aboriginal and non-aboriginal partnerships: building blocks for sustainable community development

Submitted to: Brent Mueller & Dale Leitch

Community Transition Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and

Women’s Services #221 Market Square–560 Johnson Street Victoria, British Columbia

Date: October, 2001 Prepared by: Wayne Dunn & Bob Isbister

2457 Bakerview Road Mill Bay, BC V0R 2P0 250.743.7619 [email protected]

Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Partnerships:

Building Blocks for Sustainable

Community Development

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Aboriginal Partnerships – Building Blocks for Sustainable Community Development

Acknowledgements The consulting team of Wayne Dunn & Associates Ltd. wish to acknowledge the sincere co-operation and support they received from the Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and Women’s Services, the Ministry of Water, Air and Land Protection, the Office of the Provincial Health Officer, and the numerous individuals and organizations involved in Aboriginal partnerships. While it is impossible to directly thank and acknowledge everyone who was so generous with their time, information and ideas, a number of individuals deserve special mention for their valuable contribution to this process. We are grateful to the Project Team of Mr. Dale Leitch, Executive Director, Community Transition Branch of the Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and Women’s Services and to Mr. Brent Mueller, Ms. Catherine Rodgers, also of this Ministry, for their input throughout this process. Their quick responses, insightful suggestions and ideas, and their enthusiastic collaboration throughout this project have been extremely valuable. Mr. Tim Cottrell, formerly Assistant Director of the Community Transition Branch was also an indispensable contributor to the project prior to his transfer to the Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management. The Consultants and the Project Team would like to acknowledge the advice and assistance from Ms. Lisa Nye and Mr. Graham Dragushan of the Ministry of Community Aboriginal and Women's Services; Ms. Judy Birch of the Ministry of Water, Air and Land Protection; and Cathy Hull of the Office of the Provincial Health Officer. Throughout our research numerous individuals from various organizations throughout the province made themselves available for interviews (many more than once). While we cannot thank everyone directly, we would like to acknowledge Allan Pineo, Claire Marshall, Steve Mazur, Tarel S. Quandt, Cameron Beck, Bill Cordoban, Gerry Stelsmaschuk, Wayne d’Easum, Mathew Ney, Janice Rose, Robin True, Russ Helberg, Doug Krogel, Ron Creber, Frankie Craig, Wanda Stachura, Richard Krentz, Darlene Luke, Chief Sophie Pierre, Alex Wolf, Randall Martin, Bill Lee, Rob Enfield, Tina Donald, Kevin Brown, Clarence Louie, Jeannine Cook, Lee-Anne Crane, Gerry Sanders, Dave Monture, Mike Anderson, Georg Schurian, Jennifer Turner, Harvey Filger, Roger Williams, Bob Sankey, Bernadette Spence, Alison McNeil, Frieda Enns, Clinton Mutch, Diane St. Jacques and Steven James. To those we may have missed, please accept our sincere apologies and our heartfelt thanks. WDA Project Team:

Wayne Dunn Bob Isbister Gifty Serbeh-Dunn Bernadette Spence Randall Levine

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Table of Contents 1 Introduction and Background.................................................................................. 1 2 Methodology and Approach ..................................................................................... 4

2.1 Approach................................................................................................................... 4 2.1.1 Data Sources and Collection Methodologies ............................................................. 5 2.1.2 Data Collection Framework ....................................................................................... 5

2.2 Limitations of Research ........................................................................................... 7 3 Case Studies and Individual Partnership Analysis .............................................. 10

3.1 Summary of Partnership Case Studies................................................................. 10 3.2 Individual Case Studies ......................................................................................... 11

3.2.1 Carrier Sekani Family Services................................................................................ 11 3.2.2 Gallagher Canyon Agreement .................................................................................. 14 3.2.3 Greater Massett Development Corporation.............................................................. 17 3.2.4 Iisaak Forest Resources ............................................................................................ 22 3.2.5 Lakeview Meadows.................................................................................................. 26 3.2.6 Monthly Licensee Meetings – North Thompson...................................................... 29 3.2.7 Skwlax/Sanders Construction Ltd. ........................................................................... 32 3.2.8 Sun Rivers Resort Community................................................................................. 36 3.2.9 Tsilqot’in People of Xeni and BC Parks (Ts’yl-os Provincial Park)........................ 39 3.2.10 West Chilcotin Forest Products................................................................................ 43

4 Lessons Learned....................................................................................................... 46 4.1 Motivation of Partners and Stakeholders ............................................................ 46 4.2 Critical Success Factors ......................................................................................... 49 4.3 Conflict Management............................................................................................. 50 4.4 Lessons Learned from Failed Partnerships ......................................................... 51 4.5 Lessons Learned from other Initiatives................................................................ 53

4.5.1 First Nations Summit of Chiefs and UBCM ............................................................ 54 4.5.2 Knowledge Network Series...................................................................................... 55

5 From Individual to Community – The Case for Community Level Facilitated Partnership Development ....................................................................................... 56

6 Building on the Results: Recommendations for Developing a Community Partnership Initiative....................................................................................... 59

6.1 Model Partnership and Bridge Building Process ................................................ 59 6.2 Selecting Pilot Project Communities .................................................................... 62 6.3 Next Steps - Launching a Pilot Project................................................................. 63

7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 69

Attachments Table of Abbreviations and Acronyms Information Sources and Bibliography List of Exhibits

Exhibit 2-1 WDA Partnership Analysis Framework© ...................................................... 6 Exhibit 6-1 Community Transformation Process ............................................................. 61 Exhibit 6-2 Suggested Year 1 Activities and Financial Sources ..................................... 66 Exhibit 6-3 Analysis of Two Potential Pilot Communities ............................................. 67

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Executive Summary In British Columbia, there is an ever-increasing need for First Nations to partner with

private industry as well as local and regional public sector entities, to enhance the

potential to achieve shared goals of diversification, sustainable employment and

community economic and social development. While there are an increasing number of

such partnerships being developed the authors argue that a facilitated process for

developing and supporting partnerships would substantially increase their number and

impact on the economy of British Columbia (especially rural and remote areas who have

been hardest hit by the downturn in traditional resource based economies).

The report which follows is the result of efforts by the British Columbia Ministry of

Community, Aboriginal and Women’s Services to gain a greater understanding of the

nature of existing partnerships of this type, as well as to develop an initiative for

identifying and supporting community-based collaboration efforts.

In the development of this report, several case analyses were undertaken within the

province, the results of which have provided a body of data and information which was

used to identify a number of lessons learned and critical success factors for

Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal partnerships. From the information collected, ten specific

studies were analyzed which reflect a level of regional coverage and industry variation

which cumulatively offer a valid and relevant cross-section of current partnership

activities.

The analysis of these various collaborations has highlighted the following critical success

factors in the development of an Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal partnership framework for

the future (see Section 4.2 for full information and text).

All partners should have clear and appropriate motivation to collaborate

Regular, effective and appropriate communications should be maintained

Partners should have the capacity to finance their participation in projects

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Roles and responsibilities within the partnership should be clearly outlined, with a

strong commitment to mutual decision-making

Partners should have committed leadership who will endeavour to keep politics

out of the operations of the partnership

An appropriate level of managerial and operational competence must be present,

as well as technical capacity which meets the requirements of the project

A sufficient amount of front-end negotiating time to ensure appropriate partner

selection and mutual understanding of issues

Partners should have qualified personnel to manage their activities

Partnerships should have a clear, succinct vision and mandate as well as

measurable objectives.

The findings also detail several challenges faced by collaborative endeavours, including

the need to develop sustainable revenue streams and ensure the effective management of

finances and resources. Further challenges included balancing the desire to maximize

employment with the economic realities faced by the communities, reconciling individual

autonomy to support effective partnerships, and ensuring the administrative and political

stability of partner First Nation(s) while keeping politics out of the negotiations and

operations.

The lessons learned through the examination of the case studies provide the basis for the

development of a community partnership initiative for the Province. Such a process

would involve two fundamental, concurrent activities to support collaborative efforts:

• Economic bridge building

• Social/community bridge building.

The economic bridge building component reflects the need to identify and foster

collaborative economic opportunities through joint ventures or partnerships. The process

should include the identification of potential partners and developing a mutual

understanding of the interests of stakeholders, as well as the delivery of highly practical

workshops on creating and negotiating the partnerships themselves. Finally, the

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provision of on-going support and consultation will be critical to ensure the development

of the partnerships.

The social/community bridge building aspect of the framework reflects the need for

sustained dialogue between stakeholders. The goal of this activity is to address long-

standing divisions in the community, and ultimately to change conflicting relationships,

and foster a level of trust and respect that would serve to increase collaboration and trust

(and thus increase the number and sustainability of Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal

partnerships).

In order to create this initiative, pilot communities should be identified and qualified

based upon the following recommended criteria:

• Community has been subjected to recent economic downturn

• Partners have access to sufficient financial resources to cover costs of project

• Community has proven history of collaboration between Aboriginal and non-

Aboriginal community

• Community is comprised of sufficiently large groups of both populations

• All partners display commitment to project

• Strong leadership evident amongst partners

• Meaningful and practical economic opportunities available

Through the course of the creation of this report, two potential pilot communities have

been identified which meet the above criteria, with the exception of the level of

commitment made, which cannot be determined until later in the process. Both Port

Hardy and Ucluelet represent excellent examples of communities where pilot initiatives

of the provincial partnership framework could be developed.

The review and analysis of the case study partnerships identified in this report serve to

reinforce the belief that Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal partnerships offer a major economic

opportunity to several communities in the province, both in the expansion of existing

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partnerships, and in the identification and fostering of potential collaborations in the

future. The suggested plan presents an opportunity for the Government of British

Columbia to work proactively with these community partners and take a leading role in

the fostering of such value-added initiatives.

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1 Introduction and Background

The Community Transition Branch of the Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and

Women’s Services of the Government of British Columbia (BC) initiated this Research

Project on Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Partnerships to develop an improved

understanding of such partnerships and identify opportunities for the Ministry to support

community level collaboration between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal groups. A

Request for Proposals was issued and the BC firm Wayne Dunn & Associates Ltd.

(WDA) was engaged to undertake the project.

The project was launched in early February and a progress report was submitted on

February 23, 2001. The Progress Report included mini case studies and preliminary

analysis of sixty-four1 examples of collaboration between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal

interests2. The Progress Report was circulated to various government stakeholders for

comment and observation. On March 9, 2001 the Consultants met with the Ministry to

discuss their comments on the Progress Report and identify those partnerships suitable

for more detailed study and analysis.

Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities alike face social and economic challenges

that require new approaches and innovative solutions. While in general terms, many

Aboriginal communities have improved their quality of life in recent years, in

comparison to the non-Aboriginal population they are more likely to be burdened by a

lack of employment opportunities, under-educated and living in poverty. Non-Aboriginal

communities also face difficult challenges in trying to secure a stronger social and

economic future, including recovery from economic downturns in the resource sector or

dealing with inner-city poverty. Improving relations between these two groups can help

BC communities overcome impediments to social and economic progress.

1 Subsequent to the completion of the Progress Report, preliminary analysis was conducted on four additional partnerships

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Cooperation and collaboration between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities can

mobilize and focus local and regional resources to affect positive change for all residents.

Insight on how these communities can work together to address common concerns in

building a healthy sustainable future can be provided through the profiling of best

practices of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal partnerships.

This Report builds on and makes extensive use of prior research sponsored by the

Ministry and the Federal, Provincial and Territorial Ministers and National Aboriginal

Leaders report on Strengthening Aboriginal Participation in the Economy. Section 2

describes the methodology and approach employed by the Consultants to collect the data

and undertake the various analyses.

The following Section (3) presents ten case studies of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal

partnerships in five different sectors of the BC economy. Section 4 summarizes the

lessons learned from these partnerships; examining in particular what motivated the

formation of the partnerships, what were the critical success factors and then discusses

how the issue of conflict management is addressed. As well, this Section reviews lessons

learned from ‘failed partnerships’ and discusses lessons learned from two other Ministry-

supported partnership initiatives.

In Section 5 the Consultants argue that, while individual and ad-hoc partnerships between

Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal citizens of BC have made a positive impact on the social

and economic fabric of BC, the impact could be significantly greater if a facilitated and

systematic partnership development and bridge building process was implemented at a

community level.

2 A listing of the sixty-eight partnerships and the results of the analysis conducted on them is presented in Appendix 1.

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Section 6 outlines what such a process might look like and then goes on to list criteria

that would help to select potential pilot community sites. This section also presents a

detailed plan for launching and financing a pilot project that could, after testing and

refinement, be rolled out to communities across the province. The final section contains

the Consultants conclusions.

The following section summarizes the approach and methodology utilized by the

Consultants and discusses limitations of the research.

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2 Methodology and Approach

2.1 Approach

In order to achieve the objectives of the assignment within the time and budget

constraints, a two-stage research and analysis process was developed. The initial

research stage involved the identification of partnerships, desktop research to gather

preliminary data on the identified partnerships, and preliminary analysis of each

partnership. A data collection framework was developed to ensure consistency of data

across the various partnerships reviewed.

The geographic focus of the research was on the province of British Columbia. However,

the Progress Report included several Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal partnerships from

northern Saskatchewan, as this area has been particularly successful at the development

of economic and business collaboration between First Nations and other interests.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that Northern Saskatchewan is a world leader in Aboriginal

business and economic development. For this reason, the researchers felt that it was

worthwhile to review appropriate examples from this area. However, after consultation

with various stakeholders it was decided that due to: the unique history of Aboriginal

issues in BC; the ease with which BC examples can be followed-up by interested parties;

the fact that there may be historical and geographic challenges to applying lessons from

outside BC; and the project’s budgetary limitations, it was appropriate that detailed

research and analysis should focus exclusively on BC partnerships.

The Consultants and the Ministry team identified seventeen partnerships in five basic

sectors (Environment, Social, Economic, Municipal and Other) that were suitable for

further research and analysis. Recognizing that time and budget constraints, coupled with

the need to contact and interview major stakeholders in each partnership would make it

impossible to complete the research on all seventeen partnerships in the time available, it

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was agreed that the Consultants should attempt to develop 6-10 detailed case studies,

with at least one from each sector. This report contains ten such case studies and further

analysis.

2.1.1 Data Sources and Collection Methodologies

Data sources and collection methodologies utilized by the Consultant included:

• Telephone interviews and meetings with First Nations officials, federal,

provincial and municipal officials, representatives of non-Aboriginal partners,

and other significant stakeholders in various partnerships;

• Review of published documents and reports; and

• Internet research.

A complete listing of information sources is presented in Attachment 2.

Data Verification and Crosschecking

Due to the preliminary nature of the information required, the 68 partnership overviews

that were reviewed in the initial stage did not necessarily include data crosschecking and

verification. Many of the overviews presented in the initial stage were based on only one

data source. However, the detailed partnership case studies presented in this report all

involved multiple data sources to ensure accuracy of data and to enable the Consultants to

synthesize the viewpoints of significant stakeholders.

2.1.2 Data Collection Framework

In order to ensure consistency of data, the Consultants developed a uniform data

collection framework for each Phase of the project (see Attachment 3 for the Data

Collection Frameworks utilized for each Phase). The Frameworks were designed to

allow researchers to quickly gather and organize pertinent information. The Phase I

Framework was designed to provide sufficient information to enable a preliminary

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analysis of each partnership and allow the project team and the client to identify which

partnerships warranted further research and development as more detailed case studies.

The Phase II Data Collection Framework, which was used for interviews with each

partner and stakeholder, was designed to allow the Consultants to develop a more

detailed understanding of each partnership and the factors that supported or inhibited its

success. The project team recognized that even though it was unlikely that data on each

item in the framework would be available for each partnership, it was useful to have a

framework that could easily capture and organize whatever data was available. This

enabled a more systematic and consistent analytical process, which allowed the

identification of critical success factors across the range of partnerships reviewed. The

overall data gathering and analysis process is summarized in Exhibit 2-1 below.

Exhibit 2-1 WDA Partnership Analysis Framework©

The results from the data gathering and analysis are presented in Section 3 (Case Studies

and Individual Partnership Analysis).

Following the analysis of individual partnerships the Consultants undertook an integrated

review of all ten partnerships to identify traits and characteristics that are generally

applicable to successful partnerships, regardless of which sector they are in. This is

presented in Section 4 (Lessons Learned).

Partnership Researchand Analysis

Identificationof Critical

SuccessFactors

ReplicablePartnershipCase Study

Legal/Structural Development

Accomplishments

AboriginalEmployment

CapacityDevelopment

Operational

Stakeholders

Barriers andConstraints

CommunityCharacteristics

External issuesAboriginal

Procurement

Financial

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The draft plan for a Community Bridge Building Initiative is presented in Section 6.

2.2 Limitations of Research

The consultants recognize that there are significant limitations on the preliminary

research and analysis. These limitations include:

• Partnership identification was not exhaustive – No effort was made to

inventory every Aboriginal - Non-Aboriginal partnership in British Columbia.

However, consultation was undertaken with key government contacts with

extensive knowledge of Aboriginal partnerships. This consultation helped to

identify important partnerships and focus the Consultants on those partnerships

that the stakeholders felt most relevant. While conducting an inventory of

partnerships may well be a very useful exercise it was beyond the scope and

budget of the current project. The objective of the Phase I research was simply to

identify and collect information on enough partnerships to provide a pool from

which partnerships could be selected for further research and analysis.

This notwithstanding, the consultants would encourage the Government of BC to

consider undertaking an exhaustive partnership inventory. This exercise would

produce valuable information and data and would provide a baseline from which

to measure the success of efforts to support and promote Aboriginal/non-

Aboriginal partnerships.

• No crosschecking and data verification (Phase I) – For most partnerships only

one data source was utilized to gather data and information. However, the

consulting team itself has considerable personal knowledge of many of the

partnerships reviewed. This information was used to undertake a preliminary

verification of data and information. Still, there could well be some inaccuracies

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in the data and information. Phase II research methodology utilized a data

checking and verification process as outlined in Section 2.1.

• Uneven geographic dispersion of partnerships. The project team attempted to

identify examples that represented a wide range of foci and types of initiative

rather than to undertake an exhaustive inventory of partnerships for any particular

area or to ensure that there were partnerships identified and reviewed from

throughout the entire province. While efforts were made to identify and gather

information from all areas, challenges with having telephone calls returned

limited the geographic dispersion in Phase I. Phase II research targets were, for

the most part, selected from partnerships reviewed in Phase I. Information was

not gathered on any partnerships in the far north of the province. It should be

noted that the research was conducted near the end of the fiscal year, a time that is

particularly demanding for most informants.

• Some partnerships are of recent origin. Generally, partnerships between

Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests in BC are recent phenomena. Although

some partnerships had several years of operating experience, most were originally

formed within the past three years. As a result, some critical success factors and

key challenges may have not yet become evident. To compensate for this the

Consultants informally compared the results of the partnership analysis to their

knowledge of partnerships in other areas that have been in existence for extended

periods of time (e.g., Kitsaki Development Corporation/Trimac Transportation

(1986); Meadow Lake Tribal Council/NorSask Forest Products (1988), etc.).

• No Research into Failed Partnerships. The research focused only on existing

successful partnerships. In other words, it did not seek to review partnerships that

had failed in order to glean learnings from them. However the researchers have

had direct experience in partnerships that have failed and this has been factored

into the Lessons Learned discussion in Section 4.

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Despite the limitations noted above, the Consultants are confident that the research and

analysis has provided findings that are interesting and useful and which will serve to

guide the establishment of comprehensive partnership development and bridge building

initiatives in British Columbia. These findings and analyses are presented in subsequent

Sections.

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3 Case Studies and Individual Partnership Analysis

3.1 Summary of Partnership Case Studies

The following list summarizes the detailed case studies reviewed in this report and

specifies the sector that they are from.

1. Environment • Tsilqot'in People of Xeni and BC Parks

2. Social

• Carrier Sekanni Family Services 3. Economic

• West Chilcotin Forest Products Ltd. • Monthly Licensee Meetings – North Thompson • Skwalx/Sanders Construction Ltd – Little Shuswap Indian Band and Sanders

Construction • Greater Masset Development Corporation • Iisaak Forest Resources

4. General

• Sun Rivers Resort Community – Kamloops Indian Band and Sun Rivers 5. Other (Municipal)

• Gallagher Canyon Agreement • Lake View Meadows

Detailed case studies of the above ten partnerships are presented in the following sub-

section. The case studies are arranged in alphabetical order.

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3.2 Individual Case Studies

The following ten sub-sections discuss the ten case studies referred to earlier. Specific

contacts and methods of data gathering utilized for gathering information are summarized

in the Appendix Information Sources.

3.2.1 Carrier Sekani Family Services

Parties to the Agreement:

• Carrier Sekani Family Services ⇒ Wet’suwet’en First Nation ⇒ Cheslatta First Nation ⇒ Burns Lake First Nation ⇒ Stellat’en First Nation ⇒ Nadleh Whut’en First Nation ⇒ Saik’us First Nation ⇒ Nak’azdli First Nation ⇒ Tl’azt’en First Nation ⇒ Takla Lake First Nation ⇒ Yekooche First Nation

• Indian and Northern Affairs Canada

• Ministry for Children and Family Services

Narrative Description of the Collaboration

Carrier Sekani Family Services is essentially a service delivery agreement entered into in

1991 between the Provincial Ministry of Child and Family Services, Indian and Northern

Affairs Canada (INAC) and the ten First Nations. This is a multi-year financing

agreement that allows the First Nations to organize a service delivery agency (Carrier

Sekani Family Services) to deliver child and family service programs to First Nations

Peoples in the area. The agreement is similar to others that are negotiated throughout

Canada involving First Nations, INAC and the relevant provincial Ministry.

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INAC’s policy governing the

financing of Child and Family

Service Agency funding stipulates

that there must be a minimum of

500 children in the area before

they will enter into an agreement

(the purpose is to ensure effective

economies of scale).

Launched in 1990/91 the Mission Statement of Carrier Sekani Family Services is:

A 10 person Board of Directors, one from each member nation, oversees the operation of

Carrier Sekani.

Motivation of the Partners and Stakeholders

The First Nations’ interest was to ensure that their membership received child and family

services in a culturally appropriate manner. The Federal and Provincial government

recognized that traditional mechanisms for delivering child and family services to First

Nations Peoples was not working and that they could be enhanced through First Nations

controlled delivery structures.

Lessons Learned and Critical Success Factors

Interviews and research have identified several lessons learned and critical success

factors. They are:

• Secure financing is a critical issue, especially in an organization that has no

mechanism for internally generated financing;

• A strong focus on acquiring, training and maintaining quality staff is fundamental.

This is especially important when activities are located in relatively remote areas

Mission Statement

"With the guidance of our elders, Carrier Sekani

Family Services is committed to the healing and

empowerment of Aboriginal Families by taking

direct responsibilities for health, social and legal

services for First Nations people residing in Carrier

Sekanni territory."

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and there is a difficulty in attracting staff to move from the more populated areas

like the lower mainland;

• There is value in delivering more services, as long as they are related in a general

way. This provides the organization with improved economies of scale and

greater visibility with its stakeholders.

• It is important to involve the communities and local stakeholders at the onset of

the project. It allows the membership to define priorities and drive the process.

This will ensure much more credibility when the organization is up and running.

• There is a need to develop as much information as possible and manage it in a

way that it can be used to further the goals of the organization.

Bridge Building and Conflict Management Strategies

Due to the nature of the collaboration – an agreement with Federal and Provincial

governments to deliver specific services to specific clients, there did not appear to be any

overt bridge building strategies undertaken. Conflicts with other governments are

addressed through negotiations; other conflicts (staff, member nations, etc.) are addressed

through the personnel manual and organization by-laws.

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3.2.2 Gallagher Canyon Agreement


• Westbank First Nation, Kelowna, BC

• Central Okanagan Regional District (CORD), Kelowna, BC

• The Corporation of the City of Kelowna

• The Black Mountain Irrigation District

• The South East Kelowna Irrigation District


After nearly five years of negotiations the Westbank First Nation and the Central

Okanagan Regional District (CORD) signed a five-year services agreement (Gallagher

Canyon Agreement) in early 2000. The agreement includes other local stakeholders and

covers how services are provided to some fee simple land that the First Nation purchased

several years ago.

After purchasing the land the First Nation wanted to convert it to Reserve status. The

land had several easements to local Improvement Districts to allow for the provision of

water to their constituents. As well, the City of Kelowna had constructed a road through

the land in question. In order to fully understand the implications for all stakeholders

CORD asked the Federal Government to undertake a thorough examination of the

situation prior to converting the land to Reserve Status.

In about 1995 CORD and Westbank began negotiations to develop a framework for

development of this land. While the original intent of the land purchase was to provide

land for First Nation’s housing, everyone recognized that the agreement needed to be

flexible enough to enable the stakeholders to accommodate changing requirements in the

future.

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The agreement addresses the allocation of various developmental costs, the number of

homes, types of buildings allowed and provides for the continuation of the easements. It

also protects the rights of the several service providers on this land.

CORD also has another agreement with Westbank which addresses payment for services

provided to approximately 7,000 non-Aboriginals who live on Reserve land but utilize

CORD services (recreation centre, emergency vehicles, etc.). CORD felt that this

agreement did not provide the Regional District with adequate payment for services

provided so they took the First Nation to court to attempt to have the agreement

renegotiated. The court case failed but relations between the parties remained cordial.

According to CORD the First Nation acknowledges that there is a problem with the

current agreement and that, in the interest of longer-term collaboration and relationships,

a new agreement should be developed.

Even though the Gallagher Canyon Agreement has been in place for only one year, the

stakeholders have already begun negotiations for a follow-up agreement that would also

address the issue of non-Aboriginals utilizing CORD services.


• The primary motivation for each partner was the desire to develop a mutually

agreeable framework for development and development services on the land

acquired by the First Nation. Each party wanted the agreement to be structured so

that it would support their longer-term development aspirations and provide a

mechanism for fair allocation of costs and benefits.

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• All parties were motivated to develop a legal agreement that could provide a

framework to support their respective needs and development aspirations.

• The parties agreed to spend the time up-front (five-years) to ensure that all issues

were raised in negotiations and that the final agreement would meet their needs.

• It is possible to have a ‘civilized disagreement’ and still remain as active

collaborators on other fronts.

• When developing agreements it is critically important to openly communicate

one’s needs and to be patient and keep the discussion going, even when some

aspects of it are difficult and there is no evident path to an agreement.


The parties identified two specific bridge building and conflict management strategies

that worked for them. They were:

• Keep the dialogue going even when there is conflict and the two sides don’t fully

understand each other; and

• Make the agreement comprehensive so that all foreseeable conflicts and issues have

been addressed.

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3.2.3 Greater Massett Development Corporation


• Old Masset First Nation

• Village of Masset


The Greater Massett Development Corporation (GMDC) had its genesis in 1994 when

the Federal Department of National Defense (DND) decided to close the local military

base (GMDC was incorporated in 1996). The base contained: 190 residences; barracks

that could accommodate up to 65 people; a recreation centre; a curling rink, and

administration buildings. Costs to dismantle and decommission the facilities were

pegged at $3 million.

Coupled with significant downturns in the forestry and fisheries sectors, and the closure

of a local refueling station, the village of Massett and the Old Massett First Nation were

facing a major economic downturn. The military base had traditionally pumped about $5

million dollars per year into the local economy – its closure could be devastating. DND

was facing a major public relations challenge as the closure of the base could push the

local economy over the economic brink and DND could become the public scapegoat.

Necessity brought the three major stakeholders (Old Massett First Nation, Village of

Massett and DND) together to try and develop a scenario that would lessen the economic

and social impact of the base closure. The First Nation and the Village had prior

partnership experience with each other – two years earlier they had combined their sewer

and water systems. This benefited both parties by improving overall service and creating

operational efficiencies and economies of scale.

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The stakeholders decided that the economic impact of the base closure could be mitigated

somewhat with the formation of a development corporation that would be jointly owned

by the First Nation and the Village. DND agreed to transfer the base infrastructure and

fixed assets, along with the $3 million decommissioning budget to the newly formed

Greater Massett Development Corporation.

The GMDC was formed as the vehicle to liquidate the assets, and look after the funds

from the sales of Personnel Married Quarters (PMQs) and other former DND properties.

Approximately $8 million in revenue was generated through these sales. The GMDC was

to re-invest these funds into the two communities to enhance local economic

development activities. GMDC presently utilizes these funds to support the operations of

the Old and the New Massett Economic Development offices. DND also provided the

GMDC with a $3,000,000 barracks demolition fund which is presently invested in its

own account, the interest of which is only to be used to subsidise the operation of the

Massett recreation centre.

Each partner (the village and the First Nation) appointed five Directors to the GMDC

Board and they began the difficult process of launching a jointly owned corporation and

affecting the transfer of assets from DND. The partners spent considerable time at the

front end developing a strategic plan for GMDC. This afforded the opportunity to

surface potential conflict areas and fully discuss the strategic direction of the corporation

and the communities.

Transferring the assets from DND proved to be a Herculean challenge involving 11

different government departments and many layers of bureaucracy. The $3 million was

put into a GMDC managed ‘Greenfield Fund’ which is used to assist local entrepreneurs.

The former administration centre was converted into an incubator mall, which has

already spawned some successful local businesses. The GMDC operates the recreation

facilities for the benefit of the entire community. Western Diversification provides

project specific financing to assist GMDC.

19


GMDC holds monthly Board of Director meetings, and two large meetings per year that

are open to the general public; an Annual General Meeting and a Public Meeting.

Communication with the public and consistent attendance at Director’s meetings has

been a critical issue for GMDC.

Decisions are made by a ten-person Board of Directors (each partner appoints five Board

members). At one point GMDC undertook a major communication initiative, going

door-to-door in the community to inform community members of the corporation and its

strategic direction (they used the strategic plan as a guide).

Although there have been numerous challenges, including ensuring that there are revenue

streams to match expenses (e.g., operating community recreation facilities), and it is too

early to determine its long term success, GMDC has had a positive impact on the Greater

Massett community. It has inspired a can-do attitude and helped to mitigate the social

and economic impact of the base closure. It has established infrastructure that is

dedicated to supporting the economic rejuvenation of the entire community. As well, it

has significantly increased cross-cultural interaction and fostered improved relations

between the First Nations and non-First Nations communities.

The main financial challenge facing GMDC is that there are no significant revenue

sources. The operations of the GMDC and the costs of operating the recreation center are

funded from the rapidly depleting capital base that was generated by the liquidation of

DND assets.

However, despite the intentions of all parties, there have been few jobs or entrepreneurs

created other than in the operation of the recreation centre. There have been few direct

benefits for the community, other than the 8 to 11 total employees of the GMDC. The

partnership appears to face serious challenges as the $11 Million in seed money that they

started with has been seriously eroded and continues to be burned at a high rate by the

costs of the recreation centre. Some people that were interviewed indicated that the

20


partnership has actually worsened relationships between the Aboriginal and non-

Aboriginal elements of the community.


The partners and stakeholders were all motivated by enlightened self-interest. Old

Massett First Nation and the Village of Massett were searching for opportunities to

mitigate major economic shocks to the community. DND and the Federal Government

sought to close the base with a minimum negative impact on the local economy and on

their reputation.

The original motivation was to split the DND assets equally between the two

communities. This has not changed since its inception; both communities would like to

share in the assets equally.


The partners identified several lessons learned and critical success factors:

• It was vitally important to spend time at the onset in the development of a

strategic plan. In addition to providing direction to the corporation, the process of

developing the plan enabled the partners to address numerous issues that may

have created serious problems if left un-addressed;

• Communication with community members is essential – do what it takes to

ensure that the larger community is informed;

• Once you have a plan, stick to it. A well-developed strategic plan/vision can

provide directional stability and allow an organization to proactively pursue its

long-term vision. Conversely, failure to follow a plan/vision encourages reactive

responses to the opportunity of the week;

21


• Solid financial plans, especially on the revenue side, are extremely important.

Failure to adequately develop a sustainable financial plan can place extreme

stresses on the partnership and the relationships between the partners;

• A committed Board of Directors who will attend all meetings, and provide

strategic guidance and direction to the organization is of critical importance;

• Ensure that the operations of the development corporation are managed in a way

that is consistent with the goals and objectives of the organization. This requires

careful selection of a General Manager and ensuring that appropriate

management, reporting and monitoring processes are in place that allow any

deviations from the strategic plan to be quickly identified and corrected; and

• It is important to ensure that the Directors are qualified and well trained and that

personal agendas do not interfere with the strategic direction of the organization.


There were a number of processes and strategies that helped to mitigate the impact of

conflicts and build bridges between the two communities. These included:

• A two-day strategic planning workshop at the start of the partnership to address

outstanding issues and develop a strategic plan for the partnership;

• Decisions of the partnership are made by consensus;

• The partners have found that, as they come together for community activities in

their jointly owned recreation facilities, they have developed better friendships

with one and other on a personal level.

22


3.2.4 Iisaak Forest Resources


• Weyerhaeuser Canada Ltd. (formerly MacMillan Bloedel Ltd)

• Nuu-chah-nulth

• Ahousaht First Nation

• Hesquiaht First Nation

• Tla-o-qui-aht First Nation

• Ucluelet First Nation

• Toquaht First Nation

While not officially ‘partners’ in Iisaak, numerous international environmental

organizations such as Greenpeace were critical stakeholders who had shaped the

conditions that stimulated the creation of Iisaak.


Worldwide attention was brought to bear on the logging industry in Clayoquot Sound in

the 1990s. International organizations applied tremendous pressure on companies

logging (clear-cutting) the old growth forests in the area, disrupting logging activities and

alienating markets in Europe and North America.

Clayoquot Sound is the traditional home of the Central Nuu-chah-nulth Aboriginal

people. They have an interest in reclaiming their lands to promote economic, social and

cultural development for their people. These people include five First Nations, with the

northern most three, the Hesquiaht, Ahousaht and Tla-o-qui-aht residing within

Clayoquot Sound with the Ucluelet and Toquaht bordering to the south.

23


Before the escalation of conflict, Weyerhaeuser (MacMillan Bloedel (MB)) the operator

throughout the 1990s was purchased by Weyerhaeuser in 1999) had an annual harvest of

over 600,000 cubic metres in Clayoquot Sound, which generated over $100 million in

economic activity. This activity was a significant component of the local economy

supporting many local businesses and providing a revenue base to municipal, provincial

and federal governments.

Initially the local First Nations, who had been largely excluded from the economic

benefits associated Weyerhaeuser’s (MB) operation, supported and were supported by the

international organizations that were leading the anti-logging protest. In July 1996, First

Nations hosted an all-stakeholder meeting to discuss a resolution to Clayoquot

controversy. In January 1997, Weyerhaeuser (MB) laid off 110 workers with a decision

to stop logging in Clayoquot Sound for 18 months.

Iisaak Forest Resources was formed in March 1997, as a joint venture between Nuu-

chah-nulth people and Weyerhaeuser (MB). Iisaak (pronounced e-sock) would be 51%

First Nations owned and would take over Weyerhaeuser’s (MB’s) operations in

Clayoquot Sound. However harvests would be reduced to 40,000 cubic metres per year

and be put-off for three years while value-added forest product opportunities were

investigated. Harvesting resumed in Clayoquot in August 2000.

Iisaak Forest Resources will harvest up to 40,000 cubic metres per year. That is less than

10% of the volume that had been sustained before the dispute began. First Nations

control Iisaak, not Weyerhaeuser (MB), and they have options to increase their

ownership, to 100% at some point. Weyerhaeuser (MB) will continue to work with

Iisaak, providing start-up working capital and management experience.

The intent of the partners is that the area will be managed first for conservation values

and then for economic benefit. This enabled the support of many of the international

organizations that had previously led the protest against Clayoquot logging.

24


Iisaak is committed to an eco-forestry approach, logging in second growth areas,

supplying wood to local value-added wood converters and pursuing eco-certifications

through a process agreed to by the international organizations. Some watersheds and

other areas will be set aside for non-timber uses including eco-tourism and spiritual uses.

The international organizations have committed to assist with marketing products from

Iisaak and to continue looking for other ways to stay positively involved.

Economically, Iisaak expects to operate at barely above break-even in 2000 and 2001. So

despite the positive feeling of the parties supporting Iisaak, it is clearly too early to

conclude whether Iisaak will grow to be an economically viable success.


• The First Nations involved were interested in both economic growth and development

and in preserving Clayoquot Sound as one of the world’s special places.

• Weyerhaeuser was interested in limiting the damage to its international

reputation/brand equity and the alienation of markets for its other forest products.

Additionally, Iisaak provides them with an opportunity to work directly in partnership

with First Nations and will undoubtedly assist them in their relationships with First

Nations Peoples in other areas where they work.

• While many of the international organizations would have undoubtedly preferred an

absolute moratorium on logging in Clayoquot Sound, they realized that for them to

continue opposing a limited-impact logging program that was supported by local First

Nations would be difficult.


A number of lessons can be drawn from this experience:

25


• First Nations can have a strong influence on disputes between industry and

environmentalists;

• Local issues can quickly become global problems for resource companies; and

• First Nations’ leadership and commitment were able to draw former combatants

together and forge a common ground.


The Iisaak partnership grew out of one of the biggest conflicts in BC history. Partners

have learned to work together in support of their common interest. First Nations

leadership and moral commitment to balance environmental preservation with the

creation of economic opportunities for their members provided the catalyst to bridge the

chasm that had developed between the parties.

26


3.2.5 Lakeview Meadows


• Shuswap First Nation, Cranbrook, BC

• Regional District of East Kootenay, Cranbrook, BC

• Private Developer (Lakeview Meadows)


In the late 1990s the Regional District of East Kootenay (RDEK) and the Shuswap First

Nation faced some difficult challenges. The popularity of the area as a summer resort

resulted in extensive development along the shores of Lake Windermere. All of the

houses and cottages were on septic fields, which were causing pollution levels to rise to

unacceptable standards. RDEK recognized the need for a new sewer and water system,

but financing the $15 million cost of developing it would require an expensive and

lengthy referendum process, with no guarantee of receiving approval.

Due to geology, geographic proximity and a greater degree of regulatory autonomy, it

made sense to explore the option of having the Shuswap First Nation finance and

construct the sewer and water system and sell services to RDEK. The parties already had

a history of cooperating. The First Nation had a service agreement with the Regional

District for fire protection and the Regional District had a member on the First Nation’s

Development Review Board. As well, the First Nation saw this as a lucrative opportunity

to protect the environment and make a profit at the same time.

The situation came to a head when a private developer wanted to develop Lakeview

Meadows subdivision and needed sewer and water services in order to do so. The First

Nation negotiated a pre-payment of service fees and an agreement to pay design costs and

construction costs from the edge of the reserve to the Lakeview Meadows subdivision.

27


They leveraged the prepayment and commitment to secure the capital to develop the

system. Today the First Nation supplies sewer and water services to the Lakeview

Meadows subdivision and has a new system for their own members. RDEK has a

management contract with the First Nation to manage the system for at least five years –

during this time it is expected that someone from the First Nation will be trained to

operate the system. Financing for the system was entirely private – the First Nation was

able to bypass traditional government financing processes for on-reserve infrastructure,

allowing them to proceed with the development in a timely fashion (sources indicated

that the average time to process government financing for on-reserve infrastructure is 36-

42 months).


The partners had a history of working together and recognized that they could realize

advantages by collaborating on this initiative. They both wanted to reverse the

environmental damage that was caused by septic systems. RDEK wanted to avoid the

challenges of securing regulatory approval and raising $15 million capital to finance a

new system. The First Nation wanted to utilize their geographic and geological

advantages to develop a profitable business opportunity.


A number of lessons learned and critical success factors emerged when reviewing this

partnership with the stakeholders:

• Leadership is critical. The First Nation had strong leadership with clear vision

and goals (and an active process of consultation and communication with the FN

community);

• Communication is essential. Each party involved the other in relevant decisions

and there was a regular sharing of information;

28


• Both partners had clear goals and understood what they could do best to make the

partnership work;

• Both partners stressed the importance of entering into negotiations with an open

mind, a good understanding of the risks and a commitment to continue

negotiations until all issues had been addressed and the best possible deal for

everyone had been developed;

• Financing – developing and arranging the appropriate financial package allowed

the development to proceed in a timely manner; and

• Shared interests – the parties needed each other to solve a common problem

(pollution) and to achieve other party specific objectives (e.g., create a revenue

opportunity, avoid a referendum and the need to raise a huge amount of capital).


In addition to a history of trust and collaboration developed through earlier initiatives the

partners stressed the importance of regular communication as a mechanism for bridge

building and managing potential conflict. The agreement also included a clause

committing the parties to binding arbitration if they were unable to come to agreement on

a particular issue.

29


3.2.6 Monthly Licensee Meetings – North Thompson

Parties to the Agreement (Process):

The participants are:

• North Thompson First Nation

• Ministry of Forests (MOF)

• Ministry of Environment (MOE)

• FRBC

• Tolco Industries

• Slocan Forest Products

• Weyerhaeuser Canada Ltd.

• Adams Lake Lumber (Division of Interfor)

• Gilbert Smith Forest Products

• Several small forest operators from the area

Guests and Environmental consultants sometimes participate in the meetings.


In the early 1990s the stakeholders in North Thompson’s forest and other natural

resources began meeting regularly (monthly) to exchange information and inform each

other of their plans and priorities. Although the meetings were nominally about all

resource sectors, forestry related issues were generally the primary focus. These

meetings have continued over the past decade and have become an important and regular

feature of resource management and development in the North Thompson.

30


A major benefit of the process is that it provides an ongoing opportunity for dialogue and

interaction amongst the stakeholders. This dialogue assists the stakeholders to get to

know each other and to increase the coordination and efficiency of projects and activities.

For example, if the First Nations require wood for its mill, the meetings provide a forum

where they can discuss the most efficient means to get it with the major industry

participants. In some cases it may be that TOLCO is harvesting the needed species in the

geographic area – in other cases it may be Weyerhaeuser. Regardless of which supplier,

the meetings provide a quick and efficient means to gathering this information and input.

An added benefit of the meetings is that they provide an opportunity for the stakeholders

to get to know each other better. For instance, several non-Aboriginal participants noted

that they have a greater appreciation for the range of issues and concerns being addressed

by First Nations – not just those directly related to local resources. As well, the

participants in the meetings often get together for social events that help to further their

mutual understanding.


There was and still is a plethora of motivations for the individual stakeholders to

participate. They include:

• To maintain effective information flow and communication – keeping abreast of

each other’s activities and quickly identifying potential synergies and

opportunities to increase efficiency;

• To build relationships and understanding with other stakeholders;

• To understand the concerns and priorities of the North Thompson First Nation in

relation to forestry and other resource harvesting/management activities;

• To understand the capacity of local First Nation’s people and institutions and how

they can add value to existing and planned activities;

31


• To maximize the employment, business and other benefits accruing to First

Nation’s people from the harvesting and development of local forestry and other

resources;

• To provide an opportunity for informal input into broad Provincial Government

requirements on issues related to local resource management;


• It is important that everyone participate with a spirit of openness and cooperation,

ready to really listen to the viewpoints and concerns of the others;

• Perseverance is critical. It is important that the meetings be held regularly and

that participants attend consistently; and

• It is critical that participants keep in mind the objective of the meetings –

communication, dialogue and identification of opportunities for collaboration and

synergy. It needs to be clearly understood that the meetings are not a political

forum.


• The regularity of the meetings and the interaction between the participants has

enabled them to get to know each other on many levels. When they are not in

agreement on a particular issue there is a depth to the relationship that sustains

them as they work through potential conflict(s);

• The participants regularly get together for social events such as a cultural day at

the First Nation or renting the local ski hill and spending a family skiing day

together; and

• The group tries to be proactive about identifying and addressing potential conflict

issues and, if necessary, will hold weekly meetings on special occasions to ensure

adequate communication and information flow amongst stakeholders.

32


3.2.7 Skwlax/Sanders Construction Ltd.


• Little Shuswap Indian Bank, Chase BC

• Sanders & Company, Merrit BC


Sanders and Company, a Merritt based road construction and heavy equipment company

had been successfully undertaking projects on the Little Shuswap Indian Band’s (LSIB)

Quaaout Reserve for about seven years. In 1999 LSIB and Sanders decided that it would

be beneficial for both parties to form a company to undertake smaller (under $10 million)

road construction and heavy equipment projects. Skwlax/Sanders Construction Ltd. was

formed with the LSIB holding a 51% interest. Each party nominated two persons to the

Board of Directors and the management agreement made a provision for a fifth,

independent, director to be appointed jointly (to date this position has not been filled).

The company bid on and secured several projects during their first year of operation,

generating over $1 million in revenue. Gerry Sanders and Stuart Adamson, a senior

manager with LSIB, make the day-to-day decisions of the company, on a collaborative

basis. Any projects that require financing must be approved by the LSIB. Project

managers make Day to day project decisions.

Sanders brought technical expertise and equipment to the partnership while LSIB brought

manpower, information on upcoming projects and the ability to meet Aboriginal

procurement guidelines. LSIB also brought administrative capacity and are tasked with

maintaining the company’s accounting system.

33


The company had some initial challenges as it sought to balance First Nation member’s

desire to maximize employment with the economic reality of operating a project based

company in a cyclical sector. After much discussion it was agreed that, while

employment and training opportunities for First Nation’s people is a strong priority,

employment must be based on project revenue. The partners closely monitor the

financial profit and the employment and training that the projects generate.

In addition to the profits and employment, the partnership produced an unexpected

benefit in terms of addressing at least one person’s way of thinking about Aboriginal

peoples. On one project Skwlax Sanders deliberately engaged a subcontractor who had a

reputation as a vocal redneck and a staunch opponent of Aboriginal development. As a

result of working directly with the company and its Aboriginal workers, this person’s

attitude made a 180-degree shift.


The motivations of both partners were enlightened self-interest. The LSIB wanted more

employment opportunities for First Nations members, an opportunity to share in the

profits of local construction work, and the ability to have a more substantial local

business presence. Sanders wanted to develop more work and to ensure that its work in

the area was sustainable by developing a partnership with a leading influencer of local

construction opportunities.


Although the partnership is still in its early stages, a number of lessons learned and

critical success factors have been identified. They include:

• It is important to have strong technical skills in order to bid on and manage

complex construction projects. If the First Nation does not have this capacity

internally it is wise for them to select and twin with a partner who can provide it;

34


• In order to successfully execute construction projects it is important to have

access to the appropriate equipment and the skills to complete the project

effectively;

• Identifying and selecting the right partner requires a significant time commitment;

• It is important to allow enough time to thoroughly complete the due diligence;

• In order for a partnership to work effectively it must be financially self-sufficient

with clear revenue streams and partners with the necessary financial resources to

ensure adequate working capital;

• The parties must agree that there will be some limits on individual autonomy in

order to support the partnership;

• The First Nation must have the political and administrative stability that will

allow the partnership to operate without political interference and abrupt changes

in administrative direction;

• The partnership should have a clear mission/mandate and keep focused on

achieving it;

• The partners should strategically (and ethically) utilize all political relationships

and influence available in order to market themselves and develop/secure

projects; and

• It is critically important to invest the time at the front end of the partnership to

clearly define the roles, expectations, mission and mandate of the relationship and

be able to communicate it effectively to internal and external stakeholders.


In order to ensure a strong and sustainable relationship the partners have identified and

utilized a number of conflict management and bridge building strategies. These include:

• Strong/daily communication – the partners are in daily communication with each

other. That way, when an issue comes up it can surface immediately and be

addressed. They have committed to each other that, when a difficult issue arises

35


they will address it head-on and get it resolved before it develops into something

that could threaten their ongoing relationship;

• When a particular project requires debt to finance the initial working capital it

requires formal approval from both parties;

• The potential conflict between employment/profits is mitigated by the strong

leadership who ensure a separation between business and politics; and

• They have a provision to utilize a third-party mediator if a conflict arises that they

are unable to settle amongst themselves.

36


3.2.8 Sun Rivers Resort Community


• The Sun Rivers Corporation, Kamloops BC

• Kamloops Indian Band, Kamloops BC


In 1997, the membership of the Kamloops Indian Band voted by a margin of 74% in

favour of surrendering3 a 480 acre parcel of their land to Sun Rivers Corporation for a

real estate development. The property is located immediately east of the City of

Kamloops on the south-facing slope of the valley overlooking the city. The uses for this

land as approved in the Head Lease are for “developing 2,000 residential housing units, a

school, park, hotel, village centre and 18 hole golf course”.

The development utilizes thermal heat for the entire subdivision. It is one of the only

subdivisions in Canada to utilize this environmentally friendly energy source. When the

subdivision is fully developed it will provide the First Nation with annual tax revenues of

approximately $7-8 million per year. The remainder would accrue to the City of

Kamloops and to the developer for various services that they provide to the landowners.

With the prepaid lease and the market provided by the development, the First Nation was

able to finance and construct a state of the art water treatment facility that supplies

services to the Sun Rivers Resort Community and to many First Nations facilities.

3 The surrender is a formal process wherein the land is assigned back to her Majesty the Queen’s representative – the Government of Canada – who in turn provide a Head Lease (generally 99 years in duration) to the applicant First

37



Sun Rivers was motivated by a desire to profitably develop a unique housing and

recreational facility. The First Nation realized that this transaction could provide them

with a number of immediate and ongoing benefits including:

• Upfront lease payment for the land and ongoing payments over the life of the

lease;

• An ‘inside track’ on employment and business opportunities stemming from the

development;

• An opportunity to increase the tax and revenue base of the First Nation;

• The development would increase the value of other First Nation’s land in the

immediate vicinity; and

• An opportunity to increase the market for a state of the art water treatment facility

to improve the water available to First Nations members.

As well, the City of Kamloops, which has signed on to provide sewer services to the

development, can amortize the cost of their existing system (which was not running to

capacity) across a broader tax base.


• Leadership and communication is critical. The leadership of the Kamloops Indian

Band were visionary and saw the benefits that the development could bring to

their First Nation. They communicated this effectively to their membership who

overwhelmingly endorsed it in a referendum;

• The developer had a clear vision and plan for the development and had the

financial and managerial capacity to execute the plan effectively;

Nation or designate for the purpose of developing projects on this land that are not otherwise permitted under the Indian Act.

38


• Once the project had begun, the stakeholders recognized their common interest

and worked in a spirit of cooperation and collaboration; and

• The Kamloops Indian Band had the technical expertise (in the land leasing

department) and had good legal and professional advisers.


• The parties ensured that everything that was written into the agreement was

achievable. They did not make any commitments that could not be kept;

• There is strong communication between the stakeholders. All employment and

contracting opportunities are communicated to the First Nation. The developer

works with them to help them to take advantage of as many opportunities as they

have the capacity to undertake; and

• There are detailed records kept of agreements, commitments and of First Nations

employment/business opportunities at the project. That helps to ensure that the

facts are known and helps to eliminate rumour mongering.

39


3.2.9 Tsilqot’in People of Xeni and BC Parks (Ts’yl-os Provincial Park)


• The Xeni Gwet’in First Nations Government

• BC Parks (Ts’yl-os Provincial Park).


In the 1980s the Xeni Gwet’in Elders were becoming concerned that clear-cut areas were

getting very close to their traditional territory4. They were afraid that, if nothing were

done about non-Aboriginal land use practices in the area, it would severely limit the

traditional land use practices of the Xeni Gwet’in Peoples. A number of tribal meetings

were held to discuss the Elder’s concerns. In 1989 a Declaration stating that the Xeni

Gwet’in Peoples would not tolerate mining or clear-cut forestry practices on their

traditional lands was released at a press conference in Vancouver.

As a result of the Declaration the Xeni Gwet’in Peoples became involved with the

Government of British Columbia in a review of the Deferred Planning Area around

Chilco Lake (further development was frozen in this area pending additional studies). A

60 person Chilco Study Committee was formed in 1993/94. The Xeni Gwet’in were one

of three co-chairs (the Ministry of Parks and the Ministry of Municipal Affairs were the

other co-chairs). The Committee, which was made up of all stakeholders in the region,

recommended the establishment of a Provincial Park and a separate Tsilqot'in

Management Zone (TZM)

The recommendations of the Chilco Study became the basis for the development of a

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Xeni Gwet’in and BC Parks. The

MOU set out in detail what can and cannot occur in the area, what the roles and

40


responsibilities of the respective stakeholders are, and established a monthly stakeholder

meeting process. The MOU, which was supported by the stakeholder group, was signed

in a ceremony in Victoria.

The scope of the agreement, which initially focused primarily on park management

issues, has been recently expanded to include issues on lands adjacent to the park. A

management group comprised of Xeni Gwet’in and BC Parks has been created to

consider applications and permits for a variety of land use applications and other matters

that routinely come up.


The Xeni Gwet’in Peoples wanted to ensure that they had an active role in the

management of their traditional lands and that clear cutting and mining operations did not

decimate the lands. They also wanted to ensure that they would have access to the lands

for traditional purposes (e.g., hunting, gathering medicinal plants, fishing, ceremonies,

etc.).

The Government of BC wanted to ensure that the management of the area is consistent

with the mandate of BC Parks and to ensure that traditional land use practices of the First

Nations Peoples were allowed to continue. As well, they wanted to establish a process

that allowed input from other stakeholders in the region.

4 The park that was established is located about 220 kilometers west of Williams Lake

41



• The leadership demonstrated by the Xeni Gwet’in Peoples to identify their issues

and priorities and communicate them effectively provided the catalyst for this

collaboration to develop;

• The openness and willingness of BC Parks personnel to consider the priorities of

the Xeni Gwet’in Peoples and work with them to develop a mechanism to allow

the Park to be developed.

• Regular, structured interaction amongst the stakeholders (e.g., the monthly

meetings) and ensuring that all parties attend on a regular basis;

• Developing a specific focus and sticking to it. This keeps potentially divisive

issues like the Treaty Land Entitlement process out of the regular meetings and

park management process;

• A commitment to shared decision-making. The parties stressed that this has to be

a real commitment and a recognition that it may mean that you have to give up

authority in some areas. They also stressed the importance of clearly identifying

the areas of shared decision making so there is a common understanding; and

• A mechanism for other stakeholders to have input into the process (e.g., the

Chilcotin Advisory Group, which acts as a third-party watchdog)


• Regular meetings of the stakeholders are held. Between meetings the

stakeholders regularly contact each other to discuss issues and other aspects of

Park management;

• The regular meetings of the Working Group are open to the public and individuals

are encouraged to attend;

• There is ongoing, informal contact between the stakeholders. (e.g., Parks

personnel and others often drop by the Band Office for coffee); and

42


• The First Nation has a regular and consistent communication process to ensure

that their membership is well informed of issues and opportunities emanating

from the management of the Park.

43


3.2.10 West Chilcotin Forest Products

Parties to the Agreement

• Ulkatcho First Nation, Anahim Lake, B.C.

• CAT Resources Ltd. Anahim Lake, B.C.

• Carrier Lumber Ltd., Prince George, B.C.


Carrier Lumber of Prince George, B.C. had operated a sawmill in the community of

Anahim Lake for a number of years. In 1993 they were forced to close their mill when

they lost their Timber Supply License (TSL) due to a controversial decision by the

Government of the day.

The loss of the Carrier mill was potentially devastating. While the region had a

smattering of tourism outfitters and ranchers, the mill and associated logging operations

was the economic mainstay of Anahim Lake. The loss of the TSL was a significant blow

to Carrier Lumber as it literally reduced the value of their sawmill facility in Anahim

Lake to zero. It was also a huge loss to the residents of Anahim Lake as the mill, its

associated logging operations and spin off businesses was the economic lifeblood of the

community.

The leadership of one individual in the community was responsible for the formation of a

tripartite partnership involving Carrier Lumber, the Ulkatcho First Nation and a group of

50 investors from the community to form West Chilcotin Lumber. This partnership was

uniquely positioned to resuscitate the economy. Carrier Lumber had the facility and

infrastructure. The involvement of the fifty local investors provided both Carrier and the

44


Government with a concrete demonstration of local commitment and support for the

Ulkatcho First Nation’s (the third partner) application for a TSL.

West Chilcotin commenced operations in 1996 and manufactures studs (2in X 4in X 8ft

lumber), which they sell all over the world.


All parties to the agreement were highly motivated. The Ulkatcho First Nation had been

pursuing a TSL for years, but the Government had always declined, telling them to ‘go

find a partner’. The First Nation has always viewed a TSL as a means for them to

achieve a significant share of the work in the forest sector and to establish a base for their

economy.


• All partners must enter into the deal with the view and commitment that it is

better to own a portion of a success story than 100% of a failure;

• The non-Aboriginal partner must recognize, that while every effort will be made

to keep politics out of the deal, that the reality is that is difficult to keep entirely

out;

• All parties must be prepared to compromise on issues and recognize the items that

are important to the other partners and stakeholders, e.g., Chief & Council;

• If all the parties are responsible to a large constituency, then they will work hard

to get a project done. It took approximately one year to put this partnership

together; and

• All partners and stakeholders should be treated with respect.

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• Be prepared to deal with the tough issues at the negotiation table and invest the

time to get through the difficult issues. Putting them off will not make them easier

nor will it cause them to go away;

• Identify and put mechanisms in place at the start to deal with tough issues that

may crop up later, e.g., the First Nation’s expectation regarding employment;

• When all parties have equal share in the project and therefore equal to lose, they

are all highly motivated to search for win-win solutions to conflict situations; and

• Include conflict resolution clauses in all formal agreements.

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4 Lessons Learned

The preceding ten case studies supply data and information that can provide insights into

characteristics of successful partnerships and critical issues that influence the success of

partnerships between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests. These lessons learned

may help existing and future partnerships to enhance their potential for success. The

following analysis, drawn from the preceding case studies, discusses and presents the

lessons learned in three key areas: the motivation of partners and stakeholders; crucial

success factors, and conflict management strategies. This analysis is followed by a

discussion on lessons learned from failed partnerships and an overview of two innovative

projects aimed at encouraging and understanding Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal

partnerships.

4.1 Motivation of Partners and Stakeholders

The partners in the above cases consistently cited motivational factors that are rooted in

self-interest. Of course, in many instances it was enlightened self-interest. For example,

Weyerhaeuser’s collaboration in the Iisaak partnership may have been driven by a need

to mitigate damage and make the best of a difficult situation. Our conclusion is that self-

interest is the motivator in virtually every case we examined. There is nothing

fundamentally wrong with this. In fact, we would argue that a partnership is not

sustainable if it is not in the self-interests of each of the partners.

Our analysis identified five different motivations5 for the ten cases we reviewed. This is

not to suggest that these are the only motivations that can result in successful

partnerships, rather these are simply the motivations that spurred the creation of these

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partnerships. Nonetheless, the presence of one or more of these motivators can signal an

opportunity to develop a partnership.

1. Mitigating the impact of an economic downturn – A downturn in one or more

sectors of the local economy can help create conditions where there is an active

search for opportunities to rejuvenate, or at least mitigate the decline in the local

economy. This type of situation can stimulate creativity and encourage Aboriginals

and non-Aboriginals to seek out opportunities for collaboration, with the expectation

that the collaboration will help each partner to adjust more effectively to the changing

conditions.

2. Make services work better – Federal and provincial governments are recognizing

that many of the services they have traditionally delivered to Aboriginal Peoples are

less effective than they would be if they were delivered directly by Aboriginal

organizations. There are numerous cultural and logical reasons for this, including the

fact that delivery by Aboriginal People is generally done in a more culturally

sensitive manner and with improved community ownership of the process and results.

As well, there is a growing expectation that Aboriginal Peoples have the right to

deliver services to their people.

3. Synergies – Many partnerships are launched because the partners, by working

collaboratively, are able to accomplish much more than they could by working alone

i.e., generating a one plus one equals three phenomenon. This often happens when

one partner has access to financial and operational capacity and the other partner has

an enhanced position in the market and access to labour, natural resources and other

inputs. For example, a non-Aboriginal partner may have the financial and technical

capacity to bid on a contract or launch a project, while the Aboriginal partner has

preferred access to contracts and/or natural resources, access to local labour or other

5 As all of the motivations are basically linked through the self-interest of the parties, the division into five different types of motivation may be seen as arbitrary. However, we believe that it is useful in that it sets out a more systematic process against which the motivation for establishing new partnerships can be reviewed.

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inputs. For instance, in the Gallagher Canyon Development none of the parties,

working independently, could have hoped to achieve a solution as effective as the

agreement that they worked out together. Similarly, it is unlikely that either of the

partners in the Greater Massett Development Corporation could have been successful

in persuading the Department of National Defense to make the financial and asset

commitment that they did. As well, it is extremely doubtful that either party working

alone could have successfully maneuvered the agreement through the eleven different

government departments.

Other examples include the establishment of a park through the collaborative efforts

of the Tsilqot’in People of Xeni and BC Parks, Skwlax Sanders, which was able to

secure and execute construction contracts that neither party could have gotten on their

own, and Iisaak Forest Resources, where a range of environmental and economic

objectives was able to be addressed through collaboration.

4. Environmental and economic opportunities – The opportunity to develop and

implement environmental and/or economic initiatives is often a significant motivator

for Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal partnerships. Often there are opportunities that are

difficult or impossible for one party to develop on their own, but through

collaboration with other stakeholders they can achieve critical objectives. This was

the case with Iisaak Forest Resources and the Tsilqot’in People of Xeni and BC

Parks. In both cases it is doubtful that the environmental or economic objectives of

the parties could have been achieved without systematic collaboration and

partnership.

5. Improve communication and collaboration – For example, participation in the

North Thompson Monthly Licensee Meetings is motivated by the parties’ recognition

that a regular, structured forum that enables them to exchange information on

activities and issues will facilitate improved collaboration and synergies, and

minimize the potential for conflict, making all of their operations more efficient.

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4.2 Critical Success Factors

A review of the partnership examples, coupled with the authors’ own experiences in

Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal partnerships has identified 9 critical success factors that

contribute to the potential for the partnership to be successful. They are listed below in

Alphabetical order.

1. Appropriate motivation – As discussed in the previous section, motivation is

important to the success of any partnership or collaboration. Quite simply if the

partnership does not provide sustainable value to each partner (along the lines of the

five motivations discussed earlier), it is very doubtful that the partnership will be able

to survive over the medium to long term.

2. Communication – With their diverse range of public and private constituents and

stakeholders Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal partnerships have an enormous

communication challenge. Effective and appropriate communication to shareholders,

the First Nation community and often to the larger community (and sometimes

provincial and federal governments) is critical.

3. Financing and Financial Capacity – It goes without saying that partnerships require

financing and the financial capacity to continue operating. While some partnerships

may require much less financing than others (e.g., Monthly Licensee Meetings in

North Thompson), they all require some level of financing. Three finance issues are

seen as critical: a) adequate start-up financing, b) revenue and/or other financing to

meet operating requirements, and c) financial management capacity (the ability to

manage the finances of the partnership).

4. Governance – Partnerships should have a governance structure that clearly outlines

the roles and responsibilities of the partners. Many also stressed that there must be a

strong commitment to shared decision making, i.e., each partner will have to cede

some level of autonomy to the partnership in order for it to operate successfully and

realize the objectives set for it.

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5. Leadership and Commitment – Commitment and leadership are crucial to the

launch and operation of a partnership. The partners must be committed to the success

of the initiative and prepared to assume their own leadership responsibilities. This

includes ensuring that only committed and qualified Directors are appointed and then

keeping politics out of the operation.

6. Management and Operations – A successful partnership must have competent

management, appropriate technical skills and the ability to execute the partnership

plan. It is critical that the partners be realistic in the assessment of their capacity in

this regard.

7. Negotiating the Partnership – In case after case the partners have told us that one of

the most critical things for a new partnership is to invest the time up-front to select

the right partner and make sure that all issues are understood and addressed before

launching operations. They stressed that if they are not dealt with in negotiations the

issues will surface later and be more difficult to deal with.

8. Personnel and Staffing – Partnerships need the right people to manage and operate

their activities. While each partnership is unique, all need people who are

well-qualified, able to work effectively with the various partners and stakeholders. In

some cases (but not necessarily all) it is critical that personnel have the ability to

work effectively in cross-cultural settings.

9. Vision and Objectives – Partnerships should have a clear, succinct vision and

mandate, along with quantifiable objectives. The vision, mandate and objectives

should be developed and agreed upon during the negotiation phase. Planning

activities should be directly related to achieving the vision and objectives and avoid a

flavour of the week approach that diffuses the organizational focus.

4.3 Conflict Management

While it could be considered as a subset of Governance, we feel that Conflict

Management is such a critical success factor that it needs to be addressed separately. It is

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relevant to almost every other success factor. Many partnerships have addressed the

other critical issues and still failed, because conflicts amongst the partners and

stakeholders prevented them from achieving their potential. Our research suggests four

actions that can minimize the risk of debilitating conflict. These are:

1. Partnership Agreement – The partnership agreement should be

comprehensive and should address as many of the tough issues as it is

possible to foresee. Several partners with whom we spoke in our research

made statements to the effect of ‘if there are difficult issues during the initial

negotiation the temptation is there to set them aside and deal with them later.

This is a mistake as they don’t get easier to deal with and they usually come

up during a stressful time making them more difficult to address than if they

had been dealt with initially.’

2. Conflict Resolution Process – A conflict resolution process should be

included in all formal agreements. It is much easier to agree on a process

before a conflict arises. Just knowing that a process is in place can encourage

parties to reach an agreement.

3. Communication – Regular, effective and appropriate communication

amongst the partners and stakeholders (internal and external) was cited as

essential to avoid misunderstandings and conflict.

4. Decision Making Process – Decision making processes should be structured,

well understood and used. This applies at the Partnership, Board and

Operational levels.

4.4 Lessons Learned from Failed Partnerships

The research conducted during the course of this study, together with the authors’

extensive experience in Aboriginal Community Development, has revealed numerous

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partnerships that have either failed or have not lived up to their potential because they

omitted one or more of these Critical Success Factors. There are numerous other

examples of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities or corporations who have not

made an attempt to work together. The participants in these often high-profile examples

may or may not realize the high financial and social costs of this position.

The authors, while cognizant of the sensitive nature of ‘failures’, are also aware of the

folly of not adhering to the maxim, that “If one does not learn from the mistakes of

history, then one is doomed to repeat them.” Following then is an overview of some

examples associated with certain of the critical success factors. (Note: names and

identifying factors have been intentionally omitted)

1. Negotiating the Partnership

This is arguably one of the most important of the critical success factors. A recent

example from an Economic Development Corporation (EDC) will emphasize the

point. Following are some things that were not done.

Not enough investment of time up front: The EDC did not have the

luxury of time to find and research partners for a specific project in a

growing sector of the economy.

A written agreement was not obtained prior to project start. The

partners had numerous verbal discussions, and what was thought to be an

agreement on all issues (based on a draft Memorandum of Understanding).

After the project started and during the preparation of formal agreements,

the non-Aboriginal partner ‘moved the goal posts’ several times. This

partnership seems destined for the courts and all parties will lose out on a

good opportunity.

2. Vision and Objectives/ Communication

In another instance, the Vision and Objectives were agreed upon between the

partners; however, the EDC developed these with no involvement of the general

membership of the communities. When the project did not provide the salary levels

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and advancement opportunities that the membership expected, serious trouble arose

culminating in acts of violence towards the project. The ensuing and belated general

meeting with the membership salvaged the project, but did not mitigate the damage

with the result that no long term relationship or benefits resulted.

3. Communication

In British Columbia, in the post-Delgamuukw era, the good examples of what can be

achieved through pro-active communication are often overshadowed by the negative

examples. These include situations wherein parties refuse to talk, or take on a rigid

Win/Lose negotiating position. Both parties must be prepared to negotiate,

recognizing that each will have areas where flexibility may not be politically or

economically possible. There are numerous high profile examples where this apparent

rigidity and intransigence has resulted in a stand off, with the result that both parties

and their communities lose.

4. Governance

Our research identified a partnership that appears to be doomed because one of the

partners is not fulfilling its roles and responsibilities. The representatives of the Board

of Directors of one party do not attend meetings on a regular basis. Since this is a

business that requires timely decisions by the Board the remaining directors have

made the decisions. This has resulted in further widening of the rift between Board

members, with allegations of unilateral decision-making and ‘not keeping us

informed’.

4.5 Lessons Learned from other Initiatives

There have been several other initiatives launched to examine and support Aboriginal and

non-Aboriginal partnerships. While there have been valuable learnings from many of

these, two seem of particular interest to this report and its objective of suggesting a

systematic process for facilitating future partnerships. The following sub-sections

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present them in a summary form. We encourage readers who wish more information on

these initiatives to contact the organizations directly.

4.5.1 First Nations Summit of Chiefs and UBCM

“In 1997 the First Nations Summit and the Union of British Columbia Municipalities

(UBCM) co-sponsored the first province-wide Community-to-Community Forum in an

effort to increase dialogue between representatives from First Nations governments and

local governments. The event was successful and precipitated the creation of the

“Regional” Community to Community Forum Program, which provided funding for

individual or regional groups of First Nations governments and local governments to

meet and initiate a dialogue on key issues of mutual interest6.”

The proponents obtained funding to sponsor 32 regional forums from the Ministry of

Aboriginal Affairs (8) and from Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (24). Interested

communities. This funding, which was provided for up to 50% of the costs, was available

through a straightforward application process to Regional Districts and municipalities

who could demonstrate that had a local First Nations government that shared their

interest.

An in-depth evaluation of the Community-to-Community Forum program is in process.

Preliminary indications are that the program was a resounding success. Perhaps one of

the most lasting benefits of the program will be that it served as the catalyst for the first

ever discussions between the two local governments. In that sense it was ground

breaking.

6 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, Regional Community to Community Forum Evaluation, Draft Report, August, 2001

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4.5.2 Knowledge Network Series

In 2001, the Knowledge Television Network in partnership with the Ministry of

Community Development, Co-operatives and Volunteers developed the four part series,

The Power of the People: Building Stronger Communities. This series examined the

social, economic and environmental pressures that affect towns and communities

throughout BC. The show examined how the citizens of 8 communities in BC are

“confronting the challenges” and are “turning economic uncertainty into prosperity7”.

“Each of the communities that were spotlighted in the video series discovered

fundamental factors that led to success in their journey toward economic development.

Some journeys took longer than others but each identified success factors in achieving

their objectives:”

1. People count

2. Long term visions, Short term actions

3. Attitudes make a difference

4. Resourcefulness

5. Broad Perspective

6. Practical and Pragmatic

This series was excellent in many respects and identified some important success factors.

One of the 8 communities was the Sun Rivers example of an Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal

partnership at Kamloops, also featured here in Section 3.2.8

7 www.knowtv.com

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5 From Individual to Community – The Case for Community Level Facilitated Partnership Development

The preceding sections have presented and discussed a range of partnerships between

Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals in British Columbia, reviewed some lessons learned

from failed partnerships and briefly touched on two other initiatives to understand and

promote partnerships. For the most part the partnerships are producing real benefits for

the partners and for the communities in which they are located, helping them to address

pressing economic and social concerns. However, the partnerships are all of a discrete or

ad-hoc nature – that is to say that none were initiated as part of a strategic initiative to

launch Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal partnerships.

All of the partnerships studied in this report, and in fact all of the partnerships that we

reviewed in British Columbia, were launched at the initiative of one or more of the

partners and were motivated by a particular set of circumstances (see earlier discussion

on motivation). None were part of an overt, community level partnership facilitation

process. In fact, other than the UBCM initiative, which seems to be more of a funding

program than a comprehensive partnership facilitation process, we found no evidence of

any sort of facilitated community-level process to support the systematic identification

and development of Aboriginal / non-Aboriginal partnerships.

The closest to a facilitated process was the experience in two recent joint-venture

seminars (January 2000), Fort St. John and Terrace, which focused on developing

business and economic relationships between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal partners.

These seminars, which were both one-off events with no facilitated follow-up,

nonetheless demonstrated that there is both a strong willingness to explore this area in a

facilitated manner, and that real partnership opportunities do exist. The seminars, which

were supported by the Northern Development Commission, brought indigenous and non-

indigenous people (about 30 people in each seminar) together for two days to identify

mutually beneficial opportunities and create strategies and action plans for developing

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them. The seminars were successful, with participants rating them very highly, and a

number of real opportunities identified and development strategies created. However, all

participants suggested that there should be follow-up and support to provide ongoing

facilitation and assistance to the partnership development and community bridge-building

process. This is consistent with the information received from those interviewed during

the current partnership review. There was a general perception that, while

Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal partnerships represented a significant development

opportunity (especially for rural and remote communities), little is currently being done

to systematically support and encourage partnership development.

Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people and communities, especially those in rural areas of

BC, are facing unprecedented challenges as they strive to secure a sustainable future for

themselves and their children. Both communities face social and economic challenges

that require new approaches and innovative solutions. The 1999 Provincial Health

Officer's annual report indicates that while many Aboriginal communities have improved

their quality of life, in comparison to the non-Aboriginal population Aboriginal people

are more likely to be living in poverty, unemployed, and without a high school diploma,

especially if they live on-reserve. Non-Aboriginal communities also face difficult

challenges in trying to secure a stronger social and economic future including recovery

from economic downturn in the resource sector.

Partnerships have the potential to make a fundamental positive difference in their social

and economic future. Improving Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal relations can help BC

communities overcome impediments to social and economic progress. Building on best

practices of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal partnerships can provide insight on how

communities can work together to address common concerns to build a healthy

sustainable future. Cooperation and collaboration between Aboriginal and non-

Aboriginal communities can mobilize and focus local and regional resources to affect

positive change for all residents. "Partnerships are indicators of a willingness between

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Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people to work together to address issues of common

concern and build sustainable communities." 8

The challenge is to build on the experiences of current partnerships and research

initiatives and develop the tools and methodologies that can support a replicable

partnership development process. The experiences of the partnerships that are reviewed

in this report, along with other community and Aboriginal development research9 provide

important information that can be used to inform and support individual partnerships and

facilitated partnership development processes.

The following Section suggests an action plan for developing a facilitated process to

support the type of community-wide bridge building and collaboration that we believe

will spawn the creation of numerous partnerships and result in more sustainable futures

for BC communities.

8 Fraser Basin Council. Special Report, Spring 2000. 9 The Ministry has supported numerous studies and research projects that have compiled valuable information. See Bibliography (UBCM’s Community to Community Joint Forum, Knowledge Network Series, Strengthening Aboriginal Participation in the Economy, etc.)

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6 Building on the Results: Recommendations for Developing a Community Partnership Initiative

This section will seek to apply the results of the above analysis to the objective of

developing a Pilot Community Bridge Building and Partnership Development Initiative.

The recommended process for the Pilot will include facilitated partnership identification

and development processes and a facilitated community bridge building initiative. It is

our expectation that, after fine-tuning the process in pilot communities it could be

developed as a stand-alone toolkit that communities could use to assist them to take

control of their social and economic future.

6.1 Model Partnership and Bridge Building Process

The following paragraphs set out in general terms a framework for a community wide

Partnership Development and Bridge Building Process. It is the expectation of the

authors that this framework could serve as the basis for the development of a community

specific process for two or more pilot communities. (The experience of the pilot

communities will likely provide information that will enable further refinement of the

framework prior to rolling out the initiative on a wider basis.)

The process would involve the concurrent launch of an economic and social bridge

building pilot project designed to address both the social and economic aspects of

community bridge building. Our intention is to use this initial project to better

understand how this process can be applied to support community development in British

Columbia and to develop the tools and support systems that would enable the process to

be replicated in other communities.

We envisage a process that would develop and support two concurrent tracks, one

focusing on identifying and developing partnership opportunities and the second

addressing the challenge of community and social bridge building between Aboriginal

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and non-Aboriginal communities. The two tracks, although separate, would inter-relate

and provide support to each other.

The economic bridge building process will seek to identify economic opportunities that

could be developed through collaboration across racial and ethnic boundaries (e.g.

Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal joint ventures and other partnerships similar to the ones

explored earlier). This process will include:

• Identifying the key players and meeting with them to understand their

interests and opportunities they envisage;

• Hosting at least a two-day workshop on structuring and negotiating joint-

ventures and other collaborative forms of enterprise. The workshops will also

address the issue of cross-cultural communications and relationships. The

workshops will take a practical focus – identifying real opportunities and

bringing together potential partners. We expect that the end result of the

workshop will be the identification of at least two joint-venture opportunities

and agreements between specific individuals/organizations to continue

exploration and development of the opportunities;

• Ongoing consulting and logistical support to the fledgling partnerships; and

• Continued work with stakeholders to identify and facilitate additional

partnerships and opportunities.

The social/community bridge building track would be based on a sustained facilitated

dialogue process, working with targeted individuals to understand and develop strategies

for addressing long-standing disputes/divisions in the community. The application of this

model was examined by Gifty Serbeh-Dunn, who has recently completed an initial phase

of a sustained dialogue process in the Cowichan Valley as part of her thesis requirements

for a Master of Arts in Conflict Analysis and Management (Royal Roads University –

2000).

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Our model for Sustained Dialogue is based on Saunder’s definition and model that he

describes in A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and

Ethnic Conflicts

A systematic, prolonged dialogue among small groups of representative

citizens committed to changing conflictual relationships, ending conflict

and building peace. It is more structured than a good conversation; it is

less structured than a formal mediation or negotiation. It has purpose,

destination and product. As a microcosm of their bodies politic,

participants absorb events in the communities around them and together

learn to design ways to change the relationships that cause conflict

(Saunders 1999, p. 12).

Exhibit 6-1 Community Transformation Process

Bridge Building Process

Partnership Development

Community Status (Current)Declining economy

Social problemsCross-cultural tension

Missed economic opportunities

Community Status (Future)Stabilized/growing economy

Social problems being addressedCross-cultural tension easing

Economic opportunities captured

Community Transformation through Partnership and Bridge Building Proces

The two streams will interact in both structured and unstructured ways as the participants

become more engaged in the process of bridge building and community healing and

development. Each process could be utilized as a communication vehicle to continuously

reach out to additional elements and stakeholders in the community to both inform them

on the process and motivate them to become involved in the bridge building exercise.

The following sub-section sets forth strategy and recommendations that the consultants

feel will enable the launch of 1-2 pilot initiatives to test and refine this model prior to the

development of a stand-alone toolkit and province wide rollout process.

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6.2 Selecting Pilot Project Communities

While we believe that this model can eventually be adapted for application in a broad

range of settings, we recommend that any communities selected as pilot project sites meet

seven critical criteria. They are (in alphabetical order):

1. Economic downturn (recent) – When a community is experiencing or about to

experience a significant economic downturn it is much more receptive to new

ideas and approaches. Individuals, businesses and the community at large are

facing serious economic challenges and there is a willingness to try new and

innovative solutions;

2. Financial resources – In order to engage in a comprehensive partnership

development and bridge building initiative the communities (Aboriginal and non-

Aboriginal) should be in a position where they can commit financing towards the

cost of the process. It is expected that Federal and Provincial governments would

contribute significant resources to the process, however for symbolic and

commitment reasons it is absolutely critical that communities put up some of the

financing;

3. History of collaboration – There should be some history of collaboration

between the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal community. While it does not have

to be a long history or involve collaboration on major initiatives, we believe that

the two groups should at least have some experience of working together;

4. Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal community – A pilot community must

comprise sufficiently large groups of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people.

Although the two groups do not have to be equal in size we would have serious

reservations about selecting a pilot community that is predominantly made up of

one group or the other;

5. Commitment – Community leadership (Mayors, Chiefs, Band Councils, etc.)

should be fully committed to the initiative and also be prepared to actively engage

in the process. Committing financing is one demonstration of commitment;

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6. Leadership – The Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities should both have

strong leadership that is committed to playing an active role in the process;

7. Meaningful economic opportunities – There should be meaningful business and

economic opportunities available to prospective partners. There is little point in

selecting a pilot community that does not offer any realistic economic

opportunities. We would argue that, especially at the pilot stage, it is important to

achieve a ‘quick win’ that can provide the community with tangible evidence of

the potential of the initiative.

In order to properly assess and refine the process, we suggest that it should be piloted in

two communities initially. The following sub-section sets out the suggested process for

launching the pilot projects.

6.3 Next Steps - Launching a Pilot Project

The following eight steps set out our suggested process and budget for launching a bridge

building and partnership development pilot project.

1. Select community – Prepare a list of potential pilot communities (we have identified

two communities that we feel would make ideal candidates as pilot project sites, and

presented the analysis at the end of this sub-section). Ideally, two pilot communities

should be selected by the Ministry based upon the above criteria. (The proposals

submitted to the Ministry and the Northern Development Commission through the

Invitation to Quote on Regional Community Development Initiatives may be

useful in preparing an initial list of potential pilot communities.)

2. Discussion/decision by pilot communities – Discussions should be initiated with

potential pilot communities to confirm their interest in participating in a pilot project

of this nature.

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3. Planning phase – The planning phase will bring the communities together to engage

in the development of a plan to implement the pilot phase. This phase should be

facilitated by someone who is familiar with the scope and intent of the overall project

objectives and who understands what is required to achieve those objectives. While

we strongly suggest that the pilot phase contain a number of specific components (see

below) it is critical that the communities, as primary stakeholders in the process, be

actively engaged in designing the plan. The planning phase would include:

a. Initial meeting of community stakeholders to review the objectives of the

pilot phase, agree on the process for developing the pilot phase workplan

and determine roles, responsibilities and timeframes for preparing the pilot

phase workplan;

b. Completion of tasks and activities as determined in above meeting

including preparation of a draft workplan (including communication plan)

and budget for pilot phase;

c. Meeting of community stakeholders to review draft workplan and budget;

and

d. Finalizing draft workplan and budget, and preparing proposal(s) to finance

year one. Potential funders are identified below in the discussion on

suggested activities in year one.

The anticipated budget for this phase is in the $20,000 to $30,000 range, depending

on the remoteness of communities, transportation costs, etc.;

4. Start-up and operation – Launch the pilot project based on the agreed upon

activities;

5. Six-month assessment – Given the pilot nature of this initiative we believe that an

assessment of each project should be completed at about the six-month point. While

this is too early to assess the overall success of the total initiative, it should provide

valuable information on what, if any, revisions are required and on the potential value

of developing a toolkit to support replication of the process in other communities;

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6. Decision – The results of the six-month assessment should be reviewed and a

decision taken on proceeding with the development of the steps discussed in the next

point;

7. Prepare toolkit, communications plan and roll-out strategy for other

communities – Based on the experiences in the first six months of the pilot projects;

and

8. Begin implementing rollout strategy

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Suggested Year One Activities

Table 6-2 below sets out a range of suggested Year 1 activities and financial sources (the

exact scope and schedule of activities should be determined during the planning phase

[Step 3 above])

Exhibit 6-2 Suggested Year 1 Activities and Financial Sources

Activity Potential Financial Sources (The following are not necessarily presented in the order in which we would expect them to be implemented) 1. Identify partnership opportunities and prioritize; 2. Identify major interests in community and begin

discussions to establish a Sustained Dialogue process;

3. Launch communication plan (which may include a monthly newsletter and/or other appropriate communication materials;

4. Host a public information meeting or meetings to advise the stakeholders of the process and expected outcomes;

5. Hold a 2-Day Aboriginal / non-Aboriginal partnership seminar (similar to the ones hosted by the Northern Development Commission in Fort St. John and Terrace)

6. Organize a Sustained Dialogue/Bridge Building group and begin bi-weekly sessions;

7. Provide appropriate follow-up support to the partnerships identified in the seminar and any others partnerships that require assistance;

8. Continue working with stakeholders to identify and nurture partnership opportunities;

9. Identify partnership role models and utilize them to assist others;

10. Hold at least one more public meeting in the first six-months;

11. Conduct six-month review; and 12. Revise program and continue as appropriate.

• Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and Women's Services

• Indian and Northern Affairs Canada

• Aboriginal Business Canada

• Western Diversification

• Community Stakeholders

• Local Industry

• Foundations (our research has discovered a Foundation that may be interested in financing part of the Sustained Dialogue process)

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Note: We expect that the first several months would require considerable facilitation and that after six months the role of external consultants in facilitating partnerships would decline considerably. However, the Sustained Dialogue process will require a specially trained facilitator for at least one year. Potential Pilot Communities We have utilized the above criteria to undertake a preliminary analysis of two potential pilot communities, Port Hardy and Ucluelet. As the analysis in Exhibit 6-3 below indicates, both meet all of the criteria with the exception of community commitment, which can only be determined through discussion and demonstration. Exhibit 6-3 Analysis of Two Potential Pilot Communities

Criteria Port Hardy Ucluelet Economic Downturn √ The closure of the local fish processing

plant and a nearby mine as well as the contraction of the forest sector has decimated the economy.

√ The closure of the local fish processing plant and major downsizing in the forest sector has left the community without a major sector

√ Tourism has some promise but has been slow to develop in this community.

Financial Resources √ The 3 local First Nations and the District of Port Hardy either have or have access to sufficient financial resources to contribute to the process

√ The 2 local First Nations and the town of Ucluelet either have or have access to sufficient financial resources to contribute to the process

History of Collaboration

√ The Gwa sala First Nation has an agreement with the District of Port Hardy for sewer and water services that has worked well for both parties.

√ The ‘two sides’ get along well on numerous issues

√ The three local First Nations are one of the largest employers in the region and are already a mainstay of the local economy

√ The First Nations participate with the town, the Regional District and several Government departments on the Central Region Board as part of the Interim Measures Agreement.

√ They work together on the Regional Aquatics Management process.

√ The Toquaht First Nation and the town have had meetings regarding expanding the collaboration around their shared harbor.

Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal community

√ The population of the three local First Nations is quite large, comprising approximately 1/3 of the local population.

√ The population of the local First Nations is quite small; however, both they and the town recognize their relative importance in the region.

Commitment √ This cannot be determined until reviewing the concept with the primary stakeholders and they are in a position to make a decision on their level of commitment/interest

√ This cannot be determined until reviewing the concept with the primary stakeholders and they are in a position to make a decision on their level of commitment/interest

Leadership √ The Mayor of Port Hardy is an active community developer. He a former Chairman and current Board Member of the Coastal Community Network and has an engaging personality and high profile.

√ The Mayor of Ucluelet is a vocal advocate of Economic Development.

√ The Chief of the very small Ucluelet First Nation (pop 12), Bert Mack is a high profile and successful businessperson and a strong leader

Economic √ The fish farming industry is growing √ Tourism has huge potential. Ucluelet

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Criteria Port Hardy Ucluelet Opportunities rapidly in this region and now employs over

400 employees. √ There appear to be significant undeveloped

tourism opportunities. √ There may be opportunities for local value

added manufacturing.

has lagged well behind the Tofino area in this regard.

√ Joint fisheries management has potential.

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7 Conclusion

Based on our review of the ten partnerships and our analysis of other issues and factors

we conclude that Aboriginal / non-Aboriginal partnerships offer a major economic

opportunity to numerous BC communities. There are opportunities to extend and expand

the value of individual partnerships through a facilitated partnership development and

community bridge building initiative. The preceding section sets forth a suggested plan

for developing such an initiative. We recommend that the Government of British

Columbia and other stakeholders in the development of the province’s Aboriginal and

non-Aboriginal communities give serious consideration to implementing such a plan.

Attachments Page 1


1. List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

BC British Columbia

CODA Central Okanagan Regional District

DND Department of National Defense

EDC Economic Development Corporation

FN First Nation

FRBC Forest Renewal British Columbia

GMDC Greater Massett Development Corporation

INAC Indian and Northern Affairs Canada

LSIB Little Shuswap Indian Band

MB MacMillan Bloedel

MOE Ministry of Environment

MOF Ministry of Forests

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

PMQ Personnel Married Quarters

RDEK Regional District of East Kootenay

TSL Timber Supply License

TZM Tsilqotín Management Zone

UBCM Union of British Columbia Municipalities

WDA Wayne Dunn and Associates

Attachments Page 2


2. Information Sources

The following pages detail the primary information sources that were used to research the

case studies in this report and those presented in the earlier progress report. Not

mentioned are the hundreds of individuals and numerous reports that have influenced the

author’s understanding of Aboriginal partnerships during our (collective) 35 years of

work in the field of Aboriginal economic development.

The authors of the report wish to thank the following individuals who so graciously made

themselves available for meetings and telephone conversations during the course of

research for this project.

Meetings and Telephone Conversations

Sorted by organization

Name Title Organization Allan Pineo Band Manager Adams Lake First Nation Claire Marshall Aboriginal Relations BC Hydro Steve Mazur District Manager BC Parks, Caribou District, Tarel S. Quandt BC Persons with AIDS Society Cameron Beck Community Planner Carrier Chilcotin Tribal Council, Bill Cordoban Owner Carrier Lumber, Gerry Stelsmaschuk

Policy Analyst Carrier Sekanni Family Services

Wayne d’Easum Chief Administrative Officer

Central Okanagan Regional District,

Mathew Ney Consultant Chapman Business Consulting (Lake View Meadows)

Janice Rose Administrator Chemainus Community College Robin True First Nations Liaison College of the Rockies Russ Helberg Mayor Community of Port Hardy, Judy Birch Manager, Aboriginal

Relations Dept. of Environment, Government of BC

Doug Krogel Land Use Planning and First Nation Liaison

Dept. of Environment, Government of BC

Ron Creber Manager, Aboriginal Relations

Dept. of Environment, Government of BC

Attachments Page 3


Name Title Organization Frankie Craig Senior Policy Advisor Dept. of Indian and Northern Affairs Wanda Stachura Social Development

Operational Specialist Dept. of Indian and Northern Affairs

Richard Krentz Partner Hiwus Feast House on Grouse Mountain Darlene Luke Executive Assistant Ktunaxa/Kinbasket Tibal Council Chief Sophie Pierre

Chief, Ktunaxa/Kinbasket Tibal Council

Alex Wolf Lawyer/Manager Legal Services Society Randall Martin Band Manager Little Shuswap Indian Band Bill Lee Metis Commissioner Metis Commission for Children and Families Rob Enfield Forester Ministry of Forests, Tina Donald Councilor North Thompson First Nation, Kevin Brown GM Old Masset Development Corporation, Clarence Louie Chief Osoyoos First Nation Jeannine Cook People’s Law School Lee-Anne Crane Administrator Regional District of East Kootenay, Gerry Sanders Owner Sanders Construction Dave Monture XD Shuswap Nation Tribal Council, Mike Anderson None Skeetchestn First Nation, James Atebe Community Planner Sto Lo Nation, Georg Schurian President Sun Rivers Development Jennifer Turner Forester Tolco Inc, Harvey Filger Chief Executive Officer Tsechaht First Nation, Roger Williams Chief Tsilqot’In First Nation, Bob Sankey Former XD Tsimshian Tribal Council, Alison McNeil Senior Policy Analyst Union of BC Municipalities Bernadette Spence Board Member Vancouver Aboriginal Child and Family

Services Agency Frieda Enns Executive Director Vancouver Police & Native Liason Society Clinton Mutch EDO Village of Masset, Economic Development

Commission, Diane St. Jacques Mayor Village of Ucluelet, Steven James Manager West Chilcotin Forest Products Ltd.,

Attachments Page 4


Reports and Documents

Title Author Published by Date

Cameco Aboriginal Relations Wayne Dunn

Cameco Corporation November 1998

Community to Community Joint Forum: A Dialogue Between First Nations and Local Governments in British Columbia (Final Conference Report)

First Nations Summit and Union of British Columbia Municipalities

March 2001

Aboriginal/Non-Aboriginal Partnerships

Fraser Basin Council Spring 2000

The Changing Resource Development Paradigm: Maximizing Sustainable Local Benefits from Resource Development

Wayne Dunn

Government of British Columbia, Ministry of Community Development, Cooperatives and Volunteers

January 2001

A Call to Action: Our Roots Go Deep, Our Hopes Stand Tall (Delegates Kit)

Metis National Council and Royal Bank of Canada

April 1998

Guide to Aboriginal Organizations and Services

Province of British Columbia, Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs

June 12, 2000

Healing Wounds: Sustained Dialogue in the Cowichan Valley. The Role of Identify in Cross Cultural Conflict

Gifty Serbeh-Dunn

Royal Roads University (Master’s Thesis)

September 2000

Developing Partnerships: 9th Annual Report on Aboriginal Participation in Mining

Sub-committee of the Intergovernmental Working Group on the Mineral Industry

December 1998

Case Studies on Aboriginal Joint Ventures: Northern Resource Trucking

Wayne Dunn

Wayne Dunn & Associates Ltd.

September 1999

Attachments Page 5


Title Author Published by Date

Strengthening Aboriginal Participation in the Economy: Report of the Working Group on Aboriginal Participation in the Economy to the Federal-Provincial/Territorial Ministers Responsible for Aboriginal Affairs and National Aboriginal Leaders

Federal-Provincial/Territorial Ministers Responsible for Aboriginal Affairs and National Aboriginal Leaders

May 2001

Review: News from the National Round Table on Environment and the Economy

National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy

Fall 2000

Regional Community to Community Forum Evaluation, Draft Report,

Union of British Columbia Municipalities,

August 2001

Websites

Website Address (Aboriginal Canada) Portal provides a link to Strengthening Aboriginal Participation in the Economy: http://www.aboriginalcanada.gc.ca/abdt/interface/interface2.nsf/engdoc/3.html

(BC Hydro Aboriginal Relations) http://www.bchydro.bc.ca/ard/principles.html

(Centre for Community Enterprise) www.cedworks.com

(Coastal Community Network) http://www.coastalcommunity.bc.ca

(Community Economic Development Centre – Simon Fraser University) http://www.sfu.ca/cedc/

(First Nations Education Steering Committee) www.fnesc.bc.ca

(Fraser Basin Council's Special Report on Partnerships: ) http://www.fraserbasin.bc.ca/documents/Spr2000.pdf

(Knowledge Network) www.knowtv.com

(Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs) http://www.aaf.gov.bc.ca/news-releases/2000/clayimea.stm

(Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs) http://www.aaf.gov.bc.ca/news-releases/2000/claynr.stm

(Union of BC Municipalities) http://www.civicnet.gov.bc.ca/ubcm/

aboriginal and non-aboriginal partnerships: building blocks for sustainable community development

Documents

ministry of water

project team of

aboriginal andwomens

womens services andto

rivers resort community

individual case studies

wayne deasum

bill lee