1 American Grand Strategy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Jonathan Rynhold Bar-Ilan University Rynhold@biu.ac.il American Political Science Association Annual ConferenceWashington DC2014 Please do NOT cite this paper without permission Abstract ThedebateoverUSpolicytowardsIsraelandthepeaceprocessisusuallyframed without explicit reference to American grand strategy. This is so despite the fact that approachestothisissuerestimplicitlyonbroaderpreferencesrelatedtoUSgrand strategy. One of the goals of this paper is to make this relationship explicit. As such, it demonstratesthatproponentsofanassertivegrandstrategytendtoviewIsraelasa strategicassetandresolvingtheArab-Israeliconflictasunimportant,while proponentsofacautiousgrandstrategytendtotheoppositeconclusions.Thepaper thenanalyzesthesegrandstrategies'approachestotheconflictinempiricalterms. Here it argues that while Israel is an asset, the peace process cannot be ignored. These insights are then drawn together in the form of a third 'centrist' grand strategy which, it is concluded, provides a better foundation for approaching the Arab-Israeli conflict. 2 American Grand Strategy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Introduction Since 9/11 the Middle East has been at the center of American foreign policy arousing greatcontroversy.DespitethefactthatpublicsympathyforIsraelhasrisentonew heights since 9/11, this consensus evaporates when it comes to US policy towards the peace process.1 This is not new. There has been a long standing debate concerning the roleofIsraelinAmericanforeignpolicystrategicassetorliabilityadebatethat goes back to the earliest days of the Cold War.2 With the demise of the Soviet Union andtheriseofthepeaceprocessinthe1990s thatdebatewaned,butthecollapseof thepeaceprocessin2000andthe9/11terrorattacksreignitedthecontroversy.This debateisusuallyframedwithoutexplicitreferencetoAmericangrandstrategy.This issodespitethefactthatapproachestothisissuerestimplicitlyonbroader preferences related to US grand strategy. One of the goals of this paper is to make this relationshipexplicitbydemonstratingtheconnectionbetweenthespecificdebateof USpolicytoIsraelandthepeaceprocesstothewiderdebateoverAmericangrand strategy. Sowhatisgrandstrategyandwhyisitimportant?Grandstrategyinvolvesaself-conscious identification and prioritization of foreign policy goals and a selection of a plan and the appropriate instruments such as military power or diplomacyto achieve those goals. It begins with theories about how the world works and what ought to be theroleofone'sstateinthatworld.3Assuch,grandstrategyservestoframeUS policy,thoughitdoesnotdetermineit.Grandstrategyshiftsandapproachestothe Middle East change in response to a variety of external factors, including the policies pursuedbythepartiestotheconflicttowardseachotherandtowardswiderUS interestsintheregion4,aswellas,widershiftsintheregionalpoliticalandstrategic configuration. But these externalities rarely carry an unequivocal message they need tobeinterpretedandgrandstrategyconstitutesanimportantpartoftheframework though which these things are interpreted and translated into practical policies. The paper begins by outlining US strategic interests in the Middle East. In then goes ontopresenttworivalgrandstrategiesandtheirattendantapproachestoIsraeland 3 the Arab-Israeli conflict. Each of these is an ideal-type that has been distilled from the academic,intellectualandpoliticaldiscourseonthesubject.Thegoalhereisto demonstratehowaxiomsonthelevelofgrandstrategyinformapproachestothe conflict. Specifically, it is demonstrated that proponents of an assertive grand strategy tendtoviewIsraelasastrategicasset,andresolvingtheArab-Israeliconflictas unimportant,whileproponentsofacautiousgrandstrategytendtotheopposite conclusions. The paper then analyzes these grand strategies' approaches to the conflict inempiricalterms.HereitarguesthatwhileIsraelisastrategicasset,thepeace processcannotbeignored.Theseinsightsarethendrawntogetherintheformofa third'centrist'grandstrategywhichitisconcluded,providesabetterfoundationfor approaching the Arab-Israeli conflict. US Strategic Interests in the Middle East Since1945therehasbeenagreatdealofconsensusregardingcoreUSstrategic interestsintheMiddleEast.DuringtheColdWar,thecoreAmericanstrategic interest was to contain the Soviet Union. Contrary to popular perceptions, the US has never been dependent on Middle Eastern oil, but the region was still of great strategic significance, because it was the main source of oil to US allies in Western Europe and Asia.TheconcernwasthatiftheUSSRoritsalliesgainedcontrolofalarge proportion of these resources they could have used it to pressure US allies to become neutral.Simultaneously,theUSalsohadacoreinterestinpreventingregional conflictsinvolvingUSandSovietalliesliketheArab-Israeliconflict--escalating intoadirectmilitaryconfrontationbetweenthesuperpowers;especiallyassuchit might lead to a nuclear exchange. Following the end of the Cold War, theUS no longer had to worry about containing theSovietUnionortheescalationtoaglobalnuclearconfrontation.Moreover,itis becominglessdependentonforeignoil.In2005,theUSimported65%ofitsoil requirements,by2013thishadfallento40%andthisfigureisprojectedtofall significantly,with somepredicting that the US will not need to important any oil by 2030.Asof2012onlyaboutaquarterofallAmerica'soilimportshailfromthe Middle East.5 4 Nonetheless,MiddleEasternenergyresourcesremainofvitalimportancetotheUS. Theglobalizationofoilmarketshasmadethequestionofwhobuysandsellsa particular barrel of oil less relevant. US energy security depends on sufficient supplies totheglobaleconomy.BecausetheUSdrawsenergyresourcesfromtheglobal marketplace, any threat to the stability of that marketplace is a threat to the US.6 The Middle East has the majority of proven oil reserves in world, as well as nearly half of the world's natural gas reserves.7 Despite a projected doubling of renewable energy by 2035, the share of fossil fuels in the world energy mix is projectedto fall a mere 7% from82%to75%.8Therefore,theassuredsupplyofoiltotheglobaleconomy remainscritical.Byextension,theUSretainsastrategicinterestinpreventingany hostile power from gaining control over a large enough share of the region's oil so as they could then use oil revenues to threaten and challenge the US.9

Furthermore,since9/11ithasbecomeamajorstrategicprioritytopreventterrorist attacks on the US by radical (primarily Islamist) forces from the region. Most, though bynomeansall,alsoarguethatitisveryimportanttopreventtheproliferationof weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons, to such groups and otherforceshostiletotheUS.10SuchproliferationcouldnotonlythreatentheUS directly but also indirectly, as the use of WMD in the Middle East could threaten the assured supply of oil to the worldeconomy.This threat has beenaptlycharacterized as the 'equivalent of a doomsday machine strapped to the global economy.'11 While there has been a consensus regarding most of these strategic interests, there has been significant disagreement about how to advance them in practice. This debate has been implicitly informed by different grand strategies. Below, the connection between these strategies and approaches to Israel and the peace process is made explicit. US Grand Strategy, Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict12 The conventional way of differentiating grand strategies is by whether they are realist andliberal,orbythedegreeofinternationalengagementinternationalismverses isolationism.Butthesedistinctionsdonotconstitutethepertinentdividinglinesin this instance. Indeed, each of the grand strategies identified here has both a liberal and a realist version. Rather here grand strategies are delineated in terms of the dichotomy betweencautionandassertionwhich,inturn,ismeasuredacrossthefollowingfour 5 dimensions:a)thepreferreddegreeofinternationalengagementandcommitmentto allies, b) preferences regarding the required balance between 'hard power' i.e. military force verses 'soft power' i.e. diplomatic engagement, c) whether international relations isprimarilyaboutrationalmaterialinterestspursuedbynation-statesorwhether ideationalfactorssuchasextremistideologiesandregimetypearemoresignificant, andd)whether'blowback'isacentraldynamicininternationalrelations.Thetheory of'blowback'assertsthatwhenastateactsinanassertivemannerand/orwhenit intervenesmilitarilythisgenerateastrongcounter-balancingand/ornationalist backlash.Noassertivenessandintervention,nomajorhostility.13Thisisthemost important parameter. AsforapproachestoIsrael/Arab-Israeliconflict,theyaredelineatedbytheanswers theygivetothreemainquestions:i)IsIsraelviewedasastrategicassetorasa liability? ii) What should America's position be regarding the conflict: even-handed or favoroneoftheparties?iii)Whatlevelofstrategicpriorityisassignedtoresolving theArab-Israeliconflict?Specifically,doesanapproachadheretothedoctrineof 'linkage'ornot?Accordingtothe'linkage'14doctrine,theArab-Israeliconflictisthe lynchpinofregionalinstabilityandanti-AmericanismintheMiddleEastand therefore US energies should be focused on resolving the conflict in such a way as to satisfytheArabside.Toalargedegree,positioningonthefirsttwodimensions depend on the answer to this question. The Cautious Grand Strategy - Retrenchment Acautious,defensivegrandstrategyissupportedbyavarietyofgroups.These include libertarians, paleoconservatives, and many realist inclined policy-makers like Scowcroft, Brzezinski, Powell and Hagel, as well as many academic realists, such as StephenWalt.Withinthisschool,RealistsandLiberalsdifferregardingtheissueof whether theUS should adopt a more unilateral or multilateral strategy, aswell as on USstrategytowardsinternationalorganizationsandthepromotionofHumanRights abroad.Somearestronglyisolationist,butmostfavorcontinuedUSinternational engagementthoughofamorelimitednaturethanthatatpresent;onewithless alliancecommitments and less deployment of the US militaryabroad. Theyare very reluctanttointervenemilitarilytoconfrontundemocraticregimes,preferringto engagethemdiplomatically.Indeed,thedreadofgettingboggeddownandbeing 6 over-stretchediscentraltotheiroutlookanditisevidentintheWeinbergerand Powell doctrines, which severely circumscribed the terms under which the US would commit military forces abroad to combat.15 For them, the Vietnam War is a powerful symbol. The lessons of Vietnam, especially the Tet offensive of 1968, are understood asdemonstratingthestrategicfutilityofmilitaryinterventionism,forwhiletheUS wonmanybattlesmilitarilyincludingTet,itwasthewillingnessofitsindigenous nationalistopponenttosuffergreaterlossesthatultimatelydeterminedthecourseof thewar.16Thelogicbehindthisfordefensiverealistsstemsfromabeliefinthe centralityofthelogicofthecounter-balancingblowback--ininternational relations.Fromtheirperspectivethisdynamichasbeencompoundedfollowingthe endoftheCold War,bythegulfinpowerbetweenAmericaandotherstates,which has lead other countries to be especially fearful of America. Against this background, defensiveRealistsadvocatethatdirectUSinterventionabroadshouldbeextremely limited.17 Aside from this, defensive Liberals in particular put a positive emphasis of thepowerofdiplomatic,economicandculturalengagementtobuildpeaceby redressing grievances.18 The Cautious Grand Strategy's Approach towards Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflictIsolationistsadvocateacompleteUSwithdrawalfromtheMiddleEast.Theyargue thatregionalsecuritywilltakecareofitselfasstateswillnaturallytendtowardsa regionallybasedbalanceofpowerbasedonmutualdeterrence.19Defensiverealists are less sanguineabout the automatic operation of the balance of power.As a result, they argue the US should continue to deploy its forces in the region 'offshore' i.e. on aircraftcarriers,andonlyinterveneinthelastresortifthebalanceofpower collapses.20Theassumptionhereisthatrationalnationalinterestsrelatedto maintaining national sovereignty and state security predominate and that consequently radicalIslamismdoesnotrepresentanover-archingthreattotheUS21.Instead,they posit that while America had discreet conflicts of interests with a varietyof different actorsintheMiddleEast,thevastmajoritycanbehandledbypolitical accommodation,includinganuclearIran.22Whatunitestheseactorsandturnsthem intoenemiesoftheUSisnotreligionorideology,but'blowback'from American interventionintheMiddleEast23,includingthestationingofUStroopsinSaudi Arabia, the Iraq war24, and critically support for Israel25. 7 USsupportforIsraelisdeemedcriticalamongthesefactorsbecausesupportersofa cautious grand strategy are drawn to the 'linkage' doctrine that asserts the Arab-Israeli conflictisthelynchpingalvanizingotherwisedesperatesourcesofinstabilityand anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Belief in 'blowback' does not necessitate belief in'linkage'.Butlinkagefollowsasimilarlogictoblowbackandforforeign-policy generalistswhosupportacautiousgrandstrategyandwhodonotknowtheMiddle Eastintimately,theprevalenceofIsraelinAmericanpolitics,Westernmediaand Arabrhetoricinclinesthemtoacceptthecorepremiseoflinkage.Fromthis perspectiveIsraelisobviouslyastrategicliability.26Onthisview,America's commitment to the Jewish state constitutes an external intervention in the Middle East thatarousesArabnationalistrageand'blowback'againsttheUS.RemoveAmerican supportand/ortheArab-IsraeliconflictandthethreattotheUSdissipates.27As Scowcroftputit,'It[theIsraeli-Palestinianconflict]createsasenseofgrievanceand hatredforusandatsomepointthechickenswillcomehometoroost.'28Asmall minority, libertarians,29 focus on the first part of the equation removing support for Israelandwithdrawingintoisolationism.Butformostthefocusisonconflict resolution.AsBillClinton'sNationalSecurityAdvisorSandyBergerwrotein2012, 'There is perhaps no more intractable,yet vital, issue in US foreignpolicyNone of these challenges [the threat of a nuclearIran, the Syrian civil war, the rise of China] meansthatIsraeli-Palestinianpeaceislessimportantnow.Indeed,itismore important.'30Fordefensivelyinclinedliberalsthislogicisreinforcedbytheir foundational belief in the power of diplomacy to assuage grievances that will lead to conflict resolution. Whilemanyproponentsofretrenchmentopposethe'specialrelationshipwithIsrael' andaidtotheJewishstate31,otherswouldseektomaketherelationshipconditional on Israeli acceptance of their terms for conflict resolution.32 They think that resolving theArab-IsraeliconflictshouldbethetoppriorityofUSpolicytowardstheMiddle East.33In this vein, they believe that the US shouldadopt an 'even-handed' approach totheArab-Israeliconflict,whichinpracticemeansfocusingUSpressureonIsrael, which they tend to believe will lead to conflict resolution. This involves the creation ofaPalestinianstate,largelyirrespectiveofitsinternalnatureanditsunderlying approachtoreconciliationwithIsrael,whichispresumablywhymanyadvocate includinganunreconstructedHamasinthediplomaticprocess.34 AsaCenterfor 8 American Progress report put it: ''For all of the institutional problems and corruption of the Palestinian Authority, the core of the problem remains the Israeli occupation.'35

The Assertive Grand Strategy - Primacy Amongtheproponentsofanassertivegrandstrategyareseveralgroupsincluding: neoconservatives,populistnationalistsandliberalhawks.Theydisagreeaboutthe degreetowhichtheUSshouldpromoteaUS-ledworldorderbasedondemocracy andHumanRights.Butcritically,theyshareacommitmenttoanassertive internationalistgrandstrategy.Theyaremoreinclinedtointerveneinorconfront undemocraticadversaries,whetherforidealisticorsecurity-basedreasons,thanto engagethemandtheybelieveintheutilityofhardpowerandassertivenessin InternationalRelations.Theirfocusonhardpowerisbasedonasensethatsome conflictscannotbebridgedbydiplomacyduetotheideologicalortheological character of the adversary in question. In other words, unlike advocate of the cautious strategy, they do not think that the logic of nationalism and state interests captures the essenceofInternationalRelations.WhereasVietnamisthehistoricallesson emphasized by defensively inclined strategists, avoiding Munich-style appeasement is the historical lesson emphasized by this group.36 ThisassertivestrategyisinclinedtoseeIsraelasastrategicassetfortwomain reasons.First,theytendtoviewtotalitariananti-democraticideologiesasposingan overarchingthreattotheUnitedStates:FascismandNazisminWorldWarII, Marxist-LeninismintheColdWarandradicalIslaminthe21stCentury.37Inthis sense, the fact that the US and Israel share common democratic values leads them to alsosharecommonenemiesandthussharecorecommonstrategicinterests.38As such,Israel'sfightagainstterrorismisthesame asAmerica'sfightagainstterrorism. IsraelivictoriesagainstterrorismareAmericanvictoriesagainstterrorism,whilea defeatforIsraelwouldbeadefeatfortheUS.39Forsome,supportforIsraelasa democracyisalsopartofawiderprojectofexpandingaUS-leddemocraticworld order. In addition, Israel is the strongest military power in the Middle East and it has provenwillingtoactinanassertivemanner,andsincetheygreatlyvaluemilitary power and assertiveness, this inclines them to value Israel as a strategic asset. (That is nottosaythattheysupporteveryIsraelipolicy,indeedtheycameoutveryfirmly against Israel arms sales to China, though that issue has now been resolved).40 9 Equally,adherentsofassertionrejectthedoctrineoflinkage.Ingeneral,theyview anti-Americanismandinstabilityasstemmingfromradicalideologiesandregimes, notfromUSactionstheyrejectblowback.41Thus,theyaredeeplyskepticalofthe valueofdiplomaticallyengagingundemocraticregimes.Indeed,eveninthe1990s, they argued that Arab dictators would misconstrue Israel's willingness to compromise asweaknessandtheywouldthenexploitit.Indeed,America'sembraceofthepeace processremindedthemoftheappeasementofdictatorsinthe1930s.42Fromtheir perspective Israel should not compromise until the Arabs side accepted its legitimacy recognitionofIsraelasaJewish(anddemocratic)state;otherwiseanyconcession wouldjustputtheArabsideinabetterpositiontoweakenAmerica'smostreliable ally. Moreover, without democratization, they feared that any peace Israel made with one dictator might be overturned by his successor. In other words, genuine ideational changeandregimechangeareviewedasprerequisiteforpeace.Consequently, internal democratic reforms in the Palestinian Authority are more important for peace andsecuritythandiplomaticnegotiationsbetweenIsraelandanunreformed Palestinian Authority.43 As a result, they argue that resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict should not be a central concern of US policy and in the meantime the US should lean heavily towards Israel in the Arab-Israeli arena, in order to back up its strongest, most reliableandmostdemocraticallyintheMiddleEast.Israelmustbeallowedto militarily defeat Islamist extremism and suicide terrorism when it rears its head. To do otherwisewouldconstituentappeasement.InthemeantimetheyarguethattheUS should support a steadfast Israeli stance based on deterrence. For some, once terrorism is defeated, this should be combined with US support a major unilateral civilian (not military) withdrawal from the West Bank to ensure Israeli democracy, combined with efforts to conduct democratic reform in the Palestinian Authority.44 Assessing Grand Strategies and Approaches to the Arab-Israeli ConflictInthissectionthevalidityofthecoresuppositionsbehindeachgrandstrategies approachtotheArab-Israeliconflictareexaminedempiricallyinthecontextofthe Middle East. The core suppositions that examined are a) whetherIsrael is a strategic asset; b) the validity of the 'linkage' doctrine; and c) whether, if linkage is wrong, the US should basically ignore the peace process, as the assertive strategy suggests. 10 Evidence for Israel being a Strategic Asset45 Unlike,mostofAmerica'salliesintheMiddleEast,Israelisdomesticallystable, militarilypowerfulandreliablypro-American.Whereas,theUShasdeployedits forcesdirectlyinthePersianGulfduetothelackofstrongreliableallies,inthe Levant,theUSisabletoremainessentiallyoffshoreduetoIsrael'spresence.46 Indeed,IsraelhastheabilityandreadinesstointervenemilitarilytoAmerica's advantageinthissphere.Forexample,in2007IsraeldestroyedasecretSyrian nuclearreactorthatwaspartofasecretweaponsprogram.AtthetimetheBush administration was constrained from actingmilitarily to prevent proliferation.47 On a smallerscaleIsraelsucceededinassassinatingtheHezbollahterroristMughniyah, who had more American blood on his hands than any terrorist apart from Bin Laden. Israelalsoprovidesimportantintelligence.Itsinnovativemethods,relative willingnesstoincurrisk,anditscultivationofuniquesources,meanthatitprovides addedvaluetotheUSthroughthesharingrawcommunicationsintercepts,andby providingintelligenceregardingterroristtargets.Thus,Israeliinformationassisted UNinspectorstodismantleIraq'sWMDprogramanditalsohelpedtouncover RussiansupportforIran'snuclearprograminthe1990s.Inthe21stCenturytheUS andIsraelhaveco-operatedtosabotagetheIraniannuclearprogrambyintroducing computervirusessuchasStuxnetintothecomputernetworksrunningIrans enrichmentprogram.ThesejointeffortsarebelievedtohavedelayedtheIranian nuclear program by several years. Israel also helped disrupt Hezbollah smuggling and arms-procurementringsandsleepercellsthatwereoperatingintheUnitedStates. Furthermore,itprovidedinformationthathelpedtoleadtothearrestofsuspects wanted for the 1998 al-Qaeda bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.48 A leaked, highly classified, NSA memo from April 2013 concluded that,'Benefits to the U.S. [of working with Israeli intelligence] include expanded geographic access to highprioritySIGINTtargets,accesstoworld-classIsraelicryptanalyticandSIGINT engineering expertise, and access to a large pool of highly qualified analysts NSAs cyber partnerships [with Israel] have resulted in unprecedentedaccessand collection breakthroughsthatbothsidesacknowledgewouldnothavebeenpossibletoachieve without the other.'49 11 The US also benefits from Israel's battlefield experience. The countries Special Forces train together and Israeli techniques in counter-terrorism have been applied by the US. Forexample,theIsraeliapproachtointegratinghumanandtechnologicalcollection meansandweaponsplatformsprofoundlyinfluencedtheUSapproachinIraq, Afghanistan,PakistanandYemen.TheemploymentofIsraelimethodsreducedUS casualties in an urban environment by deploying thousands of Israeli designed add-on armortotheirarmoredvehiclesandbyusingtrainedofdogstodetectbombs.The latterwascriticalinreducingdeathsfromimprovisedexplosivedevices,whichhad been the main cause of US casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, in the field of homeland security,Israel has helped theUS with infrastructure protection, airport security,cybersecurityandemergencyplanningandresponse.Tensofthousandsof Americans have been trained in these various techniques.50 IsraeliresearchanddevelopmentinmilitarytechnologyalsobenefittheUS,for exampleinthefieldofmissiledefense,whereIsraelistheUS'smostsophisticated andexperiencedpartner,helpingtodeveloptheArrowsIIIwhichismoreadvanced andcapablethatanythingtheUShas.Israelisalsoapioneerinthefieldofcyber defense/warfareandatthecuttingedgeofproducingroboticsystemsforuseatland and sea. Many of the best Israeli firms partner with firms in the US as well as having factories in the US. Against this background, the US has greatly increased its military purchasesfromIsrael,whichranat$300millionayearinthe1990scomparedto about$1.5billioninthedecadeafter9/11.ThisincludesUAVs,airbornedefense targetingpods,precisionair-to-groundmunitions,helmetmountedsights,and battlefieldintelligenceandsurveillancesystems.Inthelonger-runIsraeli technologicalinnovationinthefieldofenergyconservation--theelectriccar,solar energyandwindpower--mayhelptheUSstrategicallybyreducingtheimportance of Middle Eastern oil to the global economy.51 Finally,althoughIsraelisthelargestrecipientofAmericanforeignaidsinceWorld War II, about three-quarters of that money is recycled because it must be spent inside the US. Moreover, aid has meant that the US has not had to deploy its own troops to protect Israel in stark contrast to the far larger costs the US bears for deploying troops todefendalliessuchasSouthKoreaorintheGulf.52Inanycase,ifitcametoit, Israel could do without US aid, which constitutes less than 1% of GDP and about 20% 12 ofthedefensebudget.Overallthen,astrongcasecanbemadethattherelationship withIsraelbenefitstheUSinsignificantways.Indeed,mostcriticsofthespecial relationship do not deny that such benefits exist, rather they claim that the benefits are outweighedbypoliticalcostsbecausesolongastheArab-Israeliconflictremains unresolved,USsupportforIsraelconstitutesthemainsourceofregionalinstability andanti-AmericanismintheMiddleEast.Thispositionthelinkagedoctrineis critically examined, below. LinkageInstability First,intermsofcasualties,theArab-Israeliconflicthasnotbeenclosetobeingthe bloodiestconflictintheMiddleEast.SincetheendoftheColdWar,thedeathtoll from the conflict has been in the thousands, compared to the hundreds of thousands in each of the conflicts in Darfur, Algeria and Iraq, respectively.53 In fact, three years of civilwarinSyrialedtomoredeathsthanahundredyearsoftheArab-Israeli conflict.54 Second,therehavebeennumerousterritorialconflictsintheregionthatthreaten stability, some ofwhichhave disruptedenergy supplies that have nothingdirectly to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict, for example the conflicts between: Arabs and Blacks inMauritania;MoroccoandtheWesternSahara;YemenandEritrea;Iranand Bahrain;theAlgeriancivilwar;internalconflictsinEgypt,Iraq,LibyaandSaudi Arabia; Sudan and its Darfur province; and the Kurdish question which spans Turkey, IranIraqandSyria.OftheelevenmajorscenarioswhichAnthonyCordesman's evaluatedasposingamajorthreattoenergysourcesintheMiddleEast,onlythree related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.55

Third,aswitnessedintheArabHumanDevelopmentReportsamajorcauseofthe region's instability is its failed political, economic and social development.56 Virtually all states in the region face major problems with population growth and creating jobs. Virtually all have had a high degree of authoritarianism and weak or failed economic development.AccordingtoFreedomHouse,theArabMiddleEastistheleast democratic region in the world. Despite oil revenue, the region's GDP is the lowest in world outside sub-Saharan Africa.57 The repressive nature of these regimes, combined 13 withtheirfailuretodealwiththeseproblemschallengestheirlegitimacy,asbecame glaring obvious in the Arab Spring. Solving these problems requires a process social, domestic social, political and economic reform that has nothing directly to do with the Israel or the Arab-Israel conflict. Fourth, despite the failure to fully settle the Palestinian issue, a number of Arab states thathavenotasyetsignedpeacetreatieswithIsraelhavequietlydevelopedquasi-diplomaticandintelligencetieswiththeJewishstate,primarilybecausethey,along with Egypt and Jordan, view themselvesas sharingan over-arching strategic interest vis-a-vis Iran and its allies.58 Thus in 2006, Saudi Arabia lent tacit support to Israel in its war against Hezbollah by being the first Arab state to publicly condemn Nasrallah during the Second Lebanon War.59

Anti-AmericanismUS policy towardsIsrael and the Arab-Israeli conflict is not the driving force behind anti-AmericanismintheMiddleEast.Themostanti-AmericanactorsintheMiddle East, such as Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Qaeda oppose theUSprimarilyforideologicalreasons.TheyviewAmericaastheembodimentof Westernliberalvaluestheyopposeandwhosematerialsuccesstheyfind humiliating.60 Both Khomeini and Bin Laden viewed the US as the only serious force preventing the spread of Islam.61 On this basis Islamists have opposed the US because AmericawasviewedasthekeyexternalbackerofthedictatorialsecularArab regimes that they sought to overthrow.62 Thus, Al Qaeda is not primarily interested in thePalestiniansandinanycaseitwouldnotacceptanytypeofpeacewithIsrael. Indeed, the 9/11 attacks were planned at the height of the Oslo process.63 As even an advocate of the 'Israel as a strategy liability' doctrine admitted, a change of US policy on Palestine would not stop terrorism against the US.64 Second, the claim that Arab public opinion on US policy towards Palestine is a major factorpreventingAmerica'sAraballiesfromsupportingUSpolicyisgreatlyover-stated.Tobeginwith,supportforIsraelisnotthemostimportantsourceofanti-American attitudes among the Arab public. Polls suggest that the Palestinian issue and USsupportforIsraelweresignificant,butbynomeansexclusive,factorsbehind theseanti-Americanattitudes.Inparticular,negativesentimentsspikedsharplyasa 14 resultofotherpost-9/11developments:thedetentionsatGuantanamoBay,the invasionsofAfghanistanandIraq,andtheAbuGhraibscandalandotherabuses. Negative sentiments were also sustained by perceived US hostility towardIslam and continuingUSsupportforunpopularArabautocrats.However,Arabpublicsalso disapproved of American foreign policy during the Clinton administrations intensive effortstosupportthePalestinianAuthorityandbrokertheestablishmentofan independentPalestinianstate.'65Moreover,Palestinehasnotbeenthemainissue drivingpublicdemonstrations.Thus,80%ofanti-Americanpublicprotestsinthe Arabworld2000-05,atthepeakoftheSecondintifada,weretriggeredbyalocal issue unrelated to the Arab-Israeli conflict.66 Tellingly, the massive Arab uprisings of 20112012inTunisia,Egypt,Yemen,andBahrain,andthesmallerbutstill significantdemonstrationselsewhereintheregionweredrivenbydomesticissues, nottheArab-Israeliconflict,andtherewasvirtuallynosignofanti-Americanismin those demonstrations. Mostsignificantly,USsupportforIsraelhasnotsubstantiallyaffectedthesubstance of America's relationship with its Arab and Muslim allies, except for UN votes which arelargelysymbolic.Thereisnoevidencethatthesecountrieswithheldsupportfor US efforts to contain Iraq, fight al Qaeda or contain Iran.In fact, since the turn of the millenniumUSexportstotheMiddleEasthavereachedanall-timehigh.67In contrast,itwasinthemid-1990s,whenthepeaceprocesswasinfullflight,thatthe SaudiscutbacktheirsupportforUSduetoSaudifearsregardingUSpolicytoIran andIraq,aswellasdomesticconcerns.68Whereas,in2004,whenthepeaceprocess wasatadead-end,Saudipolicyshiftedtowardsgreaterco-operationwiththeUSin the war against terror, because they came to the conclusion that appeasing extremists had failed to protect them from domestic terrorism.69

The Arab-Israeli Conflict and US Strategic interests: Beyond LinkageDespite the fact that tight 'linkage' does not exist, it does not follow that the US has no importantinterestsatstakeintheArab-Israeliconflict.Tobeginwith,theUShasa majorstrategicinterestinconflictmanagement;thatis,preventingtheescalationof the conflict so that it does not become a regional war that could threaten the supply of oil to the global economy and possibly result in the use of WMD.This is recognized in principle even by adherents ofan assertive grand strategy; though in practice they 15 often believe that the US interest is best served by allowing Israel to militarily defeat theircommonenemies.Indeed,theydohaveapoint.Noneofthewarssince1973 haveescalatedtotheregionallevel.Allhavebeencontained,despitethefactthat someliketheSecondIntifadawhenIsraeldefeatedsuicideterrorism,involveda significant number of casualties and lasted for years. Second,inanycase,theUSoftenhasaninterestinpursuingapeaceprocess,even whenthereislittlechanceofreachingafinalstatusagreementbecausenegotiations can assist in conflict management by preventing the development of a vacuum, which can be exploited by extremists to mobilize for violence. As such a diplomatic process canhelptoputradicalanti-Americanforcesonthebackfoot.Obviously,whilethis hasvalueasatactic,itcannotbemorethanthatintheabsenceoftheparties themselvesbeingwillingtomoveforward.Inaddition,increasingactivityonthe peaceprocesscanhelpgiveArabstatesafigleafforsupportingcontroversialUS actions in the region, such as the 1991 and 2003 wars against Iraq. Third, while proponentsof assertiveness are correct to identifythe legitimacydeficit intheArabworldasanimportantconstraintonconflictresolution,especiallywith regard to Palestinian policy, the fact is that Israel's peace agreements with Egypt and Jordanhaveprovedremarkablyresilientnonetheless.Thisindicates,thatatthevery leastnotallArabactorspoliciesareprimarilydrivenbyideology;otherfactors notablyregimesurvivalarecriticallyimportant.AlreadyduringtheColdWar,pro-AmericanArabregimeslookedtotheUSprimarilytoprotectthemfromradical NasseriteforcesbackedtheSovietsthatsorttooverthrowtheirregimes.Inthe contemporary era, these pro-American regimes seek US support to protect them from Iran and radical Islamist groups who seek to overthrow them. In this regard they share a common interest with Israel. It is this which has led them to co-operate strategically withIsraelwhenithasconfrontedHamasandtheIranianbackedHezbollah.To combat this threat, they have proven willing to at least agree in principle to a two-state solutionpeacewithIsraelintheformoftheArabLeaguePeaceInitiative.Atthe minimumthisindicatesthattheywouldliketowinddowntheconflictsothatthey can concentrate on combatting the real threat to their regimes.The legitimacy deficit doesconstraintheirwillingnesstoactivelypromotethePalestinianconcessionsthat wouldberequiredtomatchtheIsraeliconcessionsneededforgenuineconflict 16 resolution.70Nonetheless,evenifcompleteconflictresolutionisnotpossible,the peace process can serve the interests of the US and its allies, through the advancement of partial or interim agreements. Fourth, the US has an interest in seeking to resolve the conflict in order to remove an importantsourceofinstabilityevenintheabsenceoflinkagesolongasany agreement serves to strengthen the regional position of America's allies at the expense of its enemies.Indeed, even if the conflict is not ripe for resolution, the US can take stepswhichpreservethepossibilityoffutureconflictresolution,forexampleby pressuringIsraelnottoexpandIsraelisettlements,especiallythosedeepinsidethe West Bank that have no prospect of being included in a territorial swap in the event of a peace deal (over three-quarters of the settlers live in blocs that constitute about 5% oftheWestBank).TheUScouldalsoenhancetheprospectsoffutureresolutionby defining and legitimizing a zone of negotiability to gradually help the parties sober up torealities.SuchmeasurescouldwellleadtopoliticalclasheswithIsraeli governments(andindeedthePalestinianAuthority).Thisdemonstratesthateven though Israel is a strategic asset in a general sense that does not at all mean that every IsraeliactionisintheUSinterest.Certainly,theUShasaninterestthananypeace agreementgenuinelyprovideforIsrael'ssecurity,sinceIsraelisecurityisgoodfor stabilityandIsraelipowerhelpstounderwriteapro-Americanbalanceofpower. However,Israelisettlementexpansionhaslittletodowithsecurityandservesto weakenpro-AmericanforcesonthePalestinianside.Thatisnottosaythat settlements are the main obstacle to a peace deal, they are not.71 But nonetheless, their expansiondetractsfromthestrategicvaluetheUSgainsfromIsrael.Israelileaders seem to have internalized this to some degree, thus even those hailing from the center-rightsuchasArielSharon,EhudOlmertandNetanyahuhaveprovenwilling,in principle, to make extensive compromises on the issues of territory and settlements.72 However, just because successful conflict resolution is an American interest, does not meanitisalwaysintheUSinteresttopursueitwithgreatvigor.Infact,the aggressivepursuitofacomprehensivefinalstatuspeacedeal,intheabsenceof ripeness,canbedetrimentaltoUSstrategicinterests.Ultimatelythekeyto implementingapeaceagreementsuccessfullylieswiththeparties.Ifthepartiesdo not'own'anagreementitwillcollapse.ForiftheUSraisesexpectationsby 17 vigorously pursuing a permanent status dealwhen the gaps between to the two sides areultimatelyunbridgeable,adangeroussituationcoulddevelop.Americanprestige will be damaged, violence could break out and escalate, and regional forces opposed to peace and the US will improve their political standing. To some extent, this can be saidtohavehappenedtotheUSonboththePalestinianandSyriantracksin2000. Forthisreason,mostadministrationshavefollowedthemaximrepeatedbyvarious SecretariesofStatesince1991namelythat,'TheUnitedStateswillremain intimately engaged in this process. We will do our part. But we cannot do your part as well.We cannot want peace more than you, the parties.'73

All of this indicates that there is a major approach to Israel and the Middle East peace processthatliessomewherebetweenthepolesofcautionandassertionoutlined above.Inthenextsection,thiscentristgrandstrategyanditsapproachtoIsraeland the peace process is laid out. A Centrist Grand Strategy Betweenthepolesofassertionandcautionisathirdcentristapproach,whichagain comesinRealist74andLiberal75varieties.CentristsfavortheUSmaintainingits globalleadershipandcontinueddeeplyengagementintheinternationalarena, includingthemaintenanceofitsextensivealliancenetworkanditsleadingrolein multilateralinstitutions.CentristsviewUSsecuritycommitmentsasadeterrent againsthostilestatescontemplatingexpansionandregionalhegemony.Theyalso view such commitments as reducing competition in key regions, by giving the US the abilitytoconstrainandreassureallies,therebyreducing,ratherthanincreasing,the risk of the US become entrapped in a regional war. At the same time, they think that US should promote greater burden-sharing among its allies and that it must prioritize its geo-strategic interests. In this sense, they advocate pivoting towards Asia. Centrists believe that the US must be able to project its power, that effective statecraft requirescredibilityregardingtheuseofforceandthatmilitaryresponsestocertain threatsareunavoidableandsometimesrequirepre-emption.Ontheotherhand,they also emphasize prudence and the need to recognize the limits of power, with the key being the ability to blend diplomacy and military power in 'statecraft' or 'smart power'. Centrists,especiallyliberalcentrists,believethattheadvancementofliberalgoals 18 must inform US foreign policy, including the promotion of democracy, human rights, freetrade,andpeace.However,theyareskepticalregardingtheabilityoftheUSto shape reality in its image by using military force or coercive diplomacy to bring about democratization,liberalization,successfulregimechangeortheresolution(as opposed to the management) of local/regional conflicts. All of this depends primarily onlocalactors.TheUScanandshouldusestatecrafttofacilitatesuchpositive changes where local conditions have potential, but it cannot impose change at will.76 Critically,centristsrejectthepremisethat'blowback'isthecentraldynamicin international relations in general and in the context of America's strategic position in the Post-Cold War era, in particular.77 For centrist realists the dominant logic remains rationalstateinterestsinsecurityandsurvival.Centristliberalsalsorecognizethe importance of such logic in constraining ideological regimes, but argue that ideational factorsarepowerfuldriversofactionespecially(thoughnotexclusively)among extremistnon-stateactors.Thisisamajorreasonwhycentristliberalsprioritize preventingtheproliferationofnuclearweaponstoradicalstates.Equally,centrist realists also prioritize this objective, though for slightly different reasons. As per their general skepticism regarding balancing, they are less sanguine than defensive realists that the nuclear balance and stable deterrence of the Cold War can be replicated in an environmentwithmultiplenuclearrivalries,whichincreasestheprobablyofillicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents and unforeseen crises.78 Centrism, Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflictJust as Centrists reject the blowback thesis with regard to American grand strategy, so theyalsoreject'linkage'withregardtotheMiddleEast.RathertheArab-Israeli conflictisviewedasoneofmanysourcesofinstabilityintheMiddleEast.Evenif Israeldidnotexist,theregionwouldremainveryunstableandanti-American,with thepowervacuumprobablyfilledbyanti-Americanradicals.79LiberalCentristsin particularviewradicalIslamandthelackofdemocracyanddevelopmentasmajor causesofregionalinstability.Butfromacentristperspectiveasawhole,Arab regimeslargelyshapetheirforeignpolicyaroundregimesurvival,independentof both American policy and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.80 19 AstheyseeitthegreatestthreattotheUSintheregionstemsfromanti-American radicals who are seeking to overturn the pro-American order in the Middle East. This means radical Sunni Islamists and especially Iran. Were radical anti-American forces to get control of a largeshare of oil resources or pose a threat to the supply of oil to theglobaleconomy,thiswouldconstituteamajorthreattotheUSandtheWest.In addition,allowingIrantoobtainnuclearweaponswouldbea'tippingpoint'that wouldleadtotheproliferationofnuclearweaponsintheMiddleEast.Againstthis background,Israelisperceivedasastrategicassetasitisthestrongestandmost reliable US ally in the region.81 This means that Centrists tend to lean towardsIsrael withregardtotheArab-Israeliconflict,especiallywhereitconcernsIsraelisecurity. Forsome,thispositionisreinforcedbyIsrael'sdemocraticcharacter,whichfitsin withtheirgoalofpromotingaUS-ledliberalinternationalorder.However,concern forIsrael'sdemocraticcharacteralsoinclinesthemtosupportthepeaceprocess,as wayforIsraeltoretainitsJewishanddemocraticcharacterinlightofthechallenge posedtothisbytheon-goingoccupation.Indeed,whileCentristsviewIsraelasa strategicasset,theirsupportforIsraelisnotasunequivocalasthatgivenby supporters of an assertive grand strategy. For Centrists, the alliance with Israel is also atoolforinfluencingIsraelibehaviorbyconstrainingIsraelorencouragingIsraelto make peace, as it is about taking advantage of Israeli power. Centriststhinkthatthepeaceprocessassistsinmanagingtheconflictbypreventing thedevelopmentofadangerousvacuumthatcouldleadtoaviolentescalation.82 Althoughtheyrejectlinkage,theybelievethatU.S.supportforthepeaceprocess weakensanti-Americanforcesintheregion,whileeasingco-operationwithArab allies.83ThoughforCentriststhatlogicflowsmorepowerfullyinthereverse direction. That is, containing radical forces in the region serves to facilitate the peace process by creating an environment that it more conducive to Arab moderates, while reducingIsraelisecurityconcernsrelatedtoterritorialconcessions.Yetwhilethey stronglyfavorheavyUSengagementinthepeaceprocess,theyopposetheideathat the US should seek to impose a settlement. From this perspective, even in a favorable regionalenvironment,thesuccessfulimplementationofanypeaceagreementis primarily dependent on the parties' themselves. Without their willingness, an imposed deal would be likely to unravel quickly with dire consequences. Still, they are willing topressureandprovideincentivestobothsides.Inthisconnection,aidto Israeland 20 thedevelopmentofthestrategicrelationshipbetweenthecountriesisdesignednot onlytostrengthenanallyagainstcommonenemies,butalsotoreassureIsraeland therebyencourage it to take therisks required tomake peace.84In parallel,theyalso advocate US aidand support for Palestinian moderates, such as the former moderate PalestinianAuthorityPrimeMinisterSalimFayyad,whoseeffortsfocusedonstate-building and good governance. AgoodexampleoftheCentristapproachduringtheColdWarwasKissinger diplomacy.Unlike Vietnam, Kissinger viewed the Middle East as an arena in which coreUSstrategicinterestswereatstake.Thesecoreinterestswerecontainingthe Soviet Union and its allies, and managing the Arab-Israeli conflict that is preventing itsescalationtoregionalwarthatcouldthreatenthesupplyofoiltotheglobal economyandpossiblyresultintheuseofWMD.InselectingUSregionalallies, Kissinger'spolicywasdictatedprimarilybyacalculationofthemilitarypowerand politicalreliabilityofastate,andnotbyconcernsaboutblowbackandlinkage. Whereas America's Arab allies were weak and unreliable, Israel proved itself to be the opposite.Israelwasastrategicasset,helpingtoassureapro-Americanbalanceof powerintheMiddleEast.Hence,followingIsrael'ssuccessfulinterventioninthe Jordancrisisin1970,USaidtoIsraelincreasedbyafactoroften.Kissingeralso suppliedIsraelwithweaponsinordertodemonstratetotheArabsidethatSoviet weapons would not enable them to achieve the return of their territory. Yet, Kissinger also viewed the growing strategic relationship with Israel as a means of influencingandconstrainingIsraelibehavior.AttheendoftheYomKippurWar Kissinger pressured Israel not to destroy the Egyptian Third Army, in order to prevent an escalation toa directsuperpower confrontation.Later, following theYom Kippur War, he opposed focusing on trying to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-IsraeliconflictbecauseitwouldprovideanopportunityforincreasedSoviet influence.Indoingso,herejectedthelinkagedoctrinewhichheldthatonlya comprehensive settlement of the conflict on Arab terms could limit Soviet influence. Instead, he opted to pursue interim agreement betweenIsrael and Egypt that allowed the US to play the central mediating role alone. Subsequently, as a result of heavy US pressure,IsraelpartiallywithdrewfromSinaiinreturnforanup-gradingofits strategic relations with the US. As a result the US secured several strategic interests. 21 First, Egypt switched sides in the Cold War, altering the balance of power in favor of the West. At the same time, Kissinger increased US strategic support for Israel, which preservedAmerica'sreputationasanally,whilefurtherenhancingthepro-American balance of power in the region. Second, Kissinger increased the prospects for conflict management by turning both Egypt and Israel into American clients dependent on US aidandweapons.ThisincreasedAmericanleverageandtheresultantdependencyof bothcountriesonUSmaterialmadeitverydifficultforthemtosustainanarmed confrontationagainsteach-otherintheabsenceofUSwillingnesstoresupplythem. FurthermorewithEgyptremovedfromtheequationtheprospectsofanothermajor Arab-Israeli war spreading to threaten the stability of the region receded dramatically. Inotherwords,whileKissinger'sapproachrejected'linkage',itnonethelessviewed the conflict as important both in terms of conflict management and asa factor in the widerMiddleEaststrategicequation.Israelwasviewedasastrategicasset,butthe strategic relationship was as much about the US gaining influence overIsrael policy, asaboutusingIsraelipowertoforwardUSinterestsagainstcommonenemies.The interimagreementsKissingerbrokeredwithIsraeldidnotleadtoacomprehensive peace or even a full bilateral peace, but they represent a critical step in that direction, and as such a major contribution towards the ultimate goal of conflict resolution. Conclusion The logic of different grand strategies engenders different approaches to Israel and the Arab-Israeliconflict.Atonepole,proponentsofanassertivegrandstrategyview Israel unequivocally as a strategic asset and they dismiss the peace process as at best irrelevant,andatworstappeasement.Attheotherpole,proponentsofacautious grand strategy are equally unequivocal in reaching diametrically opposed conclusions. Ithasbeenarguedabovethatthedoctrineof'linkage'thatdrivesthecautious approach, is wrong and that consequentlyIsrael is not inherentlya strategic liability, butratherastrategicassetasproclaimedbyproponentsoftheassertivestrategy. However,Israel'sstatusasanassetisnotquiteasunequivocalastheymakeout,in part because advancing the peace process is an American strategic interest, even if it is not the most important interest in the region. The grand strategy that represents this position is a centrist one lying between the poles of assertion and caution. 22 Criticsofthecentristapproachmightarguethatitsattempttochartamiddlecourse comesattheexpenseofclearprescriptions,leavingpolicytodrift.However,thisis notthecase.ThecentristapproachtotheMiddleEastenunciatesaclearsetof strategicprioritiesandpolicypreferences.Itdoesallowforawidermenuofpolicy options than the other two approaches, giving more room for events in the region and the policies pursued by local actors there to affect US calculations. Indeed, it requires muchgreaterattention to the intricacies of localpolitics in the Middle East.Delving into those intricacies would require a separate paper all to itself, so it cannot be dealt with here directly. By way of contrast, the danger inherent in the other two grand strategies is the pursuit ofapolicythatisover-determinedbygrandstrategicaxioms.Thesedangersare evident with regard to US policy towards Hamas. While US policy-makers differ as to thedegreetowhichHamasisanegativephenomenon,nobodyclaimsthat strengtheningHamasshouldbeagoalofUSpolicy.Yet,theunthinkingapplication of both assertive and cautious grand strategic axioms has led in that direction, albeit to different degrees. For the Bush administration democratization was a core principle of its assertive grand strategy. In 2006, it insisted that a Hamas affiliated list be allowed toruninPalestinianelections,theresultofwhichempoweredthatradicalterrorist organization.Meanwhile,theObamaadministrationhasadoptedacautiousgrand strategywhichhassoughttoengageIslamistsandkeepalidonregionalconflicts betweenpro-Westernandanti-Westernforces.Inthisspirit,JohnKerrysoughtto broker a ceasefire using pro-Hamas intermediaries Turkey and Qatar that would have givenintomanyofHamas'demandsandupgradeditsstatus.Followingprotestsby core US regional allies -- Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority and the Arab League itseemsthatKerryhasreversedcourse.85Inanycase,thepointisthatmore attentionneedstobepaidtothenexusbetweengrandstrategyandapproachesto regional conflicts such as the one examined in this paper. 23 1 See Jonathan Rynhold, Israel in American Political Culture (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 2 See for example, Camille Mansour, Beyond Alliance (Columbia University Press, 1993) chapters 1-2; A.F.K. Organski, The $36 billion Bargain (NY: Columbia University Press, 1990). 3 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 6; Peter Feaver, 'What is grand strategy and why do we need it?' Foreign Policy April 8, 2009 http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/08/what_is_grand_strategy_and_why_do_we_need_itAlso on American grand strategy see Henry Nau, Conservative Internationalism (Princeton University Press, 2014), and Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (Routledge, 2002).4 Jonathan Rynhold, 'The U.S. & the Middle East Peace Process: Conflict Management vs. Conflict Resolution' in E. Inbar & E. Gilboa Eds. U.S-Israeli Relations in a New Era (London: Routledge, 2009) pp. 140-157. 5 US Energy Information Administration, 'How dependent are we on foreign oil?' http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/energy_in_brief/foreign_oil_dependence.cfm 6 Anthony Cordesman & Khalid Al-Rodhan The Changing Dynamics of Energy in the Middle East (Greenwood, 2006); Daniel Yergin, 'Energy Security and Markets' in Jan Kalicki and David Goldwyn eds. Energy & Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005) 7 John Duffield, Over a Barrel: The Costs of US Foreign Oil Dependence (Stanford University Press, 2007); pp. 11-12, 52-56. 8 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2013: Executive Summary http://www.iea.org/media/executivesummaries/WEO_2013_ES_English_WEB.pdf9 Shibley Telhami, Understanding the Challenge Middle East Journal 56 (1), 2002. 10 Robert Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003): 45-82.11 Leon Fuerth, 'Energy, Homeland and National security' in Jan Kalicki and David Goldwyn eds. Energy & Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy (Johns Hopkins University Press 2005); Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan The Changing Dynamics of Energy in the Middle East (Greenwood, 2006) 12 This sections draws heavily on chapters 2 and 3 of Jonathan Rynhold, The Arab-Israeli Conflict in American Political Culture, (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2015). 13 Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: Norton, 2005); Patrick Buchanan, A Republic, Not an Empire: Reclaiming Americas Destiny (Washington, DC, Regnery, 1999). 14 Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, Myths, Illusions and Peace: Finding a New Direction for America in the Middle East (New York: Viking, 2009). 15 James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (Penguin, 2004), pp. 43-44, 53. 16 Peter Beinart, The Icarus Syndrome: A History of American Hubris (N.Y.: Harpers, 2010). 17 Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: Norton, 2005); Patrick Buchanan, A Republic, Not an Empire: Reclaiming Americas Destiny (Washington, DC, Regnery, 1999). 18 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); John Ikenberry, 'An Agenda for Liberal International Renewal' in Michele Flourney and Shawn Brimley Eds., Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy (Washington DC: Center for New American Security: 2008) pp. 43-60; John Ikenberry, Thomas Knock, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Tony Smith, The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Henry Nau, Conservative Internationalism Chapter 2. 19 Leon Hadar, Quagmire: America in the Middle East (Washington, DC: Cato, 1992); Leon Hadar, Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East 20 Stephen M. Walt, 'Taming American Power,' Foreign Affairs, 84: 5 (2005).21 Leon Hadar, 'What Green Peril,' Foreign Affairs, 72: 2 (Spring 1993). 22 Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, America and the World (New York: Basic 2008), p. 21-29, 57-59, 77-78; 'Bush 41 Adviser Scowcroft Says He'd Tell Israel To "Calm Down" On Iran Strike,' Huffington Post, July 22, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/07/22/mccain-adviser-scowcroft_n_114379.html; 'U.S. presidential hopeful Ron Paul: 'Friendship' is best way to deal with Iran,' Ha'aretz, November 6, 2011; Bruce Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future (Brookings Press 2008); Michael Lind 'American Strategy Project -- Grand Strategy No.1', New America Foundation, March 13, 2003 http://asp.newamerica.net/publications/policy/american_strategy_project_grand_strategy_no_1 24

23 Daniel Pipes, 'Looking Back on the Middle East: James A. Baker III,' Middle East Quarterly (September 1994); Michael Desch, 'Ominous President,' The American Conservative, May 5 2003; Christopher Layne 'Balancing Act,' The American Conservative, September 10, 2007. 24 Brzezinski and Scowcroft, America and the World; Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 'The Perils of Occupation', October 28, 2004, http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org/downloads/perils_of_occupation_1004.pdf.25 Doug Bandow, 'Israel's Democracy Dilemma,' The American Conservative, November 3 2003; John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby: and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2007), p. 86-87; Taki, 'Not So Clean Break,' The American Conservative, September 11, 2006; Patrick Buchanan, 'The Persecution of the Palestinians,' The American Conservative, June 5, 2006; George Szamuely, 'Thomas Friedman, Dean of Liberal Imperialism,' The American Conservative, December 2, 2002; John J. 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A29; Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 'Ending the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate,' January 1, 2005, http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org/archives/2005/01/ending_the_isra.php ; Patrick J, Buchanan, 'Israels Isolation and Ours.' http://buchanan.org/blog/pjb-israels-isolation-and-ours-589; March 29, 2004; Brent Scowcroft 'Beyond Lebanon: This Is the Time for a U.S.-Led Comprehensive Settlement,' Washington Post, July 30, 2006; B07; James Baker and Lee Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), p. 7; Brzezinski and Scowcroft, America and the World, pp, 64, 87, 104; Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby, pp. 58-77, 335-255. Mara Rudman and Brian Katulis, 'U.S. Must Lead for Middle East Progress,' washingtonpost.com, May 28, 2007;Brian Katulis, Marc Lynch, and Robert C. Adler, 'Window of Opportunity for a Two-State Solution: Policy recommendations to the Obama administration on the Israeli-Palestinian front,' Center for American Progress, July 2009; Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda; Robert Reich, 'How To Be Tough On Terrorism,' The American Prospect, November 5, 2001, p. 48; Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, 'A Durable Middle East Peace,' The American Prospect, November 2003, p. 55.28 Brzezinski and Scowcroft, America and the World, p. 85. 29 Leon Hadar, 'Let the Locals Fix the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.' ; Leon Hadar, 'The Real Lesson of the Oslo Accord: "Localize" the Arab-Israeli Conflict,' Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing, No. 31, May 9, 2001 ; Srdja Trifkovic, 'An Exercise in Futility,' Chronicles, September 3, 2010 . 30 Sandy Berger and James Baker, 'Forward' in Daniel Kurtzer, ed., Pathways to Peace: America and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. vii-xii. 31 Brzezinski and Scowcroft, America and the World (New York: Basic Books: 2008), p. 87; Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby; Pat Buchanan, 'Foreign Aid: Ever With Us,' December 21, 1994, http://buchanan.org/blog/foreign-aid-ever-with-us-166; Andrew Sullivan, 'Giving Up on Israel,' http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2010/12/giving-up-on-israel.html; Leon Hadar, 'Let the Locals Fix the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,' June 21, 2001, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/let-locals-fix-israel/palestinian-conflict 32 Brian Katulis, Marc Lynch, and Robert C. Adler, 'Window of Opportunity for a Two-State Solution Policy. '33 Shibley Telhami, Brian Katulis, Jon Alterman, Milton Viorst 'Middle Eastern Views Of The United States: What Do The Trends Indicate?' Middle East Policy Vol13 (3) 2006; Brzezinski and Scowcroft, America and the World, p. 19. 34 Brzezinski and Scowcroft, America and the World, pp. 19, 80-92; Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby pp. 226, 381 ft. 38 ; Patrick J. Buchanan, 'The Prisoner of Sharon,' April 5, 2002, http://buchanan.org/blog/pjb-the-prisoner-of-sharon-438; John Judis, 'The Real Foreign-Policy Debate,' American Prospect, May 6, 2002, p. 10; Rudman and Katulis, 'U.S. Must Lead for Middle East Progress;' Daniel Kurtzer, 'American policy, strategy and tactics' in Kurtzer, ed. Pathways to Peace, p. 196; Katulis, Lynch, and Adler, 'Window of Opportunity for a Two-State Solution;'; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Thomas Pickering, Lee Hamilton, Carla Hills, and Nancy Kassebaum-Baker,, 'Failure Risks Devastating Consequences, ' New York Review of Books, November 8, 2007 35 Katulis, Lynch, and Adler, 'Window of Opportunity for a Two-State Solution25

36 Heilbrun, They Knew They Were Right, pp. 12, 44-47, 95, 114-115; Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York: HarperCollins, 2008). James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans , pp. 27-29, 74-75 37 Gary J. Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservativism and the New Pax Americana (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 181; Author interview with Danielle Pletka, Vice President of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute, 2013. Norman Podhoretz, World War IV: The Long Struggle against Islamofascism, (New York: Doubleday, 2007) 38 George Will, 'Netanyahu: Promises to Keep,' Washington Post, June 23, 1996, p. C07; Victor Davis Hanson, 'Islamic Fascism 101,' National Review Online, September 25, 2006; Clifford May, 'The Battle Of Gaza,' National Review Online, January 22, 2009. 39 Victor Davis Hanson, 'Why Support Israel?' National Review, February 4, 2002; David Brooks 'A Season of Cynicism,' The Daily Standard, April 1, 2002; Fred Barnes, 'Bush Stands with Israel; And against the State Department,' The Weekly Standard; April 29, 2002, p. 12; Robert Kagan and William Kristol, 'Back on Track?' The Weekly Standard, April 29, 2002, p. 9; William Safire, ' Our 'Relentless' Liberation, New York Times, October 8, 2001, p. 17; George Will, 'A Plan for Arafat,' Washington Post, December 4, 2001, p. A25; Norman Podhoretz, 'World War IV: How It Started, What It Means, and Why We Have to Win,' Commentary, September 2004, pp. 17-54; Michael Ledeen, 'Books in Review; The War That Never Ended,' The American Spectator, July 2002 - August 2002, pp. 72-73. 40 William Safire, 'Israel's Shame,' New York Times, December 23, 1999, p. 29. Eisenstadt and Pollock, Asset Test ft 73 41 George Will, 'The End of Our Holiday from History,' Washington Post, September 11, 2001, p. A27; David Pryce-Jones, 'Why they hate us,' National Review, October 1, 2001, p. 8; Victor Davis Hanson, 'And Then They Came After Us,' National Review Online, July 22, 2005. 42 For example, George Will, 'A Peace With Considerable Risks,' Washington Post, September 9, 1993, p. A21; George Will, 'No Partners For Peace,' Washington Post, October 22, 2000, p. B07 43 Elliot Abrams, 'Israel and the Peace process,' in Robert Kagan and William Kristol, eds., Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy (San Francisco CA: Encounter, 2000), pp.221-240. A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm (Washington, DC: Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, 1996). 44 David Brooks, 'Keeping It Simple,' The Daily Standard, June 25, 2002; Charles Krauthammer, 'Arafat's War; How to End It'; George Will, 'A War and Then a Wall,' Washington Post, August 17, 2001, p. A23; Hillel Halkin, 'Beyond the Geneva Accord,' Commentary, January 2004, pp. 21-28; Hillel Halkin, 'Does Sharon Have a Plan?' Commentary, June 2004, pp. 17-22;Dan Darling, 'Hezbollah's Arsenal; It's more lethal than everyone thought,' The Weekly Standard, July 31, 2006; Fred Barnes, 'Letting Israel Be Israel; Bush's consistent approach to war and peace in the Middle East,' The Weekly Standard, July 31, 2006; Elliott Abrams, 'Bibi Speaks; Netanyahu endorses a demilitarized Palestinian state--rejects Obama's call for a settlement freeze,' The Weekly Standard, June 14, 2009 45 The case for Israel as a strategic asset since the end of the Cold war is most comprehensively laid out put in Michael Eisenstadt and David Pollock, Asset Test, on which this section draws extensively.46 Martin Kramer, The American Interest, Azure, no. 26 (Fall 2006), pp. 21-33. 47 George W. Bush, Decision Points (London: Random House, 2010), pp. 421-424. 48 Author interviews with Israeli and US officials; Nathan Guttman, US said adopting Israeli army counter-terror tactics in Iraq Haaretz; Amnon Barzilai, US Army wants to buy more Israeli Hunter dronesHaaretz 8 July 2003; Israeli Technology to See Action in Iraq AP 21 March 2003; Israel, US to fund laser that shoots down rockets AP 28 October 2003; Broad, Markoff, and Sanger, Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial; Eli Lake, Operation Sabotage: Our Secret War against Iran, New Republic, July 14, 2010, http://www.tnr.com/article/world/75952/operation-sabotage; William Broad and David Sanger, In Nuclear Nets Undoing, a Web of Shadowy Details, New York Times, news/25iht-25nuke.15597447.html?pagewanted=all. 49 Amir Oren, 'Leaked classified memo reveals U.S.-Israeli intel cooperation on Egypt, Iran' Ha'aretz Aug. 5, 2014 50 Eisenstadt and Pollack, Asset Test 51 Ehud Zion Waldoks, 'Sunday Solar Power Company CEO Kobi Dinar Is Thinking Beyond The Local Scene' JP Nov 23, 2008; David Horowitz 'Obama may adopt Israeli electric car' Jerusalem Post 18 December 2008. 52 A.F.K. Organski, The $36 billion Bargain (NY: Columbia University Press, 1990) pp. 114-132; Eisenstadt and Pollock, Asset Test.26

53 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darfur_conflict#Mortality_figures ; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_Civil_War; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Iraq_War 54 Estimates of deaths in the Syrian Civil War, per opposition activist groups, vary between 97 000 and 130,000, see Ian Black, Middle East editor. "Syria deaths near 100,000, says UN and 6,000 are children" The Guardian 30 August 2013; 'Death Toll In Syria Surpasses 130,000, Monitoring Group Says' Reuters 31 December 2013; for figures of casualties in the Arab-Israeli conflict see www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/casualtiestotal.html.55 Cordesman, The Changing Dynamics of Energy in the Middle East, pp. 67, 89. 56 Arab Human Development Reports available at http://www.arab-hdr.org/ 57 Kenneth Pollack, A Path Out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East (NY: Random House, 2008), pp. 71-95. 58 Eli Lake, 'Israel, Gulf States Conducted Secret Diplomacy: Adversaries Fearful of Iran', Washington Times, December 1, 2010, Yoel Guzansky, Tacit Allies: Israel and the Arab Gulf States, Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 5, no. 1 (2011), pp. 918 59 Saudi News Agency, 13 July 2006. 60 Barry Rubin & Judith Colp Rubin, Hating America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) Ch. 9; Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (New York: Random House, 2004), pp. 69-72; Reuven Paz, 'Islamists and Anti-Americanism', MERIA 7 (4) 2003; Patrick Clawson, "The Paradox of Anti-Americanism in Iran" MERIA 8 (1) 2004. 61 Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (New York: Random House, 2004) pp. 78-84, 160-162. 62 Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War against America (New York: Random House, 2003( 63 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Berkley Trade 2003 p. 121; Simon and Benjamin The Age of Sacred Terror p, 147. Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (New York: Random House, 2004) p. xxviii 64 Telhami, Understanding the Challenge. 65 David Pollock Slippery Polls: Uses and Abuses of Opinion Surveys from Arab States (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2008); Stephen Brooks, As Others See Us: The Causes & Consequences of Foreign Perceptions of America (Broadview Press) pp. 123-128. 66 Robert Satloff, Eunice Youmans, and Mark Nakhla, Assessing What Arabs Do, Not What They Say: A New Approach to Understanding Arab Anti-Americanism (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 2006). 67 Eisenstadt and Pollock, Asset Test 68 Simon Henderson, The New Pillar: Conservative Arab Gulf States and U.S. Strategy Policy (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003). 69 Rachel Bronson, Thicker Than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia (Oxford University Press/Council on Foreign Relations 2006) p. 231; J. Robinson West, 'Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the Gulf' in in, Jan Kalicki and David Goldwyn, eds. Energy Security (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005) pp. 197- 218. 70 Ross and Makovsky, pp. 100-102. On the limitations of the Arab Peace Initiative see Joshua Teitelbaum, The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2009) http://jcpa.org/text/Arab-Peace-Initiative.pdf71 On Abbas' rejection of Olmert's offer see Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor (New York: Random House, 2011), p. 723. A few months later Abbas confirmed that he turned down the offer, telling the Washington Post, 'The gaps were wide' Jackson Diehl, 'Abbas's Waiting Game on Peace with Israel,' Washington Post, May 29, 2009 www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/28/AR2009052803614.html; On Arafat's rejectionism and support for terrorism see Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 2004); Barry Rubin and Judith Rubin Colp, Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography (Oxford University Press, 2003); Ehud Yaari, Super Intifada, Jerusalem Report, October 23, 2000; Amos Harel, 'Barghouti ran terror for Arafat' Ha'aretz April 18, 2002; Lesley Stah, 'Israel: Terror Linked To Iran , Iraq': Officals Tell About Seized Documents' CBS September 27, 2002, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-terror-linked-to-iran-iraq/; Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 'Barghouti gave orders to terror groups with Arafat's silent approval', Ha'aretz April 19, 2012; Gilad Sher, The Israeli Palestinian Peace Negotiations 1991-2001 (London: Routledge, 2006); The official Palestinian response to the Framework appeared in Al-Ayyam, 2 January 2001, see also 44 reasons why the Fatah movement rejects the Proposals made by U.S. President Clinton. www.pna.gov.ps/peace/44_reasons.htm 27

72 On Sharon's shift see Jonathan Rynhold and Dov Waxman, 'Ideological Change & Israel's Disengagement from Gaza' Political Science Quarterly 123 (1) 2008; On the details of Olmert's offer see, Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor (New York: Random House, 2011), pp. 723-724; Jack Khoury, 'Abbas: Olmert offered PA land equaling 100% of West Bank,' Ha'aretz December 20, 2009 www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-page/abbas-olmert-offered-pa-land-equaling-100-of-west-bank-1747?trailingPath=2.169%2C2.216%2C; Avi Issacharoff, 'Olmert: I am still waiting for Abbas to call The Tower May 24, 2013 www.thetower.org/exclusive-olmert-i-am-still-waiting-for-abbas-to-call-will-abbas-ever-say-yes/; 'Olmert: No doubt Israel can evacuate 80,000 settlers from West Bank'Associated Press February 7, 2014 www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.573078; On Netanyahu's moves towards concessions see, 'Address by PM Netanyahu, Bar-Ilan University, June 14, 2009', Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2009/pages/address_pm_netanyahu_bar-ilan_university_14-jun-2009.aspx; Netanyahu's Address to U.S. Congress, May, 24 2011 http:/ /www.cfr.org/israel/netanyahus-address-uzsz-congress-may-2011/p25073; Barak Ravid, Netanyahus border proposal: Israel to annex settlement blocs, but not Jordan Valley, Haaretz, 9 February 2012 www.haaretz.com/blogs/diplomania/netanyahu-s-border-proposal-israel-to-annex-settlement-blocs-but-not-jordan-valley-1.413473; Ben Birnbaum and Amir Tibon, 'The Explosive, Inside Story of How John Kerry Built an Israel-Palestine Peace Plan and Watched It Crumble' New Republic July 20, 2014 73 'James A. Baker address Middle East Peace Conference' Transcript, US Department of State Dispatch, February 1992; For similar quotes by subsequent Presidents and Secretaries of State see Jonathan Rynhold, 'The U.S. & the Middle East Peace Process: Conflict Management vs. Conflict Resolution' in E. Inbar & E. Gilboa Eds, US-Israeli Relations in a New Era (Routledge, 2008). 74 Stephen G., Brooks, John Ikenberry, William Wohlforth, 'Lean Forward' Foreign Affairs Jan/Feb2013, Vol. 92 Issue 1: 130-142; S. G. Brooks & W. C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance (Princeton University Press, 2008) 75 Dennis Ross, Statecraft: How to Restore Americas standing in the World (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007). 76 Ross, Statecraft, pp. 3-28, 333. 77 Stephen G., Brooks, John Ikenberry, William Wohlforth, 'Lean Forward' Foreign Affairs Jan/Feb2013, Vol. 92 Issue 1: 130-142; S. G. Brooks & W. C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance (Princeton University Press, 2008) 78 Ibid. 79 Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, Myths, Illusions and Peace: Finding a New Direction for America in the Middle East (N.Y: Viking, 2009), p. 6, 20, 27880 Kenneth Pollack, A Path out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East (Random House, 2008), Chapter 5, 10; Ross, Statecraft p. 295; Barry Rubin, The tragedy of the Middle East, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002); Barry Rubin, 'The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism', Foreign Affairs November/December 2002. 81 Ross and Makovsky, Myths, Illusions and Peace; Pollack, A Path out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East; Thomas Friedman, 'Order vs. Disorder', New York Times, July 21, 2006 p. 19; Jeffrey Goldberg, 'The Great Atlantic Israel-Iran Debate' Aug 27 2010, Jeffrey Goldberg, 'Indyk: U.S. More Likely Than Israel to Bomb Iran,' Aug 16 2010; Ross, Statecraft, pp. 151-158, 306. 82 Ross and Makovsky, Myths, Illusions and Peace; Pollack, A Path out of the Desert. 83 Ross and Makovsky, Myths, Illusions and Peace; Pollack, A Path out of the Desert. 84 Ross and Makovsky, Myths, Illusions and Peace. 85 Jonathan Rynhold, 'The Kerry-Qatar Ceasefire Document: What it Says About American Strategy in the Middle East' BESA Perspectives, no. 261, August 3, 2014; David Ignatius, 'John Kerrys big blunder in seeking an Israel-Gaza cease-fire' Washington Post July 28, 2014.