after ethnic violence in the caucasus: attitudes of local abkhazians and displaced georgians in 2010

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After Ethnic Violence in the Caucasus:Attitudes of Local Abkhazians andDisplaced Georgians in 2010Gerard Toal a & Magdalena Frichova Grono ba Virginia Techb Conciliation Resources, Brussels, BelgiumPublished online: 15 May 2013.

To cite this article: Gerard Toal & Magdalena Frichova Grono (2011) After Ethnic Violence in theCaucasus: Attitudes of Local Abkhazians and Displaced Georgians in 2010, Eurasian Geography andEconomics, 52:5, 655-678

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Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2011, 52, No. 5, pp. 655–678. http://dx.doi.org/10.2747/1539-7216.52.5.655Copyright © 2011 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved.

After Ethnic Violence in the Caucasus: Attitudes of Local Abkhazians and Displaced Georgians in 2010

Gerard Toal and Magdalena Frichova Grono1

Abstract: The paper combines the results of two nearly simultaneous surveys in 2010 to provide a unique, rather comprehensive picture of the attitudes of (a) current residents of Abkhazia and (b) largely ethnic Georgian former residents of Abkhazia now living in forced displacement in Georgia following the 1992–1993 war. More specifically, it probes the views of these two groups about each other and the sensitive question raised by the disputed return of displaced Georgians to breakaway Abkhazia. Also investigated are the potential conditions for possible return in the future, including issues relating to property ownership. The authors conclude by discussing the policy implications of the survey results. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: D740, I310, J600, O150. 13 figures, 24 references. Key words: Abkhazia, Georgia, Russia, Caucasus, ethnic conflict, displaced persons, right of return, public opinion surveys, property restitution.

Whatever one might think about the justice of the August 2008 war between the Russian Federation, in support of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the Republic of Georgia,

there are “new realities” on the ground: the conflict has resulted in displacement, changed boundaries, and power relations. Mighty empires and states have long sought to create their own realities in the Caucasus and, in recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as indepen-dent states on August 26, 2008, Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev continued this prac-tice, in part in retaliation for the Western-orchestrated independence of Kosovo. Since then, Medvedev has called on the international community to recognize these “new realities” in the South Caucasus, arguing that doing so will strengthen peace and stability in the region (Medvedev, 2009). Few states have chosen to do so, and while most members of the inter-national community use ever stronger rhetoric to support Georgia’s territorial integrity, they also admit that reconciliation between Georgia and its breakaway regions is more distant than ever.

Dozens of thousands were displaced by the 2008 war, and many have joined those uprooted by the conflicts in the 1990s in being unable to return to their homes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Lines of control have shifted and hardened: Russian troops now manage and

1Respectively, Professor of Government and International Affairs, Virginia Tech, National Capital Region, Alexandria, VA 22314 ([email protected]) and Caucasus Programme Associate, Conciliation Resources, Brussels, Belgium ([email protected]). Both authors have contributed equally, and the views expressed are the authors’ only, not those of Conciliation Resources. Any writing on the ethno-territorial conflict in Georgia has to ne-gotiate problematic naming conventions; how the conflict is described, named, and understood is also an expression of it. In this paper, we focus on the community level Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. We use the term Abkhaz to refer to ethnic Abkhaz and Abkhazians to all current residents of the post-1993 de facto state of Abkhazia. The term Georgian refers to positions and interests represented by the government in Tbilisi; in reference to persons it can describe either those who consider themselves ethnic Georgians or citizens of contemporary Georgia. Although the 1992–1993 war may not have begun as an “ethnic war,” the conflict has become thoroughly ethnicized. In terming it the “Georgian-Abkhaz” conflict, we are acknowledging this produced political fact but are mindful that this description disguises important complexities.

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656 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS

the EU Monitoring Mission observe respective sides of the de facto borders between the two separatist regions and Georgia. Political attitudes have also hardened. Georgia considers Abkhazia and South Ossetia “Russian-occupied territory,” and continues to view the local authorities in place as illegal satellite regimes. Georgia’s Law on Occupied Territories of October 23, 2008 criminalizes any attempt to enter Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Russia and any economic activity or real estate transactions in these territories not approved by the Georgian state.2 For their part, the authorities in Sukum(i) and Tskhinval(i) have signed long-term basing agreements with the Russian military, and as before the 2008 war, they continue to rely on Russian budgetary subventions and investment for sustainability. They show no interest in “rejoining” Georgia, and Abkhazia is focused on consolidating its partially recog-nized independence.

These “new realities” of deepening separation and division leave those Euro-Atlantic states and institutions interested in regional stability and peace-building with difficult policy dilemmas. Policy formulations such as “engagement without recognition” have sought to transcend the staleness of policies based on formulaic assertions of support for Georgia’s “territorial integrity,” but little practical engagement of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the European Union or United States has occurred to date, and prospects for substantive progress in negotiations about status, security, or return of persons displaced by conflicts in the 1990s or the 2008 war are minimal (Mitchell and Cooley, 2010; Charap and Welt, 2011).

Ethnic Georgians forcefully displaced from their homes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia have always embodied the human costs of Georgia’s unresolved disputes. Questions of their return are central to future solutions to the conflicts. Between 200,000 and 240,000 Georgians from Abkhazia were displaced during the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992–1993, and most have been unable to return to their homes. It has been a cardinal principle of Georgian govern-ment policy since to focus on these displaced persons’ “right to return.” This right has tradi-tionally received greater political prominence than their right to locally integrate in their place of displacement or to migrate to a third country for manifestly political reasons: in effect, the right to return is part of the struggle by the Georgian government to restore its sovereignty and control over the breakaway regions. Rhetorically, displaced persons have become symbols of the broader suffering of the Georgian people at the hands of those intent on fragmenting and dismembering historic Georgian lands; in practice, little attention has been paid to addressing problems of those displaced by the 1992–1993 war. While Tbilisi’s political arguments stress Georgia’s territorial integrity and justice aspects of the internally displaced persons’ (IDPs’) right of return, an important calculation is also that the IDPs’ return would in fact initiate a process of re-Georgianizing territories that were, from the Georgian perspective, deliberately ethnically cleansed of their Georgian population. With return not only would the forced dis-placement be reversed but so also would post-war demographic accounting, something many in Abkhazia fear.

Just as Georgian authorities have held unspoken aspirations for a “demographic re- conquest” of the conflict regions, so Abkhazian authorities have thought in similar demo-graphic terms, viewing large-scale ethnic Georgian returns as an existential threat to their hard-won “freedom” and “independence.” In their view, preserving the Abkhaz “national project” has required a resolute determination to prevent ethnic Georgians from becoming once more the largest plurality in Abkhazia (as they were counted in the final USSR census

2It is not clear if this law prohibits academic fieldwork and research such as the survey carried out by the De Facto State project. We have sought clarification on this question from the Georgian government and have not received a response as of the time of publication.

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TOAL AND FRICHOVA GRONO 657

in 1989). The demographic history of Abkhazia is a central debate in the conflict. While Georgians focus on the injustice of the 1992–1993 displacement and claim ethnic cleansing has led to an artificial demographic balance favoring the Abkhaz, the Abkhaz side argues that the demography of Abkhazia was artificially created by a policy of settlements, sometimes forced, of ethnic Georgians from Western Georgia (Racha, Guria) to Abkhazia. Significant migration of non-Abkhaz populations to the region began after the Russian Empire subju-gated the area and drove thousands of Abkhaz into exile in the Ottoman Empire between 1864 and 1878. The creation of the Soviet Union led to a short-lived period of Abkhaz hegemony, but starting in 1936, forced collectivization and industrialization was accompanied also by a policy of “Georgianization” until de-Stalinization (Blauvelt, 2007).

In the game of garnering international sympathy and legitimacy for their side, the Georgian authorities have tended to mute their political aspirations from a return process whereas the de facto Abkhazian authorities have tended not to publicly state their determined opposition to the prospect of ethnic Georgian returnees. Since 2008 the UN General Assembly has annu-ally passed a Georgia-sponsored resolution reiterating the right of all displaced persons and refugees to return to Abkhazia and South Ossetia; in 2011, Abkhaz and Ossetian delegations to the Geneva talks stated they would not participate in substantive discussions of return if the resolution is adopted (which it was in June); the October round of the Geneva talks saw no discussion on return. Instead they point to the Gal(i) District in Abkhazia, an agricultur-ally rich region adjacent to the ceasefire line that has historically had a largely homogeneous ethnic Georgian population, as a place where they have permitted returns. The Georgians living in that region are overwhelmingly Mingrelian speakers and thus can be classified as separate from other Kartvelian language speakers, especially users of standard Georgian, the only Kartvelian language that has a written form. This Mingrelian-Georgian dichotomy has a long and fiercely contentious history in Georgia, and in the context of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict it has been used in political arguments about the Gal(i) District being a part of a potential “Mingrelian separatist project” (Broers, 2011).3

Gal(i) Georgians have been caught between the two sides, often with split loyalties and typically unprotected by either side. Many of them did not mobilize in arms against the Abkhaz during the war but aspired to remain neutral, reportedly concluding an informal agreement to this effect with ethnic Abkhaz authorities in Sukhum(i) at the outset of the war in return for an agreement by the Abkhaz that they would not target Gal(i) Georgians.4 Nevertheless they fled en masse at the end of the war, in late September 1993, before the advancing Abkhazian forces, supported by volunteer and other brigades from the North Caucasus. According to Abkhazian authorities, it was this group that plundered and pillaged the houses left behind by the Gal(i) District residents. While readily acknowledging that they failed to protect the property or rights of those that fled, they also assert that Abkhaz forces did not directly put the Gal(i) population in harm’s way.5 Since then, the authorities in Sukhum(i) have had a conflicted attitude toward the residents of Gal(i). On the one hand, the residents are seen as a distinctive group somewhat separate from the larger Abkhazian-Georgian war; they are also an important work force in one of the agriculturally richest areas of Abkhazia; and their

3Another Kartvelian language group, some of whose members lived in the Upper Kodori Gorge area, the only part of Abkhazia not controlled by the Abkhaz between 1993 and 2008, are Svans. A majority of Svans live in the mountainous areas of Georgia, the regions of Upper and Lower Svaneti. For a sense of the complexity of these groups and of Georgian ethnic identity, see the definition of “Georgian” in Wixman (1988, pp. 71–72) .

4Author interview with Abkhaz Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Sukhum(i), February 2002.5Author Interview with Ruslan Kishmaria, Presidential Representative to the Gal(i) District, Sukum(i), November

13, 2009.

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return has had a security dimension as well—the compactly settled and almost exclusively ethnic Georgian population of Gal(i) might have served as a “strategic buffer” in the event of a resumption of hostilities. On the other hand, many view them in the polarized post-war environment as suspect “fifth columnists” within Abkhazia, particularly given that Gal(i) resi-dents have retained strong links with Georgia proper, where most of them travel regularly and typically retain their IDP status, which affords them access to the social support made avail-able by the Georgian state to displaced persons (Inal-Ipa, 2009).

Efforts by the Georgian state in the mid- and late 1990s to sponsor guerilla bands to engage in low-intensity warfare against the de facto Abkhaz authorities increased the vulner-ability of returnees in Gal(i) to reprisals. A particularly tense period in May 1998 saw violence resume; with the CIS peace-keeping force keeping a low profile, Abkhaz forces responded to the guerilla provocations with a wave of crackdowns on Gal(i) and its population, burning houses and public buildings restored with the assistance of international agencies. The whole Gal(i) population fled again into Georgia proper before slowly returning to re-build houses over the following decade. Since then, Gal(i) Georgians have been unable to rely on either side for full support. Tbilisi, insisting on the right of safe and dignified return for all IDPs, has sought to minimize the reality that spontaneous returns to Gal(i) have brought some 40,000 to 60,000 Gal(i) Georgians back to Abkhazia; it has also torpedoed most international verifica-tion efforts. While Sukhum(i) has shown a half-hearted tolerance towards Gal(i) returnees, it has shied away from guaranteeing their human and civil rights within Abkhazia. It has also refused to countenance returnees to other parts of Abkhazia. The standard storyline Abkhaz officials have used to address the issue of return is that “successful return to Gal(i) is the first phase of return” and that only those who have not committed crimes (which is often expressed as “those who did not fight against us”) could return. Absent any comprehensive settlement of the conflict that would address the conditions under which any right to return might be exercised, this attitude is a blanket refusal to accept any sustained returns beyond the Gal(i) District.6

Thus, the current condition of Georgians displaced from Abkhazia has both endur-ing and new realities. What endures is that the standard official storylines on return in the Georgia-Abkhazian conflict continue to be at loggerheads, and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. What has changed is that, in the wake of the August 2008 war, the politi-cal prospects for a peace agreement and some resolution of the status of displaced persons seem bleaker than ever. With Abkhazia now accepted by a few countries as an independent state, a broader return movement is receding as a realizable political possibility. At the same time IDPs from Abkhazia have also seen minimal progress in terms of genuine integration in Georgia proper; recent evictions of IDPs from collective centers in Tbilisi has left many of them more vulnerable than ever.

Given this state of affairs, what are the contemporary attitudes of displaced Georgians and current residents of Abkhazia toward the question of return and their future? How do the displaced Georgians from Abkhazia, who have been living in collective centers for almost two decades, view their prospects, choices, and options in light of the prevailing political deadlock regarding return? With the status of Abkhazia now a lot more secure than previ-ously, how do current residents of Abkhazia view the possibility of the return of the area’s former ethnic Georgian residents? Are they open to international engagement as part of a comprehensive solution to the question of displacement?

6Some returns to Ochamchira/e have also taken place; returns beyond these two regions are rare.

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To answer these questions, we draw upon two large-scale research surveys we have worked on over the past year. The first survey, conducted in June 2010 by the British NGO Conciliation Resources in cooperation with the NGO Synergy IDP Network and the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC), is a representative survey of Georgians displaced from Abkhazia.7 Henceforth, we will refer to this survey as the Conciliation Resources survey. Its respondents were persons displaced by the 1992–1993 conflict in Abkhazia, who are 18 years or older, and are registered with the Georgian Ministry for Refugees and Accommodation as currently living in centers of collective settlement.8 The sampling frame was a list of collec-tive centers for IDPs displaced from Abkhazia as a result of the war in 1992–1993, including the number of households in each collective center (Fig. 1). The total sample size was 999, equally distributed among three geographic strata: the Tbilisi region, the Samegrelo region (near Georgia’s frontier with Abkhazia), and locations beyond these two, so as to allow for comparisons between these locations.9 This division was guided by preliminary indications that IDPs in the capital may have different economic or other opportunities than those living in the regions, and that IDPs in Samegrelo are likely to have different opportunities, or that they may emphasize different aspects of their identity, than other IDPs thanks to their proximity to

7Comprehensive details on the survey (financed by the EU), including the questionnaire, frequency tables, graphs, policy brief, and analysis by Magdalena Frichova Grono are available at: http://www.c-r.org/our-work/caucasus/ displacement_in_georgia.php.

8Due to difficulties in creating a representative sample, it was impossible to include privately housed displaced persons; focus groups addressing similar themes were carried out with a sample of IDPs living in private accom-modation instead.

9Even so, the total number of households in all collective centers in the capital is roughly twice that in the Samegrelo and the other non-capital strata.

Fig. 1. Sample point locations for the June 2010 survey of Georgians displaced from Abkhazia.

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Abkhazia. A sample of households equivalent to a simple random sample was drawn from lists of collective centers provided by the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation; households within collective centers were selected using systematic sampling (for additional details, see CRRC, 2010). When asked which ethnic groups they consider themselves a part of, 94 per-cent of the sample indicated Georgian.10 For the sake of convenience we use the term IDPs to describe this group, although some non-Georgians were also displaced by the conflict and became IDPs or refugees.

The second poll is a representative public opinion survey conducted by the Levada Center in Abkhazia in March 2010 for a U.S. National Science Foundation research project on de facto states in Eurasia in the wake of the independence of Kosovo (henceforth referred to as the De Facto State survey).11 Using revised estimates of population numbers from the official 2003 national population census conducted by the Abkhaz authorities, the survey developed

10Seventeen percent also indicated Mingrelian (as this categorization was permitted as a secondary response); mixed and other nationalities accounted for the remainder.

11The project proposal, written by John O’Loughlin and Gerard Toal with the help of Michael Ward, was funded as grant no. 0827016 in the Human and Social Dynamics Initiative of the U.S. National Science Foundation. Profes-sor Vladimir Kolossov made invaluable contributions to the questionnaire’s design and implementation. A team led by Aleksey Grazhdankin, Levada Center, Moscow and Viktoriya Remmler, Levada Center, Krasnodar administered the survey.

Fig. 2. Sample point locations for the March 2010 survey of residents of Abkkhazia.

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a sample proportion of population groups by ethnicity across Abkhazia’s seven rayony and the capital Sukhum(i). The boundaries of the 170 precincts used in the December 2009 presi-dential election in Abkhazia were the basis for developing primary sampling units; 84 were randomly selected, together with separate villages in Gal(i) Rayon that did not have electoral precincts (Fig. 2). The selection of households in each sampling point followed the random route method. The survey size was 1,000 respondents, with self-ascribed ethnic Abkhaz con-stituting 42.5 percent of the total, Armenians 18.5 percent, Russians 10.4, Georgians 12.5, Mingrelians 7.4, Georgians/ Mingrelians 4.3, and Others 3.4 percent.12 For the sake of analy-sis, here the Georgian, Mingrelian, and Georgian-Mingrelian categories are combined into one Georgian identity category.

Both surveys have significant similarities: they are methodologically rigorous, similar in sample size, and close in timing. Both are surveys of Abkhazia’s residents, past and pres-ent. One is a survey of displaced persons in their involuntary place of residence, the other a survey of current residents of Abkhazia. While the conflict separates the two survey’s target groups, the Gal(i) population accounts for a degree of overlap: the De Facto State survey includes responses from current residents of Gal(i), whereas some of the Conciliation Resources survey’s respondents belong to the Gal(i) returnees whose lives straddle the con-flict divide.

In this paper, we bring these surveys together to provide a general overview of the contemporary attitudes of current and former residents of Abkhazia to the deeply sensitive question of return. To situate these attitudes we explore the divergent yet also common experi-ences of this once coterminous population during the Georgian-Abkhaz war, and subsequently on different sides of resultant political boundaries. We seek to grasp what they themselves say about their former property or the property they have since acquired. Having established this, we then turn to examine three categories of attitudes: toward each other, toward potential con-ditions for return, and toward the future. Many of the issues are complex, and our treatment is unavoidably cursory. The paper concludes with some brief observations on the important policy implications of the results.

12Because of interviewer doubts about the honesty of responses, and because a small number chose “mixed nationality” or “hard to say” in response to the nationality question, 70 questionnaire responses were removed from the De Facto State survey, bringing the total sample down to 930. For a complete discussion of details on the sample design and methodology, see O’Loughlin et al. (2011).

Fig. 3. Responses of Abkhazian residents to the question: “Were you or your family displaced by the war in 1992–1993?” Source: De Facto State survey, 2010.

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DISPLACEMENT EXPERIENCES

The Scope of Displacement

Both surveys provide important information on the displacement experiences of Abkhazia’s current and former residents. The De Facto State survey asked respondents to state whether they or their family had been displaced by the 1992–1993 war, and if so how many times (Fig. 3). As one might expect, the Georgians in the survey (who are largely though not exclusively concentrated in the Gal(i) District) exhibited the highest levels of experience with displacement, with less than 20 percent indicating they were not displaced. Approximately a quarter of Abkhaz respondents, the most numerous ethnic group in the survey sample, indi-cated that they experienced displacement more than once. A slight majority (over 50 percent) of Abkhaz, Armenians, and Russians in the sample said they did not experience any displace-ment; this indicates a widespread experience of displacement among all ethnic groups living in Abkhazia and is consistent with the fact that the war took place exclusively on the territory of the former autonomy, not in any other parts of “Georgia proper.”

The Conciliation Resources survey provides more detail on the when and where of dis-placement for IDPs currently living in Georgia. Survey results indicate that over two-thirds of IDPs were originally displaced in 1993, whereas some 30 percent date their displacement to 1992. These results reflect the pre-conflict demographic distribution of ethnic Georgians throughout Abkhazia, and the shifting front lines and control of territory by respective sides during the different stages of the 1992–1993 conflict. Prior to the conflict, some 60 percent of the current Georgian IDPs surveyed lived in districts south of Sukhum(i), which the de facto Abkhaz authorities today term “Eastern Abkhazia” (a term not used by the Georgians or in Soviet times). The main centers of ethnic Georgian settlement there were in the Gal(i) District, followed by Ochamchira/e and Gulripsh(i) districts, with only 2 percent of respondents iden-tifying their former homes as being in the mountainous mining region of Tkvarchal(eli). Less than one-third (30 percent) of IDPs indicated that they lived in Abkhazia’s capital Sukhum(i). Only 10 percent lived in districts north of Sukhum(i) and south of the Russian border such as Gudauta and Gagra, or what is today known as “Western Abkhazia” (Fig. 4).

Consider both surveys together and one begins to grasp the extent of the experience of displacement in the Georgian-Abkhaz war: only a small minority of the pre-war population of Abkhazia was not displaced from their homes by the 1992–1993 war and its attendant terror and violence. This first-hand exposure to war of most of Abkhazia’s pre-1992 population,

Fig. 4. Responses of Georgian IDPs to the question: “Where did you/your family live prior to your first displacement?” Source: Conciliation Resources survey, 2010.

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regardless of their ethnic origins, is an experience that average residents of “Georgia proper” did not share, unless they or their family members joined regular or irregular Georgian forces. This experiential dissonance has strongly influenced attitudes to conflict on both sides of the divide, and helps explain the fact that, as shown later, IDPs are on the whole less inclined to support military solutions to the conflict than the average Georgian population.

The Conciliation Resources survey results indicate that roughly a quarter of the Georgian IDPs were displaced once, and never subsequently changed their place of residence. Slightly less than a quarter changed residence once and 24 percent twice since the original displace-ment from Abkhazia, and 24 percent moved three to five times. The results underscore the consequent social vulnerability of Georgian IDPs from Abkhazia: nearly half of the displaced population have had to find a new home three to six times over the past 20 years. This lack of stability is a practical illustration of complex—and often deeply political—problems IDPs face integrating into the socio-economic and political life of Georgian society. Access to jobs, education, and health care has been a perennial challenge for IDPs, in addition to the gen-erally low quality of living space in the collective centers. It has also impacted on IDPs’ ability to build confidence and long-term ties with communities beyond the IDP circles in their current places of residence, and to overcome existing negative stereotypes about IDPs among the Georgian population (Mitchneck et al., 2009). Nearly 30 percent of respondents placed themselves at the lowest rung of a 10-step ladder reflecting the economic standing of all households in Georgia (as compared with 14 percent in a Georgia-wide survey; CCRC, 2009). The second and third lowest rungs are cited by 20 percent of IDPs on average. Only 1 percent identified rungs 6 and 7, the highest levels among respondents.

IDPs from Gal(i) have been among the most vulnerable: after their first displacement (most often in 1993), many started trickling back, first for seasonal work in their orchards, later for semi-permanent residence. The May 1998 escalations displaced the Gal(i) returnees for a second time—and many of them continue to lead an existence straddling both sides of the conflict divide. While security is precarious in Gal(i), and their rights unprotected, Gal(i) residents say they choose their homes and agriculture-based livelihoods over “surviv-ing in collective centers.”13 Tbilisi-based IDPs have also been required to move relatively frequently. An important factor is the increasing value of real estate in which IDPs have been housed over the recent years; many buildings that have attracted the interest of investors have been put on the market by authorities, and their dwellers forced to relocate (the alternative housing offered tends to be in remote places where IDPs rarely want to relocate).14

In contrast to the largely vulnerable and marginal condition of IDPs and Gal(i) return-ees, current non-Georgian residents of Abkhazia are relatively positive about their economic condition and prospects. Over 80 percent of ethnic Abkhaz view their country as generally moving in the right direction; only 40 percent of the ethnic Georgians, mostly in Gal(i), share this view. More than a quarter of all ethnic Abkhaz indicate they can purchase all they need, whereas over 50 percent indicate that they can purchase all except durable goods. More than half the ethnic Abkhaz describe the economic situation in Abkhazia as much better than in Georgia, a sentiment shared by Armenians and Russians although not to the same extent (see Figs. 3 and 6 in O’Loughlin et al., 2011).

13Author interviews with Gal(i) residents, Gal(i), November 2002 and Gal(i) teachers, November 2004.14From a “live analysis workshop” of the Conciliation Resources survey results with members of Synergy, a

network of IDP activists and organizations, Tbilisi, November 2010.

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Communication and Travel

Movement of persons across the Georgian-Abkhaz divide has not been free or large in scale, and it is generally assumed that few IDPs have been able to return to Abkhazia given the political and security restrictions in place. It is thus somewhat surprising that 25 percent of IDPs say they have visited Abkhazia since first becoming displaced. Of them, an over-whelming majority (80 percent) have been back to the Gal(i) District; 12 percent have visited Ochamchira(e) and Sukhum(i), and 4 percent each Gulripsh(i), Tkvarchal(eli), and Gagra, the three latter being areas with relatively low pre-war ethnic Georgian settlement. More women than men have been back to Abkhazia (26 percent as opposed to 19 percent); this is not an uncommon trend in terms of movement across a conflict boundary.

These data are significant in that IDPs are not completely ignorant of the current condi-tion of their houses and property, and, to a limited degree, also of the current communities living in Abkhazia, although relatively few, have been able to visit areas where Abkhaz and Georgians used to live together. This situation sharply contrasts to the situation of displaced Azerbaijanis from Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding areas occupied by Armenian armed forces, who have been completely isolated from their former place of residence and commu-nities since displacement. It also differs from the pre-2008 situation in the Georgian-Ossetian zone of conflict where the two ethnic groups freely mixed in marketplaces and everyday life, and where mixed villages existed until 2008 (see Toal, 2008); in the post-2008 context, there are some parallels between the situations in Gal(i) and the Akhalgori/Leningor District in South Ossetia.

For those who travelled to Abkhazia, the most frequent reasons chosen from a menu of options were visiting friends or relatives, and attending occasions such as weddings and funerals. There is a marked discrepancy between the reasons for current visits and the moti-vations for future visits to Abkhazia cited by IDPs who have not been back. The latter group puts visits to graves and their old homes first, citing visits of friends and family and social occasions as a secondary consideration. Nearly half of those who have been back to Abkhazia last visited in 2009 and 2010 (as per survey results of June 2010). Six percent of respondents crossed the boundary line once in the 12 months prior to the survey, and 1 percent crossed it five times. This indicates that the number of IDPs residing in collective centers who visit Abkhazia frequently—and hence are likely to have a semi-permanent base in Gal(i)—is very small. Nearly one-fifth of those who visited in 2009 and 2010 said they were able to go more often than before the 2008 conflict; nearly half indicated that they went with the same fre-quency, and nearly a third less often. While longer-term calculations of Gal(i) returnees are more ridden with stark choices regarding political versus kin loyalty after 2008, paradoxi-cally, the security situation in Gal(i) appears to have somewhat stabilized in the wake of the 2008 conflict, mainly due to the more robust military presence on the ground for both sides.

The strong motivation of ethnic Georgian IDPs to travel in Abkhazia contrasts with the relative lack of motivation on the part of most non-Georgian Abkhazians to travel to Georgia proper, a finding consistent with the overall logic and dynamic of the Georgian-Abkhaz con-flict. The De Facto State survey queried respondents about their experiences in traveling to a series of destinations, including Georgia (proper). The question allowed respondents three substantive options: problems occur, problems do not occur, and there is no necessity or they have no wish to travel to these destinations (Fig. 5). The results reveal that the only group traveling to Georgia (proper) from Abkhazia are ethnic Georgians living in Abkhazia. The vast majority of ethnic Abkhaz respondents indicate they have no necessity or desire to travel to Georgia. This is also true, to a lesser extent, of ethnic Armenians and Russians living in

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Abkhazia. The likely motivations for those that do travel there are trading opportunities and/or health services (specifically, HIV/AIDS treatment facilities in Georgia proper have been cited by some in Abkhazia as an important reason).15 These results are significant: they chal-lenge Tbilisi’s central political argument that only Abkhaz political elites are uninterested in Georgia proper, whereas in reality travel of Abkhazians to Georgia proper is frequent and illustrates their interest in engagement with Georgia proper.

Property/Knowledge

The De Facto State survey asked current residents of Abkhazia whether their dwelling sustained damage during the 1992–1993 war (Fig. 6). A majority of ethnic Abkhaz respon-dents indicated that their property suffered some form of damage, with 15 percent indicating that it was totally ruined. Not surprisingly, the ethnic Georgian group had the largest number of respondents indicating their dwellings were totally ruined and the least number indicating their dwelling sustained no damage.

15Author interviews in Abkhazia with civil society activists, Sukhum(i), November 2009.

Fig. 5. Responses of Abkhazian residents to the question: “Do you have any necessity or wish to travel in Georgia and, if so, do some problems occur?” Source: De Facto State survey, 2010.

Fig. 6. Responses of Abkhazian residents to the question: “Was your dwelling damaged during the war in 1992–1993? Source: De Facto State survey, 2010.

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There is no independent comprehensive information on the current conditions of property and housing abandoned by ethnic Georgians as they fled Abkhazia. The Georgian government has launched various efforts to develop a system of accounting, but it has been fraught with institutional problems and stymied by the obvious political stalemate and lack of access. Nevertheless, most Georgian IDPs are aware of the general current condition of their former properties. Both the Georgian IDP and the Abkhaz communities are socially tightly knit and small enough for informal information channels and word of mouth to be an effective com-munication mechanism. Fifty-six percent of the Conciliation Resources survey respondents indicated they have relatives or close friends currently living in Abkhazia, and 31 percent said they were in touch with them at least once per month. This confirms that communica-tion channels between current residents of Abkhazia and IDPs (not the rest of the Georgian population) exist.

Among the Conciliation Resources survey’s most striking findings is that over three quarters of IDPs from Abkhazia would be unable to return to their original homes, as these homes have been destroyed (47 percent), occupied by others without the owners’ consent (23 percent), or their status is unknown (10 percent). These figures represent a stark reality that is typically not reflected in the Georgian public discourse, or internalized by a majority of IDPs. Four percent say their family continues to use the dwelling (most of them in the Gal(i) District), or that another family is using the home with their consent (2 percent). Another 11 percent say their homes are now deserted; these would most typically be homes in the now largely depopulated areas in Ochamchira(e) and parts of Gulripsh(i), but also those homes in Gal(i) to which IDPs have been unable or unwilling to return in the current conditions. In Ochamchira(e), for instance, many traditionally Georgian or formerly mixed villages are currently more or less depopulated and the region remains economically underdeveloped, although there have been localized attempts to boost agricultural output, such as greenhouse production or farming of non-traditional fruits like kiwi, and investment has been steadily increasing since Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia.

These figures have strong implications also for current residents of Abkhazia, most often ethnic Abkhaz, who have occupied IDP houses for different reasons. In some cases, this has been motivated by necessity. As the De Facto State survey results underscore, many Abkhaz (and Armenian, Russian, and Greek) homes were destroyed during the 1992–1993 fighting. Looting of non-Georgian homes took place in Sukhum(i) and other areas under Georgian control during the war (and vice versa, Georgian homes were looted in areas under Abkhaz control). In other cases, houses and flats have been taken over for profit. These dwellings were appropriated by Abkhaz fighters or strongmen in the wake of the war, in a spontaneous, unruly process.16 Abkhaz authorities have not sought to regulate this “accumulation through dispos-session” in any way.17 Indeed, to do so would have been to challenge the post-war political economy and cultural order in Abkhazia. Wartime suffering justified post-war appropriations of the property of “those who fought against the Abkhaz,” while society-wide elevation of “war heroes” has made it difficult to challenge the actions of prominent veterans.

Property appropriations are an understandably sensitive issue within Abkhazia, both socially and politically. The practice has been complicated by cultural notions of honor, shame, and even superstition. A few Abkhaz analysts admit that issues of IDP property loom over the Abkhaz society, which will have to face them sooner or later.18 Some among those

16Interviews with civil society experts, Sukhum(i), November 2008.17On a similar process in Bosnia, see Toal (2011) and Toal and Dahlman (2011).18Interviews with analysts, Sukhum(i), November 2008.

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who live in “occupied flats” privately say they are not particularly happy to be living in a dwelling that belongs to others, and that some have sought to “undo” the injustice suffered by the private former owners by finding private back-channel arrangements, whether struc-tured around “compensation,” “a sale,” or simply agreeing with the former residents that their house would be looked after in their absence.

IDPs say they do not approve of such back-channel property deals; they also appear to be unwilling to discuss them openly. A strong majority of IDPs express negative attitudes toward any property arrangements that involve financial gain: between 65 and 70 percent say they disapprove of sales, rental, or exchange arrangements concerning their property in Abkhazia. In comparison, only 43 percent disapprove of IDPs letting others live in their prop-erty in Abkhazia without paying rent, in exchange for maintaining the house or flat. When asked whether they know cases of back-channel deals having been concluded, IDPs’ answers are polarized: roughly half say they do not know anyone who has engaged in back-channel property deals, whereas the other 50 percent give a “do not know,” or an inconclusive answer. Only 5 percent admit they know 1 or 2 out of every 10 households who have let others live in their property in exchange for maintaining it. The high incidence of inconclusive answers may well mean that respondents simply do not know; but given that such deals are illegal under the Georgian legislation, and deeply politically sensitive, many IDPs may also have been cautious with their answers.19

IDP property acquisitions by current residents of Abkhazia have also led to a number of property rights issues within Abkhazia. As Abkhaz real estate prices and Russian inves-tors’ interest soared after Russian recognition, the property market in Abkhazia has received an additional boost. Existing institutional practices are struggling to adjust, and speculation with property has become problem. Yet the system of property deeds is not sophisticated, especially in regard to IDP property that has been, in some cases, passed on from one post-war “owner” to another in an effort to legitimize the current ownership. Observers have also described situations whereby one property is apparently sold to several Russian investors at the same time. The Abkhaz judicial system de facto does not always offer an effective remedy to situations that might inconvenience ethnic Abkhaz.20

ACROSS THE DIVIDE: COMPARING ATTITUDES TOWARD EACH OTHER

There has been very little regular contact between ethnic Georgians and ethnic Abkhaz since the end of the war. Two separate societies have developed and grown around a political divide and in isolation from one other, with asymmetrical enemy images: the Abkhaz side has fostered hostility toward Georgia and Georgians; the Georgian side in turn has tradition-ally focused its enmity toward Russia, while minimizing Abkhaz grievances and aspirations. Both surveys sought to measure the group perceptions of the other in the wake of the August 2008 war. These findings, and their juxtaposition, are significant in delineating the landscape of attitudes to potential future interethnic reconciliation. The respective perceptions on inter-ethnic relations come from very different starting points. The conventional Georgian IDPs’ story about interethnic relations with the Abkhaz views the pre-war years as filled with friend-ship and brotherhood between the two ethnicities. Few, if any, problems are remembered, both in terms of social and political cohabitation. In discussions about their lives in Abkhazia, IDPs often cite this “golden past” as a prologue to emphasizing the role of Moscow in the

19Responses in a “live analysis workshop,” Tbilisi, November 2010.20Interviews with analysts and journalists, Sukhum(i), March 2010.

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origins of the 1992–1993 war, which typically overshadows most aspects of the Georgian side’s own responsibility. The Abkhaz narrative of the common past with Georgians is much more conflicted, and filled with grievances that date from the immediate pre-war years to a much deeper history.

The Conciliation Resources survey indicates that IDPs perceive interethnic relations between the two groups as more complex, and with more caution today than they generally like to admit. While 68 percent completely or somewhat agree that more unites than divides Georgian and Abkhaz people (in terms of culture, values, mentality), 26 percent answer inconclusively and 6 percent disagree. Similarly, over a quarter of respondents answered inconclusively when asked whether the Georgian people are generally friendly toward the Abkhaz people. The caution reflected in these responses is further amplified in responses to questions about Georgian perceptions of Abkhaz feelings. Figure 7 shows that only 11 percent completely agreed (and an additional 22 percent somewhat agreed) that the Abkhaz people are friendly toward other ethnicities; 54 percent answered inconclusively (“neither agree nor disagree” + “don’t know”) and 13 percent were in disagreement. Nineteen percent of respon-dents agreed that the Abkhaz people are generally hostile toward Georgians, and only 11 per-cent completely disagreed with this statement (Fig. 7). For comparison, only 8 percent of the IDPs agreed with the statement that the Georgian people are hostile towards Abkhaz; whereas 67 percent somewhat or completely disagreed (Fig. 7).

The fact that IDP property has been taken over by those currently residing in Abkhazia has added another layer of complexity to feelings towards the other: nearly half cite resent-ment that other people occupy their house, and there are even those (one in eight) who say that they would rather see their property destroyed than others living in it. But many have also been able to transcend these feelings, or look at the situation pragmatically. One quarter of IDPs (from among those whose houses are taken as well as those who speak of other IDPs’ homes) look for the positive and stress they appreciate that someone else is looking after the house (Grono, 2011).

The survey of current Abkhazian residents poses the direct question: “what do you now, on the whole, think of the following people?,” with a five-point scale provided: very good,

Fig. 7. Responses of Georgian IDPs to the questions: (1) “Do you agree or diagree, generally speaking, that Abkhaz people are friendly toward people of other ethnicities?”; (2) “Do you agree or diagree, generally speaking, that Abkhaz people are hostile toward Georgians?”; and (3) “Do you agree or diagree, generally speaking, that Georgian people are hostile toward the Abkhaz people?” Source: Conciliation Resources survey, 2010.

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mostly good, neutral, mostly bad, and very bad.21 The survey posed this question about six dif-ferent categories: Abkhazians, Armenians, Georgians, Mingrelians, Russians, and Americans. Direct questions offer an indicator of the power or weakness of prevailing friend/enemy distinctions. Figure 8 shows the results for ethnic Abkhaz polled in the survey. Of all the ethnic groups in Abkhazia today, ethnic Abkhaz had the most negative feelings towards the Georgians at 35 percent; however, slightly more ethnic Abkhaz had positive feelings. More than one-fifth of Armenians and Russians responding in the broader De Facto State survey also had negative feelings (mostly and very bad) toward Georgians, but larger portions of these nationalities expressed positive feelings (mostly and very good) (Fig. 9). These results affirm that negative perceptions of Georgians are still a force in contemporary Abkhazian society but that these are outweighed among all ethnic groups by positive attitudes.

Both surveys’ findings confirm that much conflict transformation work is still needed: interethnic relations and confidence between the groups have suffered serious damage and negative stereotypes have been cemented over the past 20 years. Nevertheless, there is suf-ficient evidence in both surveys to suggest that attitudes are not as overdetermined by the violent past and as polarized and enemy-defined as might be supposed.

21“Do not know” and “refuse to answer” were unstated options.

Fig. 8. Responses of ethnic Abkhaz residents of Abkhazia to the question: “What do you now think of the [ethnic group]?” N = 425. Source: De Facto State survey, 2010.

Fig. 9. Responses of Abkhazian residents to the question: “At present what are your personal feel-ings about Georgians?” Source: De Facto State survey, 2010.

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ATTITUDES TOWARD RETURN

Perceptions of Political Conditions for Return

Political conditions in which return might be acceptable to either side have been among the key elements of Georgian and Abkhaz calculations about return issues. Debate begins from a harsh reality, namely that the Georgian-Abkhaz war had clear victorious and losing parties. As the ostensible victors, the Abkhaz authorities concentrated on consolidating their power and establishing their own largely ethnocratic institutions in the post-war territory devastated by fighting and forced displacement. Forged in a post-war environment that saw Abkhazia initially under sanctions from the CIS, including the Russian Federation that offi-cially publicly supported Georgia’s territorial integrity until 2008, Abkhaz authorities have long had little interest in (or incentive to support) a return process beyond the Gal(i) District. The increasingly cooperative relationship with Russia under Putin and recognition after the August 2008 war have not altered the hardline stance, grounded in fears that demographic shifts might endanger the Abkhaz national project. Both surveys sought to tease out post-August 2008 war thinking about what conditions would have to be fulfilled for each of the constituencies to consider return possible.

The De Facto State survey explored whether Abkhazians would be willing to accept full return of Georgians displaced from Abkhazia in return for Abkhazia’s recognition as a state by the West and the rest of the international community. Although the “full return for self-determination outside of Georgia” formula has appeared (particularly since 2008) in debates about policy options, it remains hypothetical. After 2008, Western actors ever more vocally and resolutely support Georgia’s territorial integrity. Responses to this question (Fig. 10) across the ethnic groups in Abkhazia underscore how such a potential “earned sovereignty” or “status for standards” formula (Williams and Heymann, 2004), in the domain of displaced persons at least, is unacceptable. Over 90 percent of ethnic Abkhaz reject the linkage, as do over 80 percent and 70 percent of ethnic Armenians and Russians in Abkhazia, respec-tively. Ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia are more receptive to the notion, although the question is clearly sensitive for some, as it garnered a high “difficult to say” response, a stance consis-tent with the Gal(i) Georgians’ desire not to choose between the two power poles delimiting their life conditions. Such results are a measure not only of current public opinion but the

Fig. 10. Responses of Abkhazian residents (disaggregated by ethnic group) to the question: “Would you be willing to accept the full return of Georgian refugees to Abkhazia in return for Abkhazia’s rec-ognition as a state by the West and the rest of the international community?” Source: De Facto State survey, 2010.

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longstanding position in the de facto state that is hostile to the idea of a more comprehensive return of Abkhazia’s former ethnic Georgian residents. Meaningful discussion of conflict res-olution through such earned sovereignty ideas, or associated notions such as “interim status” for Abkhazia (a notion under discussion in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict negotiations) are not on the agenda for the Abkhaz side because current Abkhazians largely see the war with Georgia as over and their independence affirmed by recognition by the Russian Federation and the few others that have followed its lead.22 For these elites the notion of earned sovereignty, including acceptance of the idea of the right of returns of Georgians, may have considerable attractions, especially when Conciliation Resources survey data on the likelihood of actual returns to an Abkhazia beyond Georgia’s control are considered.

The Conciliation Resources survey asked under what political and practical conditions IDPs would be willing to consider returning to Abkhazia permanently. Although prospects of return are currently hypothetical, an indication of what considerations would influence IDPs’ calculations on return can inform policy debate about potential practical interim approaches to the issue. There is an overwhelming preference on the part of IDPs for return to Abkhazia if its status is defined within Georgia; 87 percent IDPs would consider returning permanently if Abkhazia reintegrates with Georgia. This is hardly surprising, inasmuch as it is the official scenario for return projected as the only acceptable one by Tbilisi. Other scenarios required respondents to break from this and accept circumstances that are not officially acceptable: 12 percent indicated they would consider permanent return if Abkhazia maintains its current status as an entity not recognized by most of the world; 11 percent if Abkhazia is integrated into the Russian Federation; and 9 percent if Abkhazia becomes an independent country recognized by most of the world, but not Georgia. An additional scenario proposed to respondents was the following: Abkhazia becomes an independent country recognized by most of the world, including Georgia: 17 percent said they would consider permanent return in these conditions. This hypothetical presupposes the Republic of Georgia’s consent, and one may hence rea-sonably assume that negotiated mutually acceptable mechanisms—such as an internationally sponsored security mechanism, minority rights protection mechanisms, or even some form of shared sovereignty—would be in place to facilitate the creation of such an outcome in prac-tice. Respondents, however, appear not to have fully engaged with this hypothetical, possibly because it is too far removed from the current political stalemate to seem realistic.

Because the question of status is so vital, the Conciliation Resources survey asked respondents again, without hypotheticals, the direct question: “would you think about return-ing permanently to Abkhazia if it is outside of Georgia’s control?” In this question the 12 per-cent figure above drops to 9 percent who say yes, with 85 percent indicating no and 6 percent “don’t know.” Besides underscoring the importance of status for the majority of respondents, this result has potential policy implications for Abkhazia’s authorities, in that their fear that large numbers of Georgian IDPs would return under current conditions if they would permit re-entry is unwarranted. On the basis of these results at least, it appears that Abkhaz authori-ties, even given their current aspirations and fears, may have more flexibility in their attitude toward this question simply because it seems that, in practice, relatively few Georgian IDPs are interested in return to an Abkhazia outside of Georgia’s control.

One may assume a degree of social/political desirability is reflected in IDPs responses to the above question: when broken down by geographical locations, the results for the capital

22For other stakeholders, these options are a taboo for different reasons: for Georgia, this would mean a loss of territorial integrity, an unacceptable outcome; for its Western partners, this would mean allowing Russia to redraw borders with the use of force.

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Tbilisi, a relatively more liberal milieu than regions outside of the capital, indicate that up to 20 percent of Tbilisi-based IDPs were ready to consider (or openly admit they are ready to consider) return under the current conditions. Factors such as a relatively greater openness of discourse in Tbilisi in comparison with rural areas are likely at play here. In this urban-rural divide, socio-political aspects are more significant than any effect of physical distance. In fact, greater outspokenness on the part of Tbilisi IDPs than of those based in rural regions was a trend throughout the survey (this issue requires further study).

The small minority of respondents who said they would be prepared to return to Abkhazia even if it is outside of Georgia’s control were also asked to rate the importance of certain practical conditions under which they were ready to consider return. For nearly all, the fol-lowing conditions were essential (other options being “will not influence my decision” and “would be nice to have, but is not crucial”): the ability to travel freely between Georgia and Abkhazia; the ability for their children to attend Georgian language schools; the ability to attend Georgian Orthodox services; protection of returned Georgians by the local authorities; the withdrawal of Russian troops; the return of a significant number of Georgian IDPs; and that IDPs are not considered traitors by the Georgian population.23 For two-thirds of IDPs, the possibility to maintain Georgian citizenship and the possibility to regain real estate in Abkhazia were essential.

Return and Legacies of the War

Both Sukhum(i) and Tbilisi have sophisticated political arguments supporting their respective, mutually exclusive positions on the question of IDP return. Because a zero sum logic predominates (with Gal(i) a separate case), both have rarely explored the concerns, interests, and fears that each side holds, not to mention what alternatives there may be to the current deadlock. The De Facto State and Conciliation Resources surveys probe these issues with questions that connected well with each other.

For example, common rhetoric employed by the Abkhaz side has been that, were return to take place, only ethnic Georgians who did not engage in warfare could safely come back to Abkhazia because interethnic cohabitation would be impossible as Abkhazians might seek revenge (ICG, 2006, p. 6). Some among the Abkhaz political elite have argued that ethnic Georgians are collectively guilty for war crimes committed during the war, and that large-scale Georgian returns would present insurmountable community security challenges within a post-return Abkhazia.

The De Facto State survey asked respondents whether they agreed with the statement that among the displaced there are those who should not be allowed to come back to Abkhazia (Fig. 11). The results reveal emphatic endorsement of this sentiment, with over 70 percent of ethnic Abkhaz registering strong agreement. Ethnic Armenians and Russians in Abkhazia are not quite as emphatic, but nonetheless over half strongly agreed. Most ethnic Georgians choose the “difficult to say” option. The Conciliation Resources survey asked respondents if they took an active part in the fighting: 17 percent of IDPs indicated they had. Given the prevailing Abkhaz sentiment, this implies that nearly a fifth of IDPs would face potential serious challenges to their ability to exercise their right to return, should political conditions enable a large-scale return process. Additionally, 41 percent of IDPs indicated that their fam-ily members were involved in the fighting. Both the Abkhaz and the Georgian societies are

23It has not been uncommon for Gal(i) returnees, particularly those who have cooperated with the de facto Abkhaz authorities—for instance by working in local administrations in Gal(i)—to be dubbed traitors.

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closely knit and relatively small; who is related to whom and what role individuals played in society, including during the war, is common (or easily accessible) knowledge locally. Certain specific characteristics of these still relatively traditional societies further complicate matters, and in fact resonate with the Abkhaz “community security” concerns were return to take place. Clan loyalty continues to be a strong social feature, and clan-based vendetta mechanisms are endemic to both Georgian and Abkhaz traditional practices. These forms of response and redress have not entirely disappeared, particularly in rural or mountainous areas, despite Soviet and post-Soviet legal structures and impositions.24 It therefore appears reasonable to assume that a number of community security challenges would indeed arise post-return, particularly given that small arms tend to be a relatively common household item in both the Abkhaz and Georgian societies. It is also reasonable to assume that a number of those who themselves or whose family members fought would not consider return a realistic option for their family in the first place.

Justice issues remain notoriously underexplored in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict resolu-tion process (Frichova, 2009). This is particularly true for issues of personal responsibility and personal liability for contraventions of the laws of war that, as documented, both sides have committed (Human Rights Watch, 1995). Interventions that would establish facts regarding (as well as responsibility for) violations of laws of war during the 1992–1993 period might potentially, and perhaps paradoxically, also assist in addressing broader issues of return. Doc-umentation, investigations, and where appropriate also prosecutions, might be among the appropriate mechanisms. Although the context for such interventions is and would continue to be deeply politicized, the Conciliation Resources survey indicates relatively broad public support for addressing legacies of past abuse.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FUTURE

What effect has the August 2008 war had on how Abkhazians and IDPs approach the future? Questions from the De Facto State and Conciliation Resources surveys on future

24E.g., see O’Loughlin et al. (2008) on displacement-return issues involving Ingush and Ossetians in the North Caucasus region of Russia.

Fig. 11. Responses of Abkhazian residents (disaggregated by ethnic group) to the question: “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?: Among those displaced by the war, are there people who should not be allowed to come back to Abkhazia.” Source: De Facto State survey, 2010.

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expectations and normative aspirations reveal two ethnic populations with very different visions. For the majority of ethnic Abkhaz, the post-August 2008 war world is a positive one, involving the realization of their independence. For the majority of Georgian IDPs, their expectations of return have declined significantly in the wake of this war.

Figure 12 presents the results from the De Facto State survey on the future status of Abkhazia. Of the three options presented—remain independent or be a part of either Russia or Georgia—the majority of ethnic Abkhaz choose independence. Interestingly, roughly half of Armenians in the sample expressed a preference for it to be part of the Russian Federation whereas the majority of ethnic Russians express a preference for independence. The option of becoming part of Georgia garners minimal support. For ethnic Georgians within Abkhazia this question was undoubtedly a sensitive one (indicated, in part, by the high “hard to say” and “refuse to answer” figures) and fear may have shaped some responses. Their responses, consequently, need to be treated with caution; the same question asked of the same respondent in Georgia would most likely elicit a different answer. The De Facto State survey also asked respondents what policies the government of Abkhazia should adopt towards Georgia, with three simple options—collaborate, do not collaborate, and maintain the status quo—provided. Figure 13 displays the results, which indicate that over 70 percent of ethnic Abkhaz favor no collaboration, as do smaller majorities of Armenians and Russians. Not surprisingly, a strong plurality of Georgians support collaboration.

Taken together, the results of both these De Facto State survey questions confirm the difficult attitudinal landscape facing any serious negotiations and future rapprochement between Georgia and Abkhazia. In unleashing events that led to its recognition by Russia, the August 2008 war has created conditions in Abkhazia supporting the further entrenchment of uncompromising positions toward Georgia. With considerable Russian government subsidies, new private sector investment from Russia, new Russian military agreements, and Russian soldiers patrolling its de facto border with Georgia proper, the ethnic Abkhaz, Armenian, and Russian populations of Abkhazia have little incentive and are under little pressure to compromise. From their perspective, the future is now brighter than it was prior to Russia’s recognition, even if many admit that navigating the relationship with Moscow is fraught with difficulties and that Moscow is not likely to put Abkhaz interests first. The potentialities real-izable from a more positive and productive relationship with the Republic of Georgia are not apparent or real. Only Gal(i) residents traversing the border regularly have a different attitude.

Fig. 12. Responses of Abkhazian residents (disaggregated by ethnic group) to the question: “In your opinion, what should be the future status of Abkhazia.” Source: De Facto State survey, 2010.

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One consequence of the prevalence of a hardline anti-Georgian disposition in Abkhazia is that the Gal(i) District is likely to remain undeveloped as a transit region, its southern border largely militarized. Abkhazia’s connectivity to the world remains oriented toward the north through the Russian Federation. Engagement with the EU and U.S. would be an alternative welcomed by many in Abkhazia—though many also complain that the West’s current two-prong policy of nonrecognition and engagement has thus far only developed the former of its two components. Tbilisi’s fear is that engagement leads to “creeping recognition.”

The Conciliation Resources survey asked IDPs whether they would, over the next two years, support a series of actions that the Georgian government could take in order to find a solution to the conflict. In their responses, it is clear that the IDPs focused predominantly on interventions that would deal with the level of Georgian-Abkhaz conflict: 85 percent would support activities to establish the fate of missing persons; 72 percent would give civil society a greater voice in the process of reconciliation; and 59 and 58 percent, respectively would support signing a non-use of force treaty with Abkhazia and entering into negotiations with the de facto Abkhaz authorities regarding Abkhazia’s status. In contrast, 53 and 45 percent would support the non-use of force treaty and negotiations regarding Abkhazia’s status with Russia. This is interesting, especially given that most IDPs highlight the role of Russia in the conflict, in accordance with the current Georgian government’s view that no Georgian-Abkhaz or Georgian-Ossetian conflicts exist, only that between Georgia and Russia.

A follow-up question investigated what topics IDPs would want to see discussed, were the direct negotiations with Abkhaz to restart. A vast majority would prioritize discussions about return (83 percent); many stressed also security along the boundary line (48 percent), unrestricted travel of all Georgians to Abkhazia, and the political status of Abkhazia (both at 24 percent). Not surprisingly, IDPs are better attuned to the localized geopolitics of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. And while most would like to have the right of return, and the majority say they would want to exercise it in political conditions they would deem favorable (i.e., reintegration), most IDPs do not see the chances of reintegration as high in the short to medium terms: 26 percent think Abkhazia will be reintegrated within the next 5–10 years; 7 percent in the next 11–50 years; 14 percent say never; and 49 percent say they do not know. This indicates that most IDPs in Georgia are no longer hostages to illusions of speedy return and have an appreciation of the political and security circumstances at play in the conflict that prevent, or at best complicate, their return.

Fig. 13. Responses of Abkhazian residents (disaggregated by ethnic group) to the question: “In your opinion, what policies should the government of Abkhazia adopt toward Georgia?” N = 930 in 57 locations. Source: De Facto State survey, 2010.

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CONCLUSION

Situations of protracted displacement are all too common in international affairs. In this paper we have examined displacement of ethnic Georgians from Abkhazia that took place nearly two decades ago. We have reviewed some of the current social attitudes and dispo-sitions in the post-2008 context, and how they impact the question of return. Tbilisi and Sukhum(i) both frame their attitudes to return as part of arguments about state sovereignty. These positions leave minimal scope for discussions of any practical substantive matters, including those where incremental progress might be of interest to the conflict-affected popu-lations on both sides.

Georgians insist on the immediate right of safe and dignified return for all displaced people. But while focusing on the right in principle, a practical discussion on what return might mean in practice for IDPs has largely been a taboo in Georgia (except for localized attempts by NGOs working with IDPs to raise awareness of IDPs by discussing such issues). The Abkhaz say they have allowed for some returns to take place, but insist on guarantees of non-use of force before any more substantive discussions of large-scale return, in effect also avoiding a discussion of displaced people’s rights, and other related issues (such as property).

What is lost in this battle of political positions are possible opportunities for progress on practical issues. A debate about what return might mean in practice for people who left Abkhazia nearly two decades ago, many of whose children were born in Georgia proper, or whose houses have been taken over by others or destroyed, might produce a dialogue on how many IDPs might actually want to return to Abkhazia on a permanent basis, in what political and security conditions, and what portion of the IDP population might simply be interested in having their right of return acknowledged, but would chose not to exercise it. This might in turn impact on Abkhaz perceptions of and calculations about addressing return issues.

One practical step that could help loosen the knot of issues around returns is to first think about property rights, restitution, and broader reparations (including symbolic). Whatever the merits of the Bosnian experience with return questions after its war, the process of practically grappling with return there helped spur the codification of the Pinheiro Principles (COHRE, 2005), and debate over improving them (Paglione, 2008; Ballard, 2010; Anderson, 2011; Toal, 2011). These, in effect, separate the process of restitution from return, and make the case for a transparent international body to establish property rights and mechanisms to enable displaced persons to acquire title and deed over property previously owned or used, without implications for their potential right of return. The De Facto State survey asked respondents in Abkhazia if they agreed or disagreed with the establishment of an inter national commis-sion to make judgment on claims of property made by both sides. The results are largely consistent with the hardline attitudes we have seen in the other survey questions, but not overwhelmingly so.25 This idea is a relatively new one, and was not familiar to some respon-dents (indicated by the high “difficult to say” answer).26 Attitudes may not be firmly estab-lished yet. For those interested in moving beyond the current political stalemate, where the

25The ethnic Georgian and Abkhaz positions are almost polar opposites of each other. More specifically, over 50 percent of ethnic Georgians surveyed in Abkhazia agreed (strongly or mostly) that an international commission should be created, compared to just over 20 percent of ethnic Abkhaz. Conversely, roughly 50 percent of the latter group disagreed with the idea to create such a commission, compared with about 20 percent of Georgians. A pluralitly of ethnic Russians surveyed, and roughly half of Armenians, disapproved of the idea of a commission.

26Responses in this category among the four groups ranged from just over one-fifth for Georgians to one-third for Russians.

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interests of populations affected by war and persons displaced by the conflict (within and beyond Abkhazia) are refracted through the prism of state interests rather than human secu-rity needs, the idea of a neutral international commission with a technocratic mandate to establish a restitution process that meets international human rights norms has the potential to depoliticize some highly sensitive legacies of the Georgia-Abkhaz conflict, and open new practical possibilities for future incremental progress on issues of reparations for both sides. In parallel to starting a restitutions process, other reparations-focused interventions such as financial compensation to war victims or their families, financial compensation for destroyed and damaged property on all sides, and symbolic gestures acknowledging losses suffered by both sides would be beneficial. At the moment none of this is likely, as both governments appear mired in zero-sum habits of thought that prioritize absolutist positions before the needs and interests of all the citizens they claim to represent.

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after ethnic violence in the caucasus: attitudes of local abkhazians and displaced georgians in 2010

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