesensationswhichthebrainconveystoit.Mybrainconveystomesingly,andbywidelydifferentpaths,thevisual,tactual,andauditorysensationswhichthesoulthencombinesintotheideaofatrumpet.Thus,whatisreallytheresultofaprocess(i.e.,theideaofatrumpet),isformyconsciousnesstheprimarydatum.Inthisresultnothingcananylongerbefoundofwhatexistsoutsideofmeandoriginallystimulatedmysense-organs.Theexternalobjectislostentirelyonthewaytothebrainandthroughthebraintothesoul.

Itwouldbehardtofindinthehistoryofhumanspeculationanotheredificeofthoughtwhichhasbeenbuiltupwithgreateringenuity,andwhichyet,oncloseranalysis,collapsesintonothing.Letuslookalittlecloseratthewayithasbeenconstructed.Thetheorystartswithwhatisgiveninnaïveconsciousness,i.e.,withthingsasperceived.Itproceedstoshowthatnoneofthequalitieswhichwefindinthesethingswouldexistforus,hadwenosense-organs.Noeye—nocolour.Therefore,thecolourisnot,asyet,presentinthestimuluswhichaffectstheeye.Itarisesfirstthroughtheinteractionoftheeyeandtheobject.Thelatteris,therefore,colourless.Butneitheristhecolourintheeye,forintheeyethereisonlyachemical,orphysical,processwhichisfirstconductedbytheopticnervetothebrain,andthereinitiatesanotherprocess.Eventhisisnotyetthecolour.Thatisonlyproducedinthesoulbymeansofthebrainprocess.Eventhenitdoesnotyetappearinconsciousness,butisfirstreferredbythesoultoabodyintheexternalworld.ThereIfinallyperceiveit,asaqualityofthisbody.Wehavetravelledinacompletecircle.Weareconsciousofacolouredobject.Thatisthestarting-point.Herethoughtbeginsitsconstruction.IfIhadnoeye,theobjectwouldbe,forme,colourless.Icannot,therefore,attributethecolourtotheobject.Imustlookforitelsewhere.Ilookforit,first,intheeye—invain;inthenerve—invain;inthebrain—invainoncemore;inthesoul—hereIfinditindeed,butnotattachedtotheobject.Irecoverthecolouredbodyonlyonreturningtomystarting-point.Thecircleiscompleted.Thetheoryleadsmetoidentifywhatthenaïvemanregardsasexistingoutsideofhim,asreallyaproductofmymind.

Aslongasonestopshereeverythingseemstofitbeautifully.Butwemustgoovertheargumentoncemorefromthebeginning.HithertoIhaveused,asmystarting-point,theobject,i.e.,theexternalperceptofwhichuptonow,frommynaïvestandpoint,Ihadatotallywrongconception.Ithoughtthatthepercept,justasIperceiveit,hadobjectiveexistence.ButnowIobservethatitdisappearswithmyactofperception,thatitisonlyamodificationofmymentalstate.HaveI,then,anyrightatalltostartfromitinmyarguments?CanIsayofitthatitactsonmysoul?ImusthenceforthtreatthetableofwhichformerlyIbelievedthatitactedonme,andproducedanideaofitselfinme,as

itselfanidea.Butfromthisitfollowslogicallythatmysense-organs,andtheprocessesinthemarealsomerelysubjective.Ihavenorighttotalkofarealeyebutonlyofmyideaofaneye.Exactlythesameistrueofthenervepaths,andthebrainprocesses,andevenoftheprocessinthesoulitself,throughwhichthingsaresupposedtobeconstructedoutofthechaosofdiversesensations.Ifassumingthetruthofthefirstcircleofargumentation,Irunthroughthestepsofmycognitiveactivityoncemore,thelatterrevealsitselfasatissueofideaswhich,assuch,cannotactononeanother.Icannotsaythatmyideaoftheobjectactsonmyideaoftheeye,andthatfromthisinteractionresultsmyideaofcolour.ButitisnecessarythatIshouldsaythis.ForassoonasIseeclearlythatmysense-organsandtheiractivity,mynerve-andsoul-processes,canalsobeknowntomeonlythroughperception,theargumentwhichIhaveoutlinedrevealsitselfinitsfullabsurdity.ItisquitetruethatIcanhavenoperceptwithoutthecorrespondingsense-organ.ButjustaslittlecanIbeawareofasense-organwithoutperception.FromtheperceptofatableIcanpasstotheeyewhichseesit,orthenervesintheskinwhichtouchesit,butwhattakesplaceintheseIcan,inturn,learnonlyfromperception.AndthenIsoonperceivethatthereisnotraceofsimilaritybetweentheprocesswhichtakesplaceintheeyeandthecolourwhichIsee.IcannotgetridofcoloursensationsbypointingtotheprocesswhichtakesplaceintheeyewhilstIperceiveacolour.NomorecanIre-discoverthecolourinthenerve-orbrain-processes.Ionlyaddanewpercept,localisedwithintheorganism,tothefirstperceptwhichthenaïvemanlocalisesoutsideofhisorganism.Ionlypassfromonepercepttoanother.

Moreover,thereisabreakinthewholeargument.Icanfollowtheprocessesinmyorganismuptothoseinmybrain,eventhoughmyassumptionsbecomemoreandmorehypotheticalasIapproachthecentralprocessesofthebrain.Themethodofexternalobservationceaseswiththeprocessinmybrain,moreparticularlywiththeprocesswhichIshouldobserve,ifIcouldtreatthebrainwiththeinstrumentsandmethodsofPhysicsandChemistry.Themethodofinternalobservation,orintrospection,beginswiththesensations,andincludestheconstructionofthingsoutofthematerialofsense-data.Atthepointoftransitionfrombrainprocesstosensation,thereisabreakinthesequenceofobservation.

ThetheorywhichIhaveheredescribed,andwhichcallsitselfCriticalIdealism,incontrasttothestandpointofnaïvecommonsensewhichitcallsNaïveRealism,makesthemistakeofcharacterisingonegroupofperceptsasideas,whilsttakinganothergroupintheverysamesenseastheNaïveRealismwhichitapparentlyrefutes.Itestablishestheidealcharacterofperceptsbyacceptingnaïvely,asobjectivelyvalidfacts,theperceptsconnectedwithone’sownbody;and,inaddition,itfailstoseethatitconfusestwospheresofobservation,betweenwhichitcanfindnoconnectinglink.

CriticalIdealismcanrefuteNaïveRealismonlybyitselfassuming,innaïve-realisticfashion,thatone’sownorganismhasobjectiveexistence.AssoonastheIdealistrealisesthattheperceptsconnectedwithhisownorganismstandonexactlythesamefootingasthosewhichNaïveRealismassumestohaveobjectiveexistence,hecannolongerusetheformerasasafefoundationforhistheory.Hewould,tobeconsistent,havetoregardhisownorganismalsoasamerecomplexofideas.Butthisremovesthepossibilityof

regardingthecontentoftheperceptualworldasaproductofthemind’sorganisation.Onewouldhavetoassumethattheidea“colour”wasonlyamodificationoftheidea“eye.”So-calledCriticalIdealismcanbeestablishedonlybyborrowingtheassumptionsofNaïveRealism.Theapparentrefutationofthelatterisachievedonlybyuncriticallyacceptingitsownassumptionsasvalidinanothersphere.

Thismuch,then,iscertain:AnalysiswithintheworldofperceptscannotestablishCriticalIdealism,and,consequently,cannotstripperceptsoftheirobjectivecharacter.

Stilllessisitlegitimatetorepresenttheprinciplethat“theperceptualworldismyidea”asself-evidentandneedingnoproof.Schopenhauerbeginshischiefwork,TheWorldasWillandIdea,withthewords:“Theworldismyidea—thisisatruthwhichholdsgoodforeverythingthatlivesandknows,thoughmanalonecanbringitintoreflectiveandabstractconsciousness.Ifhereallydoesthis,hehasattainedtophilosophicalwisdom.Itthenbecomesclearandcertaintohimthatwhatheknowsisnotasunandanearth,butonlyaneyethatseesasun,ahandthatfeelsanearth;thattheworldwhichsurroundshimisthereonlyinidea,i.e.,onlyinrelationtosomethingelse,theconsciousnesswhichishimself.Ifanytruthcanbeassertedapriori,itisthis:foritistheexpressionofthemostgeneralformofallpossibleandthinkableexperience,aformwhichismoregeneralthantime,orspace,orcausality,fortheyallpresupposeit…”(TheWorldasWillandIdea,BookI,par.1).Thiswholetheoryiswreckedbythefact,alreadymentionedabove,thattheeyesandthehandarejustasmuchperceptsasthesunandtheearth.UsingSchopenhauer’svocabularyinhisownsense,Imightmaintainagainsthimthatmyeyewhichseesthesun,andmyhandwhichfeelstheearth,aremyideasjustlikethesunandtheearththemselves.That,putinthisway,thewholetheorycancelsitself,isclearwithoutfurtherargument.Foronlymyrealeyeandmyrealhand,butnotmyideas“eye”and“hand,”couldowntheideas“sun”and“earth”asmodifications.YetitisonlyintermsoftheseideasthatCriticalIdealismhastherighttospeak.

CriticalIdealismistotallyunabletogainaninsightuntotherelationofpercepttoidea.Itcannotmaketheseparation,mentionedonp.58,betweenwhathappenstotheperceptintheprocessofperceptionandwhatmustbeinherentinitpriortoperception.Wemustthereforeattemptthisprobleminanotherway.

OURKNOWLEDGEOFTHEWORLD

Fromtheforegoingconsiderationsitfollowsthatitisimpossibletoprove,byanalysisofthecontentofourperceptions,thatourperceptsareideas.Thisissupposedtobeprovedbyshowingthat,iftheprocessofperceivingtakesplaceinthewayinwhichweconceiveitinaccordancewiththenaïve-realisticassumptionsconcerningthepsychologicalandphysiologicalconstitutionofhumanindividuals,thenwehavetodo,notwiththingsthemselves,butmerelywithourideasofthings.Now,ifNaïveRealism,whenconsistentlythoughtout,leadstoresultswhichdirectlycontradictitspresuppositions,thenthesepresuppositionsmustbediscardedasunsuitableforthefoundationofatheoryoftheworld.Inanycase,itisinadmissibletorejectthepresuppositionsandyetaccepttheconsequences,astheCriticalIdealistdoeswhobaseshisassertionthattheworldismyideaonthelineofargumentindicatedabove.(EduardvonHartmanngivesinhisworkDasGrundproblemderErkenntnistheorieafullaccountofthislineofargument.)

ThetruthofCriticalIdealismisonething,thepersuasivenessofitsproofsanother.Howitstandswiththeformer,willappearlaterinthecourseofourargument,butthepersuasivenessofitsproofsisnil.Ifonebuildsahouse,andthegroundfloorcollapseswhilstthefirstfloorisbeingbuilt,thenthefirstfloorcollapsestoo.NaïveRealismandCriticalIdealismarerelatedtooneanotherlikethegroundfloortothefirstfloorinthissimile.

Foronewhoholdsthatthewholeperceptualworldisonlyanidealworld,and,moreover,theeffectofthingsunknowntohimactingonhissoul,therealproblemofknowledgeisnaturallyconcerned,notwiththeideaspresentonlyinthesoul,butwiththethingswhichlieoutsidehisconsciousness,andwhichareindependentofhim.Heasks,Howmuchcanwelearnaboutthemindirectly,seeingthatwecannotobservethemdirectly?Fromthispointofview,heisconcerned,notwiththeconnectionofhisconsciousperceptswithoneanother,butwiththeircauseswhichtranscendhisconsciousnessandexistindependentlyofhim,whereasthepercepts,onhisview,disappearassoonasheturnshissense-organsawayfromthethingsthemselves.Ourconsciousness,onthisview,workslikeamirrorfromwhichthepicturesofdefinitethingsdisappeartheverymomentitsreflectingsurfaceisnotturnedtowardsthem.If,now,wedonotseethethingsthemselves,butonlytheirreflections,wemustobtainknowledgeofthenatureoftheformerindirectlybydrawingconclusionsfromthecharacterofthelatter.Thewholeofmodernscienceadoptsthispointofview,whenitusesperceptsonlyasameansofobtaininginformationaboutthemotionsofmatterwhichliebehindthem,andwhichalonereally“are.”Ifthephilosopher,asCriticalIdealist,admitsrealexistenceatall,thenhissoleaimistogainknowledgeofthisrealexistenceindirectlybymeansofhisideas.Hisinterestignoresthesubjectiveworldofideas,andpursuesinsteadthecausesoftheseideas.

TheCriticalIdealistcan,however,goevenfurtherandsay,Iamconfinedtotheworldofmyownideasandcannotescapefromit.IfIconceiveathingbeyondmyideas,thisconcept,oncemore,isnothingbutmyidea.AnIdealistofthistypewilleitherdenythe

thing-in-itselfentirelyor,atanyrate,assertthatithasnosignificanceforhumanminds,i.e.,thatitisasgoodasnon-existentsincewecanknownothingofit.

TothiskindofCriticalIdealistthewholeworldseemsachaoticdream,inthefaceofwhichallstrivingforknowledgeissimplymeaningless.Forhimtherecanbeonlytwosortsofmen:(1)victimsoftheillusionthatthedreamstheyhavewoventhemselvesarerealthings,and(2)wisemenwhoseethroughthenothingnessofthisdreamworld,andwhograduallylosealldesiretotroublethemselvesfurtheraboutit.Fromthispointofview,evenone’sownpersonalitymaybecomeameredreamphantom.Justasduringsleepthereappearsamongmydream-imagesanimageofmyself,soinwakingconsciousnesstheideaofmyownSelfisaddedtotheideaoftheouterworld.Ihavethengiventomeinconsciousness,notmyrealSelf,butonlymyideaofmySelf.Whoeverdeniesthatthingsexist,or,atleast,thatwecanknowanythingofthem,mustalsodenytheexistence,respectivelytheknowledge,ofone’sownpersonality.ThisishowtheCriticalIdealistcomestomaintainthat“Allrealitytransformsitselfintoawonderfuldream,withoutalifewhichistheobjectofthedream,andwithoutamindwhichhasthedream;intoadreamwhichisnothingbutadreamofitself.”(Cp.Fichte,DieBestimmungdesMenschen.)

Whetherhewhobelievesthatherecognisesimmediateexperiencetobeadream,postulatesnothingbehindthisdream,orwhetherherelateshisideastoactualthings,isimmaterial.Inbothcaseslifeitselfmustloseallscientificinterestforhim.However,whereasforthosewhobelievethatthewholeofaccessiblerealityisexhaustedindreams,allscienceisanabsurdity,forthosewhofeelcompelledtoarguefromideastothings,scienceconsistsinstudyingthesethings-in-themselves.ThefirstofthesetheoriesoftheworldmaybecalledAbsoluteIllusionism,thesecondiscalledTranscendentalRealism1

byitsmostrigorouslylogicalexponent,EduardvonHartmann.

ThesetwopointsofviewhavethisincommonwithNaïveRealism,thattheyseektogainafootingintheworldbymeansofananalysisofpercepts.Withinthissphere,however,theyareunabletofindanystablepoint.

OneofthemostimportantquestionsforanadherentofTranscendentalRealismwouldhavetobe,howtheEgoconstructstheworldofideasoutofitself.Aworldofideaswhichwasgiventous,andwhichdisappearedassoonasweshutoursensestotheexternalworld,mightprovokeanearnestdesireforknowledge,insofarasitwasameansforinvestigatingindirectlytheworldoftheself-existingSelf.Ifthethingsofourexperiencewere“ideas,”thenoureverydaylifewouldbelikeadream,andthediscoveryofthetruefactslikewaking.Evenourdream-imagesinterestusaslongaswedreamand,consequently,donotdetecttheirdreamcharacter.Butassoonaswewake,wenolongerlookfortheconnectionsofourdream-imagesamongthemselves,butratherforthephysical,physiological,andpsychologicalprocesseswhichunderliethem.Inthesameway,aphilosopherwhoholdstheworldtobehisidea,cannotbeinterestedinthereciprocalrelationsofthedetailswithintheworld.IfheadmitstheexistenceofarealEgoatall,thenhisquestionwillbe,nothowoneofhisideasisassociatedwithanother,butwhattakesplaceintheSoulwhichisindependentoftheseideas,whileacertaintrainof

ideaspassesthroughhisconsciousness.IfIdreamthatIamdrinkingwinewhichmakesmythroatburn,andthenwakeupwithafitofcoughing(cp.Weygandt,EntstehungderTräume,1893)Icease,themomentIwake,tobeinterestedinthedream-experienceforitsownsake.Myattentionisnowconcernedonlywiththephysiologicalandpsychologicalprocessesbymeansofwhichtheirritationwhichcausesmetocough,comestobesymbolicallyexpressedinthedream.Similarly,oncethephilosopherisconvincedthatthegivenworldconsistsofnothingbutideas,hisinterestisboundtoswitchfromthematoncetothesoulwhichistherealitylyingbehindthem.Thematterismoreserious,however,fortheIllusionistwhodeniestheexistenceofanEgobehindthe“ideas,”oratleastholdsthisEgotobeunknowable.Wemightveryeasilybeledtosuchaviewbythereflectionthat,incontrasttodreaming,thereisthewakingstateinwhichwehavetheopportunitytodetectourdreams,andtorealisetherealrelationsofthings,butthatthereisnostateoftheselfwhichisrelatedsimilarlytoourwakingconsciouslife.Everyadherentofthisviewfailsentirelytoseethatthereis,infact,somethingwhichistomereperceptionwhatourwakingexperiencetoourdreams.Thissomethingisthought.

Thenaïvemancannotbechargedwithfailuretoperceivethis.Heacceptslifeasitis,andregardsthingsasrealjustastheypresentthemselvestohiminexperience.Thefirststep,however,whichwetakebeyondthisstandpointcanbeonlythis,thatweaskhowthoughtisrelatedtoperception.Itmakesnodifferencewhetherornothepercept,asgiventome,hasacontinuousexistencebeforeandafterIperceiveit.IfIwanttoassertanythingwhateveraboutit,Icandosoonlywiththehelpofthought.WhenIassertthattheworldismyidea,Ihaveenunciatedtheresultofanactofthought,andifmythoughtisnotapplicabletotheworld,thenmyresultisfalse.Betweenaperceptandeverykindofjudgmentaboutitthereintervenesthought.

Thereasonwhy,inourdiscussionaboutthings,wegenerallyoverlookthepartplayedbythought,hasalreadybeengivenabove(p.31).Itliesinthefactthatourattentionisconcentratedonlyontheobjectaboutwhichwethink,butnotatthesametimeonthethinkingitself.Thenaïvemind,therefore,treatsthoughtassomethingwhichhasnothingtodowiththings,butstandsaltogetheralooffromthemandmakesitstheoriesaboutthem.Thetheorywhichthethinkerconstructsconcerningthephenomenaoftheworldisregarded,notaspartoftherealthings,butasexistingonlyinmen’sheads.Theworldiscompleteinitselfevenwithoutthistheory.Itisallready-madeandfinishedwithallitssubstancesandforces,andofthisready-madeworldmanmakeshimselfapicture.Whoeverthinksthusneedonlybeaskedonequestion.Whatrighthaveyoutodeclaretheworldtobecompletewithoutthought?Doesnottheworldcausethoughtsinthemindsofmenwiththesamenecessityasitcausestheblossomsonplants?Plantaseedintheearth.Itputsforthrootsandstem,itunfoldsintoleavesandblossoms.Settheplantbeforeyourselves.Itconnectsitself,inyourminds,withadefiniteconcept.Whyshouldthisconceptbelonganylesstothewholeplantthanleafandblossom?Yousaytheleavesandblossomsexistquiteapartfromanexperiencingsubject.Theconceptappearsonlywhenahumanbeingmakesanobjectoftheplant.Quiteso.Butleavesandblossomsalsoappearontheplantonlyifthereissoilinwhichtheseedcanbeplanted,andlightandairinwhichtheblossomsandleavescanunfold.Justsotheconceptofaplantariseswhena

thinkingbeingcomesintocontactwiththeplant.

Itisquitearbitrarytoregardthesumofwhatweexperienceofathingthroughbareperceptionasatotality,awhole,whilethatwhichthoughtrevealsinitisregardedasamereaccretionwhichhasnothingtodowiththethingitself.IfIamgivenarosebudto-day,theperceptthatoffersitselftomeiscompleteonlyforthemoment.IfIputthebudintowater,Ishallto-morrowgetaverydifferentpictureofmyobject.IfIwatchtherosebudwithoutinterruption,Ishallseeto-day’sstategraduallychangeintoto-morrow’sthroughaninfinitenumberofintermediatestages.Thepicturewhichpresentsitselftomeatanyonemomentisonlyachancesectionoutofthecontinuousprocessofgrowthinwhichtheobjectisengaged.IfIdonotputthebudintowater,awholeseriesofstates,thepossibilityofwhichlayinthebud,willnotberealised.Similarly,Imaybepreventedto-morrowfromwatchingtheblossomfurther,andthuscarryawayanincompletepictureofit.

Itwouldbeaquiteunscientificandarbitraryjudgmentwhichdeclaredofanyhaphazardappearanceofathing,thisisthething.

Toregardthesumofperceptualappearancesasthethingisnomorelegitimate.Itmightbequitepossibleforamindtoreceivetheconceptatthesametimeas,andtogetherwith,thepercept.Tosuchaminditwouldneveroccurthattheconceptdidnotbelongtothething.Itwouldhavetoascribetotheconceptanexistenceindivisiblyboundupwiththething.

Letmemakemyselfclearerbyanotherexample.IfIthrowastonehorizontallythroughtheair,Iperceiveitindifferentplacesatdifferenttimes.Iconnecttheseplacessoastoformaline.Mathematicsteachesmetodistinguishvariouskindsoflines,oneofwhichistheparabola.Iknowaparabolatobealinewhichisproducedbyapointmovingaccordingtoacertainwell-definedlaw.IfIanalysetheconditionsunderwhichthestonethrownbymemoves,IfindthatthelineofitsflightisidenticalwiththelineIknowasaparabola.Thatthestonemovesexactlyinaparabolaisaresultofthegivenconditionsandfollowsnecessarilyfromthem.Theformoftheparabolabelongstothewholephenomenonasmuchasanyotherfeatureofit.Thehypotheticalminddescribedabovewhichhasnoneedoftheroundaboutwayofthought,wouldfinditselfpresented,notonlywithasequenceofvisualperceptsatdifferentpoints,but,aspartandparcelofthesephenomena,alsowiththeparabolicformofthelineofflight,whichwecanaddtothephenomenononlybyanactofthought.

Itisnotduetotherealobjectsthattheyappeartousatfirstwithouttheirconceptualsides,buttoourmentalorganisation.Ourwholeorganisationfunctionsinsuchawaythatintheapprehensionofeveryrealthingtherelevantelementscometousfromtwosources,viz.,fromperceptionandfromthought.

ThenatureofthingsisindifferenttothewayIamorganisedforapprehendingthem.ThebreachbetweenperceptionandthoughtexistsonlyfromthemomentthatIconfrontobjectsasspectator.Butwhichelementsdo,andwhichdonot,belongtotheobjects,cannotdependonthemannerinwhichIobtainmyknowledgeofthem.

Manisabeingwithmanylimitations.Firstofall,heisathingamongotherthings.His

existenceisinspaceandtime.Hencebutalimitedportionofthetotaluniversecaneverbegiventohim.Thislimitedportion,however,islinkedupwithotherpartsoneverysidebothintimeandinspace.Ifourexistenceweresolinkedwiththingsthateveryprocessintheobjectworldwerealsoaprocessinus,therewouldbenodifferencebetweenusandthings.Neitherwouldtherebeanyindividualobjectsforus.Allprocessesandeventswouldthenpasscontinuouslyoneintotheother.Thecosmoswouldbeaunityandawholecompleteinitself.Thestreamofeventswouldnowherebeinterrupted.Butowingtoourlimitationsweperceiveasanindividualobjectwhat,intruth,isnotanindividualobjectatall.Nowhere,e.g.,istheparticularquality“red”tobefoundbyitselfinabstraction.Itissurroundedonallsidesbyotherqualitiestowhichitbelongs,andwithoutwhichitcouldnotsubsist.Forus,however,itisnecessarytoisolatecertainsectionsoftheworldandtoconsiderthembythemselves.Oureyecanseizeonlysinglecoloursoneafteranotheroutofamanifoldcolour-complex,ourunderstandingonlysingleconceptsoutofaconnectedconceptualsystem.Thisisolationisasubjectiveact,whichisduetothefactthatwearenotidenticalwiththeworld-process,butareonlythingsamongotherthings.

Itisofthegreatestimportanceforustodeterminetherelationofourselves,asthings,toallotherthings.Thedeterminingofthisrelationmustbedistinguishedfrommerelybecomingconsciousofourselves.Forthisself-awarenesswedependonperceptionjustaswedoforourawarenessofanyotherthing.TheperceptionofmyselfrevealstomeanumberofqualitieswhichIcombineintoanapprehensionofmypersonalityasawhole,justasIcombinethequalities,yellow,metallic,hard,etc.,intheunity“gold.”Thiskindofself-consciousnessdoesnottakemebeyondthesphereofwhatbelongstome.Henceitmustbedistinguishedfromthedeterminationofmyselfbythought.JustasIdeterminebythoughttheplaceofanysingleperceptoftheexternalworldinthewholecosmicsystem,soIfitbyanactofthoughtwhatIperceiveinmyselfintotheorderoftheworld-process.Myself-observationrestrictsmewithindefinitelimits,butmythoughthasnothingtodowiththeselimits.InthissenseIamatwo-sidedbeing.IamcontainedwithinthespherewhichIapprehendasthatofmypersonality,butIamalsothepossessorofanactivitywhich,fromahigherstandpoint,determinesmyfiniteexistence.Thoughtisnotindividuallikesensationandfeeling;itisuniversal.Itreceivesanindividualstampineachseparatehumanbeingonlybecauseitcomestoberelatedtohisindividualfeelingsandsensations.Bymeansoftheseparticularcolouringsoftheuniversalthought,individualmenaredistinguishedfromoneanother.Thereisonlyonesingleconceptof“triangle.”ItisquiteimmaterialforthecontentofthisconceptwhetheritisinA’sconsciousnessorinB’s.Itwill,however,begraspedbyeachofthetwomindsinitsownindividualway.

Thisthoughtconflictswithacommonprejudicewhichisveryhardtoovercome.Thevictimsofthisprejudiceareunabletoseethattheconceptofatrianglewhichmymindgraspsisthesameastheconceptwhichmyneighbour’smindgrasps.Thenaïvemanbelieveshimselftobethecreatorofhisconcepts.Hencehebelievesthateachpersonhashisprivateconcepts.Oneofthefirstthingswhichphilosophicthoughtrequiresofusistoovercomethisprejudice.Theonesingleconceptof“triangle”doesnotsplitupintomanyconceptsbecauseitisthoughtbymanyminds.Forthethoughtofthemanyisitselfaunity.

Inthoughtwehavetheelementwhichweldseachman’sspecialindividualityintoonewholewiththecosmos.Insofaraswesenseandfeel(perceive),weareisolatedindividuals;insofaraswethink,wearetheAll-OneBeingwhichpervadeseverything.Thisisthedeepermeaningofourtwo-sidednature.Weareconsciousofanabsoluteprinciplerevealingitselfinus,aprinciplewhichisuniversal.Butweexperienceit,notasitissuesfromthecentreoftheworld,butratheratapointontheperiphery.Weretheformerthecase,weshouldknow,assoonaseverwebecameconscious,thesolutionofthewholeworldproblem.Butsincewestandatapointontheperiphery,andfindthatourownbeingisconfinedwithindefinitelimits,wemustexploretheregionwhichliesbeyondourownbeingwiththehelpofthought,whichistheuniversalcosmicprinciplemanifestingitselfinourminds.

Thefactthatthought,inus,reachesoutbeyondourseparateexistenceandrelatesitselftotheuniversalworld-order,givesrisetothedesireforknowledgeinus.Beingswithoutthoughtdonotexperiencethisdesire.Whentheycomeincontactwithotherthingsnoquestionsariseforthem.Theseotherthingsremainexternaltosuchbeings.Butinthinkingbeingstheconceptconfrontstheexternalthing.Itisthatpartofthethingwhichwereceivenotfromwithout,butfromwithin.Toassimilate,tounite,thetwoelements,theinnerandtheouter,thatisthefunctionofknowledge.

Thepercept,thus,isnotsomethingfinishedandself-contained,butonesideonlyofthetotalreality.Theothersideistheconcept.Theactofcognitionisthesynthesisofperceptandconcept.Anditisonlytheunionofperceptandconceptwhichconstitutesthewholething.

Theprecedingdiscussionshowsclearlythatitisfutiletoseekforanyothercommonelementintheseparatethingsoftheworldthantheidealcontentwhichthinkingsupplies.Allattemptstodiscoveranyotherprincipleofunityintheworldthanthisinternallycoherentidealcontent,whichwegainforourselvesbytheconceptualanalysisofourpercepts,areboundtofail.NeitherapersonalGod,norforce,normatter,northeblindwill(ofSchopenhauerandHartmann),canbeacceptedbyusastheuniversalprincipleofunityintheworld.Theseprinciplesallbelongonlytoalimitedsphereofourexperience.Personalityweexperienceonlyinourselves,forceandmatteronlyinexternalthings.Thewill,again,canberegardedonlyastheexpressionoftheactivityofourfinitepersonalities.Schopenhauerwantstoavoidmaking“abstract”thoughttheprincipleofunityintheworld,andseeksinsteadsomethingwhichpresentsitselftohimimmediatelyasreal.Thisphilosopherholdsthatwecanneversolvetheriddleoftheworldsolongasweregarditasan“external”world.“Infact,themeaningforwhichweseekofthatworldwhichispresenttousonlyasouridea,orthetransitionfromtheworldasmereideaoftheknowingsubjecttowhateveritmaybebesidesthis,wouldneverbefoundiftheinvestigatorhimselfwerenothingmorethanthepureknowingsubject(awingedcherubwithoutabody).Buthehimselfisrootedinthatworld:hefindshimselfinitasanindividual,thatistosay,hisknowledge,whichisthenecessarysupporterofthewholeworldasidea,isyetalwaysgiventhroughthemediumofabody,whoseaffectionsare,aswehaveshown,thestarting-pointfortheunderstandingintheperceptionofthatworld.Hisbodyis,forthepureknowingsubject,anidealikeeveryotheridea,anobjectamong

objects.Itsmovementsandactionsaresofarknowntohiminpreciselythesamewayasthechangesofallotherperceivedobjects,andwouldbejustasstrangeandincomprehensibletohimiftheirmeaningwerenotexplainedforhiminanentirelydifferentway ….Thebodyisgivenintwoentirelydifferentwaystothesubjectofknowledge,whobecomesanindividualonlythroughhisidentitywithit.Itisgivenasanideainintelligentperception,asanobjectamongobjectsandsubjecttothelawsofobjects.Anditisalsogiveninquiteadifferentwayasthatwhichisimmediatelyknowntoeveryone,andissignifiedbytheword‘will.’Everytrueactofhiswillisalsoatonceandwithoutexceptionamovementofhisbody.Theactofwillandthemovementofthebodyarenottwodifferentthingsobjectivelyknown,whichthebondofcausalityunites;theydonotstandintherelationofcauseandeffect;theyareoneandthesame,buttheyaregiveninentirelydifferentways—immediately,andagaininperceptionfortheunderstanding.”(TheWorldasWillandIdea,Book2,§18.)Schopenhauerconsidershimselfentitledbytheseargumentstoholdthatthewillbecomesobjectifiedinthehumanbody.Hebelievesthatintheactivitiesofthebodyhehasanimmediateexperienceofreality,ofthething-in-itselfintheconcrete.Againsttheseargumentswemusturgethattheactivitiesofourbodybecomeknowntousonlythroughself-observation,andthat,assuch,theyareinnowaysuperiortootherpercepts.Ifwewanttoknowtheirrealnature,wecandosoonlybymeansofthought,i.e.,byfittingthemintotheidealsystemofourconceptsandideas.

Oneofthemostdeeplyrootedprejudicesofthenaïvemindistheopinionthatthinkingisabstractandemptyofanyconcretecontent.Atbest,wearetold,itsuppliesbutan“ideal”counterpartoftheunityoftheworld,butneverthatunityitself.Whoeverholdsthisviewhasnevermadecleartohimselfwhataperceptapartfromconceptsreallyis.Letusseewhatthisworldofbareperceptsis.Amerejuxtapositioninspace,ameresuccessionintime,achaosofdisconnectedparticulars—thatiswhatitis.Noneofthesethingswhichcomeandgoonthestageofperceptionhasanyconnectionwithanyother.Theworldisamultiplicityofobjectswithoutdistinctionsofvalue.Noneplaysanygreaterpartinthenexusoftheworldthananyother.Inordertorealisethatthisorthatfacthasagreaterimportancethananotherwemustgotothought.Aslongaswedonotthink,therudimentaryorganofananimalwhichhasnosignificanceinitslife,appearsequalinvaluetoitsmoreimportantlimbs.Theparticularfactsrevealtheirmeaning,inthemselvesandintheirrelationswithotherpartsoftheworld,onlywhenthoughtspinsitsthreadsfromthingtothing.Thisactivityofthinkinghasalwaysacontent.ForitisonlythroughaperfectlydefiniteconcretecontentthatIcanknowwhythesnailbelongstoalowertypeoforganisationthanthelion.Themereappearance,thepercept,givesmenocontentwhichcouldinformmeastothedegreeofperfectionoftheorganisation.

Thoughtcontributesthiscontenttotheperceptfromtheworldofconceptsandideas.Incontrastwiththecontentofperceptionwhichisgiventousfromwithout,thecontentofthoughtappearswithinourminds.Theforminwhichthoughtfirstappearsinconsciousnesswewillcall“intuition.”Intuitionistothoughtswhatobservationistopercepts.Intuitionandobservationarethesourcesofourknowledge.Anexternalobjectwhichweobserveremainsunintelligibletous,untilthecorrespondingintuitionariseswithinuswhichaddstotherealitythosesidesofitwhicharelackinginthepercept.To

anyonewhoisincapableofsupplyingtherelevantintuitions,thefullnatureoftherealremainsasealedbook.Justasthecolour-blindpersonseesonlydifferencesofbrightnesswithoutanycolourqualities,sothemindwhichlacksintuitionseesonlydisconnectedfragmentsofpercepts.

Toexplainathing,tomakeitintelligible,meansnothingelsethantoplaceitinthecontextfromwhichithasbeentornbythepeculiarorganisationofourminds,describedabove.Nothingcanpossiblyexistcutofffromtheuniverse.Henceallisolationofobjectshasonlysubjectivevalidityformindsorganisedlikeours.Forustheuniverseissplitupintoaboveandbelow,beforeandafter,causeandeffect,objectandidea,matterandforce,objectandsubject,etc.Theobjectswhich,inobservation,appeartousasseparate,becomecombined,bitbybit,throughthecoherent,unifiedsystemofourintuitions.Bythoughtwefuseagainintoonewholeallthatperceptionhasseparated.

Anobjectpresentsriddlestoourunderstandingsolongasitexistsinisolation.Butthisisanabstractionofourownmakingandcanbeunmadeagainintheworldofconcepts.

Exceptthroughthoughtandperceptionnothingisgiventousdirectly.Thequestionnowarisesastotheinterpretationofperceptsonourtheory.WehavelearntthattheproofwhichCriticalIdealismoffersforthesubjectivenatureofperceptscollapses.Buttheexhibitionofthefalsityoftheproofisnot,byitself,sufficienttoshowthatthedoctrineitselfisanerror.CriticalIdealismdoesnotbaseitsproofontheabsolutenatureofthought,butreliesontheargumentthatNaïveRealism,whenfollowedtoitslogicalconclusion,contradictsitself.Howdoesthematterappearwhenwerecognisetheabsolutenessofthought?

Letusassumethatacertainpercept,e.g.,red,appearsinconsciousness.Tocontinuedobservation,theperceptshowsitselftobeconnectedwithotherpercepts,e.g.,acertainfigure,temperature,andtouch-qualities.ThiscomplexofperceptsIcallanobjectintheworldofsense.Icannowaskmyself:Overandabovetheperceptsjustmentioned,whatelseisthereinthesectionofspaceinwhichtheyare?Ishallthenfindmechanical,chemical,andotherprocessesinthatsectionofspace.Inextgofurtherandstudytheprocesseswhichtakeplacebetweentheobjectandmysense-organs.Ishallfindoscillationsinanelasticmedium,thecharacterofwhichhasnottheleastincommonwiththeperceptsfromwhichIstarted.IgetthesameresultifItracefurthertheconnectionbetweensense-organsandbrain.IneachoftheseinquiriesIgathernewpercepts,buttheconnectingthreadwhichbindsallthesespatiallyandtemporallyseparatedperceptsintoonewhole,isthought.Theairvibrationswhichcarrysoundaregiventomeasperceptsjustlikethesound.Thoughtalonelinksalltheseperceptsonetotheotherandexhibitsthemintheirreciprocalrelations.Wehavenorighttosaythatoverandaboveourimmediateperceptsthereisanythingexcepttheidealnexusofprecepts(whichthoughthastoreveal).Therelationoftheobjectperceivedtotheperceivingsubject,whichrelationtranscendsthebarepercept,isthereforepurelyideal,i.e.,capableofbeingexpressedonlythroughconcepts.Onlyifitwerepossibletoperceivehowtheobjectofperceptionaffectstheperceivingsubject,or,alternatively,onlyifIcouldwatchtheconstructionoftheperceptualcomplexthroughthesubject,couldwespeakasmodern

Physiology,andtheCriticalIdealismwhichisbasedonit,speak.Theirtheoryconfusesanidealrelation(thatoftheobjecttothesubject)withaprocessofwhichwecouldspeakonlyifitwerepossibletoperceiveit.Theproposition,“Nocolourwithoutacolour-sensingeye,”cannotbetakentomeanthattheeyeproducesthecolour,butonlythatanidealrelation,recognisablebythought,subsistsbetweenthepercept“colour”andthepercept“eye.”

Toempiricalsciencebelongsthetaskofascertaininghowthepropertiesoftheeyeandthoseofthecoloursarerelatedtooneanother;bymeansofwhatstructurestheorganofsightmakespossibletheperceptionofcolours,etc.Icantracehowoneperceptsucceedsanotherandhowoneisrelatedtoothersinspace,andIcanformulatetheserelationsinconceptualterms,butIcanneverperceivehowaperceptoriginatesoutofthenon-perceptible.Allattemptstoseekanyrelationsbetweenperceptsotherthanconceptualrelationsmustofnecessityfail.

Whatthenisapercept?Thisquestion,askedinthisgeneralway,isabsurd.Aperceptappearsalwaysasaperfectlydeterminate,concretecontent.Thiscontentisimmediatelygivenandiscompletelycontainedinthegiven.Theonlyquestiononecanaskconcerningthegivencontentis,whatitisapartfromperception,thatis,whatitisforthought.Thequestionconcerningthe“what”ofaperceptcan,therefore,onlyrefertotheconceptualintuitionwhichcorrespondstothepercept.Fromthispointofview,theproblemofthesubjectivityofpercepts,inthesenseinwhichtheCriticalIdealistsdebateit,cannotberaisedatall.Onlythatwhichisexperiencedasbelongingtothesubjectcanbetermed“subjective.”Toformalinkbetweensubjectandobjectisimpossibleforanyrealprocess,inthenaïvesenseoftheword“real,”inwhichitmeansaprocesswhichcanbeperceived.Thatispossibleonlyforthought.Forus,then,“objective”meansthatwhich,forperception,presentsitselfasexternaltotheperceivingsubject.AssubjectofperceptionIremainperceptibletomyselfafterthetablewhichnowstandsbeforemehasdisappearedfrommyfieldofobservation.Theperceptionofthetablehasproducedamodificationinmewhichpersistslikemyself.IpreserveanimageofthetablewhichnowformspartofmySelf.ModernPsychologytermsthisimagea“memory-idea.”Nowthisistheonlythingwhichhasanyrighttobecalledtheideaofthetable.Foritistheperceptiblemodificationofmyownmentalstatethroughthepresenceofthetableinmyvisualfield.Moreover,itdoesnotmeanamodificationinsome“Ego-in-itself”behindtheperceivingsubject,butthemodificationoftheperceivingsubjectitself.Theideais,therefore,asubjectivepercept,incontrastwiththeobjectiveperceptwhichoccurswhentheobjectispresentintheperceptualfield.ThefalseidentificationofthesubjectivewiththisobjectiveperceptleadstothemisunderstandingofIdealism:Theworldismyidea.

Ournexttaskmustbetodefinetheconceptof“idea”morenearly.Whatwehavesaidaboutitsofardoesnotgiveustheconcept,butonlyshowsuswhereintheperceptualfieldideasaretobefound.Theexactconceptof“idea”willalsomakeitpossibleforustoobtainasatisfactoryunderstandingoftherelationofideaandobject.Thiswillthenleadusovertheborder-line,wheretherelationofsubjecttoobjectisbroughtdownfromthepurelyconceptualfieldofknowledgeintoconcreteindividuallife.Onceweknowhowwearetoconceivetheworld,itwillbeaneasytasktoadaptourselvestoit.Onlywhenwe

knowtowhatobjectwearetodevoteouractivitycanweputourwholeenergyintoouractions.

TheviewwhichIhavehereoutlinedmayberegardedasonetowhichmanisledasitwerespontaneously,assoonashebeginstoreflectabouthisrelationtotheworld.Hethenfindshimselfcaughtinasystemofthoughtswhichdissolvesforhimasfastasheframesit.Thethoughtswhichformthissystemaresuchthatthepurelytheoreticalrefutationofthemdoesnotexhaustourtask.Wehavetolivethroughthem,inordertounderstandtheconfusionintowhichtheyleadus,andtofindthewayout.Theymustfigureinanydiscussionoftherelationofmantotheworld,notforthesakeofrefutingotherswhomonebelievestobeholdingmistakenviewsaboutthisrelation,butbecauseitisnecessarytounderstandtheconfusioninwhichallfirsteffortsatreflectionaboutsucharelationareapttoissue.Oneneedstolearnbyexperiencehowtorefuteoneselfwithrespecttothesefirstreflections.Thisisthepointofviewfromwhichtheargumentsoftheprecedingchapteraretobeunderstood.

Whoevertriestoworkoutforhimselfatheoryoftherelationofmantotheworld,becomesawareofthefactthathecreatesthisrelation,atleastinpart,byformingideasaboutthethingsandeventsintheworld.Inconsequence,hisattentionisdeflectedfromwhatexistsoutsideintheworldanddirectedtowardshisinnerworld,therealmofhisideas.Hebeginstosaytohimself,Itisimpossibleformetostandinrelationtoanythingorevent,unlessanideaappearsinme.Fromthisfact,oncenoticed,itisbutasteptothetheory:allthatIexperienceisonlymyideas;oftheexistenceofaworldoutsideIknowonlyinsofarasitisanideainme.Withthistheory,manabandonsthestandpointofNaïveRealismwhichheoccupiespriortoallreflectionabouthisrelationtotheworld.Solongashestandsthere,hebelievesthatheisdealingwithrealthings,butreflectionabouthimselfdriveshimawayfromthisposition.Reflectiondoesnotrevealtohisgazearealworldsuchasnaïveconsciousnessclaimstohavebeforeit.Reflectionrevealstohimonlyhisideas;theyinterposethemselvesbetweenhisownnatureandasupposedlyrealworld,suchasthenaïvepointofviewconfidentlyaffirms.Theinterpositionoftheworldofideaspreventsmanfromperceivinganylongersucharealworld.Hemustsupposethatheisblindtosuchareality.Thusarisestheconceptofa“thing-in-itself”whichisinaccessibletoknowledge.Solongasweconsideronlytherelationtotheworldintowhichmanappearstoenterthroughthestreamofhisideas,wecanhardlyavoidframingthistypeoftheory.YetwecannotremainatthepointofviewofNaïveRealismexceptatthepriceofclosingourmindsartificiallytothedesireforknowledge.Theexistenceofthisdesireforknowledgeabouttherelationofmantotheworldprovesthatthenaïvepointofviewmustbeabandoned.Ifthenaïvepointofviewyieldedanythingwhichwecouldacknowledgeastruth,wecouldnotexperiencethisdesire.Butmereabandonmentofthenaïvepointofviewdoesnotleadtoanyotherviewwhichwecouldregardastrue,solongasweretain,withoutnoticingit,thetypeoftheorywhichthenaïvepointofviewimposesonus.Thisisthemistakemadebythemanwhosays,Iexperienceonlymyideas,andthoughIthinkthatIamdealingwithrealthings,Iamactuallyconsciousofnothingbutmyideasofreal

things.Imust,therefore,supposethatgenuinerealities,“things-in-themselves,”existonlyoutsidetheboundaryofmyconsciousness;thattheyareinaccessibletomyimmediateknowledge;butthattheysomehowcomeintocontactwithmeandinfluencemesoastomakeaworldofideasariseinme.Whoeverthinksthus,duplicatesinthoughttheworldbeforehimbyaddinganother.But,strictlyheoughttobeginhiswholetheorisingoveragainwithregardtothissecondworld.Fortheunknown“thing-in-itself,”initsrelationtoman’sownnature,isconceivedinexactlythesamewayasistheknownthingofthenaïvelyrealisticpointofview.Thereisonlyonewayofescapingfromtheconfusionintowhichonefalls,bycriticalreflectiononthisnaïvepointofview.Thisistoobservethat,attheveryheartofeverythingwecanexperience,beitwithinthemindoroutsideintheworldofperception,thereissomethingwhichdoesnotsharethefateofanideainterposingitselfbetweentherealeventandthecontemplatingmind.Thissomethingisthinking.WithregardtothinkingwecanmaintainthepointofviewofNaïveRealism.Ifwemistakenlyabandonit,itisonlybecausewehavelearntthatwemustabandonitforothermentalactivities,butoverlookthatwhatwehavefoundtobetrueforotheractivities,doesnotapplytothinking.Whenwerealisethis,wegainaccesstothefurtherinsightthat,inthinkingandthroughthinking,mannecessarilycomestoknowtheverythingtowhichheappearstoblindhimselfbyinterposingbetweentheworldandhimselfthestreamofhisideas.Acritichighlyesteemedbytheauthorofthisbookhasobjectedthatthisdiscussionofthinkingstopsatanaïvelyrealistictheoryofthinking,asshownbythefactthattherealworldandtheworldofideasareheldtobeidentical.However,theauthorbelieveshimselftohaveshowninthisverydiscussionthatthevalidityof“NaïveRealism,”asappliedtothinking,resultsinevitablyfromanunprejudicedstudyofthinking;andthatNaïveRealism,insofarasitisinvalidforothermentalactivities,isovercomethroughtherecognitionofthetruenatureofthinking.

Knowledgeistranscendentalwhenitisawarethatnothingcanbeasserteddirectlyaboutthething-in-itselfbutmakesindirectinferencesfromthesubjectivewhichisknowntotheunknownwhichliesbeyondthesubjective(transcendental).Thething-in-itselfis,accordingtothisview,beyondthesphereoftheworldofimmediateexperience;inotherwords,itistranscendent.Ourworldcan,however,betranscendentallyrelatedtothetranscendent.Hartmann’stheoryiscalledRealismbecauseitproceedsfromthesubjective,themental,tothetranscendent,thereal.↑

HUMANINDIVIDUALITY

Philosophershavefoundthechiefdifficultyintheexplanationofideasinthefactthatwearenotidenticalwiththeexternalobjects,andyetourideasmusthaveaformcorrespondingtotheirobjects.Butoncloserinspectionitturnsoutthatthisdifficultydoesnotreallyexist.Wecertainlyarenotidenticalwiththeexternalthings,butwebelongtogetherwiththemtooneandthesameworld.Thestreamoftheuniversalcosmicprocesspassesthroughthatsegmentoftheworldwhich,tomyperception,ismyselfassubject.Sofarasmyperceptiongoes,Iam,inthefirstinstance,confinedwithinthelimitsboundedbymyskin.Butallthatiscontainedwithintheskinbelongstothecosmosasawhole.Hence,forarelationtosubsistbetweenmyorganismandanobjectexternaltome,itisbynomeansnecessarythatsomethingoftheobjectshouldslipintome,ormakeanimpressiononmymind,likeasignet-ringonwax.Thequestion,HowdoIgainknowledgeofthattreetenfeetawayfromme,isutterlymisleading.Itspringsfromtheviewthattheboundariesofmybodyareabsolutebarriers,throughwhichinformationaboutexternalthingsfiltersintome.Theforceswhichareactivewithinmybodyarethesameasthosewhichexistoutside.Iam,therefore,reallyidenticalwiththeobjects;not,however,IinsofarasIamsubjectofperception,butIinsofarasIamapartwithintheuniversalcosmicprocess.TheperceptofthetreebelongstothesamewholeasmySelf.Theuniversalcosmicprocessproducesalike,heretheperceptofthetree,andtheretheperceptofmySelf.WereIaworld-creatorinsteadofaworld-knower,subjectandobject(perceptandself)wouldoriginateinoneact.Fortheyconditiononeanotherreciprocally.Asworld-knowerIcandiscoverthecommonelementinboth,sofarastheyarecomplementaryaspectsoftheworld,onlythroughthoughtwhichbymeansofconceptsrelatestheonetotheother.

Themostdifficulttodrivefromthefieldaretheso-calledphysiologicalproofsofthesubjectivityofourpercepts.WhenIexertpressureontheskinofmybody,Iexperienceitasapressuresensation.Thissamepressurecanbesensedaslightbytheeye,assoundbytheear.Iexperienceanelectricalshockbytheeyeaslight,bytheearassound,bythenervesoftheskinastouch,andbythenoseasasmellofphosphorus.Whatfollowsfromthesefacts?Onlythis:Iexperienceanelectricalshock,or,asthecasemaybe,apressurefollowedbyalight,orasound,or,itmaybe,acertainsmell,etc.Iftherewerenoeyepresent,thennolightqualitywouldaccompanytheperceptionofthemechanicalvibrationsinmyenvironment;withoutthepresenceoftheear,nosound,etc.Butwhatrighthavewetosaythatintheabsenceofsense-organsthewholeprocesswouldnotexistatall?Allthosewho,fromthefactthatanelectricalprocesscausesasensationoflightintheeye,concludethatwhatwesenseaslightisonlyamechanicalprocessofmotion,forgetthattheyareonlyarguingfromonepercepttoanother,andnotatalltosomethingaltogethertranscendingpercepts.Justaswecansaythattheeyeperceivesamechanicalprocessofmotioninitssurroundingsaslight,sowecanaffirmthateverychangeinanobject,determinedbynaturallaw,isperceivedbyusasaprocessofmotion.IfIdrawtwelvepicturesofahorseonthecircumferenceofarotatingdisc,reproducingexactlythe

positionswhichthehorse’sbodysuccessivelyassumesinmovement,Ican,byrotatingthedisc,producetheillusionofmovement.Ineedonlylookthroughanopeninginsuchawaythat,atregularintervals,Iperceivethesuccessivepositionsofthehorse.Iperceive,notseparatepicturesoftwelvehorses,butonepictureofasinglegallopinghorse.

Theabove-mentionedphysiologicalfactscannot,therefore,throwanylightontherelationofpercepttoidea.Hence,wemustseekarelationsomeotherway.

Themomentaperceptappearsinmyfieldofconsciousness,thought,too,becomesactiveinme.Amemberofmythought-system,adefiniteintuition,aconcept,connectsitselfwiththepercept.When,next,theperceptdisappearsfrommyfieldofvision,whatremains?Theintuition,withthereferencetotheparticularperceptwhichitacquiredinthemomentofperception.ThedegreeofvividnesswithwhichIcansubsequentlyrecallthisreferencedependsonthemannerinwhichmymentalandbodilyorganismisworking.Anideaisnothingbutanintuitionrelatedtoaparticularpercept;itisaconceptwhichwasonceconnectedwithacertainpercept,andwhichretainsthisreferencetothepercept.Myconceptofalionisnotconstructedoutofmyperceptsofalion;butmyideaofalionisformedundertheguidanceofthepercepts.Icanteachsomeonetoformtheconceptofalionwithouthiseverhavingseenalion,butIcannevergivehimalivingideaofitwithoutthehelpofhisownperception.

Anideaisthereforenothingbutanindividualisedconcept.Andnowwecanseehowrealobjectscanberepresentedtousbyideas.Thefullrealityofathingispresenttousinthemomentofobservationthroughthecombinationofconceptandpercept.Theconceptacquiresbymeansoftheperceptanindividualisedform,arelationtothisparticularpercept.Inthisindividualisedformwhichcarrieswithit,asanessentialfeature,thereferencetothepercept,itcontinuestoexistinusandconstitutestheideaofthethinginquestion.Ifwecomeacrossasecondthingwithwhichthesameconceptconnectsitself,werecognisethesecondasbeingofthesamekindasthefirst;ifwecomeacrossthesamethingtwice,wefindinourconceptualsystem,notmerelyacorrespondingconcept,buttheindividualisedconceptwithitscharacteristicrelationtothissameobject,andthuswerecognisetheobjectagain.

Theidea,then,standsbetweentheperceptandtheconcept.Itisthedeterminateconceptwhichpointstothepercept.

Thesumofmyideasmaybecalledmyexperience.Themanwhohasthegreaternumberofindividualisedconceptswillbethemanofricherexperience.Amanwholacksallpowerofintuitionisnotcapableofacquiringexperience.Theobjectssimplydisappearagainfromthefieldofhisconsciousness,becausehelackstheconceptswhichheoughttobringintorelationwiththem.Ontheotherhand,amanwhosefacultyofthoughtiswelldeveloped,butwhoseperceptionfunctionsbadlyowingtohisclumsysense-organs,willbenobetterabletogainexperience.Hecan,itistrue,byonemeansandanotheracquireconcepts;butthelivingreferencetoparticularobjectsislackingtohisintuitions.Theunthinkingtravellerandthestudentabsorbedinabstractconceptualsystemsarealikeincapableofacquiringarichexperience.

Realitypresentsitselftousastheunionofperceptandconcept;andthesubjective

representationofthisrealitypresentsitselftousasidea.

Ifourpersonalityexpresseditselfonlyincognition,thetotalityofallthatisobjectivewouldbecontainedinpercept,conceptandidea.

However,wearenotsatisfiedmerelytoreferpercepts,bymeansofthinking,toconcepts,butwerelatethemalsotoourprivatesubjectivity,ourindividualEgo.Theexpressionofthisrelationtousasindividualsisfeeling,whichmanifestsitselfaspleasureandpain.

Thinkingandfeelingcorrespondtothetwo-foldnatureofourbeingtowhichreferencehasalreadybeenmade.Bymeansofthoughtwetakeanactivepartintheuniversalcosmicprocess.Bymeansoffeelingwewithdrawourselvesintothenarrowprecinctsofourownbeing.

Thoughtlinksustotheworld;feelingleadsusbackintoourselvesandthusmakesusindividuals.Werewemerelythinkingandperceivingbeings,ourwholelifewouldflowalonginmonotonousindifference.CouldweonlyknowourselvesasSelves,weshouldbetotallyindifferenttoourselves.Itisonlybecausewithself-knowledgeweexperienceself-feeling,andwiththeperceptionofobjectspleasureandpain,thatweliveasindividualswhoseexistenceisnotexhaustedbytheconceptualrelationsinwhichtheystandtotherestoftheworld,butwhohaveaspecialvalueinthemselves.

Onemightbetemptedtoregardthelifeoffeelingassomethingmorerichlysaturatedwithrealitythantheapprehensionoftheworldbythought.Butthereplytothisisthatthelifeoffeeling,afterall,hasthisrichermeaningonlyformyindividualself.Fortheuniverseasawholemyfeelingscanbeofvalueonlyif,asperceptsofmyself,theyenterintoconnectionwithaconceptandinthisroundaboutwaybecomelinksinthecosmos.

Ourlifeisacontinualoscillationbetweenourshareintheuniversalworld-processandourownindividualexistence.Thefartherweascendintotheuniversalnatureofthoughtwheretheindividual,atlast,interestsusonlyasanexample,aninstance,oftheconcept,themorethecharacterofsomethingindividual,ofthequitedeterminate,uniquepersonality,becomeslostinus.Thefartherwedescendintothedepthsofourownprivatelifeandallowthevibrationsofourfeelingstoaccompanyallourexperiencesoftheouterworld,themorewecutourselvesofffromtheuniversallife.Trueindividualitybelongstohimwhosefeelingsreachuptothefarthestpossibleextentintotheregionoftheideal.Therearemeninwhomeventhemostgeneralideasstillbearthatpeculiarpersonaltingewhichshowsunmistakablytheirconnectionwiththeirauthor.Thereareotherswhoseconceptscomebeforeusasdevoidofanytraceofindividualcolouringasiftheyhadnotbeenproducedbyabeingoffleshandbloodatall.

Evenideasgivetoourconceptuallifeanindividualstamp.Eachoneofushashisspecialstandpointfromwhichhelooksoutontheworld.Hisconceptslinkthemselvestohispercepts.Hehashisownspecialwayofforminggeneralconcepts.Thisspecialcharacterresultsforeachofusfromhisspecialstandpointintheworld,fromthewayinwhichtherangeofhisperceptsisdependentontheplaceinthewholewhereheexists.Theconditionsofindividualityhereindicated,wecallthemilieu.

Thisspecialcharacterofourexperiencemustbedistinguishedfromanotherwhich

dependsonourpeculiarorganisation.Eachofus,asweknow,isorganisedasaunique,fullydeterminedindividual.Eachofuscombinesspecialfeelings,andtheseinthemostvaryingdegreesofintensity,withhispercepts.Thisisjusttheindividualelementinthepersonalityofeachofus.Itiswhatremainsoverwhenwehaveallowedfullyforallthedeterminingfactorsinourmilieu.

Alifeoffeeling,whollydevoidofthought,wouldgraduallyloseallconnectionwiththeworld.Butmanismeanttobeawhole,andknowledgeofobjectswillgohand-in-handforhimwiththedevelopmentandeducationofthefeeling-sideofhisnature.

Feelingisthemeanswhereby,inthefirstinstance,conceptsgainconcretelife.

ARETHEREANYLIMITSTOKNOWLEDGE?

Wehaveestablishedthattheelementsfortheexplanationofrealityaretobetakenfromthetwospheresofperceptionandthought.Itisdue,aswehaveseen,toourorganisationthatthefulltotalityofreality,includingourownselvesassubjects,appearsatfirstasaduality.Knowledgetranscendsthisdualitybyfusingthetwoelementsofreality,theperceptandtheconcept,intothecompletething.Letuscallthemannerinwhichtheworldpresentsitselftous,beforebymeansofknowledgeithastakenonitstruenature,“theworldofappearance,”indistinctionfromtheunifiedwholecomposedofperceptandconcept.Wecanthensay,Theworldisgiventousasaduality(Dualism),andknowledgetransformsitintoaunity(Monism).AphilosophywhichstartsfromthisbasalprinciplemaybecalledaMonisticphilosophy,orMonism.Opposedtothisisthetheoryoftwoworlds,orDualism.Thelatterdoesnot,byanymeans,assumemerelythattherearetwosidesofasinglereality,whicharekeptapartbyourorganisation,butthattherearetwoworldstotallydistinctfromoneanother.Itthentriestofindinoneofthesetwoworldstheprincipleofexplanationfortheother.

Dualismrestsonafalseconceptionofwhatwecallknowledge.Itdividesthewholeofrealityintotwospheres,eachofwhichhasitsownlaws,anditleavesthesetwoworldsstandingoutsideoneanother.

ItisfromaDualismsuchasthisthattherearisesthedistinctionbetweentheobjectofperceptionandthething-in-itself,whichKantintroducedintophilosophy,andwhich,tothepresentday,wehavenotsucceededinexpelling.Accordingtoourinterpretation,itisduetothenatureofourorganisationthataparticularobjectcanbegiventousonlyasapercept.Thoughttranscendsthisparticularitybyassigningtoeachperceptitsproperplaceintheworldasawhole.Aslongaswedeterminetheseparatepartsofthecosmosaspercepts,wearesimplyfollowing,inthissortingout,alawofoursubjectiveconstitution.If,however,weregardallpercepts,takentogether,merelyasonepart,andcontrastwiththisasecondpart,viz.,thethings-in-themselves,thenourphilosophyisbuildingcastles-in-the-air.Wearethenengagedinmereplayingwithconcepts.Weconstructanartificialopposition,butwecanfindnocontentforthesecondoftheseopposites,seeingthatnocontentforaparticularthingcanbefoundexceptinperception.

Everykindofrealitywhichisassumedtoexistoutsidethesphereofperceptionandconceptionmustberelegatedtothelimboofunverifiedhypotheses.Tothiscategorybelongsthe“thing-in-itself.”Itis,ofcourse,quitenaturalthataDualisticthinkershouldbeunabletofindtheconnectionbetweentheworld-principlewhichhehypotheticallyassumesandthefactsthataregiveninexperience.Forthehypotheticalworld-principleitselfacontentcanbefoundonlybyborrowingitfromexperienceandshuttingone’seyestothefactoftheborrowing.Otherwiseitremainsanemptyandmeaninglessconcept,amereformwithoutcontent.InthiscasetheDualisticthinkergenerallyassertsthatthecontentofthisconceptisinaccessibletoourknowledge.Wecanknowonlythatsuchacontentexists,butnotwhatitis.IneithercaseitisimpossibletotranscendDualism.Even

thoughoneweretoimportafewabstractelementsfromtheworldofexperienceintothecontentofthething-in-itself,itwouldstillremainimpossibletoreducetherichconcretelifeofexperiencetothosefewelements,whichare,afterall,themselvestakenfromexperience.DuBois-Reymondlaysitdownthattheimperceptibleatomsofmatterproducesensationandfeelingbymeansoftheirpositionandmotion,andtheninfersfromthispremisethatwecanneverfindasatisfactoryexplanationofhowmatterandmotionproducesensationandfeeling,for“itisabsolutelyandforeverunintelligiblethatitshouldbeotherthanindifferenttoanumberofatomsofcarbon,hydrogen,andnitrogen,etc.,howtheylieandmove,howtheylayormoved,orhowtheywilllieandwillmove.Itisinnowayintelligiblehowconsciousnesscancomeintoexistencethroughtheirinteraction.”Thisconclusionischaracteristicofthewholetendencyofthisschoolofthought.Positionandmotionareabstractedfromtherichworldofpercepts.Theyarethentransferredtothefictitiousworldofatoms.Andthenweareastonishedthatwefailtoevolveconcretelifeoutofthisprincipleofourownmaking,whichwehaveborrowedfromtheworldofpercepts.

ThattheDualist,workingashedoeswithacompletelyemptyconceptofthething-in-itself,canreachnoexplanationoftheworld,followsfromtheverydefinitionofhisprinciplewhichhasbeengivenabove.

Inanycase,theDualistfindsitnecessarytosetimpassablebarrierstoourfacultyofknowledge.AfolloweroftheMonistictheoryoftheworldknowsthatallheneedstoexplainanygivenphenomenonintheworldistobefoundwithinthisworlditself.Whatpreventshimfromfindingitcanbeonlychancelimitationsinspaceandtime,ordefectsofhisorganisation,i.e.,notofhumanorganisationingeneral,butonlyofhisown.

Itfollowsfromtheconceptofknowledge,asdefinedbyus,thattherecanbenotalkofanylimitsofknowledge.Knowledgeisnotaconcernoftheuniverseingeneral,butonewhichmenmustsettleforthemselves.Externalthingsdemandnoexplanation.Theyexistandactononeanotheraccordingtolawswhichthoughtcandiscover.Theyexistinindivisibleunitywiththeselaws.Butwe,inourself-hood,confrontthem,graspingatfirstonlywhatwehavecalledpercepts.However,withinourselveswefindthepowertodiscoveralsotheotherpartofreality.OnlywhentheSelfhascombinedforitselfthetwoelementsofrealitywhichareindivisiblyboundupwithoneanotherintheworld,isourthirstforknowledgestilled.TheSelfisthenagainincontactwithreality.

ThepresuppositionsforthedevelopmentofknowledgethusexistthroughandfortheSelf.ItistheSelfwhichsetsitselftheproblemsofknowledge.Ittakesthemfromthought,anelementwhichinitselfisabsolutelyclearandtransparent.Ifwesetourselvesquestionswhichwecannotanswer,itmustbebecausethecontentofthequestionsisnotinallrespectsclearanddistinct.Itisnottheworldwhichsetsquestionstous,butwewhosetthemtoourselves.

IcanimaginethatitwouldbequiteimpossibleformetoansweraquestionwhichIhappenedtofindwrittendownsomewhere,withoutknowingtheuniverseofdiscoursefromwhichthecontentofthequestionistaken.

Inknowledgeweareconcernedwithquestionswhichariseforusthroughthefactthata

worldofpercepts,conditionedbytime,space,andoursubjectiveorganisation,standsoveragainstaworldofconceptsexpressingthetotalityoftheuniverse.Ourtaskconsistsintheassimilationtooneanotherofthesetwospheres,withbothofwhichwearefamiliar.Thereisnoroomherefortalkingaboutlimitsofknowledge.Itmaybethat,ataparticularmoment,thisorthatremainsunexplainedbecause,throughchanceobstacles,wearepreventedfromperceivingthethingsinvolved.Whatisnotfoundto-day,however,mayeasilybefoundto-morrow.Thelimitsduetothesecausesareonlycontingent,andmustbeovercomebytheprogressofperceptionandthought.

Dualismmakesthemistakeoftransferringtheoppositionofsubjectandobject,whichhasmeaningonlywithintheperceptualworld,topureconceptualentitiesoutsidethisworld.Nowthedistinctandseparatethingsintheperceptualworldremainseparatedonlysolongastheperceiverrefrainsfromthinking.Forthoughtcancelsallseparationandrevealsitasduetopurelysubjectiveconditions.TheDualist,therefore,transferstoentitiestranscendingtheperceptualworldabstractdeterminationswhich,evenintheperceptualworld,havenoabsolute,butonlyrelative,validity.Hethusdividesthetwofactorsconcernedintheprocessofknowledge,viz.,perceptandconcept,intofour:(1)theobjectinitself;(2)theperceptwhichthesubjecthasoftheobject;(3)thesubject;(4)theconceptwhichrelatesthepercepttotheobjectinitself.Therelationbetweensubjectandobjectis“real”;thesubjectisreally(dynamically)influencedbytheobject.Thisrealprocessdoesnotappearinconsciousness.Butitevokesinthesubjectaresponsetothestimulationfromtheobject.Theresultofthisresponseisthepercept.This,atlength,appearsinconsciousness.Theobjecthasanobjective(independentofthesubject)reality,theperceptasubjectivereality.Thissubjectiverealityisreferredbythesubjecttotheobject.Thisreferenceisanidealone.Dualismthusdividestheprocessofknowledgeintotwoparts.Theonepart,viz.,theproductionoftheperceptualobjectbythething-in-itself,heconceivesofastakingplaceoutsideconsciousness,whereastheother,thecombinationofperceptwithconceptandthelatter’sreferencetothething-in-itself,takesplace,accordingtohim,inconsciousness.

Withsuchpresuppositions,itisclearwhytheDualistregardshisconceptsmerelyassubjectiverepresentationsofwhatisreallyexternaltohisconsciousness.Theobjectivelyrealprocessinthesubjectbymeansofwhichtheperceptisproduced,andstillmoretheobjectiverelationsbetweenthings-in-themselves,remainfortheDualistinaccessibletodirectknowledge.Accordingtohim,mancangetonlyconceptualrepresentationsoftheobjectivelyreal.Thebondofunitywhichconnectsthings-in-themselveswithoneanother,andalsoobjectivelywiththeindividualminds(asthings-in-themselves)ofeachofus,existsbeyondourconsciousnessinaDivineBeingofwhom,oncemore,wehavemerelyaconceptualrepresentation.

TheDualistbelievesthatthewholeworldwouldbedissolvedintoamereabstractschemeofconcepts,didhenotposittheexistenceofrealconnectionsbesidetheconceptualones.Inotherwords,theidealprincipleswhichthinkingdiscoversaretooairyfortheDualist,andheseeks,inaddition,realprincipleswithwhichtosupportthem.

Letusexaminetheserealprinciplesalittlemoreclosely.Thenaïveman(NaïveRealist)

regardstheobjectsofsense-experienceasrealities.Thefactthathishandscangrasp,andhiseyessee,theseobjectsisforhimsufficientguaranteeoftheirreality.“Nothingexiststhatcannotbeperceived”is,infact,thefirstaxiomofthenaïveman;anditisheldtobeequallyvalidinitsconverse:“Everythingwhichisperceivedexists.”Thebestproofforthisassertionisthenaïveman’sbeliefinimmortalityandinghosts.Hethinksofthesoulasafinekindofmatterperceptiblebythesenseswhich,inspecialcircumstances,mayactuallybecomevisibletotheordinaryman(beliefinghosts).

Incontrastwiththis,hisreal,world,theNaïveRealistregardseverythingelse,especiallytheworldofideas,asunreal,or“merelyideal.”Whatweaddtoobjectsbythinkingismerelythoughtsabouttheobjects.Thoughtaddsnothingrealtothepercept.

Butitisnotonlywithreferencetotheexistenceofthingsthatthenaïvemanregardsperceptionasthesoleguaranteeofreality,butalsowithreferencetotheexistenceofprocesses.Athing,accordingtohim,canactonanotheronlywhenaforceactuallypresenttoperceptionissuesfromtheoneandactsupontheother.Theolderphysiciststhoughtthatveryfinekindsofsubstancesemanatefromtheobjectsandpenetratethroughthesense-organsintothesoul.Theactualperceptionofthesesubstancesisimpossibleonlybecauseofthecoarsenessofoursense-organsrelativelytothefinenessofthesesubstances.Inprinciple,thereasonforattributingrealitytothesesubstanceswasthesameasthatforattributingittotheobjectsofthesensibleworld,viz.,theirkindofexistence,whichwasconceivedtobeanalogoustothatofperceptualreality.

Theself-containedbeingofideasisnotthoughtofbythenaïvemindasrealinthesamesense.Anobjectconceived“merelyinidea”isregardedasachimerauntilsense-perceptioncanfurnishproofofitsreality.Inshort,thenaïvemandemands,inadditiontotheidealevidenceofhisthinking,therealevidenceofhissenses.Inthisneedofthenaïvemanliesthegroundfortheoriginofthebeliefinrevelation.TheGodwhomweapprehendbythoughtremainsalwaysmerelyourideaofGod.ThenaïveconsciousnessdemandsthatGodshouldmanifestHimselfinwaysaccessibletothesenses.Godmustappearintheflesh,andmustattesthisGodheadtooursensesbythechangingofwaterintowine.

Evenknowledgeitselfisconceivedbythenaïvemindasaprocessanalogoustosense-perception.Things,itisthought,makeanimpressiononthemind,orsendoutcopiesofthemselveswhichenterthroughoursenses,etc.

Whatthenaïvemancanperceivewithhissensesheregardsasreal,andwhathecannotperceive(God,soul,knowledge,etc.)heregardsasanalogoustowhathecanperceive.

OnthebasisofNaïveRealism,sciencecanconsistonlyinanexactdescriptionofthecontentofperception.Conceptsareonlymeanstothisend.Theyexisttoprovideidealcounterpartsofpercepts.Withthethingsthemselvestheyhavenothingtodo.FortheNaïveRealistonlytheindividualtulips,whichwecansee,arereal.Theuniversalideaoftulipistohimanabstraction,theunrealthought-picturewhichthemindconstructsforitselfoutofthecharacteristicscommontoalltulips.

NaïveRealism,withitsfundamentalprincipleoftherealityofallpercepts,contradicts

experience,whichteachesusthatthecontentofperceptsisofatransitorynature.ThetulipIseeisrealto-day;inayearitwillhavevanishedintonothingness.Whatpersistsisthespecies“tulip.”Thisspeciesis,however,fortheNaïveRealistmerelyanidea,notareality.Thusthistheoryoftheworldfindsitselfintheparadoxicalpositionofseeingitsrealitiesariseandperish,whilethatwhich,bycontrastwithitsrealities,itregardsasunrealendures.HenceNaïveRealismiscompelledtoacknowledgetheexistenceofsomethingidealbythesideofpercepts.Itmustincludewithinitselfentitieswhichcannotbeperceivedbythesenses.Inadmittingthem,itescapescontradictingitselfbyconceivingtheirexistenceasanalogoustothatofobjectsofsense.Suchhypotheticalrealitiesaretheinvisibleforcesbymeansofwhichtheobjectsofsense-perceptionactononeanother.Anothersuchrealityisheredity,theeffectsofwhichsurvivetheindividual,andwhichisthereasonwhyfromtheindividualanewbeingdevelopswhichissimilartoit,andbymeansofwhichthespeciesismaintained.Thesoul,thelife-principlepermeatingtheorganicbody,isanothersuchrealitywhichthenaïvemindisalwaysfoundconceivinginanalogytorealitiesofsense-perception.And,lastly,theDivineBeing,asconceivedbythenaïvemind,issuchahypotheticalentity.TheDeityisthoughtofasactinginamannerexactlycorrespondingtothatwhichwecanperceiveinmanhimself,i.e.,theDeityisconceivedanthropomorphically.

ModernPhysicstracessensationsbacktothemovementsofthesmallestparticlesofbodiesandofaninfinitelyfinesubstance,calledether.Whatweexperience,e.g.,aswarmthisamovementofthepartsofabodywhichcausesthewarmthinthespaceoccupiedbythatbody.Hereagainsomethingimperceptibleisconceivedontheanalogyofwhatisperceptible.Thus,intermsofperception,theanalogontotheconcept“body”is,say,theinteriorofaroom,shutinonallsides,inwhichelasticballsaremovinginalldirections,impingingoneonanother,bouncingonandoffthewalls,etc.

WithoutsuchassumptionstheworldoftheNaïveRealistwouldcollapseintoadisconnectedchaosofpercepts,withoutmutualrelations,andhavingnounitywithinitself.Itisclear,however,thatNaïveRealismcanmaketheseassumptionsonlybycontradictingitself.Ifitwouldremaintruetoitsfundamentalprinciple,thatonlywhatisperceivedisreal,thenitoughtnottoassumearealitywhereitperceivesnothing.Theimperceptibleforcesofwhichperceptiblethingsarethebearersare,infact,illegitimatehypothesesfromthestandpointofNaïveRealism.ButbecauseNaïveRealismknowsnootherrealities,itinvestsitshypotheticalforceswithperceptualcontent.Itthustransfersaformofexistence(theexistenceofpercepts)toaspherewheretheonlymeansofmakinganyassertionconcerningsuchexistence,viz.,sense-perception,islacking.

Thisself-contradictorytheoryleadstoMetaphysicalRealism.Thelatterconstructs,besidetheperceptiblereality,animperceptibleonewhichitconceivesontheanalogyoftheformer.MetaphysicalRealismis,therefore,ofnecessityDualistic.

WherevertheMetaphysicalRealistobservesarelationbetweenperceptiblethings(mutualapproachthroughmovement,theentranceofanobjectintoconsciousness,etc.),therehepositsareality.However,therelationofwhichhebecomesawarecannotbeperceivedbutonlyexpressedbymeansofthought.Theidealrelationisthereuponarbitrarilyassimilated

tosomethingperceptible.Thus,accordingtothistheory,theworldiscomposedoftheobjectsofperceptionwhichareinceaselessflux,arisinganddisappearing,andofimperceptibleforcesbywhichtheperceptibleobjectsareproduced,andwhicharepermanent.

MetaphysicalRealismisaself-contradictorymixtureofNaïveRealismandIdealism.Itsforcesareimperceptibleentitiesendowedwiththequalitiespropertopercepts.TheMetaphysicalRealisthasmadeuphismindtoacknowledgeinadditiontothespherefortheexistenceofwhichhehasaninstrumentofknowledgeinsense-perception,theexistenceofanothersphereforwhichthisinstrumentfails,andwhichcanbeknownonlybymeansofthought.Buthecannotmakeuphismindatthesametimetoacknowledgethatthemodeofexistencewhichthoughtreveals,viz.,theconcept(oridea),hasequalrightswithpercepts.Ifwearetoavoidthecontradictionofimperceptiblepercepts,wemustadmitthat,forus,therelationswhichthoughttracesbetweenperceptscanhavenoothermodeofexistencethanthatofconcepts.IfonerejectstheuntenablepartofMetaphysicalRealism,thereremainstheconceptoftheworldastheaggregateofperceptsandtheirconceptual(ideal)relations.MetaphysicalRealism,then,mergesitselfinaviewoftheworldaccordingtowhichtheprincipleofperceptibilityholdsforpercepts,andthatofconceivabilityfortherelationsbetweenthepercepts.Thisviewoftheworldhasnoroom,inadditiontotheperceptualandconceptualworlds,forathirdsphereinwhichbothprinciples,theso-called“real”principleandthe“ideal”principle,aresimultaneouslyvalid.

WhentheMetaphysicalRealistassertsthat,besidetheidealrelationbetweentheperceivedobjectandtheperceivingsubject,theremustbearealrelationbetweentheperceptas“thing-in-itself”andthesubjectas“thing-in-itself”(theso-calledindividualmind),heisbasinghisassertiononthefalseassumptionofarealprocess,imperceptiblebutanalogoustotheprocessesintheworldofpercepts.Further,whentheMetaphysicalRealistassertsthatwestandinaconsciousidealrelationtoourworldofpercepts,butthattotherealworldwecanhaveonlyadynamic(force)relation,herepeatsthemistakewehavealreadycriticised.Wecantalkofadynamicrelationonlywithintheworldofpercepts(inthesphereofthesenseoftouch),butnotoutsidethatworld.

Letuscalltheviewwhichwehavejustcharacterised,andintowhichMetaphysicalRealismmergeswhenitdiscardsitscontradictoryelements,Monism,becauseitcombinesone-sidedRealismandIdealismintoahigherunity.

ForNaïveRealism,therealworldisanaggregateofpercepts;forMetaphysicalRealism,realitybelongsnotonlytoperceptsbutalsotoimperceptibleforces;Monismreplacesforcesbyidealrelationswhicharesuppliedbythought.Theserelationsarethelawsofnature.Alawofnatureisnothingbuttheconceptualexpressionfortheconnectionofcertainpercepts.

Monismisnevercalledupontoaskwhetherthereareanyprinciplesofexplanationforrealityotherthanperceptsandconcepts.TheMonistknowsthatinthewholerealmoftherealthereisnooccasionforthisquestion.Intheperceptualworld,asimmediatelyapprehended,heseesone-halfofreality;intheunionofthisworldwiththeworldof

conceptshefindsfullreality.TheMetaphysicalRealistmightobjectthat,relativelytoourorganisation,ourknowledgemaybecompleteinitself,thatnopartmaybelacking,butthatwedonotknowhowtheworldappearstoamindorganiseddifferentlyfromourown.TothistheMonistwillreply,Maybethereareintelligencesotherthanhuman;andmaybealsothattheirperceptsaredifferentfromours,iftheyhaveperceptionatall.Butthisisirrelevanttomeforthefollowingreasons.Throughmyperceptions,i.e.,throughthisspecificallyhumanmodeofperception,I,assubject,amconfrontedwiththeobject.Thenexusofthingsistherebybroken.Thesubjectreconstructsthenexusbymeansofthought.Indoingsoitre-insertsitselfintothecontextoftheworldasawhole.AsitisonlythroughtheSelf,assubject,thatthewholeappearsrentintwobetweenperceptandconcept,thereunionofthosetwofactorswillgiveuscompleteknowledge.Forbeingswithadifferentperceptualworld(e.g.,iftheyhadtwiceournumberofsense-organs)thenexuswouldappearbrokeninanotherplace,andthereconstructionwouldaccordinglyhavetotakeaformspecificallyadaptedtosuchbeings.ThequestionconcerningthelimitsofknowledgetroublesonlyNaïveandMetaphysicalRealism,bothofwhichseeinthecontentsofmindonlyidealrepresentationsoftherealworld.For,tothesetheories,whateverfallsoutsidethesubjectissomethingabsolute,aself-containedwhole,andthesubject’smentalcontentisacopywhichiswhollyexternaltothisabsolute.Thecompletenessofknowledgedependsonthegreaterorlesserdegreeofresemblancebetweentherepresentationandtheabsoluteobject.Abeingwithfewersensesthanmanwillperceivelessoftheworld,onewithmoresenseswillperceivemore.Theformer’sknowledgewill,therefore,belesscompletethanthelatter’s.

ForMonism,thesituationisdifferent.Thepointwheretheunityoftheworldappearstoberentasunderintosubjectandobjectdependsontheorganisationofthepercipient.Theobjectisnotabsolutebutmerelyrelativetothenatureofthesubject.Thebridgingofthegap,therefore,cantakeplaceonlyinthequitespecificwaywhichischaracteristicofthehumansubject.AssoonastheSelf,whichinperceptionissetoveragainsttheworld,isagainre-insertedintotheworld-nexusbyconstructivethought,allfurtherquestioningceases,havingbeenbutaresultoftheseparation.

Adifferentlyconstitutedbeingwouldhaveadifferentlyconstitutedknowledge.Ourownknowledgesufficestoanswerthequestionswhichresultfromourownmentalconstitution.

MetaphysicalRealismmustask,Whatisitthatgivesusourpercepts?Whatisitthatstimulatesthesubject?

Monismholdsthatperceptsaredeterminedbythesubject.Butinthoughtthesubjecthas,atthesametime,theinstrumentfortranscendingthisdeterminationofwhichitisitselftheauthor.

TheMetaphysicalRealistisfacedbyafurtherdifficultywhenheseekstoexplainthesimilarityoftheworld-viewsofdifferenthumanindividuals.Hehastoaskhimself,Howisitthatmytheoryoftheworld,builtupoutofsubjectivelydeterminedperceptsandoutofconcepts,turnsouttobethesameasthatwhichanotherindividualisalsobuildingupoutofthesesametwosubjectivefactors?How,inanycase,isitpossibleformetoargue

frommyownsubjectiveviewoftheworldtothatofanotherhumanbeing?TheMetaphysicalRealistthinkshecaninferthesimilarityofthesubjectiveworld-viewsofdifferenthumanbeingsfromtheirabilitytogetonwithoneanotherinpracticallife.Fromthissimilarityofworld-viewsheinfersfurtherthelikenesstooneanotherofindividualminds,meaningby“individualmind”the“I-in-itself”underlyingeachsubject.

Wehavehereaninferencefromanumberofeffectstothecharacteroftheunderlyingcauses.Webelievethatafterwehaveobservedasufficientlylargenumberofinstances,weknowtheconnectionsufficientlytoknowhowtheinferredcauseswillactinotherinstances.Suchaninferenceiscalledaninductiveinference.Weshallbeobligedtomodifyitsresults,iffurtherobservationyieldssomeunexpectedfact,becausethecharacterofourconclusionis,afterall,determinedonlybytheparticulardetailsofouractualobservations.TheMetaphysicalRealistassertsthatthisknowledgeofcauses,thoughrestrictedbytheseconditions,isquitesufficientforpracticallife.

InductiveinferenceisthefundamentalmethodofmodernMetaphysicalRealism.Atonetimeitwasthoughtthatoutofconceptswecouldevolvesomethingthatwouldnolongerbeaconcept.Itwasthoughtthatthemetaphysicalreals,whichMetaphysicalRealismafterallrequires,couldbeknownbymeansofconcepts.Thismethodofphilosophisingisnowoutofdate.Insteaditisthoughtthatfromasufficientlylargenumberofperceptualfactswecaninferthecharacterofthething-in-itselfwhichliesbehindthesefacts.Formerlyitwasfromconcepts,nowitisfrompercepts,thattheRealistseekstoevolvethemetaphysicallyreal.Becauseconceptsarebeforethemindintransparentclearness,itwasthoughtthatwemightdeducefromthemthemetaphysicallyrealwithabsolutecertainty.Perceptsarenotgivenwiththesametransparentclearness.Eachfreshoneisalittledifferentfromothersofthesamekindwhichprecededit.Inprinciple,therefore,anythinginferredfrompastexperienceissomewhatmodifiedbyeachsubsequentexperience.Thecharacterofthemetaphysicallyrealthusobtainedcanthereforebeonlyrelativelytrue,foritisopentocorrectionbyfurtherinstances.ThecharacterofVonHartmann’sMetaphysicsdependsonthismethodologicalprinciple.Themottoonthetitle-pageofhisfirstimportantbookis,“SpeculativeresultsgainedbytheinductivemethodofScience.”

TheformwhichtheMetaphysicalRealistatthepresentdaygivestohisthings-in-themselvesisobtainedbyinductiveinferences.Considerationoftheprocessofknowledgehasconvincedhimoftheexistenceofanobjectively-realworld-nexus,overandabovethesubjectiveworldwhichweknowbymeansofperceptsandconcepts.Thenatureofthisrealityhethinkshecandeterminebyinductiveinferencesfromhispercepts.

Theunprejudicedstudyofexperience,inperceivingandconceiving,suchaswehaveattemptedtodescribeitintheprecedingchapters,isliabletobeinterferedwithagainandagainbycertainideaswhichspringfromthesoilofnaturalscience.Thus,takingourstandonscience,wesaythattheeyeperceivesinthespectrumcoloursfromredtoviolet.Butbeyondviolettherelierayswithinthecompassofthespectrumtowhichcorresponds,notacolourperceivedbytheeye,butachemicaleffect.Similarly,beyondtherayswhich

makeusperceivered,therearerayswhichhaveonlyheateffects.Theseandsimilarphenomenalead,onreflection,totheviewthattherangeofman’sperceptualworldisdefinedbytherangeofhissenses,andthathewouldperceiveaverydifferentworldifhehadadditional,oraltogetherdifferent,senses.Thosewholiketoindulgeinfar-roamingfanciesinthisdirection,forwhichthebrilliantdiscoveriesofrecentscientificresearchprovideahighlytemptingoccasion,maywellbeledtoconfessthatnothingentersthefieldofman’sobservationexceptwhatcanaffecthissenses,asthesehavebeendeterminedbyhiswholeorganisation.Manhasnorighttoregardhispercepts,limitedasthesearebyhisorganisation,asinanywayastandardtowhichrealitymustconform.Everynewsensewouldconfronthimwithadifferentpictureofreality.Withinitsproperlimits,thisisawhollyjustifiedview.Butifanyoneletshimselfbeconfusedbythisviewintheunprejudicedstudyoftherelationofperceptandconcept,assetforthinthesechapters,heblocksthepathforhimselftoaknowledgeofmanandtheworldwhichisrootedinreality.Theexperienceoftheessentialnatureofthought,i.e.,theactiveconstructionoftheworldofconcepts,issomethingwhollydifferentfromtheexperienceofaperceptibleobjectthroughthesenses.Whateveradditionalsensesmanmighthave,notonewouldgivehimreality,ifhisthinkingdidnotorganisewithitsconceptswhateverheperceivedbymeansofsuchasense.Everysense,whateveritskind,providedonlyitisorganisedbythought,enablesmantoliverightinthereal.Thefancy-pictureofotherperceptualworlds,madepossiblebyothersenses,hasnothingtodowiththeproblemofhowitisthatmanstandsinthemidstofreality.Wemustclearlyunderstandthateveryperceptualpictureoftheworldowesitsformtothephysicalorganisationofthepercipient,butthatonlytheperceptswhichhavebeenorganisedbythelivinglabourofthoughtleadusintoreality.Fancifulspeculationsconcerningthewaytheworldwouldappeartootherthanhumansouls,cangiveusnooccasiontowanttounderstandman’srelationtotheworld.Suchadesirecomesonlywiththerecognitionthateveryperceptpresentsonlyapartoftherealityitcontains,andthat,consequently,itleadsusawayfromitsownproperreality.Thisrecognitionissupplementedbythefurtheronethatthinkingleadsusintothepartofrealitywhichtheperceptconcealsinitself.Anotherdifficultyinthewayoftheunprejudicedstudyoftherelationwehaveheredescribed,betweenperceptandconceptaselaboratedbythought,maybemetwithoccasionally,wheninthefieldofphysicsthenecessityarisesofspeaking,notofimmediatelyperceptibleelements,butofnon-perceptiblemagnitudes,suchas,e.g.,linesofelectricormagneticforce.Itmayseemasiftheelementsofrealityofwhichphysicistsspeak,hadnoconnectioneitherwithwhatisperceptible,orwiththeconceptswhichactivethinkinghaselaborated.Yetsuchaviewwoulddependonself-deception.Themainpointisthatalltheresultsofphysicalresearch,exceptillegitimatehypotheseswhichoughttobeexcluded,havebeengainedthroughperceivingandconceiving.Entitieswhichareseeminglynon-perceptible,arereferredbythephysicists’soundinstinctforknowledgetothefieldinwhichactualperceptslie,andtheyaredealtwithinthoughtbymeansoftheconceptswhicharecommonlyappliedinthisfield.Themagnitudesinafieldofelectricormagneticforcearereached,intheiressence,bynoothercognitiveprocessthantheonewhichconnectsperceptandconcept.—Anincreaseoramodificationofhumansenseswouldyieldadifferentperceptualpicture,anenrichmentoramodificationofhumanexperience.Butgenuineknowledge

couldbegainedoutofthisnewexperienceonlythroughthemutualco-operationofconceptandpercept.Thedeepeningofknowledgedependsonthepowersofintuitionwhichexpressthemselvesinthinking(seepage90).Intuitionmay,inthoseexperiencesinwhichthinkingexpressesitself,diveeitherintodeeperorshallowerlevelsofreality.Anexpansionoftheperceptualpicturemaysupplystimulifor,andthusindirectlypromote,thisdivingofintuition.Butthisdivingintothedepth,throughwhichweattainreality,oughtnevertobeconfusedwiththecontrastbetweenawiderandanarrowerperceptualpicture,whichalwayscontainsonlyhalfofreality,asthatisconditionedbythestructureoftheknower’sorganism.Thosewhodonotlosethemselvesinabstractionswillunderstandhowforaknowledgeofhumannaturethefactisrelevant,thatphysicsmustinfertheexistence,inthefieldofpercepts,ofelementstowhichnosenseisadaptedasitistocolourorsound.Humannature,takenconcretely,isdeterminednotonlybywhat,invirtueofhisphysicalorganisation,manopposestohimselfasimmediatepercept,butalsobyallelsewhichheexcludesfromthisimmediatepercept.Justaslifeneedsunconscioussleepalongsideofconsciouswakingexperience,soman’sexperienceofhimselfneedsoverandabovethesphereofhissense-perceptionanothersphere—andamuchbiggerone—ofnon-perceptibleelementsbelongingtothesamefieldfromwhichtheperceptsofthesensescome.Implicitlyallthiswasalreadylaiddownintheoriginalargumentofthisbook.Theauthoraddsthepresentamplificationoftheargument,becausehehasfoundbyexperiencethatsomereadershavenotreadattentivelyenough.Itistoberemembered,too,thattheideaofperception,developedinthisbook,isnottobeconfusedwiththeideaofexternalsense-perceptionwhichisbutaspecialcaseoftheformer.Thereaderwillgatherfromwhathaspreceded,butevenmorefromwhatwillbeexpoundedlater,thateverythingisheretakenas“percept”whichsensuouslyorspirituallyentersintoman’sexperience,solongasithasnotyetbeenseizeduponbytheactivelyconstructedconcept.No“senses,”asweordinarilyunderstandtheterm,arenecessaryinordertohaveperceptsofapsychicalorspiritualkind.Itmaybeurgedthatthisextensionofordinaryusageisillegitimate.Buttheextensionisabsolutelyindispensable,unlesswearetobepreventedbythecurrentsenseofawordfromenlargingourknowledgeofcertainrealmsoffacts.Ifweuse“percept”onlyasmeaning“sense-percept,”weshallneveradvancebeyondsense-perceptstoaconceptfitforthepurposesofknowledge.Itissometimesnecessarytoenlargeaconceptinorderthatitmaygetitsappropriatemeaningwithinanarrowerfield.Again,itisattimesnecessarytoaddtotheoriginalcontentofaconcept,inorderthattheoriginalthoughtmaybejustifiedor,perhaps,readjusted.Thuswefinditsaidhereinthisbook:“Anideaisnothingbutanindividualisedconcept.”Ithasbeenobjectedthatthisisasolecism.Butthisterminologyisnecessaryifwearetofindoutwhatanideareallyis.Howcanweexpectanyprogressinknowledge,ifeveryonewhofindshimselfcompelledtoreadjustconcepts,istobemetbytheobjection:“Thisisasolecism”?

THEREALITYOFFREEDOM

THEFACTORSOFLIFE

Letusrecapitulatetheresultsgainedinthepreviouschapters.Theworldappearstomanasamultiplicity,asanaggregateofseparateentities.Hehimselfisoneoftheseentities,athingamongthings.Ofthisstructureoftheworldwesaysimplythatitisgiven,andinasmuchaswedonotconstructitbyconsciousactivity,butsimplyfindit,wesaythatitconsistsofpercepts.Withinthisworldofperceptsweperceiveourselves.ThisperceptofSelfwouldremainmerelyoneamongmanyotherpercepts,diditnotgiverisetosomethingwhichprovescapableofconnectingallperceptsonewithanotherand,therefore,theaggregateofallotherperceptswiththeperceptofSelf.Thissomethingwhichemergesisnolongeramerepercept;neitherisit,likepercepts,simplygiven.Itisproducedbyouractivity.Itappears,inthefirstinstance,boundupwithwhateachofusperceivesashisSelf.Initsinnersignificance,however,ittranscendstheSelf.Itaddstotheseparateperceptsidealdeterminations,which,however,arerelatedtooneanother,andwhicharegroundedinawhole.Whatself-perceptionyieldsisideallydeterminedbythissomethinginthesamewayasallotherpercepts,andplacedassubject,or“I,”overagainsttheobjects.Thissomethingisthought,andtheidealdeterminationsaretheconceptsandideas.Thought,therefore,firstmanifestsitselfinconnectionwiththeperceptofself.Butitisnotmerelysubjective,fortheSelfcharacterisesitselfassubjectonlywiththehelpofthought.ThisrelationoftheSelftoitselfbymeansofthoughtisoneofthefundamentaldeterminationsofourpersonallives.Throughitweleadapurelyidealexistence.Bymeansofitweareawareofourselvesasthinkingbeings.Thisdeterminationofourliveswouldremainapurelyconceptual(logical)one,ifitwerenotsupplementedbyotherdeterminationsofourSelves.Ourliveswouldthenexhaustthemselvesinestablishingidealconnectionsbetweenperceptsthemselves,andbetweenthemandourselves.Ifwecallthisestablishmentofanidealrelationan“actofcognition,”andtheresultingconditionofourselves“knowledge,”then,assumingtheabovesuppositiontobetrue,weshouldhavetoconsiderourselvesasbeingswhomerelyapprehendorknow.

Thesuppositionis,however,untrue.Werelateperceptstoourselvesnotmerelyideally,throughconcepts,butalso,aswehavealreadyseen,throughfeeling.Inshort,thecontentofourlivesisnotmerelyconceptual.TheNaïveRealistholdsthatthepersonalityactuallylivesmoregenuinelyinthelifeoffeelingthaninthepurelyidealactivityofknowledge.Fromhispointofviewheisquiterightininterpretingthematterinthisway.Feelingplaysonthesubjectivesideexactlythepartwhichperceptsplayontheobjectiveside.FromtheprincipleofNaïveRealism,thateverythingisrealwhichcanbeperceived,itfollowsthatfeelingistheguaranteeoftherealityofone’sownpersonality.Monism,however,mustbestowonfeelingthesamesupplementationwhichitconsidersnecessaryforpercepts,ifthesearetostandtousforrealityinitsfullnature.ForMonism,feelingisanincompletereality,which,intheforminwhichitfirstappearstous,lacksasyetitssecondfactor,theconceptoridea.Thisiswhy,inactuallife,feelings,likepercepts,appearpriortoknowledge.Atfirst,wehavemerelyafeelingofexistence;anditisonlyinthecourseofourgradualdevelopment,thatweattaintothepointatwhichtheconceptofSelfemerges

fromwithintheblindmassoffeelingswhichfillsourexistence.However,whatforusdoesnotappearuntillater,isfromthefirstindissolublyboundupwithourfeelings.Thisishowthenaïvemancomestobelievethatinfeelinghegraspsexistenceimmediately,inknowledgeonlymediately.Thedevelopmentoftheaffectivelife,therefore,appearstohimmoreimportantthananythingelse.Notuntilhehasgraspedtheunityoftheworldthroughfeelingwillhebelievethathehascomprehendedit.Heattemptstomakefeelingratherthanthoughttheinstrumentofknowledge.Nowafeelingisentirelyindividual,somethingequivalenttoapercept.Henceaphilosophyoffeelingmakesacosmicprincipleoutofsomethingwhichhassignificanceonlywithinmyownpersonality.Anyonewhoholdsthisviewattemptstoinfusehisownselfintothewholeworld.WhattheMoniststrivestograspbymeansofconceptsthephilosopheroffeelingtriestoattainthroughfeeling,andhelooksonhisownfeltunionwithobjectsasmoreimmediatethanknowledge.

Thetendencyjustdescribed,thephilosophyoffeeling,isMysticism.Theerrorinthisviewisthatitseekstopossessbyimmediateexperiencewhatmustbeknown,thatitseekstodevelopfeeling,whichisindividual,intoauniversalprinciple.

Afeelingisapurelyindividualactivity.Itistherelationoftheexternalworldtothesubject,insofarasthisrelationfindsexpressioninapurelysubjectiveexperience.

Thereisyetanotherexpressionofhumanpersonality.TheSelf,throughthought,takespartintheuniversalworld-life.Throughthoughtitestablishespurelyideal(conceptual)relationsbetweenperceptsanditself,andbetweenitselfandpercepts.Infeeling,ithasimmediateexperienceoftherelationofobjectstoitselfassubject.Inwill,theoppositeisthecase.Involition,weareconcernedoncemorewithapercept,viz.,thatoftheindividualrelationoftheselftowhatisobjective.Whateverintheactofwillisnotanidealfactor,isjustasmuchmereobjectofperceptionasisanyobjectintheexternalworld.

Nevertheless,theNaïveRealistbelieveshereagainthathehasbeforehimsomethingfarmorerealthancaneverbeattainedbythought.Heseesinthewillanelementinwhichheisimmediatelyawareofanactivity,acausation,incontrastwiththoughtwhichafterwardsgraspsthisactivityinconceptualform.Onthisview,therealisationbytheSelfofitswillisaprocesswhichisexperiencedimmediately.Theadherentofthisphilosophybelievesthatinthewillhehasreallygotholdofoneendofreality.Whereashecanfollowotheroccurrencesonlyfromtheoutsidebymeansofperception,heisconfidentthatinhiswillheexperiencesarealprocessquiteimmediately.Themodeofexistencepresentedtohimbythewillwithinhimselfbecomesforhimthefundamentalrealityoftheuniverse.Hisownwillappearstohimasaspecialcaseofthegeneralworld-process;hencethelatterisconceivedasauniversalwill.Thewillbecomestheprincipleofrealityjustas,inMysticism,feelingbecomestheprincipleofknowledge.ThiskindoftheoryiscalledVoluntarism(Thelism).Itmakessomethingwhichcanbeexperiencedonlyindividuallythedominantfactoroftheworld.

VoluntarismcanaslittlebecalledscientificascanMysticism.Forbothassertthattheconceptualinterpretationoftheworldisinadequate.Bothdemand,inadditiontoa

principleofbeingwhichisideal,alsoaprinciplewhichisreal.Butasperceptionisouronlymeansofapprehendingtheseso-calledrealprinciples,theassertionofMysticismandVoluntarismcoincideswiththeviewthatwehavetwosourcesofknowledge,viz.,thoughtandperception,thelatterfindingindividualexpressionaswillandfeeling.Sincetheimmediateexperienceswhichflowfromtheonesourcecannotbedirectlyabsorbedintothethoughtswhichflowfromtheother,perception(immediateexperience)andthoughtremainsidebyside,withoutanyhigherformofexperiencetomediatebetweenthem.Besidetheconceptualprincipletowhichweattainbymeansofknowledge,thereisalsoarealprinciplewhichmustbeimmediatelyexperienced.Inotherwords,MysticismandVoluntarismarebothformsofNaïveRealism,becausetheysubscribetothedoctrinethattheimmediatelyperceived(experienced)isreal.ComparedwithNaïveRealisminitsprimitiveform,theyareguiltyoftheyetfurtherinconsistencyofacceptingonedefiniteformofperception(feeling,respectivelywill)astheexclusivemeansofknowingreality.Yettheycandothisonlysolongastheyclingtothegeneralprinciplethateverythingthatisperceivedisreal.Theyought,therefore,toattachanequalvaluetoexternalperceptionforpurposesofknowledge.

VoluntarismturnsintoMetaphysicalRealism,whenitassertstheexistenceofwillalsointhosespheresofrealityinwhichwillcannolonger,asintheindividualsubject,beimmediatelyexperienced.Itassumeshypotheticallythataprincipleholdsoutsidesubjectiveexperience,fortheexistenceofwhich,nevertheless,subjectiveexperienceisthesolecriterion.AsaformofMetaphysicalRealism,Voluntarismisopentothecriticismdevelopedintheprecedingchapter,acriticismwhichmakesitnecessarytoovercomethecontradictoryelementineveryformofMetaphysicalRealism,andtorecognisethatthewillisauniversalworld-processonlyinsofarasitisideallyrelatedtotherestoftheworld.

Thedifficultyofseizingtheessentialnatureofthinkingbyobservationliesinthis,thatithasgenerallyeludedtheintrospectingmindalltooeasilybythetimethatthemindtriestobringitintothefocusofattention.Nothingbutthelifelessabstract,thecorpseoflivingthought,thenremainsforinspection.Whenweconsideronlythisabstract,wefindithard,bycontrast,toresistyieldingtothemysticismoffeeling,or,again,tothemetaphysicsofwill,bothofwhichare“fulloflife.”Wearetemptedtoregarditasoddthatanyoneshouldwanttoseizetheessenceofrealityin“merethoughts.”Butifweoncesucceedinreallyholdingfastthelivingessenceofthinking,welearntounderstandthattheself-abandonmenttofeelings,ortheintuitingofthewill,cannotevenbecomparedwiththeinwardwealthofthislifeofthinking,whichweexperienceaswithinitselfeveratrest,yetatthesametimeeverinmovement.Stilllessisitpossibletorankwillandfeelingabovethinking.Itisowingpreciselytothiswealth,tothisinwardabundanceofexperience,thattheimageofthinkingwhichpresentsitselftoourordinaryattitudeofmind,shouldappearlifelessandabstract.Nootheractivityofthehumanmindissoeasilymisapprehendedasthinking.Willandfeelingstillfillthemindwithwarmthevenwhenwelivethroughthemagaininmemory.Thinkingalltooreadilyleavesuscoldinrecollection;itisasifthelife

ofthemindhaddriedout.Butthisisreallynothingbutthestronglymarkedshadowthrownbyitsluminous,warmnaturepenetratingdeeplyintothephenomenaoftheworld.Thispenetrationiseffectedbytheactivityofthinkingwithaspontaneousoutpouringofpower—apowerofspirituallove.Thereisnoroomherefortheobjectionthatthustoperceiveloveintheactivityofthinkingistoendowthinkingwithafeelingandalovewhicharenotpartofit.Thisobjectionis,intruth,aconfirmationoftheviewhereadvocated.Ifweturntowardstheessentialnatureofthinking,wefindinitbothfeelingandwill,andboththeseintheirmostprofoundlyrealforms.Ifweturnawayfromthinkingandtowards“mere”feelingandwill,theseloseforustheirgenuinereality.Ifwearewillingtomakeofthinkinganintuitiveexperience,wecandojustice,also,toexperiencesofthetypeoffeelingandwill.Butthemysticismoffeelingandthemetaphysicsofwilldonotknowhowtodojusticetothepenetrationofrealitywhichpartakesatonceofintuitionandofthought.Theyconcludebuttooreadilythattheythemselvesarerootedinreality,butthattheintuitivethinker,untouchedbyfeeling,blindtoreality,formsoutof“abstractthoughts”ashadowy,chillypictureoftheworld.

THEIDEAOFFREEDOM

Theconcept“tree”isconditionedforourknowledgebythepercept“tree.”ThereisonlyonedeterminateconceptwhichIcanselectfromthegeneralsystemofconceptsandapplytoagivenpercept.Theconnectionofconceptandperceptismediatelyandobjectivelydeterminedbythoughtinconformitywiththepercept.Theconnectionbetweenaperceptanditsconceptisrecognisedaftertheactofperception,buttherelevanceoftheonetotheotherisdeterminedbythecharacterofeach.

Verydifferentistheresultwhenweconsiderknowledge,and,moreparticularly,therelationofmantotheworldwhichoccursinknowledge.Intheprecedingchapterstheattempthasbeenmadetoshowthatanunprejudicedexaminationofthisrelationisabletothrowlightonitsnature.Acorrectunderstandingofthisexaminationleadstotheconclusionthatthinkingmaybeintuitivelyapprehendedinitsunique,self-containednature.Thosewhofinditnecessary,fortheexplanationofthinkingassuch,toinvokesomethingelse,e.g.,physicalbrain-processes,orunconsciousspiritualprocesseslyingbehindtheconsciousthinkingwhichtheyobserve,failtograspthefactswhichanunprejudicedexaminationyields.Whenweobserveourthinking,weliveduringtheobservationimmediatelywithintheessenceofaspiritual,self-sustainingactivity.Indeed,wemayevenaffirmthatifwewanttograsptheessentialnatureofSpiritintheforminwhichitimmediatelypresentsitselftoman,weneedbutlookatourownself-sustainingthinking.

Forthestudyofthinkingtwothingscoincidewhichelsewheremustalwaysappearapart,viz.,conceptandpercept.Ifwefailtoseethis,weshallbeunabletoregardtheconceptswhichwehaveelaboratedinresponsetoperceptsasanythingbutshadowycopiesofthesepercepts,andweshalltaketheperceptsaspresentingtousrealityasitreallyis.Weshall,further,buildupforourselvesametaphysicalworldafterthepatternoftheworldofpercepts.Weshall,eachaccordingtohishabitualideas,callthisworldaworldofatoms,orofwill,orofunconsciousspirit,andsoon.Andweshallfailtonoticethatallthetimewehavebeendoingnothingbuterectinghypotheticallyametaphysicalworldmodeledontheworldweperceive.Butifweclearlyapprehendwhatthinkingconsistsin,weshallrecognisethatperceptspresenttousonlyaportionofreality,andthatthecomplementaryportionwhichaloneimpartstorealityitsfullcharacterasreal,isexperiencedbyusintheorganisationofperceptsbythought.Weshallregardallthought,notasashadowycopyofreality,butasaself-sustainingspiritualessence.Weshallbeabletosayofit,thatitisrevealedtousinconsciousnessthroughintuition.Intuitionisthepurelyspiritualconsciousexperienceofapurelyspiritualcontent.Itisonlythroughintuitionthatwecangrasptheessenceofthinking.

Towinthrough,bymeansofunprejudicedobservation,totherecognitionofthistruthoftheintuitiveessenceofthinkingrequiresaneffort.Butwithoutthiseffortweshallnotsucceedinclearingthewayforatheoryofthepsycho-physicalorganisationofman.Werecognisethatthisorganisationcanproducenoeffectwhateverontheessentialnatureof

thinking.Atfirstsightthisseemstobecontradictedbypatentandobviousfacts.Forordinaryexperience,humanthinkingoccursonlyinconnectionwith,andbymeansof,suchanorganisation.Thisdependenceonpsycho-physicalorganisationissoprominentthatitstruebearingcanbeappreciatedbyusonlyifwerecognise,thatintheessentialnatureofthinkingthisorganisationplaysnopartwhatever.Onceweappreciatethis,wecannolongerfailtonoticehowpeculiaristherelationofhumanorganisationtothought.Forthisorganisationcontributesnothingtotheessentialnatureofthought,butrecedeswheneverthoughtbecomesactive.Itsuspendsitsownactivity,ityieldsground.Andthegroundthussetfreeisoccupiedbythought.Theessencewhichisactiveinthoughthasatwo-foldfunction:firstitrestrictsthehumanorganisationinitsownactivity;next,itstepsintotheplaceofthatorganisation.Yes,eventheformer,therestrictionofhumanorganisation,isaneffectoftheactivityofthought,andmoreparticularlyofthatpartofitwhichpreparesthemanifestationofthinking.Thisexplainsthesenseinwhichthinkinghasitscounterpartintheorganisationofthebody.Onceweperceivethis,wecannolongermisapprehendthesignificanceforthinkingofthisphysicalcounterpart.Whenwewalkoversoftgroundourfeetleavedeeptracksinthesoil.Weshallnotbetemptedtosaythattheforcesoftheground,frombelow,haveformedthesetracks.Weshallnotattributetotheseforcesanyshareintheproductionofthetracks.Justso,ifwithopenmindsweobservetheessentialnatureofthinking,weshallnotattributeanyshareinthatnaturetothetracesinthephysicalorganismwhichthinkingproducesinpreparingitsmanifestationthroughthebody.1

Animportantquestion,however,confrontsushere.Ifhumanorganisationhasnopartintheessentialnatureofthinking,whatisitsfunctionwithinthewholenatureofman?Well,theeffectsofthinkinguponthisorganisationhavenobearingupontheessenceofthinking,buttheyhaveabearingupontheoriginofthe“I,”orEgo-consciousness,throughthinking.Thinking,initsuniquecharacter,constitutestherealEgo,butitdoesnotconstitute,assuch,theEgo-consciousness.Toseethiswehavebuttostudythinkingwithanopenmind.TheEgoistobefoundinthinking.TheEgo-consciousnessarisesthroughthetraceswhich,inthesenseaboveexplained,theactivityofthinkingimpressesuponourgeneralconsciousness.TheEgo-consciousnessthusarisesthroughthephysicalorganisation.Thisviewmustnot,however,betakentoimplythattheEgo-consciousness,onceithasarisen,remainsdependentonthephysicalorganisation.Onthecontrary,onceitexistsitistakenupintothoughtandshareshenceforththought’sspiritualself-subsistence.

TheEgo-consciousnessisbuiltuponhumanorganisation.Thelatteristhesourceofallactsofwill.Followingoutthedirectionoftheprecedingexposition,wecangaininsightintotheconnectionofthought,consciousEgo,andactofwill,onlybystudyingfirsthowanactofwillissuesfromhumanorganisation.2

Inaparticularactofwillwemustdistinguishtwofactors:themotiveandthespringofaction.Themotiveisafactorofthenatureofconceptoridea;thespringofactionisthefactorinwillwhichisdirectlydeterminedinthehumanorganisation.Theconceptualfactor,ormotive,isthemomentarydeterminingcauseofanactofwill;thespringofactionisthepermanentdeterminingfactorintheindividual.Themotiveofanactofwillcanbeonlyapureconcept,orelseaconceptwithadefiniterelationtoperception,i.e.,an

idea.Universalandindividualconcepts(ideas)becomemotivesofwillbyinfluencingthehumanindividualanddetermininghimtoactioninaparticulardirection.Oneandthesameconcept,however,oroneandthesameidea,influencedifferentindividualsdifferently.Theydeterminedifferentmentodifferentactions.Anactofwillis,therefore,notmerelytheoutcomeofaconceptoranidea,butalsooftheindividualmake-upofhumanbeings.Thisindividualmake-upwewillcall,followingEduardvonHartmann,the“characterologicaldisposition.”Themannerinwhichconceptandideaactonthecharacterologicaldispositionofamangivestohislifeadefinitemoralorethicalstamp.

Thecharacterologicaldispositionconsistsofthemoreorlesspermanentcontentoftheindividual’slife,thatis,ofhishabitualideasandfeelings.Whetheranideawhichentersmymindatthismomentstimulatesmetoanactofwillornot,dependsonitsrelationtomyotheridealcontents,andalsotomypeculiarmodesoffeeling.Myidealcontent,inturn,isconditionedbythesumtotalofthoseconceptswhichhave,inthecourseofmyindividuallife,comeincontactwithpercepts,thatis,havebecomeideas.This,again,dependsonmygreaterorlessercapacityforintuition,andontherangeofmyperception,thatis,onthesubjectiveandobjectivefactorsofmyexperiences,onthestructureofmymindandonmyenvironment.Myaffectivelifemoreespeciallydeterminesmycharacterologicaldisposition.WhetherIshallmakeacertainideaorconceptthemotiveforactionwilldependonwhetheritgivesmepleasureorpain.

Thesearethefactorswhichwehavetoconsiderinanactofwill.Theimmediatelypresentideaorconcept,whichbecomesthemotive,determinestheendorthepurposeofmywill;mycharacterologicaldispositiondeterminesmetodirectmyactivitytowardsthisend.Theideaoftakingawalkinthenexthalf-hourdeterminestheendofmyaction.Butthisideaisraisedtothelevelofamotiveonlyifitmeetswithasuitablecharacterologicaldisposition,thatis,ifduringmypastlifeIhaveformedtheideasofthewholesomenessofwalkingandthevalueofhealth;and,further,iftheideaofwalkingisaccompaniedbyafeelingofpleasure.

Wemust,therefore,distinguish(1)thepossiblesubjectivedispositionswhicharelikelytoturngivenideasandconceptsintomotives,and(2)thepossibleideasandconceptswhicharecapableofsoinfluencingmycharacterologicaldispositionthatanactofwillresults.Theformerareformoralitythespringsofaction,thelatteritsends.

Thespringsofactioninthemorallifecanbediscoveredbyanalysingtheelementsofwhichindividuallifeiscomposed.

Thefirstlevelofindividuallifeisthatofperception,moreparticularlysense-perception.Thisisthestageofourindividuallivesinwhichapercepttranslatesitselfintowillimmediately,withouttheinterventionofeitherafeelingoraconcept.Thespringofactionhereinvolvedmaybecalledsimplyinstinct.Ourlower,purelyanimal,needs(hunger,sexualintercourse,etc.)findtheirsatisfactioninthisway.Themaincharacteristicofinstinctivelifeistheimmediacywithwhichtheperceptstartsofftheactofwill.Thiskindofdeterminationofthewill,whichbelongsoriginallyonlytothelifeofthelowersenses,may,however,becomeextendedalsototheperceptsofthehighersenses.Wemayreacttotheperceptofacertaineventintheexternalworldwithoutreflectingonwhatwedo,and

withoutanyspecialfeelingconnectingitselfwiththepercept.Wehaveexamplesofthisespeciallyinourordinaryconventionalintercoursewithmen.Thespringofthiskindofactioniscalledtactormoralgoodtaste.Themoreoftensuchimmediatereactionstoaperceptoccur,themoretheagentwillprovehimselfabletoactpurelyundertheguidanceoftact;thatis,tactbecomeshischaracterologicaldisposition.

Thesecondlevelofhumanlifeisfeeling.Definitefeelingsaccompanytheperceptsoftheexternalworld.Thesefeelingsmaybecomespringsofaction.WhenIseeahungryman,mypityforhimmaybecomethespringofmyaction.Suchfeelings,forexample,aremodesty,pride,senseofhonour,humility,remorse,pity,revenge,gratitude,piety,loyalty,love,andduty.3

Thethirdandlastleveloflifeistohavethoughtsandideas.Anideaoraconceptmaybecomethemotiveofanactionthroughmerereflection.Ideasbecomemotivesbecause,inthecourseofmylife,Iregularlyconnectcertainaimsofmywillwithperceptswhichrecuragainandagaininamoreorlessmodifiedform.Henceitisthat,withmenwhoarenotwhollywithoutexperience,theoccurrenceofcertainperceptsisalwaysaccompaniedalsobytheconsciousnessofideasofactions,whichtheyhavethemselvescarriedoutinsimilarcasesorwhichtheyhaveseenotherscarryout.Theseideasfloatbeforetheirmindsasdeterminingmodelsinallsubsequentdecisions;theybecomepartsoftheircharacterologicaldisposition.Wemaygivethenameofpracticalexperiencetothespringofactionjustdescribed.Practicalexperiencemergesgraduallyintopurelytactfulbehaviour.Thathappens,whendefinitetypicalpicturesofactionshavebecomesocloselyconnectedinourmindswithideasofcertainsituationsinlife,that,inanygiveninstance,weomitalldeliberationbasedonexperienceandpassimmediatelyfromthepercepttotheaction.

Thehighestlevelofindividuallifeisthatofconceptualthoughtwithoutreferencetoanydefiniteperceptualcontent.Wedeterminethecontentofaconceptthroughpureintuitiononthebasisofanidealsystem.Suchaconceptcontains,atfirst,noreferencetoanydefinitepercepts.Whenanactofwillcomesaboutundertheinfluenceofaconceptwhichreferstoapercept,i.e.,undertheinfluenceofanidea,thenitistheperceptwhichdeterminesouractionindirectlybywayoftheconcept.Butwhenweactundertheinfluenceofpureintuitions,thespringofouractionispurethought.Asitisthecustominphilosophytocallpurethought“reason,”wemayperhapsbejustifiedingivingthenameofpracticalreasontothespringofactioncharacteristicofthisleveloflife.TheclearestaccountofthisspringofactionhasbeengivenbyKreyenbühl(PhilosophischeMonatshefte,vol.xviii,No.3).Inmyopinionhisarticleonthissubjectisoneofthemostimportantcontributionstopresent-dayphilosophy,moreespeciallytoEthics.Kreyenbühlcallsthespringofaction,ofwhichwearetreating,thepracticalapriorii.e.,aspringofactionissuingimmediatelyfrommyintuition.

Itisclearthatsuchaspringofactioncannolongerbecountedinthestrictestsenseaspartofthecharacterologicaldisposition.Forwhatishereeffectiveinmeasaspringofactionisnolongersomethingpurelyindividual,buttheideal,andhenceuniversal,contentofmyintuition.AssoonasIregardthiscontentasthevalidbasisandstarting-pointofanaction,

Ipassoverintowilling,irrespectiveofwhethertheconceptwasalreadyinmymindbeforehand,orwhetheritonlyoccurstomeimmediatelybeforetheaction,thatis,irrespectiveofwhetheritwaspresentintheformofadispositioninmeornot.

Arealactofwillresultsonlywhenapresentimpulsetoaction,intheformofaconceptoridea,actsonthecharacterologicaldisposition.Suchanimpulsethereuponbecomesthemotiveofthewill.

Themotivesofmoralconductareideasandconcepts.ThereareMoralistswhoseeinfeelingalsoamotiveofmorality;theyassert,e.g.,thattheendofmoralconductistosecurethegreatestpossiblequantityofpleasurefortheagent.Pleasureitself,however,canneverbeamotive;atbestonlytheideaofpleasurecanactasmotive.Theideaofafuturepleasure,butnotthefeelingitself,canactonmycharacterologicaldisposition.Forthefeelingdoesnotyetexistinthemomentofaction;onthecontrary,ithasfirsttobeproducedbytheaction.

Theideaofone’sownoranother’swell-beingis,however,rightlyregardedasamotiveofthewill.Theprincipleofproducingthegreatestquantityofpleasureforoneselfthroughone’saction,thatis,toattainindividualhappiness,iscalledEgoism.Theattainmentofthisindividualhappinessissoughteitherbythinkingruthlesslyonlyofone’sowngood,andstrivingtoattainitevenatthecostofthehappinessofotherindividuals(PureEgoism),orbypromotingthegoodofothers,eitherbecauseoneanticipatesindirectlyafavourableinfluenceonone’sownhappinessthroughthehappinessofothers,orbecauseonefearstoendangerone’sowninterestbyinjuringothers(MoralityofPrudence).Thespecialcontentoftheegoisticalprincipleofmoralitywilldependontheideaswhichweformofwhatconstitutesourown,orothers’,good.Amanwilldeterminethecontentofhisegoisticalstrivinginaccordancewithwhatheregardsasoneoflife’sgoodthings(luxury,hopeofhappiness,deliverancefromdifferentevils,etc.).

Further,thepurelyconceptualcontentofanactionistoberegardedasyetanotherkindofmotive.Thiscontenthasnoreference,liketheideaofone’sownpleasure,solelytotheparticularaction,buttothedeductionofanactionfromasystemofmoralprinciples.Thesemoralprinciples,intheformofabstractconcepts,mayguidetheindividual’smorallifewithouthisworryinghimselfabouttheoriginofhisconcepts.Inthatcase,wefeelmerelythemoralnecessityofsubmittingtoamoralconceptwhich,intheformoflaw,controlsouractions.Thejustificationofthisnecessityweleavetothosewhodemandfromusmoralsubjection,thatis,tothosewhosemoralauthorityoverusweacknowledge(theheadofthefamily,thestate,socialcustom,theauthorityofthechurch,divinerevelation).Wemeetwithaspecialkindofthesemoralprincipleswhenthelawisnotproclaimedtousbyanexternalauthority,butcomesfromourownselves(moralautonomy).Inthiscasewebelievethatwehearthevoice,towhichwehavetosubmitourselves,inourownsouls.Thenameforthisvoiceisconscience.

Itisagreatmoraladvancewhenamannolongertakesasthemotiveofhisactionthecommandsofanexternalorinternalauthority,buttriestounderstandthereasonwhyagivenmaximofactionoughttobeeffectiveasamotiveinhim.Thisistheadvancefrommoralitybasedonauthoritytoactionfrommoralinsight.Atthislevelofmorality,aman

willtrytodiscoverthedemandsofthemorallife,andwilllethisactionbedeterminedbythisknowledge.Suchdemandsare(1)thegreatestpossiblehappinessofhumanityasawholepurelyforitsownsake,(2)theprogressofcivilisation,orthemoraldevelopmentofmankindtowardsevergreaterperfection,(3)therealisationofindividualmoralendsconceivedbyanactofpureintuition.

Thegreatestpossiblehappinessofhumanityasawholewillnaturallybedifferentlyconceivedbydifferentpeople.Theabove-mentionedmaximdoesnotimplyanydefiniteideaofthishappiness,butrathermeansthateveryonewhoacknowledgesthisprinciplestrivestodoallthat,inhisopinion,mostpromotesthegoodofthewholeofhumanity.

Theprogressofcivilisationisseentobeaspecialapplicationofthemoralprinciplejustmentioned,atanyrateforthosetowhomthegoodswhichcivilisationproducesbringfeelingsofpleasure.However,theywillhavetopaythepriceofprogressinthedestructionandannihilationofmanythingswhichalsocontributetothehappinessofhumanity.Itis,however,alsopossiblethatsomemenlookupontheprogressofcivilisationasamoralnecessity,quiteapartfromthefeelingsofpleasurewhichitbrings.Ifso,theprogressofcivilisationwillbeanewmoralprincipleforthem,differentfromthepreviousone.

Boththeprincipleofthepublicgood,andthatoftheprogressofcivilisation,alikedependonthewayinwhichweapplythecontentofourmoralideastoparticularexperiences(percepts).Thehighestprincipleofmoralitywhichwecanconceive,however,isthatwhichcontains,tostartwith,nosuchreferencetoparticularexperiences,butwhichspringsfromthesourceofpureintuitionanddoesnotseekuntillateranyconnectionwithpercepts,i.e.,withlife.Thedeterminationofwhatoughttobewilledissuesherefromapointofviewverydifferentfromthatoftheprevioustwoprinciples.Whoeveracceptstheprincipleofthepublicgoodwillinallhisactionsaskfirstwhathisidealscontributetothispublicgood.Theupholderoftheprogressofcivilisationastheprincipleofmoralitywillactsimilarly.Thereis,however,astillhighermodeofconductwhich,inagivencase,doesnotstartfromanysinglelimitedmoralideal,butwhichseesacertainvalueinallmoralprinciples,alwaysaskingwhetherthisorthatprincipleismoreimportantinaparticularcase.Itmayhappenthatamanconsidersincertaincircumstancesthepromotionofthepublicgood,inothersthatoftheprogressofcivilisation,andinyetothersthefurtheringofhisownprivategood,tobetherightcourse,andmakesthatthemotiveofhisaction.Butwhenallothergroundsofdeterminationtakesecondplace,thenwerely,inthefirstplace,onconceptualintuitionitself.Allothermotivesnowdropoutofsight,andtheidealcontentofanactionalonebecomesitsmotive.

Amongthelevelsofcharacterologicaldisposition,wehavesingledoutasthehighestthatwhichmanifestsitselfaspurethought,orpracticalreason.Amongthemotives,wehavejustsingledoutconceptualintuitionasthehighest.Onnearerconsideration,wenowperceivethatatthislevelofmoralitythespringofactionandthemotivecoincide,i.e.,thatneitherapredeterminedcharacterologicaldisposition,noranexternalmoralprincipleacceptedonauthority,influenceourconduct.Theaction,therefore,isneitheramerelystereotypedonewhichfollowstherulesofamoralcode,norisitautomaticallyperformed

inresponsetoanexternalimpulse.Ratheritisdeterminedsolelythroughitsidealcontent.

Forsuchanactiontobepossible,wemustfirstbecapableofmoralintuitions.Whoeverlacksthecapacitytothinkoutforhimselfthemoralprinciplesthatapplyineachparticularcase,willneverrisetothelevelofgenuineindividualwilling.

Kant’sprincipleofmorality:Actsothattheprincipleofyouractionmaybevalidforallmen—istheexactoppositeofours.Hisprinciplewouldmeandeathtoallindividualaction.Thenormformecanneverbewhatallmenwoulddo,butratherwhatitisrightformetodoineachspecialcase.

Asuperficialcriticismmighturgeagainstthesearguments:Howcananactionbeindividuallyadaptedtothespecialcaseandthespecialsituation,andyetatthesametimebeideallydeterminedbypureintuition?Thisobjectionrestsonaconfusionofthemoralmotivewiththeperceptualcontentofanaction.Thelatter,indeed,maybeamotive,andisactuallyamotivewhenweactfortheprogressofculture,orfrompureegoism,etc.,butinactionbasedonpuremoralintuitionitneverisamotive.Ofcourse,mySelftakesnoticeoftheseperceptualcontents,butitdoesnotallowitselftobedeterminedbythem.Thecontentisusedonlytoconstructatheoreticalconcept,butthecorrespondingmoralconceptisnotderivedfromtheobject.Thetheoreticalconceptofagivensituationwhichfacesme,isamoralconceptalsoonlyifIadoptthestandpointofaparticularmoralprinciple.IfIbaseallmyconductontheprincipleoftheprogressofcivilisation,thenmywaythroughlifeistieddowntoafixedroute.Fromeveryoccurrencewhichcomestomynoticeandattractsmyinteresttherespringsamoralduty,viz.,todomytinysharetowardsusingthisoccurrenceintheserviceoftheprogressofcivilisation.Inadditiontotheconceptwhichrevealstometheconnectionsofeventsorobjectsaccordingtothelawsofnature,thereisalsoamorallabelattachedtothemwhichcontainsforme,asamoralagent,ethicaldirectionsastohowIhavetoconductmyself.Atahigherlevelthesemorallabelsdisappear,andmyactionisdeterminedineachparticularinstancebymyidea;andmoreparticularlybytheideawhichissuggestedtomebytheconcreteinstance.

Menvarygreatlyintheircapacityforintuition.Insome,ideasbubbleuplikeaspring,othersacquirethemwithmuchlabour.Thesituationsinwhichmenlive,andwhicharethescenesoftheiractions,arenolesswidelydifferent.Theconductofamanwilldepend,therefore,onthemannerinwhichhisfacultyofintuitionreactstoagivensituation.Theaggregateoftheideaswhichareeffectiveinus,theconcretecontentofourintuitions,constitutethatwhichisindividualineachofus,notwithstandingtheuniversalcharacterofourideas.Insofarasthisintuitivecontenthasreferencetoaction,itconstitutesthemoralsubstanceoftheindividual.Toletthissubstanceexpressitselfinhislifeisthemoralprincipleofthemanwhoregardsallothermoralprinciplesassubordinate.WemaycallthispointofviewEthicalIndividualism.

Thedeterminingfactorofanaction,inanyconcreteinstance,isthediscoveryofthecorrespondingpurelyindividualintuition.Atthislevelofmorality,therecanbenoquestionofgeneralmoralconcepts(norms,laws).Generalnormsalwayspresupposeconcretefactsfromwhichtheycanbededuced.Butfactshavefirsttobecreatedbyhumanaction.

Whenwelookfortheregulatingprinciples(theconceptualprinciplesguidingtheactionsofindividuals,peoples,epochs),weobtainasystemofEthicswhichisnotascienceofmoralnorms,butratherascienceofmoralityasanaturalfact.Onlythelawsdiscoveredinthiswayarerelatedtohumanactionasthelawsofnaturearerelatedtoparticularphenomena.Theselaws,however,areveryfarfrombeingidenticalwiththeimpulsesonwhichwebaseouractions.Ifwewanttounderstandhowman’smoralwillgivesrisetoanaction,wemustfirststudytherelationofthiswilltotheaction.Forthispurposewemustsingleoutforstudythoseactionsinwhichthisrelationisthedeterminingfactor.WhenI,oranother,subsequentlyreviewmyactionwemaydiscoverwhatmoralprinciplescomeintoplayinit.ButsolongasIamacting,Iaminfluenced,notbythesemoralprinciples,butbymylovefortheobjectwhichIwanttorealisethroughmyaction.Iasknomanandnomoralcode,whetherIshallperformthisactionornot.Onthecontrary,IcarryitoutassoonasIhaveformedtheideaofit.Thisalonemakesitmyaction.Ifamanactsbecauseheacceptscertainmoralnorms,hisactionistheoutcomeoftheprincipleswhichcomposehismoralcode.Hemerelycarriesoutorders.Heisasuperiorkindofautomaton.Injectsomestimulustoactionintohismind,andatoncetheclock-workofhismoralprincipleswillbegintoworkandrunitsprescribedcourse,soastoissueinanactionwhichisChristian,orhumane,orunselfish,orcalculatedtopromotetheprogressofculture.ItisonlywhenIfollowsolelymylovefortheobject,thatitisI,myself,whoact.Atthislevelofmorality,Iacknowledgenolordoverme,neitheranexternalauthority,northeso-calledvoiceofmyconscience.Iacknowledgenoexternalprincipleofmyaction,becauseIhavefoundinmyselfthegroundformyaction,viz.,myloveoftheaction.Idonotaskwhethermyactionisgoodorbad;Iperformit,becauseIaminlovewithit.Myactionis“good”when,withlovingintuition,Iinsertmyselfintherightwayintotheworld-nexusasIexperienceitintuitively;itis“bad”whenthisisnotthecase.NeitherdoIaskmyselfhowanothermanwouldactinmyposition.Onthecontrary,IactasI,thisuniqueindividuality,willtoact.Nogeneralusage,nocommoncustom,nogeneralmaximcurrentamongmen,nomoralnormguidesme,butmylovefortheaction.Ifeelnocompulsion,neitherthecompulsionofnaturewhichdominatesmethroughmyinstincts,northecompulsionofthemoralcommandments.Mywillissimplytorealisewhatinmelies.

Thosewhoholdtogeneralmoralnormswillreplytotheseargumentsthat,ifeveryonehastherighttolivehimselfoutandtodowhathepleases,therecanbenodistinctionbetweenagoodandabadaction;everyfraudulentimpulseinmehasthesamerighttoissueinactionastheintentiontoservethegeneralgood.Itisnotthemerefactofmyhavingconceivedtheideaofanactionwhichoughttodeterminemeasamoralagent,butthefurtherexaminationofwhetheritisagoodoranevilaction.OnlyifitisgoodoughtItocarryitout.

Thisobjectioniseasilyintelligible,andyetithaditsrootinwhatisbutamisapprehensionofmymeaning.Myreplytoitisthis:Ifwewanttogetattheessenceofhumanvolition,wemustdistinguishbetweenthepathalongwhichvolitionattainstoacertaindegreeofdevelopment,andtheuniquecharacterwhichitassumesasitapproachesitsgoal.Itisonthepathtowardsthegoalthatthenormsplayalegitimatepart.Thegoalconsistsintherealisationofmoralaimswhichareapprehendedbypureintuition.Manattainssuchaims

inproportionasheisabletoriseatalltothelevelatwhichintuitiongraspstheidealcontentoftheworld.Inanyparticularvolition,otherelementswill,asarule,bemixedup,asmotivesorspringsofaction,withsuchmoralaims.But,forallthat,intuitionmaybe,whollyorinpart,thedeterminingfactorinhumanvolition.Whatweoughttodo,thatwedo.Wesupplythestageuponwhichdutybecomesdeed.Itisourownactionwhich,assuch,issuesfromus.Theimpulse,then,canonlybewhollyindividual.And,infact,onlyavolitionwhichissuesoutofintuitioncanbeindividual.Itisonlyinanageinwhichimmaturemenregardtheblindinstinctsaspartofaman’sindividuality,thattheactofacriminalcanbedescribedaslivingoutone’sindividualityinthesamesense,inwhichtheembodimentinactionofapureintuitioncanbesodescribed.

Theanimalinstinctwhichdrivesamantoacriminalactdoesnotspringfromintuition,anddoesnotbelongtowhatisindividualinhim,butrathertothatwhichismostgeneralinhim,tothatwhichisequallypresentinallindividuals.Theindividualelementinmeisnotmyorganismwithitsinstinctsandfeelings,butrathertheunifiedworldofideaswhichrevealsitselfthroughthisorganism.Myinstincts,cravings,passions,justifynofurtherassertionaboutmethanthatIbelongtothegeneralspeciesman.Thefactthatsomethingidealexpressesitselfinitsownuniquewaythroughtheseinstincts,passions,andfeelings,constitutesmyindividuality.Myinstinctsandcravingsmakemethesortofmanofwhomtherearetwelvetothedozen.Theuniquecharacteroftheidea,bymeansofwhichIdistinguishmyselfwithinthedozenas“I,”makesofmeanindividual.Onlyabeingotherthanmyselfcoulddistinguishmefromothersbythedifferenceinmyanimalnature.Bythought,i.e.,bytheactivegraspingoftheidealelementworkingitselfoutthroughmyorganism,Idistinguishmyselffromothers.Henceitisimpossibletosayoftheactionofacriminalthatitissuesfromtheideawithinhim.Indeed,thecharacteristicfeatureofcriminalactionsispreciselythattheyspringfromthenon-idealelementsinman.

Anactthegroundsforwhichlieintheidealpartofmyindividualnatureisfree.Everyotheract,whetherdoneunderthecompulsionofnatureorundertheobligationimposedbyamoralnorm,isunfree.

Thatmanaloneisfreewhoineverymomentofhislifeisabletoobeyonlyhimself.Amoralactismyactonlywhenitcanbecalledfreeinthissense.Sofarweareconcernedherewiththepresuppositionsunderwhichanactofwillisfelttobefree;thesequelwillshowhowthispurelyethicalconceptoffreedomisrealisedintheessentialnatureofman.

Actiononthebasisoffreedomdoesnotexclude,butinclude,themorallaws.Itonlyshowsthatitstandsonahigherlevelthanactionswhicharedictatedbytheselaws.WhyshouldmyactservethegeneralgoodlesswellwhenIdoitfrompureloveofit,thanwhenIperformitbecauseitisadutytoservethegeneralgood?Theconceptofdutyexcludesfreedom,becauseitwillnotacknowledgetherightofindividuality,butdemandsthesubjectionofindividualitytoageneralnorm.FreedomofactionisconceivableonlyfromthestandpointofEthicalIndividualism.

Buthowaboutthepossibilityofsociallifeformen,ifeachaimsonlyatassertinghisownindividuality?ThisquestionexpressesyetanotherobjectiononthepartofMoralismwronglyunderstood.TheMoralistbelievesthatasocialcommunityispossibleonlyifall

menareheldtogetherbyacommonmoralorder.ThisshowsthattheMoralistdoesnotunderstandthecommunityoftheworldofideas.Hedoesnotrealisethattheworldofideaswhichinspiresmeisnootherthanthatwhichinspiresmyfellow-men.Thisidentityis,indeed,butaconclusionfromourexperienceoftheworld.However,itcannotbeanythingelse.Forifwecouldrecogniseitinanyotherwaythanbyobservation,itwouldfollowthatuniversalnorms,notindividualexperience,weredominantinitssphere.Individualityispossibleonlyifeveryindividualknowsothersonlythroughindividualobservation.Idifferfrommyneighbour,notatallbecausewearelivingintwoentirelydifferentmentalworlds,butbecausefromourcommonworldofideaswereceivedifferentintuitions.Hedesirestoliveouthisintuitions,Imine.Ifwebothdrawourintuitionsreallyfromtheworldofideas,anddonotobeymereexternalimpulses(physicalormoral),thenwecannotbutmeetoneanotherinstrivingforthesameaims,inhavingthesameintentions.Amoralmisunderstanding,aclashofaims,isimpossiblebetweenmenwhoarefree.Onlythemorallyunfreewhoblindlyfollowtheirnaturalinstinctsorthecommandsofduty,turntheirbacksontheirneighbours,ifthesedonotobeythesameinstinctsandthesamelawsasthemselves.Toliveinloveofactionandtoletliveinunderstandingoftheother’svolition,thisisthefundamentalmaximofthefreeman.Heknowsnoother“ought”thanthatwithwhichhiswillintuitivelyputsitselfinharmony.Howheshallwillinanygivencase,thatwillbedeterminedforhimbytherangeofhisideas.

Ifsociabilitywerenotdeeplyrootedinhumannature,noexternallawswouldbeabletoinoculateuswithit.Itisonlybecausehumanindividualsareakininspiritthattheycanliveouttheirlivessidebyside.Thefreemanlivesouthislifeinthefullconfidencethatallotherfreemenbelongtoonespiritualworldwithhimself,andthattheirintentionswillcoincidewithhis.Thefreemandoesnotdemandagreementfromhisfellow-men,butheexpectsitnonetheless,believingthatitisinherentinhumannature.Iamnotreferringheretothenecessityforthisorthatexternalinstitution.Irefertothedisposition,tothestateofmind,throughwhichaman,awareofhimselfasoneofagroupoffellow-menforwhomhecares,comesnearesttolivinguptotheidealofhumandignity.

TherearemanywhowillsaythattheconceptofthefreemanwhichIhaveheredeveloped,isachimeranowheretobefoundrealised,andthatwehavegottodealwithactualhumanbeings,fromwhomwecanexpectmoralityonlyiftheyobeysomemorallaw,i.e.,iftheyregardtheirmoraltaskasadutyanddonotsimplyfollowtheirinclinationsandloves.Idonotdenythis.Onlyablindmancoulddothat.But,ifso,awaywithallthishypocrisyofmorality!Letussaysimplythathumannaturemustbecompelledtoactaslongasitisnotfree.Whetherthecompulsionofman’sunfreenatureiseffectedbyphysicalforceorthroughmorallaws,whethermanisunfreebecauseheindulgeshisunmeasuredsexualdesire,orbecauseheisboundtightinthebondsofconventionalmorality,isquiteimmaterial.Onlyletusnotassertthatsuchamancanrightlycallhisactionshisown,seeingthatheisdriventothembyanexternalforce.Butinthemidstofallthisnetworkofcompulsion,therearisefreespiritswho,inallthewelterofcustoms,legalcodes,religiousobservances,etc.,learntobetruetothemselves.Theyarefreeinsofarastheyobeyonlythemselves;unfreeinsofarastheysubmittocontrol.Whichofuscansaythatheisreallyfreeinallhisactions?Yetineachofustheredwells

somethingdeeperinwhichthefreemanfindsexpression.

Ourlifeismadeupoffreeandunfreeactions.Wecannot,however,formafinalandadequateconceptofhumannaturewithoutcominguponthefreespiritasitspurestexpression.Afterall,wearemeninthefullestsenseonlyinsofaraswearefree.

Thisisanideal,manywillsay.Doubtless;butitisanidealwhichisarealelementinusworkinguptothesurfaceofournature.Itisnoidealbornofmereimaginationordream,butonewhichhaslife,andwhichmanifestsitselfclearlyevenintheleastdevelopedformofitsexistence.Ifmenwerenothingbutnaturalobjects,thesearchforideals,thatis,forideaswhichasyetarenotactualbuttherealisationofwhichwedemand,wouldbeanimpossibility.Indealingwithexternalobjectstheideaisdeterminedbythepercept.Wehavedoneoursharewhenwehaverecognisedtheconnectionbetweenideaandpercept.Butwithahumanbeingthecaseisdifferent.Thecontentofhisexistenceisnotdeterminedwithouthim.Hisconceptofhistrueselfasamoralbeing(freespirit)isnotaprioriunitedobjectivelywiththeperceptualcontent“man,”sothatknowledgeneedonlyregisterthefactsubsequently.Manmustbyhisownactunitehisconceptwiththepercept“man.”Conceptandperceptcoincidewithoneanotherinthisinstance,onlyinsofarastheindividualhimselfmakesthemcoincide.Thishecandoonlyifhehasfoundtheconceptofthefreespirit,thatis,ifhehasfoundtheconceptofhisownSelf.Intheobjectiveworld,aboundary-lineisdrawnbyourorganisationbetweenperceptandconcept.Knowledgebreaksdownthisbarrier.Inoursubjectivenaturethisbarrierisnolesspresent.Theindividualovercomesitinthecourseofhisdevelopment,byembodyinghisconceptofhimselfinhisoutwardexistence.Henceman’smorallifeandhisintellectuallifeleadhimbothaliketohistwo-foldnature,perception(immediateexperience)andthought.Theintellectuallifeovercomeshistwo-foldnaturebymeansofknowledge,themorallifesucceedsthroughtheactualrealisationofthefreespirit.Everybeinghasitsinbornconcept(thelawsofitsbeingandaction),butinexternalobjectsthisconceptisindissolublyboundupwiththepercept,andseparatedfromitonlyintheorganisationofhumanminds.Inhumanbeingsconceptandperceptare,atfirst,actuallyseparated,tobejustasactuallyreunitedbythem.Someonemightobjectthattoourperceptofamantherecorrespondsateverymomentofhislifeadefiniteconcept,justaswithexternalobjects.Icanconstructformyselftheconceptofanaverageman,andImayalsohavegiventomeapercepttofitthispattern.SupposenowIaddtothistheconceptofafreespirit,thenIhavetwoconceptsforthesameobject.

Suchanobjectionisone-sided.AsobjectofperceptionIamsubjecttoperpetualchange.AsachildIwasonething,anotherasayouth,yetanotherasaman.Moreover,ateverymomentIamdifferent,aspercept,fromwhatIwasthemomentbefore.Thesechangesmaytakeplaceinsuchawaythateitheritisalwaysonlythesame(average)manwhoexhibitshimselfinthem,orthattheyrepresenttheexpressionofafreespirit.Sucharethechangeswhichmyactions,asobjectsofperception,undergo.

Intheperceptualobject“man”thereisgiventhepossibilityoftransformation,justasintheplant-seedthereliesthepossibilityofgrowthintoafullydevelopedplant.Theplanttransformsitselfingrowth,becauseoftheobjectivelawofnaturewhichisinherentinit.

Thehumanbeingremainsinhisundevelopedstate,unlesshetakesholdofthematerialfortransformationwithinhimanddevelopshimselfthroughhisownenergy.Naturemakesofmanmerelyanaturalbeing;Societymakesofhimabeingwhoactsinobediencetolaw;onlyhehimselfcanmakeafreemanofhimself.AtadefinitestageinhisdevelopmentNaturereleasesmanfromherfetters;Societycarrieshisdevelopmentastepfurther;healonecangivehimselfthefinalpolish.

Thetheoryoffreemorality,then,doesnotassertthatthefreespiritistheonlyforminwhichmancanexist.Itlooksuponthefreedomofthespiritonlyasthelaststageinman’sevolution.Thisisnottodenythatconductinobediencetonormshasitslegitimateplaceasastageindevelopment.Thepointisthatwecannotacknowledgeittobetheabsolutestandpointinmorality.Forthefreespirittranscendsnorms,inthesensethatheisinsensibletothemascommands,butregulateshisconductinaccordancewithhisimpulses(intuitions).

WhenKantapostrophisesduty:“Duty!Thousublimeandmightyname,thatdostembracenothingcharmingorinsinuating,butrequirestsubmission,”thouthat“holdestforthalaw…beforewhichallinclinationsaredumb,eventhoughtheysecretlycounterworkit,”4thenthefreespiritreplies:“Freedom!thoukindlyandhumanename,whichdostembracewithinthyselfallthatismorallymostcharming,allthatinsinuatesitselfmostintomyhumanity,andwhichmakestmetheservantofnobody,whichholdestforthnolaw,butwaitestwhatmyinclinationitselfwillproclaimaslaw,becauseitresistseverylawthatisforceduponit.”

Thisisthecontrastofmoralityaccordingtolawandaccordingtofreedom.

ThephilistinewholooksupontheStateasembodiedmoralityissuretolookuponthefreespiritasadangertotheState.Butthatisonlybecausehisviewisnarrowlyfocusedonalimitedperiodoftime.Ifhewereabletolookbeyond,hewouldsoonfindthatitisbutonrareoccasionsthatthefreespiritneedstogobeyondthelawsofhisstate,andthatitneverneedstoconfrontthemwithanyrealcontradiction.Forthelawsofthestate,oneandall,havehadtheiroriginintheintuitionsoffreespirits,justlikeallotherobjectivelawsofmorality.Thereisnotraditionallawenforcedbytheauthorityofafamily,whichwasnot,onceuponatime,intuitivelyconceivedandlaiddownbyanancestor.Similarlytheconventionallawsofmoralityarefirstofallestablishedbyparticularmen,andthelawsofthestatearealwaysborninthebrainofastatesman.Thesefreespiritshavesetuplawsovertherestofmankind,andonlyheisunfreewhoforgetsthisoriginandmakesthemeitherdivinecommands,orobjectivemoralduties,or—falselymystical—theauthoritativevoiceofhisownconscience.

He,ontheotherhand,whodoesnotforgettheoriginoflaws,butlooksforitinman,willrespectthemasbelongingtothesameworldofideaswhichisthesourcealsoofhisownmoralintuitions.Ifhethinkshisintuitionsbetterthantheexistinglaws,hewilltrytoputthemintotheplaceofthelatter.Ifhethinksthelawsjustified,hewillactinaccordancewiththemasiftheywerehisownintuitions.

Mandoesnotexistinordertofoundamoralorderoftheworld.Anyonewhomaintainsthathedoes,standsinhistheoryofmanstillatthatsamepoint,atwhichnaturalscience

stoodwhenitbelievedthatabullhashornsinorderthatitmaybutt.Scientists,happily,havecasttheconceptofobjectivepurposesinnatureintothelimboofdeadtheories.ForEthics,itismoredifficulttoachievethesameemancipation.Butjustashornsdonotexistforthesakeofbutting,butbuttingbecauseofhorns,somandoesnotexistforthesakeofmorality,butmoralityexiststhroughman.Thefreemanactsmorallybecausehehasamoralidea,hedoesnotactinordertobemoral.Humanindividualsarethepresuppositionofamoralworldorder.

Thehumanindividualisthefountainofallmoralityandthecentreofalllife.Stateandsocietyexistonlybecausetheyhavenecessarilygrownoutofthelifeofindividuals.Thatstateandsociety,inturn,shouldreactuponthelivesofindividuals,isnomoredifficulttocomprehend,thanthatthebuttingwhichistheresultoftheexistenceofhorns,reactsinturnuponthefurtherdevelopmentofthehorns,whichwouldbecomeatrophiedbyprolongeddisuse.Similarly,theindividualmustdegenerateifheleadsanisolatedexistencebeyondthepaleofhumansociety.Thatisjustthereasonwhythesocialorderarises,viz.,thatitmayreactfavourablyupontheindividual.

Thewayinwhichtheaboveviewhasinfluencedpsychology,physiology,etc.,invariousdirectionshasbeensetforthbytheauthorinworkspublishedafterthisbook.Hereheisconcernedonlywithcharacterisingtheresultsofanopen-mindedstudyofthinkingitself.↑

Thepassagefrompage146downtothispointhasbeenadded,orrewritten,forthepresentRevisedEdition.(1918).↑

Acompletecatalogueoftheprinciplesofmorality(fromthepointofviewofMetaphysicalRealism)maybefoundinEduardvonHartmann’sPhänomenologiedessittlichenBewusstseins.↑

TranslationbyAbbott,Kant’sTheoryofEthics,p.180;CritiqueofPurePracticalReason,chap.iii.↑

MONISMANDTHEPHILOSOPHYOFSPIRITUALACTIVITY

Thenaïvemanwhoacknowledgesnothingasrealexceptwhathecanseewithhiseyesandgraspwithhishands,demandsforhismorallife,too,groundsofactionwhichareperceptibletohissenses.Hewantssomeonewhowillimparttohimthesegroundsofactioninamannerthathissensescanapprehend.Heisreadytoallowthesegroundsofactiontobedictatedtohimascommandsbyanyonewhomheconsiderswiserormorepowerfulthanhimself,orwhomheacknowledges,forwhateverreason,tobeapowersuperiortohimself.Thisaccountsforthemoralprinciplesenumeratedabove,viz.,theprincipleswhichrestontheauthorityoffamily,state,society,church,andGod.Themostnarrow-mindedmanstillsubmitstotheauthorityofsomesinglefellow-man.Hewhoisalittlemoreprogressiveallowshismoralconducttobedictatedbyamajority(state,society).Ineverycasehereliesonsomepowerwhichispresenttohissenses.When,atlast,theconvictiondawnsonsomeonethathisauthoritiesare,atbottom,humanbeingsjustasweakashimself,thenheseeksrefugewithahigherpower,withaDivineBeing,whom,inturn,heendowswithqualitiesperceptibletothesenses.HeconceivesthisBeingascommunicatingtohimtheidealcontentofhismorallifebywayofhissenses—believing,forexample,thatGodappearsintheflamingbush,orthatHemovesaboutamongmeninmanifesthumanshape,andthattheirearscanhearHisvoicetellingthemwhattheyaretodoandwhatnottodo.

ThehigheststageofdevelopmentwhichNaïveRealismattainsinthesphereofmoralityisthatatwhichthemorallaw(themoralidea)isconceivedashavingnoconnectionwithanyexternalbeing,but,hypothetically,asbeinganabsolutepowerinone’sownconsciousness.WhatmanfirstlistenedtoasthevoiceofGod,tothathenowlistensasanindependentpowerinhisownmindwhichhecallsconscience.Thisconception,however,takesusalreadybeyondthelevelofthenaïveconsciousnessintothespherewheremorallawsaretreatedasindependentnorms.Theyaretherenolongermadedependentonahumanmind,butareturnedintoself-existentmetaphysicalentities.Theyareanalogoustothevisible-invisibleforcesofMetaphysicalRealism.HencealsotheyappearalwaysasacorollaryofMetaphysicalRealism,whichseeksreality,notinthepartwhichhumannature,throughitsthinking,playsinmakingrealitywhatitis,butwhichhypotheticallypositsrealityoverandabovethefactsofexperience.Hencetheseextra-humanmoralnormsalwaysappearascorollariesofMetaphysicalRealism.Forthistheoryisboundtolookfortheoriginofmoralitylikewiseinthesphereofextra-humanreality.Therearedifferentpossibleviewsofitsorigin.Ifthething-in-itselfisunthinkingandactsaccordingtopurelymechanicallaws,asmodernMaterialismconceivesthatitdoes,thenitmustalsoproduceoutofitself,bypurelymechanicalnecessity,thehumanindividualandallthatbelongstohim.Onthatviewtheconsciousnessoffreedomcanbenothingmorethananillusion.ForwhilstIconsidermyselftheauthorofmyaction,itisthematterofwhichIamcomposedandthemovementswhicharegoingoninitthatdetermineme.Iimagine

myselffree,butactuallyallmyactionsarenothingbuttheeffectsofthemetabolismwhichisthebasisofmyphysicalandmentalorganisation.Itisonlybecausewedonotknowthemotiveswhichcompelusthatwehavethefeelingoffreedom.“Wemustemphasisethatthefeelingoffreedomdependsontheabsenceofexternalcompellingmotives.”“Ouractionsareasmuchsubjecttonecessityasourthoughts”(Ziehen,LeitfadenderPhysiologischenPsychologie,pp.207,ff.).1

AnotherpossibilityisthatsomeonewillfindinaspiritualbeingtheAbsolutelyingbehindallphenomena.Ifso,hewilllookforthespringofactioninsomekindofspiritualpower.Hewillregardthemoralprincipleswhichhisreasoncontainsasthemanifestationofthisspiritualbeing,whichpursuesinmenitsownspecialpurposes.MorallawsappeartotheDualist,whoholdsthisview,asdictatedbytheAbsolute,andman’sonlytaskistodiscover,bymeansofhisreason,thedecisionsoftheAbsoluteandtocarrythemout.FortheDualist,themoralorderoftheworldisthevisiblesymbolofthehigherorderthatliesbehindit.Ourhumanmoralityisarevelationofthedivineworld-order.Itisnotmanwhomattersinthismoralorderbutrealityinitself,thatis,God.ManoughttodowhatGodwills.EduardvonHartmann,whoidentifiesreality,assuch,withGod,andwhotreatsGod’sexistenceasalifeofsuffering,believesthattheDivineBeinghascreatedtheworldinordertogain,bymeansoftheworld,releasefromhisinfinitesuffering.Hencethisphilosopherregardsthemoralevolutionofhumanityasaprocess,thefunctionofwhichistheredemptionofGod.“Onlythroughthebuildingupofamoralworld-orderonthepartofrational,self-consciousindividualsisitpossiblefortheworld-processtoapproximatetoitsgoal.”“RealexistenceistheincarnationofGod.Theworld-processisthepassionofGodwhohasbecomeflesh,andatthesametimethewayofredemptionforHimwhowascrucifiedintheflesh;andmoralityisourco-operationintheshorteningofthisprocessofsufferingandredemption”(Hartmann,PhänomenologiedessittlichenBewusstseins,§871).Onthisview,mandoesnotactbecausehewills,buthemustactbecauseitisGod’swilltoberedeemed.WhereastheMaterialisticDualistturnsmanintoanautomaton,theactionofwhichisnothingbuttheeffectofcausalityaccordingtopurelymechanicallaws,theSpiritualisticDualist(i.e.,hewhotreatstheAbsolute,thething-in-itself,asaspiritualsomethinginwhichmanwithhisconsciousexperiencehasnoshare),makesmantheslaveofthewilloftheAbsolute.NeitherMaterialism,norSpiritualism,noringeneralMetaphysicalRealismwhichinfers,astruereality,anextra-humansomethingwhichitdoesnotexperience,haveanyroomforfreedom.

NaïveandMetaphysicalRealism,iftheyaretobeconsistent,havetodenyfreedomforoneandthesamereason,viz.,because,forthem,mandoesnothingbutcarryout,orexecute,principlesnecessarilyimposeduponhim.NaïveRealismdestroysfreedombysubjectingmantoauthority,whetheritbethatofaperceptiblebeing,orthatofabeingconceivedontheanalogyofperceptiblebeings,or,lastly,thatoftheabstractvoiceofconscience.TheMetaphysician,contentmerelytoinferanextra-humanreality,isunabletoacknowledgefreedombecause,forhim,manisdetermined,mechanicallyormorally,bya“thing-in-itself.”

MonismwillhavetoadmitthepartialjustificationofNaïveRealism,withwhichitagreesinadmittingthepartplayedbytheworldofpercepts.Hewhoisincapableofproducing

moralideasthroughintuitionmustreceivethemfromothers.Insofarasamanreceiveshismoralprinciplesfromwithoutheisactuallyunfree.ButMonismascribestotheideathesameimportanceastothepercept.Theideacanmanifestitselfonlyinhumanindividuals.Insofarasmanobeystheimpulsescomingfromthissideheisfree.ButMonismdeniesalljustificationtoMetaphysics,andconsequentlyalsototheimpulsesofactionwhicharederivedfromso-called“things-in-themselves.”AccordingtotheMonisticview,man’sactionisunfreewhenheobeyssomeperceptibleexternalcompulsion;itisfreewhenheobeysnonebuthimself.ThereisnoroominMonismforanykindofunconsciouscompulsionhiddenbehindperceptandconcept.Ifanybodymaintainsoftheactionofafellow-manthatithasnotbeenfreelydone,heisboundtoproducewithinthevisibleworldthethingorthepersonortheinstitutionwhichhascausedtheagenttoact.Andifhesupportshiscontentionbyanappealtocausesofactionlyingoutsidetherealworldofourperceptsandthoughts,thenMonismmustdeclinetotakeaccountofsuchanassertion.

AccordingtotheMonistictheory,then,man’sactionispartlyfree,partlyunfree.Heisconsciousofhimselfasunfreeintheworldofpercepts,andherealisesinhimselfthespiritwhichisfree.

ThemorallawswhichhisinferencescompeltheMetaphysiciantoregardasissuingfromahigherpowerhave,accordingtotheupholderofMonism,beenconceivedbymenthemselves.Tohimthemoralorderisneitheramereimageofapurelymechanicalorderofnaturenorofthedivinegovernmentoftheworld,butthroughandthroughthefreecreationofmen.Itisnotman’sbusinesstorealiseGod’swillintheworld,buthisown.Hecarriesouthisowndecisionsandintentions,notthoseofanotherbeing.Monismdoesnotfindbehindhumanagentsaruleroftheworld,determiningthemtoactaccordingtohiswill.Menpursueonlytheirownhumanends.Moreover,eachindividualpursueshisownprivateends.Fortheworldofideasrealisesitself,notinacommunity,butonlyinindividualmen.Whatappearsasthecommongoalofacommunityisnothingbuttheresultoftheseparatevolitionsofitsindividualmembers,andmostcommonlyofafewoutstandingmenwhomtherestfollowastheirleaders.Eachoneofushasitinhimtobeafreespirit,justaseveryrosebudispotentiallyarose.

Monism,then,isinthesphereofgenuinelymoralactionthetruephilosophyoffreedom.Beingalsoaphilosophyofreality,itrejectsthemetaphysical(unreal)restrictionofthefreespiritasemphaticallyasitacknowledgesthephysicalandhistorical(naïvelyreal)restrictionsofthenaïveman.Inasmuchasitdoesnotlookuponmanasafinishedproduct,exhibitingineverymomentofhislifehisfullnature,itconsidersidlethedisputewhetherman,assuch,isfreeornot.Itlooksuponmanasadevelopingbeing,andaskswhether,inthecourseofthisdevelopment,hecanreachthestageofthefreespirit.

MonismknowsthatNaturedoesnotsendforthmanready-madeasafreespirit,butthatsheleadshimuptoacertainstage,fromwhichhecontinuestodevelopstillasanunfreebeing,untilhereachesthepointwherehefindshisownself.

Monismperceivesclearlythatabeingactingunderphysicalormoralcompulsioncannotbetrulymoral.Itregardsthestagesofautomaticaction(inaccordancewithnatural

impulsesandinstincts),andofobedientaction(inaccordancewithmoralnorms),asanecessarypropædeuticformorality,butitunderstandsthatitispossibleforthefreespirittotranscendboththesetransitorystages.Monismemancipatesmaningeneralfromalltheself-imposedfettersofthemaximsofnaïvemorality,andfromalltheexternallyimposedmaximsofspeculativeMetaphysicians.TheformerMonismcanaslittleeliminatefromtheworldasitcaneliminatepercepts.Thelatteritrejects,becauseitlooksforallprinciplesofexplanationofthephenomenaoftheworldwithinthatworldandnotoutsideit.JustasMonismrefuseseventoentertainthethoughtofcognitiveprinciplesotherthanthoseapplicabletomen(p.125),soitrejectsalsotheconceptofmoralmaximsotherthanthoseoriginatedbymen.Humanmorality,likehumanknowledge,isconditionedbyhumannature,andjustasbeingsofahigherorderwouldprobablymeanbyknowledgesomethingverydifferentfromwhatwemeanbyit,sowemayassumethatotherbeingswouldhaveaverydifferentmorality.ForMonists,moralityisaspecificallyhumanquality,andfreedomthehumanwaybeingmoral.

1.ADDITIONTOTHEREVISEDEDITION(1918).

Informingajudgmentabouttheargumentofthetwoprecedingchapters,adifficultymayarisefromwhatmayappeartobeacontradiction.Ontheoneside,wehavespokenoftheexperienceofthinkingasonethesignificanceofwhichisuniversalandequallyvalidforeveryhumanconsciousness.Ontheotherside,wehavepointedoutthattheideaswhichwerealiseinmoralactionandwhicharehomogeneouswiththosethatthinkingelaborates,manifestthemselvesineveryhumanconsciousnessinauniquelyindividualway.Ifwecannotgetbeyondregardingthisantithesisasa“contradiction,”andifwedonotrecognisethatinthelivingintuitionofthisactuallyexistingantithesisapieceofman’sessentialnaturerevealsitself,weshallnotbeabletoapprehendinthetruelighteitherwhatknowledgeisorwhatfreedomis.Thosewhothinkofconceptsasnothingmorethanabstractionsfromtheworldofpercepts,andwhodonotacknowledgethepartwhichintuitionplays,cannotbutregardasa“purecontradiction”thethoughtforwhichwehavehereclaimedreality.Butifweunderstandhowideasareexperiencedintuitivelyintheirself-sustainingessence,weseeclearlythat,inknowledge,manlivesandentersintotheworldofideasasintosomethingwhichisidenticalforallmen.Ontheotherhand,whenmanderivesfromthatworldtheintuitionsforhisvoluntaryactions,heindividualisesamemberoftheworldofideasbythatsameactivitywhichhepractisesasauniversallyhumanoneinthespiritualandidealprocessofcognition.Theapparentcontradictionbetweentheuniversalcharacterofcognitiveideasandtheindividualcharacterofmoralideasbecomes,whenintuitedinitsreality,alivingconcept.Itisacriterionoftheessentialnatureofmanthatwhatweintuitivelyapprehendofhisnatureoscillates,likealivingpendulum,betweenknowledgewhichisuniversallyvalid,andindividualisedexperienceofthisuniversalcontent.Thosewhofailtoperceivetheoneoscillationinitsrealcharacter,willregardthinkingasamerelysubjectivehumanactivity.Forthosewhoareunabletograsptheotheroscillation,man’sactivityinthinkingwillseemtoloseallindividuallife.Knowledgeistotheformer,themorallifetothelatter,anunintelligiblefact.Bothwillfallbackonallsortsofideasfortheexplanationoftheoneoroftheother,

becausebotheitherdonotunderstandatallhowthinkingcanbeintuitivelyexperienced,or,else,misunderstanditasanactivitywhichmerelyabstracts.

Onpage180IhavespokenofMaterialism.Iamwellawarethattherearethinkers,liketheabove-mentionedTh.Ziehen,whodonotcallthemselvesMaterialistsatall,butyetwhomustbecalledsofromthepointofviewadoptedinthisbook.Itdoesnotmatterwhetherathinkersaysthatforhimtheworldisnotrestrictedtomerelymaterialbeing,andthat,therefore,heisnotaMaterialist.No,whatmattersiswhetherhedevelopsconceptswhichareapplicableonlytomaterialbeing.Anyonewhosays,“ouraction,likeourthought,isnecessarilydetermined,”laysdownaconceptwhichisapplicableonlytomaterialprocesses,butnotapplicableeithertowhatwedoortowhatweare.Andifheweretothinkoutwhathisconceptimplies,hewouldendbythinkingmaterialistically.Hesaveshimselffromthisfateonlybythesameinconsistencywhichsooftenresultsfromnotthinkingone’sthoughtsouttotheend.ItisoftensaidnowadaysthattheMaterialismofthenineteenthcenturyisscientificallydead.Butintruthitisnotso.Itisonlythatnowadayswefrequentlyfailtonoticethatwehavenootherideasthanthosewhichapplyonlytothematerialworld.ThusrecentMaterialismisdisguised,whereasinthesecondhalfofthenineteenthcenturyitopenlyflaunteditself.TowardsatheorywhichapprehendstheworldspirituallythecamouflagedMaterialismofthepresentisnolessintolerantthantheself-confessedMaterialismofthelastcentury.ButitdeceivesmanywhothinktheyhavearighttorejectatheoryoftheworldintermsofSpirit,onthegroundthatthescientificworld-view“haslongagoabandonedMaterialism.”

ForthemannerinwhichIhaveherespokenof“Materialism,”andforthejustificationofsospeakingofit,seetheAdditionattheendofthischapter.↑

WORLD-PURPOSEANDLIFE-PURPOSE

(THEDESTINYOFMAN)

Amongthemanifoldcurrentsinthespirituallifeofhumanitythereisonewhichwemustnowtrace,andwhichwemaycalltheeliminationoftheconceptofpurposefromspherestowhichitdoesnotbelong.Adaptationtopurposeisaspecialkindofsequenceofphenomena.Suchadaptationisgenuinelyrealonlywhen,incontrasttotherelationofcauseandeffectinwhichtheantecedenteventdeterminesthesubsequent,thesubsequenteventdeterminestheantecedent.Thisispossibleonlyinthesphereofhumanactions.Manperformsactionswhichhefirstpresentstohimselfinidea,andheallowshimselftobedeterminedtoactionbythisidea.Theconsequent,i.e.,theaction,influencesbymeansoftheideatheantecedent,i.e.,thehumanagent.Ifthesequenceistohavepurposivecharacter,itisabsolutelynecessarytohavethiscircuitousprocessthroughhumanideas.

Intheprocesswhichwecananalyseintocauseandeffect,wemustdistinguishperceptfromconcept.Theperceptofthecauseprecedestheperceptoftheeffect.Causeandeffectwouldsimplystandsidebysideinourconsciousness,ifwewerenotabletoconnectthemwithoneanotherthroughthecorrespondingconcepts.Theperceptoftheeffectmustalwaysbeconsequentupontheperceptofthecause.Iftheeffectistohavearealinfluenceuponthecause,itcandosoonlybymeansoftheconceptualfactor.Fortheperceptualfactoroftheeffectsimplydoesnotexistpriortotheperceptualfactorofthecause.Whoevermaintainsthatthefloweristhepurposeoftheroot,i.e.,thattheformerdeterminesthelatter,canmakegoodthisassertiononlyconcerningthatfactorintheflowerwhichhisthoughtrevealsinit.Theperceptualfactoroftheflowerisnotyetinexistenceatthetimewhentherootoriginates.

Inordertohaveapurposiveconnection,itisnotonlynecessarytohaveanidealconnectionofconsequentandantecedentaccordingtolaw,buttheconcept(law)oftheeffectmustreally,i.e.,bymeansofaperceptibleprocess,influencethecause.Suchaperceptibleinfluenceofaconceptuponsomethingelseistobeobservedonlyinhumanactions.Hencethisistheonlysphereinwhichtheconceptofpurposeisapplicable.Thenaïveconsciousness,whichregardsasrealonlywhatisperceptible,attempts,aswehaverepeatedlypointedout,tointroduceperceptiblefactorsevenwhereonlyidealfactorscanactuallybefound.Insequencesofperceptibleeventsitlooksforperceptibleconnections,or,failingtofindthem,itimportsthembyimagination.Theconceptofpurpose,validforsubjectiveactions,isveryconvenientforinventingsuchimaginaryconnections.Thenaïvemindknowshowitproduceseventsitself,andconsequentlyconcludesthatNatureproceedslikewise.IntheconnectionsofNaturewhicharepurelyidealitfinds,notonlyinvisibleforces,butalsoinvisiblerealpurposes.Manmakeshistoolstosuithispurposes.Onthesameprinciple,sotheNaïveRealistimagines,theCreatorconstructsallorganisms.Itisbutslowlythatthismistakenconceptofpurposeisbeingdrivenoutofthesciences.Inphilosophy,evenatthepresentday,itstilldoesagooddealofmischief.Philosophersstillasksuchquestionsas,Whatisthepurposeoftheworld?Whatisthefunction(andconsequentlythepurpose)ofman?etc.

Monismrejectstheconceptofpurposeineverysphere,withthesoleexceptionofhumanaction.ItlooksforlawsofNature,butnotforpurposesofNature.PurposesofNature,nolessthaninvisibleforces(p.118),arearbitraryassumptions.Butevenlife-purposeswhichmandoesnotsetupforhimself,are,fromthestandpointofMonism,illegitimateassumptions.Nothingispurposiveexceptwhatmanhasmadeso,foronlytherealisationofideasoriginatesanythingpurposive.Butanideabecomeseffective,intherealisticsense,onlyinhumanactions.Hencelifehasnootherpurposeorfunctionthantheonewhichmangivestoit.Ifthequestionbeasked,Whatisman’spurposeinlife?Monismhasbutoneanswer:Thepurposewhichhegivestohimself.Ihavenopredestinedmissionintheworld;mymission,atanyonemoment,isthatwhichIchooseformyself.Idonotenteruponlife’svoyagewithafixedroutemappedoutforme.

Ideasarerealisedonlybyhumanagents.Consequently,itisillegitimatetospeakoftheembodimentofideasbyhistory.Allsuchstatementsas“historyistheevolutionofmantowardsfreedom,”or“therealisationofthemoralworld-order,”etc.,are,fromaMonisticpointofview,untenable.

Thesupportersoftheconceptofpurposebelievethat,insurrenderingit,theyareforcedtosurrenderalsoallunityandorderintheworld.Listen,forexample,toRobertHamerling(AtomistikdesWillens,vol.ii,p.201):“AslongasthereareinstinctsinNature,solongisitfoolishtodenypurposesinNature.Justasthestructureofalimbofthehumanbodyisnotdeterminedandconditionedbyanideaofthislimb,floatingsomewhereinmid-air,butbyitsconnectionwiththemoreinclusivewhole,thebody,towhichthelimbbelongs,sothestructureofeverynaturalobject,beitplant,animal,orman,isnotdeterminedandconditionedbyanideaofitfloatinginmid-air,butbytheformativeprincipleofthemoreinclusivewholeofNaturewhichunfoldsandorganisesitselfinapurposivemanner.”Andonpage191ofthesamevolumeweread:“Teleologymaintainsonlythat,inspiteofthethousandmisfitsandmiseriesofthisnaturallife,thereisahighdegreeofadaptationtopurposeandplanunmistakableintheformationsanddevelopmentsofNature—anadaptation,however,whichisrealisedonlywithinthelimitsofnaturallaws,andwhichdoesnottendtotheproductionofsomeimaginaryfairy-land,inwhichlifewouldnotbeconfrontedbydeath,growthbydecay,withallthemoreorlessunpleasant,butquiteunavoidable,intermediarystagesbetweenthem.WhenthecriticsofTeleologyopposealaboriouslycollectedrubbish-heapofpartialorcomplete,imaginaryorreal,maladaptationstoaworldfullofwondersofpurposiveadaptation,suchasNatureexhibitsinallherdomains,thenIconsiderthisjustasamusing——”

Whatisheremeantbypurposiveadaptation?Nothingbuttheconsonanceofperceptswithinawhole.But,sinceallperceptsarebaseduponlaws(ideas),whichwediscoverbymeansofthinking,itfollowsthattheorderlycoherenceofthemembersofaperceptualwholeisnothingmorethantheideal(logical)coherenceofthemembersoftheidealwholewhichiscontainedinthisperceptualwhole.Tosaythatananimaloramanisnotdeterminedbyanideafloatinginmid-airisamisleadingwayofputtingit,andtheviewwhichthecriticattackslosesitsapparentabsurdityassoonasthephraseisputright.Ananimalcertainlyisnotdeterminedbyanideafloatinginmid-air,butitisdeterminedbyanideainborninitandconstitutingthelawofitsnature.Itisjustbecausetheideaisnot

externaltothenaturalobject,butisoperativeinitasitsveryessence,thatwecannotspeakhereofadaptationtopurpose.Thosewhodenythatnaturalobjectsaredeterminedfromwithout(anditdoesnotmatter,inthiscontext,whetheritbebyanideafloatinginmid-airorexistinginthemindofacreatoroftheworld),aretheverymenwhooughttoadmitthatsuchanobjectisnotdeterminedbypurposeandplanfromwithout,butbycauseandlawfromwithin.Amachineisproducedinaccordancewithapurpose,ifIestablishaconnectionbetweenitspartswhichisnotgiveninNature.ThepurposivecharacterofthecombinationswhichIeffectconsistsjustinthis,thatIembodymyideaoftheworkingofthemachineinthemachineitself.Inthiswaythemachinecomesintoexistenceasanobjectofperceptionembodyingacorrespondingidea.Naturalobjectshaveaverysimilarcharacter.Whoevercallsathingpurposivebecauseitsformisinaccordancewithplanorlawmay,ifhesoplease,callnaturalobjectsalsopurposive,providedonlythathedoesnotconfusethiskindofpurposivenesswiththatwhichbelongstoasubjectivehumanaction.Inordertohaveapurpose,itisabsolutelynecessarythattheefficientcauseshouldbeaconcept,morepreciselyaconceptoftheeffect.ButinNaturewecannowherepointtoconceptsoperatingascauses.Aconceptisneveranythingbuttheidealnexusofcauseandeffect.CausesoccurinNatureonlyintheformofpercepts.

Dualismmaytalkofcosmicandnaturalpurposes.Whereverforourperceptionthereisanexusofcauseandeffectaccordingtolaw,theretheDualistisfreetoassumethatwehavebuttheimageofanexusinwhichtheAbsolutehasrealiseditspurposes.ForMonism,ontheotherhand,therejectionofanAbsoluteRealityimpliesalsotherejectionoftheassumptionofpurposesinWorldandNature.

Noonewho,withanopenmind,hasfollowedtheprecedingargument,willcometotheconclusionthattheauthor,inrejectingtheconceptofpurposeforextra-humanfacts,intendedtosidewiththosethinkerswhorejectthisconceptinordertobeabletoregard,first,everythingoutsidehumanactionand,next,humanactionitself,asapurelynaturalprocess.Againstsuchmisunderstandingtheauthorshouldbeprotectedbythefactthattheprocessofthinkingisinthisbookrepresentedasapurelyspiritualprocess.Thereasonforrejectingtheconceptofpurposeevenforthespiritualworld,sofarasitliesoutsidehumanaction,isthatinthisworldthereisrevealedsomethinghigherthanapurpose,suchasisrealisedinhumanlife.Andwhenwecharacteriseaserroneoustheattempttoconceivethedestinyofthehumanraceaspurposiveaccordingtothepatternofhumanpurposiveness,wemeanthattheindividualadoptspurposes,andthattheresultofthetotalactivityofhumanityiscomposedoftheseindividualpurposes.Thisresultissomethinghigherthanitscomponentparts,thepurposesofindividualmen.

MORALIMAGINATION

(DARWINANDMORALITY)

Afreespiritactsaccordingtohisimpulses,i.e.,intuitions,whichhisthoughthasselectedoutofthewholeworldofhisideas.Foranunfreespirit,thereasonwhyhesinglesoutaparticularintuitionfromhisworldofideas,inordertomakeitthebasisofanaction,liesintheperceptualworldwhichisgiventohim,i.e.,inhispastexperiences.Herecalls,beforemakingadecision,whatsomeoneelsehasdone,orrecommendedasproperinananalogouscase,orwhatGodhascommandedtobedoneinsuchacase,etc.,andheactsontheserecollections.Afreespiritdispenseswiththesepreliminaries.Hisdecisionisabsolutelyoriginal.Hecaresaslittlewhatothershavedoneinsuchacaseaswhatcommandstheyhavelaiddown.Hehaspurelyideal(logical)reasonswhichdeterminehimtoselectaparticularconceptoutofthesumofhisconcepts,andtorealiseitinaction.Buthisactionwillbelongtoperceptiblereality.Consequently,whatheachieveswillcoincidewithadefinitecontentofperception.Hisconceptwillhavetoberealisedinaconcreteparticularevent.Asaconceptitwillnotcontainthiseventasparticular.Itwillrefertotheeventonlyinitsgenericcharacter,justas,ingeneral,aconceptisrelatedtoapercept,e.g.,theconceptliontoaparticularlion.Thelinkbetweenconceptandperceptistheidea(cp.pp.104ff).Totheunfreespiritthisintermediatelinkisgivenfromtheoutset.Motivesexistinhisconsciousnessfromthefirstintheformofideas.Wheneverheintendstodoanythingheactsashehasseenothersact,orheobeystheinstructionshereceivesineachseparatecase.Henceauthorityismosteffectiveintheformofexamples,i.e.,intheformoftraditionalpatternsofparticularactionshandeddownfortheguidanceoftheunfreespirit.AChristianmodelshisconductlessontheteachingthanonthepatternoftheSaviour.Ruleshavelessvaluefortellingmenpositivelywhattodothanfortellingthemwhattoleaveundone.Lawstakeontheformofuniversalconceptsonlywhentheyforbidactions,notwhentheyprescribeactions.Lawsconcerningwhatweoughttodomustbegiventotheunfreespiritinwhollyconcreteform.Cleanthestreetinfrontofyourdoor!Payyourtaxestosuchandsuchanamounttothetax-collector!etc.Conceptualformbelongstolawswhichinhibitactions.Thoushaltnotsteal!Thoushaltnotcommitadultery!Buttheselaws,too,influencetheunfreespiritonlybymeansofaconcreteidea,e.g.,theideaofthepunishmentsattachedbyhumanauthority,orofthepangsofconscience,orofeternaldamnation,etc.

Evenwhenthemotivetoanactionexistsinuniversalconceptualform(e.g.,Thoushaltdogoodtothyfellow-men!Thoushaltlivesothatthoupromotestbestthywelfare!),therestillremainstobefound,intheparticularcase,theconcreteideaoftheaction(therelationoftheconcepttoacontentofperception).Forafreespiritwhoisnotguidedbyanymodelnorbyfearofpunishment,etc.,thistranslationoftheconceptintoanideaisalwaysnecessary.

Concreteideasareformedbyusonthebasisofourconceptsbymeansoftheimagination.Hencewhatthefreespiritneedsinordertorealisehisconcepts,inordertoasserthimselfintheworld,ismoralimagination.Thisisthesourceofthefreespirit’saction.Onlythose

men,therefore,whoareendowedwithmoralimaginationare,properlyspeaking,morallyproductive.Thosewhomerelypreachmorality,i.e.,thosewhomerelyexcogitatemoralruleswithoutbeingabletocondensethemintoconcreteideas,aremorallyunproductive.Theyarelikethosecriticswhocanexplainverycompetentlyhowaworkofartoughttobemade,butwhoarethemselvesincapableofthesmallestartisticproduction.

Moralimagination,inordertorealiseitsideas,mustenterintoadeterminatesphereofpercepts.Humanactiondoesnotcreatepercepts,buttransformsalreadyexistingperceptsandgivesthemanewcharacter.Inordertobeabletotransformadefiniteobjectofperception,orasumofsuchobjects,inaccordancewithamoralidea,itisnecessarytounderstandtheobject’slaw(itsmodeofactionwhichoneintendstotransform,ortowhichonewantstogiveanewdirection).Further,itisnecessarytodiscovertheprocedurebywhichitispossibletochangethegivenlawintothenewone.Thispartofeffectivemoralactivitydependsonknowledgeoftheparticularworldofphenomenawithwhichonehasgottodeal.Weshall,therefore,finditinsomebranchofscientificknowledge.Moralaction,then,presupposes,inadditiontothefacultyofmoralconcepts1andofmoralimagination,theabilitytoaltertheworldofperceptswithoutviolatingthenaturallawsbywhichtheyareconnected.Thisabilityismoraltechnique.Itmaybelearntinthesamesenseinwhichscienceingeneralmaybelearnt.For,ingeneral,menarebetterabletofindconceptsfortheworldasitis,thanproductivelytooriginateoutoftheirimaginationsfuture,andasyetnon-existing,actions.Hence,itisverywellpossibleformenwithoutmoralimaginationtoreceivemoralideasfromothers,andtoembodytheseskilfullyintheactualworld.Viceversa,itmayhappenthatmenwithmoralimaginationlacktechnicalskill,andaredependentontheserviceofothermenfortherealisationoftheirideas.

Insofaraswerequireformoralactionknowledgeoftheobjectsuponwhichweareabouttoact,ouractiondependsuponsuchknowledge.Whatweneedtoknowherearethelawsofnature.ThesebelongtotheNaturalSciences,nottoEthics.

Moralimaginationandthefacultyofmoralconceptscanbecomeobjectsoftheoryonlyaftertheyhavefirstbeenemployedbytheindividual.But,thusregarded,theynolongerregulatelife,buthavealreadyregulatedit.Theymustnowbetreatedasefficientcauses,likeallothercauses(theyarepurposesonlyforthesubject).Thestudyofthemis,asitwere,theNaturalScienceofmoralideas.

EthicsasaNormativeScience,overandabovethisscience,isimpossible.

SomewouldmaintainthenormativecharacterofmorallawsatleastinthesensethatEthicsistobetakenasakindofdieteticwhich,fromtheconditionsoftheorganism’slife,deducesgeneralrules,onthebasisofwhichithopestogivedetaileddirectionstothebody(Paulsen,SystemderEthik).Thiscomparisonismistaken,becauseourmorallifecannotbecomparedwiththelifeoftheorganism.Thebehaviouroftheorganismoccurswithoutanyvolitiononourpart.Itslawsarefixeddatainourworld;hencewecandiscoverthemandapplythemwhendiscovered.Morallaws,ontheotherhand,donotexistuntilwecreatethem.Wecannotapplythemuntilwehavecreatedthem.Theerrorisduetothefactthatmorallawsarenotateverymomentnewcreations,butarehandeddownbytradition.

Thosewhichwetakeoverfromourancestorsappeartobegivenlikethenaturallawsoftheorganism.Butitdoesnotfollowthatalatergenerationhastherighttoapplytheminthesamewayasdieteticrules.Fortheyapplytoindividuals,andnot,likenaturallaws,tospecimensofagenus.Consideredasanorganism,Iamsuchagenericspecimen,andIshallliveinaccordancewithnatureifIapplythelawsofmygenustomyparticularcase.AsamoralagentIamanindividualandhavemyownprivatelaws.2

TheviewhereupheldappearstocontradictthatfundamentaldoctrineofmodernNaturalSciencewhichisknownastheTheoryofEvolution.Butitonlyappearstodoso.Byevolutionwemeantherealdevelopmentofthelateroutoftheearlierinaccordancewithnaturallaw.Intheorganicworld,evolutionmeansthatthelater(moreperfect)organicformsarerealdescendantsoftheearlier(imperfect)forms,andhavegrownoutoftheminaccordancewithnaturallaws.Theupholdersofthetheoryoforganicevolutionbelievethattherewasonceatimeonourearth,whenwecouldhaveobservedwithourowneyesthegradualevolutionofreptilesoutofProto-Amniotes,supposingthatwecouldhavebeenpresentasmen,andhadbeenendowedwithasufficientlylongspanoflife.Similarly,EvolutionistssupposethatmancouldhavewatchedthedevelopmentofthesolarsystemoutoftheprimordialnebulaoftheKant-Laplacehypothesis,ifhecouldhaveoccupiedasuitablespotintheworld-etherduringthatinfinitelylongperiod.ButnoEvolutionistwilldreamofmaintainingthathecouldfromhisconceptoftheprimordialAmniondeducethatofthereptilewithallitsqualities,evenifhehadneverseenareptile.JustaslittlewoulditbepossibletoderivethesolarsystemfromtheconceptoftheKant-Laplacenebula,ifthisconceptofanoriginalnebulahadbeenformedonlyfromtheperceptofthenebula.Inotherwords,iftheEvolutionististothinkconsistently,heisboundtomaintainthatoutofearlierphasesofevolutionlateronesreallydevelop;thatoncetheconceptoftheimperfectandthatoftheperfecthavebeengiven,wecanunderstandtheconnection.Butinnocasewillheadmitthattheconceptformedfromtheearlierphasesis,initself,sufficientfordeducingfromitthelaterphases.FromthisitfollowsforEthicsthat,whilstwecanunderstandtheconnectionoflatermoralconceptswithearlierones,itisnotpossibletodeduceasinglenewmoralideafromearlierones.Theindividual,asamoralbeing,produceshisowncontent.Thiscontent,thusproduced,isforEthicsadatum,asmuchasreptilesareadatumforNaturalScience.ReptileshaveevolvedoutoftheProto-Amniotes,butthescientistcannotmanufacturetheconceptofreptilesoutoftheconceptoftheProto-Amniotes.Latermoralideasevolveoutoftheearlierones,butEthicscannotmanufactureoutofthemoralprinciplesofanearlieragethoseofalaterone.Theconfusionisduetothefactthat,asscientists,westartwiththefactsbeforeus,andthenmakeatheoryaboutthem,whereasinmoralactionwefirstproducethefactsourselves,andthentheoriseaboutthem.Intheevolutionofthemoralworld-orderweaccomplishwhat,atalowerlevel,Natureaccomplishes:wealtersomepartoftheperceptualworld.Hencetheethicalnormcannotstraightwaybemadeanobjectofknowledge,likealawofnature,foritmustfirstbecreated.Onlywhenthathasbeendonecanthenormbecomeanobjectofknowledge.

Butisitnotpossibletomaketheoldameasureforthenew?Isnoteverymancompelledtomeasurethedeliverancesofhismoralimaginationbythestandardoftraditionalmoral

principles?Ifhewouldbetrulyproductiveinmorality,suchmeasuringisasmuchanabsurdityasitwouldbeanabsurdityifoneweretomeasureanewspeciesinnaturebyanoldoneandsaythatreptiles,becausetheydonotagreewiththeProto-Amniotes,areanillegitimate(degenerate)species.

EthicalIndividualism,then,sofarfrombeinginoppositiontothetheoryofevolution,isadirectconsequenceofit.Haeckel’sgenealogicaltree,fromprotozoauptomanasanorganicbeing,oughttobecapableofbeingworkedoutwithoutabreachofnaturallaw,andwithoutagapinitsuniformevolution,uptotheindividualasabeingwithadeterminatemoralnature.But,whilstitisquitetruethatthemoralideasoftheindividualhaveperceptiblygrownoutofthoseofhisancestors,itisalsotruethattheindividualismorallybarren,unlesshehasmoralideasofhisown.

ThesameEthicalIndividualismwhichIhavedevelopedonthebasisoftheprecedingprinciples,mightbeequallywelldevelopedonthebasisofthetheoryofevolution.Thefinalresultwouldbethesame;onlythepathbywhichitwasreachedwouldbedifferent.

Thatabsolutelynewmoralideasshouldbedevelopedbythemoralimaginationisforthetheoryofevolutionnomoreinexplicablethanthedevelopmentofoneanimalspeciesoutofanother,providedonlythatthistheory,asaMonisticworld-view,rejects,inmoralityasinscience,everytranscendent(metaphysical)influence.Indoingso,itfollowsthesameprinciplebywhichitisguidedinseekingthecausesofneworganicformsinformsalreadyexisting,butnotintheinterferenceofanextra-mundaneGod,whoproduceseverynewspeciesinaccordancewithanewcreativeideathroughsupernaturalinterference.JustasMonismhasnouseforsupernaturalcreativeideasinexplaininglivingorganisms,soitisequallyimpossibleforittoderivethemoralworld-orderfromcauseswhichdonotliewithintheworld.Itcannotadmitanycontinuoussupernaturalinfluenceuponmorallife(divinegovernmentoftheworldfromtheoutside),noraninfluenceeitherthroughaparticularactofrevelationataparticularmomentinhistory(givingofthetencommandments),orthroughGod’sappearanceontheearth(DivinityofChrist3).Moralprocessesare,forMonism,naturalproductslikeeverythingelsethatexists,andtheircausesmustbelookedforinnature,i.e.,inman,becausemanisthebearerofmorality.

EthicalIndividualism,then,isthecrownoftheedificethatDarwinandHaeckelhaveerectedforNaturalScience.Itisthetheoryofevolutionappliedtothemorallife.

Anyonewhorestrictstheconceptofthenaturalfromtheoutsettoanartificiallylimitedandnarrowedsphere,iseasilytemptednottoallowanyroomwithinitforfreeindividualaction.TheconsistentEvolutionistdoesnoteasilyfallapreytosuchanarrow-mindedview.Hecannotlettheprocessofevolutionterminatewiththeape,andacknowledgeformanasupernaturalorigin.Again,hecannotstopshortattheorganicreactionsofmanandregardonlytheseasnatural.Hehastotreatalsothelifeofmoralself-determinationasthecontinuationoforganiclife.TheEvolutionist,then,inaccordancewithhisfundamentalprinciples,canmaintainonlythatmoralactionevolvesoutofthelessperfectformsofnaturalprocesses.Hemustleavethecharacterisationofaction,i.e.,itsdeterminationasfreeaction,totheimmediateobservationofeachagent.Allthathemaintainsisonlythatmenhavedevelopedoutofnon-humanancestors.Whatthenatureofmenactuallyismust

bedeterminedbyobservationofmenthemselves.Theresultsofthisobservationcannotpossiblycontradictthehistoryofevolution.Onlytheassertionthattheresultsaresuchastoexcludetheirbeingduetoanaturalworld-orderwouldcontradictrecentdevelopmentsintheNaturalSciences.4

EthicalIndividualism,then,hasnothingtofearfromaNaturalSciencewhichunderstandsitself.Observationyieldsfreedomasthecharacteristicqualityoftheperfectformofhumanaction.Freedommustbeattributedtothehumanwill,insofarasthewillrealisespurelyidealintuitions.Forthesearenottheeffectsofanecessityactinguponthemfromwithout,butaregroundedinthemselves.Whenwefindthatanactionembodiessuchanidealintuition,wefeelittobefree.Freedomconsistsinthischaracterofanaction.

What,then,fromthestandpointofnaturearewetosayofthedistinction,alreadymentionedabove(p.8),betweenthetwostatements,“Tobefreemeanstobeabletodowhatyouwill,”and“Tobeable,asyouplease,tostriveornottostriveistherealmeaningofthedogmaoffreewill”?Hamerlingbaseshistheoryoffreewillpreciselyonthisdistinction,bydeclaringthefirststatementtobecorrectbutthesecondtobeanabsurdtautology.Hesays,“IcandowhatIwill,buttosayIcanwillwhatIwillisanemptytautology.”WhetherIamabletodo,i.e.,tomakereal,whatIwill,i.e.,whatIhavesetbeforemyselfasmyideaofaction,thatdependsonexternalcircumstancesandonmytechnicalskill(cp.p.200).Tobefreemeanstobeabletodeterminebymoralimaginationoutofoneselfthoseideas(motives)whichlieatthebasisofaction.FreedomisimpossibleifanythingotherthanImyself(whetheramechanicalprocessorGod)determinesmymoralideas.Inotherwords,IamfreeonlywhenImyselfproducetheseideas,butnotwhenIammerelyabletorealisetheideaswhichanotherbeinghasimplantedinme.Afreebeingisonewhocanwillwhatheregardsasright.Whoeverdoesanythingotherthanwhathewillsmustbeimpelledtoitbymotiveswhichdonotlieinhimself.Suchamanisunfreeinhisaction.Accordingly,tobeabletowill,asyouplease,whatyouconsiderrightorwrongmeanstobefreeorunfreeasyouplease.Thisis,ofcourse,justasabsurdastoidentifyfreedomwiththefacultyofdoingwhatoneiscompelledtowill.ButthisisjustwhatHamerlingmaintainswhenhesays,“Itisperfectlytruethatthewillisalwaysdeterminedbymotives,butitisabsurdtosaythatonthisgrounditisunfree;foragreaterfreedomcanneitherbedesirednorconceivedthanthefreedomtorealiseoneselfinproportiontoone’sownpowerandstrengthofwill.”Onthecontrary,itiswellpossibletodesireagreaterfreedomandthatatruefreedom,viz.,thefreedomtodetermineforoneselfthemotivesofone’svolitions.

Undercertainconditionsamanmaybeinducedtoabandontheexecutionofhiswill;buttoallowotherstoprescribetohimwhatheshalldo—inotherwords,towillwhatanotherandnotwhathehimselfregardsasright—tothisamanwillsubmitonlywhenhedoesnotfeelfree.

ExternalpowersmaypreventmefromdoingwhatIwill,butthatisonlytocondemnmetodonothingortobeunfree.Notuntiltheyenslavemyspirit,drivemymotivesoutofmyhead,andputtheirownmotivesintheplaceofmine,dotheyreallyaimatmakingmeunfree.Thatisthereasonwhythechurchattacksnotonlythemeredoing,butespecially

theimpurethoughts,i.e.,motivesofmyaction.Andforthechurchallthosemotivesareimpurewhichshehasnotherselfauthorised.Achurchdoesnotproducegenuineslavesuntilherprieststurnthemselvesintoadvisersofconsciences,i.e.,untilthefaithfuldependuponthechurch,i.e.,upontheconfessional,forthemotivesoftheiractions.

ADDITIONTOREVISEDEDITION(1918).

InthesechaptersIhavegivenanaccountofhoweveryonemayexperienceinhisactionssomethingwhichmakeshimawarethathiswillisfree.Itisespeciallyimportanttorecognisethatwederivetherighttocallanactofwillfreefromtheexperienceofanidealintuitionrealisingitselfintheact.Thiscanbenothingbutadatumofobservation,inthesensethatweobservethedevelopmentofhumanvolitioninthedirectiontowardsthegoalofattainingthepossibilityofjustsuchvolitionsustainedbypurelyidealintuition.Thisattainmentispossiblebecausetheidealintuitioniseffectivethroughnothingbutitsownself-dependentessence.Wheresuchanintuitionispresentinthemind,ithasnotdevelopeditselfoutoftheprocessesintheorganism(cp.pp.146ff.),buttheorganicprocesseshaveretiredtomakeroomfortheidealprocesses.Observationofanactofwillwhichembodiesanintuitionshowsthatoutofit,likewise,allorganicallynecessaryactivityhasretired.Theactofwillisfree.Noonecanobservethisfreedomofwillwhoisunabletoseehowfreewillconsistsinthis,that,first,theintuitivefactorlamesandrepressesthenecessaryactivityofthehumanorganism,andthenputsinitsplacethespiritualactivityofawillguidedbyideas.Onlythosewhoareunabletoobservethesetwofactorsinthefreeactofwillbelievethateveryactofwillisunfree.Thosewhoareabletoobservethemwinthroughtotherecognitionthatmanisunfreeinsofarashefailstorepressorganicactivitycompletely,butthatthisunfreedomistendingtowardsfreedom,andthatthisfreedom,sofarfrombeinganabstractideal,isadirectiveforceinherentinhumannature.Manisfreeinproportionashesucceedsinrealisinginhisactsofwillthesamedispositionofmind,whichpossesseshimwhenheisconsciousinhimselfoftheformationofpurelyideal(spiritual)intuitions.

Onlyasuperficialcriticwillfindintheuseoftheword“faculty,”inthisandotherpassages,arelapseintotheold-fashioneddoctrineoffacultiesofthesoul.↑

WhenPaulsen,p.15ofthebookmentionedabove,says:“Differentnaturalendowmentsanddifferentconditionsoflifedemandbothadifferentbodilyandalsoadifferentmentalandmoraldiet,”heisveryclosetothecorrectview,butyethemissesthedecisivepoint.InsofarasIamanindividual,Ineednodiet.Dieteticmeanstheartofbringingaparticularspecimenintoharmonywiththeuniversallawsofthegenus.ButasanindividualIamnotaspecimenofagenus.↑

TheEditorwouldcallthereader’sattentiontothefactthatthisbookwaswrittenin1894.FormanyyearsDr.Steiner’seffortshavebeenchieflyconcentratedinupholdingtheDivinityofChristconsistentlywiththebroaderlinesoftheChristianChurches.↑

Weareentitledtospeakofthoughts(ethicalideas)asobjectsofobservation.For,althoughtheproductsofthinkingdonotenterthefieldofobservation,solongasthethinkinggoeson,theymaywellbecomeobjectsofobservationsubsequently.Inthiswaywehavegainedourcharacterisationofaction.↑

THEVALUEOFLIFE

(OPTIMISMANDPESSIMISM)

Acounterpartofthequestionconcerningthepurposeandfunctionoflife(cp.pp.190ff.)isthequestionconcerningitsvalue.Wemeetherewithtwomutuallyopposedviews,andbetweenthemwithallconceivableattemptsatcompromise.Oneviewsaysthatthisworldisthebestconceivablewhichcouldexistatall,andthattoliveandactinitisagoodofinestimablevalue.Everythingthatexistsdisplaysharmoniousandpurposiveco-operationandisworthyofadmiration.Evenwhatisapparentlybadandevilmay,fromahigherpointofview,beseentobeagood,foritrepresentsanagreeablecontrastwiththegood.Wearethemoreabletoappreciatethegoodwhenitisclearlycontrastedwithevil.Moreover,evilisnotgenuinelyreal;itisonlythatweperceiveasevilalesserdegreeofgood.Evilistheabsenceofgood,ithasnopositiveimportofitsown.

Theotherviewmaintainsthatlifeisfullofmiseryandagony.Everywherepainoutweighspleasure,sorrowoutweighsjoy.Existenceisaburden,andnon-existencewould,fromeverypointofview,bepreferabletoexistence.

Thechiefrepresentativesoftheformerview,i.e.,Optimism,areShaftesburyandLeibnitz;thechiefrepresentativesofthesecond,i.e.,Pessimism,areSchopenhauerandEduardvonHartmann.

Leibnitzsaystheworldisthebestofallpossibleworlds.Abetteroneisimpossible.ForGodisgoodandwise.AgoodGodwillstocreatethebestpossibleworld,awiseGodknowswhichisthebestpossible.Heisabletodistinguishthebestfromallotherandworsepossibilities.OnlyaneviloranunwiseGodwouldbeabletocreateaworldworsethanthebestpossible.

Whoeverstartsfromthispointofviewwillfinditeasytolaydownthedirectionwhichhumanactionmustfollow,inordertomakeitscontributiontothegreatestgoodoftheuniverse.AllthatmanneeddowillbetofindoutthecounselsofGodandtoactinaccordancewiththem.IfheknowswhatGod’spurposesareconcerningtheworldandthehumanrace,hewillbeable,forhispart,todowhatisright.Andhewillbehappyinthefeelingthatheisaddinghissharetoalltheothergoodintheworld.Fromthisoptimisticstandpoint,then,lifeisworthliving.Itissuchastostimulateustoco-operatewith,andenterinto,it.

QuitedifferentisthepictureSchopenhauerpaints.Hethinksofultimaterealitynotasanall-wiseandall-beneficentbeing,butasblindstrivingorwill.Eternalstriving,ceaselesscravingforsatisfactionwhichyetiseverbeyondreach,thesearethefundamentalcharacteristicsofallwill.Forassoonaswehaveattainedwhatwewant,afreshneedspringsup,andsoon.Satisfaction,whenitoccurs,enduresalwaysonlyforaninfinitesimaltime.Thewholerestofourlivesisunsatisfiedcraving,i.e.,discontentandsuffering.Whenatlastblindcravingisdulled,everydefinitecontentisgonefromourlives.Existenceisfilledwithnothingbutanendlessennui.Hencethebestwecandoistothrottlealldesiresandneedswithinusandexterminatethewill.Schopenhauer’s

Pessimismleadstocompleteinactivity;itsmoralaimisuniversalidleness.

ByaverydifferentargumentVonHartmannattemptstoestablishPessimismandtomakeuseofitforEthics.Heattempts,inkeepingwiththefashionofourage,tobasehisworld-viewonexperience.Byobservationoflifehehopestodiscoverwhetherthereismorepainormorepleasureintheworld.Hepassesinreviewbeforethetribunalofreasonwhatevermenconsidertobehappinessandagood,inordertoshowthatallapparentsatisfactionturnsout,oncloserinspection,tobenothingbutillusion.Itisillusionwhenwebelievethatinhealth,youth,freedom,sufficientincome,love(sexualsatisfaction),pity,friendshipandfamilylife,honour,reputation,glory,power,religiousedification,pursuitofscienceandofart,hopeofalifeafterdeath,participationintheadvancementofcivilisation—thatinallthesewehavesourcesofhappinessandsatisfaction.Soberlyconsidered,everyenjoymentbringsmuchmoreevilandmiserythanpleasureintotheworld.Thedisagreeablenessof“themorningafter”isalwaysgreaterthantheagreeablenessofintoxication.Painfaroutweighspleasureintheworld.Noman,eventhoughrelativelythehappiest,would,ifasked,wishtolivethroughthismiserablelifeasecondtime.Now,sinceHartmanndoesnotdenythepresenceofanidealfactor(wisdom)intheworld,but,onthecontrary,grantstoitequalrightswithblindstriving(will),hecanattributethecreationoftheworldtohisAbsoluteBeingonlyonconditionthatHemakesthepainintheworldsubserveaworld-purposethatiswise.ButthepainofcreatedbeingsisnothingbutGod’spainitself,forthelifeofNatureasawholeisidenticalwiththelifeofGod.AnAll-wiseBeingcanaimonlyatreleasefrompain,andsinceallexistenceispain,atreleasefromexistence.Hencethepurposeofthecreationoftheworldistotransformexistenceintothenon-existencewhichissomuchbetter.Theworld-processisnothingbutacontinuousbattleagainstGod’spain,abattlewhichendswiththeannihilationofallexistence.Themorallifeformen,therefore,willconsistintakingpartintheannihilationofexistence.ThereasonwhyGodhascreatedtheworldisthatthroughtheworldhemayfreehimselffromhisinfinitepain.Theworldmustberegarded,“asitwere,asanitchingeruptionontheAbsolute,”bymeansofwhichtheunconscioushealingpoweroftheAbsoluteridsitselfofaninwarddisease;oritmayberegarded“asapainfuldrawing-plasterwhichtheAll-Oneappliestoitselfinorderfirsttodiverttheinnerpainoutwards,andthentogetridofitaltogether.”Humanbeingsaremembersoftheworld.IntheirsufferingsGodsuffers.Hehascreatedtheminordertosplitupinthemhisinfinitepain.ThepainwhicheachoneofussuffersisbutadropintheinfiniteoceanofGod’spain(Hartmann,PhänomenologiedesSittlichenBewusstseins,pp.866ff.).

Itisman’sdutytopermeatehiswholebeingwiththerecognitionthatthepursuitofindividualsatisfaction(Egoism)isafolly,andthatheoughttobeguidedsolelybythetaskofassistingintheredemptionofGodbyunselfishserviceoftheworld-process.Thus,incontrastwiththePessimismofSchopenhauer,thatofVonHartmannleadsustodevotedactivityinasublimecause.

Butwhatoftheclaimthatthisviewisbasedonexperience?

Tostriveaftersatisfactionmeansthatouractivityreachesoutbeyondtheactualcontentofourlives.Acreatureishungry,i.e.,itdesiressatiety,whenitsorganicfunctionsdemand

fortheircontinuationthesupplyoffreshlife-materialsintheformofnourishment.Thepursuitofhonourconsistsinthatamandoesnotregardwhathepersonallydoesorleavesundoneasvaluableunlessitisendorsedbytheapprovalofothersfromwithout.Thestrivingforknowledgeariseswhenamanisnotcontentwiththeworldwhichhesees,hears,etc.,solongashehasnotunderstoodit.Thefulfilmentofthestrivingcausespleasureintheindividualwhostrives,failurecausespain.Itisimportantheretoobservethatpleasureandpainareattachedonlytothefulfilmentornon-fulfilmentofmystriving.Thestrivingitselfisbynomeanstoberegardedasapain.Hence,ifwefindthat,intheverymomentinwhichastrivingisfulfilled,atonceanewstrivingarises,thisisnogroundforsayingthatpleasurehasgivenbirthtopain,becauseenjoymentineverycasegivesrisetoadesireforitsrepetition,orforafreshpleasure.Icanspeakofpainonlywhendesirerunsupagainsttheimpossibilityoffulfilment.EvenwhenanenjoymentthatIhavehadcausesinmethedesirefortheexperienceofagreater,moresubtle,andmoreexoticpleasure,Ihavenorighttospeakofthisdesireasapaincausedbythepreviouspleasureuntilthemeansfailmetogainthegreaterandmoresubtlepleasure.Ihavenorighttoregardpleasureasthecauseofpainunlesspainfollowsonpleasureasitsconsequencebynaturallaw,e.g.,whenawoman’ssexualpleasureisfollowedbythesufferingofchild-birthandthecaresofnursing.Ifstrivingcausedpain,thentheremovalofstrivingoughttobeaccompaniedbypleasure.Buttheveryreverseistrue.Tohavenostrivinginone’slifecausesboredom,andboredomisalwaysaccompaniedbydispleasure.Now,sinceitmaybealongtimebeforeastrivingmeetswithfulfilment,andsince,intheinterval,itiscontentwiththehopeoffulfilment,wemustacknowledgethatthereisnoconnectioninprinciplebetweenpainandstriving,butthatpaindependssolelyonthenon-fulfilmentofthestriving.Schopenhauer,then,iswrong,inanycase,inregardingdesireorstriving(will)asbeinginprinciplethesourceofpain.

Intruth,theveryreverseofthisiscorrect.Striving(desire)isinitselfpleasurable.Whodoesnotknowthepleasurewhichiscausedbythehopeofaremotebutintenselydesiredenjoyment?Thispleasureisthecompanionofalllabour,theresultsofwhichwillbeenjoyedbyusonlyinthefuture.Itisapleasurewhichiswhollyindependentoftheattainmentoftheend.Forwhentheaimhasbeenattained,thepleasureofsatisfactionisaddedasafreshthrilltothepleasureofstriving.Ifanyoneweretoarguethatthepaincausedbythenon-attainmentofanaimisincreasedbythepainofdisappointedhope,andthatthus,intheend,thepainofnon-fulfilmentwillstillalwaysoutweightheutmostpossiblepleasureoffulfilment,weshallhavetoreplythatthereversemaybethecase,andthattherecollectionofpastpleasureatatimeofunsatisfieddesirewillasoftenmitigatethedispleasureofnon-satisfaction.Whoeveratthemomentwhenhishopessuffershipwreckexclaims,“Ihavedonemypart,”provestherebymyassertion.Theblessedfeelingofhavingwilledthebestwithinone’spowersisignoredbyallwhomakeeveryunsatisfieddesireanoccasionforassertingthat,notonlyhasthepleasureoffulfilmentbeenlost,butthattheenjoymentofthestrivingitselfhasbeendestroyed.

Thesatisfactionofadesirecausespleasureanditsnon-satisfactioncausespain.Butwehavenorighttoinferfromthisfactthatpleasureisnothingbutthesatisfactionofadesire,andpainnothingbutitsnon-satisfaction.Bothpleasureandpainmaybeexperienced

withoutbeingtheconsequenceofdesire.Allillnessispainnotprecededbyanydesire.Ifanyoneweretomaintainthatillnessisunsatisfieddesireforhealth,hewouldcommittheerrorofregardingtheinevitableandunconsciouswishnottofallillasapositivedesire.Whensomeonereceivesalegacyfromarichrelativeofwhoseexistencehehadnotthefaintestidea,heexperiencesapleasurewithouthavingfeltanyprecedingdesire.

Hence,ifwesetouttoinquirewhetherthebalanceisonthesideofpleasureorofpain,wemustallowinourcalculationforthepleasureofstriving,thepleasureofthesatisfactionofstriving,andthepleasurewhichcomestouswithoutanystrivingwhatever.Onthedebitsideweshallhavetoenterthedispleasureofboredom,thedispleasureofunfulfilledstriving,and,lastly,thedispleasurewhichcomestouswithoutanystrivingonourpart.Underthislastheadingweshallhavetoputalsothedispleasurecausedbyworkthathasbeenforceduponus,notchosenbyourselves.

Thisleadsustothequestion,Whatistherightmethodforstrikingthebalancebetweenthecreditandthedebitcolumns?EduardvonHartmannassertsthatreasonholdsthescales.Itistruethathesays(PhilosophiedesUnbewussten,7thedition,vol.ii.p.290):“Painandpleasureexistonlyinsofarastheyareactuallybeingfelt.”Itfollowsthattherecanbenostandardforpleasureotherthanthesubjectivestandardoffeeling.Imustfeelwhetherthesumofmydisagreeablefeelings,contrastedwithmyagreeablefeelings,resultsinmeinabalanceofpleasureorofpain.But,notwithstandingthis,VonHartmannmaintainsthat“thoughthevalueofthelifeofeverybeingcanbesetdownonlyaccordingtoitsownsubjectivemeasure,yetitfollowsbynomeansthateverybeingisabletocomputethecorrectalgebraicsumofallthefeelingsofitslife—or,inotherwords,thatitstotalestimateofitsownlife,withregardtoitssubjectivefeelings,shouldbecorrect.”Butthismeansthatrationalestimationoffeelingsisreinstatedasthestandardofvalue.1

ItisbecauseVonHartmannholdsthisviewthathethinksitnecessary,inordertoarriveatacorrectvaluationoflife,toclearoutofthewaythosefactorswhichfalsifyourjudgmentaboutthebalanceofpleasureandofpain.Hetriestodothisintwoways:first,byshowingthatourdesire(instinct,will)operatesasadisturbingfactorinthesoberestimationoffeeling-values;e.g.,whereasweoughttojudgethatsexualenjoymentisasourceofevil,wearebeguiledbythefactthatthesexualinstinctisverystronginus,intopretendingtoexperienceapleasurewhichdoesnotoccurintheallegedintensityatall.Wearebentonindulgingourselves,hencewedonotacknowledgetoourselvesthattheindulgencemakesussuffer.Secondly,VonHartmannsubjectsfeelingstoacriticismdesignedtoshow,thattheobjectstowhichourfeelingsattachthemselvesrevealthemselvesasillusionswhenexaminedbyreason,andthatourfeelingsaredestroyedfromthemomentthatourconstantlygrowinginsightseesthroughtheillusions.

VonHartmann,then,conceivesthematterasfollows.Supposeanambitiousmanwantstodetermineclearlywhether,uptothemomentofhisinquiry,therehasbeenasurplusofpleasureorofpaininhislife.Hehastoeliminatetwosourcesoferrorthatmayaffecthisjudgment.Beingambitious,thisfundamentalfeatureofhischaracterwillmakehimseeallthepleasuresofthepublicrecognitionofhisachievementslargerthantheyare,andalltheinsultssufferedthroughrebuffssmallerthantheyare.Atthetimewhenhesufferedthe

rebuffshefelttheinsultsjustbecauseheisambitious,butinrecollectiontheyappeartohiminamilderlight,whereasthepleasuresofrecognitiontowhichheissomuchmoresusceptibleleaveafardeeperimpression.Undeniably,itisarealbenefittoanambitiousmanthatitshouldbeso,forthedeceptiondiminisheshispaininthemomentofself-analysis.But,nonetheless,itfalsifieshisjudgments.Thesufferingswhichhenowreviewsasthroughaveilwereactuallyexperiencedbyhiminalltheirintensity.Henceheentersthematawrongvaluationonthedebitsideofhisaccount.Inordertoarriveatacorrectestimate,anambitiousmanwouldhavetolayasidehisambitionforthetimeofhisinquiry.Hewouldhavetoreviewhispastlifewithoutanydistortingglassesbeforehismind’seye,elsehewillresembleamerchantwho,inmakinguphisbooks,entersamongtheitemsonthecreditsidehisownzealinbusiness.

ButVonHartmanngoesevenfurther.Hesaystheambitiousmanmustmakecleartohimselfthatthepublicrecognitionwhichhecravesisnotworthhaving.Byhimself,orwiththeguidanceofothers,hemustattaintheinsightthatrationalbeingscannotattachanyvaluetorecognitionbyothers,seeingthat“inallmatterswhicharenotvitalquestionsofdevelopment,orwhichhavenotbeendefinitelysettledbyscience,”itisalwaysascertainasanythingcanbe“thatthemajorityiswrongandtheminorityright.”“Whoevermakesambitionthelode-starofhislifeputsthehappinessofhislifeatthemercyofsofallibleajudgment”(PhilosophiedesUnbewussten,vol.ii,p.332).Iftheambitiousmanacknowledgesallthistohimself,heisboundtoregardalltheachievementsofhisambitionasillusions,includingeventhefeelingswhichattachthemselvestothesatisfactionofhisambitiousdesires.ThisisthereasonwhyVonHartmannsaysthatwemustalsostrikeoutofthebalance-sheetofourlife-valueswhateverisseentobeillusoryinourfeelingsofpleasure.Whatremainsafterthatrepresentsthesum-totalofpleasureinlife,andthissumissosmallcomparedwiththesum-totalofpainthatlifeisnoenjoymentandnon-existencepreferabletoexistence.

Butwhilstitisimmediatelyevidentthattheinterferenceoftheinstinctofambitionproducesself-deceptioninstrikingthebalanceofpleasuresandthusleadstoafalseresult,wemustnonethelesschallengewhatVonHartmannsaysconcerningtheillusorycharacteroftheobjectstowhichpleasureisattached.Fortheelimination,fromthecredit-sideoflife,ofallpleasurablefeelingswhichaccompanyactualorsupposedillusionswouldpositivelyfalsifythebalanceofpleasureandofpain.Anambitiousmanhasgenuinelyenjoyedtheacclamationsofthemultitude,irrespectiveofwhethersubsequentlyhehimself,orsomeotherperson,recognisesthatthisacclamationisanillusion.Thepleasure,onceenjoyed,isnotonewhitdiminishedbysuchrecognition.Consequentlytheeliminationofallthese“illusory”feelingsfromlife’sbalance,sofarfrommakingourjudgmentaboutourfeelingsmorecorrect,actuallycancelsoutoflifefeelingswhichweregenuinelythere.

Andwhyarethesefeelingstobeeliminated?Hewhohasthemderivespleasurefromthem;hewhohasovercomethem,gainsthroughtheexperienceofself-conquest(notthroughthevainemotion:WhatanoblefellowIam!butthroughtheobjectivesourcesofpleasurewhichlieintheself-conquest)apleasurewhichis,indeed,spiritualised,butnonethelessvaluableforthat.Ifwestrikefeelingsfromthecreditsideofpleasureinour

account,onthegroundthattheyareattachedtoobjectswhichturnouttohavebeenillusory,wemakethevalueoflifedependent,notonthequantity,butonthequalityofpleasure,andthis,inturn,onthevalueoftheobjectswhichcausethepleasure.ButifIamtodeterminethevalueoflifeonlybythequantityofpleasureorpainwhichitbrings,Ihavenorighttopresupposesomethingelsebywhichfirsttodeterminethepositiveornegativevalueofpleasure.IfIsayIwanttocomparequantityofpleasureandquantityofpain,inordertoseewhichisgreater,Iamboundtobringintomyaccountallpleasuresandpainsintheiractualintensities,regardlessofwhethertheyarebasedonillusionsornot.IfIcreditapleasurewhichrestsonanillusionwithalesservalueforlifethanonewhichcanjustifyitselfbeforethetribunalofreason,Imakethevalueoflifedependentonfactorsotherthanmerequantityofpleasure.

Whoever,likeEduardvonHartmann,putsdownpleasureaslessvaluablewhenitisattachedtoaworthlessobject,islikeamerchantwhoenterstheconsiderableprofitsofatoy-factoryatonlyone-quarteroftheirrealvalueonthegroundthatthefactoryproducesnothingbutplaythingsforchildren.

Ifthepointissimplytoweighquantityofpleasureagainstquantityofpain,weoughttoleavetheillusorycharacteroftheobjectsofsomepleasuresentirelyoutofaccount.

Themethod,then,whichVonHartmannrecommends,viz.,rationalcriticismofthequantitiesofpleasureandpainproducedbylife,hastaughtussofarhowwearetogetthedataforourcalculation,i.e.,whatwearetoputdownontheonesideofouraccountandwhatontheother.Buthowarewetomaketheactualcalculation?Isreasonablealsotostrikethebalance?

Amerchantmakesamiscalculationwhenthegaincalculatedbyhimdoesnotbalancewiththeprofitswhichhehasdemonstrablyenjoyedfromhisbusinessorisstillexpectingtoenjoy.Similarly,thephilosopherwillundoubtedlyhavemadeamistakeinhisestimate,ifhecannotdemonstrateinactualfeelingthesurplusofpleasureor,asthecasemaybe,ofpainwhichhismanipulationoftheaccountmayhaveyielded.

ForthepresentIshallnotcriticisethecalculationsofthosePessimistswhosupporttheirestimateofthevalueoftheworldbyanappealtoreason.Butifwearetodecidewhethertocarryonthebusinessoflifeornot,weshalldemandfirsttobeshownwheretheallegedbalanceofpainistobefound.

Herewetouchthepointwherereasonisnotinapositionbyitselftodeterminethesurplusofpleasureorofpain,butwhereitmustexhibitthissurplusinlifeassomethingactuallyfelt.Formanreachesrealitynotthroughconceptsbythemselves,butthroughtheinterpenetrationofconceptsandpercepts(andfeelingsarepercepts)whichthinkingbringsabout(cp.pp.82ff.).Amerchantwillgiveuphisbusinessonlywhenthelossofgoods,ascalculatedbyhisaccountant,isactuallyconfirmedbythefacts.Ifthefactsdonotbearoutthecalculation,heaskshisaccountanttochecktheaccountoncemore.Thatisexactlywhatamanwilldointhebusinessoflife.Ifaphilosopherwantstoprovetohimthatthepainisfargreaterthanthepleasure,butthathedoesnotfeelitso,thenhewillreply:“Youhavemadeamistakeinyourtheorisings;repeatyouranalysisoncemore.”Butiftherecomesatimeinabusinesswhenthelossesarereallysogreatthatthefirm’screditno

longersufficestosatisfythecreditors,bankruptcyresults,eventhoughthemerchantmayavoidkeepinghimselfinformedbycarefulaccountsaboutthestateofhisaffairs.Similarly,supposingthequantityofpaininaman’slifebecameatanytimesogreatthatnohope(credit)offuturepleasurecouldhelphimtogetoverthepain,thebankruptcyoflife’sbusinesswouldinevitablyfollow.

Nowthenumberofthosewhocommitsuicideisrelativelysmallcomparedwiththenumberofthosewholivebravelyon.Onlyveryfewmengiveupthebusinessoflifebecauseofthepaininvolved.Whatfollows?Eitherthatitisuntruetosaythatthequantityofpainisgreaterthanthequantityofpleasure,orthatwedonotmakethecontinuationoflifedependentonthequantityoffeltpleasureorpain.

Inaverycuriousway,EduardvonHartmann’sPessimism,havingconcludedthatlifeisvaluelessbecauseitcontainsasurplusofpain,yetaffirmsthenecessityofgoingonwithlife.Thisnecessityliesinthefactthattheworld-purposementionedabove(p.216)canbeachievedonlybytheceaseless,devotedlabourofhumanbeings.Butsolongasmenstillpursuetheiregoisticalappetitestheyareunfitforthisdevotedlabour.ItisnotuntilexperienceandreasonhaveconvincedthemthatthepleasureswhichEgoismpursuesareincapableofattainment,thattheygivethemselvesuptotheirpropertask.Inthiswaythepessimisticconvictionisofferedasthefountainofunselfishness.AneducationbasedonPessimismistoexterminateEgoismbyconvincingitofthehopelessnessofachievingitsaims.

Accordingtothisview,then,thestrivingforpleasureisfundamentallyinherentinhumannature.Itisonlythroughtheinsightintotheimpossibilityofsatisfactionthatthisstrivingabdicatesinfavourofthehighertasksofhumanity.

Itis,however,impossibletosayofthisethicaltheory,whichexpectsfromtheestablishmentofPessimismadevotiontounselfishendsinlife,thatitreallyovercomesEgoisminthepropersenseoftheword.Themoralideasaresaidnottobestrongenoughtodominatethewilluntilmanhaslearntthattheselfishstrivingafterpleasurecannotleadtoanysatisfaction.Man,whoseselfishnessdesiresthegrapesofpleasure,findsthemsourbecausehecannotattainthem,andsoheturnshisbackonthemanddevoteshimselftoanunselfishlife.Moralideals,then,accordingtotheopinionofPessimists,aretooweaktoovercomeEgoism,buttheyestablishtheirkingdomontheterritorywhichpreviousrecognitionofthehopelessnessofEgoismhasclearedforthem.

Ifmenbynaturestriveafterpleasurebutareunabletoattainit,itfollowsthatannihilationofexistenceandsalvationthroughnon-existencearetheonlyrationalends.AndifweaccepttheviewthattherealbearerofthepainoftheworldisGod,itfollowsthatthetaskofmenconsistsinhelpingtobringaboutthesalvationofGod.Tocommitsuicidedoesnotadvance,buthinders,therealisationofthisaim.Godmustrationallybeconceivedashavingcreatedmenforthesolepurposeofbringingabouthissalvationthroughtheiraction,elsewouldcreationbepurposeless.Everyoneofushastoperformhisowndefinitetaskinthegeneralworkofsalvation.Ifhewithdrawsfromthetaskbysuicide,anotherhastodotheworkwhichwasintendedforhim.Somebodyelsemustbearinhissteadtheagonyofexistence.Andsinceineverybeingitis,atbottom,Godwhoisthe

ultimatebearerofallpain,itfollowsthattocommitsuicidedoesnotintheleastdiminishthequantityofGod’spain,butratherimposesuponGodtheadditionaldifficultyofprovidingasubstitute.

Thiswholetheorypresupposesthatpleasureisthestandardofvalueforlife.Nowlifemanifestsitselfthroughanumberofinstincts(needs).Ifthevalueoflifedependedonitsproducingmorepleasurethanpain,aninstinctwouldhavetobecalledvaluelesswhichbroughttoitsownerabalanceofpain.Letus,ifyouplease,inspectinstinctandpleasure,inordertoseewhethertheformercanbemeasuredbythelatter.Andlestwegiverisetothesuspicionthatlifedoesnotbeginforusbelowthesphereofthe“aristocratsoftheintellect,”weshallbeginourexaminationwitha“purelyanimal”need,viz.,hunger.

Hungerariseswhenourorgansareunabletocontinuefunctioningwithoutafreshsupplyoffood.Whatahungrymandesires,inthefirstinstance,istohavehishungerstilled.Assoonasthesupplyofnourishmenthasreachedthepointwherehungerceases,everythinghasbeenattainedthatthefood-instinctcraves.Thepleasurewhichisconnectedwithsatietyconsists,tobeginwith,intheremovalofthepainwhichiscausedbyhunger.Buttothemerefood-instinctthereisaddedafurtherneed.Formandoesnotmerelydesiretorestore,bytheconsumptionoffood,thedisturbanceinthefunctioningofhisorgans,ortogetridofthepainofhunger,butheseekstoeffectthistotheaccompanimentofpleasurablesensationsoftaste.Whenhefeelshungry,andiswithinhalfanhourofamealtowhichhelooksforwardwithpleasure,heavoidsspoilinghisenjoymentofthebetterfoodbytakinginferiorfoodwhichmightsatisfyhishungersooner.Heneedshungerinordertogetthefullenjoymentoutofhismeal.Thushungerbecomesforhimatthesametimeacauseofpleasure.Supposingallthehungerintheworldcouldbesatisfied,weshouldgetthetotalquantityofpleasurewhichweowetotheexistenceofthedesirefornourishment.Butweshouldstillhavetoaddtheadditionalpleasurewhichgourmetsgainbycultivatingthesensibilityoftheirtaste-nervesbeyondthecommonmeasure.

Thegreatestconceivablevalueofthisquantityofpleasurewouldbereached,ifnoneedremainedunsatisfiedwhichwasinanywayconnectedwiththiskindofpleasure,andifwiththesmoothofpleasurewehadnotatthesametimetotakeacertainamountoftheroughofpain.

ModernScienceholdstheviewthatNatureproducesmorelifethanitcanmaintain,i.e.,thatNaturealsoproducesmorehungerthanitisabletosatisfy.Thesurplusoflifethusproducediscondemnedtoapainfuldeathinthestruggleforexistence.Grantedthattheneedsoflifeare,ateverymomentoftheworld-process,greaterthantheavailablemeansofsatisfaction,andthattheenjoymentoflifeiscorrespondinglydiminished,yetsuchenjoymentasactuallyoccursisnotonewhitreducedthereby.Whereveradesireissatisfied,therethecorrespondingquantityofpleasureexists,eventhoughinthecreatureitselfwhichdesires,orinitsfellow-creatures,therearealargenumberofunsatisfiedinstincts.Whatisdiminishedis,notthequantity,butthe“value”oftheenjoymentoflife.Ifonlyapartoftheneedsofalivingcreaturefindsatisfaction,itexperiencesstillacorrespondingpleasure.Thispleasureisinferiorinvalueinproportionasitisinadequatetothetotaldemandoflifewithinagivengroupofdesires.Wemightrepresentthisvalue

asafraction,thenumeratorofwhichistheactuallyexperiencedpleasure,whilstthedenominatoristhesum-totalofneeds.Thisfractionhasthevalue1whenthenumeratorandthedenominatorareequal,i.e.,whenallneedsarealsosatisfied.Thefractionbecomesgreaterthan1whenacreatureexperiencesmorepleasurethanitsdesiresdemand.Itbecomessmallerthan1whenthequantityofpleasurefallsshortofthesum-totalofdesires.Butthefractioncanneverhavethevalue0solongasthenumeratorhasanyvalueatall,howeversmall.Ifamanweretomakeuptheaccountbeforehisdeathandtodistributeinimaginationoverthewholeoflifethequantitybelongingtoaparticularinstinct(e.g.,hunger),aswellasthedemandsofthisinstinct,thenthetotalpleasurewhichhehasexperiencedmighthaveonlyaverysmallvalue,butthisvaluewouldneverbecomealtogethernil.Ifthequantityofpleasureremainsconstant,thenwitheveryincreaseintheneedsofthecreaturethevalueofthepleasurediminishes.ThesameistrueforthetotalityoflifeinNature.Thegreaterthenumberofcreaturesinproportiontothosewhichareablefullytosatisfytheirinstincts,thesmalleristheaveragepleasure-valueoflife.Thechequesonlife’spleasurewhicharedrawninourfavourintheformofourinstincts,becomeincreasinglylessvaluableinproportionaswecannotexpecttocashthemattheirfullfacevalue.SupposeIgetenoughtoeatonthreedaysandamthencompelledtogohungryforanotherthreedays,theactualpleasureonthethreedaysofeatingisnottherebydiminished.ButIhavenowtothinkofitasdistributedoversixdays,andthisreducesits“value”formyfood-instinctbyhalf.Thesameappliestothequantityofpleasureasmeasuredbythedegreeofmyneed.SupposeIhavehungerenoughfortwosandwichesandcanonlygetone,thepleasurewhichthisonegivesmehasonlyhalfthevalueitwouldhavehadiftheeatingofithadstilledmyhunger.Thisisthewayinwhichwedeterminethevalueofapleasureinlife.Wedetermineitbytheneedsoflife.Ourdesiressupplythemeasure;pleasureiswhatismeasured.Thepleasureofstillinghungerhasvalueonlybecausehungerexists,andithasdeterminatevaluethroughtheproportionwhichitbearstotheintensityofthehunger.

Unfulfilleddemandsofourlifethrowtheirshadowevenuponfulfilleddesires,andthusdetractfromthevalueofpleasurablehours.Butwemayspeakalsoofthepresentvalueofafeelingofpleasure.Thisvalueisthesmaller,themoreinsignificantthepleasureisinproportiontothedurationandintensityofourdesire.

Aquantityofpleasurehasitsfullvalueforuswhenitsdurationanddegreeexactlycoincidewithourdesire.Aquantityofpleasurewhichissmallerthanourdesirediminishesthevalueofthepleasure.Aquantitywhichisgreaterproducesasurpluswhichhasnotbeendemandedandwhichisfeltaspleasureonlysolongas,whilstenjoyingthepleasure,wecancorrespondinglyincreasetheintensityofourdesire.Ifwearenotabletokeeppaceintheincreaseofourdesirewiththeincreaseinpleasure,thenpleasureturnsintodispleasure.Theobjectwhichwouldotherwisesatisfyus,whenitassailsusunbiddenmakesussuffer.Thisprovesthatpleasurehasvalueforusonlysolongaswehavedesiresbywhichtomeasureit.Anexcessofpleasurablefeelingturnsintopain.Thismaybeobservedespeciallyinthosemenwhosedesireforagivenkindofpleasureisverysmall.Inpeoplewhosedesireforfoodisdulled,eatingeasilyproducesnausea.Thisagainshowsthatdesireisthemeasureofvalueforpleasure.

NowPessimismmightreplythatanunsatisfieddesireforfoodproduces,notonlythepainofalostenjoyment,butalsopositiveills,agony,andmiseryintheworld.Itappealsforconfirmationtotheuntoldmiseryofallwhoareharassedbyanxietiesaboutfood,andtothevastamountofpainwhichfortheseunfortunatesresultsindirectlyfromtheirlackoffood.Andifitwantstoextenditsassertionalsotonon-humannature,itcanpointtotheagoniesofanimalswhich,incertainseasons,diefromlackoffood.ConcerningalltheseevilsthePessimistmaintainsthattheyfaroutweighthequantityofpleasurewhichthefood-instinctbringsintotheworld.

Thereisnodoubtthatitispossibletocomparepleasureandpainonewithanother,anddeterminethesurplusoftheoneortheotheraswedeterminecommercialgainorloss.ButifPessimiststhinkthatasurplusonthesideofpainisagroundforinferringthatlifeisvalueless,theyfallintothemistakeofmakingacalculationwhichinactuallifeisnevermade.

Ourdesire,inanygivencase,isdirectedtoaparticularobject.Thevalueofthepleasureofsatisfaction,aswehaveseen,willbethegreaterinproportionasthequantityofthepleasureisgreaterrelativelytotheintensityofourdesire.2Itdepends,further,onthisintensityhowlargeaquantityofpainwearewillingtobearinordertogainthepleasure.Wecomparethequantityofpain,notwiththequantityofpleasure,butwiththeintensityofourdesire.Hewhofindsgreatpleasureineatingwill,byreasonofhispleasureinbettertimes,bemoreeasilyabletobearaperiodofhungerthanonewhodoesnotderivepleasurefromthesatisfactionoftheinstinctforfood.Awomanwhowantsachildcomparesthepleasuresresultingfromthepossessionofachild,notwiththequantitiesofpainduetopregnancy,birth,nursing,etc.,butwithherdesireforthepossessionofthechild.

Weneveraimatacertainquantityofpleasureintheabstract,butatconcretesatisfactionofaperfectlydeterminatekind.Whenweareaimingatadefiniteobjectoradefinitesensation,itwillnotsatisfyustobeofferedsomeotherobjectorsomeothersensation,eventhoughtheygivethesameamountofpleasure.Ifwedesiresatisfactionofhunger,wecannotsubstituteforthepleasurewhichthissatisfactionwouldbringapleasureequallygreatbutproducedbyawalk.Onlyifourdesirewere,quitegenerally,foracertainquantityofpleasure,wouldithavetodieawayatonceifthispleasurewereunattainableexceptatthepriceofanevengreaterquantityofpain.Butbecausewedesireadeterminatekindofsatisfaction,weexperiencethepleasureofrealisationevenwhen,alongwithit,wehavetobearanevengreaterpain.Theinstinctsoflivingbeingstendinadeterminatedirectionandaimatconcreteobjects,anditisjustforthisreasonthatitisimpossible,inourcalculations,tosetdownasanequivalentfactorthequantitiesofpainwhichwehavetobearinthepursuitofourobject.Providedthedesireissufficientlyintensetobestilltosomedegreeinexistenceevenafterhavingovercomethepain—howevergreatthatpain,takenintheabstract,maybe—thepleasureofsatisfactionmaystillbeenjoyedtoitsfullextent.Thedesire,therefore,doesnotmeasurethepaindirectlyagainstthepleasurewhichweattain,butindirectlybymeasuringthepain(proportionately)againstitsownintensity.Thequestionisnotwhetherthepleasuretobegainedisgreaterthanthepain,butwhetherthedesirefortheobjectatwhichweaimis

greaterthantheinhibitoryeffectofthepainwhichwehavetoface.Iftheinhibitionisgreaterthanthedesire,thelatteryieldstotheinevitable,slackens,andceasestostrive.Butinasmuchaswestriveafteradeterminatekindofsatisfaction,thepleasurewegaintherebyacquiresanimportancewhichmakesitpossible,oncesatisfactionhasbeenattained,toallowinourcalculationfortheinevitablepainonlyinsofarasithasdiminishedtheintensityofourdesire.IfIampassionatelyfondofbeautifulviews,Inevercalculatetheamountofpleasurewhichtheviewfromthemountain-topgivesmeascompareddirectlywiththepainofthetoilsomeascentanddescent;butIreflectwhether,afterhavingovercomealldifficulties,mydesirefortheviewwillstillbesufficientlyintense.Thuspleasureandpaincanbemadecommensurateonlymediatelythroughtheintensityofthedesire.Hencethequestionisnotatallwhetherthereisasurplusofpleasureorofpain,butwhetherthedesireforpleasureissufficientlyintensetoovercomethepain.

Aprooffortheaccuracyofthisviewistobefoundinthefact,thatweputahighervalueonpleasurewhenithastobepurchasedatthepriceofgreatpainthanwhenitsimplyfallsintoourlaplikeagiftfromheaven.Whensufferingsandagonieshavetoneddownourdesireandyetafterallouraimisattained,thenthepleasureisallthegreaterinproportiontotheintensityofthedesirethathassurvived.Nowitisjustthisproportionwhich,asIhaveshown(p.233),representsthevalueofthepleasure.Afurtherproofistobefoundinthefactthatalllivingcreatures(includingmen)developtheirinstinctsaslongastheyareabletobeartheoppositionofpainsandagonies.Thestruggleforexistenceisbutaconsequenceofthisfact.Alllivingcreaturesstrivetoexpand,andonlythoseabandonthestrugglewhosedesiresarethrottledbytheoverwhelmingmagnitudeofthedifficultieswithwhichtheymeet.Everylivingcreatureseeksfooduntilsheerlackoffooddestroysitslife.Man,too,doesnotturnhishandagainsthimselfuntil,rightlyorwrongly,hebelievesthathecannotattainthoseaimsinlifewhichaloneseemtohimworthstrivingfor.Solongashestillbelievesinthepossibilityofattainingwhathethinksworthstrivingfor,hewillbattleagainstallpainsandmiseries.Philosophywouldhavetoconvincemanthatstrivingisrationalonlywhenpleasureoutweighspain,foritishisnaturetostrivefortheattainmentoftheobjectswhichhedesires,solongashecanbeartheinevitableincidentalpain,howevergreatthatmaybe.Suchaphilosophy,however,wouldbemistaken,becauseitwouldmakethehumanwilldependentonafactor(thesurplusofpleasureoverpain)which,atfirst,iswhollyforeigntoman’spointofview.Theoriginalmeasureofhiswillishisdesire,anddesireassertsitselfaslongasitcan.IfIamcompelled,inpurchasingacertainquantityofapples,totaketwiceasmanyrottenonesassoundones—becausethesellerwishestoclearouthisstock—Ishallnothesitateamomenttotakethebadapplesaswell,ifIputsohighavalueonthesmallerquantityofgoodapplesthatIamprepared,inadditiontothepurchaseprice,tobearalsotheexpenseforthetransportationoftherottengoods.Thisexampleillustratestherelationbetweenthequantitiesofpleasureandofpainwhicharecausedbyagiveninstinct.Ideterminethevalueofthegoodapples,notbysubtractingthesumofthegoodfromthatofthebadones,butbythefactthat,inspiteofthepresenceofthebadones,Istillattachavaluetothegoodones.

JustasIleaveoutofaccountthebadapplesintheenjoymentofthegoodones,soIsurrendermyselftothesatisfactionofadesireafterhavingshakenofftheinevitablepains.

SupposingevenPessimismwereintherightwithitsassertionthattheworldcontainsmorepainthanpleasure,itwouldneverthelesshavenoinfluenceuponthewill,forlivingbeingswouldstillstriveaftersuchpleasureasremains.Theempiricalproofthatpainoverbalancespleasureisindeedeffectiveforshowingupthefutilityofthatschoolofphilosophy,whichlooksforthevalueoflifeinasurplusofpleasure(Eudæmonism),butnotforexhibitingthewill,assuch,asirrational.Forthewillisnotsetuponasurplusofpleasure,butonwhateverquantityofpleasureremainsaftersubtractingthepain.Thisremainingpleasurestillappearsalwaysasanobjectworthpursuing.

AnattempthasbeenmadetorefutePessimismbyassertingthatitisimpossibletodeterminebycalculationthesurplusofpleasureorofpainintheworld.Thepossibilityofeverycalculationdependsonourbeingabletocomparethethingstobecalculatedinrespectoftheirquantity.Everypainandeverypleasurehasadefinitequantity(intensityandduration).Further,wecancomparepleasurablefeelingsofdifferentkindsonewithanother,atleastapproximately,withregardtotheirintensity.Weknowwhetherwederivemorepleasurefromagoodcigarorfromagoodjoke.Noobjectioncanberaisedagainstthecomparabilityofdifferentpleasuresandpainsinrespectoftheirintensity.Thethinkerwhosetshimselfthetaskofdeterminingthesurplusofpleasureorpainintheworld,startsfrompresuppositionswhichareundeniablylegitimate.ItispossibletomaintainthatthePessimisticresultsarefalse,butitisnotpossibletodoubtthatquantitiesofpleasureandpaincanbescientificallyestimated,andthatthesurplusoftheoneortheothercantherebybedetermined.Itisincorrect,however,toassertthatfromthiscalculationanyconclusionscanbedrawnforthehumanwill.Thecasesinwhichwereallymakethevalueofouractivitydependentonwhetherpleasureorpainshowsasurplus,arethoseinwhichtheobjectstowardswhichouractivityisdirectedareindifferenttous.Ifitisaquestionwhether,aftertheday’swork,Iamtoamusemyselfbyagameorbylightconversation,andifIamtotallyindifferentwhatIdosolongasitamusesme,thenIsimplyaskmyself:Whatgivesmethegreatestsurplusofpleasure?AndIabandontheactivityaltogetherifthescalesinclinetowardsthesideofdispleasure.Ifwearebuyingatoyforachildweconsider,inselecting,whatwillgivehimthegreatestpleasure,butinallothercaseswearenotdeterminedexclusivelybyconsiderationsofthebalanceofpleasure.

Hence,ifPessimisticthinkersbelievethattheyarepreparingthegroundforanunselfishdevotiontotheworkofcivilisation,bydemonstratingthatthereisagreaterquantityofpainthanofpleasureinlife,theyforgetaltogetherthatthehumanwillissoconstitutedthatitcannotbeinfluencedbythisknowledge.Thewholestrivingofmenisdirectedtowardsthegreatestpossiblesatisfactionthatisattainableafterovercomingalldifficulties.Thehopeofthissatisfactionisthebasisofallhumanactivity.Theworkofeverysingleindividualandthewholeachievementofcivilisationhavetheirrootsinthishope.ThePessimistictheoryofEthicsthinksitnecessarytorepresentthepursuitofpleasureasimpossible,inorderthatmanmaydevotehimselftohispropermoraltasks.Butthesemoraltasksarenothingbuttheconcretenaturalandspiritualinstincts;andhestrivestosatisfythesenotwithstandingallincidentalpain.Thepursuitofpleasure,then,whichthe

Pessimistsetshimselftoeradicateisnowheretobefound.Butthetaskswhichmanhastofulfilarefulfilledbyhimbecausefromhisverynaturehewillstofulfilthem.ThePessimisticsystemofEthicsmaintainsthatamancannotdevotehimselftowhatherecognisesashistaskinlifeuntilhehasfirstgivenupthedesireforpleasure.ButnosystemofEthicscaneverinventothertasksthantherealisationofthosesatisfactionswhichhumandesiresdemand,andthefulfilmentofman’smoralideas.NoEthicaltheorycandeprivehimofthepleasurewhichheexperiencesintherealisationofwhathedesires.WhenthePessimistsays,“Donotstriveafterpleasure,forpleasureisunattainable;striveinsteadafterwhatyourecognisetobeyourtask,”wemustreplythatitishumannaturetostrivetodoone’stasks,andthatphilosophyhasgoneastrayininventingtheprinciplethatmanstrivesfornothingbutpleasure.Heaimsatthesatisfactionofwhathisnaturedemands,andtheattainmentofthissatisfactionistohimapleasure.PessimisticEthics,indemandingthatweshouldstrive,notafterpleasure,butaftertherealisationofwhatwerecogniseasourtask,laysitsfingerontheverythingwhichmanwillsinvirtueofhisownnature.Thereisnoneedformantobeturnedinsideoutbyphilosophy,thereisnoneedforhimtodiscardhisnature,inordertobemoral.Moralitymeansstrivingforanendsolongasthepainconnectedwiththisstrivingdoesnotinhibitthedesirefortheendaltogether;andthisistheessenceofallgenuinewill.Ethicsisnotfoundedontheeradicationofalldesireforpleasure,inorderthat,initsplace,bloodlessmoralideasmaysetuptheirrulewherenostrongdesireforpleasurestandsintheirway,butitisbasedonthestrongwill,sustainedbyidealintuitions,whichattainsitsendevenwhenthepathtoitisfullofthorns.

Moralidealshavetheirrootinthemoralimaginationofman.Theirrealisationdependsonthedesireforthembeingsufficientlyintensetoovercomepainsandagonies.Theyareman’sownintuitions.Inthemhisspiritbracesitselftoaction.Theyarewhathewills,becausetheirrealisationishishighestpleasure.HeneedsnoEthicaltheoryfirsttoforbidhimtostriveforpleasureandthentoprescribetohimwhatheshallstrivefor.Hewill,ofhimself,striveformoralidealsprovidedhismoralimaginationissufficientlyactivetoinspirehimwiththeintuitions,whichgivestrengthtohiswilltoovercomeallresistance.

Ifamanstrivestowardssublimelygreatideals,itisbecausetheyarethecontentofhiswill,andbecausetheirrealisationwillbringhimanenjoymentcomparedwithwhichthepleasurewhichinferiorspiritsdrawfromthesatisfactionoftheircommonplaceneedsisamerenothing.Idealistsdelightintranslatingtheiridealsintoreality.

Anyonewhowantstoeradicatethepleasurewhichthefulfilmentofhumandesiresbrings,willhavefirsttodegrademantothepositionofaslavewhodoesnotactbecausehewills,butbecausehemust.Fortheattainmentoftheobjectofwillgivespleasure.Whatwecallthegoodisnotwhatamanmustdo,butwhathewillstodowhenheunfoldsthefulnessofhisnature.Anyonewhodoesnotacknowledgethismustdeprivemanofalltheobjectsofhiswill,andthenprescribetohimfromwithoutwhatheistomakethecontentofhiswill.

Manvaluesthesatisfactionofadesirebecausethedesirespringsfromhisownnature.Whatheattainsisvaluablebecauseitistheobjectofhiswill.Ifwedenyanyvaluetotheendswhichmendowill,thenweshallhavetolookfortheendsthatarevaluableamongobjectswhichmendonotwill.

AsystemofEthics,then,whichisbuiltuponPessimismhasitsrootinthecontemptforman’smoralimagination.Onlyhewhodoesnotconsidertheindividualhumanmindcapableofdeterminingforitselfthecontentofitsstriving,canlookforthesumandsubstanceofwillinthecravingforpleasure.Amanwithoutimaginationdoesnotcreatemoralideas;theymustbeimpartedtohim.Physicalnatureseestoitthatheseeksthesatisfactionofhislowerdesires;butforthedevelopmentofthewholemanthedesireswhichhavetheirorigininthespiritarefullyasnecessary.Onlythosewhobelievethatmanhasnosuchspiritualdesiresatallcanmaintainthattheymustbeimpartedtohimfromwithout.Onthatviewitwillalsobecorrecttosaythatitisman’sdutytodowhathedoesnotwilltodo.EveryEthicalsystemwhichdemandsofmanthatheshouldsuppresshiswillinordertofulfiltaskswhichhedoesnotwill,works,notwiththewholeman,butwithastuntedbeingwholacksthefacultyofspiritualdesires.Foramanwhohasbeenharmoniouslydeveloped,theso-calledideasoftheGoodlie,notwithout,butwithintherangeofhiswill.Moralactionconsists,notintheextirpationofone’sindividualwill,butinthefullestdevelopmentofhumannature.Toregardmoralidealsasattainableonlyonconditionthatmandestroyshisindividualwill,istoignorethefactthattheseidealsareasmuchrootedinman’swillasthesatisfactionoftheso-calledanimalinstincts.

Itcannotbedeniedthattheviewshereoutlinedmayeasilybemisunderstood.Immatureyouthswithoutanymoralimaginationliketolookupontheinstinctsoftheirhalf-developednaturesasthefullsubstanceofhumanity,andrejectallmoralideaswhichtheyhavenotthemselvesoriginated,inorderthattheymay“livethemselvesout”withoutrestriction.Butitgoeswithoutsayingthatatheorywhichholdsforafullydevelopedmandoesnotholdforhalf-developedboys.Anyonewhostillrequirestobebroughtbyeducationtothepointwherehismoralnaturebreaksthroughtheshellofhislowerpassions,cannotexpecttobemeasuredbythesamestandardasamatureman.Butitwasnotmyintentiontosetdownwhatahalf-fledgedyouthrequirestobetaught,buttheessentialnatureofamatureman.Myintentionwastodemonstratethepossibilityoffreedom,whichbecomesmanifest,notinactionsphysicallyorpsychicallydetermined,butinactionssustained;byspiritualintuitions.

Everymaturemanisthemakerofhisownvalue.Hedoesnotaimatpleasure,whichcomestohimasagiftofgraceonthepartofNatureoroftheCreator;nordoesheliveforthesakeofwhatherecognisesasduty,afterhehasputawayfromhimthedesireforpleasure.Heactsashewills,thatis,inaccordancewithhismoralintuitions;andhefindsintheattainmentofwhathewillsthetrueenjoymentoflife.Hedeterminesthevalueofhislifebymeasuringhisattainmentsagainsthisaims.AnEthicalsystemwhichputs“ought”intheplaceof“will,”dutyintheplaceofinclination,isconsistentindeterminingthevalueofmanbytheratiobetweenthedemandsofdutyandhisactualachievements.Itappliestomanameasurethatisexternaltohisownnature.TheviewwhichIhaveheredevelopedpointsmanbacktohimself.Itrecognisesasthetruevalueoflifenothingexceptwhateachindividualregardsassuchbythemeasureofhisownwill.Avalueoflifewhichtheindividualdoesnotrecogniseisaslittleacknowledgedbymyviewsasapurposeoflifewhichdoesnotspringfromthevaluethusrecognised.Myviewlooksupontheindividualashisownmasterandtheassessorofhisownvalue.

Theargumentofthischapterisopentomisapprehensionbythosewhoobstinatelyinsistontheapparentobjection,thatthewill,assuch,istheirrationalfactorinman,andthatitsirrationalityshouldbeexhibitedinordertomakemansee,thatthegoalofhismoralendeavouroughttobehisultimateemancipationfromwill.Preciselysuchanillusoryobjectionhasbeenbroughtagainstmebyacompetentcriticwhourgedthatitisthebusinessofthephilosophertomakegoodwhatanimalsandmostmenthoughtlesslyforget,viz.,tostrikeagenuinebalanceoflife’saccount.Buttheobjectionignorespreciselythemainpoint.Iffreedomistoberealised,thewillinhumannaturemustbesustainedbyintuitivethinking.Atthesametimewefindthatthewillmayalsobedeterminedbyfactorsotherthanintuition,andthatmoralityanditsworkcanhavenootherrootthanthefreerealisationofintuitionissuingfromman’sessentialnature.EthicalIndividualismiswellfittedtoexhibitmoralityinitsfulldignity.Itdoesnotregardtruemoralityastheoutwardconformityofthewilltoanorm.Morality,forit,consistsintheactionswhichissuefromtheunfoldingofman’smoralwillasanintegralpartofhiswholenature,sothatimmoralityappearstomanasastuntingandcripplingofhisnature.

Thosewhowanttosettlebycalculationwhetherthesumtotalofpleasureorthatofpainisbigger,ignorethattheyaresubjectingtocalculationsomethingwhichisnowhereexperienced.Feelingdoesnotcalculate,andwhatmattersfortherealvaluingoflifeiswhatwereallyexperience,notwhatresultsfromanimaginarycalculation.↑

Wedisregardherethecasewhereexcessiveincreaseofpleasureturnspleasureintopain.↑

THEINDIVIDUALANDTHEGENUS

Theviewthatmanisawhollyself-contained,freeindividualitystandsinapparentconflictwiththefacts,thatheappearsasamemberofanaturalwhole(race,tribe,nation,family,maleorfemalesex),andthatheactswithinawhole(state,church,etc.).Heexhibitsthegeneralcharacteristicsofthecommunitytowhichhebelongs,andgivestohisactionsacontentwhichisdefinedbytheplacewhichheoccupieswithinasocialwhole.

Thisbeingso,isanyindividualityleftatall?Canweregardmanasawholeinhimself,inviewofthefactthathegrowsoutofawholeandfitsasamemberintoawhole?

Thecharacterandfunctionofamemberofawholearedefinedbythewhole.Atribeisawhole,andallmembersofthetribeexhibitthepeculiarcharacteristicswhichareconditionedbythenatureofthetribe.Thecharacterandactivityoftheindividualmemberaredeterminedbythecharacterofthetribe.Hencethephysiognomyandtheconductoftheindividualhavesomethinggenericaboutthem.Whenweaskwhythisorthatinamanissoorso,wearereferredfromtheindividualtothegenus.Thegenusexplainswhysomethingintheindividualappearsintheformobservedbyus.

Butmanemancipateshimselffromthesegenericcharacteristics.Hedevelopsqualitiesandactivitiesthereasonforwhichwecanseekonlyinhimself.Thegenericfactorsservehimonlyasameanstodevelophisownindividualnature.Heusesthepeculiaritieswithwhichnaturehasendowedhimasmaterial,andgivesthemaformwhichexpresseshisownindividuality.Weseekinvainforthereasonofsuchanexpressionofaman’sindividualityinthelawsofthegenus.Wearedealingherewithanindividualwhocanbeexplainedonlythroughhimself.Ifamanhasreachedthepointofemancipationfromwhatisgenericinhim,andwestillattempttoexplainallhisqualitiesbyreferencetothecharacterofthegenus,thenwelacktheorganforapprehendingwhatisindividual.

Itisimpossibletounderstandahumanbeingcompletelyifonemakestheconceptofthegenusthebasisofone’sjudgment.Thetendencytojudgeaccordingtothegenusismostpersistentwheredifferencesofsexareinvolved.Manseesinwoman,womaninman,almostalwaystoomuchofthegenericcharacteristicsoftheother’ssex,andtoolittleofwhatisindividualintheother.Inpracticallifethisdoeslessharmtomenthantowomen.Thesocialpositionofwomenis,inmostinstances,solowbecauseitisnotdeterminedbytheindividualcharacteristicsofeachwomanherself,butbythegeneralideaswhicharecurrentconcerningthenaturalfunctionandneedsofwoman.Aman’sactivityinlifeisdeterminedbyhisindividualcapacityandinclination,whereasawoman’sactivityissupposedtobedeterminedsolelybythefactthatsheisjustawoman.Womanistobetheslaveofthegeneric,ofthegeneralideaofwomanhood.Solongasmendebatewhetherwoman,fromher“naturaldisposition,”isfittedforthis,that,ortheotherprofession,theso-calledWoman’sQuestionwillneveradvancebeyondthemostelementarystage.Whatitliesinwoman’snaturetostriveforhadbetterbelefttowomanherselftodecide.Ifitistruethatwomenarefittedonlyforthatprofessionwhichistheirsatpresent,thentheywillhardlyhaveitinthemtoattainanyother.Buttheymustbeallowedtodecidefor

themselveswhatisconformabletotheirnature.Toallwhofearanupheavalofoursocialstructure,shouldwomenbetreatedasindividualsandnotasspecimensoftheirsex,weneedonlyreplythatasocialstructureinwhichthestatusofone-halfofhumanityisunworthyofahumanbeingstandsitselfingreatneedofimprovement.1

Anyonewhojudgeshumanbeingsaccordingtotheirgenericcharacterstopsshortattheverypointbeyondwhichtheybegintobeindividualswhoseactivityrestsonfreeself-determination.Whateverliesshortofthispointmaynaturallybecomematterforscientificstudy.Thusthecharacteristicsofrace,tribe,nation,andsexarethesubject-matterofspecialsciences.Onlymenwhoaresimplyspecimensofthegenuscouldpossiblyfitthegenericpicturewhichthemethodsofthesesciencesproduce.Butallthesesciencesareunabletogetasfarastheuniquecharacterofthesingleindividual.Wherethesphereoffreedom(thinkingandacting)begins,therethepossibilityofdeterminingtheindividualaccordingtothelawsofhisgenusceases.Theconceptualcontentwhichman,byanactofthought,hastoconnectwithpercepts,inordertopossesshimselffullyofreality(cp.pp.83ff.),cannotbefixedbyanyoneonceandforall,andhandeddowntohumanityready-made.Theindividualmustgainhisconceptsthroughhisownintuition.Itisimpossibletodeducefromanyconceptofthegenushowtheindividualoughttothink;thatdependssinglyandsolelyontheindividualhimself.So,again,itisjustasimpossibletodetermine,onthebasisoftheuniversalcharacteristicsofhumannature,whatconcreteendstheindividualwillsetbeforehimself.Anyonewhowantstounderstandthesingleindividualmustpenetratetotheinnermostcoreofhisbeing,andnotstopshortatthosequalitieswhichheshareswithothers.Inthissenseeverysinglehumanbeingisaproblem.Andeverysciencewhichdealsonlywithabstractthoughtsandgenericconceptsisbutapreparationforthekindofknowledgewhichwegainwhenahumanindividualcommunicatestoushiswayofviewingtheworld,andforthatotherkindofknowledgewhicheachofusgainsfromthecontentofhisownwill.Whereverwefeelthatherewearedealingwithamanwhohasemancipatedhisthinkingfromallthatisgeneric,andhiswillfromthegroovestypicalofhiskind,therewemustceasetocallinanyconceptsofourownmakingifwewouldunderstandhisnature.Knowledgeconsistsinthecombinationbythoughtofaconceptandapercept.Withallotherobjectstheobserverhastogainhisconceptsthroughhisintuition.Butiftheproblemistounderstandafreeindividuality,weneedonlytotakeoverintoourownmindsthoseconceptsbywhichtheindividualdetermineshimself,intheirpureform(withoutadmixture).Thosewhoalwaysmixtheirownideasintotheirjudgmentonanotherpersoncanneverattaintotheunderstandingofanindividuality.Justasthefreeindividualemancipateshimselffromthecharacteristicsofthegenus,soourknowledgeoftheindividualmustemancipateitselffromthemethodsbywhichweunderstandwhatisgeneric.

Amancountsasafreespiritinahumancommunityonlytothedegreeinwhichhehasemancipatedhimself,inthewaywehaveindicated,fromallthatisgeneric.Nomanisallgenus,noneisallindividuality;buteverymangraduallyemancipatesagreaterorlessersphereofhisbeing,bothfromthegenericcharacteristicsofanimallife,andfromthelawsofhumanauthoritieswhichrulehimdespotically.

Inrespectofthatpartofhisnatureforwhichmanisnotabletowinthisfreedomfor

himself,heformsamemberwithintheorganismofnatureandofspirit.Helives,inthisrespect,bytheimitationofothers,orinobediencetotheircommand.Butethicalvaluebelongsonlytothatpartofhisconductwhichspringsfromhisintuitions.Andwhatevermoralinstinctsmanpossessesthroughtheinheritanceofsocialinstincts,acquireethicalvaluethroughbeingtakenupintohisintuitions.Insuchethicalintuitionsallmoralactivityofmenhasitsroot.Toputthisdifferently:themorallifeofhumanityisthesum-totaloftheproductsofthemoralimaginationoffreehumanindividuals.ThisisMonism’sconfessionoffaith.

Immediatelyuponthepublicationofthisbook(1894),criticsobjectedtotheaboveargumentsthat,evennow,withinthegenericcharacterofhersex,awomanisabletoshapeherlifeindividually,justasshepleases,andfarmorefreelythanamanwhoisalreadyde-individualised,firstbytheschool,andlaterbywarandprofession.Iamawarethatthisobjectionwillbeurgedto-day,evenmorestrongly.Nonetheless,Ifeelboundtoletmysentencesstand,inthehopethattherearereaderswhoappreciatehowviolentlysuchanobjectionrunscountertotheconceptoffreedomadvocatedinthisbook,andwhowillinterpretmysentencesabovebyanotherstandardthanthatofman’slossofindividualitythroughschoolandprofession.↑

ULTIMATEQUESTIONS

THECONSEQUENCESOFMONISM

AnexplanationofNatureonasingleprinciple,or,inotherwords,Monism,derivesfromhumanexperienceallthematerialwhichitrequiresfortheexplanationoftheworld.Inthesameway,itlooksforthespringsofactionalsowithintheworldofobservation,i.e.,inthathumanpartofNaturewhichisaccessibletoourself-observation,andmoreparticularlyinthemoralimagination.Monismdeclinestoseekoutsidethatworldtheultimategroundsoftheworldwhichweperceiveandthink.ForMonism,theunitywhichreflectiveobservationaddstothemanifoldmultiplicityofpercepts,isidenticalwiththeunitywhichthehumandesireforknowledgedemands,andthroughwhichthisdesireseeksentranceintothephysicalandspiritualrealms.Whoeverlooksforanotherunitybehindthisone,onlyshowsthathefailstoperceivethecoincidenceoftheresultsofthinkingwiththedemandsoftheinstinctforknowledge.Aparticularhumanindividualisnotsomethingcutofffromtheuniverse.Heisapartoftheuniverse,andhisconnectionwiththecosmicwholeisbroken,notinreality,butonlyforourperception.Atfirstweapprehendthehumanpartoftheuniverseasaself-existingthing,becauseweareunabletoperceivethecordsandropesbywhichthefundamentalforcesofthecosmoskeepturningthewheelofourlife.

Allwhoremainatthisperceptualstandpointseethepartofthewholeasifitwereatrulyindependent,self-existingthing,amonadwhichgainsallitsknowledgeoftherestoftheworldinsomemysteriousmannerfromwithout.ButMonismhasshownthatwecanbelieveinthisindependenceonlysolongasthoughtdoesnotgatherourperceptsintothenetworkoftheconceptualworld.Assoonasthishappens,allpartialexistenceintheuniverse,allisolatedbeing,revealsitselfasamereappearanceduetoperception.Existenceasaself-containedtotalitycanbepredicatedonlyoftheuniverseasawhole.Thoughtdestroystheappearancesduetoperceptionandassignstoourindividualexistenceaplaceinthelifeofthecosmos.Theunityoftheconceptualworldwhichcontainsallobjectivepercepts,hasroomalsowithinitselfforthecontentofoursubjectivepersonality.Thoughtgivesusthetruestructureofrealityasaself-containedunity,whereasthemultiplicityofperceptsisbutanappearanceconditionedbyourorganisation(cp.pp.178ff.).Therecognitionofthetrueunityofreality,asagainsttheappearanceofmultiplicity,isatalltimesthegoalofhumanthought.Sciencestrivestoapprehendourapparentlydisconnectedperceptsasaunitybytracingtheirinter-relationsaccordingtonaturallaw.But,owingtotheprejudicethataninter-relationdiscoveredbyhumanthoughthasonlyasubjectivevalidity,thinkershavesoughtthetruegroundofunityinsomeobjecttranscendingtheworldofourexperience(God,will,absolutespirit,etc.).Further,basingthemselvesonthisprejudice,menhavetriedtogain,inadditiontotheirknowledgeofinter-relationswithinexperience,asecondkindofknowledgetranscendingexperience,whichshouldrevealtheconnectionbetweenempiricalinter-relationsandthoserealitieswhichliebeyondthelimitsofexperience(Metaphysics).Thereasonwhy,bylogicalthinking,weunderstandthenexusoftheworld,wasthoughttobethatanoriginalcreatorhasbuiltuptheworldaccordingtologicallaws,and,similarly,thegroundofouractions

wasthoughttolieinthewillofthisoriginalbeing.Itwasoverlookedthatthinkingembracesinonegraspthesubjectiveandtheobjective,andthatitcommunicatestousthewholeofrealityintheunionwhichiteffectsbetweenperceptandconcept.Onlysolongaswecontemplatethelawswhichpervadeanddetermineallpercepts,intheabstractformofconcepts,doweindeeddealonlywithsomethingpurelysubjective.Butthissubjectivitydoesnotbelongtothecontentoftheconceptwhich,bymeansofthought,isaddedtothepercept.Thiscontentistaken,notfromthesubject,butfromreality.Itisthatpartofrealitywhichisinaccessibletoperception.Itisexperience,butnotthekindofexperiencewhichcomesfromperception.Thosewhocannotunderstandthattheconceptissomethingreal,haveinmindonlytheabstractform,inwhichwefixandisolatetheconcept.Butinthisisolation,theconceptisasmuchdependentsolelyonourorganisationasisthepercept.ThetreewhichIperceive,takeninisolationbyitself,hasnoexistence;itexistsonlyasamemberintheimmensemechanismofNature,andispossibleonlyinrealconnectionwithNature.Anabstractconcept,takenbyitself,hasaslittlerealityasapercepttakenbyitself.Theperceptisthatpartofrealitywhichisgivenobjectively,theconceptthatpartwhichisgivensubjectively(byintuition;cp.pp.90ff.).Ourmentalorganisationbreaksuprealityintothesetwofactors.Theonefactorisapprehendedbyperception,theotherbyintuition.Onlytheunionofthetwo,whichconsistsoftheperceptfittedaccordingtolawintoitsplaceintheuniverse,isrealityinitsfullcharacter.Ifwetakemereperceptsbythemselves,wehavenorealitybutonlyadisconnectedchaos.Ifwetakethelawswhichdetermineperceptsbythemselves,wehavenothingbutabstractconcepts.Realityisnottobefoundintheabstractconcept.Itisrevealedtothecontemplativeactofthoughtwhichregardsneithertheconceptbyitselfnortheperceptbyitself,buttheunionofboth.

EventhemostorthodoxIdealistwillnotdenythatweliveintherealworld(that,asrealbeings,wearerootedinit);buthewilldenythatourknowledge,bymeansofitsideas,isabletograsprealityasweliveit.Asagainstthisview,Monismshowsthatthoughtisneithersubjectivenorobjective,butaprinciplewhichholdstogetherboththesesidesofreality.Thecontemplativeactofthoughtisacognitiveprocesswhichbelongsitselftothesequenceofrealevents.Bythoughtweovercome,withinthelimitsofexperienceitself,theone-sidednessofmereperception.Wearenotablebymeansofabstractconceptualhypotheses(purelyconceptualspeculation)topuzzleoutthenatureofthereal,butinsofaraswefindforourperceptstherightconceptsweliveinthereal.Monismdoesnotseektosupplementexperiencebysomethingunknowable(transcendingexperience),butfindsrealityinconceptandpercept.Itdoesnotmanufactureametaphysicalsystemoutofpureconcepts,becauseitlooksuponconceptsasonlyonesideofreality,viz.,thesidewhichremainshiddenfromperception,butismeaninglessexceptinunionwithpercepts.ButMonismgivesmantheconvictionthathelivesintheworldofreality,andhasnoneedtoseekbeyondtheworldforahigherreality.ItrefusestolookforAbsoluteRealityanywherebutinexperience,becauseitrecognisesrealityintheverycontentofexperience.Monismissatisfiedwiththisreality,becauseitknowsthatourthoughtpointstonoother.WhatDualismseeksbeyondtheworldofexperience,thatMonismfindsinthisworlditself.Monismshowsthatourknowledgegraspsrealityinitstruenature,notinapurelysubjectiveimage.Itholdstheconceptualcontentoftheworldtobeidenticalfor

allhumanindividuals(cp.pp.84ff.).AccordingtoMonisticprinciples,everyhumanindividualregardseveryotherasakintohimself,becauseitisthesameworld-contentwhichexpressesitselfinall.Inthesingleconceptualworldtherearenotasmanyconceptsof“lion”asthereareindividualswhoformthethoughtof“lion,”butonlyone.AndtheconceptwhichAaddstotheperceptof“lion”isidenticalwithB’sconceptexceptsofaras,ineachcase,itisapprehendedbyadifferentperceivingsubject(cp.p.85).Thoughtleadsallperceivingsubjectsbacktotheidealunityinallmultiplicity,whichiscommontothemall.Thereisbutoneidealworld,butitrealisesitselfinhumansubjectsasinamultiplicityofindividuals.Solongasmanapprehendshimselfmerelybyself-observation,helooksuponhimselfasthisparticularbeing,butsosoonashebecomesconsciousoftheidealworldwhichshinesforthwithinhim,andwhichembracesallparticularswithinitself,heperceivesthattheAbsoluteRealityliveswithinhim.DualismfixesupontheDivineBeingasthatwhichpermeatesallmenandlivesinthemall.MonismfindsthisuniversalDivineLifeinRealityitself.Theidealcontentofanothersubjectisalsomycontent,andIregarditasadifferentcontentonlysolongasIperceive,butnolongerwhenIthink.Everymanembracesinhisthoughtonlyapartofthetotalworldofideas,andsofar,individualsaredistinguishedonefromanotheralsobytheactualcontentsoftheirthought.Butallthesecontentsbelongtoaself-containedwhole,whichcompriseswithinitselfthethought-contentsofallmen.Henceeveryman,insofarashethinks,laysholdoftheuniversalRealitywhichpervadesallmen.Tofillone’slifewithsuchthought-contentistoliveinReality,andatthesametimetoliveinGod.ThethoughtofaBeyondowesitsorigintothemisconceptionofthosewhobelievethatthisworldcannothavethegroundofitsexistenceinitself.Theydonotunderstandthat,bythinking,theydiscoverjustwhattheydemandfortheexplanationoftheperceptualworld.Thisisthereasonwhynospeculationhaseverproducedanycontentwhichhasnotbeenborrowedfromrealityasitisgiventous.ApersonalGodisnothingbutahumanbeingtransplantedintotheBeyond.Schopenhauer’sWillisthehumanwillmadeabsolute.Hartmann’sUnconscious,madeupofideaandwill,isbutacompoundoftwoabstractionsdrawnfromexperience.Exactlythesameistrueofallothertranscendentprinciples.

Thetruthisthatthehumanmindnevertranscendstherealityinwhichitlives.Indeed,ithasnoneedtotranscendit,seeingthatthisworldcontainseverythingthatisrequiredforitsownexplanation.IfphilosophersdeclarethemselvesfinallycontentwhentheyhavededucedtheworldfromprincipleswhichtheyborrowfromexperienceandthentransplantintoanhypotheticalBeyond,thesamesatisfactionoughttobepossible,ifthesesameprinciplesareallowedtoremaininthisworldtowhichtheybelonganyhow.Allattemptstotranscendtheworldarepurelyillusory,andtheprinciplestransplantedintotheBeyonddonotexplaintheworldanybetterthantheprincipleswhichareimmanentinit.Whenthoughtunderstandsitself,itdoesnotdemandanysuchtranscendenceatall,forthereisnothought-contentwhichdoesnotfindwithintheworldaperceptualcontent,inunionwithwhichitcanformarealobject.Theobjectsofimagination,too,arecontentswhichhavenovalidity,untiltheyhavebeentransformedintoideasthatrefertoaperceptualcontent.Throughthisperceptualcontenttheyhavetheirplaceinreality.Aconceptthecontentofwhichissupposedtoliebeyondtheworldwhichisgiventous,isanabstractiontowhichnorealitycorresponds.Thoughtcandiscoveronlytheconceptsof

reality;inordertofindrealityitself,weneedalsoperception.AnAbsoluteBeingforwhichweinventacontent,isahypothesiswhichnothoughtcanentertainthatunderstandsitself.Monismdoesnotdenyidealfactors;indeed,itrefusestorecogniseasfullyrealaperceptualcontentwhichhasnoidealcounterpart,butitfindsnothingwithinthewholerangeofthoughtthatisnotimmanentwithinthisworldofours.Asciencewhichrestrictsitselftoadescriptionofpercepts,withoutadvancingtotheiridealcomplements,is,forMonism,butafragment.ButMonismregardsasequallyfragmentaryallabstractconceptswhichdonotfindtheircomplementinpercepts,andwhichfitnowhereintotheconceptualnetthatembracesthewholeperceptualworld.HenceitknowsnoideasreferringtoobjectslyingbeyondourexperienceandsupposedtoformthecontentofpurelyhypotheticalMetaphysics.WhatevermankindhasproducedinthewayofsuchideasMonismregardsasabstractionsfromexperience,whoseorigininexperiencehasbeenoverlookedbytheirauthors.

Justaslittle,accordingtoMonisticprinciples,aretheendsofouractionscapableofbeingderivedfromtheBeyond.Sofaraswecanthinkthem,theymusthavetheirorigininhumanintuition.Mandoesnotadoptthepurposesofanobjective(transcendent)beingashisownindividualpurposes,buthepursuestheendswhichhisownmoralimaginationsetsbeforehim.Theideawhichrealisesitselfinanactionisselectedbytheagentfromthesingleidealworldandmadethebasisofhiswill.ConsequentlyhisactionisnotarealisationofcommandswhichhavebeenthrustintothisworldfromtheBeyond,butofhumanintuitionswhichbelongtothisworld.ForMonismthereisnoruleroftheworldstandingoutsideofusanddeterminingtheaimanddirectionofouractions.Thereisformannotranscendentgroundofexistence,thecounselsofwhichhemightdiscover,inorderthencetolearntheendstowhichheoughttodirecthisaction.Manmustrestwhollyuponhimself.Hemusthimselfgiveacontenttohisaction.Itisinvainthatheseeksoutsidetheworldinwhichhelivesformotivesofhiswill.IfheistogoatallbeyondthesatisfactionofthenaturalinstinctsforwhichMotherNaturehasprovided,hemustlookformotivesinhisownmoralimagination,unlesshefindsitmoreconvenienttoletthembedeterminedforhimbythemoralimaginationofothers.Inotherwords,hemusteitherceaseactingaltogether,orelseactfrommotiveswhichheselectsforhimselffromtheworldofhisideas,orwhichothersselectforhimfromthatsameworld.Ifhedevelopsatallbeyondalifeabsorbedinsensuousinstinctsandintheexecutionofthecommandsofothers,thenthereisnothingthatcandeterminehimexcepthimself.Hehastoactfromamotivewhichhegivestohimselfandwhichnothingelsecandetermineforhimexcepthimself.Itistruethatthismotiveisideallydeterminedinthesingleworldofideas;butinactualfactitmustbeselectedbytheagentfromthatworldandtranslatedintoreality.Monismcanfindthegroundfortheactualrealisationofanideathroughhumanactiononlyinthehumanbeinghimself.Thatanideashouldpassintoactionmustbewilledbymanbeforeitcanhappen.Suchawillconsequentlyhasitsgroundonlyinmanhimself.Man,onthisview,istheultimatedeterminantofhisaction.Heisfree.

Inthesecondpartofthisbooktheattempthasbeenmadetojustifytheconvictionthat

freedomistobefoundinhumanconductasitreallyis.Forthispurposeitwasnecessarytosortout,fromthewholesphereofhumanconduct,thoseactionswithrespecttowhichunprejudicedself-observationmayappropriatelyspeakoffreedom.Thesearetheactionswhichappearasrealisationsofidealintuitions.Nootheractionswillbecalledfreebyanunprejudicedobserver.However,open-mindedself-observationcompelsmantoregardhimselfasendowedwiththecapacityforprogressontheroadtowardsethicalintuitionsandtheirrealisation.Yetthisopen-mindedobservationoftheethicalnatureofmanis,byitself,insufficienttoconstitutethefinalcourtofappealforthequestionoffreedom.For,supposeintuitivethinkinghaditselfsprungfromsomeotheressence;supposeitsessencewerenotgroundedinitself,thentheconsciousnessoffreedom,whichissuesfrommoralconduct,wouldprovetobeamereillusion.Butthesecondpartofthisbookfindsitsnaturalsupportinthefirstpart,whichpresentsintuitivethinkingasaninwardspiritualactivitywhichmanexperiencesassuch.Toappreciatethroughexperiencethisessenceofthinkingisequivalenttorecognisingthefreedomofintuitivethinking.Andonceweknowthatthisthinkingisfree,weknowalsothespherewithinwhichwillmaybecalledfree.Weshallregardmanasafreeagent,ifonthebasisofinnerexperiencewemayattributetothelifeofintuitivethinkingaself-sustainingessence.Whoevercannotdothiswillbeunabletodiscoveranywhollyunassailableroadtothebeliefinfreedom.Theexperiencetowhichweherereferrevealsinconsciousnessintuitivethinking,therealityofwhichdoesnotdependmerelyonourbeingconsciousofit.Freedom,too,istherebyrevealedasthecharacteristicofallactionswhichissuefromtheintuitionsofconsciousness.

Theargumentationofthisbookisbuiltuponthefactofintuitivethinking,whichmaybeexperiencedinapurelyspiritualway,andwhicheveryperceptioninsertsintorealitysothatrealitycomestherebytobeknown.Allthatthisbookaimedatpresentingwastheresultofasurveyfromthebasisofourexperienceofintuitivethinking.However,theintentionalsowastoemphasisethesystematicinterpretationwhichthisthinking,asexperiencedbyus,demands.Itdemandsthatweshallnotdenyitspresenceincognitionasaself-sustainingexperience.Itdemandsthatweacknowledgeitscapacityforexperiencingrealityinco-operationwithperception,andthatwedonotmakeitseekrealityinaworldoutsideexperienceandaccessibleonlytoinference,inthefaceofwhichhumanthinkingwouldbeonlyasubjectiveactivity.

Thisviewcharacterisesthinkingasthatfactorinmanthroughwhichheinsertshimselfspirituallyintoreality.(And,strictly,nooneshouldconfusethiskindofworld-view,whichisbasedonthinkingasdirectlyexperienced,withmereRationalism.)But,ontheotherhand,thewholetenoroftheprecedingargumentationshowsthatperceptionyieldsadeterminationofrealityforhumanknowledgeonlywhenitistakenholdofinthinking.Outsideofthinkingthereisnothingtocharacteriserealityforwhatitis.Hencewehavenorighttoimaginethatsense-perceptionistheonlywitnesstoreality.Whatevercomestousbywayofperceptiononourjourneythroughlife,wecannotbutexpect.Theonlypointopentoquestionwouldbewhether,fromtheexclusivepointofviewofthinkingasweintuitivelyexperienceit,wehavearighttoexpectthatoverandabovesensuous

perceptionthereisalsospiritualperception.Thisexpectationisjustified.For,thoughintuitivethinkingis,ontheonehand,anactiveprocesstakingplaceinthehumanmind,itis,ontheotherhand,alsoaspiritualperceptionmediatedbynosense-organ.Itisaperceptioninwhichthepercipientishimselfactive,andaself-activitywhichisatthesametimeperceived.Inintuitivethinkingmanentersaspiritualworldalsoasapercipient.Whateverwithinthisworldpresentsitselftohimasperceptinthesamewayinwhichthespiritualworldofhisownthinkingsopresentsitself,thatisrecognisedbyhimasconstitutingaworldofspiritualperception.Thisworldofspiritualperceptionwemaysupposetobestandinginthesamerelationtothinkingasdoes,onthesensuousside,theworldofsense-perception.Mandoesnotexperiencetheworldofspiritualperceptionasanaliensomething,becauseheisalreadyfamiliarinhisintuitivethinkingwithanexperienceofpurelyspiritualcharacter.WithsuchaworldofspiritualperceptionanumberofthewritingsareconcernedwhichIhavepublishedsincethispresentbookappeared.ThePhilosophyofSpiritualActivitylaysthephilosophicalfoundationfortheselaterwritings.Foritattemptstoshowthatintheveryexperienceofthinking,rightlyunderstood,weexperienceSpirit.Thisisthereasonwhyitappearstotheauthorthatnoonewillstopshortofenteringtheworldofspiritualperceptionwhohasbeenabletoadopt,inallseriousness,thepointofviewofthePhilosophyofSpiritualActivity.True,logicaldeduction—bysyllogisms—willnotextractoutofthecontentsofthisbookthecontentsoftheauthor’slaterbooks.Butalivingunderstandingofwhatismeantinthisbookby“intuitivethinking”willnaturallypreparethewayforlivingentryintotheworldofspiritualperception.

TRUTHANDSCIENCE1

ThePrefaceandIntroductiontotheoriginaleditionof“TruthandScience”areprintedasAppendixIIIandAppendixIVattheendofthisvolume.↑

PRELIMINARYOBSERVATIONS

TheoryofKnowledgeaimsatbeingascientificinvestigationoftheveryfactwhichallothersciencestakeforgrantedwithoutexamination,viz.,knowingorknowledge-gettingitself.Tosaythisistoattributetoit,fromtheverystart,thecharacterofbeingthefundamentalphilosophicaldiscipline.For,itisonlythisdisciplinewhichcantelluswhatvalueandsignificancebelongtotheinsightgainedbytheothersciences.Inthisrespectitisthefoundationforallscientificendeavour.But,itisclearthattheTheoryofKnowledgecanfulfilitstaskonlyifitworkswithoutanypresuppositionsofitsown,sofarasthatispossibleinviewofthenatureofhumanknowledge.Thisisprobablyconcededonallsides.Andyet,amoredetailedexaminationofthebetter-knownepistemologicalsystemsrevealsthat,attheverystarting-pointoftheinquiry,thereismadeawholeseriesofassumptionswhichdetractconsiderablyfromtheplausibilityoftherestoftheargument.Inparticular,itisnoticeablehowfrequentlycertainhiddenassumptionsaremadeintheveryformulationofthefundamentalproblemsofepistemology.But,ifasciencebeginsbymisstatingitsproblems,wemustdespairfromthestartoffindingtherightsolution.Thehistoryofthesciencesteachesusthatcountlesserrors,fromwhichwholeepochshavesuffered,aretobetracedwhollyandsolelytothefactthatcertainproblemswerewronglyformulated.ForillustrationsthereisnoneedtogobacktoAristotleortotheArsMagnaLulliana.Thereareplentyofexamplesinmorerecenttimes.Thenumerousquestionsconcerningthepurposesoftherudimentaryorgansofcertainorganismscouldbecorrectlyformulatedonlyafterthediscoveryofthefundamentallawofbiogenesishadcreatedthenecessaryconditions.AslongasBiologywasundertheinfluenceofteleologicalconcepts,itwasimpossibletoputtheseproblemsinaformpermittingasatisfactoryanswer.Whatfantasticideas,forexample,werecurrentconcerningthepurposeoftheso-calledpinealgland,solongasitwasfashionabletoframebiologicalquestionsintermsof“purpose.”AnanswerwasnotachieveduntilthesolutionoftheproblemwassoughtbythemethodofComparativeAnatomy,andscientistsaskedwhetherthisorganmightnotbemerelyaresidualsurvivalinmanfromalowerevolutionarylevel.Or,tomentionyetanotherexample,considerthemodificationsincertainphysicalproblemsafterthediscoveryofthelawsofthemechanicalequivalentsofheatandoftheconservationofenergy!Inshort,thesuccessofscientificinvestigationsdependsessentiallyupontheinvestigator’sabilitytoformulatehisproblemscorrectly.EventhoughtheTheoryofKnowledge,asthepresuppositionofallothersciences,occupiesapositionverydifferentfromtheirs,wemayyetexpectthatforit,too,successfulprogressinitsinvestigationswillbecomepossibleonlywhenthefundamentalquestionshavebeenputinthecorrectform.

Thefollowingdiscussionsaim,inthefirstplace,atsuchaformulationoftheproblemofknowledgeaswilldojusticetothecharacteroftheTheoryofKnowledgeasadisciplinewhichiswithoutanypresuppositionswhatever.TheirsecondaryaimistothrowlightontherelationofJ.G.Fichte’sWissenschaftslehretosuchafundamentalphilosophicaldiscipline.ThereasonwhypreciselyFichte’sattempttoprovideanabsolutelycertainbasisforthescienceswillbebroughtintocloserrelationwithourownphilosophical

programme,willbecomeclearofitselfinthecourseofourinvestigation.

THEFUNDAMENTALPROBLEMOFKANT’STHEORYOFKNOWLEDGE

ItisusualtodesignateKantasthefounderoftheTheoryofKnowledgeinthemodernsense.AgainstthisviewitmightplausiblybearguedthatthehistoryofphilosophyrecordspriortoKantnumerousinvestigationswhichdeservetoberegardedassomethingmorethanmerebeginningsofsuchascience.ThusVolkelt,inhisfundamentalworkontheTheoryofKnowledge,1remarksthatthecriticaltreatmentofthisdisciplinetookitsoriginalreadywithLocke.Butinthewritingsofevenolderphilosophers,yes,eveninthephilosophyofAncientGreece,discussionsaretobefoundwhichatthepresentdayareusuallyundertakenundertheheadingofTheoryofKnowledge.However,Kanthasrevolutionisedallproblemsunderthisheadfromtheirverydepthsup,and,followinghim,numerousthinkershaveworkedthemthroughsothoroughlythatalltheolderattemptsatsolutionsmaybefoundoveragaineitherinKanthimselforelseinhissuccessors.Hence,forthepurposesofapurelysystematic,asdistinctfromahistorical,studyoftheTheoryofKnowledge,thereisnotmuchdangerofomittinganyimportantphenomenonbytakingaccountonlyoftheperiodsinceKantburstupontheworldwithhisCritiqueofPureReason.Allpreviousepistemologicalachievementsarerecapitulatedduringthisperiod.

ThefundamentalquestionofKant’sTheoryofKnowledgeis,Howaresyntheticjudgmentsaprioripossible?Letusconsiderthisquestionforamomentinrespectofitsfreedomfrompresuppositions.Kantasksthequestionpreciselybecausehebelievesthatwecanattainunconditionallycertainknowledgeonlyifweareabletoprovethevalidityofsyntheticjudgmentsapriori.Hesays:“Shouldthisquestionbeansweredinasatisfactoryway,weshallatthesametimelearnwhatpartreasonplaysinthefoundationandcompletionofthosescienceswhichcontainatheoreticalaprioriknowledgeofobjects;”2and,further,“Metaphysicsstandsandfallswiththesolutionofthisproblem,onwhich,therefore,theveryexistenceofMetaphysicsabsolutelydepends.”3

Arethereanypresuppositionsinthisquestion,asformulatedbyKant?Yes,thereare.Forthepossibilityofasystemofabsolutelycertainknowledgeismadedependentonitsbeingbuiltupexclusivelyoutofjudgmentswhicharesyntheticandacquiredindependentlyofallexperience.“Synthetic”isKant’stermforjudgmentsinwhichtheconceptofthepredicateaddstotheconceptofthesubjectsomethingwhichlieswhollyoutsidethesubject,“althoughitstandsinsomeconnectionwiththesubject,”4whereasin“analytic”judgmentsthepredicateaffirmsonlywhatisalready(implicitly)containedinthesubject.ThisisnottheplaceforconsideringtheacuteobjectionswhichJohannesRehmke5bringsforwardagainstthisclassificationofjudgments.Forourpresentpurpose,itisenoughtounderstandthatwecanattaintogenuineknowledgeonlythroughjudgmentswhichaddtooneconceptanotherthecontentofwhichwasnot,forusatleast,containedinthatoftheformer.Ifwechoosetocallthisclassofjudgments,withKant,“synthetic,”wemayagreethatknowledgeinjudgmentformisobtainableonlywheretheconnectionofpredicateand

subjectisofthissyntheticsort.But,thecaseisverydifferentwiththesecondhalfofKant’squestion,whichdemandsthatthesejudgmentsaretobeformedapriori,i.e.,independentlyofallexperience.Foronething,itisaltogetherpossible6thatsuchjudgmentsdonotoccuratall.AtthestartoftheTheoryofKnowledgewemustholdentirelyopenthequestion,whetherwearriveatanyjudgmentsotherwisethanbyexperience,oronlybyexperience.Indeed,tounprejudicedreflectiontheallegedindependenceofexperienceseemsfromthefirsttobeimpossible.For,lettheobjectofourknowledgebewhatitmay—itmust,surely,alwayspresentitselftousatsometimeinanimmediateanduniqueway;inshort,itmustbecomeforusanexperience.Mathematicaljudgments,too,areknownbyusinnootherwaythanbyourexperiencingtheminparticularconcretecases.Evenif,withOttoLiebmann,7forexample,wetreatthemasfoundeduponacertainorganisationofourconsciousness,thisempiricalcharacterisnonethelessmanifest.Weshallthensaythatthisorthatpropositionisnecessarilyvalid,becausethedenialofitstruthwouldimplythedenialofourconsciousness,butthecontentofapropositioncanenterourknowledgeonlybyitsbecominganexperienceforusinexactlythesamewayinwhichaprocessintheouterworldofnaturedoesso.Letthecontentofsuchapropositionincludefactorswhichguaranteeitsabsolutevalidity,orletitsvaliditybebasedonothergrounds—ineithercase,Icanpossessmyselfofitonlyinonewayandinnoother:itmustbepresentedtomeinexperience.ThisisthefirstobjectiontoKant’sview.

Theotherobjectionliesinthis,thatwehavenoright,attheoutsetofourepistemologicalinvestigations,toaffirmthatnoabsolutelycertainknowledgecanhaveitssourceinexperience.Withoutdoubt,itiseasilyconceivablethatexperienceitselfmightcontainacriterionguaranteeingthecertaintyofallknowledgewhichhasanempiricalsource.

Thus,Kant’sformulationoftheproblemimpliestwopresuppositions.Thefirstisthatweneed,overandaboveexperience,anothersourceofcognitions.Thesecondisthatallknowledgefromexperiencehasonlyconditionalvalidity.Kantentirelyfailstorealisethatthesetwopropositionsareopentodoubt,thattheystandinneedofcriticalexamination.Hetakesthemoverasunquestionedassumptionsfromthedogmaticphilosophyofhispredecessorsandmakesthemthebasisofhisowncriticalinquiries.Thedogmaticthinkersassumethevalidityofthesetwopropositionsandsimplyapplytheminordertogetfromeachthekindofknowledgewhichitguarantees.Kantassumedtheirvalidityandonlyasks,Whataretheconditionsoftheirvalidity?But,whatiftheyarenotvalidatall?Inthatcase,theedificeofKantiandoctrinelacksallfoundationwhatever.

ThewholeargumentationofthefivesectionswhichprecedeKant’sformulationoftheproblem,amountstoanattempttoprovethatthepropositionsofMathematicsaresynthetic.8But,preciselythetwopresuppositionswhichwehavepointedoutareretainedasmereassumptionsinhisdiscussions.IntheIntroductiontotheSecondEditionoftheCritiqueofPureReasonweread,“experiencecantellusthatathingissoandso,butnotthatitcannotbeotherwise,”and,“experienceneverbestowsonitsjudgmentstrueorstrictuniversality,butonlytheassumedandrelativeuniversalityofinduction.”9InPrologomena,10wefinditsaid,“First,asregardsthesourcesofmetaphysics,thevery

conceptofMetaphysicsimpliesthattheycannotbeempirical.TheprinciplesofMetaphysics(wheretheterm‘principles’includes,notmerelyitsfundamentalpropositions,butalsoitsfundamentalconcepts),canneverbegainedfromexperience,fortheknowledgeofthemetaphysicianhaspreciselytobe,notphysical,but‘metaphysical,’i.e.,lyingbeyondthereachofexperience.”LastlyKantsaysintheCritiqueofPureReason:“Thefirstthingtonoticeis,thatnotrulymathematicaljudgmentsareempirical,butalwaysapriori.Theycarrynecessityontheirveryface,andthereforecannotbederivedfromexperience.Shouldanyonedemurtothis,IamwillingtolimitmyassertiontothepropositionsofPureMathematics,which,aseverybodywilladmit,arenotempiricaljudgments,butperfectlypureaprioriknowledge.”11

WemayopentheCritiqueofPureReasonwhereverweplease,weshallalwaysfindthatinallitsdiscussionsthesetwodogmaticpropositionsaretakenforgranted.Cohen12andStadler13attempttoprovethatKanthasestablishedtheaprioricharacterofthepropositionsofMathematicsandPureNaturalScience.ButallthatKanttriestodointheCritiquemaybesummedupasfollows.ThefactthatMathematicsandPureNaturalScienceareapriorisciencesimpliesthatthe“form”ofallexperiencehasitsgroundinthesubject.Hence,allthatisgivenbyexperienceisthe“matter”ofsensations.Thismatterissynthesisedbytheforms,inherentinthemind,intothesystemofempiricalscience.Itisonlyasprinciplesoforderforthematterofsensethattheformalprinciplesoftheaprioritheorieshavefunctionandsignificance.Theymakeempiricalsciencepossible,buttheycannottranscendit.Theseformalprinciplesarenothingbutthesyntheticjudgmentsapriori,whichthereforeextend,asconditionsofallpossibleempiricalknowledge,asfarasthatknowledgebutnofurther.Thus,theCritiqueofPureReason,sofarfromprovingtheaprioricharacterofMathematicsandPureNaturalScience,doesbutdelimitthesphereoftheirapplicabilityontheassumptionthattheirprinciplesmustbecomeknownindependentlyofexperience.Indeed,Kantissofarfromattemptingaproofoftheaprioricharacteroftheseprinciples,thathesimplyexcludesthatpartofMathematics(seethequotationabove)inwhich,evenaccordingtohisview,thatcharactermightbecalledinquestion,andconfineshimselftothepartinwhichhethinkshecaninfertheaprioricharacterfromthebareconceptsinvolved.JohannesVolkelt,too,comestotheconclusionthat“Kantstartsfromtheexplicitpresupposition”that“thereactuallydoesexistknowledgewhichisuniversalandnecessary.”Hegoesontoremark,“ThispresuppositionwhichKanthasneverexplicitlyquestioned,issoprofoundlycontradictorytothecharacterofatrulycriticalTheoryofKnowledge,thatthequestionmustbeseriouslyputwhethertheCritiqueistobeacceptedascriticalTheoryofKnowledgeatall.”Volkeltdoes,indeed,decidethattherearegoodgroundsforansweringthisquestionintheaffirmative,butstill,ashesays,“thisdogmaticassumptiondoesdisturbthecriticalattitudeofKant’sepistemologyinthemostfar-reachingway.”14Inshort,Volkelt,too,findsthattheCritiqueofPureReasonisnotaTheoryofKnowledgefreefromallassumptions.

InsubstantialagreementwithourviewarealsotheviewsofO.Liebmann,15Holder,16Windelband,17Ueberweg,18EduardvonHartmann,19andKunoFischer,20allofwhomacknowledgethatKantmakestheaprioricharacterofPureMathematicsandPhysicsthebasisofhiswholeargumentation.

Thepropositionsthatwereallyhaveknowledgewhichisindependentofallexperience,andthatexperiencecanfurnishknowledgeofonlyrelativeuniversality,couldbeacceptedbyusasvalidonlyiftheywereconclusionsdeducedfromotherpropositions.Itwouldbeabsolutelynecessaryforthesepropositionstobeprecededbyaninquiryintotheessentialnatureofexperience,aswellasbyanotherinquiryintotheessentialnatureofknowing.Theformermightjustifythefirst,thelatterthesecond,oftheabovetwopropositions.

ItwouldbepossibletoreplytotheobjectionswhichwehaveurgedagainsttheCritiqueofPureReason,asfollows.ItmightbesaidthateveryTheoryofKnowledgemustfirstleadthereadertotheplacewherethestarting-point,freefromallpresuppositions,istobefound.For,theknowledgewhichwehaveatanygivenmomentofourlivesisfarremovedfromthisstarting-point,sothatwemustfirstbeartificiallyledbacktoit.Now,itistruethatsomesuchmutualunderstandingbetweenauthorandreaderconcerningthestarting-pointofthescienceisnecessaryinallTheoryofKnowledge.Butsuchanunderstandingoughtonnoaccounttogobeyondshowinghowfartheallegedstarting-pointofknowingistrulysuch.Itoughttoconsistofpurelyself-evident,analyticpropositions.Itoughtnottolaydownanypositive,substantialaffirmationswhichinfluence,asinKant,thecontentofthesubsequentargumentation.Moreover,itisthedutyoftheepistemologisttoshowthatthestarting-pointwhichheallegesisreallyfreefromallpresuppositions.Butallthishasnothingtodowiththeessentialnatureofthatstarting-point.Itlieswhollyoutsidethestarting-pointandmakesnoaffirmationsaboutit.Atthebeginningofmathematicalinstruction,too,theteachermustexerthimselftoconvincethepupiloftheaxiomaticcharacterofcertainprinciples.Butnoonewillmaintainthatthecontentoftheaxiomsisinanywaymadedependentonthesepriordiscussionsoftheiraxiomaticcharacter.21Inexactlythesameway,theepistemologist,inhisintroductoryremarks,oughttoshowthemethodbywhichwecanreachastarting-pointfreefromallpresuppositions.Buttherealcontentofthestarting-pointoughttobeindependentofthereflectionsbywhichitisdiscovered.Thereis,mostcertainly,awidedifferencebetweensuchanintroductiontotheTheoryofKnowledgeandKant’swayofbeginningwithaffirmationsofquitedefinite,dogmaticcharacter.

l.c.,p.20.↑

cf.Kant,CritiqueofPureReason,Intr.to2ndedit.,Sectionvi.↑

Prolegomena,Sectionv.↑

CritiqueofPureReason,Intr.,Sectioniv.↑

cf.hisAnalysederWirklichkeit,GedankenundTatsachen.↑

“Possible”heremeansmerelyconceivable.↑

cf.DieWeltalsWahrnehmungundBegriff,pp.161ff.↑

Thisattempt,bytheway,isonewhichtheobjectionsofRobertZimmermann(ÜberKant’smathematischesVorurteilunddessenFolgen)showtobe,ifnotwhollymistaken,atleasthighlyquestionable.↑

CritiqueofPureReason,Intr.to2ndedit.,Sectionii.↑

cf.Kant’sTheoriederErfahrung,pp.90ff.↑

l.c.,Sectionv.↑

cf.Kant’sTheoriederErfahrung,pp.90ff.↑

cf.DieGrundsätzederreinenErkenntnistheorieinderKantischenPhilosophie,p.76.↑

l.c.,p.21.↑

ZurAnalysederWirklichkeit,pp.211ff.↑

DarstellungderKantischenErkenntnistheorie,p.14.↑

VierteljahrsschriftfürWissenschaftlichePhilosophie,1877,p.239.↑

SystemderLogik,3rdedit.,pp.380ff.↑

KritischeGrundlagendesTranscendentalenRealismus,pp.142–172.↑

GeschichtederNeuerenPhilosophie,Vol.v.,p.60.VolkeltismistakenaboutFischerwhenhesays(Kant’sErkenntnistheorie,p.198,n.)that“itisnotclearfromFischer’saccountwhether,inhisopinion,Kanttakesforgrantedonlythepsychologicalfactoftheoccurrenceofuniversalandnecessaryjudgments,butalsotheirobjectivevalidityandtruth.”For,inthepassagereferredtoabove,FischersaysthatthechiefdifficultyoftheCritiqueofPureReasonistobefoundinthefactthat“itsfundamentalpositionsrestoncertainpresuppositions”which“havetobegrantediftherestistobevalid.”ThesepresuppositionsconsistforFischer,too,inthis,that“firstthefactofknowledgeisaffirmed,”andthenanalysisrevealsthecognitivefaculties“bymeansofwhichthatfactitselfisexplained.”↑

Howfarourownepistemologicaldiscussionsconformtothismethod,willbeshowninSectioniv,“TheStarting-pointsoftheTheoryofKnowledge.”↑

THEORYOFKNOWLEDGESINCEKANT

Kant’smistakenformulationoftheproblemhashadagreaterorlesserinfluenceonallsubsequentstudentsoftheTheoryofKnowledge.ForKant,theviewthatallobjectswhicharegiventousinexperienceareideasinourmindsisaconsequenceofhistheoryoftheapriori.Fornearlyallhissuccessors,ithasbecomethefirstprincipleandstarting-pointoftheirepistemologicalsystems.Itissaidthatthefirstandmostimmediatetruthis,simplyandsolely,thepropositionthatweknowourownideas.Thishascometobeawell-nighuniversalconvictionamongphilosophers.G.E.SchulzemaintainsinhisÆnesidemus,asearlyas1792,thatallourcognitionsaremereideasandthatwecannevertranscendourideas.Schopenhauerputsforward,withallthephilosophicalpathoswhichdistinguisheshim,theviewthatthepermanentachievementofKant’sphilosophyisthethesisthat“theworldismyidea.”ToEduardvonHartmannthisthesisissoincontestable,thatheaddresseshistreatise,KritischeGrundlegungdesTranscendentalenRealismus,exclusivelytoreaderswhohaveachievedcriticalemancipationfromthenaïveidentificationoftheworldofperceptionwiththething-in-itself.Hedemandsofthemthattheyshallhavemadecleartothemselvestheabsoluteheterogeneityoftheobjectofperceptionwhichthroughtheactofrepresentationhasbeengivenasasubjectiveandidealcontentofconsciousness,andofthething-in-itselfwhichisindependentoftheactofrepresentationandoftheformofconsciousnessandwhichexistsinitsownright.Hisreadersarerequiredtobethoroughlyconvincedthatthewholeofwhatisimmediatelygiventousconsistsofideas.1InhislatestworkonTheoryofKnowledge,Hartmanndoes,indeed,attempttogivereasonsforthisview.WhatvalueshouldbeattachedtothesereasonsbyanunprejudicedTheoryofKnowledgewillappearinthefurthercourseofourdiscussions.OttoLiebmannpositsasthesacrosanctfirstprincipleoftheTheoryofKnowledgetheproposition,“Consciousnesscannottranscenditself.”2Volkelthascalledthepropositionthatthefirstandmostimmediatetruthisthelimitationofallourknowledge,inthefirstinstance,toourownideasexclusively,thepositivisticprincipleofknowledge.Heregardsonlythosetheoriesofknowledgeas“inthefullestsensecritical”which“placethisprinciple,astheonlyfixedstarting-pointofphilosophy,attheheadoftheirdiscussionsandthenconsistentlythinkoutitsconsequences.”3OtherphilosophersplaceotherpropositionsattheheadoftheTheoryofKnowledge,e.g.,thepropositionthatitsrealproblemconcernstherelationbetweenThoughtandBeing,andthepossibilityofamediationbetweenthem;4orthatitconcernsthewayinwhichBeingbecomesanobjectofConsciousness;5andmanyothers.Kirchmannstartsfromtwoepistemologicalaxioms,“Whateverisperceivedis,”and,“Whateverisself-contradictory,isnot.”6AccordingtoE.L.Fischer,knowledgeisthescienceofsomethingactual,somethingreal,7andhecriticisesthisdogmaaslittleasdoesGoeringwhoassertssimilarly,“Toknowmeansalwaystoknowsomethingwhichis.ThisisafactwhichcannotbedeniedeitherbyscepticismorbyKant’scriticalphilosophy.”8Thesetwolatterthinkerssimplylaydownthelaw:Thisiswhatknowledgeis.Theydonottroubletoaskthemselveswithwhatrighttheydoit.

But,evenifthesevariouspropositionswerecorrect,orledtocorrectformulationsoftheproblem,itwouldstillbeimpossibletodiscussthemattheoutsetoftheTheoryofKnowledge.For,theyallbelong,aspositiveanddefinitecognitions,withintherealmofknowledge.Tosaythatmyknowledgeextends,inthefirstinstance,onlytomyideas,istoexpressinaperfectlydefinitejudgmentsomethingwhichIknow.InthisjudgmentIqualifytheworldwhichisgiventomebythepredicate“existingintheformofidea.”ButhowamItoknow,priortoallknowledge,thattheobjectsgiventomeareideas?

ThebestwaytoconvinceourselvesofthetruthoftheassertionthatthispropositionhasnorighttobeputattheheadoftheTheoryofKnowledge,istoretracethewaywhichthehumanmindmustfollowinordertoreachthisproposition,whichhasbecomealmostanintegralpartofthewholemodernscientificconsciousness.Theconsiderationswhichhaveledtoitaresystematicallysummarised,withapproximateexhaustiveness,inPartIofEduardvonHartmann’streatise,DasGrundproblemderErkenntnistheorie.Hisstatement,there,mayserveasasortofguiding-threadforusinourtaskofreviewingthereasonswhichmayleadtotheacceptanceofthisproposition.

Thesereasonsarephysical,psycho-physical,physiological,andproperlyphilosophical.

ThePhysicistisledbyobservationofthephenomenawhichoccurinourenvironmentwhen,e.g.,weexperienceasensationofsound,totheviewthatthereisnothinginthesephenomenawhichintheveryleastresembleswhatweperceiveimmediatelyassound.Outside,inthespacewhichsurroundsus,nothingistobefoundexceptlongitudinaloscillationsofbodiesandoftheair.Thenceitisinferredthatwhatinordinarylifewecall“sound”or“tone”isnothingbutthesubjectivereactionofourorganismtothesewave-likeoscillations.Similarly,itisinferredthatlightandcolourandheatarepurelysubjective.Thephenomenaofcolour-dispersion,ofrefraction,ofinterference,ofpolarisation,teachusthattothejust-mentionedsensationstherecorrespondintheouterspacecertaintransverseoscillationswhichwefeelcompelledtoascribe,inparttothebodies,inparttoanimmeasurablyfine,elasticfluid,the“ether.”Further,thePhysicistisdrivenbycertainphenomenaintheworldofbodiestoabandonthebeliefinthecontinuityofobjectsinspace,andtoanalysethemintosystemsofexceedinglyminuteparticles(molecules,atoms),thesizeofwhich,relativelytothedistancesbetweenthem,isimmeasurablysmall.Thenceitisinferredthatallactionofbodiesoneachotherisacrosstheemptyinterveningspace,andisthusagenuineactioindistans.ThePhysicistbelieveshimselfjustifiedinholdingthattheactionofbodiesonoursensesoftouchandtemperaturedoesnottakeplacethroughdirectcontact,becausetheremustalwaysremainadefinite,ifsmall,distancebetweenthebodyandthespotontheskinwhichitissaidto“touch.”Thenceitissaidtofollowthatwhatwesenseashardnessorheatinbodiesisnothingbutthereactionsoftheend-organsofourtouch-andtemperature-nervestothemolecularforcesofbodieswhichactuponthemacrossemptyspace.

TheseconsiderationsfromthesphereofPhysicsaresupplementedbythePsycho-physicistswiththeirdoctrineofspecificsense-energies.J.Müllerhasshownthateverysensecanbeaffectedonlyinitsowncharacteristicwayasdeterminedbyitsorganisation,andthatitsreactionisalwaysofthesamekindwhatevermaybetheexternalstimulus.If

theopticalnerveisstimulated,light-sensationsareexperiencedbyusregardlessofwhetherthestimuluswaspressure,oranelectriccurrent,orlight.Ontheotherhand,thesameexternalphenomenaproducequitedifferentsensationsaccordingastheyareperceivedbydifferentsenses.Fromthesefactstheinferencehasbeendrawnthatthereoccursonlyonesortofphenomenonintheexternalworld,viz.,motions,andthatthevarietyofqualitiesoftheworldweperceiveisessentiallyareactionofoursensestothesemotions.Accordingtothisview,wedonotperceivetheexternalworldassuch,butonlythesubjectivesensationswhichitevokesinus.

Physiologyaddsitsquotatothephysicalarguments.Physicsdealswiththephenomenawhichoccuroutsideourorganismsandwhichcorrespondtoourpercepts.Physiologyseekstoinvestigatetheprocesseswhichgooninman’sownbodywhenacertainsensationisevokedinhim.Itteachesusthattheepidermisiswhollyinsensitivetothestimuliintheexternalworld.Thus,e.g.,ifexternalstimuliaretoaffecttheend-organsofourtouch-nervesonthesurfaceofourbodies,theoscillationswhichoccuroutsideourbodieshavetobetransmittedthroughtheepidermis.Inthecaseofthesensesofhearingandofsight,theexternalmotionshave,inaddition,tobemodifiedbyanumberofstructuresinthesense-organs,beforetheyreachthenerves.Thenerveshavetoconducttheeffectsproducedintheend-organsuptothecentralorgan,andonlythencantakeplacetheprocessbymeansofwhichpurelymechanicalchangesinthebrainproducesensations.Itisclearthatthestimuluswhichactsuponthesense-organsissocompletelychangedbythetransformationswhichitundergoes,thateverytraceofresemblancebetweentheinitialimpressiononthesense-organsandthefinalsensationinconsciousnessmustbeobliterated.Hartmannsumsuptheoutcomeoftheseconsiderationsinthesewords:“Thiscontentofconsciousnessconsists,originally,ofsensationswhicharethereflexresponsesofthesoultothemolecularmotionsinthehighestcorticalcentres,butwhichhavenotthefaintestresemblancetothemolecularmotionsbywhichtheyareelicited.”

Ifwethinkthislineofargumentthroughtotheend,wemustagreethat,assumingittobecorrect,theresurvivesinthecontentofourconsciousnessnottheleastelementofwhatmaybecalled“externalexistence.”

Tothephysicalandphysiologicalobjectionsagainstso-called“NaïveRealism”Hartmannaddssomefurtherobjectionswhichhedescribesasphilosophicalinthestrictsense.Alogicalexaminationofthephysicalandphysiologicalobjectionsrevealsthat,afterall,thedesiredconclusioncanbereachedonlyifwestartfromtheexistenceandnexusofexternalobjects,justastheseareassumedbytheordinarynaïveconsciousness,andtheninquirehowthisexternalworldcanentertheconsciousnessofbeingswithorganismssuchasours.Wehaveseenthateverytraceofsuchanexternalworldislostonthewayfromtheimpressiononthesense-organtotheappearanceofthesensationinourconsciousness,andthatinthelatternothingsurvivesexceptourideas.Hence,wehavetoassumethatthepictureoftheexternalworldwhichweactuallyhave,hasbeenbuiltupbythesoulonthebasisofthesensationsgiventoit.First,thesoulconstructsoutofthedataofthesensesoftouchandsightapictureoftheworldinspace,andthenthesensationsoftheothersensesarefittedintothisspace-system.Whenwearecompelledtothinkofacertaincomplexofsensationsasbelongingtogether,weareledtotheconceptofsubstanceandregard

substanceasthebearerofsense-qualities.Whenweobservethatsomesense-qualitiesdisappearfromasubstanceandthatothersappearintheirplace,weascribethiseventintheworldofphenomenatoachangeregulatedbythelawofcausality.Thus,accordingtothisview,ourwholeworld-pictureiscomposedofsubjectivesensationswhichareorderedbytheactivityofourownsouls.Hartmannsays,“Whatthesubjectperceivesisalwaysonlymodificationsofitsownpsychicstatesandnothingelse.”9

Nowletusaskourselves,Howdowecomebysuchaview?Thebareskeletonofthelineofthoughtwhichleadstoitisasfollows.Supposinganexternalworldexists,wedonotperceiveitassuchbuttransformitthroughourorganisationintoaworldofideas.Thisisasuppositionwhich,whenconsistentlythoughtout,destroysitself.Butisthisreflectioncapableofsupportinganypositivealternative?Arewejustifiedinregardingtheworld,whichisgiventous,asthesubjectivecontentofideasbecausetheassumptionsofthenaïveconsciousness,logicallyfollowedout,leadtothisconclusion?Ourpurposeis,rather,toexhibittheseassumptionsthemselvesasuntenable.Yet,sofarweshouldhavefoundonlythatitispossibleforapremisetobefalseandyetfortheconclusiondrawnfromittobetrue.Grantedthatthismayhappen,yetwecanneverregardtheconclusionasprovedbymeansofthatpremise.

Itisusualtoapplythetitleof“NaïveRealism”tothetheorywhichacceptsasself-evidentandindubitabletherealityoftheworld-picturewhichisimmediatelygiventous.Theoppositetheory,whichregardsthisworldasmerelythecontentofourconsciousness,iscalled“TranscendentalIdealism.”Hence,wemaysumuptheoutcomeoftheabovediscussionbysaying,“TranscendentalIdealismdemonstratesitsowntruth,byemployingthepremisesoftheNaïveRealismwhichitseekstorefute.”TranscendentalIdealismistrue,ifNaïveRealismisfalse.Butthefalsityofthelatterisshownonlybyassumingittobetrue.Onceweclearlyrealisethissituation,wehavenochoicebuttoabandonthislineofargumentandtotryanother.Butarewetotrusttogoodluck,andexperimentaboutuntilwehitbyaccidentupontherightline?ThisisEduardvonHartmann’sviewwhenhebelieveshimselftohaveshownthevalidityofhisownepistemologicalstandpoint,onthegroundthathistheoryexplainsthephenomenawhereasitsrivalsdonot.Accordingtohisview,theseveralphilosophicalsystemsareengagedinasortofstruggleforexistenceinwhichthefittestisultimatelyacceptedasvictor.Butthismethodappearstoustobeunsuitable,ifonlyforthereasonthattheremaywellbeseveralhypotheseswhichexplainthephenomenaequallysatisfactorily.Hence,wehadbetterkeeptotheabovelineofthoughtfortherefutationofNaïveRealism,andseewherepreciselyitsdeficiencylies.For,afterall,NaïveRealismistheviewfromwhichweallstartout.Forthisreasonaloneitisadvisabletobeginbysettingitright.Whenwehaveonceunderstoodwhyitmustbedefective,weshallbeledupontherightpathwithfargreatercertaintythanifweproceedsimplyathaphazard.

Thesubjectivismwhichwehavesketchedaboveistheresultoftheelaborationofcertainfactsbythought.Thus,ittakesforgrantedthat,fromgivenfactsasstarting-point,wecanbyconsistentthinking,i.e.,bylogicalcombinationofcertainobservations,gaincorrectconclusions.Butourrightthustoemployourthinkingremainsunexamined.There,precisely,liestheweaknessofthismethod.WhereasNaïveRealismstartsfromthe

unexaminedassumptionthatthecontentsofourperceptualexperiencehaveobjectivereality,theIdealismjustdescribedstartsfromthenolessunexaminedconvictionthatbytheuseofthoughtwecanreachconclusionswhicharescientificallyvalid.IncontrasttoNaïveRealism,wemaycallthispointofview“NaïveRationalism.”Inordertojustifythisterm,itmaybewelltoinserthereabriefcommentontheconceptofthe“Naïve.”A.Döring,inhisessayÜberdenBegriffdesNaivenRealismus,10attemptsamoreprecisedeterminationofthisconcept.Hesays,“TheconceptoftheNaïvemarksasitwerethezero-pointonthescaleofourreflectionuponourownactivity.IncontenttheNaïvemaywellcoincidewiththeTrue,for,althoughtheNaïveisunreflectingand,therefore,uncriticalora-critical,yetthislackofreflectionandcriticismexcludesonlytheobjectiveassuranceoftruth.Itimpliesthepossibilityandthedangeroferror,butitdoesnotimplythenecessityoferror.Therearenaïvemodesoffeelingandwillingastherearenaïvemodesofapprehendingandthinking,inthewidestsenseofthelatterterm.Further,therearenaïvemodesofexpressingtheseinwardstatesincontrastwiththeirrepressionormodificationthroughconsiderationforothersandthroughreflection.Naïveactivityisnotinfluenced,atleastnotconsciously,bytradition,education,orimposedrule.Itisinallspheres(asitsrootnativus,bringsout),unconscious,impulsive,instinctive,dæmonicactivity.”Startingfromthisaccount,wewilltrytodeterminetheconceptoftheNaïvestillmoreprecisely.Ineveryactivitywemayconsidertwoaspects—theactivityitselfandourconsciousnessofitsconformitytoalaw.Wemaybewhollyabsorbedintheformer,withoutcaringatallforthelatter.Theartistisinthisposition,whodoesnotknowinreflectiveformthelawsofhiscreativeactivitybutyetpractisestheselawsbyfeelingandsense.Wecallhim“naïve.”Butthereisakindofself-observationwhichinquiresintothelawsofone’sownactivityandwhichreplacesthenaïveattitude,justdescribed,bytheconsciousnessofknowingexactlythescopeandjustificationofallonedoes.Thiswewillcall“critical.”Thisaccountseemstousbesttohitoffthemeaningofthisconceptwhich,moreorlessclearlyunderstood,hassinceKantacquiredcitizen-rightsintheworldofphilosophy.Criticalreflectionis,thus,theoppositeofnaïveconsciousness.Wecallanattitude“critical”whichmakesitselfmasterofthelawsofitsownactivityinordertoknowhowfaritcanrelyonthemandwhataretheirlimits.TheoryofKnowledgecanbenothingifnotacriticalscience.Itsobjectispreciselythemostsubjectiveactivityofman—knowing.Whatitaimsatexhibitingisthelawstowhichknowingconforms.Hence,thenaïveattitudeiswhollyexcludedfromthisscience.Itsclaimtostrengthliespreciselyinthatitachieveswhatmanyminds,interestedinpracticeratherthanintheory,pridethemselvesonneverhavingattempted,viz.,“thinkingaboutthought.”

l.c.,Preface,p.x.↑

ZurAnalysederWirklichkeit(Strassburg,1876),p.28.↑

Kant’sErkenntnistheorie,Sectioni.↑

A.Dorner,DasmenschlicheErkennen(Berlin,1887).↑

Rehmke,l.c.↑

DieLehrevomWissen(Berlin,1868).↑

DieGrundfragenderErkenntnistheorie(Mainz,1887)p.385.↑

SystemderkritischenPhilosophie,I.Teil,p.257.↑

DasGrundproblemderErkenntnistheorie,p.37.↑

PhilosophischeMonatshefte,Vol.xxvi(1890),p.390.↑

THESTARTING-POINTSOFTHETHEORYOFKNOWLEDGE

Atthebeginningofanepistemologicalinquirywemust,inaccordancewiththeconclusionswehavereached,putasideeverythingwhichwehavecometoknow.For,knowledgeissomethingwhichmanhasproduced,somethingwhichhehasoriginatedbyhisactivity.IftheTheoryofKnowledgeisreallytoextendthelightofitsexplanationoverthewholefieldofwhatweknow,itmustsetoutfromapointwhichhasremainedwhollyuntouchedbycognitiveactivity—indeedwhichratherfurnishesthefirstimpulseforthisactivity.Thepointatwhichwemuststartliesoutsideofwhatweknow.Itcannotasyetitselfbeanitemofknowledge.Butwemustlookforitimmediatelypriortotheactofcognition,sothattheverynextstepwhichmantakesshallbeacognitiveact.Themethodfordeterminingthisabsolutelyfirststarting-pointmustbesuchthatnothingentersintoitwhichisalreadytheresultofcognitiveactivity.

Thereisnothingbuttheimmediately-givenworld-picturewithwhichwecanmakeastartofthissort.Thismeansthepictureoftheworldwhichispresentedtomanbeforehehasinanywaytransformeditbycognitiveactivity,i.e.,beforehehasmadetheveryleastjudgmentaboutitorsubmittedittotheverysmallestdeterminationbythinking.Whatthuspassesinitiallythroughourmindsandwhatourmindspassthrough—thisincoherentpicturewhichisnotyetdifferentiatedintoparticularelements,inwhichnothingseemsdistinguishedfrom,nothingrelatedto,nothingdeterminedby,anythingelse,thisistheImmediately-Given.Onthislevelofexistence—ifthephraseispermissible—noobject,noevent,isasyetmoreimportantormoresignificantthananyother.Therudimentaryorganofananimal,which,inthelightoftheknowledgebelongingtoahigherlevelofexistence,isperhapsseentobewithoutanyimportancewhateverforthedevelopmentandlifeoftheanimal,comesbeforeuswiththesameclaimtoourattentionasthenoblestandmostnecessarypartoftheorganism.Priortoallcognitiveactivitynothinginourpictureoftheworldappearsassubstance,nothingasquality,nothingascauseoraseffect.Thecontrastsofmatterandspirit,ofbodyandsoul,havenotyetarisen.Everyotherpredicate,too,mustbekeptawayfromtheworld-picturepresentedatthislevel.Wemaythinkofitneitherasrealitynorasappearance,neitherassubjectivenorasobjective,neitherasnecessarynorascontingent.Wecannotdecideatthisstagewhetheritis“thing-in-itself”ormere“idea.”For,wehaveseenalreadythattheconclusionsofPhysicsandPhysiology,whichleadustosubsumetheGivenunderoneorotheroftheaboveheads,mustnotbemadethebasisonwhichtobuildtheTheoryofKnowledge.

Supposeabeingwithfully-developedhumanintelligenceweretobesuddenlycreatedoutofNothingandconfrontedwiththeworld,thefirstimpressionmadebytheworldonhissensesandhisthoughtwouldbeprettymuchwhatwehaveherecalledtheimmediately-givenworld-picture.Ofcourse,noactualmanatanymomentofhislifehasnothingbutthisoriginalworld-picturebeforehim.Inhismentaldevelopmentthereisnowhereasharplinebetweenpure,passivereceptionoftheGivenfromwithoutandthecognitive

apprehensionofitbyThought.Thisfactmightsuggestcriticaldoubtsconcerningourmethodofdeterminingthestarting-pointoftheTheoryofKnowledge.Thus,e.g.,EduardvonHartmannremarks:“Wedonotaskwhatisthecontentofconsciousnessofachildjustawakeningtoconsciouslife,norofananimalonthelowestrungoftheladderoforganisms.For,ofthesethingsphilosophisingmanhasnoexperience,and,ifhetriestoreconstructthecontentofconsciousnessofbeingsonprimitivebiogeneticorontogeneticlevels,hecannotbutbasehisconclusionsonhisownpersonalexperience.Hence,ourfirsttaskistodeterminewhatisthecontentofconsciousnesswhichphilosophisingmandiscoversinhimselfwhenhebeginshisphilosophicalreflection.”1But,theobjectiontothisviewisthatthepictureoftheworldwithwhichwebeginphilosophicalreflection,isalreadyqualifiedbypredicateswhicharetheresultssolelyofknowledge.Wehavenorighttoacceptthesepredicateswithoutquestion.Onthecontrary,wemustcarefullyextractthemfromoutoftheworld-picture,inorderthatitmayappearinitspuritywithoutanyadmixtureduetotheprocessofcognition.Ingeneral,thedividinglinebetweenwhatisgivenandwhatisaddedbycognitioncannotbeidentifiedwithanysinglemomentofhumandevelopment,butmustbedrawnartificially.Butthiscanbedoneateverylevelofdevelopment,providedonlywedividecorrectlywhatispresentedtouspriortocognition,withoutanydeterminationbythinking,fromwhatismadeofitbycognition.

Now,itmaybeobjectedthatwehavealreadypiledupawholehostofthought-determinationsintheveryprocessofextractingtheallegedprimitiveworld-pictureoutofthecompletepictureintowhichman’scognitiveelaborationhastransformedit.But,indefencewemusturgethatallourconceptualapparatuswasemployed,notforthecharacterisationoftheprimitiveworld-picture,norforthedeterminationofitsqualities,butsolelyfortheguidanceofouranalysis,inordertoleadittothepointwhereknowledgerecognisesthatitbegan.Hence,therecanbenoquestionofthetruthorerror,correctnessorincorrectness,ofthereflectionswhich,accordingtoourview,precedethemomentwhichbringsustothestarting-pointoftheTheoryofKnowledge.Theirpurposeissolelytoguideusconvenientlytothatpoint.Nobodywhoisabouttooccupyhimselfwithepistemologicalproblems,standsatthesametimeatwhatwehaverightlycalledthestarting-pointofknowledge,forhisknowledgeisalready,uptoacertaindegree,developed.Nothingbutanalysiswiththehelpofconceptsenablesustoeliminatefromourdevelopedknowledgeallthegainsofcognitiveactivityandtodeterminethestarting-pointwhichprecedesallsuchactivity.Buttheconceptsthusemployedhavenocognitivevalue.Theyhavethepurelynegativetasktoeliminateoutofourfieldofvisionwhateveristheresultofcognitiveactivityandtoleadustothepointwherethisactivityfirstbegins.Thepresentdiscussionspointthewaytothoseprimitivebeginningsuponwhichthecognitiveactivitysetstowork,buttheyformnopartofsuchactivity.Thus,whateverTheoryofKnowledgehastosayintheprocessofdeterminingthestarting-point,mustbejudged,notastrueorfalse,butonlyasfitorunfitforthispurpose.Errorisexcluded,too,fromthatstarting-pointitself.For,errorcanbeginonlywiththeactivityofcognition;priortothis,itcannotoccur.

ThislastpropositioniscompatibleonlywiththekindofTheoryofKnowledgewhichsetsoutfromourlineofthought.For,atheorywhichsetsoutfromsomeobject(orsubject)

withadefiniteconceptualdeterminationisliabletoerrorfromtheverystart,viz.,inthisverydetermination.Whetherthisdeterminationisjustifiedornot,dependsonthelawswhichthecognitiveactestablishes.Thisisaquestiontowhichonlythecourseoftheepistemologicalinquiryitselfcansupplytheanswer.AllerrorisexcludedonlywhenIcansaythatIhaveeliminatedallconceptualdeterminationswhicharetheresultsofmycognitiveactivity,andthatIretainnothingbutwhatentersthecircleofmyexperiencewithoutanyactivityonmypart.Where,onprinciple,Iabstainfromeverypositiveaffirmation,thereIcannotfallintoerror.

Fromtheepistemologicalpointofview,errorcanoccuronlywithinthesphereofcognitiveactivity.Anillusionofthesensesisnoerror.Thefactthattherisingmoonappearstousbiggerthanthemoonoverheadisnotanerror,butaphenomenonfullyexplainedbythelawsofnature.Anerrorwouldresultonly,ifthought,inorderingthedataofperception,weretoputafalseinterpretationonthe“bigger”or“smaller”sizeofthemoon.Butsuchaninterpretationwouldliewithinthesphereofcognitiveactivity.

Ifknowledgeisreallytobeunderstoodinitsessentialnature,wemust,withoutdoubt,beginourstudyofitatthepointwhereitoriginates,whereitstarts.Moreover,itisclearthatwhateverprecedesitsstarting-pointhasnolegitimateplaceinanyexplanatoryTheoryofKnowledge,butmustsimplybetakenforgranted.Itisthetaskofscience,initsseveralbranches,tostudytheessentialnatureofallthatweareheretakingforgranted.Ouraim,here,isnottoacquirespecificknowledgeofthisorthat,buttoinvestigateknowledgeassuch.Wemustfirstunderstandtheactofcognition,beforewecanjudgewhatsignificancetoattachtotheaffirmationsaboutthecontentoftheworldwhichcometobemadeintheprocessofgettingtoknowthatcontent.

Forthisreason,weabstainfromeveryattempttodeterminewhatisimmediately-given,solongasweareignorantoftherelationofourdeterminationstowhatisdeterminedbythem.Noteventheconceptofthe“immediately-given”affirmsanypositivedeterminationofwhatprecedescognition.ItsonlypurposeistopointtowardstheGiven,todirectourattentionuponit.Here,atthestarting-pointoftheTheoryofKnowledge,thetermmerelyexpresses,inconceptualform,theinitialrelationofthecognitiveactivitytotheworld-content.Thechoiceofthistermallowsevenforthecasethatthewholeworld-contentshouldturnouttobenothingbutafigmentofourown“Ego,”i.e.,thatthemostextremesubjectivismshouldberight.For,ofcourse,subjectivismdoesnotexpressafactwhichisgiven.Itcan,atbest,beonlytheresultoftheoreticalconsiderations.Itstruth,inotherwords,needstobeestablishedbytheTheoryofKnowledge.Itcannotserveasthepresuppositionofthattheory.

Thisimmediately-givenworld-contentincludeseverythingwhichcanappearwithinthehorizonofourexperience,inthewidestsenseofthisterm,viz.,sensations,percepts,intuitions,feelings,volitions,dreams,fancies,representations,concepts,ideas.

Illusions,too,andhallucinationsstandatthislevelexactlyonaparwithotherelementsoftheworld-content.Onlytheoreticalconsiderationscanteachusinwhatrelationsillusions,etc.,standtootherpercepts.

ATheoryofKnowledgewhichstartsfromtheassumptionthatalltheexperiencesjust

enumeratedarecontentsofourconsciousness,findsitselfconfrontedatoncebythequestion:Howdowetranscendourconsciousnesssoastoapprehendreality?Whereisthejumping-boardwhichwilllaunchusfromthesubjectiveintothetrans-subjective?Forus,thesituationisquitedifferent.Forus,consciousnessandtheideaofthe“Ego”are,primarily,onlyitemsintheImmediately-Given,andtherelationofthelattertothetwoformerhasfirsttobediscoveredbyknowledge.Wedonotstartfromconsciousnessinordertodeterminethenatureofknowledge,but,viceversa,westartfromknowledgeinordertodetermineconsciousnessandtherelationofsubjecttoobject.Seeingthat,attheoutset,weattachnopredicateswhatevertotheGiven,weareboundtoask:Howisitthatweareabletodetermineitatall?Howisitpossibletostartknowledgeanywhereatall?Howdowecometodesignateoneitemoftheworld-content,as,e.g.,percept,anotherasconcept,athirdasreality,othersasappearance,ascause,aseffect?Howdowecometodifferentiateourselvesfromwhatis“objective,”andtocontrast“Ego”and“Non-Ego?”

Wemustdiscoverthebridgewhichleadsfromthepictureoftheworldasgiventothepictureofitwhichourcognitiveactivityunfolds.Butthefollowingdifficultyconfrontsus.SolongaswedonothingbutpassivelygazeattheGiven,wecannowherefindapointwhichknowledgecantakeholdofandfromwhichitcandevelopitsinterpretations.SomewhereintheGivenwemustdiscoverthespotwherewecangettowork,wheresomethinghomogeneoustocognitionmeetsus.Ifeverythingweremerelygiven,weshouldnevergetbeyondthebaregazingoutwardsintotheexternalworldandanolessbaregazinginwardsintotheprivacyofourinnerworld.Weshould,atmost,beabletodescribe,butnevertounderstand,theobjectsoutsideofus.Ourconceptswouldstandinapurelyexternal,notinaninternal,relationtothattowhichtheyapply.Ifthereistobeknowledge,everythingdependsontherebeing,somewherewithintheGiven,afieldinwhichourcognitiveactivitydoesnotmerelypresupposetheGiven,butisatworkintheveryheartoftheGivenitself.Inotherwords,theverystrictnesswithwhichweholdfasttheGiven,asmerelygiven,mustrevealthatnoteverythingisgiven.OurdemandfortheGiventurnsouttohavebeenonewhich,inbeingstrictlymaintained,partiallycancelsitself.Wehaveinsistedonthedemand,lestweshouldarbitrarilyfixuponsomepointasthestarting-pointoftheTheoryofKnowledge,insteadofmakingagenuineefforttodiscoverit.Inoursenseoftheword“given,”everythingmaybegiven,evenwhatinitsowninnermostnatureisnotgiven.Thatistosay,thelatterpresentsitself,inthatcase,touspurelyformallyasgiven,butrevealsitself,oncloserinspection,forwhatitreallyis.

Thewholedifficultyinunderstandingknowledgeliesinthatwedonotcreatetheworld-contentoutofourselves.Ifwedidsocreateit,therewouldbenoknowledgeatall.Onlyobjectswhicharegivencanoccasionquestionsforme.ObjectswhichIcreatereceivetheirdeterminationsbymyact.Hence,Idonotneedtoaskwhetherthesedeterminationsaretrueorfalse.

This,then,isthesecondpointinourTheoryofKnowledge.Itconsistsinthepostulatethattheremust,withinthesphereoftheGiven,beapointatwhichouractivitydoesnotfloatinavacuum,atwhichtheworld-contentitselfentersintoouractivity.

Wehavealreadydeterminedthestarting-pointoftheTheoryofKnowledgebyassigningit

aplacewhollyantecedenttoallcognitiveactivity,lestweshoulddistortthatactivitybysomeprejudiceborrowedfromamongitsownresults.Nowwedeterminethefirststepinthedevelopmentofourknowledgeinsuchawaythat,oncemore,therecanbenoquestionoferrororincorrectness.For,weaffirmnojudgmentaboutanythingwhatsoever,butmerelystatetheconditionwhichmustbefulfilledifknowledgeistobeacquiredatall.Itisall-importantthatweshould,withthemostcompletecriticalself-consciousness,keepbeforeourmindsthefactthatwearepostulatingtheverycharacterwhichthatpartoftheworld-contentmustpossessonwhichourcognitiveactivitycanbegintooperate.

Nothingelseis,infact,possible.Asgiven,theworld-contentiswhollywithoutdeterminations.Nopartofitcanbyitselffurnishtheimpulseforordertobegintobeintroducedintothechaos.Hence,cognitiveactivitymustissueitsedictanddeclarewhatthecharacterofthatpartistobe.SuchanedictinnowayinfringesthecharacteroftheGivenassuch.Itintroducesnoarbitraryaffirmationintoscience.For,intruth,itaffirmsnothing.Itmerelydeclaresthat,ifthepossibilityofknowledgeistobeexplicableatall,weneedtolookforafieldliketheoneabovedescribed.Ifthereissuchafield,knowledgecanbeexplained;ifnot,not.WebeganourTheoryofKnowledgewiththe“Given”asawhole;nowwelimitourrequirementtothesinglingoutofaparticularfieldwithintheGiven.

Letuscometoclosergripswiththisrequirement.Wherewithintheworld-picturedowefindsomethingwhichisnotmerelygiven,butisgivenonlyinsofarasitisatthesametimecreatedbythecognitiveactivity?

Weneedtobeabsolutelyclearthatthiscreativeactivitymust,initsturn,begiventousinallitsimmediacy.Noinferencesmustberequiredinordertoknowthatitoccurs.Thenceitfollows,atonce,thatsense-datadonotmeetourrequirement.For,thefactthattheydonotoccurwithoutouractivityisknowntous,notimmediately,butasaninferencefromphysicalandphysiologicalarguments.Ontheotherhand,wedoknowimmediatelythatitisonlyinandthroughthecognitiveactthatconceptsandideasenterintothesphereoftheImmediately-Given.Hence,nooneisdeceivedconcerningthecharacterofconceptsandideas.Itispossibletomistakeahallucinationforanobjectgivenfromwithout,butnooneiseverlikelytobelievethathisconceptsaregivenwithouttheactivityofhisownthinking.Alunaticwillregardasreal,thoughtheyareinfactunreal,onlythingsandrelationswhichhaveattachedtothemthepredicateof“actuality,”buthewillneversayofhisconceptsandideasthattheyhavecomeintotheworldwithouthisactivity.Everythingelseinourworld-pictureissuchthatitmustbegiven,ifitistobeexperiencedbyus.Onlyofourconceptsandideasistheoppositetrue:theymustbeproducedbyus,iftheyaretobeexperienced.They,andonlythey,aregiveninawaywhichmightbecalledintellectualintuition.Kantandthemodernphilosopherswhofollowhimdenyaltogetherthatmanpossessesthiskindofintuition,onthegroundthatallourthinkingreferssolelytoobjectsandisabsolutelyimpotenttoproduceanythingoutofitself,whereasinintellectualintuitionformandmattermustbegiventogether.But,isnotpreciselythisactuallythecasewithpureconceptsandideas?2Toseethis,wemustconsiderthempurelyintheforminwhich,asyet,theyarequitefreefromallempiricalcontent.Inorder,e.g.,tocomprehendthepureconceptofcausality,wemustgo,nottoaparticularinstanceof

causalitynortothesumofallinstances,buttothepureconceptitself.Particularcausesandeffectsmustbediscoveredbyinvestigationintheworld,butcausalityasaFormofThoughtmustbecreatedbyourselvesbeforewecandiscovercausesintheworld.IfweholdfasttoKant’sthesisthatconceptswithoutperceptsareempty,itbecomesunintelligiblehowthedeterminationoftheGivenbyconceptsistobepossible.For,supposetherearegiventwoitemsoftheworld-content,aandb.Inordertofindarelationbetweenthem,Imustbeguidedinmysearchbyaruleofdeterminatecontent.SucharuleIcanonlycreateintheactofcognitionitself.Icannotderiveitfromtheobject,becauseitisonlywiththehelpoftherulethattheobjectistoreceiveitsdeterminations.Sucharule,therefore,forthedeterminationoftherealhasitsbeingwhollyinpurelyconceptualform.

Beforepassingon,wemustmeetapossibleobjection.Itmightseemasifinourargumentwehadunconsciouslyassignedaprominentparttotheideaofthe“Ego,”orthe“personalsubject,”andasifweemployedthisideainthedevelopmentofourlineofthought,withouthavingestablishedourrighttodoso.Forexample,wehavesaidthat“weproduceconcepts,”orthat“wemakethisorthatdemand.”Butthesearemereformsofspeechwhichplaynopartinourargument.Thatthecognitiveactistheactof,andoriginatesin,an“Ego,”can,aswehavealreadypointedout,beaffirmedonlyasaninferenceintheprocessofknowledgeitself.Strictly,weoughtattheoutsettospeakonlyofcognitiveactivitywithoutsomuchasmentioningacognitiveagent.For,allthathasbeenestablishedsofaramountstonomorethanthis,(1)thatsomethingis“given,”and(2)thatatacertainpointwithinthe“given”thereoriginatesthepostulatesetforthabove;also,thatconceptsandideasaretheentitieswhichanswertothatpostulate.Thisisnottodenythatthepointatwhichthepostulateoriginatesisthe“Ego.”But,inthefirstinstance,wearecontenttoestablishthesetwostepsintheTheoryofKnowledgeintheirabstractpurity.

DasGrundproblemderErkenntnistheorie,p.1.↑

By“concept”Imeanaruleforthesynthesisofthedisconnecteddataofperceptionintoaunity.Causality,e.g.,isa“concept.”By“idea”Imeannothingbutaconceptofricherconnotation.“Organism,”takenquitegenerally,isanexampleofan“idea.”↑

KNOWLEDGEANDREALITY

Conceptsandideas,then,thoughthemselvespartoftheGiven,yetatthesametimetakeusbeyondtheGiven.Thus,theymakeitpossibletodeterminealsothenatureoftheothermodesofcognitiveactivity.

Bymeansofapostulate,wehaveselectedaspecialpartoutofthegivenworld-picture,becauseitistheveryessenceofknowledgetoproceedfromapartwithjustthischaracter.Thus,wehavemadetheselectionsolelyinordertobeabletounderstandknowledge.But,wemustclearlyconfesstoourselvesthatbythisselectionwehaveartificiallytornintwotheunityofthegivenworld-picture.WemustbearinmindthatthepartwhichwehavedivorcedfromtheGivenstillcontinues,quiteapartfromourpostulateandindependentlyofit,tostandinanecessaryconnectionwiththeworldasgiven.ThisfactdeterminesthenextstepforwardintheTheoryofKnowledge.Itwillconsistinrestoringtheunitywhichwehavedestroyedinordertoshowhowknowledgeispossible.Thisrestorationwillconsistinthinkingabouttheworldasgiven.Theactofthinkingabouttheworldactuallyeffectsthesynthesisofthetwopartsofthegivenworld-content—oftheGivenwhichwesurveyuptothehorizonofourexperience,andofthepartwhich,inordertobealsogiven,mustbeproducedbyusintheactivityofcognition.Thecognitiveactisthesynthesisofthesetwofactors.Ineverysinglecognitiveacttheonefactorappearsassomethingproducedintheactitselfandasaddedtotheotherfactorwhichisthepuredatum.ItisonlyattheverystartoftheTheoryofKnowledgethatthefactorwhichotherwiseappearsasalwaysproduced,appearsalsoasgiven.

Tothinkabouttheworldistotransmutethegivenworldbymeansofconceptsandideas.Thinking,thus,isinverytruththeactwhichbringsaboutknowledge.Knowledgecanariseonlyifthinking,outofitself,introducesorderintothecontentoftheworldasgiven.Thinkingisitselfanactivitywhichproducesacontentofitsowninthemomentofcognition.Hence,thecontentcognised,insofarasithasitsoriginsolelyinthinking,offersnodifficultytocognition.Weneedonlyobserveit,forinitsessentialnatureitisimmediatelygiventous.Thedescriptionofthinkingisalsothescienceofthinking.Infact,Logicwasneveranythingbutadescriptionoftheformsofthinking,neverademonstrativescience.For,demonstrationoccursonlywhenthereisasynthesisoftheproductsofthinkingwithacontentotherwisegiven.Hence,GideonSpickerisquiterightwhenhesaysinhisbook,Lessing’sWeltanschauung(p.5):“Wehavenomeansofknowing,eitherempiricallyorlogically,whethertheresultsofthinking,assuch,aretrue.”Wemayaddthat,sincedemonstrationalreadypresupposesthinking,thinkingitselfcannotbedemonstrated.Wecandemonstrateaparticularfact,butwecannotdemonstratetheprocessofdemonstratingitself.Wecanonlydescribewhatademonstrationis.Alllogicaltheoryiswhollyempirical.Logicisasciencewhichconsistsonlyofobservation.Butifwewanttogettoknowanythingoverandaboveourthinking,wecandosoonlywiththehelpofthinking.Thatistosay,ourthinkingmustapplyitselftosomethinggivenandtransformitschaoticintoasystematicconnectionwiththeworld-picture.Thinking,then,

initsapplicationtotheworldasgiven,isaformativeprinciple.Theprocessisasfollows.First,thinkingselectscertaindetailsoutofthetotalityoftheGiven.For,intheGiven,therearestrictlynoindividualdetails,butonlyanundifferentiatedcontinuum.Next,thinkingrelatestheselecteddetailstoeachotheraccordingtotheformswhichithasitselfproduced.And,lastly,itdetermineswhatfollowsfromthisrelation.Theactofrelatingtwodistinctitemsoftheworld-contenttoeachotherdoesnotimplythatthinkingarbitrarilydeterminessomethingaboutthem.Thinkingwaitsandseeswhatisthespontaneousconsequenceoftherelationestablished.Withthisconsequencewehaveatlastsomedegreeofknowledgeofthetwoselecteditemsoftheworld-content.Supposetheworld-contentrevealsnothingofitsnatureinresponsetotheestablishmentofsucharelation,thentheeffortofthinkingmustmiscarry,andafresheffortmusttakeitsplace.Allcognitionsconsistinthis,thattwoormoreitemsoftheGivenarebroughtintorelationwitheachotherbyusandthatweapprehendwhatfollowsfromthisrelation.

Withoutdoubt,manyofoureffortsofthinkingmiscarry,notonlyinthesciences,asisamplyprovedbytheirhistory,butalsoinordinarylife.Butinthesimplecasesofmistakewhichare,afterall,thecommonest,thecorrectthoughtsorapidlyreplacestheincorrect,thatthelatterisnever,orrarely,noticed.

Kant,inhistheoryofthe“syntheticunityofapperception,”hadaninklingofthisactivityofthoughtinthesystematicorganisationoftheworld-content,aswehaveheredevelopedit.Buthisfailuretoappreciateclearlytherealfunctionofthinkingisrevealedbythefact,thathebelieveshimselfabletodeducetheapriorilawsofPureNaturalSciencefromtherulesaccordingtowhichthissyntheticactivityproceeds.Kanthasoverlookedthatthesyntheticactivityofthinkingismerelythepreparationforthediscoveryofnaturallawsproperlyso-called.Supposeweselecttwoitems,aandb,fromtheGiven.Forknowledgetoariseofanexusaccordingtolawbetweenaandb,thefirstrequirementisthatthinkingshouldsorelateaandb,thattherelationmayappeartousasgiven.Thus,thecontentproperofthelawofnatureisderivedfromwhatisgiven,andthesolefunctionofthinkingistoestablishsuchrelationsbetweentheitemsoftheworld-picturethatthelawstowhichtheyaresubjectbecomemanifest.Thepuresyntheticactivityofthinkingisnotthesourceofanyobjectivelawswhatever.

Wemustinquirewhatpartthinkingplaysintheformationofourscientificworld-pictureasdistinctfromthemerelygivenone.Itfollowsfromouraccountthatthinkingsuppliestheformalprincipleoftheconformityofphenomenatolaw.Suppose,inourexampleabove,thataisthecause,btheeffect.Unlessthinkingwereabletoproducetheconceptofcausality,weshouldneverbeabletoknowthataandbwerecausallyconnected.But,inorderthatwemayknow,inthegivencase,thataisthecauseandbtheeffect,itisnecessaryforaandbtopossessthecharacteristicswhichwemeanwhenwespeakofcauseandeffect.Asimilaranalysisappliestotheothercategoriesofthought.

ItwillbeappropriatetonoticehereinafewwordsHume’sdiscussionofcausality.AccordingtoHume,theconceptsofcauseandeffecthavetheiroriginsolelyincustom.Weobserverepeatedlythatoneeventfollowsanotherandbecomeaccustomedtothinkofthemascausallyconnected,sothatweexpectthesecondtooccurassoonaswehave

observedthefirst.Thistheory,however,springsfromatotallymistakenviewofthecausalrelation.SupposeforseveraldaysrunningIobservethesamepersonwheneverIstepoutofthedoorofmyhouse,Ishallgraduallyformthehabitofexpectingthetemporalsequenceofthetwoevents.But,itwillneveroccurtometothinkthatthereisanycausalconnectionbetweenmyownappearanceandthatoftheotherpersonatthesamespot.Ishallcallinaidessentiallyotheritemsoftheworld-contentinordertoexplainthecoincidenceoftheseevents.Inshort,wedeterminethecausalnexusoftwoevents,notaccordingtotheirtemporalsequence,butaccordingtotheessentialcharacteroftheitemsoftheworld-contentwhichwecall,respectively,causeandeffect.

Fromthispurelyformalactivityofourthinkingintheconstructionofthescientificpictureoftheworld,itfollowsthatthecontentofeverycognitioncannotbefixedaprioriinadvanceofobservation(inwhichthinkingcomestogripswiththeGiven),butmustbederivedcompletelyandexhaustivelyfromobservation.Inthissense,allourcognitionsareempirical.Norisitpossibletoseehowitcouldbeotherwise.For,Kant’sjudgmentsaprioriareatbottom,notcognitions,butpostulates.OnKant’sprinciples,allwecaneversayisonlythis,thatifathingistobecometheobjectofpossibleexperience,itmustconformtotheselaws.Theyare,therefore,ruleswhichthesubjectprescribestoallobjects.But,weshouldratherexpectcognitionsoftheGiventohavetheirsource,notintheconstitutionofthesubject,butinthatoftheobject.

ThinkingmakesnoaprioriaffirmationsabouttheGiven.Butitcreatestheforms,onthebasisofwhichtheconformityofphenomenatolawbecomesmanifestaposteriori.

Fromourpointofview,itisimpossibletodetermineanythingaprioriaboutthedegreeofcertaintybelongingtoajudgmentwhichembodiesknowledgethusgained.For,certainty,too,derivesfromnothingotherthantheGiven.Perhapsitwillbeobjectedthatobservationneverestablishesanythingexceptthatacertainnexusofphenomenaactuallyoccurs,butnotthatitmustoccur,andwillalwaysoccur,inlikeconditions.But,thissuggestion,too,isinerror.ForanynexuswhichIapprehendbetweenelementsintheworld-pictureis,onourprinciples,nothingbutwhatisgroundedintheseelementsthemselves.Itisnotimportedintotheseelementsbythinking,butbelongstothemessentially,andmust,therefore,necessarilyexistwhenevertheythemselvesexist.

Onlyaviewwhichregardsallscientificresearchasnothingbuttheendeavourtocorrelatethefactsofexperiencebymeansofprincipleswhicharesubjectiveandexternaltothefacts,canholdthatthenexusofaandbmayto-dayobeyonelawandto-morrowanother(J.S.Mill).Ontheotherhand,ifweseeclearlythatthelawsofnaturehavetheirsourceintheGiven,andthat,therefore,thenexusofphenomenaessentiallydependsupon,andisdeterminedby,them,weshallneverthinkoftalkingofa“merelyrelativeuniversality”ofthelawswhicharederivedfromobservation.Thisis,ofcourse,nottoassertthatanygivenlawwhichwehaveonceacceptedascorrect,mustbeabsolutelyvalid.Butwhen,later,anegativeinstanceoverthrowsalaw,thereasonis,notthatthelawfromthefirstcouldbeinferredonlywithrelativeuniversality,butthatithadnotatfirstbeeninferredcorrectly.Agenuinelawofnatureisnothingbuttheformulationofanexusinthegivenworld-picture,anditexistsaslittlewithoutthefactswhichitdetermines,astheseexist

withoutit.

Above,wehavelaiddownthatitistheessenceofthecognitiveactivitytotransmute,bythinking,thegivenworld-picturebymeansofconceptsandideas.Whatfollowsfromthisfact?IftheImmediately-Givenwereatotalitycompleteinitself,theworkwhichthinkingdoesuponitincognitionwouldbebothimpossibleandunnecessary.WeshouldsimplyaccepttheGiven,asitis,andbesatisfiedwithitassuch.CognitiveactivityispossibleonlybecauseintheGivensomethinglieshiddenwhichdoesnotyetrevealitselfsolongaswegazeattheGiveninitsimmediacy,butwhichbecomesmanifestwiththeaidoftheorderwhichthinkingintroduces.Priortotheworkofthinking,theGivendoesnotpossessthefulnessofitsowncompletenature.

Thispointbecomesstillmoreobviousbyconsideringingreaterdetailthetwofactorsinvolvedintheactofcognition.ThefirstfactoristheGiven.“Beinggiven”isnotaqualityoftheGiven,butmerelyatermexpressingitsrelationtothesecondfactorintheactofcognition.Thissecondfactor,viz.,theconceptualcontentoftheGiven,isfoundbyourthoughtintheactofcognitiontobenecessarilyconnectedwiththeGiven.Twoquestionsarise:(1)WherearetheGivenandtheConceptdifferentiated?(2)Wherearetheyunited?Theanswertothesetwoquestionsistobefound,beyondanydoubt,intheprecedingdiscussions.Theyaredifferentiatedsolelyintheactofcognition.TheyareunitedintheGiven.ThenceitfollowsnecessarilythattheconceptualcontentisbutapartoftheGiven,andthattheactofcognitionconsistsinre-unitingwitheachotherthetwopartsoftheworld-picturewhichare,atfirst,giventoitinseparation.Thegivenworld-picturethusattainsitscompletiononlythroughthatmediatekindofgivennesswhichthinkingbringsabout.Initsoriginalimmediacytheworld-pictureisaltogetherincomplete.

IftheconceptualcontentwerefromthefirstunitedwiththeGiveninourworld-picture,therewouldbenocognition.For,noneedcouldeverariseoftranscendingtheGiven.So,again,ifbythinkingandinthinkingwecouldcreatethewholeworld-content,oncemoretherewouldbenocognition.For,whatwecreateourselveswedonotneedtocognise.Hence,cognitionexistsbecausetheworld-contentisgiventousoriginallyinaformwhichisincomplete,whichdoesnotcontainitasawhole,butwhich,overandabovewhatitpresentsimmediately,ownsanother,nolessessential,aspect.Thissecondaspectoftheworld-content—anaspectnotoriginallygiven—isrevealedbycognition.Purethinkingpresentsintheabstract,notemptyforms,butasumofdeterminations(categories)whichserveasformsfortherestoftheworld-content.Theworld-contentcanbecalledREALITYonlyintheformwhichitacquiresthroughcognitionandinwhichbothaspectsofitareunited.

THEORYOFKNOWLEDGEWITHOUTPRESUPPOSITIONSVERSUSFICHTE’STHEORYOF

SCIENCE

Sofar,wehavedeterminedtheideaofknowledge.Thisideaisgivenimmediatelyinthehumanconsciousnesswheneveritfunctionscognitively.Tothe“Ego,”asthecentre1ofconsciousness,aregivenimmediatelyexternalandinternalperceptions,aswellasitsownexistence.TheEgofeelsimpelledtofindmoreintheGiventhanitimmediatelycontains.Overagainstthegivenworld,asecondworld,theworldofthinking,unfoldsitselffortheEgoandtheEgounitesthesetwobyrealising,ofitsownfreewill,theideaofknowledgewhichwehavedetermined.ThisaccountsforthefundamentaldifferencebetweenthewayinwhichintheobjectsofhumanconsciousnessitselftheconceptandtheImmediately-GivenunitetoformRealityinitswholeness,andthewayinwhichtheirunionobtainsintherestoftheworld-content.Foreveryotherpartoftheworld-contentwemustassumethattheunionofthetwofactorsisoriginalandnecessaryfromthefirst,andthatitisonlyforcognition,whencognitionbegins,thatanartificialseparationhassupervened,butthatcognitionintheendundoestheseparationinkeepingwiththeoriginalandessentialunityoftheobject-world.Forconsciousnessthecaseisquiteotherwise.Heretheunionexistsonlywhenitisachievedbythelivingactivityofconsciousnessitself.Witheveryotherkindofobject,theseparationofthetwofactorsissignificant,notfortheobject,butonlyforknowledge.Theirunionishereoriginal,theirseparationderivative.Cognitioneffectsaseparationonlybecauseitmustfirstseparatebeforeitcanachieveunionbyitsownmethods.But,forconsciousness,theConceptandtheGivenareoriginallyseparate.Unionisherederivative,andthatiswhycognitionhasthecharacterwhichwehavedescribed.JustbecauseinconsciousnessIdeaandGivenappearinseparation,doesthewholeofrealitysplititselfforconsciousnessintothesetwofactors.And,again,justbecauseconsciousnesscanbringabouttheunionofthetwofactorsonlybyitsownactivity,canitreachfullrealityonlybyperformingtheactofcognition.Theremainingcategories(ideas)wouldbenecessarilyunitedwiththecorrespondinglandsoftheGiven,eveniftheywerenottakenupintocognition.ButtheideaofcognitioncanbeunitedwiththeGivenwhichcorrespondstoit,onlybytheactivityofconsciousness.Realconsciousnessexistsonlyinrealisingitself.Withtheseremarkswebelieveourselvestobesufficientlyequippedforlayingbaretheroot-errorofFichte’sWissenschaftslehreand,atthesametime,forsupplyingthekeytotheunderstandingofit.FichteisamongallKant’ssuccessorstheonewhohasfeltmostvividlythatnothingbutatheoryofconsciousnesscansupplythefoundationforallthesciences.Butheneverclearlyunderstoodwhythisisso.HefeltthattheactwhichwehavecalledthesecondstepintheTheoryofKnowledgeandwhichwehaveformulatedasapostulate,mustreallybeperformedbythe“Ego.”Thismaybeseen,e.g.,fromthefollowingpassage.“TheTheoryofScience,then,arises,asitselfasystematicdiscipline,justasdoallpossiblesciencesinsofarastheyaresystematic,throughacertainactoffreedom,thedeterminatefunctionofwhichis,moreparticularly,

tomakeusconsciousofthecharacteristicactivityofintelligenceassuch.Theresultofthisfreeactisthatthenecessaryactivityofintelligence,whichinitselfalreadyisform,isfurthertakenupasmatterintoafreshformofcognitionorconsciousness.”2WhatdoesFichteheremeanbytheactivityofthe“intelligence,”whenwetranslatewhathehasobscurelyfeltintoclearconcepts?Nothingbuttherealisationoftheideaofknowledge,takingplaceinconsciousness.HadthisbeenperfectlycleartoFichte,heoughttohaveexpressedhisviewsimplybysaying,“ItisthetaskoftheTheoryofSciencetobringcognition,insofarasitisstillanunreflectiveactivityofthe‘Ego,’intoreflectiveconsciousness;ithastoshowthattherealisationoftheideaofcognitioninactualfactisanecessaryactivityofthe‘Ego.’ ”

Fichtetriestodeterminetheactivityofthe“Ego.”Hedeclares“thatthebeing,theessenceofwhichconsistssolelyinthisthatitpositsitselfasexisting,istheEgoasabsolutesubject.”3ThispositingoftheEgoisforFichtetheoriginal,unconditionedact“whichliesatthebasisofalltherestofconsciousness.”4ItfollowsthattheEgo,inFichte’ssense,canlikewisebeginallitsactivityonlythroughanabsolutefiatofthewill.But,itisimpossibleforFichtetosupplyanysortofcontentforthisactivitywhichhis“Ego”absolutelyposits.For,Fichtecannamenothinguponwhichthisactivitymightdirectitself,orbywhichitmightbedetermined.HisEgoissupposedtoperformanact.Yes,butwhatisittodo?FichtefailedtodefinetheconceptofcognitionwhichtheEgoistorealise,and,inconsequence,hestruggledinvaintofindanywayofadvancingfromhisabsoluteacttothedetaileddeterminationsoftheEgo.Nay,intheendhedeclaresthattheinquiryintothemannerofthisadvanceliesoutsidethescopeofhistheory.InhisdeductionoftheideaofcognitionhestartsneitherfromanabsoluteactoftheEgo,norfromoneoftheNon-Ego,butfromastateofbeingdeterminedwhichis,atthesametime,anactofdetermining.Hisreasonforthisisthatnothingelseeitheris,orcanbe,immediatelycontainedinconsciousness.Histheoryleavesitwhollyvaguewhatdetermines,inturn,thisdetermination.AnditisthisvaguenesswhichdrivesusonbeyondFichte’stheoryintothepracticalpartoftheWissenschaftslehre.5But,bythisturnFichtedestroysallknowledgewhatsoever.For,thepracticalactivityoftheEgobelongstoquiteadifferentsphere.Thepostulatewhichwehaveputforwardabovecan,indeed,berealised—somuchisclear—onlybyafreeactoftheEgo.But,ifthisactistobeacognitiveact,theall-importantpointisthatitsvoluntarydecisionshouldbetorealisetheideaofcognition.Itis,nodoubt,truethattheEgobyitsownfreewillcandomanyotherthingsaswell.But,whatmattersfortheepistemologicalfoundationofthesciencesisnotadefinitionofwhatitisfortheEgotobefree,butofwhatitistoknow.Fichtehasallowedhimselftobetoomuchinfluencedbyhissubjectivetendencytopresentthefreedomofhumanpersonalityinthebrightestlight.Harms,inhisaddressonThePhilosophyofFichte(p.15),rightlyremarks,“Hisworld-viewispredominantlyandexclusivelyethical,andthesamecharacterisexhibitedbyhisTheoryofKnowledge.”Knowledgewouldhaveabsolutelynothingtodo,ifallspheresofrealityweregivenintheirtotality.But,seeingthattheEgo,solongasithasnotbeen,bythinking,insertedintoitsplaceinthesystematicwholeoftheworld-picture,existsmerelyasanimmediately-givensomething,itisnotenoughmerelytopointoutwhatitdoes.Fichte,however,believesthatallweneedtodoconcerningtheEgoistoseek

andfindit.“Wehavetoseekandfindtheabsolutelyfirst,whollyunconditionedprincipleofallhumanknowledge.Beingabsolutelyfirst,thisprincipleadmitsneitherofproofnorofdetermination.”6WehaveseenthatproofanddeterminationareoutofplacesolelyasappliedtothecontentofPureLogic.ButtheEgoisapartofreality,andthismakesitnecessarytoestablishthatthisorthatcategoryisactuallytobefoundintheGiven.Fichtehasfailedtodothis.AndthisisthereasonwhyhehasgivensuchamistakenformtohisTheoryofScience.Zellerremarks7thatthelogicalformulæbymeansofwhichFichteseekstoreachtheconceptoftheEgo,dobutilldisguisehispredeterminedpurposeatanypricetoreachthisstarting-pointforhistheory.Thiscommentappliestothefirstform(1794)whichFichtegavetohisWissenschaftslehre.Takingit,then,asestablishedthatFichte,inkeepingwiththewholetrendofhisphilosophicalthinking,couldnot,infact,restcontentwithanyotherstarting-pointforknowledgethananabsoluteandarbitraryact,wehavethechoicebetweenonlytwowaysofmakingthisstartintelligible.Theonewaywastoseizeuponsomeoneamongtheempiricalactivitiesofconsciousnessandtostripoff,onebyone,allthecharacteristicsofitwhichdonotfolloworiginallyfromitsessentialnature,untilthepureconceptoftheEgohadbeencrystallisedout.Theotherwaywastobegin,straightway,withtheoriginalactivityoftheEgo,andtoexhibititsnaturebyintrospectionandreflection.Fichtefollowedthefirstwayattheoutsetofhisphilosophicalthinking,butinthecourseofithegraduallyswitchedovertotheother.

BasinghimselfuponKant’s“synthesisoftranscendentalapperception,”FichteconcludedthatthewholeactivityoftheEgointhesynthesisofthematterofexperienceproceedsaccordingtotheformsofthejudgment.Tojudgeistoconnectapredicatewithasubject—anactofwhichthepurelyformalexpressionisa=a.Thispropositionwouldbeimpossibleifthexwhichconnectspredicateandsubject,didnotrestuponapowertoaffirmunconditionally.For,thepropositiondoesnotmean,“aexists”;itmeans,“ifaexists,thenthereexistsa.”Thus,aismostcertainlynotaffirmedabsolutely.Hence,ifthereistobeanabsolute,unconditionallyvalidaffirmation,thereisnoalternativebuttodeclaretheactofaffirmingitselftobeabsolute.Whereasaisconditioned,theaffirmingofaisunconditioned.ThisaffirmingistheactoftheEgowhich,thus,possessesthepowertoaffirmabsolutelyandwithoutconditions.Intheproposition,a=a,theoneaisaffirmedonlyonconditionoftheotherbeingpresupposed.Moreover,theaffirmingisanactoftheEgo.“IfaisaffirmedintheEgo,itisaffirmed.”8ThisconnectionispossibleonlyonconditionthatthereisintheEgosomethingalwaysself-identical,whicheffectsthetransitionfromtheoneatotheother.Theabove-mentionedxisthisself-identicalaspectoftheEgo.TheEgowhichaffirmstheoneaisthesameEgoasthatwhichaffirmstheothera.ThisistosayEgo=Ego.Butthisproposition,expressedinjudgment-form,“IftheEgois,itis,”ismeaningless.For,theEgoisnotaffirmedonconditionofanotherEgohavingbeenpresupposed,butitpresupposesitself.Inshort,theEgoisabsoluteandunconditioned.Thehypotheticaljudgment-formwhichistheformofalljudgments,solongastheabsoluteEgoisnotpresupposed,changesfortheEgointotheformofthecategoricalaffirmationofexistence,“Iamunconditionally.”Fichtehasanotherwayofputtingthis:“theEgooriginallyaffirmsitsownexistence.”9Clearly,thiswholedeductionisnothingbutasortofelementaryschool-drillbymeansofwhichFichtetriestoleadhis

readerstothepointatwhichtheywillperceiveforthemselvestheunconditionedactivityoftheEgo.HisaimistoputclearlybeforetheireyesthatfundamentalactivityoftheEgointheabsenceofwhichthereisnosuchthingasanEgoatall.

Letusnowlookback,oncemore,overFichte’slineofthought.Oncloserinspection,itbecomesobviousthatitcontainsaleap—aleap,moreover,whichthrowsgravedoubtsuponthecorrectnessofhistheoryoftheoriginalactoftheEgo.WhatpreciselyisitthatisabsoluteintheaffirmationoftheEgo?Takethejudgment,“Ifaexists,thenthereexistsa.”TheaisaffirmedbytheEgo.Sofarthereisnoroomfordoubt.But,thoughtheactisunconditioned,yettheEgomustaffirmsomethinginparticular.Itcannotaffirman“activityingeneralandassuch”;itcanaffirmonlyaparticular,determinateactivity.Inshort,theaffirmationmusthaveacontent.But,itcannotderivethiscontentfromitself,forelseweshouldgetnothingbutaffirmationsofactsofaffirmationininfinitum.Hence,theremustbesomethingwhichisrealisedbythisaffirming,bythisabsoluteactivityoftheEgo.IftheEgodoesnotseizeuponsomethinggiveninordertoaffirmit,itcandonothingatall,and,consequently,itcannotaffirmeither.Thisisproved,too,byFichte’sproposition,“theEgoaffirmsitsownexistence.”“Existence,”here,isacategory.Thus,wearebackatourownposition:theactivityoftheEgoconsistsinthatitaffirms,ofitsownfreewill,theconceptsandideasinherentintheGiven.IfFichtehadnotunconsciouslybeendeterminedtoexhibittheEgoas“existing,”hewouldhavegotnowhereatall.If,instead,hehadbuiltuptheconceptofcognition,hewouldhavereachedthetruestarting-pointoftheTheoryofKnowledge,viz.,“TheEgoaffirmstheactofcognition.”BecauseFichtefailedtomakecleartohimselfwhatdeterminestheactivityoftheEgo,hefixedsimplyupontheaffirmationofitsownexistenceasthecharacterofthatactivity.But,thisisatoncetorestricttheabsoluteactivityoftheEgo.For,ifnothingisunconditionedexcepttheEgo’saffirmationofitsownexistence,theneveryotheractivityoftheEgoisconditioned.Moreover,thewayiscutoffforpassingfromtheunconditionedtotheconditioned.IftheEgoisunconditionedonlyintheaffirmationofitsownexistence,thenatoncethereiscutoffallpossibilityofaffirmingbyanoriginalactanythingotherthanitsownexistence.Hence,thenecessityarisestoassignagroundforalltheotheractivitiesoftheEgo.ButFichte,aswehaveseenabove,soughtforsuchagroundinvain.

Thisisthereasonwhyheshiftedtothesecondofthetwoways,indicatedabove,forthedeductionoftheEgo.Alreadyin1797,inhisErsteEinleitungindieWissenschaftslehre,herecommendsself-observationastherightmethodforstudyingtheEgoinitstrue,originalcharacter.“Observeandwatchthyself,turnthyeyeawayfromallthatsurroundstheeandlookintothyself—thisisthefirstdemandwhichphilosophymakesuponitsdisciple.Thetopicofourdiscourse,is,notanythingoutsidethyself,butthyselfalone.”10ThisintroductiontotheTheoryofScienceis,intruth,inonewaymuchsuperiortotheother.For,self-observationdoesnotmakeusacquaintedwiththeactivityoftheEgoone-sidedlyinafixeddirection.Itexhibitsthatactivity,notmerelyasaffirmingitsownexistence,butasstriving,initsmany-sideddevelopment,tocomprehendbythinkingtheworld-contentwhichisimmediately-given.Toself-observation,theEgorevealsitselfasengagedinbuildingupitsworld-picturebythesynthesisoftheGivenwithconcepts.But,anyonewhohasnotaccompaniedusinourlineofthoughtabove,andwho,consequently,

doesnotknowthattheEgocangraspthewholecontentofrealityonlyonconditionofapplyingitsThought-FormstotheGiven,isliabletoregardcognitionasamereprocessofspinningtheworldoutoftheEgoitself.Hence,forFichtetheworld-picturetendsincreasinglytobecomeaconstructionoftheEgo.HeemphasisesmoreandmorethatthemainpointintheWissenschaftslehreistoawakenthesensewhichisabletowatchtheEgointhisconstructingofitsworld.Hewhoisablethustowatchstands,forFichte,onahigherlevelofknowledgethanhewhohaseyesonlyforthefinishedconstruct,theready-madeworld.Ifwefixoureyesonlyontheworldofobjects,wefailtoperceivethat,butforthecreativeactivityoftheEgo,thatworldwouldnotexist.If,ontheotherhand,wewatchtheEgoinitsconstructiveactivity,weunderstandthegroundofthefinishedworld-picture.Weknowhowithascometobewhatitis.Weunderstanditastheconclusionforwhichwehavethepremises.Theordinaryconsciousnessseesonlywhathasbeenaffirmed,whathasbeendeterminedthusorthus.Itlackstheinsightintothepremises,intothegroundswhyanaffirmationisjustasitisandnototherwise.Tomediatetheknowledgeofthesepremisesis,accordingtoFichte,thetaskofawhollynewsense.ThisisexpressedmostclearlyintheEinleitungsvorlesungenindieWissenschaftslehre.11“Mytheorypresupposesawhollynovelinwardsense-organ,bymeansofwhichanewworldisgivenwhichdoesnotexistfortheordinarymanatall.”Or,again,“Theworldofthisnovelsense,andtherebythissenseitself,areherebyforthepresentclearlydetermined:itistheworldinwhichweseethepremisesonwhichisgroundedthejudgment,‘Somethingexists’;itisthegroundofexistencewhich,justbecauseitisthegroundofexistence,cannot,initsturn,besaidtobeortobeanexistence.”12

But,here,too,FichtelacksclearinsightintotheactivityoftheEgo.Hehasneverworkedhiswaythroughtoit.ThatiswhyhisWissenschaftslehrecouldnotbecomewhatelse,fromitswholedesign,itoughttohavebecome,viz.,aTheoryofKnowledgeasthefundamentaldisciplineofphilosophy.For,afterithadoncebeenrecognisedthattheactivityoftheEgomustbeaffirmedbytheEgoitself,itwasveryeasytothinkthattheactivityreceivesitsdeterminationalsofromtheEgo.ButhowelsecanthishappenexceptweassignacontenttothepurelyformalactivityoftheEgo?IftheEgoisreallytoimportacontentintoitsactivitywhich,else,iswhollyundetermined,thenthenatureofthatcontentmustalsobedetermined.For,failingthis,itcouldatbestberealisedonlybysome“thing-in-itself”intheEgo,ofwhichtheEgowouldbetheinstrument,butnotbytheEgoitself.IfFichtehadattemptedtofurnishthisdetermination,hewouldhavebeenledtotheconceptofcognitionwhichitisthetaskoftheEgotorealise.Fichte’sWissenschaftslehreprovesthateventheacutestthinkerfailstomakefruitfulcontributionstoanyphilosophicaldiscussion,unlesshelaysholdofthecorrectThought-Form(category,idea)which,supplementedbytheGiven,yieldsreality.Suchathinkerislikeamanwhofailstohearthemostgloriousmelodieswhicharebeingplayedforhim,becausehehasnoearfortunes.Ifwearetodeterminethenatureofconsciousness,asgiven,wemustbeabletoriseto,andmakeourown,the“ideaofconsciousness.”

AtonepointFichteisactuallyquiteclosetothetrueview.Hedeclares,intheEinleitungenzurWissenschaftslehre(1797),thattherearetwotheoreticalsystems,viz.,Dogmatism,forwhichtheEgoisdeterminedbytheobjects,andIdealism,forwhichthe

objectsaredeterminedbytheEgo.Bothare,accordingtohim,establishedaspossibletheoriesoftheworld;bothcanbedevelopedintoself-consistentsystems.But,ifwethrowinourlotwithDogmatism,wemustabandontheindependenceoftheEgoandmakeitdependentonthe“thing-in-itself.”Ifwedonotwanttodothis,wemustadoptIdealism.Thephilosopher’schoicebetweenthesetwosystemsisleftbyFichtewhollytothepreferenceoftheEgo.ButheaddsthatiftheEgodesirestopreserveitsindependence,itwillgiveupthebeliefinexternalthingsandsurrenderitselftoIdealism.

But,whatFichteforgotwastheconsiderationthattheEgocannotmakeanygenuine,well-groundeddecisionorchoice,unlesssomethingispresupposedwhichhelpstheEgotochoose.AlltheEgo’sattemptsatdeterminationremainemptyandwithoutcontent,iftheEgodoesnotfindsomethingwhollydeterminateandfullofcontent,whichenablesittodeterminetheGiven,andtherebyalsotochoosebetweenIdealismandDogmatism.This“somethingwhollydeterminateandfullofcontent”is,precisely,theworldofThought.AndthedeterminationoftheGivenbythinkingis,precisely,whatwecallcognition.WemaytakeFichtewhereweplease—everywherewefindthathislineofthoughtatoncegetsmeaningandsubstance,assoonasweconceivehisgrey,emptyactivityoftheEgotobefilledandregulatedbywhatwehavecalled“theprocessofcognition.”

ThefactthattheEgoisfreetoenterintoactivityoutofitself,makesitpossibleforit,byfreeself-determination,torealisethecategoryofcognition,whereasintherestoftheworldallcategoriesareconnectedbyobjectivenecessitywiththeGivenwhichcorrespondstothem.Theinvestigationofthenatureoffreeself-determinationwillbethetaskofEthicsandMetaphysics,basedonourTheoryofKnowledge.Thesedisciplines,too,willhavetodebatethequestionwhethertheEgoisabletorealiseotherideas,besidestheideaofcognition.But,thattherealisationoftheideaofcognitionissuesfromafreeacthasbeenmadesufficientlyclearinthecourseofourdiscussionsabove.For,thesynthesis,effectedbytheEgo,oftheImmediately-GivenandoftheFormofThoughtappropriatetoit,whichtwofactorsofrealityremainotherwisealwaysdivorcedfromeachotherinconsciousness,canbebroughtaboutonlybyanactoffreedom.Moreover,ourargumentsthrow,inanotherway,quiteafreshlightonCriticalIdealism.ToanyclosestudentofFichte’ssystemitwillappearasifFichtecaredfornothingsomuchasforthedefenceoftheproposition,thatnothingcanentertheEgofromwithout,thatnothingcanappearintheEgowhichwasnottheEgo’sownoriginalcreation.Now,itisbeyondalldisputethatnotypeofIdealismwilleverbeabletoderivefromwithintheEgothatformoftheworld-contentwhichwehavecalled“theImmediately-Given.”For,thisformcanonlybegiven;itcanneverbeconstructedbythinking.Inproofofthis,itisenoughtoreflectthat,evenifthewholeseriesofcoloursweregiventousexceptone,weshouldnotbeabletofillinthatoneoutofthebareEgo.Wecanformanimageofthemostremotecountries,thoughwehaveneverseenthem,providedwehaveoncepersonallyexperienced,asgiven,thedetailswhichgotoformtheimage.Wethenbuildupthetotalpicture,accordingtotheinstructionssuppliedtous,outoftheparticularfactswhichwehaveourselvesexperienced.Butweshallstriveinvaintoinventoutofourselvesevenasingleperceptualelementwhichhasneverappearedwithinthesphereofwhathasbeengiventous.Itisonethingtobemerelyacquaintedwiththeworld;itisanothertohave

knowledgeofitsessentialnature.Thisnature,forallthatitiscloselyidentifiedwiththeworld-content,doesnotbecomecleartousunlesswebuilduprealityourselvesoutoftheGivenandtheFormsofThought.Thereal“what”oftheGivencomestobeaffirmedfortheEgoonlythroughtheEgoitself.TheEgowouldhavenooccasiontoaffirmthenatureoftheGivenforitself,ifitdidnotfinditselfconfrontedattheoutsetbytheGiveninwhollyindeterminateform.Thus,theessentialnatureoftheworldisaffirmed,notapartfrom,butthrough,theEgo.

ThetrueformofrealityisnotthefirstforminwhichitpresentsitselftotheEgo,butthelastformwhichitreceivesthroughtheactivityoftheEgo.Thatfirstformis,infact,withoutanyimportancefortheobjectiveworldandcountsonlyasthebasisfortheprocessofcognition.Hence,itisnottheformgiventotheworldbytheorywhichissubjective,butrathertheforminwhichtheworldisoriginallygiventotheEgo.If,followingVolkeltandothers,wecallthegivenworld“experience,”ourviewamountstosaying:Theworld-picturepresentsitself,owingtotheconstitutionofourconsciousness,insubjectiveformasexperience,butsciencecompletesitandmakesitstruenaturemanifest.

OurTheoryofKnowledgesuppliesthebasisforanIdealismwhich,inthetruesenseoftheword,understandsitself.Itsuppliesgoodgroundsfortheconvictionthatthinkingbringshometoustheessentialnatureoftheworld.Nothingbutthinkingcanexhibittherelationsofthepartsoftheworld-content,beittherelationoftheheatofthesuntothestonewhichitwarms,ortherelationoftheEgototheexternalworld.Thinkingalonehasthefunctionofdeterminingallthingsintheirrelationstoeachother.

TheobjectionmightstillbeurgedbythefollowersofKant,thatthedetermination,above-described,oftheGivenholds,afterall,onlyfortheEgo.Ourreplymustbe,consistentlywithourprinciples,thatthedistinctionbetweenEgoandOuterWorld,too,holdsonlywithintheGiven,andthat,therefore,itisirrelevanttoinsistonthephrase,“fortheEgo,”inthefaceoftheactivityofthinkingwhichunitesallopposites.TheEgo,asdivorcedfromtheouterworld,disappearscompletelyintheprocessofthinkingoutthenatureoftheworld.HenceitbecomesmeaninglessstilltotalkofdeterminationswhichholdonlyfortheEgo.

Itoughtnottobenecessarytosaythattheterm“centre,”here,isnotintendedtoaffirmatheoryconcerningthenatureofconsciousness,butisusedmerelyasashorthandexpressionforthetotalphysiognomyofconsciousness.↑

Fichte’sSämtlicheWerke,Vol.I,p.71.↑

l.c.,Vol.I,p.97.↑

l.c.,Vol.I,p.91.↑

l.c.,Vol.I,p.178.↑

l.c.,Vol.I,p.91.↑

GeschichtederPhilosophie,p.605.↑

Fichte,SämtlicheWerke,Vol.I,p.94.↑

l.c.,Vol.I,p.98.↑

l.c.,Vol.I,p.422.↑

Deliveredintheautumnof1813attheUniversityofBerlin.SeeNachgelasseneWerke,Vol.I,p.4.↑

l.c.,Vol.I,p.16.↑

CONCLUDINGREMARKS:EPISTEMOLOGICAL

WehavelaidthefoundationsoftheTheoryofKnowledgeasthescienceofthesignificanceofallhumanknowledge.Italoneclearsupforustherelationofthecontentsoftheseparatesciencestotheworld.Itenablesus,withthehelpofthesciences,toattaintoaphilosophicalworld-view.Positiveknowledgeisacquiredbyusthroughparticularcognitions;whatthevalueofourknowledgeis,consideredasknowledgeofreality,welearnthroughtheTheoryofKnowledge.Byholdingfaststrictlytothisprinciple,andbyemployingnoparticularcognitionsinourargumentation,wehavetranscendedallone-sidedworld-views.One-sidedness,asarule,resultsfromthefactthattheinquiry,insteadofconcentratingontheprocessofcognitionitself,busiesitselfaboutsomeobjectofthatprocess.Ifourargumentsaresound,Dogmatismmustabandonits“thing-in-itself”asfundamentalprinciple,andSubjectiveIdealismits“Ego,”forboththeseowetheirdeterminatenaturesintheirrelationtoeachotherfirsttothinking.Scepticismmustgiveupitsdoubtswhethertheworldcanbeknown,forthereisnoroomfordoubtwithreferencetothe“Given,”becauseitisasyetuntouchedbyanyofthepredicateswhichcognitionconfersonit.Ontheotherhand,ifScepticismweretoassertthatthinkingcanneverapprehendthingsastheyare,itsassertion,beingitselfpossibleonlythroughthinking,wouldbeself-contradictory.For,tojustifydoubtbythinkingistoadmitbyimplicationthatthinkingcanproducegroundssufficienttoestablishcertainty.Lastly,ourtheoryofknowledgetranscendsbothone-sidedEmpiricismandone-sidedRationalisminunitingbothatahigherlevel.Thusitdoesjusticetoboth.ItjustifiesEmpiricismbyshowingthatallpositiveknowledgeabouttheGivenisobtainableonlythroughdirectcontactwiththeGiven.AndRationalism,too,receivesitsdueinourargument,seeingthatweholdthinkingtobethenecessaryandexclusiveinstrumentofknowledge.

Theworld-viewwhichhastheclosestaffinitytoours,aswehaveherebuiltituponepistemologicalfoundations,isthatofA.E.Biedermann.1ButBiedermannrequiresforthejustificationofhispointofviewdogmatictheseswhicharequiteoutofplaceinTheoryofKnowledge.Thus,e.g.,heworkswiththeconceptsofBeing,Substance,Space,Time,etc.,withouthavingfirstanalysedthecognitiveprocessbyitself.Insteadofestablishingthefactthatthecognitiveprocessconsists,tobeginwith,onlyofthetwoelements,theGivenandThought,hetalksoftheKindsofBeingofthereal.Forexample,inSection15,hesays:“Everycontentofconsciousnessincludeswithinitselftwofundamentalfacts—itpresentstous,asgiven,twokindsofBeingwhichwecontrastwitheachotherassensuousandspiritual,thing-likeandidea-like,Being.”AndinSection19:“Whateverhasaspatio-temporalexistence,existsmaterially;thatwhichisthegroundofallexistenceandthesubjectoflifehasanidea-likeexistence,isrealashavinganidealBeing.”Thissortofargumentbelongs,nottotheTheoryofKnowledge,buttoMetaphysics,whichlatterpresupposesTheoryofKnowledgeasitsfoundation.WemustadmitthatBiedermann’sdoctrinehasmanypointsofsimilaritywithours;butourmethodhasnotasinglepointofcontactwithhis.Hence,wehavehadnooccasiontocompareourpositiondirectlywithhis.Biedermann’saimistogainanepistemologicalstandpointwith

thehelpofafewmetaphysicalaxioms.Ouraimistoreach,throughananalysisoftheprocessofcognition,atheoryofreality.

Andwebelievethatwehavesucceededinshowing,thatallthedisputesbetweenphilosophicalsystemsresultfromthefactthattheirauthorshavesoughttoattainknowledgeaboutsomeobjectorother(Thing,Self,Consciousness,etc.),withouthavingfirstgivenclosestudytothatwhichalonecanthrowlightonwhateverelseweknow,viz.,thenatureofknowledgeitself.

cf.hisChristlicheDogmatik,2ndedit.,1884–5.TheepistemologicalargumentsareinVol.I.AnexhaustivediscussionofhispointofviewhasbeenfurnishedbyE.vonHartmann.SeehisKritischeWanderungendurchdiePhilosophiederGegenwart,pp.200ff.↑

CONCLUDINGREMARKS:PRACTICAL

Theaimoftheprecedingdiscussionshasbeentothrowlightontherelationofourpersonality,asknower,totheobjectiveworld.Whatdoesitsignifyforustopossessknowledgeandscience?Thiswasthequestiontowhichwesoughttheanswer.

Wehaveseenthatitisjustinourknowingthattheinnermostkerneloftheworldmanifestlyrevealsitself.Theharmony,subjecttolaw,whichreignsthroughoutthewholeworld,revealsitselfpreciselyinhumancognition.

Itis,therefore,partofthedestinyofmantoelevatethefundamentallawsoftheworld,whichdoindeedregulatethewholeofexistencebutwhichwouldneverbecomeexistentinthemselves,intotherealmofrealitieswhichappear.Thispreciselyistheessentialnatureofknowledgethatinittheworld-groundismademanifestwhichintheobject-worldcanneverbediscovered.Knowingis—metaphoricallyspeaking—acontinualmergingofone’slifeintotheworld-ground.

Suchaviewisboundtothrowlightalsoonourpracticalattitudetowardslife.

Ourconductis,initswholecharacter,determinedbyourmoralideals.Thesearetheideaswehaveofourtasksinlife,or,inotherwords,oftheendswhichwesetourselvestoachievebyouraction.

Ourconductisapartofthetotalworld-process.Consequently,it,too,issubjecttotheuniversallawswhichregulatethisprocess.

Now,everyeventintheuniversehastwosideswhichmustbedistinguished:itsexternalsequenceintimeandspace,anditsinternalconformitytolaw.

Theapprehensionofthisconformityofhumanconducttolawisbutaspecialcaseofknowledge.Hence,theconclusionsatwhichwehavearrivedconcerningthenatureofknowledgemustapplytothissortofknowledge,too.Toapprehendoneselfasapersonwhoactsistopossesstherelevantlawsofconduct,i.e.,themoralconceptsandideals,intheformofknowledge.Itisthisknowledgeoftheconformityofourconducttolawwhichmakesourconducttrulyours.For,inthatcase,theconformityisgiven,notasexternaltotheobjectinwhichtheactionappears,butastheverysubstanceoftheobjectengagedinlivingactivity.The“object,”here,isourownEgo.IftheEgohaswithitsknowledgereallypenetratedtheessentialnatureofconduct,thenitfeelsthatitistherebymasterofitsconduct.Shortofthis,thelawsofconductconfrontusassomethingexternal.Theymasterus.Whatweachieve,weachieveunderthecompulsionwhichtheywieldoverus.Butthiscompulsionceases,assoonastheiraliencharacterhasbeentransformedintotheEgo’sveryownactivity.Thereafter,thelawnolongerrulesoverus,butrulesinusovertheactionswhichissuefromourEgo.Toperformanactinobediencetoalawwhichisexternaltotheagentistobeunfree.Toperformitinobediencetotheagent’sownlawistobefree.Togainknowledgeofthelawsofone’sownconductistobecomeconsciousofone’sfreedom.Theprocessofcognitionis,thus,accordingtoourarguments,theprocess

ofthedevelopmentoffreedom.

Notallhumanconducthasthischaracter.Therearemanycasesinwhichwedonotknowthelawsofourconduct.Thispartofourconductistheunfreepartofouractivity.Overagainstitstandsthepartthelawsofwhichwemakecompletelyourown.Thisistherealmoffreedom.Itisonlyinsofarasourlifefallsintothisrealmthatitcanbecalledmoral.Totransformtheactionswhichareunfreeintoactionswhicharefree—thisisthetaskofself-developmentforeveryindividual,thisislikewisethetaskofthewholehumanrace.

Thus,themostimportantproblemforallhumanthinkingistoconceivemanasapersonalitygroundeduponitselfandfree.

APPENDICES

APPENDIXI

ADDITIONTOTHEREVISEDEDITIONOF“THEPHILOSOPHYOFFREEDOM,”1918.

Variouscriticismsonthepartofphilosopherswithwhichthisbookmetimmediatelyuponitspublication,inducemetoaddtothisRevisedEditionthefollowingbriefstatement.

Icanwellunderstandthattherearereaderswhoareinterestedintherestofthebook,butwhowilllookuponwhatfollowsasatissueofabstractconceptswhichtothemisirrelevantandmakesnoappeal.Theymay,iftheychoose,leavethisbriefstatementunread.Butinphilosophyproblemspresentthemselveswhichhavetheiroriginratherincertainprejudicesonthethinker’spartthaninthenaturalprogressionofnormalhumanthinking.Withthemainbodyofthisbookitseemstometobethedutyofeveryonetoconcernhimself,whoisstrivingforclearnessabouttheessentialnatureofmanandhisrelationtotheworld.Whatfollowsisratheraproblemthediscussionofwhichcertainphilosophersdemandasnecessarytoatreatmentofthetopicsofthisbook,becausethesephilosophers,bytheirwholewayofthinking,havecreatedcertaindifficultieswhichdonototherwiseoccur.IfIweretopassbytheseproblemsentirely,certainpeoplewouldbequicktoaccusemeofdilettantism,etc.Theimpressionwouldthusbecreatedthattheauthoroftheviewssetdowninthisbookhasnotthoughtouthispositionwithregardtotheseproblemsbecausehehasnotdiscussedtheminhisbook.

TheproblemtowhichIreferisthis:therearethinkerswhofindaparticulardifficultyinunderstandinghowanothermindcanactonone’sown.Theysay:theworldofmyconsciousnessisaclosedcirclewithinme;soistheworldofanother’sconsciousnesswithinhim.Icannotlookintotheworldofanother’smind.How,then,doIknowthatheandIareinacommonworld?Thetheoryaccordingtowhichwecanfromtheconsciousworldinferanunconsciousworldwhichnevercanenterconsciousness,attemptstosolvethisdifficultyasfollows.Theworld,itsays,whichIhaveinmyconsciousnessistherepresentationinmeofarealworldtowhichmyconsciousnesshasnoaccess.Inthistranscendentworldexisttheunknownagentswhichcausetheworldinmyconsciousness.Init,too,existsmyownrealself,ofwhichlikewiseIhaveonlyarepresentationinmyconsciousness.Init,lastly,existstheessentialselfofthefellow-manwhoconfrontsme.Whateverpassesintheconsciousnessofmyfellow-mancorrespondstoarealityinhistranscendentessencewhichisindependentofhisconsciousness.Hisessentialnatureactsinthatrealmwhich,onthistheory,isequallybeyondconsciousness.Thusanimpressionismadeinmyconsciousnesswhichrepresentstherewhatispresentinanother’sconsciousnessandwhollybeyondthereachofmydirectawareness.Clearlythepointofthistheoryistoaddtotheworldaccessibletomyconsciousnessanhypotheticalworldwhichistomyimmediateexperienceinaccessible.Thisisdonetoavoidthesupposedalternativeofhavingtosaythattheexternalworld,whichIregardasexistingbeforeme,isnothingbuttheworldofmyconsciousness,withtheabsurd—solipsistic—corollarythatotherpersonslikewiseexistonlywithinmyconsciousness.

Severalepistemologicaltendenciesinrecentspeculationhavejoinedincreatingthisproblem.Butitispossibletoattaintoclearnessaboutitbysurveyingthesituationfromthepointofviewofspiritualperceptionwhichunderliestheexpositionofthisbook.Whatisitthat,inthefirstinstance,IhavebeforemewhenIconfrontanotherperson?Tobeginwith,thereisthesensuousappearanceoftheother’sbody,asgiveninperception.Tothiswemightaddtheauditoryperceptionofwhatheissaying,andsoforth.AllthisIapprehend,notwithapassivestare,butbytheactivityofmythinkingwhichissetinmotion.ThroughthethinkingwithwhichInowconfronttheotherperson,theperceptofhimbecomes,asitwere,psychicallytransparent.Asmythinkingapprehendsthepercept,IamcompelledtojudgethatwhatIperceiveisreallyquiteotherthanitappearstotheoutersenses.Thesensuousappearance,inbeingwhatitimmediatelyis,revealssomethingelsewhichitismediately.Inpresentingitselftomeasadistinctobject,it,atthesametime,extinguishesitselfasameresensuousappearance.Butinthusextinguishingitselfitrevealsacharacterwhich,solongasitaffectsme,compelsmeasathinkingbeingtoextinguishmyownthinkingandtoputitsthinkingintheplaceofmine.Itsthinkingisthenapprehendedbymythinkingasanexperiencelikemyown.ThusIhavereallyperceivedanother’sthinking.Fortheimmediatepercept,inextinguishingitselfassensuousappearance,isapprehendedbymythinking.Itisaprofesswhichpasseswhollyinmyconsciousnessandconsistsinthis,thattheother’sthinkingtakestheplaceofmythinking.Theself-extinctionofthesensuousappearanceactuallyabolishestheseparationbetweenthespheresofthetwoconsciousnesses.Inmyownconsciousnessthisfusionmanifestsitselfinthat,solongasIexperiencethecontentsoftheother’sconsciousness,IamawareofmyownconsciousnessaslittleasIamawareofitindreamlesssleep.Justasmywakingconsciousnessiseliminatedfromthelatter,soarethecontentsofmyownconsciousnesseliminatedfrommyperceptionofthecontentsofanother’sconsciousness.Twothingstendtodeceiveusaboutthetruefacts.Thefirstisthat,inperceivinganotherperson,theextinctionofthecontentsofone’sownconsciousnessisreplacednot,asinsleep,byunconsciousness,butbythecontentsoftheother’sconsciousness.Theotheristhatmyconsciousnessofmyownselfoscillatessorapidlybetweenextinctionandrecurrence,thatthesealternationsusuallyescapeobservation.Thewholeproblemistobesolved,notthroughartificialconstructionofconcepts,involvinganinferencefromwhatisinconsciousnesstowhatalwaysmusttranscendconsciousness,butthroughgenuineexperienceoftheconnectionbetweenthinkingandperceiving.Thesameremarkappliestomanyotherproblemswhichappearinphilosophicalliterature.Philosophersshouldseektheroadtounprejudicedspiritualobservation,insteadofhidingrealitybehindanartificialfrontageofconcepts.

InamonographbyEduardvonHartmannon“TheUltimateProblemsofEpistemologyandMetaphysics”(intheZeitschriftfürPhilosophieundphilosophischeKritik,Vol.108,p.55),myPhilosophyofSpiritualActivityhasbeenclassedwiththephilosophicaltendencywhichseekstobuilduponan“epistemologicalMonism.”EduardvonHartmannrejectsthispositionasuntenable,forthefollowingreasons.Accordingtothepointofviewmaintainedinhismonograph,thereareonlythreepossiblepositionsinthetheoryofknowledge.Thefirstconsistsinremainingtruetothenaïvepointofview,whichregardsobjectsofsense-perceptionasrealthingsexistingoutsidethehumanmind.This,urges

VonHartmann,impliesalackofcriticalreflection.IfailtorealisethatwithallmycontentsofconsciousnessIremainimprisonedinmyownconsciousness.IfailtoperceivethatIamdealing,notwitha“table-in-itself,”butonlywithaphenomenoninmyownconsciousness.IfIstopatthispointofview,orifforwhateverreasonsIreturntoit,IamaNaïveRealist.Butthiswholepositionisuntenable,foritignoresthatconsciousnesshasnootherobjectsthanitsowncontents.Thesecondpositionconsistsinappreciatingthissituationandconfessingittooneself.Asaresult,IbecomeaTranscendentalIdealist.Assuch,saysVonHartmann,Iamobligedtodenythata“thing-in-itself”caneverappearinanywaywithinthehumanmind.But,ifdevelopedwithunflinchingconsistency,thisviewendsinAbsoluteIllusionism.Fortheworldwhichconfrontsmeisnowtransformedintoameresumofcontentsofconsciousness,and,moreover,ofcontentsofmyprivateconsciousness.Theobjectsofotherhumanminds,too,Iamthencompelledtoconceive—absurdlyenough—aspresentsolelyinmyownconsciousness.Hence,theonlytenableposition,accordingtoVonHartmann,isthethird,viz.,TranscendentalRealism.Onthisview,thereare“things-in-themselves,”butconsciousnesscanhavenodealingswiththembywayofimmediateexperience.Existingbeyondthesphereofhumanconsciousness,theycause,inawayofwhichweremainunconscious,theappearanceofobjectsinconsciousness.These“things-in-themselves”areknownonlybyinferencefromthecontentsofconsciousness,whichareimmediatelyexperiencedbutforthatveryreason,purelyideal.EduardvonHartmannmaintainsinthemonographcitedabove,that“epistemologicalMonism”—forsuchhetakesmypointofviewtobe—isboundtodeclareitselfidenticalwithoneorotheroftheabovethreepositions;andthatitsfailuretodosoisdueonlytoitsinconsistencyinnotdrawingtheactualconsequencesofitspresuppositions.Themonographgoesontosay:“Ifwewanttofindoutwhichepistemologicalpositionaso-calledEpistemologicalMonistoccupies,allwehavetodoistoputtohimcertainquestionsandcompelhimtoanswerthem.For,outofhisowninitiative,noMonistwillcondescendtostatehisviewsonthesepoints,andlikewisehewillseektododgeineverywaygivingastraightanswertoourquestions,becauseeveryanswerhemaygivewillbetraythatEpistemologicalMonismdoesnotdifferfromoneorotherofthethreepositions.Ourquestionsarethefollowing:(1)Arethingscontinuousorintermittentintheirexistence?Iftheansweris‘continuous,’wehavebeforeussomeoneoftheformsofNaïveRealism.Iftheansweris‘intermittent,’wehaveTranscendentalIdealism.Butiftheansweris:‘Theyare,ontheonehand,continuous,viz.,ascontentsoftheAbsoluteMind,orasunconsciousideas,oraspermanentpossibilitiesofperception,but,ontheotherhand,intermittent,viz.,ascontentsoffiniteconsciousness,’werecogniseTranscendentalRealism.(2)Whenthreepersonsaresittingatatable,howmanydistincttablesarethere?TheNaïveRealistanswers‘one’;theTranscendentalIdealistanswers‘three’;buttheTranscendentalRealistanswers‘four.’Thislastanswerdoes,indeed,presupposethatitislegitimatetogrouptogetherinthesinglequestion,‘Howmanytables?’thingssounlikeeachotherastheonetablewhichisthe‘thing-in-itself’andthethreetableswhicharetheobjectsofperceptioninthethreeperceivers’minds.Ifthisseemstoogreatalicencetoanyone,hewillhavetoanswer‘oneandthree,’insteadof‘four.’(3)Whentwopersonsarealonetogetherinaroom,howmanydistinctpersonsarethere?Ifyouanswer‘two’—youareaNaïveRealist.Ifyouanswer‘four,’viz.,ineachof

thetwomindsone‘I’andone‘Other,’youareaTranscendentalIdealist.Ifyouanswer‘six,’viz.,twopersonsas‘things-in-themselves’andfourpersonsasidealobjectsinthetwominds,youareaTranscendentalRealist.InordertoshowthatEpistemologicalMonismisnotoneofthesethreepositions,weshouldhavetogiveotheranswersthantheabovetoeachofthesethreequestions.ButIcannotimaginewhatanswersthesecouldbe.”TheanswersofthePhilosophyofSpiritualActivitywouldhavetobe:(1)Whoeverapprehendsonlywhatheperceivesofathingandmistakestheseperceptsfortherealityofthething,isaNaïveRealist.Hedoesnotrealisethat,strictly,heoughttoregardtheseperceptualcontentsasexistingonlysolongasheislookingattheobjects,sothatheoughttoconceivetheobjectsbeforehimasintermittent.Assoon,however,asitbecomescleartohimthatrealityistobemetwithonlyintheperceptswhichareorganisedbythinking,heattainstotheinsightthattheperceptswhichappearasintermittentevents,revealthemselvesascontinuouslyinexistenceassoonastheyareinterpretedbytheconstructionsofthought.Hencecontinuityofexistencemustbepredicatedofthecontentsofperceptionwhichlivingthoughthasorganised.Onlythatpartwhichisonlyperceived,notthought,wouldhavetoberegardedasintermittentif—whichisnotthecase—thereweresuchapart.(2)Whenthreepersonsaresittingatatable,howmanydistincttablesarethere?Thereisonlyonetable.Butsolongasthethreepersonsstopshortattheirperceptualimages,theyoughttosay:“Theseperceptsarenottherealityatall.”Assoonastheypassontothetableasapprehendedbythinking,thereisrevealedtothemtheonerealtable.Theyarethenunitedwiththeirthreecontentsofconsciousnessinthisonereality.(3)Whentwopersonsarealonetogetherinaroom,howmanydistinctpersonsarethere?Mostassuredlytherearenotsix—noteveninthesenseoftheTranscendentalRealist’stheory—butonlytwo.Only,atfirst,eachpersonhasnothingbuttheunrealperceptofhimselfandoftheotherperson.Therearefoursuchpercepts,thepresenceofwhichinthemindsofthetwopersonsisthestimulusfortheapprehensionofrealitybytheirthinking.Inthisactivityofthinkingeachofthetwopersonstranscendsthesphereofhisownconsciousness.Alivingawarenessoftheconsciousnessoftheotherpersonaswellasofhisownarisesineach.Inthesemomentsoflivingawarenessthepersonsareaslittleimprisonedwithintheirconsciousnessastheyareinsleep.Butatothermomentsconsciousnessofthisidentificationwiththeotherreturns,sothateachperson,intheexperienceofthinking,apprehendsconsciouslybothhimselfandtheotherperson.IknowthataTranscendentalRealistdescribesthisviewasarelapseintoNaïveRealism.But,then,IhavealreadypointedoutinthisbookthatNaïveRealismretainsitsjustificationforourthinkingasweactuallyexperienceit.TheTranscendentalRealistignoresthetruesituationintheprocessofcognitioncompletely.Hecutshimselfofffromthefactsbyatissueofconceptsandentangleshimselfinit.Moreover,theMonismwhichappearsinthePhilosophyofSpiritualActivityoughtnottobelabelled“epistemological,”but,ifanepithetiswanted,thena“MonismofThought.”AllthishasbeenmisunderstoodbyEduardvonHartmann.IgnoringallthatisspecificintheargumentationofthePhilosophyofSpiritualActivity,hehaschargedmewithhavingattemptedtocombineHegel’sUniversalisticPanlogismwithHume’sIndividualisticPhenomenalism(ZeitschriftfürPhilosophie,vol.108,p.71,note).But,intruth,thePhilosophyofSpiritualActivityhasnothingwhatevertodowiththetwopositionswhichitisaccusedoftryingtocombine.

(This,too,isthereasonwhyIcouldfeelnointerestinpolemicsagainst,e.g.,theEpistemologicalMonismofJohannesRehmke.ThepointofviewofthePhilosophyofSpiritualActivityissimplyquitedifferentfromwhatEduardvonHartmannandotherscall“EpistemologicalMonism.”)

APPENDIXII

REVISEDINTRODUCTIONTO“PHILOSOPHYOFFREEDOM.”

Thefollowingchapterreproduces,inallessentials,thepageswhichstoodasasortof“Introduction”inthefirsteditionofthisbook.InasmuchasitratherreflectsthemoodoutofwhichIcomposedthisbooktwenty-fiveyearsago,thanhasanydirectbearingonitscontents,Iprintithereasan“Appendix.”Idonotwanttoomititaltogether,becausethesuggestionkeepscroppingupthatIwanttosuppresssomeofmyearlierwritingsonaccountofmylaterworksonspiritualmatters.

Ourageisonewhichisunwillingtoseektruthanywherebutinthedepthsofhumannature.1Ofthefollowingtwowell-knownpathsdescribedbySchiller,itisthesecondwhichwillto-daybefoundmostuseful:

Wahrheitsuchenwirbeide,duaussenimLeben,ichinnen

IndemHerzen,undsofindetsiejedergewiss.

IstdasAugegesund,sobegegnetesaussendemSchöpfer

IstesdasHerz,danngewissspiegeltesinnendieWelt.2

Atruthwhichcomestousfromwithoutbearseverthestampofuncertainty.Convictionattachesonlytowhatappearsastruthtoeachofusinourownhearts.

Truthalonecangiveusconfidenceindevelopingourpowers.Hewhoistorturedbydoubtsfindshispowerslamed.Inaworldtheriddleofwhichbaffleshim,hecanfindnoaimforhisactivity.

Wenolongerwanttobelieve;wewanttoknow.Beliefdemandstheacceptanceoftruthswhichwedonotwhollycomprehend.Buttheindividualitywhichseekstoexperienceeverythinginthedepthsofitsownbeing,isrepelledbywhatitcannotunderstand.Onlythatknowledgewillsatisfyuswhichspringsfromtheinnerlifeofthepersonality,andsubmitsitselftonoexternalnorm.

Again,wedonotwantanyknowledgewhichhasencaseditselfonceandforallinhide-boundformulas,andwhichispreservedinEncyclopædiasvalidforalltime.Eachofusclaimstherighttostartfromthefactsthatlienearesttohand,fromhisownimmediateexperiences,andthencetoascendtoaknowledgeofthewholeuniverse.Westriveaftercertaintyinknowledge,buteachinhisownway.

Ourscientifictheories,too,arenolongertobeformulatedasifwewereunconditionallycompelledtoacceptthem.NoneofuswouldwishtogiveascientificworkatitlelikeFichte’sAPellucidAccountfortheGeneralPublicconcerningtheRealNatureoftheNewestPhilosophy.AnAttempttoCompeltheReaderstoUnderstand.Nowadaysthereisnoattempttocompelanyonetounderstand.Weclaimnoagreementfromanyonewhoma

distinctindividualneeddoesnotdrivetoacertainview.Wedonotseeknowadaystocramfactsofknowledgeevenintotheimmaturehumanbeing,thechild.Weseekrathertodevelophisfacultiesinsuchawaythathisunderstandingmaydependnolongeronourcompulsion,butonhiswill.Iamundernoillusionconcerningthecharacteristicsofthepresentage.Iknowhowmanyflauntamanneroflifewhichlacksallindividualityandfollowsonlytheprevailingfashion.ButIknowalsothatmanyofmycontemporariesstrivetoordertheirlivesinthedirectionoftheprinciplesIhaveindicated.TothemIwoulddedicatethisbook.Itdoesnotpretendtoofferthe“onlypossible”waytoTruth,itonlydescribesthepathchosenbyonewhoseheartissetuponTruth.

Thereaderwillbeledatfirstintosomewhatabstractregions,wherethoughtmustdrawsharpoutlines,ifitistoreachsecureconclusions.Buthewillalsobeledoutofthesearidconceptsintoconcretelife.Iamfullyconvincedthatonecannotdowithoutsoaringintotheetherealrealmofabstraction,ifone’sexperienceistopenetratelifeinalldirections.Hewhoislimitedtothepleasuresofthesensesmissesthesweetestenjoymentsoflife.TheOrientalsagesmaketheirdisciplesliveforyearsalifeofresignationandasceticismbeforetheyimparttothemtheirownwisdom.TheWesternworldnolongerdemandspiousexercisesandasceticpracticesasapreparationforscience,butitdoesrequireasincerewillingnesstowithdrawoneselfawhilefromtheimmediateimpressionsoflife,andtobetakeoneselfintotherealmofpurethought.

Thespheresoflifearemanyandforeachtheredevelopsaspecialscience.Butlifeitselfisone,andthemorethesciencesstrivetopenetratedeeplyintotheirseparatespheres,themoretheywithdrawthemselvesfromthevisionoftheworldasalivingwhole.Theremustbeonesupremesciencewhichseeksintheseparatesciencestheelementsforleadingmenbackoncemoretothefullnessoflife.Thescientificspecialistseeksinhisstudiestogainaknowledgeoftheworldanditsworkings.Thisbookhasaphilosophicalaim:scienceitselfishereinfusedwiththelifeofanorganicwhole.Thespecialsciencesarestagesonthewaytothisall-inclusivescience.Asimilarrelationisfoundinthearts.Thecomposerinhisworkemploystherulesofthetheoryofcomposition.Thislatterisanaccumulationofprinciples,knowledgeofwhichisanecessarypresuppositionforcomposing.Intheactofcomposing,therulesoftheorybecometheservantsoflife,ofreality.Inexactlythesamewayphilosophyisanart.Allgenuinephilosophershavebeenartistsinconcepts.Humanideashavebeenthemediumoftheirart,andscientificmethodtheirartistictechnique.Abstractthinkingthusgainsconcreteindividuallife.Ideasturnintolife-forces.Wehavenolongermerelyaknowledgeaboutthings,butwehavenowmadeknowledgeareal,self-determiningorganism.Ourconsciousness,aliveandactive,hasrisenbeyondamerepassivereceptionoftruths.

Howphilosophy,asanart,isrelatedtofreedom;whatfreedomis;andwhetherwedo,orcan,participateinit—thesearetheprincipalproblemsofmybook.Allotherscientificdiscussionsareputinonlybecausetheyultimatelythrowlightonthesequestionswhichare,inmyopinion,themostintimatethatconcernmankind.Thesepagesoffera“PhilosophyofFreedom.”

Allsciencewouldbenothingbutthesatisfactionofidlecuriositydiditnotstriveto

enhancetheexistentialvalueofhumanpersonality.Thetruevalueofthesciencesisseenonlywhenweareshowntheimportanceoftheirresultsforhumanity.Thefinalaimofanindividualitycanneverbethecultivationofanysinglefaculty,butonlythedevelopmentofallcapacitieswhichslumberwithinus.Knowledgehasvalueonlyinsofarasitcontributestotheall-roundunfoldingofthewholenatureofman.

Thisbook,therefore,doesnotconceivetherelationbetweenscienceandlifeinsuchawaythatmanmustbowdownbeforetheworldofideasanddevotehispowerstoitsservice.Onthecontrary,itshowsthathetakespossessionoftheworldofideasinordertousethemforhishumanaims,whichtranscendthoseofmerescience.

Manmustconfrontideasasmaster,lesthebecometheirslave.

Onlytheveryfirstopeningsentences(inthefirstedition)ofthisargumenthavebeenaltogetheromittedhere,becausetheyseemtometo-daywhollyirrelevant.Buttherestofthechapterseemstomeeventodayrelevantandnecessary,inspite,nay,because,ofthescientificbiasofcontemporarythought.↑

Truthseekweboth—Thouinthelifewithouttheeandaround;

Iintheheartwithin.BybothcanTruthalikebefound.

ThehealthyeyecanthroughtheworldthegreatCreatortrack;

ThehealthyheartisbuttheglasswhichgivesCreationback.

BULWER.↑

APPENDIXIII

PREFACETOTHEORIGINALEDITIONOF“TRUTHANDSCIENCE”

ContemporaryphilosophysuffersfromamorbidbeliefinKant.Tohelptowardsouremancipationfromthisbeliefistheaimofthepresentessay.ItwouldindeedbecriminaltotryandminimisethedebtwhichthedevelopmentofGermanphilosophyowestoKant’simmortalwork.ButitishightimetoacknowledgethattheonlywayoflayingthefoundationsforatrulysatisfyingviewoftheworldandofhumanlifeistoputourselvesindecisiveoppositiontothespiritofKant.WhatisitthatKanthasachieved?Hehasshownthatthetranscendentgroundoftheworldwhichliesbeyondthedataofoursensesandthecategoriesofourreason,andwhichhispredecessorssoughttodeterminebymeansofemptyconcepts,isinaccessibletoourknowledge.Fromthisheconcludedthatallourscientificthinkingmustkeepwithinthelimitsofpossibleexperience,andisincapableofattainingtoknowledgeofthetranscendentandultimategroundoftheworld,i.e.,ofthe“thing-in-itself.”Butwhatifthis“thing-in-itself,”thiswholetranscendentgroundoftheworld,shouldbenothingbutafiction?Itiseasytoseethatthisispreciselywhatitis.Aninstinctinseparablefromhumannatureimpelsustosearchfortheinnermostessenceofthings,fortheirultimateprinciples.Itisthebasisofallscientificenquiry.But,thereisnottheleastreasontolookforthisultimategroundoutsidetheworldofoursensesandofourspirit,unlessathoroughandcomprehensiveexaminationofthisworldshouldrevealwithinitelementswhichpointunmistakablytoanexternalcause.

Thepresentessayattemptstoprovethatalltheprincipleswhichweneedinordertoexplainourworldandmakeitintelligible,arewithinreachofourthought.Thus,theassumptionofexplanatoryprincipleslyingoutsideourworldturnsouttobetheprejudiceofanextinctphilosophywhichlivedonvaindogmaticfancies.ThisoughttohavebeenKant’sconclusion,too,ifhehadreallyenquiredintothepowersofhumanthought.Instead,hedemonstratedinthemostcomplicatedwaythattheconstitutionofourcognitivefacultiesdoesnotpermitustoreachtheultimateprincipleswhichliebeyondourexperience.ButwehavenoreasonwhateverforpositingtheseprinciplesinanysuchBeyond.ThusKanthasindeedrefuted“dogmatic”philosophy,buthehasputnothinginitsplace.Hence,allGermanphilosophywhichsucceededKanthasevolvedeverywhereinoppositiontohim.Fichte,Schelling,HegelsimplyignoredthelimitsfixedbyKantforourknowledgeandsoughttheultimateprinciples,notbeyond,butwithin,theworldaccessibletohumanreason.EvenSchopenhauer,thoughhedoesdeclaretheconclusionsofKant’sCritiqueofPureReasontobeeternalandirrefutabletruths,cannotavoidseekingknowledgeoftheultimategroundsoftheworldalongpathswidelydivergentfromthoseofhismaster.Butthefatalmistakeofallthesethinkerswasthattheysoughtknowledgeofultimatetruths,withouthavinglaidthefoundationforsuchanenterpriseinapreliminaryinvestigationofthenatureofknowledgeitself.Hence,theproudintellectualedificeserectedbyFichte,SchellingandHegelhavenofoundationtoreston.Thelackofsuchfoundationsreactsmostunfavourablyupontheargumentsofthesethinkers.Ignorantof

theimportanceoftheworldofpureideasandofitsrelationtotherealmofsense-perception,theybuilterroruponerror,one-sidednessuponone-sidedness.Nowonderthattheirover-boldsystemsprovedunabletowithstandthestormsofanagewhichreckednothingofphilosophy.Nowonderthatmanygoodthingsinthesesystemswerepitilesslysweptawayalongwiththeerrors.

Toremedythedefectwhichhasjustbeenindicatedisthepurposeofthefollowinginvestigations.TheywillnotimitateKantbyexplainingwhatourmindscannotknow:theiraimistoshowwhatourmindscanknow.

Theoutcomeoftheseinvestigationsisthattruthisnot,asthecurrentviewhasit,anidealreproductionofasomerealobject,butafreeproductofthehumanspirit,whichwouldnotexistanywhereatallunlessweourselvesproducedit.Itisnotthetaskofknowledgetoreproduceinconceptualformsomethingalreadyexistingindependently.Itstaskistocreateawhollynewrealmwhich,unitedwiththeworldofsense-data,endsbyyieldingusrealityinthefullsense.Inthisway,man’ssupremeactivity,thecreativeproductivityofhisspirit,findsitsorganicplaceintheuniversalworld-process.Withoutthisactivityitwouldbeimpossibletoconceivetheworld-processasatotalitycompleteinitself.Mandoesnotconfronttheworld-processasapassivespectatorwhomerelycopiesinhismindtheeventswhichoccur,withouthisparticipation,inthecosmoswithout.Heisanactiveco-creatorintheworld-process,andhisknowledgeisthemostperfectmemberoftheorganismoftheuniverse.

Thisviewcarrieswithitanimportantconsequenceforourconduct,forourmoralideals.These,too,mustberegarded,notascopiesofanexternalstandard,butasrootedwithinus.Similarly,werefusetolookuponourmorallawsasthebehestsofanypoweroutsideus.Weknowno“categoricalimperative”which,likeavoicefromtheBeyond,prescribestouswhattodoortoleaveundone.Ourmoralidealsareourownfreecreations.Allwehavetodoistocarryoutwhatweprescribetoourselvesasthenormofourconduct.Thus,theconceptoftruthasafreeactleadstoatheoryofmoralsbasedontheconceptofaperfectlyfreepersonality.

Thesetheses,ofcourse,arevalidonlyforthatpartofourconductthelawsofwhichourthinkingpenetrateswithcompletecomprehension.Solongasthelawsofourconductaremerelynaturalmotivesorremainobscuretoourconceptualthinking,itmaybepossiblefromahigherspiritualleveltoperceivehowfartheyarefoundedinourindividuality,butweourselvesexperiencethemasinfluencingusfromwithout,ascompellingustoaction.Everytimethatwesucceedinpenetratingsuchamotivewithclearunderstanding,wemakeafreshconquestintherealmoffreedom.

TherelationoftheseviewstothetheoryofEduardvonHartmann,whoisthemostsignificantfigureincontemporaryphilosophy,willbemadecleartothereaderindetailinthecourseofthisessay,especiallyasregardstheproblemofknowledge.

ApreludetoaPhilosophyofSpiritualActivity—thisiswhatthepresentessayoffers.Thatphilosophyitself,completelyworkedout,willshortlyfollow.

Theultimateaimofallscienceistoincreasethevalueofexistenceforhumanpersonality.

Whoeverdoesnotdevotehimselftosciencewiththisaiminviewismerelymodellinghimselfinhisownworkuponsomemaster.Ifhe“researches,”itismerelybecausethathappenstobewhathehasbeentaughttodo.Butnotforhimisthetitleofa“freethinker.”

Thesciencesareseenintheirtruevalueonlywhenphilosophyexplainsthehumansignificanceoftheirresults.Tomakeacontributiontosuchanexplanationwasmyaim.But,perhaps,ourpresent-daysciencescornsallphilosophicalvindication!Ifso,twothingsarecertain.Oneisthatthisessayofmineissuperfluous.Theotheristhatmodernthinkersarelostinthewoodanddonotknowwhattheywant.

InconcludingthisPreface,Icannotomitapersonalobservation.UptonowIhaveexpoundedallmyphilosophicalviewsonthebasisofGoethe’sworld-view,intowhichIwasfirstintroducedbymydearandreveredteacher,KarlJuliusSchröer,whotomestandsintheveryforefrontofGoethe-students,becausehisgazeiseverfocussedbeyondtheparticularupontheuniversalIdeas.

But,withthisessayIhopetohaveshownthattheedificeofmythoughtisawholewhichhasitsfoundationsinitselfandwhichdoesnotneedtobederivedfromGoethe’sworld-view.Mytheories,astheyareheresetforthandastheywillpresentlybeamplifiedinthePhilosophyofSpiritualActivity,havegrownupinthecourseofmanyyears.NothingbutadeepsenseofgratitudeleadsmetoaddthattheaffectionatesympathyoftheSpechtfamilyinVienna,duringtheperiodwhenIwasthetutorofitschildren,providedmewithanenvironment,thanwhichIcouldnothavewishedabetter,forthedevelopmentofmyideas.Inthesamespirit,Iwouldadd,further,thatIowetothestimulatingconversationswithmyverydearfriend,MissRosaMayreder,ofVienna,themoodwhichIneededforputtingintofinalformmanyofthethoughtswhichIhavesketchedprovisionallyasgermsofmyPhilosophyofSpiritualActivity.Herownliteraryefforts,whichexpressthesensitiveandhigh-mindednatureofatrueartist,arelikelybeforelongtobepresentedtothepublic.

Vienna,December,1891.

APPENDIXIV

INTRODUCTIONTOORIGINALEDITIONOF“TRUTHANDSCIENCE”

Theaimofthefollowingdiscussionsistoreducetheactofcognition,byanalysis,toitsultimateelementsandthustodiscoveracorrectformulationoftheproblemofknowledgeandawaytoitssolution.TheycriticisealltheoriesofknowledgewhicharebasedonKant’slineofthought,inordertoshowthatalongthisroadnosolutionoftheproblemofknowledgecaneverbefound.Itis,however,duetothefundamentalspade-workwhichVolkelthasdoneinhisthoroughexaminationoftheconceptofexperience,1toacknowledgethatwithouthispreliminarylabourstheprecisedetermination,whichIhavehereattemptedoftheconceptoftheGivenwouldhavebeenverymuchmoredifficult.However,wearecherishingthehopethatwehavelaidthefoundationsforouremancipationfromtheSubjectivismwhichattachestoalltheoriesofknowledgethatstartfromKant.Webelieveourselvestohaveachievedthisemancipationthroughshowingthatthesubjectiveform,inwhichthepictureoftheworldpresentsitselftotheactofcognition,priortoitselaborationbyscience,isnothingbutanecessarystageoftransitionwhichisovercomeintheveryprocessofknowledgeitself.Forus,experience,so-called,whichPositivismandNeo-Kantianismwouldliketorepresentastheonlythingwhichiscertain,ispreciselythemostsubjectiveofall.Indemonstratingthis,wealsoshowthatObjectiveIdealismistheinevitableconclusionofatheoryofknowledgewhichunderstandsitself.ItdiffersfromthemetaphysicalandabsoluteIdealismofHegelinthis,thatitseeksinthesubjectofknowledgethegroundforthediremptionofrealityintogivenexistenceandconcept,andthatitlooksforthereconciliationofthisdivorce,notinanobjectiveworld-dialectic,butinthesubjectiveprocessofcognition.Thepresentwriterhasalreadyoncebeforeadvocatedthispointofviewinprint,viz.,intheOutlinesofaTheoryofKnowledge(BerlinandStuttgart,1885).However,thatbookdiffersessentiallyinmethodfromthepresentessay,anditalsolackstheanalyticreductionofknowledgetoitsultimateelements.

ErfahrungundDenken,KritischeGrundlegungderErkenntnistheorie,vonJohannesVolkelt(HamburgundLeipzig,1886).↑

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Title: ThephilosophyofspiritualactivityAuthor: RudolfSteiner(1861–1925) InfoEditor: HarryCollison(1868–1945) InfoTranslator: AgnesWinifredTuckerHoernlé(1885–

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Translator: ReinholdFriedrichAlfredHoernlé(1880–1943)

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