ajax applications : a blueprint for disaster

Ajax Applications : A Blueprint for Disaster

Bryan Sullivan, Security Program ManagerMicrosoft

Originally developed with Billy Hoffman, Hewlett Packard

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General Ajax Security Issues

• Increased attack surface• Direct API access• Easier to reverse-engineer• Amplifies web attacks• Offline attacks

…in theory…

Theory put to the test

• Ajax application built using “expert” advice

• Books• Blogs• Conferences

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DEMONSTRATIONHacker Vacations

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Lessons learned

1. You cannot control client-side code2. Don’t store secrets in client-side code3. Don’t let client-side code perform

authentication/authorization functions4. Don’t expose admin functionality5. Remember web application security basics6. Exercise caution when converting data to

HTML on the client

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PATTERNS AND ANTIPATTERNSAjax Security

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Antipattern 1: Domino Effect

holdSeat

makeOffer

chargeAccount

bookSeat

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Pattern 1: Polling Status Calls

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PerformLongOp

GetStatus

Antipattern 2: Holding Critical State on Client

• Script variables• Flash/Silverlight variables• Offline storage mechanisms• Local Shared Objects ie “Flash cookies”• Silverlight Isolated Storage• Hidden form fields• Cookies

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Pattern 2: Hold Critical State on Server

• Keep session state just like Web 1.0

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Antipattern 3: Single-call Authorization

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holdSeat

makeOffer

chargeAccount

Check authorization here

Pattern 3: Every-call Authorization

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holdSeat

makeOffer

chargeAccount

Check authorization here

…and here

…and here

Antipattern 4: Exposing Admin Libraries

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Pattern 4: Segregate Admin Libraries

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Use with care: Client-side Data Binding

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Conclusion

With great power comes great responsibility

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More resources

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My blog:http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/

My alias:bryansul