1

AgainstEmergentIndividualism

RobertC.Koons1

UniversityofTexasatAustin

1.Introduction

Inaseriesofatleasttenbooksandarticlesoverthelasttwenty-twoyears,Timothy

O’Connorandhiscollaboratorshavedevelopedoneofthemostrigorous,subtle,and

influentialaccountsoftherelationbetweenmindandbody,whichforpresent

purposeswecancall‘emergentindividualism’.Myownworkhasbeenshapedand

enrichedbythisbodyofwork.Consequently,thecritiqueIofferhereisadecidedly

friendly,intendedtoadvanceourunderstandingofthemindwhilebuildingonthe

contributionsofO’Connorandhisco-authors(Wong,Churchill,Theiner,andJacobs).

Inrecentyears,Ihavebeenworkingonthearticulationanddefenseofaversionof

thehylomorphismofAristotleandThomasAquinas(seeKoons2014).Thereis

muchcommongroundbetweensuchaThomisticversionofhylomorphismand

emergentindividualism.Boththeoriesincludearejectionofphysicalism,inbothits

reductiveandnon-reductiveversions,basedonphysicalism’sfailuretoaccount

adequatelyforqualia,intentionality,normativity,andmentalcausation.Both

embraceanincompatibilistversionoffreewillandbothadoptthemodelofagent

causation(infact,hylomorphistswouldextendthismodeltocoverallcausal

interactions,treatingtheearlymodernmodelofeventcausationascapturinga

derivativelevelofmetaphysicalreality).Bothcountmentalcausationasrealand

irreducible.Bothincorporatecausalpowersasafundamentalelementofontology,

andbothendorseasparseontologyofproperties.Bothrejectnominalismand

1 Iwouldliketoacknowledgethesupportduringthe2014-15academicyearoftheJamesMadisonPrograminAmericanIdealsandInstitutionsatPrincetonUniversity(foraVisitingFellowship)andtheUniversityofTexasatAustin(forafacultyresearchgrant).

2

conceptualism,includingsomeformofrealismaboutproperties,eitherintheform

ofimmanentuniversals(thatareliterallypartsoftheirinstances)ortrope-like

abstractparticulars(individualforms).

Where,then,dothedifferenceslie?Thisquestionwilltakeupsection2ofthispaper,

inwhichIwilllocateeachoffouranti-reductionistpositionsonaconceptualmap,

namely:non-reductivephysicalism,Cartesiandualism,Thomistichylomorphism,

andemergentindividualism.Insections3,4,and5,Iwillargueforthesuperiorityof

hylomorphismoveremergentindividualismoneachofthreeissues:thenatureof

thecausesoftheexistenceofpersons(section3),thepossibilityofdisembodied

personalsurvival(section4),andthenatureoftheinfluenceofmindonbody

(section5).Imakesomeconcludingremarksinsection6.

2.AConceptualMapforthePhilosophyofMind

Tobeginwith,let’sexcludethetwomostextremeviews:reductivephysicalism(in

whichonlythephysicalreal)andidealism(inwhichonlythementalisreal).That

leavesfourmoderatepositions:non-reductivephysicalism,Thomistic

hylomorphism,emergentindividualism,andCartesiandualism.2

Howdoreductiveandnon-reductiveversionsofphysicalismdiffer?Wecan

distinguishthetwoverysimply,ifourbackgroundtheoryincludesarelationof

metaphysicalgrounding(seeFine1999and2012,Schaffer2009,andRosen2010)

andasparseontologyofpropertiesandstatesofaffairs.Forreductivephysicalists,

therearenon-physicalconceptswithnon-emptyextensions,andtruepropositions

2Thereareotherwaysofdividingupthelogicalspace,whichwouldgenerateotherpositions,includingneutralmonism,dual-aspecttheory,orpanpsychism.Forpresentpurposes,eachofthesecouldbeseeneitherasavariantofoneofthefourpositions(forexample,dual-aspecttheoryseemstobeaversionofnonreductivematerialism)orasintroducingorthogonalissues(forexample,thequestionofhowmanythingshaveminds–aquestiontowhichpanpsychismprovidesananswer).

3

withnon-physicalcontent,buttheonlypropertieswithinstancesandtheonly

actualstatesofaffairs(orfacts)areentirelyphysicalinnature.Non-reductive

physicalists,incontrast,arecommittedtotherealexistenceofnon-physical

propertiesandfacts.Theycountasphysicalistsbecausetheyholdthatallnon-

physicalfactsarewhollygroundedinthephysicalfactsalone.Consequently,the

classofthetruth-valuesofnon-physicalpropositionsstronglysupervenesonthe

classofthetruth-valuesofthepropositionsofphysics.

Theotherthreepositionsdenyphysicalismaltogetherbydenyingthatthenon-

physicalfactsarewhollygroundedbythephysicalfacts.Fornon-physicalists,there

arefundamentalnon-physicalpropertiesandfacts(includingmentalpropertiesand

facts).Thisdoesnotnecessarilyentailadenialofmental-on-physicalsupervenience,

sincesupervenienceisanecessarybutnotasufficientconditionforphysicalism.

However,mostanti-physicalists(including,Ithink,allCartesiandualists)doinfact

denyeventheweak,globalsupervenienceofthementalonthephysical.

Itismuchhardertomaintainthestrong,localizedsupervenienceofthementalon

thephysical,intheabsenceofthecompletegroundingofthementalbythephysical.

Forthisreason,strong,localizedsupervenienceis(asfarasIknow)amaterially

adequatedefinitionofnon-reductivephysicalism,althoughIthinkthedefinitionin

termsofgroundingdoesabetterjobofgettingtotheheartofthematter.

HowcanwedistinguishCartesiandualism,Thomistichylomorphism,andemergent

individualismfromoneanother?Therearetworelativelysuperficialteststhatseem

todoanadequatejobofsortinganti-physicalisttheoriesintooneofthethreebins.

First,isitpossibleforahumanbeing(oranotherentitywithmentalproperties)to

begintoexistwithouthavinganyphysicalproperties(inanimmaterialor

matterlesscondition)?IfYes,thenwehaveaversionofCartesiandualism.IfNo,

theneitherThomistichylomorphismoremergentindividualism.Second,isit

4

possibleforahumanbeingtoreachaconditionofimmateriality?IfYes,then

Thomistichylomorphism.IfNo,thenemergentindividualism.3

Althoughthesequestionsdogiveusthreemutuallyexclusivecategoriesthatare

jointlyexhaustiveofnon-idealisticanti-physicalism,theyarenotveryilluminating

aboutwhatreasonscanbegivenforthesethreesetsofanswers.Wehaveabetter

chanceofgainingsuchilluminationifwelookatrelationsofontologicaldependency

betweenthemindandthebody.Metaphysicalgroundingisonespeciesof

ontologicaldependency,butitisnottheonlyspeciesofthisgenus.Itispossiblefor

onemetaphysicallyfundamental(ungrounded)entitytobeontologicallydependent

onanother(Fine1994).Forexample,ifweacceptoriginsessentialism,each

organismisontologicallydependentonthepriorexistenceofitsparents,butthat

doesnotmeanthatthechild’sexistence(now)isgroundedbytheparents’existence

(then).Here’sanotherexample:wemightthinkthatextendedthingsare

ontologicallydependentontheexistenceofspacewithoutsupposingthatthe

existenceoftheextendedthingispartlygroundedbytheexistenceofspace.

Ontologicaldependencecanbeeithersynchronicordiachronic.IfAis

synchronicallydependentonB,thenA’sexistenceateachmomenttdependsonB’s

existenceatthatmoment.Diachronicdependenceisweaker:ifA’sexistenceis

diachronicallydependentonB,thentheexistenceofAateachmomenttdependson

B’sexistenceatsometimet*(typicallyatimenolaterthant).

Cantherebysynchronicontologicaldependencywithoutgrounding?Ithinkso.I

supposethatmetaphysicalgroundingisanecessitatingrelation:whenfactFwholly

3Itisobvious,Ithink,thatnoonewillwanttodefendthepositionaccordingto

whichisitpossibleforahumanbeingtobeimmaterialatthefirstmomentofits

existencebutimpossibletobeimmaterialatlatermoments.So,threecategoriesof

anti-physicalismseemsufficient.

5

groundsfactG,itisimpossibleforFtoexistwithoutG’sexisting.Incontrast,

ontologicaldependencyrunsintheoppositedirection,modallyspeaking:ifobjectO

isontologicallydependentonobjectP,itisimpossibleforOtoexistwithoutP’s

existence.Thus,synchronicontologicaldependencyofoneobjectOonPis

incompatiblewiththecompletegroundingofthefactofP’sexistencebyO’s

existence,eventhoughineachcase,theexistenceofthefactthatOexistsentailsthe

existenceofthefactthatPexists.Metaphysicianshaveattimesspokenasifthe

impossibilityofF’sexistencewithoutG’sexistencewereakindof“dependency”ofF

onG(evenAristotlespokethiswayabout“priority”4),butthissortofmodal

“dependency”shouldbesharplydistinguishedfromtrue,metaphysicaldependency,

whichisanasymmetricrelationbetweenentities,andnotmerelyafactabout

covariationacrossworlds.

Wecannowask:Arehumanbeings(andothermental-propertybearingentities)in

arelationofsynchronicontologicaldependencetophysicalthings?Iftheansweris

Yes,thenwehaveeithernon-reductivephysicalismoremergentindividualism.If

theanswerisNo,thenwehaveeitherThomistichylomorphismorCartesiandualism.

TodistinguishhylomorphismfromCartesiandualism,wecanaskthefollow-up

question:Arehumanbodiesinarelationofsynchronicontologicaldependenceto

humansouls?IfYes,thenThomistichylomorphism.IfNo,thenCartesiandualism.

Howthenshallwedistinguishnon-reductivephysicalismfromemergent

individualism?Wecouldtrytodistinguishthembytheiranswerstothesame

follow-upquestion:Isthereasynchronicontologicaldependencyofhumanbodies

onhumansouls?However,itislikelythatbothnon-reductivephysicalistsand

emergentindividualistswillanswerNotothisquestion,onthegroundsthatthere

arenoentities(onthoseviews)thatcanreasonablybeidentifiedwiththeterm

humansouls.Wecouldtryaslightlydifferentformofthequestion:Istherea

4MetaphysicsDelta,1019a.

6

synchronicontologicaldependencyofhumanbodiesonhumanpersons(or

individuals)?EmergentindividualistsshouldanswerYestothisquestion,onthe

groundthatitisonlytheemergenthumanpersonthatsuppliestheperseunityto

thematerialsthatmakeupthebody.Withouttheemergenthumanbeing,thematter

thatcomposesthehumanbeingwouldnotcomposeanyonethingatall,andso

nothingthatdeservesthelabelof‘body’wouldexist.However,itisnotcleartome

thatthenon-reductivephysicalistscouldn’talsogiveaYesanswerforthesame

reason.

Inordertodistinguishnon-reductivephysicalismfromemergentindividualism,we

havetoaskadifferentquestion,namely:Arethereinstancesofirreduciblemental-

to-physicalcausation?TheemergentindividualistsmustanswerYes,andthenon-

reductivephysicalistsshouldanswerNo.Itistruethatsomenon-reductive

physicalistshaveattemptedtoanswerYestothisquestion,despiteKim’sfamous

causalexclusionargument,butIagreewithO’ConnorandChurchillthatsuch

attemptsultimatelyfail(O’ConnorandChurchill2010).Thisconclusionfollows

fromoursharedcommitmenttobothcausalpowersasfundamentalandtoasparse

ontologyofpropertiesandfacts.Ifmentalfactsarewhollygroundedinthephysical

facts,thentherelationbetweenthementalandthephysicalisessentiallynon-causal

innature,andallgenuinecausalrelationstiephysicalfactsandeventstoother

physicalfactsandevents.

WhatpositionsdoThomistichylomorphistsandCartesiandualiststakeonthe

questionofmentaltophysicalcausation?ItisclearthatCartesiandualistsmustbe

interactionists:theymustpositdirectandfundamentalcausaltiesrunningfromthe

mindtothebodyandthebodytothemind.Otherwise,theywouldbeforcedto

embraceidealism(norealcausalpowerinthephysicalworld),epiphenomenalism

(norealcausalpowerinthementalworld),orLeibnizianpre-establishedharmony

(norealcausalpowerofthemindoverthebodyorviceversa).Thesearenot

attractiveoptions.

7

SincebothemergentindividualistsandCartesiandualistsbelieveindirectand

fundamentalcausationfrommentalfactstophysicalfacts,andsinceboththinkthat

boththementalandtherelevantmicrophysicalfacts(i.e.,factsaboutthelocations

andtrajectoriesofthemicro-particles)aremetaphysicallyfundamental,both

groupsoftheoristsmustpositthatmentalfactscanmakearealdifferencetothe

behaviorofphysicalentities,adifferencethatcannotbeaccountedforintermsof

thecausalpowersofthosemicrophysicalentitiesalone,includingthepowers

associatedwiththefourfundamentalphysicalforces(gravitation,electromagnetism,

weakandstrongnuclearforces).Therefore,theymusteitherpositafifth

fundamentalforce(amentalorpersonalforce)orpositatleastlocalandtemporary

violationsofmass-energyconservation.5

TheissueismorecomplicatedwhenweturntoThomistichylomorphists.For

hylomorphists,manycausalpowersofthebodyanditsparts(evenitsultimate,

microscopicparts)areatleastpartlygroundedintheessentialandaccidental

propertiesofthesoul(orform).Theformalcausationthatrunsfromsoulto

corporealorgansisaspeciesofmetaphysicalgroundingandnotofcausationproper

(whatAristoteliansrefertoasefficientcausation).Thus,thesoulactsuponothers

onlyindirectly,usingcorporealorgansasinstruments.Thereneedbenodirect

causationfrommindtobody.Consequently,thereneedbeneitherafifth

fundamentalforcenoranyviolationofconservationlaws.Thenomological

completenessofmicro-physicsisnothreattotherealandirreduciblepowerofthe

macroscopicorganism,becausethehylomorphistnolongersupposesthe

microphysicalfactstobefundamentalandungrounded.Itisthesoul(form)thatis

5Cartesiandualistsandemergentistsmightarguethatquantumcollapsephenomenaprovidesanavenueforrealdownwardcausationwithoutnewfundamentalforcesorviolationsofconservation.Infact,Iwilldefendsuchapositionmyself,butIarguethatsuchdownwardinfluenceisbestunderstoodasinvolving,atleastinpart,theAristoteliannotionofformalcausation,ratherthanbeingunderstoodintermsofstandardevent-eventcausation.

8

responsible(inpart)fortherelativelocationsandtrajectoriesofthemicrophysical

parts:themicrophysicallawssimplytakeasinputswhatis(already)partly

groundedinthenatureofthewhole,livingandrationalperson.

Hereistheresultingconceptualmap:

Figure1.

Iwanttomakeonemoreattemptataconceptualmapoftheterritory,thistimein

termsofmetaphysicalgrounding.Cartesiandualiststakeboththemindandthe

bodytobecompleteandindependentsubstances.Forsuchdualists,thefactsabout

themindarenotevenpartlygroundedbythefactsofthebody,norarethefacts

aboutthebodypartlygroundedbythefactsaboutthemindorsoul.Incontrast,

Thomistichylomorphistsdotakemanyfactsaboutthebody(evenaboutitsultimate

orsimpleconstituents,ifthereareany)tobeatleastpartlygroundedinfactsabout

thehumansoul(astheAristotelianformofthebody).Emergentindividualistsmay

alsotakecertainmereologicalfactsaboutthebodyanditsparts(e.g.,thefactthat

Isthemindontologicallydependent(synchronically)onthe

body?

YesIstherementaltophysicalcausation?

Yes:EmergentIndividualism

No:Non-reductivePhysicalism

NoIsthebodyontologicallydependentonthesoul?

Yes:Thomistic

Hylomorphism

No:CartesianDualism

9

thesematerialentitiesdocomposeasinglething)tobeatleastpartlygroundedin

factsabouttheemergenthumanindividual.

Non-reductivephysicalistsdenythatthebodyisevenpartlygroundedbythesoul,

buttheyinsistthatthesoulisatleastpartly(and,infact,wholly)groundedbythe

body.Thus,wehavesofardistinguishedbothCartesiandualismandnon-reductive

physicalismfromeachotherandfromtheremainingtwocategories,butwehave

notyetdistinguishedbetweenThomistichylomorphismandemergent

individualism.

ThedifferencebetweenThomistichylomorphismandemergentindividualism

seemstolieintherealmofcausation.Thomistsagreewithemergentistsinthinking

thatitismetaphysicallyimpossibleforahumanbeingtobegintoexistwithoutthe

synchronicparticipationofcertainphysicalentities(suchasthehumanovum).

Moreover,itispartoftheveryessenceofhumanbeingsthatwehavesucha

beginning.However,oncewehumanbeingshavebeguntoexist,wearecapableof

continuingtoexistwithoutthecooperationofanyphysicalentitywhatsoever.For

emergentindividualists,incontrast,theexistenceofahumanbeingdependsateach

momentonthecooperationofthephysicalpartsthatmakeupthehumanbody,and

thiscausaldependencyisitselfessentialtothepersistence(andnotjustthe

origination)ofahumanbeing.

ThisschemewouldseemtoleaveuswithtwopossibleversionsofCartesian

dualism:thosewhoagreewithThomistsinthinkingthatthereisanessentialcausal

dependencyofthesoulonthebodyatitsfirstmomentofexistence,andthosewho

denyanysuchessentialcausaldependency.Infact,thefirstsortofCartesian

dualismseemsveryhardtojustify.Hylomorphistshaveanexplanationforthe

essentialcausaldependencyofthesoulonthebodyatitsorigin:namely,thethesis

thatthenaturalstateofthehumanbeingisthatofasinglesubstancewithboth

mentalandphysicalpowers.Inrationalanimalslikeus,ourintellectualpowersare

10

essentiallydependentoncertainofourcorporealpowers,namely,oursensory

powers.Allofouruniversalsandallofouruniversalknowledgearederived(by

abstraction)fromtheinformationreceivedthroughoursenses.ForAristotelians

(bothancientandmodern),sensorypowersareessentiallytiedtothesensitivities

ofcorporealsenseorgans.Thecorporealsenseorganhasamongitsessentialand

fundamentalpassivecausalpowerssystematicsensitivitiestothepresenceofreal

qualitiesintheenvironment.Ahumanbeingcannottakeinsuchsensory

informationwithoutabody,andwecannotexerciseourintellectualpowerswithout

suchsensoryinformation.

Thephysicalcomponentsofthebodydonothavethesesensorypowers,either

individuallyorcollectively,exceptasthelivingbodyofanensouledhumanbeing.If

ahumanbeingweretobegininadisembodiedcondition,heorshewouldutterly

lackthesesensorypowersandwouldlackthecapacitytogainthem(barring

miracles).Therewouldbenosoul-lesshumanbodieswiththemissingpowerswith

whichthedisembodiedhumanbeingcouldbeunified.Abeinginsuchacondition

couldnothavethehumanpowersofintellectatallandsocouldnotbeahuman

being.Sincehumanityisessentialtous,nohumanbeingcanbegintoexistexceptas

ahumanbeing.Thus,humanbeingscannotbegintoexistinadisembodiedstate.

Onceahumanbeinghasbeguntoexistandoncehisorherintellectualpowersbegin

tobeexercisedinsustainedactivitiesofcontemplationofuniversaltruth,that

humanbeingcanpersistinexistencewithoutthecooperationofeitherthesense

organsortherestofthebody.

TheCartesiandualist,incontrast,hasnosuchstorytotell.IfaCartesianhumansoul

weretobeginwithoutabody,itwouldhaveallthepowersthatareessentialto

beinghuman:itwouldsimplyneedtobe“hookedup”intherightwaytotoasoul-

lesshumanbody,whichwouldnolongerbeametaphysicalimpossibility.

Therefore,weobtainthefollowingmap:

11

Figure2.

Thismapprovidesuswithasecondwayofdistinguishingemergentindividualism

fromThomistichylomorphism,namely,whetherthisisanessentialcausal

dependenceofthehumanpersononthehumanbodyateachmomentofthe

person’sexistence.Wehaveseenwhythehylomorphistdeniesthepossibilityofa

disembodiedexistenceofapersonatthebeginningofhisexistence,butwehavenot

yetfoundwhytheemergentindividualistwantstoextendthisimpossibility

throughouttheperson’slife.Wemustseekafurtherfactorthatexplainswhythe

emergentindividualistwantstomakethisextensionandtheThomistdoesnot.

Isthemindwhollygroundedbythe

physical?

Yes:Non-reductivePhysicalism

No:Isthebodypartly

groundedbythesoul/emergentself?

Yes:Isthesoul/self

essentiallycausallydependentonthebodyateverymoment?

Yes:EmergentIndividualism

No:Thomistic

Hylomorphism

No:CartesianDualism

12

Thisfurtherfactorwouldseemtoconsistintheemergentindividualist’sassuming

thatthephysicalrealmhasacertainkindofcausalpriorityoverthepersonaland

mental.Thissubtlepriorityfindsitsexpressionintheterm‘emergence’:the

emergentindividualistassumesthatthepersonalormentalemergesfromthe

physical,whichpresupposesthatitisthephysical(andperhapsonlythephysical)

thathasthecausalpowertoproduceaninstanceofpersonality.Giventhispicture,it

isnotsurprisingthattheemergentindividualistsupposesthatthereisacausal

dependenceofthementalonthephysicalateachmomentofamentalorpersonal

thing’sexistence.Hylomorphists,incontrast,makenosuchassumptionaboutthe

causalpriorityofthephysical.Theyaremorelikelytothinkthatthepersonalorthe

super-personalhasthecausalpowertogenerateaperson,justaslivingentities

havethepowertogeneratenewlivingthings,inwhichcaseitwouldbe

unsurprisingforthemtosupposethatathingwithintellectual(non-material)

powersmighthavethepowertosustainitselfinexistence,withoutthecooperation

ofphysicalentities.

Wehavethenidentifiedthreecriticalissuesthatdivideemergentindividualists

fromThomistichylomorphists:

(i)Isthepowertocreateandsustainpersonspossessedbyandonlybymicro-

physicalentities?

(ii)Aredisembodiedhumanpersonspossible?

(iii)Howdoesthemindaffectthebody:byformalcausation(aspeciesof

metaphysicalgrounding)orbydirectcausalaction?

Iwilltakeupeachoftheseissuesinthefollowingthreesections.

3.Bottom-Up,Top-Down,orOn-a-Level:WhatCausesHumanBeings?

13

EmergentindividualistsowemuchtotheBritishEmergentists,especiallySamuel

Alexander(Alexander1920).Alexander’scentralthemewastheunityofnature,

understooddiachronically.Heembracedanevolutionarypictureoftheworld,with

nocausaldiscontinuitiesinnature.O’ConnorandChurchill(2010,278)echothese

themes:

“Itisenoughthatateveryjunctureintroducingsomenewkindofcausally

discontinuousbehavior,thereisacausalsourceforthatdiscontinuityinthe

networkofdispositionsthatunderlieit.Inshort:unityintheorderofthe

unfoldingnaturalworldneednotinvolvecausalcontinuityofbehavior,only

continuityofdispositionalstructure.”

Asatheist(andnotadeist),Idon’tfindsuchacommitmenttoabsolutecausal

continuityofnaturetobeobligatory.Iwouldn’truleouttheoccasionaloccurrence

ofdirectdivineinterventions–actsofspecialcreation.Myopennesstosuch

discontinuityisespeciallyclearattwocrucialpoints:theoriginoflife,andtheorigin

ofhumanity.

Nonetheless,evenifIwerecommittedtonaturalcontinuitythroughtime,Iwouldn’t

bepersuadedthatitisthemicro-particlesthatmustpossessthecausalpower

neededtoexplaintheoriginoflivingorganismsandconscioushumanbeings.Why

notattributethispowertocompositesubstancesthatarenon-living?Inparticular,

therearethreegenuinepossibilities:thecosmos,orplanetsorplanetarysystems,or

complexinorganicsystemswithholisticchemicalandthermodynamicalproperties.

Foremergentists,cosmichistoryisoneofgradualontologicalaggregation:tobegin

with,therewereonlyelementaryparticles,then(perhaps)substantialatoms,then

molecules,thenlargersystemswithvariousthermodynamic,convective,and/or

crystallinestructure,andthenfinallylivingthings(includingconsciousandfree

14

persons).Ateachstage,thesmallerentitiesexerciseatsomepointtheirlatent

powerstocombineandformnewsubstances.

Thereis,however,analternativestorythatcouldbetold,onethathasprominent

metaphysicaladvantages.Thisalternativecosmichistoryisoneofgradual

disaggregationandsplintering.Inthebeginning,therewasasinglesubstance,the

cosmos,whicheventuallybrokeupintoproto-clusters,thengalaxies,thenstarsand

planetarysystems,thenproto-ecologicalsystemswithinherentfeaturesofa

convectiveandthermalnature,thenbioticsystemsconsistingofpopulationsof

identicalone-celledorganisms,andfinallyindividualmulti-cellularorganisms.At

eachstage,existingsubstancesgiverisetonewsubstancesbydivision,not

aggregation.

TheBigBangmodelsuggeststhattheworldconsistsofasinglesubstanceinthe

immediateaftermathofthesingularity.Althoughitistruethatphotons,leptons,and

quarkssoonappear,itisfarfromobviousthattheyconstitutecompletesubstances

atthatpoint.Thephenomenaofwidespreadquantumentanglements,carryingas

theydoimplicationsofontologicalholismornon-separability,tellsintheopposite

direction.Icallthisnarrative‘de-escalation’.

De-escalationhasaclearadvantageoveremergence:itrequiresateachstageonlya

singleagentofefficientcausation,anentitywithanactivecausalpowerwhose

exerciseresultsinamultiplicityofnewsubstance.Emergence,incontrast,depends

onthecollaborationofalargenumberofindependentagents,jointlyexercisingaset

ofcomplementarycausalpowers.Emergencerequiresalarge-scaleconspiracyof

mutuallyagreeingcausalpowerspossessedbythelargenumberofsmallerentities

thatspontaneouslyjointogetherinforminganewsubstance.De-escalation,in

contrast,involvesatmosttwoentities,anagentandpatient,thefirstcausingthe

secondtoundergodisintegrationintoalargepluralityofnewentities.

15

Thisisnotperhapsadecisivefact,butweshould,otherthingsbeingequal,prefer

accountsthatavoidbruteconspiraciesamonglargenumbersofindependentagents.

Emergencewouldrequireaveryimprobableandadhocpre-establishedharmony

amongthepowersofthemanymutuallyunifyingparts--acoordinateddistribution

ofmutuallyexercisablepowers.Thisproblemramifiesasthenumberof

componentstobeunifiedincreases.Itbecomesquiteuntenablewhenbillionsof

componentsmustunitewitheachother.

De-escalationcoheresnicelywithhylomorphism,whichinturnoffersa

correspondinglysimpleaccountofsubstantialpersistence:hylomorphismlocates

thesourceofthepersistentunityofeachsubstanceinasingleagent,thesubstantial

form.Thepresenceofthemanymaterialpartsservesmerelyasthepatientofthe

formalaction,asenablingconditionsfortheexerciseoftheform’sformalpowers.

Theseenablingconditionsarebuiltintotheformitself,requiringnopriormutual

agreement.Incontrast,emergencerequiresthatthesamekindofcollaborative

conspiracyofindependentpowersneededtobringthecompositesubstanceinto

existencepersistthroughoutthesubstance’spersistence.

Howexactlydoessuchde-escalationwork?Answeringthisquestionwouldinvolve

somesubtleinteractionbetweenmetaphysicsandempiricalscience.Mycurrent

proposalisthatsubatomicparticlesdidnotconstituteAristoteliansubstancesinthe

earlyhistoryoftheuniversebutdidsoonlymuchlater,asthecosmoscooledand

separated.Notallparticlesseparatedfromtheoriginalcosmicsubstanceasdistinct

substancesintheirownright:somebecameinsteadnon-substantial,integralparts

ofothersub-cosmicsubstances,suchasgalaxiesandsolarsystems.Stillothers

eventuallyendedupaspartsofprebioticproto-ecosystems,andfinallyas

constitutingsubstantialpopulationsofunicellularorganisms.Thefirstsubstantial

organismsmayhavebeenmulticellularinconstitution,asdiscreteandcooperating

populationsmicro-organismsachievedjointreproduction.Ateachstage,the

16

substantialformofthelargersubstancecontainedwithinitthepotentialof

generatingnewsubstancesatasmallerscale.

Howdoesallthisspeculativenaturalhistoryrelatetoourpresent-dayconditions?

Wenowfindsubstancesatmultiplelevelsofscale,includingperhaps:galaxiesand

solarsystems,ecosystems,unicellularcolonies,multicellularorganisms,thermal

substances,subatomicparticles.Thesubstantialformsofcompositesubstances

(thatisallformsexceptthoseoffundamentalparticles)havethepowertotakeand

toexpelsmallerentities,whichexistassubstanceswhenseparatedfromthelarger

composite.Ifasystemisdestroyedorsuffersamputation,newsubstancesata

smallerscalearecreated.De-escalationtheoryfromemergentismbyrefusingto

locatetheultimateexplanationofallthesetransformationsintheformsofthe

ultimateparticlesalone.

4.TheIntermediateState:WhynotDisembodiedPersons?

Fromahylomorphicperspective,thepersistenceofhumanbeingsbeyondthedeath

ofthebodyisnotimpossible.Ifhumanbeingsarenotcausedtobegintoexistbythe

jointactionofmicro-particles,whyassumethattheyarecausedtopersistin

existencebysuchactionofmicro-particles?Whycan’tthehumanbeingpersistin

existence(andpersistinengaginginintellectualactivities,likethecontemplationof

abstracttruths)despitethedestructionofthebody?

CriticsofThomisticHylomorphism(includingO’ConnorandJacobs2013)offertwo

principalobjectionstothedisembodiedpersistenceofhumanpersons(theso-called

intermediatestatebetweendeathandresurrection):theCheshireCatobjection

(formswithoutmatterareimpossibleinthewaythatsmileswithoutfacesare

impossible)andtheDion/Theonobjection(thepersoncannotbecomeidentical

withoneofhisownproperparts).

17

TheCheshireCatobjection.

CriticsofThomismoftenarguethatmatter-lessformisasinconceivableasthesmile

ofLewisCarroll’sCheshireCat,whichsurvivesaftertherestofthecathas

disappeared.Theobjectionassumesthattherecan’tbeformwithoutmattertobe

formed.

WeshouldfirstnotethatthisisanobjectionnotjusttoSt.Thomasbutalsoto

Aristotle.Aristotleproposedthatthehumansoulistheformofthebody,andyet

thereexistcelestialintelligences(alsocapableofintellectualactivity)thatare

completelydevoidofmatter.DefendersoftheCheshireCatobjectionmustsuppose

thatAristotlewasdeeplyconfusedabouthisownnotionofformanditsrelationto

theintellect.

TheCheshireCatobjectionispredicatedontheassumptionthatformsare

structures,andthatstructuresaresetsofpropertiesorfacts,factsaboutthe

intrinsicnaturesofathing’smaterialpartsandabouttherelationsamongthose

parts.Athingwithoutmaterialpartscouldhavenostructure,andthereforenoform.

However,Aristotelianformsarenotstructures.Theyareinsteadthemetaphysical

groundsofstructure.So,itisnotimpossibleforthosegroundstoexistinthe

absenceofwhatisgrounded.Tobeprecise,formsarepartialgroundsofstructure:

structureisalsopartlygroundedintheexistenceofsuitablematter.Thehumansoul

canexistwithoutbeingtheactualgroundofcorporealstructuresolongasitisstill

thegroundofsomeactivity.Inthecaseofhumanbeings,thesoulcanbetheground

ofpureintellectualactivity,whichdoesnotessentiallydependontheexistenceofa

body.Asoulthatisengagedinsuchactivitycansurvivethedestructionofitsbody.6

6Arethesoulsofhumanbeingswhohavenotyetreachedtheageofreasonnot

naturallyimmortal?Ifso,itwouldstillbepossibleforGodtoenable

18

TheDion/Theonobjection

Howcanthehumanbeingbecomposedofbothbodyandsoulatonepointintime

andthenbeidenticaltothesoulaloneatalaterpointintime?Thatis,howcana

wholebecomeidenticaltooneofitsproperparts?Thiswouldentaileitherrelative

identity(thesoulisidenticaltothepersonatthelatertimebutnotidenticaltoit

attheearliertime)orthedenialoftheirreflexivityofproperparthood(the

personisalwaysidenticaltothesoulandsoisaproperpartofitselfpriortodeath),

orthedenialofWeakSupplementation(thedisembodiedpersonafterdeath

wouldhavehissoulasaproperpart,withouthavinganyotherpartthatdoesnot

overlapwithit).

TheStoicphilosopherChrysippus(c280BC-c206BC)exploitedthisdilemma(in

hisDion-Theonparadox)asaproblemforanyaccountinwhichasubstancecanlose

oneofitsproperparts.SupposethattheunfortunateDionloseshisleftfootto

amputation.Let’scallthepost-amputationperson‘Theon’.IfwesupposethatTheon

isidenticaltoDion,wefaceaproblem.ConsiderDion-Minus:theproperpartofDion

(priortoamputation)thatincludeseverythingbuthisleftfoot.ItseemsthatDion-

MinusisidenticaltoTheon:thetwoconsistoftheverysamematerialthings

arrangedinthesameway.So,ifDionisidenticaltoTheon,heis(oratleast

becomes)identicaltooneofhisownproperparts(Dion-Minus).YetDionandDion-

Minusaresurelydistinctentities.

(supernaturally)anysuchhumanbeingtobegintoexercisesuchintellectualpowers

prematurallyandtherebytosurvivedeath.Alternatively,itmightbethatoncethe

humanbeingexists,withthenaturalcapacityforabstractthought,thehumansoul

canpersistastheenduringgroundforthatcapacity.

19

PetervanInwagen(1981,123-5)correctlyidentifiedthebestsolutiontotheDion-

Theonparadox:simplytodenytheexistence(priortotheamputation)ofDion-

Minus,bydenyingthedoctrineofthearbitraryfusionofundetachedparts.The

partsofDioncomposesomething(namely,Dion),butpropersubsetsofthoseparts

(suchasthepartsofDionexcepthisleftfoor)composenothingwhatsoever.Hence,

DiondoesbecomeTheonwithoutbecomingidenticaltoanyofhisproperparts.

AsO’ConnorandJacobspointout(O’ConnorandJacobs2013),Thomistic

hylomorphistsfaceaprimafaciedifficultyinapplyingvanInwagen’ssolution:they

cannotdenythatthesoulexistspriortodeath,andtheyseemtobecommittedto

thesoul’sbeing(priortodeath)aproperpartofthehumanbeing.Therefore,when

ahumanbeingisreducedatdeathtoasoulwithoutabody,itwouldbecome

identicaltosomethingthathadexistedasoneofitsownproperparts.

Itiscrucialtodistinguishbetweentwosensesof‘part’:abroadandanarrowsense.

Inthenarrowsense,thesoulisneverpartofthehumanbeing(itisnotoneofthe

humanbeing’sintegralparts,touseThomas’slanguage).Thesoulgroundsthe

existenceofthehumanbeingateachmomentintime,whetherthehumanbeingis

composite(beforedeath)ormereologicallysimple(afterdeath).

Inthebroadsense,thesoulispartofthepersonateachmomentofhisorher

existence,bywayofbeingoneofthemetaphysicalcomponentsoftheperson,butso

toaretheperson’saccidents(includinghisorherintellectualactionsandactivities).

Beforedeath,thepersonisconstitutedbysoul,body,andaccidents;afterdeath,by

soulandaccidentsalone.Bydenyingthedoctrineofarbitraryfusions,the

hylomorphistcandenythatthereisanythingconstitutedbyjustthesouland

accidentspriortodeath,thusavoidingtheDion/Theonparadox,justasvanInwagen

does.

5.FromtheMindtotheBody:FormalCausationorFundamentalForce?

20

EmergentindividualistsandThomistichylomorphistsagreethatinsomesensethe

bodyispartlygroundedinfactsaboutthewholeperson.Foremergent

individualists,itisholisticfeaturesoftheperson(includingthewholeperson’s

causalinteractionswiththepartsofthebody)thatprovidethebodywithitsperse

unity.Itisbyvirtueoftheseemergentfactsthatthepartsofthebodycomposea

singlething.However,O’Connorandhiscollaboratorsseemtoassumethatthese

mereologicalorcompositionalfactsaboutthebodyaretheonlyonesgroundedin

theemergentself.Likephysicalists,emergentindividualistsassumethatallnon-

mereologicalfactsabouttheindividualmicroscopicparticlesorfields(e.g.,facts

concerningtheircausalpowersandspatialandspatiotemporalrelations)are

metaphysicallyindependentandfundamental.Incontrast,hylomorphiststakeall

suchfactsaboutmicroscopicpartstobeatleastpartlygroundedinholisticfacts

aboutthecompositesubstancestowhichtheybelong.

Consequently,emergentindividualistsandhylomorphistshavefundamentally

differentconceptionsaboutthewayinwhichthemicrophysicalpartsofthebody

areaffectedbytheemergentselforAristotelianform.Foremergentists,this

influenceisprimarilycausal(inthenarrowsenseofdirectefficientcausation):the

selfmovestheparticlesbyexertingonthemsomethinglikeafundamentalphysical

force.Forhylomorphists,incontrast,thesoulisaformalcause,notjustofthebody

asawhole,butalsoofeachofthebody’smicroscopicparts.Thesoulisthe

metaphysicalgroundofthecausalpowersofthemicroscopicparts,andthesoulacts

uponthephysicalworldindirectly,throughthepartsofthebodyasinstruments.

Thereissomesimilaritybetweenthehylomorphicconceptionofthecausalroleof

thesoulandthemodelofstrongemergencedevelopedbyCarlGillett(Gillett2002,

2003,2006).Inbothcases,themicroscopicparticlesandfieldshavethecausal

powerstheydobecauseoftheirinclusioninawholeofacertainkind.Inneither

caseisthewholeassigneditsowncausalpowertomoveitsconstituentparticles.

21

However,therearetwokeydifferencesbetweenhylomorphismandGillett’sstrong

emergence.First,Gillettissilentonanyrelationofmetaphysicaldependency

betweenthepartsandthewhole.Thisleavesopenthepossibilitythatthepowersof

eachmicroscopicpartareaffected,notbyitsinclusioninawholeofacertainkind,

butsimplybythepresenceinitsenvironmentofalargenumberofother

microscopicentities,suitablyarranged.Suchapossibilityisexcludedby

hylomorphism,sincethelocationandarrangementoftheothermicroparticlesis

ultimatelygroundedinthenatureofthewhole,andnotviceversa.

Second,Gillettimplicitlyexcludesthepossibilitythatthewholecouldinstantiate

anystateorengageinanyactivitythatisnotwhollyconstitutedbythearrangement

andmovementofitsconstituentparticles.Consequently,hedoesnotattributetothe

wholeanyimmanentcausalpowers—anypower,thatis,toengageinanintrinsic

activitythatisnotstronglyandlocallysupervenientonthesuccessivestatesand

movementsofitsmicro-particles.Incontrast,Thomistichylomorphiststakethe

humanbeingtobecapableofintellectualactivitiesthatarenotdependentonany

corporealorganandsoneednotsuperveneonthestateofthebody.

Hylomorphistscaneasilyaccommodatethesynchronicdependenceofmuch

intellectualactivityonthestateofthebrain.Activitiessuchasabstraction,inference,

classification,recognition,deliberation,anddecisionallrequiretheuseofinternal

imaginativerepresentations(St.Thomas’sphantasms),whichessentiallyinvolve

essentiallycorporealstates.Theonlyhumanactivitiesthatcanoccurindependently

ofthebodyareactsofpurecontemplationofabstract,whollygeneralfactsand

possibilities.7

7Godcanenhancetheintellectualactivitiesofdisembodiedsoulsbyprovidingthem

(miraculously)withtherequiredphantasms.However,therewouldbenosubsisting

soulsotoenhanceiftherewerenotsomething(purecontemplation)thatthe

disembodiedsoulcoulddonaturally.

22

O’ConnorandChurchill(O’ConnorandChurchill2010,276)objectthatGillett’s

modelofmind-to-bodycausationistoolimitedinitsscope:

“[A]llwewouldhaveembracedarementalpropertiesthatplayakindof

structuringroleintheworld’sdynamics.Theydonodistinctivecausal

work—providenoextracausaloomph.Thereis,indeed,astronganalogy

heretotheroleplayedbyspatialandtemporalrelationsinNewtonian

mechanics,asconstruedbyacausalpowerstheorist.Suchrelations,one

mightsay,provideanecessaryframeworkfortheinterplayofdispositional

entities,whilethemselveshavingnodispositionalnature.Surelyour

nonreductionistphysicalistwantsmorethanthisbywayofthecausal

relevanceofthemental.Morethanbeinglocal,nondispositionalconstraints

onthewayfundamentalphysicalcausesoperate,ourbeliefs,desires,and

intentionsthemselvesdirectlycontributetotheunfoldingdynamicsofour

behavior.”

Thisoverlooksthepossibilityofactionthroughinstrumentalintermediaries.Evenif

themindcannotactdirectlyonthebody,itcanactindirectly(throughthebody)on

otherphysicalobjects.Thewholesubstancehasrealcausalpowersofitsown:the

causalpowersofitspartsaremetaphysicallygrounded(atleastinpart)onthose

holisticpowers,makingtheactionofthemicroscopicpartsmerelyinstrumentalin

nature(seeKoons2014formoredetails).Inaddition,onthehylomorphicaccount,

thesoulhasthepowertoengageinrationalactivities(resolvingitelfupona

decision,forexample),therebysynchronicallyaltering(viaformalcausation)the

intrinsicfeaturesandrelationsofitsmicroscopicparts.

Won’tthisalterationofthemicroscopicpartsinvolvetheintroductionofnew

fundamentalforcesorviolationsofmass-energyconversion,whetherwecallthis

‘formal’or‘efficient’causation?No,thiswouldfollowonlyifweassumedthatthe

23

micro-particleshave,independentlyoftheexerciseofhumancausalpowers,precise

locationsandtrajectoriesinacommonspatiotemporaldomain.Thequantum

revolutionofthelastonehundredyearsunderminestheDemocriteanmetaphysical

assumptionsharedbyphysicalists,Cartesiandualists,andemergentindividualists.

IntheCopenhageninterpretation(developedbyBohrandhiscollaborators),the

microphysicalfactsconsistmerelyintheattributiontomicroscopicentitiesof

certainpotentialities,andthesepotentialitiesessentiallyincludecausalrelationsto

macroscopicsystems.Aquantumdoesn’ttypicallyhaveanypositionormomentum

atall(notevenavagueorfuzzyone):ithasmerelythepotentialtointeractwith

macroscopicsystemsasifithadsomedefinitepositionormomentum(orother

observablefeature)atthemomentoftheinteraction.Thus,thequantumworld(so

understood)canbeneithermetaphysicallyfundamentalnoracompletebasisfor

themacroscopicworld.

Ofcourse,thissituationgivesriseimmediatelytoapuzzle:what,then,isthe

relationshipbetweenthemacroscopicandquantumworlds?Presumably,

macroscopicphysicalobjectsarewhollycomposedofquanta.How,then,canthe

quantafailtobemetaphysicallyfundamentalandcompletebasisforthe

macroscopicworld?

Hylomorphismoffersareadyanswertothispuzzle.Themicroscopicconstituentsof

macroscopicobjectshave(atthelevelofactuality)onlyanindirectrelationtospace

andtime:theyarelocated(roughly)somewhereatatimeonlyquaconstituentsof

somefundamental,macro-ormesoscopicsubstance(intheAristoteliansense).Such

microscopicobjectsarenotmetaphysicallyfundamentalintheirentirety,andtheir

metaphysicallyfundamentalfeaturesdonotprovideacompletebasisforthe

featuresofthesubstantialwholestheycompose.

24

AlthoughtheCopenhageninterpretation,withitssomewhatsimplisticdualismof

quantumandclassicalworlds,hasfallenoutoffavorinrecentyears,Nancy

Cartwrighthasdefendedamorepluralisticversion:thedappledworldpicture

(Cartwright1999).Onthisview,theworldconsistsofavarietyofdomains,eachat

adifferentlevelofscale.Mostofthesedomainsarefullyclassical,consistingof

entitieswithmutuallycompatibleorcommutativeproperties.Atmostonedomainis

accuratelydescribedbyquantummechanics.Sincelocationdoesnot(forquantum

objects)“commute”withotherobservables,likemomentum,thequantumobjects

areonlyintermittentlylocatedinordinary,three-dimensionalspace,althoughthey

alwaysretainaprobabilityofinteractingwithclassicalobjectsatadefinitelocation.

Interactionbetweenquantumpropertiesandclassicalproperties(includingthoseof

experimentersandtheirinstruments)precipitatesanobjectivecollapseofthe

quantumobject’swavefunction,asaresultofthejointexerciseoftherelevant

causalpowersoftheobjectandtheinstruments,andnotbecauseoftheinvolvement

ofhumanconsciousnessandchoice.

ThemaindrawbackofCartwright’smodelisthatitdeniestheintelligibilityof

speakingofacosmicwavefunctionembracingallofreality,anapproachthathas

becomepopularinrecentyears.AlexanderPruss’straveling-formsmodel(Pruss

2014)offersaninterpretationofquantummechanicsthatisbothfriendlyto

hylomorphismandconsistentwithacosmicwavefunction.OnPruss’spicture,there

isasinglequantumwavefunctionwhichdescribesthestateofthewholeof

microphysicalrealityandwhichevolvesaccordingtoaunified,deterministiclaw

(basedonSchrödinger’sequation).However,thisquantumrealmisnotthewholeof

reality,nordoesthemacroscopicworldsuperveneuponit.

Thisquantumwavefunctioncanbetakenasascribingpotentialpositionstoeachof

theworld’squantumparticles.Someofthepotentialpositionsofsomeparticlesare

stronglycorrelatedwiththoseofotherparticles,asaresultoftheprocessknownas

decoherence.Thisdecoherencecanbethoughtofasdelimitingaverylargesetof

25

alternativeconsistenthistoriesoftheworld’sparticles.OnPruss’sview,justoneof

thesehistorieshasametaphysicallyprivilegedstatus,formingthebasisforthereal

compositionofmaterialbodies,includinglivingorganisms.Eventhoughthishistory

isnotmicrophysicallyprivileged,actingsimplyonaparwithallotherconsistent

historiesintheuniformevolutionofthequantumworld,itisontologically

distinguishedbythefactthatit,anditalone,correspondstoaworldofreal

compositeobjects.Prussineffectusesfactsaboutthe“specialquestionof

composition”(tousePetervanInwagen’sphraseinvanInwagen1995)tosingleout

onemicro-historyasthematerialbasisforaworldofmacroscopicobjects.

AlthoughPruss’sworldismicroscopicallydeterministic,themacroscopicworldis

dynamicallyindeterministic,sincetheconsistenthistorythatunderliesthat

macroscopicworldatonetimecanlater“branch”intoseveral,disjointhistories.The

substantialformsofmacroscopicobjectstraveltogetherdownjustoneofthose

branches,inawaythatisnotdeterminedatthequantumlevel,andwhichmaybe

indeterministicatthemacrolevelaswell,althoughmacroscopicagency(including

actsoffreewill)maycontributetodeterminingthedirectionof“travel”.

Inneithermodel(Cartwright’sorPruss’s)istherelationbetweenmacroscopic

actionsandmicroscopicrealityoneofefficientcausation.Inbothcases,microscopic

bodiesacquireapproximatepositionsandtrajectoriesbywayofmetaphysical

groundinginirreducibleandfundamentalmacroscopicfacts.Sucharelationof

groundingcouldevenbeusedtomakesenseofBohm’sinterpretationofquantum

mechanics,inwhichthemicroscopicworldisbothcompleteanddeterministic(but

radicallynon-localinitsinteractions).Wecouldtaketheinseparablyandradically

holisticfour-dimensionalworldofBohm’smechanicstobeametaphysically

dependentprojectionofanunderlyingfundamentalrealitythatconsistsof

macroscopicAristoteliansubstancesthatinteractlocallyandindeterministically.

ThiswouldbeanaloguoustothewaythatKantsavedhumanfreedombytakingthe

deterministicworldofNewtonianmechanicstodescribeaphenomenalrealm

26

ultimatelygroundedinanoumenalrealmoffreedom.Onceagain,therelation

betweenmacroscopicsubstancesandtheirmicroscopicpartswouldbeoneof

formalandnotefficientcausation.

6.Conclusion

Emergentindividualistsconcedetoomuchtothemicro-physicalist.First,they

concedethatallofrealityistobeexplainedultimatelyintermsofthecausalactivity

ofthemereologicallyfundamental(simple)particlesandfields.Thegenerationand

persistenceofnon-micro-physicalentities(the“emergent”entities)arealwaystobe

explainedintermsofthecausalpowersofthemicroscopicentities.Themicroscopic

domainiscausallyresponsiblefortheexistenceandpersistenceofallexceptionsto

itscausalcompleteness.Thepictureisoneofaworldthatwasoriginallyexclusively

microscopicincharacter(aworldofmereologicalorcompositionalnihilism)from

whichcompositesubstancesaregenerated,withoutappealtoanyagencyexcept

thatofthesimpleparticles.Wehavenoreasontoembracesuchapicture,inlightof

quantumholism.Thecosmoswastherefromthebeginning,anditneverconsisted

ofisolatedandunrelatedparticles.Macroscopicsubstanceshavebeentherefrom

theverybeginning.

Second,emergentindividualists(likeCartesiandualistsandphysicalists)accepta

Democriteanassumptionaboutthemetaphysicalnatureofthemicrophysical

domain:namely,thatthemicrophysicalfactsaremetaphysicallyfundamentaland

ungrounded.Thisimpliesthatifnon-microscopicentities(whethermacroscopicor

immaterial)aretomakeadifferencetheymustdosobyactinguponmicro-particles

throughtheexertionofforce.Incontrast,hylomorphistsdenythatthereisa

metaphysicallyindependentmicrophysicaldomaininthefirstplace,openingthe

possibilityofformalcausationfromwholestoparts.Modernquantumtheoryhas

alteredtheimaginativelandscapeinsuchawayastorevivetheplausibilityofthe

hylomorphicstory.

27

Canthesetwoelementsofemergentindividualismcomeapart?Itwouldseemtobe

impossibletorejectthesecondassumption(themetaphysicalfundamentalityofthe

microphysical)whilemaintainingthefirst(theultimatecausalsufficiencyofthe

microphysical).Itwouldbeimpossibleforthemicrophysicaltobeultimately

responsibleforcausingthemacroscopicdomainsifmicrophysicalfactsarepartly

groundedbythosedomains.

Whatabouttheotherwayaround?Whatifweweretoaffirmthemetaphysical

fundamentalityofthemicroscopicrealmwhiledenyingthatthereisanessential

synchroniccausaldependencyofthemindonthebody?There’saseriousproblem

forthiscombinationofviews:aversionofJaegwonKim’spairingproblem.Ifboth

themicroscopicentitiesandtheemergentselvesaremetaphysicallyfundamental,

thentheonlyrelationstyingthemtogetherarerelationsofcausaldependency.Why

isthismindtiedtothesemicroparticles?Clearly,themicroparticlesarenot

continouslycausallydependentonthemind,soitseemsthatwemustsupposethat

themindiscontinuouslycausallydependentonfactsabouttheseparticular

particles.

TheThomistichylomorphist,incontrast,hasadifferentandultimatelymore

satisfyingsolutiontothepairingproblem:themicroscopicpartsaremetaphysically

dependentonthewhole,andthesoulisthegroundofthatmetaphysicalunity.

Bibliography

Alexander,Samuel(1920),Space,Time,andDeity:TheGiffordLectures1916-1918

(London:MacmillanandCo.).

Cartwright,Nancy(1999),TheDappledWorld:AStudyoftheBoundariesofScience

(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress).

Fine,Kit(1994),“Ontologicaldependence,”ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety

28

95:269-290.

Fine,Kit(1995),“OntologicalDependence,”ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety

95:269-290.

Fine,Kit(2012),“GuidetoGround,”inFabriceCorreia&BenjaminSchnieder(eds.),

MetaphysicalGrounding:UnderstandingtheStructureofReality,Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversityPress.

Gillett,Carl(2002),“TheDimensionsofRealization:ACritiqueoftheStandardView,”

Analysis62:316-323.

Gillett,Carl(2003),“StrongEmergenceasaDefenseofNon-ReductivePhysicalism:

APhysicalistMetaphysicsfor‘Downward’Determination,”Principia6:83-114.

Gillett,Carl(2006),“SamuelAlexander’sEmergentism:Or,HigherCausationfor

Physicalists,”Synthese153:261-296.

Jacobs,JonathanD.andTimothyO'Connor(2010),“Emergentindividualsandthe

resurrection,”EuropeanJournalforPhilosophyofReligion2(2):69-88.

Koons,RobertC.(2014),“Staunchvs.Faint-heartedHylomorphism:TowardanAristotelian

AccountofComposition,”ResPhilosophica91:1-27.

O'Connor,Timothy(1994),“Emergentproperties,”AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly

31(2):91-104.

O'Connor,Timothy(2000a),PersonsandCauses:TheMetaphysicsofFreeWill,New

York:OxfordUniversityPress.

O'Connor,Timothy(2000b).Causality,mind,andfreewill,”Noûs34(s14):105-117.

O'Connor,TimothyandHongYuWong(2002),"EmergentProperties",TheStanford

EncyclopediaofPhilosophy(2002edition),EdwardN.Zalta(ed.),URL=<

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/properties-emergent/>.

O'Connor,TimothyandHongYuWong(2005),“Themetaphysicsofemergence,”

Noûs39(4):658-678.

O'Connor,Timothy(2009),“ConsciousWillingandtheEmergingSciencesofBrain

andBehavior,”inNanceyMurphy,GeorgeEllis,andTimothyO.’Connor(eds.),

DownwardCausationandtheNeurobiologyofFreeWill,Berlin:SpringerVerlag,

pp.173--186.

29

O’Connor,TimothyandJohnRossChurchill(2010),“NonreductivePhysicalismor

EmergentDualism:TheArgumentfromMentalCausation,”inTheWaningof

Materialism,RobertC.KoonsandGeorgeBealer(eds.),261-280.

O'Connor,TimothyandJonathanD.Jacobs(2003),“Emergentindividuals,”

PhilosophicalQuarterly53(213):540-555.

O’Connor,TimothyandGeorgTheiner(2010),"EmergenceandtheMetaphysicsof

GroupCognition”(withGeorgTheiner),inEmergenceinScienceandPhilosophy,

AntonellaCorradiniandTimothyO'Connor(eds.),NewYork:Routledge.

Pruss,Alexander(2014),“Thetravelingmindsinterpretationofindeterministic

theories,”http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2014/11/the-traveling-minds-

interpretation-of.html

Rosen,Gideon(2010),“MetaphysicalDependence:GroundingandReduction,”in

BobHaleandAvivHoffman(eds.),Modality:Metaphysics,LogicandEpistemology

(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress),pp.109-136.

Schaffer,Jonathan(2009),“OnWhatGroundsWhat,”inDavidManley,DavidJ.

Chalmers&RyanWasserman(eds.),Metametaphysics:NewEssaysonthe

FoundationsofOntology.(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress),pp.347-384.

vanInwagen,Peter(1981),“Thedoctrineofarbitraryundetachedparts,”Pacific

PhilosophicalQuarterly62:123–137.

vanInwagne,Peter(1995),MaterialBeings(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress).