adorno minima moralia selections

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h with a relaxed performance of what was once enacted, utmost exertion of thought, by Schelling and Hegel on 'With e rer's podium: the deciphering of the phenomenon. But tu in tension affects the quality of the thought the difference less than that between the philosophy of revelation! and : gossip of a mother-in-law. The same movement of d which was once to elevate its 'material' to a concept, is itself ':' ced to mere material for conceptual ordering. The ideas one just good enough to allow experts to decide whether their originator is a compulsive character, an oral type, or a hysteric. Thanks to the diminished responsibility that lies in its severance from reflection, from rational control, speculation is itself handed over as an object to science, whose subjectivity is extinguished with it. Thought, in allowing itself to be reminded of its unconscious origins by the administrative strucwre of analysis, forgets to be thought. From true judgement it becomes neutral sruff. Instead of mastering itself by performing the task of conceptualization, it entrusts itself impotently to processing by the doctor, who in any case knows everything beforehand. Thus speculation is definitively crushed, becoming itself a fact to be included in one of the depanments of classification as proof that nothing changes.



4.3 intimidation. - What truth may objectively be is difficult enough to determine, but we should not, in our dealings with people, let this fact terrorize us. To this end criteria are used that at first sight seem convincing. One of the most dependable is the reproach that a statement is 'too subjective'. If this is brought to bear, with an indignation in which rings the furious harmony of all rea.sonable people, one has grounds, for a few seconds, to feel selfThe subjective and objective been comreversed. ObJecttve means the non-controversial aspect of their unquestioned impression, the fac;ade made up of classidata, that is, the subjective; and they call subjective anything "N lch breaches that engages the specific experience of a ntatter, casts off all ready-made judgements and substitutes relatedness to the object for the majority consensus of those who do notI.

D., Phi/osop},i. tUr 0ffiMarung: the system of the late Schelling.

even look at it, let alone think about it - that is, the objective. J how vacuous the formal objection to subjective relativity is, seen in the particular field of the latter, that of aesthetic judgements Anyone who, drawing on the strength of his precise reaction to work of art, has ever subjected himself in earnest to its disciplinea to its immanent formal law, the compulsion of its structure, fand that objections to the merely subjective quality of his experience vanish like a pitiful illusion: and every step that he takes, by virtue of his highly subjective innervation, towards the heart of the matter has incomparably greater force than the comprehensive and backed-up analyses of such things as 'style', whose claims to scientific status are made at the expense of such experience. This is doubly true in the era of positivism and the culmre industry, where objectivity is calculated by the subjects managing it. In face of this, reason has retreated entirely behind a windowless wall of idiosyncrasies, which the holders of power arbitrarily reproach with arbitrariness, since they want sub;ects impotent, for fear of the objectivity that is preserved in these subjects alone.





For Post-Socratics. - Nothing is more unfitting for an intellectual resolved on practising what was earlier called philosophy, than towish, in discussion, and one might almost say in argumentation, to be right. The very wish to be right, down to its subtlest form of logical reflection, is an expression of that spirit of self-preservation which philosophy is precisely concerned to break down. I knew someone who invited all the celebrities in epistemology, science and the humanities one after the other, discussed his own system with each of them from first to last, and when none of them dared raise any further arguments against its formalism, believed his position totally impregnable. Such naivety is at work wherever philosophy has even a distant resemblance to the gestures of suasion. These are founded on the presupposition of a universztas literaru.m, an a priori agreement between minds able to communicate with each adler, and thus on complete conformism. When phers, who are well known to have difficulty in keeping silent, engage in conversation, they should try always to lose the argument, but in such a way as to convict their opponent of untruth. The70

hould not be to have absolutely correct, irrefutable, water5 gniti ons _ for they inevitably boil down to tautologies, but !Ig?tl which cause the question of their jusmess to judge itself. UlSlg this is not, however, to advocate irrationalism, the postusa of arbitrary theses justified by an intuitive faith in revelation, latton abolition 0 f t he d" between th an d argument. the lsnnctlon eSls bu t r. D.alectical thinking, (rom th IS pOint 0 fView, means t hat an argushould take on the pungency of a thesis and a thesis contain :thin itself the fullness of its reasoning. All bridging concepts, all links and logical auxiliary operations that are not a part of the matter itself, all secondary developments not saturated with the experience of the object; should be discarded. In a philosophical text all the propositions ought to be equally close to the centre. Without Hegel's ever having said so explicitly, his whole procedure bears witness to such an intention. Because it acknowledges no first principle, it ought, strictly speaking, to know of nothing secondary or deduced; and it transfers the concept of mediation from formal connections to the substance of the object itself, thereby attempting to overcome the difference between the latter and an external thought that mediates it. The limits to the success of such an intention in Hegelian philosophy are also those of its truth, that is to say, the remnants of prima philosophia, the supposition of the subject as something which is, in spite of everything, 'primary'. One of the tasks of dialectical logic is to eliminate the last traces of a deductive system, together with the last advocatory gestures of



'H.ow sickly seem all growing thingS'.1 - Dialectical thought opposes cati.on in the funher sense that it refuses to affinn individual In their isolation and separateness: it designates isolation as precIsely a product of the universal. Thus it acts as a corrective both to .rnanic fiXity and to the unresisting and empty drift of the paranOId which pays for its absolute judgements by loss of the expenence of the matter judged. But the dialectic is not for this reason what it became in the English Hegelian school and, still morelI7ie Joc" alIu W,rJ.nJ, POern H eitrr"

/craM: line from Georg Trakls


completely, in Dewey's strenuous pragmatism: a sense of p portion, a way of putting things in their correct perspective, but obdurate common sense. If Hegel seemed himself, in his CO lira venation with Goethe, to come close to such a view, when :defended his philosophy against Goethe's platonism on the groundt that it was 'basically no more than the spirit of opposition innate i S each human being, regulated and methodically developed, a which proves its worth in distinguishing truth from falsehood' 1 the veiled meaning of his formulation mischievously includes the praise of what is linnate in each human being' a denunciation of common sense, since man's innermost characteristic is defined as precisely a refusal to be guided by common sense, indeed, as opposition to it. Common sense, the correct assessment of situations, the worldly eye schooled by the market, shares with the dialectic a freedom from dogma, narrow-mindedness and prejudice. Its sobriety undeniably constitutes a moment of critical thinking. But its lack of passionate commitment makes it, all the same, the sworn enemy of such thinking. For opinion in its generality, accepted directly as that of society as it is, necessarily has agreement as its concrete content. It is no coincidence that in the nineteenth century it was stale dogmatism, given a bad conscience by the Enlightenment, that appealed to common sense, so that an archpositivist like Mill had to inveigh against the latter. The sense of proportion entails a total obligation to think in terms of the established measures and values. One need only have once heard a diehard representative ofa ruling clique say: 'That is of no consequence', or note at what times the bourgeois talk of exaggeration, hysteria, folly, to know that the appeal to reason invariably occurs most promptly in apologies for unreason. Hegel stressed the healthy spirit of with the obstinacy of the peasant who has learned over the cenb..ries to endure the hunts and ground-rent of mighty feudal lords. It is the concern of dialectics to cock a snook at the sound views held by later powers-that-be on the inunutability of the course of the world, and to decipher in their "propor tions' the faithful and reduced mirror-image of inordinately enlarged disproportions. Dialectical reason is, when set the dominant mode of reason, unreason: only in encompassing anJohann-Peter Eckermann, Gupraclu mit Go,r/a" in Goethe, Vol. 24, Zurich 1948, pp. 669-70 (Eckermann, Conversations wit! GO'''''' London 1946, p. 2.44).I.


this mode does it become itself reasonable. Was it not I .....,cel1ng talmudic to InsIst, In th e nu-d st 0 fth e exehange economy, - . and bIg difference between the labour-time expended by the worker ond t needed for the reproduction of his life? Did not Nietzsche an ha cart before all the horses on which