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After the 2008 Russia-Georgia War:Implications for the Wider Caucasus

Nona Mikhelidze

Following the Georgian-Russian war in August 2008 and Russia’s ensuing recog-

nition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Caucasus has come

back into the spotlight of the international community’s attention. First, the war

highlighted that the South Caucasus conflicts are hardly ‘frozen’, while what is

increasingly frozen are the peace processes in the region. Second, the crisis gener-

ated new sources of instability throughout the post-Soviet space, not only because it

manifested a new form of Russian revisionism but also because it brought to the

fore the limits of Western policies in what the Kremlin views as its sphere of

influence, and the colliding foreign policy agendas of the major external actors

in the region. Not only in the run-up to the war, but also in the months and years

prior to it, US and European responses to Russia were firm in words but compro-

mising in deeds. Russia made it clear to the international community that it has its

own claims to the South Caucasus, that it is ready to embark on military confron-

tation in order to achieve its goals, and that in that region Moscow is the only game

in town. Third and relatedly, the war exposed the West’s inability to prevent Russia

from moving aggressively to restore its primacy over the former Soviet territory.

Thus the August war posed new challenges not only for Georgia, but also for the

wider Caucasus1 and beyond.

Even if the long-term repercussions of the Russian-Georgian crisis remain

unclear, this article seeks to analyse the main implications and challenges for the

actors in the region, as well as for the major external powers involved in Caucasian-

Central Asian affairs. It will tackle the following issues: the current political land-

scape in Georgia and the secessionist conflicts; tensions in the North Caucasus and

implications for Central Asian-Caucasian foreign policy priorities; and the new

Turkish and Russian initiatives for the resolution of regional conflicts. The argu-

ment is not that developments in the wider region (in particular in the North

Caucasus) are the direct product of the Georgian-Russian war, but rather that this

Nona Mikhelidze is Research Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali. Email: n.mikhelidze@iai.it1In this article. the term ‘wider Caucasus’ is used in a geographical sense without any strategic connotation.

The International Spectator, Vol. 44, No. 3, September 2009, 27–42 ISSN 0393-2729 print/ISSN 1751-9721 online� 2009 Istituto Affari Internazionali DOI: 10.1080/03932720903148807

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conflict opened the door to more demands for independence and thus new chal-

lenges for neighbouring countries and the international community. Before the

Russian-Georgian war, the question was whether the West could or should play

a more significant role in the South Caucasus. The urgency of the crisis and its

implications have turned that question into how the EU and the US can engage

with the region more intensively. Strengthening Euro-Atlantic policies in the

Caucasus requires a redefinition of strategy not only towards the eastern neighbour-

hood but also towards Russia. In this context, this article analyses the limits of and

leverage available to Euro-Atlantic institutions for handling conflict issues in the

region together with Moscow.

Georgia after the August war: domestic developments and trends inthe secessionist conflicts

Had Russia fought the Georgian army strictly within the confines of South Ossetia,

Mikheil Saakashvili would probably not be Georgia’s president today. Yet Russia

opted to invade Georgian-controlled territory, thus transforming the Georgian

president into the victim of an aggression. In the post-war period, the focus in

Georgia remains on damage assessment, foreign aid and rehabilitation. However as

the post-war shock ebbs, Georgia’s mishandling of the situation in the run-up to

the war has become the subject of intense discussion, with growing sectors of the

public questioning how and why Saakashvili allowed himself to be drawn into a

war that he could never win. The price the president will pay for his miscalcula-

tions is still unknown.

In the aftermath of the war, Georgia’s democratic credentials are being scruti-

nised more closely, as the country finds itself on the frontline of confrontation with

Russia. According to the 2008 State Department report on Georgia, since 2007 the

respect for freedom of speech, the press and assembly has worsened;2 public broad-

casting has become friendlier to the government and political debate about ongoing

events is lacking; ratings on political rights have also declined.3 Georgia is char-

acterised by an unbalanced system of governance in which the executive dominates

other state bodies. In response to these reports as well as a highly critical one by

the Georgian ombudsman on Saakashvili’s authoritarianism, the President has

launched a new reform programme aimed at strengthening the parliament’s pre-

rogatives of oversight over the executive; simplifying procedures for parliament

to dismiss the government; resuming public financing of opposition and

extra-parliamentary parties; and establishing a public affairs television channel

for live coverage of the activities, debates and conferences of all parties.

2‘‘News Media Feel Limits to Georgia’s Democracy’’, The New York Times, 7 October 2008, http://www.nytimes.com.3‘‘Nations in Transit – Georgia’’, Freedom House (online) (2008), http://www.freedomhouse.org.

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The opposition has called for early parliamentary and presidential elections.

Even if there is no competitive opposition in Georgia yet, some newly created

alliances may be able to mobilise public opinion against Saakashvili. One such

group is the alliance between the Republicans and the New Rights Party led by

former Georgian ambassador to the UN Irakli Alasania. Alasania is a pro-Western

politician who emphasizes the importance of Georgia’s ambition to integrate into

Euro-Atlantic institutions, while recognising that it is essential to achieve peace

with Russia through ‘‘pragmatic and principled diplomatic steps’’.4 He is viewed

as a respectable presidential candidate, including by the Abkhaz authorities, with

whom he has established contacts and dialogue. Another opposition figure is Nino

Burjanadze, leader of Democratic Movement-United Georgia. In aspiring to the

presidency she can pursue two options: proceed alone with her own party or seek

allies within Saakashvili’s circle and divide the government from within.

In view of the ongoing global financial crisis, Georgia also faces new economic

problems after the August war, including the reconstruction of damaged military

and civilian infrastructure and new challenges to the peace processes. Following the

war, the de facto president of South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity, announced that South

Ossetia seeks ‘‘unification with North Ossetia within the composition of Russia’’,5

whereas the de facto president of Abkhazia, Sergey Bagapsh, said that the Abkhaz

people support independence and entry into the Commonwealth of Independent

States (CIS) and the Russian-Belarusian ‘‘Union State’’. Unlike Abkhazia, South

Ossetia is unlikely to survive as an independent state and is far more likely to be

absorbed into the Russian Federation. The Russian President has signed friendship,

cooperation and mutual assistance treaties with both of Georgia’s breakaway

regions, pledging to protect the two republics’ borders in return for the right to

establish military bases on their territories. Moscow is now set to keep 7,600

soldiers in these regions, more than twice the number present before the war.6

The military base in Gudauta and the ex-Soviet naval base in Ochamchire will

become fully operational in 2009,7 even though Russia had agreed back in 1999

under the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe to close its base in Gudauta.

While the EU never seriously confronted Russia on this matter, from Russia’s

perspective the Black Sea area is critical for the Russian naval force, allowing it

to expand its influence into the Mediterranean. The importance of the

Abkhaz coast increased further after it became clear that the Ukraine does not

4‘‘Georgia: Another Saakashvili Friend Turns Foe’’, Eurasianet, 26 December 2008, http://www.eurasianet.org.5‘‘What’s Next for South Ossetia and Abkhazia?’’ RadioFreeEurope, RadioLiberty, 26 August 2008, http://www.rferl.org. It should be noted that within two hours of this announcement Russia de facto pressuredPresident Kokoity into retracting his statement.6‘‘EU Hurries to Deploy Beefed-Up Georgia Mission’’, RadioFreeEurope, RadioLiberty, 22 September 2008,http://www.rferl.org.7‘‘Georgia to Stop its CIS Membership from August’’, Itar-Tass News Agency, 9 October 2008, http://www.itar-tass.com.

After the 2008 Russia-Georgia War: Implications for the Wider Caucasus 29

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intend to prolong the permission for Russian naval forces to stay in Sevastopol after

2017. Moscow also ended the CIS peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia8 and sus-

pended Georgia’s membership in the organisation.9 Russian peacekeepers in

Abkhazia are now stationed in the regions under the above-mentioned treaties,

thereby contravening the six-point agreement which calls upon Russia to withdraw

to the positions it held before 6 August.10 To this, Putin has rebuked: ‘‘Russia will

not consult Western nations or Georgia when deciding how many troops to post

in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.’’11

As a result, the future role of UN observers in the conflict zones remains unclear.

In October 2008, the UN Security Council approved a four-month extension of

the UN mandate, extending it to 15 June 2009. The Kremlin is calling for a

separate mission in Abkhazia, unrelated to the United Nations Observer Mission

in Georgia (UNOMIG) headquarters in Tbilisi. The OSCE mission’s mandate also

expired on 31 December 2008. After the Russian veto on the extension of the

OSCE mandate in Georgia, the OSCE mission started its winding-down proce-

dures. Hence both Abkhazia and South Ossetia risk remaining without interna-

tional monitoring. As for the 200 EU observers deployed in the context of the

French-brokered six-point ceasefire agreement, they cannot operate within the

conflict zones. They are mandated to monitor the situation, the respect for

human rights and the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the

areas affected by the conflict, but not in South Ossetia and Abkhazia proper.

Relatedly, Russia has failed to ensure security in the conflict zones and the buffer

zone, and in the fall of 2008 numerous civilians were harassed, attacked or killed.

Internal and international developments, such as Saakashvili’s decision to reduce

defence spending significantly in 2009 and the international peace negotiations

launched in Geneva, came too late. Ever since his rise to power, Saakashvili has

tried to demonstrate that he could regain the secessionist regions by military

means, thus spawning profound mistrust in Abkhazians and Ossetians. Georgian

militaristic rhetoric as well as the military clashes in South Ossetia in 2004 per-

suaded the secessionist regions that reintegration into Georgia would threaten

their security. Saakashvili has thus done little to shed memories of Georgia’s

ultra-nationalistic past. Furthermore, the Georgian interpretation of the conflict

as one between Georgia and Russia has overlooked the aspirations of the Abkhaz

8Even though the CIS mission had always been composed exclusively of Russian troops.9Although Georgia itself took the initiative to leave the CIS during the August war and denounced Russiantroops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as ‘‘occupational forces’’.10During the August crisis, the Russian and Georgian Presidents signed a cease-fire agreement brokered byFrance which calls for the withdrawal of troops from both sides to their positions on 7 August 2008. It alsosets out that Russia should not have more troops on the ground than the 3,500 that were there before theoutbreak of hostilities. See General Affairs and External Relations, Extraordinary Meeting, Press Release,Council of the European Union, 12453/08 (Presse 236), 13 August 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/102338.pdf.11‘‘Putin Defiant on Caucasus Troops’’, BBC News, 21 September 2008, http://www.news.bbc.co.uk.

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and Ossetian people. The Geneva talks, which cover two main issues – stability and

security in the region and the return of refugees on the basis of internationally

recognised principles – have not witnessed any progress to date (July 2009).

Georgia has raised – to no avail – the issue of Russia’s non-compliance with the

six-point agreement as a result of the Russian military presence in Akhalgori, Parevi

and the Kodori Gorge, while status questions have not yet been tackled.

The wider Caucasus after the Georgian-Russian crisis

Tensions in the North Caucasus

The Georgian-Russian crisis has also posed challenges to other states in the region.

The August war destabilised the situation in the North Caucasus, exacerbating

longstanding tensions in some republics, creating new threats to stability in others

and possibly inducing new secessionist impulses. Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia

and South Ossetia could create a dangerous precedent in the region, where borders

are bitterly disputed. According to the analyst Ivan Sukhov, Moscow’s confidence

that it controls the North Caucasus may be misplaced. The Kremlin’s control over

Chechnya, for example, ‘‘was measured by the control of Vladimir Putin over

Ramzan Kadyrov’’, but now ‘‘young people have started going into the mountains

again’’.12 Chechnya remains fairly stable, but violence has increased in Ingushetia

and Dagestan. In general, the Islamic resistance movement and Islamic communities

( jama’ts) are consolidating their presence throughout the North Caucasus.

According to Federal Security Bureau (FSB) Director A. Bortnikov, over 69 terror-

ist acts were prevented in the North Caucasus in 2008 alone.13 To reach stability

in this region in the wake of the winter games in Sochi is hardly imaginable.

Ingushetia is on the brink of war as it currently faces refugee inflows from

Chechnya and North Ossetia, as well as border disputes with these autonomous

republics and internal challenges from ‘The People’s Assembly of Ingushetia’ and

armed opposition groups. The Memorial Human Rights Group reports that kidnap-

pings, shootings, murders and government violence in the North Caucasus are

‘‘daily’’ occurrences.14 Combat losses on the Russian side include high-ranking

officers from the FSB and the Interior Ministry. In addition, the Ingush opposition

has decided to pursue independence. The unrecognised People’s Parliament of

12‘‘Iug s priznakami severa: krizis v zakavkazie ugrajaet stabilnosti severokavkazkix respublik Rosii’’ [Southshowing signs of the North. The crisis in the Caucasus threatens the stability of the North Caucasianrepublics of Russia], Vremya, 12 August 2008, http://www.vremya.ru13‘‘Bortnikov: v 2008 gody rossiskie spezclujbi presekli 69 teraktov’’ [In 2008 the Russian special serviceshave prevented 69 terrorist attacks], LentaCom, ru: Bserossiskaia obshestvenno-politicheskaia internet gazeta,14 October 2008, http://www.lentaCom.ru.14‘‘PZ ‘Memorieal’: na severnom kavkaz poxishenia i obstreli pradaljaiutsia prakticheski jednevno’’[PZ‘‘Memorieal’’: In the North Caucasus the kidnappings and bombardments are practically dailyoccurrences], Kavkazkii Uzel, 11 September 2008, http://kavkaz-uzel.ru

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Ingushetiya collected over 80,000 signatures on a petition calling for independence15

and for the US to support their secession, adding that ‘‘the genocide of the Ingush

people’’ must be stopped.16

Similar trends can be detected in Daghestan, where several armed groups are

forming although without a clear leadership. The Daghestan-Azerbaijan border has

become the scene of regular military clashes between rebel groups from Daghestan

(consisting of Azeri minorities such as the Lezgins, Avars and Kumyks) and Azeri

forces. There are also reports that Russian passports are being issued in Azerbaijan’s

northern region bordering on Daghestan and populated by Lezgins, an explicit

warning that Moscow could be sending to Baku. On their part, the Lezgins have

already expressed their desire to form some kind of political entity, suggesting that

Azerbaijan may have not only the pending Karabakh conflict to solve, but also new

tensions in its northern region bordering on Russia.

Moscow’s decision to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia also found echo

in Bashkortostan, where the national movements issued a declaration stating that

Moscow, while supporting Abkhazia and South Ossetia, ignores the rights and

demands of the Bashkir people: ‘‘The Kremlin does not give the Bashkirs the

full opportunity to develop their language as the state language of the Republic

of Bashkortostan. Having eliminated the regional component in education,

Moscow has shown that it wants to transform the Bashkirs into a faceless crowd

with families or clans.’’17

The Abkhaz and South Ossetian precedents are likely to increase separatist

sentiments in the North Caucasus, although these independence movements

cannot pose a meaningful challenge to Russia in the short and medium terms.

Furthermore, despite the violence in the North Caucasus and especially in

Chechnya, which has resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths in recent

years, there has been little international response to Russian abuses. In the after-

math of the war in Georgia, it seems even less likely that the West will react to

instability and human rights violations in the North Caucasus.

Implications for the Caspian region

In the wider region, other states, faced with Russian revisionism and Western

passivity, wonder whether it is worth complicating their relations with Moscow

for the sake of limited or uncertain support from the West. Almost all have

their own minority or border issues that could render them potentially vulnerable

15‘‘Ubistvo po politicheskim motivam’’ [Assassination for political reasons], Caucasus Times, 31 August2008, http://www.caucasustimes.com.16‘‘V ingushetii opozicia vpervie stavit vopros ob otdelenii ot Rosii’’ [In Ingushetia the opposition forthe first time raises the question of secession from Russia], Novosti NEWSru.com, 31 August 2008, http://www.news.ru.com.17‘‘Non-Russians Will Jointly Press for Self-Determination, Bashkirs Say’’, Window on Eurasia, 5September 2008.

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vis-a-vis Russia. All of the Central Asian republics, first and foremost Kazakhstan

and Turkmenistan, could thus reorient their foreign policies. Astana understands

that its security depends on relations with Moscow and will thus avoid taking clear

positions in Caucasian affairs and will seek to balance its pro-Western and pro-

Russian stance. Its economic ties with Georgia remain unclear. On the one hand,

Kazakhstan began withdrawing its investments from Georgia after the war, while

on the other, the Kazakh oil company announced its intention to proceed with its

participation in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline with ensuing investments

in Georgia’s Batumi oil export terminal. Meanwhile, Russia is deepening its mil-

itary ties to Kazakhstan. After the war, the two countries conducted their largest

joint military exercise since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It coincided with the

Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) summit, which agreed upon a

more rapid deployment of forces in Central Asia. Even if potential enemies were

not identified, the statement calls on NATO ‘‘to consider the consequences of the

eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance’’.18 Moscow has also manifested

its interest in the Ayni military airfield in Tajikistan as a possible base for Russian

air forces. Kyrgyzstan also favours military cooperation with Russia. Bishkek has

announced that the US base in Manas airport will be closed on 18 August 2009.

Cooperating with Moscow in the military domain is indeed far easier for the

Central Asian regimes than cooperating with Western actors, who often condition

cooperation on domestic reforms.

Russia also seeks to strengthen its position as a transit country of Caspian energy

resources. Recent discoveries of gas reserves in Turkmenistan have altered the

importance of transport routes from the Caspian Sea to Western markets and

consequently this country’s geopolitical and geo-economic importance.

According to Gaffney’s audit report, Turkmenistan holds the second largest gas

reserves in the world, guaranteeing the supply of the Nabucco pipeline.19 From

2009 onwards, Russia intends to increase its purchase of Turkmen gas in order to

maintain a monopoly over this field. Furthermore, Medvedev and Nazarbayev have

signed a preliminary agreement on the construction of a transport corridor linking

Russia with Western China via Kazakhstan. Indeed, in the absence of strong

Western action, Astana and Ashgabat, aware of the fact that energy resources

and international projects alone do not guarantee their countries’ security, may

be better served by turning to China to secure diversity in their energy exports.

During the Georgian-Russian crisis, when the BTC pipeline was frozen,

Azerbaijan diverted its oil supplies to Russia via the Novorosijsk pipeline and to

Iran via the Neka port. After the war, Baku has continued to pump its supplies

through these routes. Furthermore, Russia has offered to buy Azerbaijan’s entire

18Sharip, ‘‘South Ossetia Tests Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy Priorities’’. http://www.jamestowns.org.19‘‘Audit Firm Confirms Huge Turkmen Gas Reserves’’, Associated Press, 14 October 2008, http://www.ap.org.

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volume of gas available for export. Hence, the development of the Nabucco and

Odessa-Brody projects is no longer certain. Azerbaijan’s uncertain foreign policy

orientations could hinder Europe’s direct access to Caspian resources, even though

it seems that Azerbaijan does not intend to take sides in the US-Russia rivalry

and is trying to maintain balanced relationships with Moscow and the West.

Nevertheless, Baku considers that ignoring Russian interests in the Caucasus can

only cause destabilisation, as the events in August 2008 demonstrated. Moreover,

the conflict showed that European and American actors lack sufficient means

(or will to use them) to protect the South Caucasus from Russia. As far as

Nagorno-Karabakh is concerned, Azerbaijan has already declared that the EU is

incapable of pursuing a unitary policy and thus cannot be considered a peace

broker in the conflict. Given the currently blocked status of peace talks on

Karabakh, the Minsk Group process led by Russia, France, and the US can also

be viewed as dead or dying. Hence, the likelihood of a persisting stalemate in the

Karabakh peace process, a likelihood which was only increased by the Russian-

Georgian war.

During the August war, Yerevan also maintained its neutrality, even though

damage from the war amounted to over $670 million. The losses would have

been even greater had Armenia not maintained ‘‘constructive relations’’ with

Georgia, as Armenia’s prime minister called them.20 Armenia is highly dependent

on Georgia in so far as Georgian ports represent Armenia’s main thoroughfares for

foreign trade (approximately 70 percent of Armenian trade transits via Georgia).21

After the war, Yerevan appears to have recognised its need for economic access

to Western markets and thus the normalisation of relations with Turkey and

Azerbaijan has become the priority of Serz Sargsyan’s foreign policy.

Furthermore, Sargsyan announced that he was ready to hold a referendum on a

compromise agreement on Karabakh, although it seems unlikely that Armenians

will vote for a compromise in a referendum. Some nationalist groups have already

launched a new movement called Miatsum (Unification), rejecting the return of

the ‘liberated territories’ to Azerbaijan. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation

(ARF), an influential nationalist party within Sargsyian’s coalition, has also rejected

Sargsyian’s initiative.22 Nevertheless, Turkish-Armenian relations seem to be enter-

ing into a new era marked first by the ‘soccer diplomacy’23 in September 2008 and

later by the meetings between officials in New York.

20‘‘Premier-ministr armenii: ‘po-nostaiashemu jizneno vanii vopros’ – eto ustanovlenie dobrososedskixotnoshenii so vsemi ctranami regiona i prejde vsevo s Azerbaijanom’’ [Armenian Prime Minister: ‘‘Thereally ‘vitally important issue’ is the establishment of good neighbourly relations with all the countries ofthe region, primarily, Azerbaijan’’], Day.Az-Vse Novosti Azerbaijana, 7 October 2008. http://www.day.az.21Killough, ‘‘Armenia in Need of an Alternative Export-Import Route’’.22Danielyan, ‘‘Armenia Debates an Elusive Peace with Azerbaijan’’.23In September 2008, Turkish President Abdullah Gul visited Armenia and attended a football matchbetween the two historically confronted parties, becoming the first Turkish leader to set foot in Armeniasince the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

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Turkey and the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform

Finally, the August war also had implications for Ankara, as Russia tried to regain

control over pipeline routes to Turkey. Ankara is an important actor in the

Caucasus, presenting itself as a neighbour and strategic and economic partner,

and provides military assistance – training and equipment – to Georgia and

Azerbaijan. In addition, Turkey is an important link for the EU to the South

Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a strategic partner for both the EU and the US,

and is developing closer relations with Russia in terms of trade and energy. Indeed

Turkey’s closer ties with Russia are also related to the resistance Ankara is facing

from the EU in its accession process. The Georgian-Russian crisis placed Turkey in

a difficult position, not only between neighbouring partner countries, but also in

the wider confrontation between the US and Russia. In view of this, Ankara stayed

out of the conflict, neither defending its regional partner Georgia nor making

official statements on the matter. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan

admitted that ‘‘certain circles want to push Turkey into a corner either with the

United States or Russia after the Georgian incident. One of the sides is our closest

ally, the United States. The other side is Russia, with which we have an important

trade volume. We would act in line with what Turkey’s national interests

require.’’24 Despite Turkey’s participation in BTC, two-thirds of its gas comes

from Russia – hence Ankara’s careful juggling between Moscow and the US and

its Caucasian partners. Indeed a new Turkish proposal for a Caucasus Stability and

Cooperation Platform (CSCP) may be read as a further step in this direction. The

CSCP aims to bring together all three South Caucasus countries, as well as Turkey

and Russia and thus to create a new regional security framework. Ethnic conflicts

would be resolved on the basis of regional cooperation. Ankara proposed a similar

plan in the late 1990s, but the initiative was never implemented. In this case also,

there are fundamental reasons to doubt the feasibility of the plan.

Armenia has been enthusiastic about the Turkish initiative and, in view of its

interest in normalising relations with its neighbours, has declared its readiness to

cooperate without preconditions, underlining however that ‘‘the resolution of the

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is possible only if Azerbaijan recognises the right of the

people of Nagorno-Karabakh to self-determination and if Nagorno-Karabakh has

a land border with Armenia’’.25 Baku, by contrast, has greeted this proposal with

scepticism. Azerbaijan continues to reject any collaboration between Ankara and

Yerevan and fears that Turkey will use this initiative as a pretext to open its borders

with Armenia. Baku in fact uses the border issue as an instrument to exert pressure

on Yerevan. The Turkish-Armenian border was closed during the war in Karabakh

and relations between the two countries have been further tensed by Ankara’s

24Aliriza, Turkey and the Crisis in the Caucasus25‘‘Russia to Host Talks Between Armenian, Azerbaijani President’’, RadioFreeEurope, RadioLiberty,1 November 2008, http://www.rferl.org.

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refusal to recognise as genocide the massacre of Armenians at the time of the

Ottoman Empire. Azerbaijan thus declared that it will not participate in the

CSCP and rejects the inclusion of Armenia in regional projects unless the issue

of Karabakh is resolved. ‘‘Karabakh will never be independent . . .. Azerbaijan will

never recognize it, neither in 5 years, nor in 10 or 20’’,26 announced Ilham Aliyev

during the inauguration of his second presidential term.

Cooperation in such a platform also seems unlikely for Tbilisi and Moscow.

Georgia considers Russia a party to its conflicts and asserts that the Kremlin will

maintain the status quo. Tbilisi affirms further that it will not collaborate with

Moscow until Russian forces remain on Georgian territory. For his part, Russian

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has declared that Moscow will not negotiate with

Saakashvili as he is ‘‘part of a special US project’’.27 Another shortcoming of the

Turkish initiative is that its proposed members do not share a common vision for

resolving their problems. First and foremost, Russia has been ambivalent about

promoting regional cooperation and economic development in the South

Caucasus, in so far as it would facilitate the region’s integration into Euro-

Atlantic institutions. Also the involvement of the secessionist regions in this pact

is unclear. They surely would like to participate on equal terms, yet the metropol-

itan states are bound to reject the inclusion on equal terms of the de facto republics

in any kind of initiative.

Turkey was probably well aware of these obstacles, and may have viewed its

proposal simply as a means to maintain the status quo and avoid major complica-

tions in the region imperiling the Caspian-Caucasian pipelines. The initiative is

also a way to retain neutrality in the region, treading carefully with Moscow while

not offending the US and the Caucasian partners. Indeed Russia and Armenia have

been rather favourable to the Turkish proposal. Furthermore, to Russia’s satisfac-

tion, Turkey’s proposal keeps Western actors at arm’s length in the South Caucasus,

as both the EU and the US have been excluded from it.

Russia has also taken the initiative to move the peace process on Nagorno-

Karabakh forward. On 2 November 2008, President Dmitry Medvedev hosted an

official meeting between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and his Armenian

counterpart Serz Sargsyan. The result of the event was a Joint Declaration over

Nagorno-Karabakh, but expectations and intentions are harder to discern than in

the CSCP. The declaration does not indicate any specific approach and only empha-

sizes the need for negotiations. Hence rather than genuinely favouring conflict

resolution, this latest Russian initiative appears to be aimed more at preserving its

influence over Armenia and extending it further over Azerbaijan. The declaration

can also be understood as the Kremlin’s attempt to restore its reputation as a

26‘‘Ilham Aliyev: ‘Azerbaijan will get its occupied lands back’’’, Topix, 26 October 2008, http://www.topix.com.27‘‘Lavrov: ‘Saakashvili Is Not Sane as a Negotiator’’’, Russia Profile.org, http://www.russiaprofile.org, 15August 2008.

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mediator in the region after the war in Georgia. One positive by-product of the

declaration, however, is that Azerbaijan may have shed ideas of regaining its lost

territories through military means, despite the rise in Azerbaijan’s defence budget.28

In this respect, notable was Russia’s veiled warning to Azerbaijan that, in the event of

renewed armed hostilities, it would intervene in the conflict on Armenia’s side,

given that Yerevan (and not Baku) participates in the Russian-led CSTO.29

EU and US engagement with the South Caucasus: limits and leveragetowards Russia

Throughout the August war, the international community was gravely concerned

about the unravelling situation. The West considered Russia’s military action as

‘‘unacceptable’’ and criticised the Kremlin for using disproportionate force during

the conflict; it condemned Russia’s decision to recognise the independence of

Georgia’s secessionist regions and called for peaceful solution of the conflicts.

However, the EU avoided sanctions towards Moscow. As admitted by the EU’s

special envoy to the South Caucasus, Peter Semneby,

the European Union recognises Georgia’s territorial integrity within the internation-

ally recognized borders. That is the basic parameter within which further measures

have to be taken . . . [yet] it is clear that we have all failed. One of our main imme-

diate objectives was to prevent the tensions that existed in Georgia and in the conflict

regions from running out of control and from developing into a war. In this sense,

we did fail.30

The Caucasus and its conflicts were never a priority for the West. The US and EU

accepted Russia’s ‘peacekeeping’ monopoly in the region, even though they could

have demanded an internationalisation of peacekeeping in the secessionist regions,

as in the temporary protectorates established in the Balkans. Furthermore, the

US and the EU failed to elaborate a realistic strategy to counter Moscow’s ambi-

tions and ensuing military aggression. Finally, US and European recognition of

Kosovo’s independence provided the cover for the crisis in Georgia, legitimising

Russia’s ensuing recognition of the two republics’ independence. Even if the West

continues to argue that Kosovo is a ‘unique case’, Russia appeals to this precedent,

regardless of the differences between these cases,31 and while accusing the West of

28International Crisis Group, Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War.29‘‘Transcript of Remarks and Response to Media Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs SergeyLavrov at Joint Press Conference of Foreign Ministers from CSTO Member States and of the CSTOSecretary General’’, Moscow, http://www.ln.mid.ru, 4 September 2008.30‘‘‘It’s Clear that We Have All Failed’, says EU’s South Caucasus Envoy’’, RadioFreeEurope, RadioLiberty, 7September 2008, http://www.rferl.org.31In the case of Kosovo, Kosovar Albanians were the subject of ethnic cleaning; whereas in the case of SouthOssetia and Abkhazia, as a result of the wars in the early 1990s, it was Georgians who were forcefullydisplaced.

After the 2008 Russia-Georgia War: Implications for the Wider Caucasus 37

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violating international law, does likewise in recognising Georgia’s breakaway

regions.

The EU now finds itself at a loss, with a weakened stance in its eastern neigh-

bourhood and thus weakened access to Central Asian natural resources, reducing its

ambitions to secure energy diversification and reduce its energy dependence on

Russia.32 This crisis demonstrated that the 27 EU member states lack a common

position regarding the eastern neighbourhood. One set of member states (led by the

Baltic states, the eastern members and the UK) calls for soft containment, while

another (led by France and Germany) calls for engagement. Following the war, the

EU established a commission, led by former UN Special Representative to Georgia

Heidi Tagliavini, to evaluate the facts around the Georgia-Russian war. The

enquiry’s objective is to uncover the causes and triggers of the war, apportion

responsibility and present the conclusions of the report to the OSCE.33 In all

likelihood, the report will fail to come up with a conclusive answer, blaming

both sides for the events and possibly diminishing some of the Kremlin’s respon-

sibility, not least to justify Europe’s passivity towards Moscow.

Interestingly, this commission was established at the same time as the talks on a

new strategic partnership between the EU and Russia – which had been suspended

in the aftermath of the war – were re-opened, despite Russia’s recognition of

independence of the two republics and its troop presence in Georgia in contraven-

tion of the six-point agreement. At the EU-Russia summit in Nice on 14

November 2008, the EU kept silent about Moscow’s military actions in Georgia

and only the Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus noted that ‘‘resuming the talks

now would expose the EU’s weaknesses for all to see’’, allowing Russia ‘‘once more

to trample over European values’’.

Limits to Western leverage towards Russia

EU and US policies in the Caucasus are interwoven with relations with Russia.

Therefore, Western policies were and remain limited by the Europe’s limited lever-

age over Russia. True, Russia has high stakes in its relations with the EU in eco-

nomic terms. Russia is dependent on Western markets for acquiring technologies

for its energy development.34 But the EU is also dependent on trade and especially

energy from Russia, and imposing economic sanctions would harm the EU as well.

Thus the prospect of isolating Russia, with its size, natural resources, nuclear

32Socor, V. ‘‘Summit Tests EU’s Capacity to Oppose Russia’s Reexpansion’’, Eurasia Daily Monitor 5,no. 165, 29 August 2008, http://www.jamestown.org.33‘‘EU Launches Probe to Find Truth Behind Georgia-Russia War’’, Deutsche Welle, 2 December 2008,http://www.dw-world.de.34A. Cohen, ‘‘Dealing with Russia’’, 9 September 2008, International Policy Analyses, http://www.arielcohen.com.

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weapons and veto right in the UN Security Council, was and remains unlikely,

particularly for the sake of the Caucasus.

‘‘A fundamentally new geopolitical situation has taken shape. The August crisis

merely precipitated the moment of truth. We demonstrated in practice, to those

who sponsored Georgia’s present regime, that we are able to defend our national

interests,’’ announced the Russian president.35 The fact is that the US, which

‘sponsored’ Georgia, also needs Russia to cooperate on issues such as counter-

terrorism and non-proliferation. Major areas of US-Russia cooperation include

multilateral initiatives such as the Six-Party Talks on North Korea, the P5þ 1

group on Iran, the Middle East Quartet, and initiatives to combat nuclear terror-

ism. In this context, the West had limited leverage to intervene in the Georgian-

Russian conflict and Russia can continue to quietly ignore Western warnings.

Potential courses of EU action

The EU is developing its relations with Georgia in the framework of the Eastern

Partnership (launched on 20 March 2009), including visa facilitation and the

establishment of a comprehensive free trade area. In this context, the EU is also

pushing for regional cooperation in the framework of the ‘Black Sea Synergy’. The

US has provided Georgia with aid for reconstruction and has decided to deepen

bilateral relations with Tbilisi. On 9 January 2009, the US and Georgia signed

a new US-Georgia Security Pact, providing assistance in the areas as democracy,

defence and security, economy, trade and energy, and cultural exchanges. The US

administration affirms however that the Charter is not ‘‘a security guarantee’’ and

that ‘‘security guarantees will come along with NATO membership’’.36

Above and beyond these initiatives and in light of the existing power balances,

a set of measures could still be implemented with the aim of altering Russian

approaches and actions in the Caucasus. The EU could

� delegitimise Russia’s recognition of Georgia’s secessionist regions by exerting

aid conditionality on countries that recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia;37

� insist on the fulfilment of the six-point agreement with Russia and, in parti-

cular, Russia’s redeployment to the 6 August lines;

� establish EU peacekeeping in Georgia and expand its civil observer mission;

� continue aid flows to Georgia under democracy and reform conditionalities;

35‘‘Poslanie federalnomu cobraniu Rossiskoi Federazii’’ [Address to the Federal assembly of the RussianFederation], Prezident Rosii, Moskva, 5 November 2008, http://www.kremlin.ru.36‘‘Georgia, U.S. Sign Strategic Partnership Charter’’, Civil Georgia, 9 January 2008, http://www.civil.geo/ge.37Socor, V. ‘‘What the European Union Can Do about Georgia After the Russian Invasion’’, Eurasia DailyMonitor 5, no. 166, 30 August 2008, http://www.jamestown.org.

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� finalise the EU-Georgia free trade agreement in order to decrease Georgia’s

export dependence on Russia;

� exert pressure on Russia through dialogue or conditionality to halt its policy of

pasportizatsiya38 among ethnic minorities within the post-Soviet republics in

order not to replicate the Georgian precedents elsewhere.

All these measures would need to be conceived within a new coherent strategy

towards the region. The EU strategy could cover different areas: conflict resolution

and dialogue with Russia on Caucasian matters; enhancement of regional cooper-

ation in the framework of the Black Sea Synergy; energy security and serious

engagement with the Caspian region. In doing so, the EU could be confronted

with a new reality: while Russia considered the EU an unbaked broker in the

Caucasus before the August crisis, Moscow may now start viewing Europe as a

rival in the region. In any event, the EU should define a common strategy with the

US for acting in the wider Caucasus and find a common approach in dialogue with

Moscow. The EU should also not foreclose on the Caucasian countries’ long-term

EU ambitions, given the power of the ‘European dream’ to reform their governing

structures and economies.39

Conclusions

This article has outlined and analysed the short-term outcome in Georgia as well as

the wider region of the August 2008 Georgian-Russian crisis. The political con-

sequences for Saakashvili’s career are unknown. Much depends on whether the

Georgian president implements the recently announced reforms. The opposition

is likely to overthrow Saakashvili only if it succeeds in forming a new, appealing

and alternative vision for the country and in coalescing around one leader. The

West bears significant responsibility and holds the necessary leverage for inducing

Georgia to pursue a democratic path. Indeed, now that the military conflict is over,

the international community should press the Georgian government to promote

the rule of law, thus creating an independent judiciary, strengthen decentralisation

and local authorities, guarantee property rights, and abolish state control over the

media.

On the other hand, conflict resolution has become less likely following the war.

While the Geneva negotiations have created a forum for dialogue, they came too

late to affect the outcome of the conflicts meaningfully. The integration of the

secessionist entities into the Russian Federation is unlikely to happen in the short

term, but could occur in the long run if the russification of these entities is

38Ukraine claims that Russia has handed out passports to residents of Crimea. See, ‘‘Russia DistributingPassports in the Crimea’’,Telegraph.co.uk, 17 August 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk.39Triantaphyllou and Tsantoulis, Looking Beyond the Georgian Crisis: The EU in Search of an EnhancedRole in the Black Sea Region.

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complete. Considering Western limits on handling Russia in the region, Georgia

cannot rely exclusively on the international community to resolve its conflicts.

Tbilisi has to elaborate a new concept of relations with Russia and become more

realistic about its accession to NATO. It is true that neither Georgia nor the

Ukraine satisfy the democratic parameters set by NATO, but even if Georgia

were to meet all requirements, several NATO members are likely to continue to

object to Georgian membership because of the tensions that would arise with

Russia and in view of the pending conflicts.

The Turkish Caucasus Stability Pact and the Russian declaration on Karabakh

are probably not going to change the situation. Moscow and Tbilisi, on the one

hand, and Baku and Yerevan, on the other, are unlikely to collaborate on such

platforms in the foreseeable future. It is also doubtful that Ankara will succeed in

improving its relations with Yerevan to such an extent that it will be able to

influence Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan. What is more likely is that

these initiatives will represent further steps in maintaining the status quo in a

manner that is acceptable to Russia, although some steps forward may be possible

in Turkish-Armenian relations.

Moscow’s decision to recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia could have far-

reaching consequences in the North Caucasus: even if the situation there has not

reached the brink, it could have a domino effect for Russia. That said, two Chechen

wars have demonstrated that the North Caucasian peoples cannot count on Russian

tolerance or Western reactions, and we are unlikely to see a renewed massive

insurgence and open conflict against the Kremlin. On the contrary, Moscow

could feel emboldened to pursue military actions in the North Caucasus.

Considering that the international community was unable/unwilling to stand up

to the invasion of sovereign Georgia, it is unlikely that it would react to a Russian

military escalation in the North Caucasus.

All these trends are reinforced by the EU’s implicit acceptance of the status quo.

In the long run, however, only the economic development of the metropolitan

countries, their genuine democratisation and real prospects of becoming anchored

in Euro-Atlantic structures, alongside effective confidence-building measures

between the parties, can induce the secessionist regions to rethink their future.

In this context, Georgia should concentrate on democracy building and economic

and social development in order to become an attractive country in which ethnic

Abkhaz or South Ossetian citizens may want to live.

References

Aliriza, B. Turkey and the Crisis in the Caucasus, CSIS Commentary. Washington DC: Center for

Strategic and International Studies, 9 September 2008.

Danielyan, E. ‘‘Armenia Debates an Elusive Peace with Azerbaijan’’, Eurasia Daily Monitor 5,

no. 226, 25 November 2008.

After the 2008 Russia-Georgia War: Implications for the Wider Caucasus 41

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General Affairs and External Relations, Extraordinary Meeting, Press Release, Council of the

European Union, 13 August 2008, Brussels, 12453/08 (Presse 236).

International Crisis Group, Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War, Report no. 187. Brussels: ICG, 14

November 2007.

Killough, A.C. ‘‘Armenia in Need of an Alternative Export-Import Route’’. Eurasia Daily Monitor 5,

no. 195, 10 October 2008.

Sharip, F. ‘‘South Ossetia tests Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy Priorities’’. Eurasia Daily Monitor 5,

no. 180, 19 September 2008.

Socor, V. ‘‘Summit Tests EU’s Capacity to Oppose Russia’s Reexpansion’’. Eurasia Daily Monitor 5,

no. 165, 29 August 2008.

Socor, V. ‘‘What the European Union Can Do about Georgia After the Russian Invasion’’, Eurasia

Daily Monitor 5, no. 166, 30 August 2008.

Triantaphyllou, D. and Y. Tsantoulis. Looking Beyond the Georgian Crisis: The EU in Search of an

Enhanced Role in the Black Sea Region, ICBSS Policy Brief no. 8. Athens: International Centre

for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), October 2008.

ANNEX:

SOURCE: University of Texas Libraries, Perry-Castaneda Library, Map Collection: Russia and theFormer Soviet Republics Maps.

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