06. connected car cyber security _ gil litichever
Post on 27-Nov-2015
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Feasible Car Cyber
Protection
Gil Litichever
CEO, Arilou
About Arilou
A team of cyber security experts experienced in
Embedded cyber security
Mission critical systems
Attack and protect perspectives
Dedicated high end security systems
Security integration into existing systems
The modern car
Sophisticated and computerized
Decentralized electronic system
Usually consists of dozens of computers (ECUs – electronic
control units) and sensors
New functionalities – hundreds MBs of code
Connected by one or more network segments
Autonomous cars
The modern car
CAN bus protocol
A protocol from the 80’s
Very simple
Not secured in any manner
Priority according to ID
Who is the sender?
Known attacks
Disable an automotive using the internet
Attack using wireless tire pressure sensors
Attack using On-Star
Attack using the infotainment system – gain control over
the vehicle
Attack motivation
Access to the automotive internal communication network
Public safety
Car theft
Personal data theft
Extortion
Damaging competitors’ business and reputation
Chip tuning
…
Infotainment Hack
internet
Hacking a system
Protection overview
• HSM
Evita
• Encryption schemes
• Intrusion detection system - IDS
Battelle, SWRI
CAN bus firewall
A rule based CAN bus Firewall
Whitelist
Rate limit
Architecture
As general rule does not require redesign of ECU’s software or
vehicle’s network
Connected Car – V2X
• Inherent communication interface with other vehicles and
infrastructure
Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments - WAVE
Based on 802.11p (Wi-Fi) and IEEE 1609
• Two layers of protection:
Protect the medium (part of IEEE 1609)
Protect the vehicle from “legal” messages
Propagating virus
IEEE 1609
• IEEE 1609 – standards for a communication – the high
communication layer of WAVE
1609.1 -Resource Management
1609.2 -Security Services for Applications and Management
Messages
1609.3 -Networking Services
1609.4 -Multi-channel Operation
V2X medium protection
• Covered by 1609
Based on encryption and authentication using certificates
• Incomplete – still there are problems:
Anyone can communicate with the vehicle, how do we know
it is really the vehicle in front of us
Hacking the infrastructure
Propagating virus – hostile vehicle
Vehicle protection from V2X
• Not in the standard
• V2X as a medium for generic non legal messages
• Damage from “legal” messages
Example: A vehicle following another vehicle
When manual override is too late
Questions?
top related