Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Mid-Level Leadership

Joshua KoontzCritical Threats Project

American Enterprise Institute

June 2015

KEY TAKEAWAYS• AQAP has a formalized mid-level leadership structure

with a chain of command, a training and education program, and a consistent promotion process.

• It obscures the identities of its current commanders and the details of its current leadership structure as part of its operational security practice.

• AQAP’s Military Committee administers its mid-level leadership structure, which is divided into governorate commanders and district commanders.

• AQAP appoints district commanders to key terrain.• Yemenis dominate AQAP’s mid-level command

structure. [See Appendix I]

METHODOLOGY• Sources include AQAP media productions, such as eulogy statements for

slain commanders, and Yemeni and other international media reports on killed or captured commanders.

• An analysis of these sources’ common English and Arabic phrases provided the search parameters and the criteria for identifying AQAP mid-level commanders and determining their chain of command and areas of operation. The study assessed that AQAP’s mid-level leadership structure has the following ranks:– A governorate commander leads operations and/or commands all

militants in a particular governorate. AQAP calls governorate commanders “emirs” or “leaders in charge of military affairs.”

– A district commander is responsible for some militants and/or executes certain types of operations in a particular district. AQAP calls district commanders “commanders,” “leaders of some jihadi groups,” or “district or city governors” in eulogy statements.

• Mid-level commanders sometimes operate outside of their areas.

AQAP’S MID-LEVEL HIERARCHY

AQAP has a top-down decision making process for planning and executing military operations.

Photos of correspondence between Marqishi and Habbah.

Military Committee

research, vet, authorize operations

Governorate Commander

District Commander

plan and assign operations

Recent internal communications between AQAP governorate commander Jalal al Marqishi and AQAP district commander Abu Habbah display a hierarchical relationship. Marqishi advises Habbah to “listen to and obey” Allah’s instructions and considers Habbah’s request for more military equipment.

Source: Al Mashad al Yemeni

AQAP GOVERNORATE COMMANDERS

Areas with AQAP Governorate Commanders

AQAP has governorate commanders in at least 13 of 21 Yemeni governorates.

AQAP commanders have not been identified in Hajjah, Amran, al Mahwit, Raymah, Dhamar, al Dhaleh, and al Mahrah.

AQAP DISTRICT COMMANDERS MAPAQAP appoints district commanders in strategic areas with access to transportation and energy infrastructure, commercial institutions, and military bases.

Districts with AQAP District Commanders

Governorates with AQAP District Commanders

AQAP EULOGY STATEMENT EXAMPLES• The study analyzed AQAP’s different terms for slain mid-level commanders

in eulogy statements to identify their ranks in its command structure.– A November 2014 eulogy statement mourning two mid-level commanders killed in

a single event describes the slain district commander, Nabil al Dhahab, as “the mujahid commander.” The same statement describes the slain governorate commander, Shawqi al Badani, as “the emir, commander, and mujahid.”

• The study recorded relevant dates for each commander and compared several AQAP eulogy statements to assess the chronological order of governorate commanders and district commanders in each governorate.– A March 2012 eulogy statement for mid-level commander Ali bin Saeed bin Jamil

al Abyani describes Abyani’s promotion process: He strengthened the hearts and confused the enemy and prevented them from expanding and advancing, and after he spent a while in Abyan, he handed the banner to his brother Abu Khalid al Asiri, may Allah have mercy on him, and joined the commander Qasim al Raymi to be one of the members of the preview committee. So he, may Allah have mercy on him, participated in the writing of some research and in organization and preparing for military work. He then was assigned to be an emir in al-Bayda' province, and I was there at that time.

CASE STUDY: AQAP COMMAND STRUCTURE IN ABYANAQAP’s Abyan mid-level leadership depicts the superior-subordinate relationship and

demonstrates how AQAP compensates for membership losses.Governorate District

Wanted

Deceased

Surrendered

CASE STUDY: AQAP COMMAND STRUCTURE IN ABYAN

• The previous chart demonstrates that AQAP compensates for every killed or captured mid-level commander in Abyan by promoting, training, and inserting a new commander into its existing system.

• The chart shows that AQAP considers Abyan to be a high-priority area based on its number of district commanders. AQAP has had four times as many district commanders in Abyan (16 commanders) as any other Yemeni governorate.

• The chart also indicates that AQAP district commanders may be assisted by deputy district commanders in high-priority areas.– AQAP District Commander Ali bin Saeed bin Jamil al Abyani had two

deputy district commanders: Fawaz al Maribi and Ibrahim al Najdi.

Abyan Governorate Commander

Mudia District Commander

Mahfad District Commander

Khanfir District Commander

Zinjibar District Commander

Lawder District Commander

CASE STUDY: AQAP COMMAND STRUCTURE IN ABYAN

AQAP’s mid-level leadership in Abyan is comprised of a governorate commander and at least five district commanders.

Districts with AQAP District Commanders

AQAP MID-LEVEL LEADERSHIP TRAINING• AQAP mid-level commanders take the following courses:

– Urban and special operations– Weapons training – Philosophy– Politics – Shari’a law– Art of command and administration taught by AQAP’s military commander Qasim al Raymi

• AQAP’s military committee also conducts internal surveys to determine effective teaching styles and recommendations for improving AQAP’s academic curriculum.

• AQAP’s courses use textbooks such as AQAP cleric Nasser al Ansi’s “Military Strategy” manual, which draws on the works of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.

• AQAP probably also uses Abdel Aziz al Muqrin’s “A Practical Course for Guerrilla Warfare” and Abu Bakr al Naji’s “The Management of Savagery.”

Source: YouTube Account “Al Zubeir al Fadhli”

AQAP MID-LEVEL PROMOTION PROCESS

• A recruit can become a district commander after executing several successful operations.– District commanders may be assisted by deputy district

commanders in high-priority areas.• A district commander’s field performance determines whether

he is promoted to a governorate commander. – District commanders may work for AQAP’s military planning,

intelligence, and media wings or act as emissaries for AQAP clerics before becoming a governorate commander.

– Governorate commanders may be demoted to district commanders to serve in high-priority areas.

AQAP has a promotion cycle for fighters.

CASE STUDY: ALI BIN SAEED BIN JAMIL AL ABYANI

Ali bin Saeed bin Jamil al Abyani, a Ma’rib native, served as a district and governorate commander in several Yemeni governorates from 2007 to 2011. His promotion cycles depict a mildly successful AQAP recruit’s career trajectory.

Source: Jihadology.net

CASE STUDY: ALI BIN SAEED BIN JAMIL AL ABYANI

2007

Abyani joined AQAP in 2007, participating in Ma’rib and Abyan operations. He became a district commander in Ma’rib and received training at AQAP’s Fatah camp in Mahfad, Abyan. He served as AQAP’s first Ma’rib governorate commander from Jan. 2009 to Aug. 2010.

.

.

.

2010

Abyani became a district commander in Lawder, Abyan, commanding artillery operations from Aug. 2010 to Feb. 2011.

2011

Abyani moved to Zinjibar, Abyan, and served as AQAP’s district commander responsible for all military operations. Two AQAP deputy district commanders assisted Abyani from Feb. 2011 to June 2011.

Abyani vetted potential operations for AQAP’s military committee. He served as AQAP’s first al Bayda governorate commander from June to mid-July 2011, when an airstrike killed him.

CASE STUDY: JALAL AL MARQISHI

Jalal al Marqishi grew up in al Wadhee, Abyan. He worked at a bakery while in school and played on a local soccer team in Abyan city from about 2000 to 2001. Marqishi has served as a district and governorate commander in several Yemeni governorates from 2011 to the present. He is the leader of AQAP’s insurgent arm, Ansar al Sharia.

Source: SITE Intelligence Group

CASE STUDY: JALAL AL MARQISHI 2011 . . .

Marqishi was briefly unemployed after graduation before becoming an imam at a mosque in Zinjibar, Abyan. He joined AQAP’s insurgent arm, Ansar al Sharia, in 2011.

2012

He served as AQAP’s district commander in Zinjibar, Abyan, from July 2011 to May 2012.

Marqishi assisted in running several training camps in Mahfad, Abyan, in June 2012. The Yemeni military’s 2012 offensive pushed through Abyan into Shabwah, triggering Marqishi’s retreat to Hadramawt.

2015 . . . 2013

Marqishi established himself as the leader of Ansar al Sharia and became AQAP’s serving Hadramawt governorate commander. Marqishi has returned his operations to Shabwah and Abyan as well.

EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. DIRECT ACTION• Attrition has degraded but not seriously disrupted AQAP. AQAP has

continued to develop new commanders in Abyan and other Yemeni governorates despite membership losses.

• U.S. direct action operations account for roughly two-thirds of AQAP’s mid-level casualties, while the Yemeni military accounts for the remaining third. [See Appendix II]

• U.S. direct action operations have killed 37 AQAP mid-level commanders over six years. [See Appendix III]

AQAP Mid-Level Commanders Killed by U.S. Direct Action Operations 2009-2015 Duration: Monthly

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CONCLUSIONS

• AQAP’s mid-level command structure will continue to produce and train new leaders despite the recent deaths of three senior AQAP officials: Harith bin Ghazi al Nadhari, Ibrahim al Rubaish, and Nasser bin Ali al Ansi.

• AQAP’s training and education program represents a persistent effort to learn from past failures, preserve and refine its collective wisdom, and incorporate these lessons into a series of classes, videos, and textbooks.

• AQAP’s promotion process has bolstered its internal cohesion by retaining fighters via a sense of inclusion and opportunities for advancement.

APPENDIX I: AQAP MID-LEVEL COMMANDER NATIONALITY

Yemeni1. Fahd al Quso2. Ali Abdullah Naji al Harithi3. Mohammed Saleh Omair4. Abdullah Midhar5. Sa’ad Atef al Awlaki6. Mohammed Ali al Haniq7. Adnan al Qadhi8. Shawqi Ali Ahmad al Badani9. Saleh al Tais10. Moajab bin Aziz11. Ali Saleh Juraym12. Sarhan Abdullah Ali al Nasi13. Jalal al Marqishi14. Saleh Abdul Khaleq

15. Saeed Salim al ‘Akbari16. Abu ‘Atta al Waili17. Nader al Shaddadi18. Al Khidr Husayn al Ja’dani19. Abdul Munim al Fathani20. Jamil bin Nasser al ‘Anbari21. Ali bin Lakraa al Kazami22. Muhader Ahmad Muhader23. Fawaz al Maribi24. Mohammed Said al Umdah25. Ayed Saleh al Shabwani26. Ali Salih Farhan27. Ali bin Saeed bin Jamil al Abyani28. Tareq al Dhahab

APPENDIX I (CONTINUED)Yemeni (cont.)29. Nasser al Dhafri30. Qaid al Dhahab31. Nabil al Dhahab32. Abdulwahhab Muhammad Abdulrahman al

Humayqani33. Hadaar al Humayqani34. Abu Hamza al Sabri35. Ma’moun Abdulhamid Hatem36. Khalid Saeed Batarfi37. Musaed al Barbari38. Khaldun al Sayed39. Mahdi Badas40. Jassar al Ban41. Abdul Rahamn Hazza42. Adel Harbah43. Abu Abdullah al Hadrami44. Hizam Mujally

45. Abu Mu’eran Abu Ali46. Abdul Rahman Shoaib Mehjab 47. Abus Sayaf 48. Hamza Qu’aiti49. Hussam al Armudi

Saudi50. Turki Michaoui Zayed al Jabali Asiri51. Ibrahim al Najdi52. Abu Khaled al Asiri53. Abu Zubeir al Qassimi54. “Abu Habbah” Abdullah Ahmad Salem

Mubarak6. Murtada Ali Saeed Magram

APPENDIX I (CONTINUED)Other1. Ibrahim al Banna al Masri (Egyptian)2. Abu Islam al Shishani (Chechen)3. Abu Muslim al Uzbeki (Uzbek)4. Ala Saima al Urduni (Jordanian)5. Ahmed Daradish (Unspecified foreign commander)6. Imad al Manshabi (Unspecified foreign commander)

Unknown7. Abdullah al Thahiri 8. Abu Yousif al Sana’ani

APPENDIX II: AQAP MID-LEVEL COMMANDER CASUALTIES

AQAP Mid-Level Leadership Casualty Statistics (60 killed or captured commanders out of 63 mid-level commanders)

Conclusion: US direct action operations account for roughly two-thirds of AQAP’s mid-level casualties (62%) while the Yemeni military accounts for the remaining third of AQAP mid-level casualties (33%).

• US Direct Action Operations: 37 killed (61.6% 62%)• Yemeni Military Actions: 16 killed and 4 captured (33.3% 33%)• Al Houthi Actions: 0 (0%)• Yemeni Tribal Actions: 1 killed and 1 captured (3.3% 3%)• Natural Causes: 1 died (1.6% 2%)

APPENDIX III: AQAP COMMANDERS KILLED BY U.S. DIRECT ACTION OPERATIONS

1. Mahdi Amer Badas2. Fahd al Quso3. Ahmed Mu’eran Abu Ali4. Abu Adullah Naji al Harithi5. Sa’ad Atef al Awlaki6. Adnan al Qadhi7. Shawqi Ali Ahmad al Badani8. Moajab bin Aziz9. Ali Saleh Juraym10. Sarhan Abdullah Ali al Nasi11. Saleh Abdul Khaleq12. Abu Yousif al Sana’ani13. Al Khidr Husayn al Ja’dani14. Abdul Munim al Fathani15. Jamil bin Nasser al ‘Anbari16. Ibrahim al Najdi17. Abu Khaled al Asiri18. Nader al Shaddadi19. Abdallah Ahmad Salem Mubarak20. Ali bin Lakraa al Kazami

21. Ahmed Daradish22. Adel Hardbah23. Khaldun al Sayed24. Abu Zubeir al Qassimi25. Mohammed Said al Umdah26. Ali Salih Farhan27. Ali bin Saeed bin Jamil al Abyani28. Abu Hamza al Sabri29. Hadaar al Humayqani30. Nabil al Dhahab31. Qaid al Dhahab32. Naser al Dhafri33. Abus Sayaf 34. Muhader Ahmad Muhader 35. Abu Ali al Hadrami/Murtada Saeed al Hadrami36. Hussam al Armudi37. Ma’moun Hatem

SELECTED SOURCES1. “Army finds messages between al Qaeda leadership and recently appointed Mahfad Military

Commander,” Al Mashhad al Yemeni, May 27, 2014 [Arabic] Available: http://www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/news37278.html.

2. Zubeir al Fadhli, “Sheikh Qasim al Raymi’s characterization of good intentions God Preserve Him,” YouTube, June 4, 2014 [Arabic]. Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4jmn1x6Xv8M.

3. ABMOGA, Twitter, November 14, 2014 [Arabic]. Available: https://twitter.com/ABMOGA/status/532826978400096256.

4. Abu Humeid Al Ansari, “He Takes Among You Martyrs 5,” Jihadology.net, May 1, 2013. Available: http://bit.ly/1zi8UKE.

5. “AQAP Releases Video on May 2014 Nighttime Raid in Sayun,” SITE Intelligence Group, August 4, 2014, Available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.

6. “Madad News Gives Details of Zinjibar Clash, Provides Marqishi Video, March 12, 2012. Available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.

7. “AQAP Gives Biography of Driver, Former Military Committee Official,” SITE Intelligence Group, May 14, 2014. Available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.

8. “AQAP Gives Eulogy for Mahfad District Leader Ali bin Lakraa’,” SITE Intelligence Group, May 27, 2014. Available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.

9. Michael W. S. Ryan. Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.129.

SELECTED SOURCES (CONTINUED)10. “AQAP Releases Biography of Slain Official, Muwahhid al-Maribi,” SITE Intelligence Group,

March 23, 2012. Available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com. 11. “AQAP Releases Biography of Slain Commander, Fawaz al-Maribi,” SITE Intelligence Group,

January 3, 2012. Available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com. 12. “AQAP Video Focuses on Slain Official Abu Khalid al-Asiri,” SITE Intelligence Group, May 13,

2013. Available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com. 13. Morten Storm, Paul Cruickshank, and Tim Lister. Agent Storm: My Life Inside Al Qaeda and

the CIA. Great Britain: Grove/Atlantic, Inc., 2014. 6-12. 14. “AQAP Eulogizes Nabil al-Dhahab and Khawlan al-Sana’ani, Claims Their Killing Reveals U.S.-

Houthi Plot,” SITE Intelligence Group, November 5, 2014. Available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.

15. Khaled Abdullah, “A country armed to the teeth,” Reuters, June 7, 2013, Available: http://blogs.reuters.com/photographers-blog/2013/06/07/a-country-armed-to-the-teeth/.

16. “Republic of Yemen map,” Gulf States News, Available: http://www.gsn-online.com/republic-of-yemen-map.

17. “Yemen: Total acquires interest in Block 3 exploration license in Yemen from Oil Search,” Total, March 5, 2012. Available: http://www.total.com/en/media/news/press-releases/total-acquires-interest-and-becomes-operator-block-3-exploration-license?%FFbw=kludge1%FF.

SELECTED SOURCES (CONTINUED)18. “Yemen – Land Use,” Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection at University of Texas at Austin,

2002. Available: www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/yemen.html. 19. “Yemen Map,” World Atlas, www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/asia/ye.htm. 20. Katherine Zimmerman, “AQAP’s Campaign against the Yemeni Military,” AEI’s Critical Threats

Project, July 7, 2014. Available: http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/zimmerman-aqap-drone-campaign-yemen-military-july-7-2014.

21. Evan Hill and Laura Kasinof, “Playing a Double Game in the Fight Against AQAP,” Foreign Policy, January 19, 2015. Available: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/21/playing-a-double-game-in-the-fight-against-aqap-yemen-saleh-al-qaeda/.

22. “Al-Qaeda in Yemen releases Saudi Diplomat,” BBC News, March 2, 2015. Available: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31690781.