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A study in Buddhistpsychology: is Buddhismtruly pro‐detachment andanti‐attachment?Lynken Ghose aa Butler University , Indianapolis, Indiana, USAPublished online: 17 Feb 2007.

To cite this article: Lynken Ghose (2004) A study in Buddhist psychology: isBuddhism truly pro‐detachment and anti‐attachment?, Contemporary Buddhism: AnInterdisciplinary Journal, 5:2, 105-120

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Contemporary Buddhism, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2004

A Study in BuddhistPsychology: is Buddhism trulypro-detachment andanti-attachment?Lynken GhoseButler University, Indianapolis, Indiana, USA

Buddhism is often portrayed as pro-detachment and anti-attachment, yet is thisreally true? If we examine love, we can see that attachment is always a part oflove, and, in fact, without a deep attachment or bond, one can question whethera relationship is loving at all. Thus, since the ultimate aim of Buddhism is tobe compassionate, empathetic and loving towards both oneself and others, howcan this goal truly be a complete lack of attachment?

While it is plausible to interpret Buddhism’s goal as that of detachment(detachment often being used as the antonym of attachment), as some of thescriptural passages seem to be translatable in this fashion, Buddhism could alsobe interpreted as accepting attachments based on love but not acceptingattachments based on possessiveness. Along the same lines, rather than accept-ing all types of detachment, Buddhism could be interpreted as acceptingdetachment based on the desire to set someone or something free from one’sacquisitiveness, yet as rejecting detachment that masks a lack of caring or subtle(or not so subtle) form of apathy. Thus, translators and interpreters of Buddhismshould be very careful to make these distinctions.

In spite of the largely technical nature of this paper, the topic itself is one ofpractical concern. The fact that many modern interpreters of Buddhism andtranslators of ancient scriptures argue that Buddhism is pro-detachment andanti-attachment, not defining these terms in a careful and precise manner couldactually be quite harmful for those who rely on their interpretations forguidance. In fact, I have witnessed many Buddhist practitioners, in both the Eastand the West, attempting to distance themselves from their feelings, even thesofter ones, because they truly believed that this type of distance was themeaning of Buddhist detachment. Instead, what they ended up doing wasmerely making themselves more unhappy, as they lost touch with their realfeelings and became more apathetic towards the world.

What is the meaning of the words ‘attachment’ and ‘detachment’ in English?For the most part, this study assumes that these two words are antonyms, as thatseems to be the way that they are used in everyday English. In the Webster’sThird New International Dictionary (1993), the following definitions are offeredfor attachment: ‘a feeling (as affection) that binds a person, a regard’ or ‘the

ISSN 1463-9947 print; 1476-7953 online/04/020105-16 2004 Taylor & Francis LtdDOI: 10.1080/1463994042000319807

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physical connection by which one thing is attached to another, a fastening’. Ifwe focus on the more psychological connotations of the word, ‘attachment’implies a kind of special feeling of bonding to another person. In the samedictionary, detachment is defined as ‘the act or feeling of detaching, separation’,‘indifference to worldly concerns or partisan opinion’ or ‘absence of emotionalbias, neutrality of feeling’ (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary1993). Detachment connotes not only a lack of any special feeling or bond toanother person, but also a kind of indifference or a complete lack of hierarchyin regard to one’s feelings: thus, according to this definition of detachment, onemight treat one’s neighbor and one’s mother in the same way.

John Bowlby, one of the foundational researchers in Western psychology onattachment theory, defines attachment as a ‘“primary motivational system” withits own workings and interface with other motivational systems’ (Holmes 1993,63).1 Other modern psychological definitions, similar to the dictionarydefinitions quoted previously, seem to imply that attachment is ‘the condition inwhich an individual is linked emotionally with another person …’ (Holmes1993, 218). (Thus, detachment would be the absence of any emotional link.)Yet, it is perhaps not central to determine whether attachment is a ‘motivationalsystem’ (i.e. some sort of volition) or an emotion. Instead, the significanceattributed to attachment within the human psyche is of more import. Beginningwith Bowlby’s work on attachment, healthy attachment is seen as an essentialingredient of a human being’s psychological make-up. Bowlby also emphasizes‘the importance of bonding between parents and children’ and the ‘need for asecure base and to feel attached’ (Holmes 1993, 2). In addition, the importanceof attachment is not restricted to the psychological life of the child; for adultsand adolescents, attachment and bonding are also important. Bowlby states thatdeep, loving feelings correspond to a deep attachment (Holmes 1993, 69). Infact, he sees marriage as the ‘adult manifestation of attachment whose compan-ionship provides a secure base allowing for work and exploration, and aprotective shell in times of need’ (Holmes 1993, 81–2). In the folowing quote,Bowlby makes a link between the secure/insecure attachment of the child andsubsequent feelings of security/insecurity that may develop later in life.

A securely attached child will store an internal working model of aresponsive, loving, reliable care-giver, and a self that is worthy of loveand attention and will bring these assumptions to bear on all relationships.Conversely, an insecurely attached child may view the world as adangerous place in which people are to be treated with great caution, andsees himself as ineffective and unworthy of love. (Holmes 1993, 79)

Thus, in summary, it is evident from Bowlby’s work and subsequent theoristson attachment theory that healthy attachment is an essential ingredient of thechild’s psyche and that the nature of the child’s early attachments, especially tohis/her caregiver, is especially important in the development of healthy, lovingrelationships in adult life. Also, modern Western psychology in general assertsthat deep love always includes deep attachment, even for adults.

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Is Buddhism Truly Pro-detachment and Anti-attachment? 107

One of the more precise descriptions of attachment in Buddhist literaturecomes from the Saundarananda of Asvaghos�a. In verse 18.18-18.19, Asvaghos�aoffers a number of translations for this concept, including murchita, nisrita,sam� yoga, pratibaddha, sakta, and grathita. The word murchita comes from theverbal root murch � and is especially vivid in its connotation. It seems toimply a connection to something that has become so rigid as to be calcified.Sakta, pratibaddha, grathita, and so on imply a grasping, a fastening, or aclinging.

caturvidhe naikavidhaprasange yato �hamaharavidhavasaktah�2

amurchitas cagrathitas ca tatra tribhyo vimukto �smi tato bhavebhyah� //(18.18, Saundarananda)

Since I am unattached to the four types of food, all of which have manytypes of attachments (inherent within act of eating them) and (since) I amnot bound nor attached (to them), I am free from the three worlds.

anisritas capratibaddhacitto dr�s�t�asrutadau vyavaharadharme/yasmat samatmanugatas ca tatra tasmad visam� yogagato �smi muktah� //(18.19, Saundarananda)3

Since I am not dependent nor bound to the everyday world, characterizedby (attachment to) the sense organs, and since I have come to have anequanimous mind towards this world, I am liberated, detached (from it).

Another telling word that is used in association with attachment within theSaundarananda is astha (17.6). In the context of the Saundarananda, this wordseems to imply that one is waiting for a particular result from something, andhence anastha means the quality of non-waiting or non-expectation. Thus, if wecombine the idea of astha with murchita and so on, attachment connotessomething like a hardened bond that brings about rigid expectations for acertain result, and so on. Another part of the standard Buddhist view onattachment is that it is intricately linked to parikalpa or delusion. In verse 13.49,of Asvaghos�a’s Saundarananda and in Kambala’s Alokamala,4 the Buddhistadmonition against parikalpa, and therefore, by extension, attachment, is clearlyexpressed.

nendriyam� vis�aye tavat pravr�ttam api sajjate/yavan na manasas tatra parikalpah� pravartate//13.49, Saundarananda//5

As long as delusion does not exist in the mind, even if a sense organ isin use, it does not attach to its object.

sarva eva prahatavyah parikalpo �lpako api hi/hr�daye �bhiplavayaiva bhrantirupa hi kalpana// 8, Alokamala//6

All conception(s) should be abandoned, even the smallest. For, concep-tion, which of the nature of delusion, enters into the heart (i.e. and thuscauses the heart to be deluded).

In the passage from the Saundarananda, delusion (parikalpa) is what causesattachment, and thus attachment is entirely negative, being clearly associated

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with a misconception or a misunderstanding of the world. Without this delusion,there would be no attachment, only detachment, as we misconceive the thingsof the world as permanent, when they are, in fact, impermanent. The secondpassage from the Alokamala gives us a further hint as to the implications ofattachment by saying that conceptions themselves have the nature of delusion.This seems to imply that conceptions, due to their fixed nature and inability toapproximate the specifics of an experience, may reinforce or strengthen one’sattachments, and cause one suffering when these attachments are brought intoquestion. For example, if one has the conception that a cow has four legs,weighs at least 1000 pounds, and has a white color, it may be difficult for oneto adjust to the fact that a 1000 pound black animal with four legs could alsobe categorized as a ‘cow’, as one would be too attached to one’s preconceptionsabout the ‘whiteness’ of a ‘cow’.

In summary, to combine the different portrayals of ‘attachment’ in theSaundarananda, attachment is characterized by a misunderstanding (parikalpa)and a certain, fixed expectation (astha), as well as being characterized by ahardened (murchita) bond between two people or between a person and athing. From these passages from the Saundarananda and so on, one getsthe impression that attachment is clearly something negative. This ideadiffers greatly from the Western psychological understanding of Bowlby andothers, which does not see all attachments as necessarily stemming fromdelusive thinking, nor does it see the bond of attachment as necessarilysomething negative. As was mentioned previously, in Western psychologicalthinking, love always includes some attachment. This brings into questiontranslating words with a purely negative connotation in Buddhist Sanskrit texts(such as upadana, sakta, etc.), as ‘attachment’ because the English word‘attachment’ carries some positive undertones. Perhaps a translation of‘negative attachment’ or ‘clinging’ would always be better for these types ofwords.

In his Clarifying the Natural State, Dakpo Tashi Namgyal, a modern Tibetaninterpreter of Buddhism, provides us with more clues as to the Buddhistunderstanding of detachment. For him, Buddhist detachment is primarilyconcerned with remaining ‘unbound’ in action and with neither being too muchin pursuit of the pleasant (too ‘accepting’) nor too rejecting of the painful. Theidea of being ‘uninvolved in striving’ may hark back to the idea of anastha inthe Saundarananda, as it implies that one should have a lack of concern for acertain fixed result. In addition, Tashi Namgyal’s reference to ‘naturalness’ inthe following text seems to be urging a cultivation of one’s original state ofmind before the advent of dualistic judgments, for these types of judgmentsdisturb the inherent peace of the mind, especially if one gets too caught up inthem.

To be unbound, remain free from accepting and rejecting, remain effort-less and leave the six sense impressions in naturalness. In this way, nineessential points are listed. Phrased differently, You should possess thesethree key points: remain artless in unconcerned naturalness; remain artless

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Is Buddhism Truly Pro-detachment and Anti-attachment? 109

and uncontrived without judging; remain unbound and uninvolved instriving.7

In Buddhism, there are many words, in addition to those from the Saun-darananda, that have been translated as ‘detachment’ or ‘dispassion’: viraga,upeks�a, upadana are some that commonly occur. In the Majjhima Nikaya,viraga is frequently lauded as the goal of Buddhism, and is rendered as‘dispassion’ by one modern translator, Bhikkhu Nanamoli; in Rune Johansson’sPsychology of Nirvana, Johansson describes the feelings of the arhat as‘disinterested and impersonal’. In addition, in many standard Sanskrit–Englishand Pali–English dictionaries, viraga and upeks�a (upekkha, Pali) are translatedas ‘dispassionateness’, ‘indifference’, ‘zero point’.8 Zero point seems to implysome point of non-feeling from which one observes feelings. Also, at times,upeks�a is also rendered as ‘equanimity’ by some translators. E. H. Johnston,who can still be considered to be the principal scholarly figure in Asvaghos�astudies, translates upeks�a as ‘indifference’ and viraga as ‘passionlessness’. Inthe same two verses, Alessandro Passi, a more recent translator of the Saun-darananda, renders viraga as ‘free of passion’ (priva de passione) and upeks�aas the state of being or remaining ‘indifferent’ (indifferente).9

Many of these interpreters of Buddhism take the view that attachment issomething negative to be extinguished. For example, Grace Burford, in herstudy of the Atthakavagga, states ‘the general teaching against desire andattachment treats persons who detach themselves as ideal, exemplary’ (Burford1991, 50–1). Buddhadasa, a twentieth-century Thai Theravada Buddhist master,states: ‘Buddhism cannot be characterized as either optimistic or pessi-mistic … Furthermore, it teaches us to form no attachments, to be neither gladover the benefits nor upset over the drawbacks’ (Swearer 1991, 86). In thefollowing passage, Geshe Gelsang Gyatso, a modern Tibetan teacher, echoes thesentiments of Buddhadasa.

Likewise, the more attachment we have, the more problems we experi-ence. At the moment most of our problems arise because of attachment.A thief, for example, may be sent to prison for the whole of his lifebecause of his attachment … The Buddhist master Vasubandhu usedmany examples to show how attachment creates suffering. His firstexample was that flies have a very strong attachment to pleasing odours.Yet when they try to land on food, humans kill them. Moths are attachedto beautiful forms such as light … They try to enter into the light andfinally die. According to Vasubandhu, some living beings die fromattachment to visual form or sound, taste, smell or touch. But humanbeings have strong attachment to all of these five sense objects. (Gyatso1984, 5–6)

In contrast, Lama Anagarika Govinda strongly asserts that the term ‘detach-ment’ is a misleading representation of Buddhist doctrine. In addition, he pointsout that it is not attachment itself that is necessarily unwholesome, but rather itis the motivation behind one’s attachment that determines whether or notattachment is spiritually healthy or unhealthy. Perhaps one could extend this

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analogy of his to include positive and negative forms of detachment aswell.

The word attachment is frequently used by Buddhists in English. It isintended to express the idea that we bind ourselves through our passion-ate, demanding possessiveness, and that we therefore necessarily suffer bybeing so bound when, sooner or later, the object of desire eludes ourgrasp. It is therefore non-attachment, in giving up and letting go (the signof the true love that wishes to make not itself but the loved person happy)that the way to the overcoming of suffering is to be sought.

This basic Buddhist attitude that teaches people to show first real love,real compassion, and unrestricted joy in the joy of others (while at thesame time, we attain to an inner equanimity in regard to what happens toourselves), was at a relatively early date reinterpreted and taken to meanthat every kind of human attachment and love was devalued. This conceptarose because of the wide range of meanings in the English worddetachment, but the German-speaking Buddhists followed suit, using thewords Verhatftetsein or Anhaften for all forms of love and affection,irrespective of whether it was a matter of passionate desire and possess-iveness or of loving devotion. In this way, Western Buddhism was turnedinto a gloomily ascetic and anti-world doctrine … (Govinda 1991, 87)

Thus, Govinda asserts that a true understanding of Buddhism is that oneshould feel real joy at the happiness of others, or a kind of deep involvementwith them; yet, one should practice a kind of equanimity in the face of one’sown good and bad fortune or, in a sense, a kind of detachment towards one’sown external situation and internal mood. Govinda continues to explicate hisunderstanding of attachment in Buddhism, by making very significant distinc-tion: that of good versus bad attachments.

We must test our attachment in regard to its specific nature and character-istics, for only by doing so can we determine whether it is wholesome orunwholesome. If we cling to things or beings with passionate possessive-ness, we will experience suffering and learn the unwholesome nature ofour actions. But if we are inclined toward things and beings with an innerfreedom and with loving sentiments, that is wholesome. (Govinda 1991,89)

Thus, Lama Govinda, unlike many of the previously quoted modern interpretersand ancient sources, allows for wholesome and unwholesome attachments.There is such a thing as being attached in loving way and being attached in anon-loving way; it is not attachment itself that is the enemy. This seems toimply that an enlightened person could still have loving attachments, and hencehis theory may have implications for the way we interpret the Buddhistconception of nirvan�a. Lama Govinda’s point of view resonates with moresocially engaged Buddhist teachers, such as Chan Khong. In her book LearningTrue Love: How I Learned and Practice Social Change in Viet Nam, she states:“If tonight my heart ceases to beat, you will see me in all these sisters and

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Is Buddhism Truly Pro-detachment and Anti-attachment? 111

brothers. There are those who continue my work for hungry children, otherswho enjoy my work of listening to the suffering of people in order to help thembe healed” (1993, 251). Chan Khong does not believe in solitary enlightenment,nor does she see Buddhist practice outside of the care for the poor and theneedy. For her, Buddhism always implies involvement in the suffering ofothers. One can never detach from or live outside of this involvement, even fora moment. Thus, although she does not state this directly, Chan Khong does notseem to be for ‘detachment’ in the sense of indifference or neutrality towardsthe sufferings of other people and the world in general, nor does she seem tobe against attachments based on love and caring.

In addition, although many of his interpretations put him at odds with LamaGovinda, one phrase within Geshe Kelsang Gyatso’s comments on attachmentseems to imply some sort of agreement: ‘Also, in terms of family and personalrelationships, intense attachment can lead to problems such as over-possessive-ness’ (Gyatso 1984, 5). The key phrase here is ‘intense attachment’. This phraseindicates a distinction between ‘intense attachment’ and some other sort ofattachment—perhaps a less clingy sort of attachment? If this distinction isindeed implied, then Kelsang Gyatso is closer to Lama Govinda’s understand-ing.

If one looks at the scriptural, commentarial and semi-scriptural literature10 inBuddhism, certain scriptural sources do seem to make distinctions betweenpositive and negative types of attachments, as well as positive and negativetypes of detachments. One such discussion takes place in Buddhaghosa’sVisuddhimagga. In one section of the text, Buddhaghosa discusses six majorpersonality types: faithful, greedy, hating, intelligent, speculative and deluded.He then breaks this schema down into three pairs: the greedy personality ispaired with the faithful one; the intelligent personality with the hating; and thespeculative with the deluded. The paired personalities are considered to beparallel or linked in a certain way. The only positive personalities in thisschema are the faithful and the intelligent; the rest seem to have qualities thatare not conducive to Buddhist practice.

Yasma pana dosacaritassa kusalappavattisamaye panna balavatı hotidosassa asannagun�atta/yatha hi akusalapakkhe doso nissineho naarammanam� allıyati eva kusalapakkhe panna/ yatha ca doso abhutam� pidosameva pariyesati evam� panna bhutam� dosameva/ yatha doso satta-parivajjanakarena pavattati, evam� panna sankharaparivajjakarena tasmadosacaritassa buddhicarito sabhago/ (Visuddhimagga, 102)11

One of intelligent temperament is parallel to one of hating temperamentbecause understanding is strong when profitable (kamma) occurs in one ofhating temperament, owing to its special qualities being near to those ofhate. For, in an unprofitable way, hate is disaffected (nissineho) and doesnot cling to its object, and so, in a profitable way, is understanding. Hateseeks out only unreal (abhuta) faults and understanding seeks out onlyreal (bhuta) faults. And hate occurs in the mode of condemning living

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beings (satta), whole understanding occurs in the mode of condemningconditioned phenomena (sankhara).12

The key ideas in this quotation is that the hating personality is ‘disaffected’in a negative way, whereas the intelligent personality is ‘disaffected’(nissineha)13 in a positive way; also, neither personality ‘clings’ to their object.If one makes ‘disaffection’ synonymous to ‘detachment’, then this seems toimply that there are negative and positive ways to be detached. According toBuddhaghosa, someone who is disaffected in a negative way will tend to seekout meaningless or ‘unreal faults’, whereas someone who is disaffected in apositive way tends to see things more as they are, and thus will only see realweaknesses or faults. Modern interpreters, such as Dakpo Tashi Namgyal fromthe Tibetan tradition, also seem to imply that there is such a thing as negativedetachment. In his book Clarifying the Natural State, he calls this negativedetachment ‘indifferent calm’. Tashi Namgyal states that ‘indifferent calm’ canbe easily mistaken for true awareness, but it really is something different.Interestingly enough, Tashi Namgyal believes that this type of detachment isactually based in the state of absent-mindedness.

Moreover, if the meditation is regarded as absented-mindedly refrainingfrom accepting or rejecting the entirety of perceptual experience, thatis indifferent calm and is simply an ordinary state. (Tashi Namgyal2001, 49)

Western psychology has also performed some studies of detached states inchildren, and it has found that detachment can be a sign of a child not beingable to handle disruptions in their connection or bond to the caregiver. In thefollowing passage, the author refers to the ‘parent’s departure’. In this case,‘departure’ can refer to actual physical departure or to emotional absence orinaccessibility.

Fear and anger are often combined in a child’s protest of a parent’sdeparture. As initial attempts to reestablish contact fail and the child’sexpectation for reunion are disappointed, he or she reappraises thesituation, and frightened and angry efforts to reunite give way to sadness.Despair accompanies the recognition that protest will not succeed inreestablishing contact with the parent. Since prolonged despair and failureto reestablish contact leave the child in an intolerably painful state, thechild may attempt to reduce this pain with defensive efforts to excludeinformation about the absent parent. Defensive detachment becomes theonly available means of coping with the severe distress that the childexperiences. (Kobak 1999, 29)

Thus, ‘detachment’ is a kind of defense against pain, a distance that a child putsbetween himself/herself and his/her emotions. This is something inherentlyunhealthy in that one is out of touch with one’s feelings and never resolves orcomes to peace with one’s childhood feelings of fear and anger at being eitheremotionally or physically separated from one’s caregiver. Judging from thistype of evidence from modern Western psychology, it is important for Buddhist

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interpreters to take these nuances into account when they are making transla-tions, for detachment can possibly signify something profoundly negative andunhealthy. Therefore, to put forth the English word ‘detachment’ as the goal ofBuddhism, without some clear qualification, could lead those who read thesetranslations to injure themselves psychologically.

In Buddhaghosa’s comparison of the faithful and greedy temperaments, onesees a similar analysis of attachment: the greedy temperament is being por-trayed as attached in a negative way, whereas the faithful temperament isattached in a positive way.

Tattha yasma ragacaritassa kusalappavattisamaye saddha balavatı hotiragassa asannagun�atta/

Yatha hi akusalapakkhe rago siniddho natilukho evam� kusalapakkhesaddha rago vatthukame pariyesati evam� saddha sıladigun�e/yatha ragoahitam� na pariccajati evam� saddha hitam� na pariccajati tasmaragacaritassa saddhacarito sabhago/ (Visuddhimagga, 102)14

Herein, one of faithful temperament is parallel to one of greedy tempera-ment because faith is strong when profitable (kamma) occurs in one ofgreedy temperament, owing to its special qualities being near to those ofgreed. For, in an unprofitable way, greed is affectionate (siniddho) and notover-austere, and so, in a profitable way, is faith. Greed seeks out sensedesires as object, while faith seeks out the special qualities of virtue andso on. And greed does not give up what is harmful (ahita) while faithdoes not give up what is beneficial (hita).15

When Buddhaghosa says that ‘greed does not give up what is harmful whilefaith does not give up what is beneficial’, he seems to be implying that a faithfulperson is attached to things that are conducive to Buddhist practice whereas thegreedy personality may remain attached to what is detrimental to practice. Also,Buddhaghosa states that both the greedy and faithful personalities possessdesires; however, the faithful person will desire auspicious virtues whereas thegreedy person will desire things that are inauspicious and unwholesome forBuddhist practice. The fact that desire exists seems to imply a certain amountof attachment to the object of that desire.

In another portion of the Visuddhimagga, Buddhaghosa expounds upon atheory that might explain the problem practitioners encounter in not being ableto distinguish negative types of detachment from positive ones (and, byextension, negative types of attachment from positive ones): it is called the‘Near and Far Enemy’ theory. In this theory, Buddhaghosa goes through thefour divine abidings—compassion, lovingkindness, gladness and equanimity—and their ‘near’ and ‘far’ enemies.16 A near enemy is one that can easily bemistaken for one of the divine abidings; a far enemy is the antithesis of one ofthe abidings. The expression ‘near enemy’ is similar to the expression ‘closecousin’ in English. While there is not really a divine abiding that matches upperfectly with my earlier idea of positive detachment, nor is there a near enemythat matches up perfectly with my idea of negative detachment, the fact that

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Buddhaghosa recognizes the possibility of a negative psychological state beingeasily mistaken for a positive one does explain how Buddhist practitionerscould easily fall into the trap of not being able to distinguish apathy from thetype of detachment that frees or liberates.

The term upekkha (upeks�a in Sanskrit) is variously translated in the Pali–En-glish dictionary as ‘disinterestedness’, ‘equanimity’, ‘neutral feeling’,‘indifference’, or as a ‘zero point between joy (somanassa) and sorrow(domanassa)’, and so on. In his Buddhism and Society: A Great Tradition andits Burmese Vicissitudes, Melford Spiro also translates upekkha with the word‘detachment’ (1982, 48). One way of understanding the term upeks�a is toanalyze its component parts. The prefix ‘upa’ can mean ‘close’ or ‘near’, or itcan connote respect. For example, the verb upacar � can mean ‘respecting’,‘worshipping’, ‘attending upon’, and so on.17 Thus, in a sense, one can think ofthe term upeks�a as a careful kind of regard or attention, but also one that keepsa respectful distance. This would give it a different sense from the connotationof detachment as ‘apathy’.

If one looks at upeks�a within the context of Buddhist texts like theSaundarananda, it is also useful to examine how Asvaghos�a employs relatedwords. For example, samupeks�a connotes the idea of disregarding in a properand careful way. In the Saundarananda, this word is used in the context of thegoldsmith who leaves the gold alone for the proper time so that it is allowedto cool off and form correctly.18 The process of making gold is compared withthe process of training the mind. One has to be careful to choose the right objectof meditation (nimitta) for certain disturbances of mind: the correct nimitta willlet the mind ‘cool off’ properly while the incorrect one will disturb thedisequilibrium of the mind even further. This ‘leaving alone’ or allowing of thegold to ‘cool off’ (samupeks�a), performed by the goldsmith, does not seem tobe one of indifference, but rather a careful nurturing love of an artisan for herwork. This idea of leaving something alone in a respectful and nurturing way,attached here, could also be attached to upeks�a. In this case, the prefix ‘sam’may just indicate a slight increase in the intensity of the careful (yet not toohovering) regard of upeks�a, or perhaps the idea of ‘along with’ or ‘togetherwith’ upeks�a (Hayes 1995, 99). Thus, upeks�a or samupeks�a could connote thetype of positive attachment that Govinda refers to. In addition, in certainpassages of the Saundarananda, detachment or non-attachment is portrayed assomething bad and attachment as something good. Verse 8.24 speaks of therebeing no joy in the dharma for someone who is not attached to it and thesubsequent effects of practicing it.

sravane grahan�e �tha dharan�e paramarthavagame manah� sameavis�aktamates calatmano na hi dharme �bhiratirvidh�yate //(8.24, Saun-darananda)//19

For someone whose self is wavering, whose mind is unattached, there isno joy in the dharma, in the quieting of the mind, in the understanding ofthe ultimate truth, in practicing, grasping and hearing (of the dharma).

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Chi Tsang (549–623 CE), a Chinese Madhyamaka practitioner and scholar,believes that the goal of Nagarjuna’s interpretation of Buddhism is to eliminateany attachment one can have to any concept, including the concept of non-at-tachment. In the following statement from Chi Tsang, ‘nonacquisitiveness’ canbe taken as roughly synonymous to ‘non-attachment’.

If we take nonacquisitiveness as right, it would still be (a form of)acquisitiveness and is not called ‘nonacquisitiveness’. Just the completeabsence of dependence is called ‘nonacquisitiveness’ (Liu 1993, 2).

Thus, Chi Tsang seems to be saying: do not get attached to any idea ofnon-attachment because then you are attached to some sort of codified precon-ception of reality and not reality itself. Reality itself should be more fluid.Kambala, in his Alokamala, echoes Chi Tsang’s main point.

iti matva dvayam mithya rago vairagyam eva ca /

na kvacid bhinnamus�t�itvad rajyate na virajyate // Alokamala, 34 //

In reflecting upon the fact that both passion/attachment and dispassion/detachment are false, (the sage) is neither attached to nor detached fromanything, in that (everything) is of the nature of an open fist (i.e. empty).

vairagyam� yasya rago ’pi tasya nih�samsayam punah�tasmad ragaprahan� aya vairagyam api na spr�s�et // Alokamala, 35 //

Someone who has dispassion/detachment will surely still have passion/at-tachment (as they are attached to the concept of detachment); therefore,in order to rid oneself of attachment, detachment also should not beconceived of.

Chi Tsang and Kambala are concerned with the tendency in Buddhism (andreligious thinking in general) to refute an opponent’s ideas as calcified dogma,yet erect one’s own ideas in their place, not realizing that one’s own ideas maybe just as rigid. Detachment may be an important practice, yet it can neverbecome a fixed idea; rather, it has to stay in the realm of direct experience inorder for it to be an effective Buddhist practice. Chi Tsang specificallycomments upon the barriers constructed between Buddhist and non-Buddhist, aswell as between Hınayana and Mahayana Buddhism. These barriers are anothersign of the rigid, inflexible thinking that Chi Tsang and Madhyamaka in generalare trying to fight.20

If an explanation conflicts with the Buddhist sutras and yet hearing itresults in acceptance of the (Buddhist) Way, it becomes (salutary like)sweet dews and it is only right that it should be recorded down (Williams1989, 5).

If we harbor (the distinction between) Buddhist and non Buddhist anddwell upon (the division between) Mahayana and Hınayana, we shall fallinto the falsehood of one-sidedness and lose sight of the true prin-ciple … Only the simultaneous allaying of (the thoughts of) Buddhist and

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non-Buddhist and the concurrent subduing (of the ideas of) Mahayana andHınayana are known as the true principle (Williams 1989, 3).

Now, these statements from the Madhayamaka and Yogacara (Kambala’sAlokamala), schools of Mahayana thought seem to be saying somethingdifferent to Lama Govinda. Govinda argued that certain types of attachmentare actually acceptable as final ends of practice, and also that an apathetictype of detachment is not acceptable in Buddhist practice. Chi Tsang andKambala are arguing that one’s goal should be complete non-attachment ordetachment; however, one cannot reach true non-attachment if one is merelypracticing in a rigid way attached to some notion of non-attachment. Instead,in order to reach true detachment, any preconception of what this is has to belet go. However, in one way, Govinda, Chi Tsang, and Kambala are inagreement. All of them do seem to be critiquing any fixed conception of theBuddhist way, and that includes a strict notion that Buddhism is purely aboutdetachment.

An examination of standard Mahayana doctrines, such as nirvan�a equalssam� sara and asraya-paravr�tti, may shed further light on the problem ofattachment versus detachment in Buddhist practice. Asraya-paravr�tti is oftentranslated as something like ‘revolution at the base’—yet what exactly is meantby the word ‘base’? I take this term to mean that our minds have a kind of baseor foundation that underlies all mental phenomena (i.e. thoughts, desires andemotions): this is the foundation or asraya. If this asraya is defiled byselfishness, then all of our desires, emotions and thoughts will be egocentric;but if this asraya is completely pure or unsullied (and one can probablyascertain this by paying attention to one’s subjective experience of the asraya),then all of our emotions, desires and thoughts will be free of egocentrism. Thispure or unsullied base would be the foundation of nirvan�a, just as an impurebase would be at the foundation of sam� sara. This interpretation of nirvan�aequals sam� sara also connects to ideas such as the trisvabhava theory fromYogacara Buddhism. In this theory, an ordinary person’s mind is considereddeluded (parikalpita), in that the base of his/her mind is impure, yet throughBuddhist practice his/her mind is purified to the point where it is perfected(parinis�panna), thus being able to understand the paratantra or interdependentnature of the world itself (Cook 1981, 57). In Nichiren’s writings, we find thefollowing reference to the Buddhist teacher Nan-yueh and the idea of a purifiedand impure mind: ‘the great teacher Nan-yueh says, “the entity of the mind isendowed with two aspects, the defiled and the pure. However, it does not havetwo different forms but is single in nature and without distinction” ’ (Nichiren1999, 418). This passage from Nichiren alludes to a the same Buddhist concept:the mind in sam� sara is the defiled mind; when the mind becomes pure, it is themind of nirvan�a or the pure mind.

Could we extend this argument concerning emotions, thoughts and desires toinclude attachment and detachment? Could there be such a thing as purifiedattachments and impure attachments, and purified detachment and impuredetachment? In other words, could there be the attachments of sam� sara, based

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on clinginess and self interest, and yet also the attachments of nirvan�a based onlove and the bond of true human affection? And, could there be the detachmentof sam� sara, based on apathy and uncaring, and the detachment of nirvan�a thatseeks to set a loved one free only of one’s own clinginess?

Concluding remarks

The purpose of this article has been merely to question monolithic interpreta-tions of Buddhism. Judging from the evidence and reflections presented,Buddhism does not appear to be purely pro-detachment nor purely anti-attach-ment; however, this interpretation has been taken by the majority of modernBuddhist interpreters. This may be because many of these interpretations havebeen based on translations that have not taken into account the full semanticrange of the English words ‘detachment’ and ‘attachment’. Translators haveoften not investigated the latest research in Western psychology on these ideas;yet Western psychological research on these ideas is especially important, as,like Buddhism, the clinical aspect of Western psychology is heavily focusedupon understanding the human psyche in order to heal it. Thus, in translatinghealing-oriented concepts in Buddhism into English, it seems more important toexamine their meanings in the context of Western psychology rather than withinthe medium of Western philosophy or Christianity. Even the meanings given instandard English dictionaries may be less central to our translation process.

Perhaps the most significant points in this study come from Buddhaghosa,Lama Govinda, Chi Tsang and Kambala. Buddhaghosa and Lama Govindaassert that there are good and bad attachments, as well as good and bad waysof being detached. This type of interpretation is more all-encompassing in thatit covers the broad spectrum of human feeling inherent within attachment. Afterall, we can probably all conjure up moments when our attachment to someonehas been healthy and loving, and also moments when are attachment tosomeone has been destructive. Chi Tsang and Kambala imply that, whilenon-attachment or detachment may be the ultimate goal and thus the ultimategood, one cannot be rigidly attached to any notion of detachment. Notions orconcepts imply dualistic thinking. In order to have a conception about detach-ment, one has to have a point of comparison (i.e. attachment). Thus, byquestioning any rigid conception of detachment, Chi Tsang and Kambala arealso calling into question the dichotomy between attachment and detachment.Chi Tsang and Kambala may be trying to give us a hint here. Perhapsdetachment and attachment are merely two sides of the same coin. After all, oneneeds both attachment and detachment in a loving relationship. A mother shouldbe intimately involved with every aspect of her child’s life, but she also has tolearn to let go at times in order to let the child grow. Hence, both feelings,attachment and detachment, can be encompassed within love. The great Indiansage, Kabir, spoke directly to this problem. If we substitute the word ‘attach-ment’ for ‘love’ in the following, Kabir’s formulation comes very close to thenon-dualistic one that I have just offered here.

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The devout seeker is he who mingles in his heart the double currents oflove and detachment, like the mingling of the streams of the Ganges andJumna. In his heart the sacred water flows day and night; and thus theround of births and deaths is brought to an end.21

On the other hand, the concept of ‘detachment’ is a particularly tricky one.Even though Buddhist texts claim the opposite, it could be that detachment isnever constructive or healthy. Western psychological often indicates that de-tachment is merely a defense mechanism or a way of distancing oneself fromunwanted feelings, and Western psychotherapy has also proven that being intouch with one’s feelings improves mental health. This Western psychothera-peutic position is not far from the position taken in the Pali Canon concerning‘mindfulness of feeling’. Hence, if being in constant touch with one’s feelingsis indeed of ultimate importance, then using the word ‘detachment’ to translateany healing-oriented Buddhist concept must be questioned, as detachment couldimply an excessive distance from feelings.

Finally, I would like to close with a passage from Thich Nhat Hanh, whichechoes many scriptural passages on Buddhist mindfulness such as are found inSantideva’s Bodhicaryavatara, the Pali Canon’s Satipat�t�hana Sutta and so on.22

In this passage Hanh touches upon a Buddhist concept that comes up frequentlyin the literature: namely, that any feeling, no matter whether it is good or bad,powerful or light, should be paid attention to with mindfulness, and thatmindfulness can be thought of as a force that protects the psyche from harm.This latter point may be the most important for healing, and it is one that is alsoless well known: unbiased awareness itself guards one from the harm one cando to oneself by dwelling or attempting to push away thoughts and feelings.

The essential thing is not to let any feeling or thought arise withoutrecognizing it in mindfulness, like a palace guard who is aware of everyface that passes through the front corridor (Hanh 1976, 38).

Thus, in conclusion, perhaps attachment and detachment are both merelyfeelings, and therefore should be treated as just another object of mindfulness.And perhaps it is only through unbiased awareness that we can uncover theirtrue meaning for our psychic health, and therein discover a more fluid, less rigidversion of the Buddhist path.

Notes

1 Holmes (1993, 63). Here, I have chosen to situate myself within Western psychologyrather than Western philosophy and so on, because the Western psychology has aclinical, healing-oriented aspect that seems to correspond more closely to Bud-dhism’s stress on meditation and so on.

2 According to Monier-Monier Williams’ Sanskrit–English Dictionary, vidhi can beused pleonastically at the end of a compound. For example, mathana-vidhi can mean‘act of churning or stirring’.

3 Asvaghos�a (1975, 136).4 Lindtner, Christian, tr. A Garland of Light: Kambala’s Alokamala. Fremont: Asian

Humanities Press, 2003, p. x. Lindtner labels Kambala as a thinker from the

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Yogacara school of thought.5 Asvaghos�a (1975, 94).6 Lindtner, Christian, tr. A Garland of Light: Kambala’s Alokamala, 8, p. 15. On p. 2,

Lindtner states that the Tibetan version is ‘a sorry piece of work’. For this reason,and for the reason that my Tibetan is not as strong as my Sanskrit, I have chosen toderive my meaning primarily from the Sanskrit.

7 Tashi Namgyal (2001, 56).8 Johansson (1970, 27), Monier-Williams’ Sanskrit–English Dictionary (pp. 215, 982),

and Davids and Stede’s Pali–English Dictionary (pp. 150, 634). Also, in BhikkhuNanamoli’s translation of the Majjhima Nikaya, viraga is rendered as ‘dispassion’and upekkha as ‘equanimity’ (Bhikkhu Nanamoli 1995, 1384).

9 Asvaghos�a. Saundarananda, 17.32, 17.50, etc., E.H. Johnston, tr. Asvaghos�a. Saun-darananda, 17.32, 17.50, etc., Alessandro Passi, tr.

10 Here, I am referring to such works as Asvaghos�a’s Saundarananda, Buddhaghosa’sVisuddhimagga, and so on.

11 Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa (1977, 82).12 Buddhaghosa, The Path of Purification: Visuddhimagga, 102 (1991, 102). Here, I

have changed Bhikkhu Nanamoli’s translation according to what I have read inMathieu Boisvert’s explanation of sakhara. See Boisvert (1995, 93–105).

13 In looking at the original text, I could not entirely follow the translation; however,I do not feel confident enough, at this point, to question it. Please see theVisuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa (Buddhaghosa 1977, 82).

14 Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa (1977, 82).15 Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, 102 (1991, 101–2).16 Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, 319 (1991, 311–2).17 Apte (1992, 280) and Richard Hayes (1995, 100). Hayes’ notes are unpublished and

in use just at McGill University.18 Asvaghos�a. Saundarananda. E.H. Johnston, tr. (pp. 119–20).19 Asvaghos�a. Saundarananda. E.H. Johnston, tr. (p. 52).20 Williams (1989), on p. 211 of this overview, alludes to Fa Tsang, from the Hua Yen

school, and states that Fa Tsang may have argued that a bodhisattva is not entirelydevoid of attachment, but rather may retain a ‘sliver of attachment’ related tocompassion. See also Williams’ footnote on this.

21 Fisher and Bailey (2000, 80). It is possible that the word ‘love’ is a debatabletranslation. Kabir is basically a non-sectarian sage, although he is revered by Hindu,Muslim and Sikh alike.

22 See 5.3–5.5, etc., of Santideva’s Bodhicaryavatara (Santideva 1990).

References

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Asvaghos�a. 1975. Saundarananda, in E.H. Johnston (ed), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass(Sanskrit and English).

Bhikkhu Nanamoli (trans). 1995. The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A NewTranslation of the Majjhima Nikaya, Boston: Wisdom Publications.

Boisvert, Mathieu. 1995. The Five Aggregates: Understanding Theravada Psychologyand Soteriology, Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier Press.

Buddhaghosa. 1977. Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati (Pali).Buddhaghosa. 1991. The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), 5th edn, Bhikkhu

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Cook, Francis. 1981. Hua Yen Buddhism, University Park: Pennsylvania State UniversityPress.

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Govinda, Lama Anagarika. 1991. Buddhist Reflections, York Beach: S. Weiser.Gyatso, Geshe Kelsang. 1984. Buddhism in the Tibetan Tradition, London: Penguin.Hanh, Thich Nhat. 1976. The Miracle of Mindfulness, Boston: Beacon Press.Hayes, Richard. 1995. Continuing Sanskrit, Unpublished notes on Sanskrit grammar,

Montreal: McGill University.Holmes, Jeremy. 1993. John Bowlby and Attachment Theory, New York: Routledge.Johansson, Rune E.A. 1970. Psychology of Nirvana. Garden City: Anchor Books.Kambala. 2002. Garland of Light: Alokamala, Christian Lindtner (trans), Fremont: Asian

Humanities Press (Sanskrit, Tibetan and English).Khong, Chan. 1993. Learning True Love: How I Learned and Practiced Social Change

in Viet Nam, Berkeley: Parallax Press.Kobak, Roger. 1999. ‘The Emotional Dynamics of Disruptions in Attachment Relation-

ships’, in Jude Cassidy and Phillip Shaver (eds), Handbook of Attachment, New York:Guilford Press.

Liu, Ming-Wood. 1993. ‘A Chinese Madhyamaka Theory of Truth: The Case of ChiTsang’, Philosophy East and West, 43(4).

Nagarjuna. 1992. Mylamadhyamakakarikas de Nagarjuna, in Louis de la Vallee Poussin(ed), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (Sanskrit).

Nichiren. 1999. The Writings of Nichiren Daishonin, Gosho Translation Committee(trans), Tokyo: Soka Gakkai.

Santideva. 1990. Santideva’s Bodhicaryavatara, Parmananda Sharma (trans), NewDelhi: Aditya Prakashan (Sanskrit and English).

Spiro, Melford E. 1982. Buddhism and Society: A Great Tradition and its BurmeseVicissitudes, 2nd edn, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Swearer, Donald (ed). 1991. Me and Mine: Selected Essays of Bhikkhu Buddhadasa,Delhi: Satguru.

Tashi Namgyal, Dakpo. 2001. Clarifying The Natural State, Hongkong: Rangjung YeshePublications (Tibetan and English).

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. Springfield: Merriam-Webster, 1993.Williams, Paul. 1989. Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations, London:

Routledge.

Correspondence address: Lynken Ghose, Department of Philosophy and Religion, ButlerUniversity, 4600 Sunset Avenue, Indianapolis, IN 46208-3485, USA. E-mail:lghose@butler.edu or lynkenghose@hotmail.com

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