A security framework for a workflow-based grid development platform
Post on 05-Sep-2016
along several independently administered networks. However, thending lcontexlicabiles havbeenaking,n coord
resource sharing and introduce new challenges related to federated
including solutions for the management of credentials and policies,new resource management protocols for co-allocation of multiple
mobile terminals, being the latter one of the novelties of the project. In
Computer Standards & Interfaces 32 (2010) 230245
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
j ourna l homepage: www.esecurity and integration.Security has been a central issue in Grid computing from the
outset, and has been regarded as the most signicant challenge forgrid computing . This is particularly true for Enterprise Grids.Signicant compromises in security might be the result of aninadequate understanding of the security implications of a grid. Thesecurity requirements and policies are determined largely by the
order to validate the platform two pilot applications will be used:news and banking applications.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview onthe Globus Toolkit. Section 3 outlines what are the security services tobe taken into account in grids, paying special attention to authoriza-tion. Section 4 presents all the components of the GREDIA architectureand Section 5 how they are integrated into a single platform. Section 6architectures developed for these types ofdistinguished from clientserver architectu
Corresponding author.E-mail addresses: firstname.lastname@example.org (J.L. Vivas), mcg
(C. Fernndez-Gago), email@example.com (J. Lopez), abenjum
0920-5489/$ see front matter 2009 Elsevier B.V. Adoi:10.1016/j.csi.2009.04.001owever, shareable on-ions greatly complicate
platform that will combine new and existing middleware to supportsecure business applications. GREDIA addresses both desktop anddistributed across virtual organizations. Hdemand resources in commercial applicatutility computing. The focus today is oment of grid technologies within thesignicantly widens the range of appStandard interfaces for business servicgrid computing. Grid computing hasareas as nance, medicine, decision-mt of business , whichity of grid technologies.e also been leveraged bytargeting such differingcollaborative design, andinated resource sharing
resources and new information query protocols and data manage-ment services .
In this paper we will focus on the development of a securityframework for a generic grid development platform developed withinthe European project GREDIA, Grid Enabled to Rich Media Content. The main objective of the project is to create a generic griduse of grid computing has been expa ately to include deploy- resources and for secure remote access to data and computingamounts of data and computational resources that are distributedA security framework for a workow-bas
Jos L. Vivas, Carmen Fernndez-Gago, Javier Lopez Department of Computer Science, Complejo Tecnolgico, Campus de Teatinos, University of
a b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f o
Available online 21 April 2009
Keywords:GridSecurity frameworkSecurity servicesVirtual organizations
This paper describes the secthe project GREDIA. This plauses the OGSA standards,implements security. Thus,which others need to be cre
A grid may be dened as a collection of computing resourcesdistributed over a local or wide area network, and available to an enduser as a single large computing system. Originally, the grid focused onthe areas of computing power, data access, and storage resources.It was intended for large-scale and distributed scientic computingthat required efcient and dynamically determined access to largeapplications, which areres by the fact that grid
firstname.lastname@example.org@lcc.uma.es (A. Benjumea).
ll rights reserved.grid development platform
ndrs Benjumealaga, 29071, Malaga, Spain
ty framework that is to be developed for the generic grid platform created forrm is composed of several components that need to be secured. The platformthat the security framework will follow GSI, the portion of Globus thatwill show the security features that GSI already provides and we will outlined or enhanced.
2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
environments assume a dynamic and simultaneous use of a largenumber of resources from a number of administrative domains.Although the intention has been from the outset to use availablesecurity mechanisms as much as possible, this requirement couldnot be met by mechanisms that were devised largely for insulatingand protecting networks from their environment, as in intranetsand virtual private networks. As a result, novel security technolo-gies have been evolving all the time within the grid community,
rds & Interfaces
l sev ie r.com/ locate /cs iconcludes the paper and outlines the future work.
2. Grid security architectures and infrastructures
2.1. OGSA security
Open Grid Services Architecture (OGSA) is a service-orientedarchitecture (SOA) that represents an evolution towards a grid system
231J.L. Vivas et al. / Computer Standards & Interfaces 32 (2010) 230245architecture based on Web services concepts and technologies, auto-nomic computing principles and open standards for integration andinter-operability. The rst implementation of OGSA mechanismscorresponds to version 3 of the Globus toolkit, GT3.
OGSA builds on concepts and technologies from both the grid andWeb services. It was created in order to meet the challenges related tothe integration of services across virtual organizations (VOs) runningon top of different native platforms .
Security arises at various levels of the OGSA architecture. TheOGSA security model stipulates that security mechanisms shouldbe pluggable and discoverable by service requesters from a servicedescription, enabling service providers to select their preferred mech-anisms. The Global Grid Forum's OGSA 1.0  document targetssecurity requirements including authentication and authorization,security infrastructures, perimeter security solutions, isolation, dele-gation, policy exchange, intrusion detection and protection, andsecure logging. It also species security services associated withmessage integrity, condentiality and privacy, auditing, intrusionprevention and access control.
2.2. The Globus Toolkit
The Global Grid Forum denes the Globus Toolkit (GT) as anecosystem of components . It contains a collection of componentsthat have beenproven to beuseful andwere selected from solutions thathad been used in different grid applications. These solutions showed apotential for reusing because of their usefulness and generality. Thesesolutions were then generalized in order to become useful for a widevariety of applications.
The Globus Toolkit is thus a collection of standard building blocksand tools that does not give a complete solution for any grid project,and very few of the GT components include user interface elementsthat are immediately useful to the application. GT provides solutionsto the most common problems and promotes standard solutions. Agrid application typically must assemble together a subset of thesecomponents, components from other sources, either off-the-shelf orspecially tailored for the application, and application-specic code.These components must be organized and integrated by architectsand system integrators according to the requirements of the specicapplication. Standard mechanisms used in the GT include SSL/TLS,LDAP v3, X.509 Proxy Certicates, SOAP, HTTP, and GridFTP. Referenceimplementations of new and proposed standards may also beprovided, e.g. WSRF, DAI, WS-Agreement, WSDL 2.0, WSDM, SAML,and XACML.
The Globus Toolkit has evolved from a rst version, GT1, to themost recent one, GT4.
GT1 is tantamount to the Information Wide Area Year (I-WAY) pro-ject  conceived in 1995 with the idea to integrate high band-width networks.
GT2 was released in 2001 and became a de facto standard for grids.In this version there was no common framework, the protocols werenon-standard and the services were predened, making it hard todevelop new services.
GT3 was based on the Open Grid Services Architecture (OGSA)specications and used XML and protocol standards such as SOAPand WSDL to provide Web services interfaces . Grid services arethe core of GT3 and its corresponding infrastructure is called theOpen Grid Services Infrastructure (OGSI).
GT4 was launched in 2005. It featured a new implementation ofthe Web Services Resource Framework (WSRF)  and theWeb Services Notication (WSN)  standards, thus renderingOGSI obsolete. WSRF can be viewed as a re-factoring of OGSI,which was considered long and complex, too object oriented andnot fully integrated with Web services. WSRF is intended to be
integrated into the family of Web service standards, allowingOGSA to be based directly on Web services. WSRF denes con-ventions within the context of current Web service standards formanaging state so that applications may discover, inspect, andinteract with stateful resources in standard and inter-operableways.
2.2.1. The Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI)The Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) is the portion of the Globus
Toolkit that implements security functionality. Its security modelconstitutes a de facto standard for grid security. GSI maps to localsecurity mechanisms and gateways are used in order to translate fromthe common GSI infrastructure into the local site mechanisms. Itsupports the following features.
A public-key system. GSI is based on public-key cryptography andthus supports privacy, integrity, and authentication. Both grid usersand grid services need to have a X.509 certicate and a private key.User certicates can be managed in several ways. Certicates areissued by Certication Authorities that both users and services musttrust.
Mutual authentication through digital certicates. GSI supports threeauthentication methods: (i) X.509 certicates; (ii) username andpassword; (iii) anonymous authentication. GSI uses X.509 certi-cates to guarantee a strong authentication and X.509 identity andproxy certicates  in order to provide a globally unique iden-tier. GSI relies on trusted third parties for signing users andhost certicates. It commonly uses the Transport Layer Security(TLS) protocol for authentication, and denes a common creden-tial format based on X.509 identity certicates. Authentication isprovided by the conjunction of an X.509 certicate and an asso-ciated private key. GSI certicates are issued by a trusted partycalled the Certication Authority (CA).
Credential management. Certicate management is supported byMyProxy , a remote clientserver system in which clients canstore credentials with access control policies in an online repositoryfor later retrieval. Typically, users store long-lived credentials in therepository, which are thereafter used for providing short-livedcredentials for grid sessions. MyProxy uses X.509 certicates andcan be combined with a Certication Authority service thatautomatically stores its own certicates, to be used for ID/passwordsign-on. A command-line interface is provided allowing users tointroduce user ID and password to obtain grid proxy credentials ontheir local services.
Credential delegation and single sign-on. These features are im-plemented with the help of proxy certicates . Proxy certi-cates are similar to X.509 digital certicates except that they aresigned by an end user, and whereas X.509 certicates are in-tended for assigning long-term identities, proxy certicates areused for short-term delegation of rights. They allow a user tocreate and delegate a set of credentials to another user without theinvolvement of an administrator. Users generate delegated proxycerticates with short life spans that get passed from one com-ponent to another and form the basis of authentication, accesscontrol and logging.
For single sign-on, the user signs in once in order to create theproxy certicate which is thereafter used for all subsequentauthentications. Proxy certicates may be created locally by theuser and used by subsequent clients. Thereafter the proxy certicatecan be used to authenticate to a remote service. Proxy certicates canthus be used to create other proxy certicates, allowing thus a chainof delegations.
These delegations can also be restricted with the help of the policyspecied in a restricted proxy certicate. Restricted proxies representan extension of the X.509 certicates to carry restriction policies,
enabling grantors to delegate only a portion of the rights they possess.
232 J.L. Vivas et al. / Computer Standards & Interfaces 32 (2010) 230245The format of the restricted proxy credential is neutral and as a resultcan support different policy languages.
Authorization and access control. Authorization and access controlwas initially based on a simple access control list placed in a at lecalled the Gridmap. GT2 used the Gridmap le to map a user to auser ID on a remote resource during job submission. GT3 extendedthis idea by allowing Gridmap les to be associated with servicesand factories, and consequently applying access control policies tothose services and factories.
In a Web services context, the question is who is authorized to use acertainWebservice. InGT4,GSI supports authorization inboth the server-side and the client-side, and has six possible authorization schemes:
none: no authorization is required self: the client may use a service, or authorize an invocation by theservice, if client and service have the same identity
Gridmap: a list of authorized users akin to an access control list identity authorization: a client will be allowed to access a serviceonly if the client's identity matches a specied unique identity, or willonly allow requests to be sent to services with a specied identity.
host authorization: the client is allowed to access a service if itpresents a host credential that matches a specied unique host-name; likewise, the client will authorize an invocation if the servicehas a host credential.
SAML Callout authorization: the authorization decision can bedelegated to an OGSA Authorization-compliant authorization service.
GSI supports also custom authorization by providing an infra-structure to easily plug into other authorization mechanisms.
220.127.116.11. Dynamic creation and management of overlaid trust domains.In order to establish a VO from overlaid trust domains, GSI uses bothproxy certicates and security services such as the Community Autho-rization Service (CAS). GSI has as a policy that two entities bearingproxy certicates issued by the same entity will trust each other. Usersmay therefore create simple trust domains dynamically by issuingcerticates to services that are intended to collaboratewith each other.
18.104.22.168. Transport-level and message-level security. GT3 and GT4provide mechanisms for both transport layer security and message-level security. The transport layer security is based on a GSI-enabledHTTP protocol, and message-level security on technologies andstandards such as WS-Security, XML Encryption, and XML Signature.The TLS-based protocol provides also message protection (encryptionand integrity checking). The following security schemes are provided:
GSI Secure Message: Provides message-level security based on WS-Security, and supports privacy and integrity. The performance isgood if only few messages are sent.
GSI Secure Conversation: Provides message-level security based onthe WS-Secure Conversation specication and is the only schemethat supports credential delegation. It does support privacy,integrity and anonymous authentication. Its performance is good ifmany messages are sent.
GSI Transport: Provides transport-level security by using TLS and itis used by default in GT4. Performance is very good and privacy,integrity and anonymous authentication are supported.
3. Security services and mechanisms
3.1. Some denitions
The services that GREDIA will offer to its users should be se-
cure. This can be guaranteed if those services call to other ser-vices which are security services. Services are implanted thoroughmechanisms.
The denitions of service and mechanism are not standard andthey always depend on the context where they are going to be applied.Thus, as our context is OGSA we will adopt the denition of serviceprovided by them. We will give the denition of service and someother basic denitions.
Service. A service is a software component participating in a service-oriented architecture that provides functionality or participates inrealizing one or more capabilities .
Security service. A processing or communication service that is pro-vided by a system to give a specic kind of protection to resources,where said resources may reside with said system or reside withother systems, for example, an authentication service or a PKI-baseddocument attribution and authentication service. A security serviceis a superset of AAA services. Security services typically implementportions of security policies and are implemented via securitymechanisms .
Since the concept of service has been dened as a component, wewill here dene the concept of component:
Component. An interchangeable part of a system that encapsulatesits contents and denes its behaviour in terms of its public interfaces.
Another important concept is the following:
Securitymechanism. Aprocess (oradevice incorporating suchaprocess)that can be used in a system to implement a security service that isprovided by or within the system.
Some security services are audit, availability, condentiality, non-repudiation, integrity or accountability. However, due to their impor-tance for GREDIAwewill concentrate on authorization, authenticationand access control (see Section 3.3).
3.2. Authorization, authentication and access control in grids
Regarding to authentication, a central role is played by thePublic Key Infrastructures (PKI), which enables secure and efcientacquisition of public keys. The most widely used PKI is the PublicKey Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX) , dened by the IETF's PKIXWorking Group. The challenge posed by the existence of multipleidentities, within or across domains, and multiple authoritativesources of identity, is met by the standards for identity federationestablished by OASIS and the Liberty Alliance Project , whichdenes mechanisms for sharing identity information betweendomains. It has been adopted by the Internet2 project Shibboleth.
3.2.1. Access controlThere are currently several access control models for collaborative
environments. We briey introduce them below.
Access Matrix Model. One of the earliest access control mechanismsmainly used for resource protection in an operating system, andwhich species in a matrix the rights that a set of subjects possessesfor each object in an environment.
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). In the RBAC model  permis-sions are assigned to roles rather than to individual users. RBACis more scaleable than user-based access control and reducesthe cost of security administration. RBAC models have beensuccessfully implemented in workow systems and distributed
CAS, Kerberos and Keynote the credentials used are authorizationassertions.
We can also divide grid authorization systems into VO level systemsand resource level systems. The former has a centralized authorizationsystem that provides credentials for users to access the resources.The latter, on the other hand, allows users to access the resourcesbased on the credentials that were provided by the users themselves.VO level systems are CAS and VOMS, whereas Gridmap les, Akentiand PERMIS are examples of resource level systems (see below for adiscussion of these authorization systems). Authorization systems atdistinct levels may thus complement each other in an authorizationsystem.
The scope of authority is called an administrative domain. Asubject, resource or authority, belongs to one or several adminis-trative domains. In a grid, the subject that requests a resource and the
233J.L. Vivas et al. / Computer Standards & Interfaces 32 (2010) 230245 Task-Based Access Control (TBAC). TBAC  extends the subject/object-based access control models by including domains contain-ing task-based contextual information and allowing dynamicmanagement of permissions as the tasks progress.
Team-Based Access Control (TMAC). TMAC  extends RBAC bygrouping users in teams, and introduces the notion of user contextidentifyingusersplaying a role ona teamat agivenmoment, andobjectcontext identifying specic objects required for collaborationpurposes.
Context-based TMAC. This model  integrates RBAC and TBAC byincorporating context as an entity in the architecture.
Spatial Access Control. SPACE  is a spatial access control forcollaborative virtual environments. It consists of an access graph anda boundary dividing the collaborative environment into regions.Credentials are used to allow access within regions.
Context-Aware Access Control. This model  is an extension ofRBAC with the notion of environment roles capturing environmentstate in order to provide for security in context-aware applications.
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC). Thismodel , inwhich accessdecisions are based on the attributes of the requestor and resource, isbecoming increasingly important, and has been adopted by severalauthorization systems such as Akenti , PERMIS  and VOMS .Roles are a kind of attribute, and both RBAC and ABAC may besupported by the X.509 Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI)standard , which extends PKI with attribute certicates to supporttasks related to authorization.
3.2.2. Authorization systems and modelsIn this section we introduce the basic concepts and models of
authorization as well as some of the authorization systems andmechanisms that are candidates to become OGSA standards.
Identity-based authorization systems have so far been the mostwidely used ones (e.g. Gridmap les ), but lately both role-basedauthorization and attribute-based authorization are emerging in gridcomputing. The Global Grid Forum  created an OGSA Authoriza-tionWorking Groupwhose task is to dene the specications neededto allow for inter-operability and pluggability of authorizationcomponents from multiple authorization domains in the OGSAframework . The objective of these specications is to allowthese systems to be interchangeably used with middleware thatrequires authorization functionality.
A number of authorization systems that are emerging in the gridtodayhave beenhighlighted by theOGSAAuthorizationWorkingGroup.These systems are candidates to become OGSA standards . Theyinclude, amongothers, Akenti , CAS , PERMIS , VOMS , andPRIMA . These authorization systems typically use assertions thatbind attributes to users for purposes of authorization decision. However,there is currently no standard within attribute-based authorization forhow attributes are communicated and for expressing policies regardingthose attributes. Specications are under development today that areintended to provide basic inter-operability among authorizationcomponents in the OGSA framework.
Typically, authorization decisions are based on informationprovided by authorities that are related either to the authorizationsubject and/or to the resource that is the target of the authorizationrequest. Three basic entities are involved in authorization decisions:(i) subject, a person or process which is a user of a service resource;(ii) resource, an entity that provides or hosts services according toa set of access control policies; and (iii) authority, a trusted entitythat may issue, validate and revoke several types of assertions, e.g.attribute, policy and identity assertions.
22.214.171.124. Authorization models. The following authorizationmodels canbe recognized [81,52].
Push model. In a push model (Fig. 1) the subject requests an
authorization from an authority (step 1), which acts as a service thatissues authorization decisions in the form of authorization asser-tions that are returned to the subject (step 2), which may conveythem to the target resource (step 3); the resource may then grant ordeny the access request (step 4)
Pull model. In a pull model (Fig. 2) the subject sends the requestdirectly to the resource (step 1), which subsequently contacts theauthorization authority (step 2); the latter will then send anauthorization decision to the resource (step 3), which decideswhether the corresponding access request will be granted or not(step 4).
Authorization agent model. In an authorization agent (Fig. 3) modelthe subject sends the access request to an agent (step 1) thatthereafter makes authorization decisions according to the rulesestablished by an authorization authority, whereupon the resourceis contacted (step 2) for feedback (step 3) and subsequently a naldecision is sent to the subject (step 4).
Hybrid model. In a hybrid model we have a combination of some ofthe above models; an example is when the pull model and the pushmodel are combined: the subject may obtain authorization toaccess a resource from an authorization authority, as in the pushmodel, but the resource may also query an authorization authorityin its local domain for compliance with local policies, as in the pullmodel.
In all the models above, the authorization service typicallygives the descriptions of a subject, the action requested, and a targetresource, and returns an authorization decision. The proposed mes-sage format for requesting and expressing authorization assertionsfrom an OGSA authorization service is SAML. The goal with usingstandard message formats such as SAML is to allow differ-ent authorization systems to be used interchangeably in OGSA.Authorization in Akenti and PERMIS is based on attribute assertionsfrom external sources, in VOMS on assertions of group member-ship, and in CAS on capability assertions from a VO server. In
Fig. 1. Authorization push sequence.resource are typically in separate administrative domains, and there
126.96.36.199. Authorization systems. Gridmap les uses existing localmechanisms for authorization by authenticating a user which is thenmapped to a local identity by a local conguration le called theGridmap le. Themapping is used as an access control check, allowingor denying access to the requested resource if the user is listed or notlisted in the local mapping. After the mapping, authorization reliessolely on local policy management and enforcement mechanisms,allowing the operating system to act as a sandbox.
Gridmap les is not suitable for GREDIA applications. The system isnot scalable and lacks the required expressiveness. In GREDIA, the P2Pwould need to be responsible for the Gridmap les, which is scarcelyfeasible. For more complex trust domains there is a security servicecalled the Community Authorization Service (CAS)  that supportsthe specication of more expressive resource access policies. CAS ispresented in the next section.
234 J.L. Vivas et al. / Computer Standards & Interfaces 32 (2010) 230245is a virtual organization domain that provides privilege managementauthorities for the VO members. Contractual relationships bet-ween different domains are often necessary which can be used forestablishing trust relationships.
Authorization decisions are typically based on authorization infor-mation such as attributes, identities, policies and context para-meters. There may be different authorities and domains for eachtype of authorization information.
Attributes and policies may be communicated during interactionsor pulled from a repository, either local or associated with the attributeauthority, and must be reliably bound to the issuing authority orthe repository. Attribute certicates must be protected for integrity,authenticity and issuer non-repudiation, which is typically done by themaking use of digital signatures, secure storage or secure communica-tion. Signed SAML and X.509 Attribute Certicates are two commonattribute certicate standards.
Authorization requests and responses must also be protected toensure secure binding of a subject and the corresponding resourcerequest as well as of the authorization response and the request.Secure channels, secure containers and signature mechanisms can bealso used here.
In  two access control points are dened where access controlfunctions are performed: Policy Decision Point (PDP) and PolicyEnforcement Point (PEP). A PDP makes authorization decisions abouta subject's access request to a service, and a PEP mediates access to aresource.
Authorization decisions are carried out according to a policy,usually stored in a repository or provided by policy authorities, whichmay be under the control of the resource owner or a topmost autho-rity responsible for a separate Privilege Management Policy. Policiesare usually expressed in a policy language and stored either in a singlerepository under the control of the PDP or another policy issuer, ordistributed in a common VO domain.
188.8.131.52.1. The GREDIA platform. Data objects are central resourcesin GREDIA applications. However, in GREDIA the owner of a dataresource, the publisher, does not store the resource locally but in the P2Poverlay. Thus it cannot directly enforce resource access. It would be
Fig. 2. Authorization pull sequence.convenient here to distinguish between two kinds of objects within anordinary data object: the raw data object, which can be an encryptedtext; and the content of the data object, which might be hidden insidethe data object by encryption. This adds some complexity to theauthorizationmodels above. Both the data server of the P2Poverlay, andthe publisher of a data object, may act as enforcements points: the P2Poverlay by enforcing access to the raw data object, the publisher byenforcing access to the contents of the data object by means ofencryption. The publisher may delegate access control entirely to theP2P data server, or store data in an encrypted form. In the latter case, theP2P overlaymay be seen as completely transparent to authorization andall stored data as public. Any intermediate model is possible here. Thepublisher and the P2P data server may apply their own access controlpolicies, or collaborate together to establish the corresponding accesspolicies.The Community Authorization System (CAS) was developed inorder to solve the shortcomings of the Gridmap les. CAS is designedto work together with GSI, and uses X.509 proxy certicates forproviding authentication, single sign-on, delegation and credentials.CAS works as a push model and allows for separation of concernsbetween site local policies and VO policies by enabling sites todelegate management of a portion of their policies to the VO. CASallows a VO to explicitly maintain and communicate its own set ofpolicies, whichmay be combinedwith local policies. In order to obtainmore consistent policies across domains, CAS provides a ne-grainedmechanism for the management of the delegated policies, andsupports the enforcement of these policies.
CAS supports also the notion of groups for users and resources,which allows the specication of roles and grants associated withthese roles. The implementation includes a CAS server that is initiatedfor a community and acts as a trusted intermediary between VO usersand resources. Resource providers typically establish trust relation-ships with the CAS server and then grant privileges to the communityusing local mechanisms, e.g. Gridmap les.
CAS is used to manage the community's trust relationships andgrant ne-grained access control to resources according to the VO'saccess control policies. It holds information about CAs, a list of theusers, server and resources within the VO, as well as policy statementsspecifying which users or groups have what permissions to accessspecic resources or resource groups. Permissions are expressed interms of an action describing the type of action allowed, and a servicetype dening the namespace in which the action is allowed. The CASserver enforces also its own set of access control policies, e.g.concerning the rights to maintain groups with the VO or to delegaterights.
CAS assumes the existence of a virtual organization and in thissense it would thus be suitable for GREDIA applications. There arecase studies that show the benets of CAS applications involving adistributed network of storage systems, e.g. the Earth System Grid(ESG)  that contains environmental data. On the other hand,Fig. 3. Authorization agent sequence.
235J.L. Vivas et al. / Computer Standards & Interfaces 32 (2010) 230245CAS was intended primarily for the scientic community, not forenterprise systems as envisaged by GREDIA.
In GREDIA, both the publisher and P2P data servers could enforceauthorization according to presented CAS credentials. The capabilitiesdenoted by the credentials should normally have been provided to theCAS by the publisher. CAS shows good scalability properties, essentialfor GREDIA applications. The main drawback is that a CAS serverconstitutes a single point of failure, unless there is some type of repli-cation, i.e. by letting CAS servers be part of the P2P overlay. Also, CASdoes not provide revocation mechanisms, which could be importantin some GREDIA applications.
Concerning inter-operability, CAS is closely tied to the GlobusToolkit and uses GSI credentials, whereas many organizations usenon-GSI credentials and standards like Web services standards orBPEL. However, some efforts have been made to integrate CAS withSAML and to use XACML for expressing policies. Thus, althoughGREDIA is oriented towards Web services and CAS may be consideredas a pre-web service technology in the Globus toolkit, CAS can still beseen as a useful component for the GREDIA platform.
The Virtual Organization Membership Service (VOMS)  wasdeveloped by the EU project 14rid  and the EU- USA project Da-taTAG  as a way of delegating authorization decisions to managersin the VO, since researchers were not satised with the functionalityof CAS and the manually generated Gridmap le. The earlier versionshad a mechanism for dynamically creating Gridmap les from LDAPdirectories containing information about users, freeing thus theresource owner from the task of creating the Gridmap le. Due toproblems of scalability, a push system with no need for Gridmap leswas devised, in which pseudo-certicates that the user shouldpresent to the resource owner were signed by the VOMS server. In itslatest versions, the VOMS server produces short-lived X.509 userattribute certicates.
VOMS and CAS are very similar, and most features concerningapplicability and inter-operability are the same. They both catermainly to the scientic community. VOMS might be useful in GREDIAfor applications requiring extensive use of roles and groups in a multi-VO setting. As in CAS, a VO is dened in VOMS as a community ofusers, institutions, and resources in the same administrative domain.Also, VOMS has a policy database for storing authorization policies. InVOMS, a user may be a member of any number of VOs. Each VO mayconsist of groups and subgroups for categorizing users according totheir tasks. A user may be endowed with any number of roles andcapabilities, according to VO or group membership. Certicatesintended to be submitted to any VOMS system are obtained from aCerticate Authority. Credentials obtained from any number of VOMSsystems may be thereafter provided to the resource.
PERMIS  is an open-source attribute-based authorization infra-structure written in Java and now part of the US National ScienceFoundation'sMiddleware Initiative (NMI). The key ideawas todevelop asystem in which the resource administrator would be able to denethe access policy and let this policy be enforced by the authorizationinfrastructure . PERMIS is an attribute-based access control (ABAC)infrastructure, integrated with the Globus Toolkit to provide authoriza-tion for grid applications using the industry standard SOAP and SAMLprotocols. PERMIS denes a distributed Privilege Management Infra-structure (PMI). Attributes are stored in X.509 attribute certicates(ACs), as well as authorization policies written in XML. Roles are basedon attributes. ACs can be stored in one or more LDAP directories.In PERMIS, managers throughout a VO can act as attribute authoritieswith a private signing key and a corresponding X.509 public keycerticate. Resource owners may state which attribute authorities totrust when setting their own access control policies and then leave theauthorization infrastructure to enforce it. A Privilege Allocator is used toconstruct and sign ACs, and to store them in LDAP directories.
PERMIS can operate in both push and pull modes. The subject
wishing to access a resource starts by contacting the PEP, which mustauthenticate it. In the push mode the user pushes X.509 ACs to theapplication gateway, whereas in the pull mode the PERMIS PEP pullsthe user's X.509 ACs from LDAP directories. PERMIS does not makeany assumptions about the authentication method employed. PERMISassumes a RBAC model where each user is mapped to a role and thepolicies are assigned to roles. After authenticating the subject in anapplication dependent way, and evaluating the subject's ACs accord-ing to the policy, rejecting untrustworthy ACs, the PERMIS PEP willcontact the PERMIS PDP and forward the valid ACs for an authoriza-tion decision. This may be done either by a Java API invocation, if thePDP is built as part of the application gateway, or as a SAML requestover SOAP and HTTP, if the PDP is built as a stand alone server. ThePERMIS PDP makes the authorization decision based on the user'sattributes obtained from the user's ACs, the authorization policy inforce, the roles currently valid for the user, the policy for the resource,the requested action, and context variables such as the time of the day.The PERMIS PEP will then enforce the decision, which is a simpleBoolean, on behalf of the resource.
In the Java API, the Constructor method is used to build the PERMISdecision engine, and take as arguments the X.509 Source of Authority,which is the root of trust for authorization, a policy identier, and a listof LDAP locations for retrieving the ACs. The GetCredsmethod fetchesthe ACs from the roles of a user, and it is passed to the PERMIS PDP. TheDecision method is used to grant or deny a given action and returns aBoolean.
The Privilege Allocator tool is normally used for attribute acqui-sition. It creates X.509 ACs and stores them in an LDAP server. Othersoftware tools that may create ACs are a user friendly graphicalAttribute Certicate Manager, and a bulk loader tool designed to allowlarge numbers of users to be automatically allocated ACs.
PERMIS allows two kinds of attribute models, a push model and apullmodel. In the attribute pullmodel, the PERMIS PDP retrieves all therequired X.509 ACs from LDAP servers, whereas in the attribute pushmodel it is the PERMIS PEP that obtains the required AC's in an ap-plication dependent way, e.g. from the subject, and then forwardsthem to the PEP.
The PERMIS policy, written in XML, supports hierarchical RBAC, inwhich roles and attributes are given access rights. Superior roles orattributes in hierarchy inherit the privileges of inferior ones. Thepolicy is created by the Source of Authority (SOA) for the resource,and stored as a digitally signed CA in an LDAP directory. Duringconstruction time the PERMIS PDP retrieves the policy and makes alldecisions internally, hence no external agent can see the policy. Only agrant/deny response is then returned to the PERMIS PEP.
PERMIS is integrated with the Globus Toolkit through the use ofSAML, and similarly to Akenti. PERMIS would be very adequate formany types of possible GREDIA applications, especially those relyingon the RBAC model. It should be noted though that the access controlAPI as well as mechanisms to allocate privileges is proprietary.
Other authorization systems such as Cardea , Akenti  andPRIMA might also be relevant for grid applications, but will not bepresented here.
3.3. Trust management
From the perspective of grids a fundamental idea in the denitionof grid is resource sharing . The rst grids were developed forpartners that need to collaborate in a specic task and they knew eachother well. In this case there was an implicit trust relationship amongthe partners. However, the grids have been lately used mainly forbusiness purposes (this is the case of the GREDIA scenarios) where thepartnersmay not know each other and even though they have to shareresources. In these cases trust mechanisms are needed.
Trust management systems can be centralized or decentralized. Incentralized systems there is a central authority that manages the
credentials and distributes them among all the components of the
236 J.L. Vivas et al. / Computer Standards & Interfaces 32 (2010) 230245system. Distributed approaches aremore appropriate for grids as gridsare distributed systems.
There are several classications of trust management systems[36,44]. For instance, Service Provision Trust describes the trust of arelying party in a service or resource provider. This is one of the typesof trust considered in these classications and it turns out to beessential in grids. But the most interesting classication of all for ourpurposes within GREDIA distinguishes between credential-basedtrust management systems and behaviour-based trust managementsystems. Depending on the way of establishing or evaluating trust oneof these methods becomes more convenient.
Concerning grids, credential-based trust management systems arethe most widely used. This type of trust is present in the inclusion ofcertication authorities for the authentication mechanisms thatguarantee that the nodes of the grid belong to the trusted organizationthat participates in the computation. But as the scope of grids isgrowing and they are evolving to ubiquitous or pervasive computing,there is a need to keep the reputation of the node once it has beenallowed to enter the grid. Thus, behaviour-based trust managementsystems become also crucial for grids.
3.3.1. Trust management for gridsProviding trust for grid architectures has been a hard problem to
tackle and there are no many trust or reputation systems for thesesystems. Some efforts have been directed to provide trust usingsecurity mechanisms. Trust and security within grid environments arefocused on the need to provide scalable and dynamic VO. The workpresented in  considers a way to enhance security in GSI by usingtwo level trust models. On one hand, they dene a distributed trustmodel for the VO and, in the other hand a centralized model for eachdomain in the grid.
Since grid architectures are evolving to P2P systems and businessusage, some works have used reputation systems for grids. Some ofthese systems are GridEigenTrust  and PathTrust . Grid-EigenTrust is an extension of EigenTrust for using it in grids. Gridsinclude virtual organizations and this provides an obvious classica-tion of resources, users, and their reputation that is needed in orderto establish scalability. They introduced an implicit hierarchy ofentities that belong to organizations, and organizations that formvirtual organizations. Thus, the authors assign reputation valuesrst in the lowest level and go up in the hierarchy until they nallycompute reputation of a virtual organization. The trust of a virtualorganizationwill be computed based on the trust of its organizationsand the trust of the organization will be computed using the trust ofits entities.
PathTrust is a reputation system developed for member selectionin the formation phase of the virtual organization. The PathTrustalgorithm arranges the participants in a graph such that each edge inthe graph is weighted with trust between the nodes at the end ofthe edge. Trust is computed by accounting the number of positivefeedbacks and subtracting the number of negative feedbacksweightedby the total of positive and negative feedbacks obtained. Otherapproaches deal with trust in virtual organizations. In particular, theauthors present a trust-based access control model for virtualorganizations. This model is based on the Shibboleth technology.Trust relationships are established between three different parties inthe VO (users, groups and vroom; a Shibboleth Identity Provider and aShibboleth Service Provider). Depending on the trust relationshipsbetween parties the algorithm determines the access permissions.
4. GREDIA security framework
4.1. GREDIA architecture
As we have mentioned above GREDIA aims to enable commercial
users to manipulate data and access services in a grid computingenvironment. Several components have been identied within theGREDIA architecture  (see Fig. 4). These components are thefollowing:
The Framework for Intelligent Virtual Organizations (FiVO): Thissystem enables participating users to join virtual organizations byagreeing to and signing virtual organization contracts. Thesecontracts specify the duties and permissions of each VO participantas well as the resources which can be used by that group ofparticipants. A suitable interface will be developed for creating andmodifying the contents of VOs.
The Application Development Platform (Appea): The core system ofGREDIA, this is a platform which enables specialized users (whomwe call Application Scenario Developers) to prepare applicationscenarios that can be executed in the GREDIA architecture. This isdone by writing application scripts, which can make use of gridservices and data sources (present in the infrastructure) as well ascall upon actors who are registered with the VO framework toperform certain tasks related to the business processes which theymodel. Appea provides an integrated, powerful environment formanipulation of Grid Objects (i.e. services), data sources and actorswhile freeing the scenario developers from details related tointerfacing and invoking the actual underlying software modules.
The Grid Run Time Service Discovery Tool (GRSD): This component isused to support the identication of services that can full functional,non-functional and contextual characteristics of the applicationscenarios. More specically, the runtime service discovery toolidenties services that can replace services participating in theapplication scenarios that become unavailable, fail functional orquality service requirements, or should not be used due to changes inthe context of the services or the context of the application scenarios.The services are identied based on synchronous and asynchronousqueries specied by the Appea Runtime System.
The Rich Data Location Service (RDLS): A peer-to-peer framework forstoring and accessing annotatedmultimedia content in a distributedenvironment. This component will enable users of the system toupload and download multimedia les using P2P algorithms, as wellas query for the types of les which might interest them in theirwork. Suitable metadata descriptions will accompany each le, thusfacilitating query processing.
The user portal and clients: In order to access the functionality ofGREDIA, as provided by Appea, RDLS and other client-orientedmodules of the system, a user portal is being developed, capable ofinterfacing with lower layers of the GREDIA infrastructure, handlinginteractivity and executing application scenarios. For this portal, twotypes of clients are envisioned a client for stationary PCs and amobile client, tailored for mobile devices.
Mobile Proxy: Services which are deployed on and exposed frommobile services will be accessible through the use of a specialstationary Mobile Proxy. This proxy will keep track of mobile clientsand will be capable of contacting them in an asynchronous way. Inessence, the Mobile Proxy will represent mobile services to othercomponents of the GREDIA infrastructure.
Security should be provided for each of these components. Thesecurity framework is a horizontal component of the whole GREDIAplatform and should be embedded in each of them in such a way thatit is done as part of their deployment. We will show how this is donein the following sections.
4.2. GREDIA workows security
The GREDIA platform is intended for workow-based gridapplications. Workows may be described as executable businessprocesses. Being the focal point in the GREDIA architecture, it is
important that its security aspects are considered in detail.
237J.L. Vivas et al. / Computer Standards & Interfaces 32 (2010) 230245The concept of workow or business process is of paramountimportance in modern information technology. Business processeshave been usually considered as the starting point for systemdevelopment, providing a simplied view of business structure andthe system requirements necessary to support the business. Today wemay consider them also as the result of the system developmentprocess, as a type of executable code. As a result, business processsecurity has become a crucial aspect of modern informationtechnology, and many systems will only be deployed only if enoughassurances are given regarding their security properties.
Moreover, business process can be protably used in the require-ments phase of a system development, and might serve as the linkbetween this phase which is not part of the GREDIA framework end the implementation phase of a GREDIA application. Businessprocess models offer also a good opportunity to the early introductionof security aspects in system development, which is one of theobjectives of the GREDIA project. For instance, UML activity diagramsenriched with security information could be mapped to GREDIAworkows. As it is widely recognized, there is little systematic supportfor software engineers to design secure systems, and the specicationof security policies is typically not integrated with general softwaredevelopment. Security is usually added as an afterthought to systemrequirements and design.
Modelling business surroundings involves answering the follow-ing questions:
(i) how do different actors interact;
Fig. 4. GREDIA architec(ii) what activities are part of their work;(iii) what are the ultimate goals of their work;(iv) what other people, systems or resources are involved that do
not show up as actors to this specic system; and(v) what rules govern their activities and structures.
The answers to thesequestions are important for the security aspectsof a system. These questions can be included in business processrepresentations but, except point (ii), not in workow notations. Wepropose thus that they be represented in a suitable ontology languageattached to GREDIA workows.
A workow or business process may be dened as a set of coor-dinated activities or tasks that achieves a business objective . A taskis a logic step or description of a piece of work that contributestowards the accomplishment of a process, and may be carried out byany processing entity, either human or automated. Tasks are relatedto each other through task dependencies expressing concurrency,serialization, exclusion, alternation, etc. A workow managementsystem (WFMS) supports the execution, monitoring, coordination andadministration of workow processes. Workows may also involvemany elements in the business surroundings which are relevant forsecurity. These include agents performing the tasks, either people orprocesses, roles representing rights and artifacts such as procedures,information, information ows and material. Security requirementsmay concern any of these entities.
Role-Based Access Control is very common in workow authoriza-tion models, and will be adopted in GREDIA. Organizational
238 J.L. Vivas et al. / Computer Standards & Interfaces 32 (2010) 230245workows can be very large, with several thousands users. Thecomplexity of access control is reduced by using RBAC since thenumber of roles is signicantly smaller than the number of users.Typically, in RBAC roles are assigned to users based on theirqualications, and tasks in turn are assigned to roles.
We concentrate here only on the security aspects and require-ments which are specically related to workow, e.g. separation ofduties, object access authorization, inter-workow security andsecurity sub-processes.
Object access control implies that authorized users should gain accesson required objects according to granted privileges and usually onlyduring the execution of a specied task. Authorizationmechanismsmustensure that the various tasks of a workow are executed by authorizedusers. Hence, granting and revoking privileges should be synchronizedwith the progression of the workow from task to task. We intendto introduce a suitable formalism capable of specifying authorizationsallowing access control only during the execution of a task.
Separation of duties means that a person responsible for adetermined task in a workow may not be responsible for anotherspecic task in the workow. If there is no support for constraintswithin a workow management system, these must be implementedas application code or within the tasks themselves, which is veryawkward. We aim at introducing a formalism for the specication ofseparation of duties to be used by the workow management system.
Inter-workow security focuses on the security of the communica-tions of workows which might be located in different administrationdomains. Important security issues here are audit, authentication,secure key exchanges and the management of distributed securityproles, all of which must be provided by the security framework.
Security sub-processes  is a much neglected aspect of work-ows. Workows usually concentrate on modelling the functionalityof a system, disregarding security considerations, a fact which oftenleads to serious security vulnerabilities since security is thus left to beintegrated into an application at a later stage of software developmentand in an ad-hocmanner. Many proposals have thus been presented toexpress security semantics within business processes and workows.Security sub-processes specify a sequence of steps that is necessary toinsert into a process for security reasons, for instance for authentica-tion or verication of authenticity of signatures during contractsigning. This sequence of steps constitutes a workow in itself, can bereused, and also viewed as a security pattern that can be inserted intoa workow whenever required by the security requirements asso-ciated with the workow.
Although several methodologies have already been proposed todeal with workow security, none of them are adequate for real worldapplications, and current commercial workowmanagement systemsdo not provide designers with support for the easy integration ofsecurity goals within workows. The GREDIA project offers a uniqueopportunity to develop and test new techniques andmethodologies inthis eld. The focus should be on the establishment of securitypatterns at the workow level and of clear security ontology with thehelp of a high-level modelling language that is at least inter-operablewith the ontology languages used in the GREDIA component FiVO andservice descriptions.
The most critical components for adding security features toGREDIA workow specication and management systems are:
Execution Service: the Execution Service should be able, wheneverrequired, to authenticate application users execute application scenarios according to the security constraintsassociated with them
maintain state information necessary to enforce related securityconstraints
present the required credentials to invoke operations on other
services within the framework present the required credentials to perform queries and retrievedata from the Rich Location Service
Developer GUI: the environment of the application scenario devel-oper should give support for the specication of security features inthe design of application scenarios; the script language should beextended with the capability to express security requirements andconstraints.
Scenario Repository: Each scenario application should containinformation regarding security requirements and constraints.
Invoker: the Invoker should be able to take security constraints intoconsideration when mapping invocations of generic services ontoinvocation on concrete implementations of these services.
Data Access Client: the Data Access Client should be able to presentthe required credentials to perform queries and retrieve datafrom the Rich Location Service and other standalone database andexternal repositories.
Service Registry: The Service Registry should provide means toinclude security semantics in both technology-independent andtechnology-specic resource descriptions. The developer should beable to take security goals and requirements into considerationwhen browsing registry data and searching for information aboutconcrete services. Registry data should include security features.
RSM Registry: It should be possible to integrate security semanticswithin the overall service semantic information.
4.3. Virtual organization security
Fundamental to grid computing is the notion of scalable virtualorganization (VO) , which may be dened as a dynamic set ofindividuals and/or institutions that share resources and servicesaccording to a set of well-dened rules and policies. The grid vision isto provideunlimitedpower and information access to endusers throughthecreationof dynamicVOs for secure andagile resource sharingamongindividuals and organizations. VOs may span several administrativedomains, each one with its own security requirements and policies.Hence, inter-operability among the multiple domains involved in a VOrequires that VO-dened policies comply with domain-level policies,while at the same time maintaining a clear separation among virtualand real protection domains in a context in which they may superposeand intersect each other in a variety of ways.
The virtual organization of GREDIA is called FiVO (Framework forIntelligent Virtual Organizations). As we mention earlier.
Trust and security are especially important in the deployment ofthe VOs, more specically authorization, delegation and authentica-tion. Each virtual organization usually goes through several phases:
Creation1. Identication of market opportunity2. Partners identication3. Contract negotiation4. VO deployment
Operation/Evolution Dissolution. Provenance of obtained results.
Within the creation phase perhaps themost interesting stage is thecontract negotiation. At this point the policies and agreements amongpartners are specied. This means that knowledge of the domain isessential. This knowledge is encoded in the form of ontologies.
Regarding to authorization, GREDIA will use PERMIS as the autho-rization service. Therefore, including the specications of PERMISwithinthe ontologies used by the denition of the FiVO is of vital importance.
During the creation phase of the VO trust plays an important role inthe partner's identication and contract negotiation phase as part ofthe decision-making process. These decisions could be based on theinformation acquired from previous interactions with the participants
of the VO, i.e., on the reputation of these partners.
239J.L. Vivas et al. / Computer Standards & Interfaces 32 (2010) 2302454.4. Security in service discovery and service description
TheWeb Service Discovery process should address both the securitysemanticsof servicedescriptionsaswell as the general securityand trustrequirements associated with service discovery . However, securityproblems are usually not addressed during the service discovery itself.Security is also commonly associated with the services but not withthe clients.
4.4.1. Semantics of service descriptionsWith respect to the security semantics of service descriptions,
ontology-based descriptions may be conveniently used. However,current Web services discovery solutions like UDDI , WS-Discovery  and OWL-S  do not address most security andtrust issues.  discusses how WS-Discovery can be extended tocover condentiality and privacy in service discovery.
WS-Policy  provides a general purpose model and syntax todescribe and communicate the policies of a Web service. The WebServices Security Policy Language (WS-SecurityPolicy)  denes a setof security policy assertions which apply to Web Services Security.Furthermore, WS-PolicyAttachment  denes several methods forassociating the WS-Policy expressions with Web services. WS-Secur-ityPolicy is designed to work with the general Web services frameworkincludingWSDL service description, UDDI, and SOAPmessage structure.
4.4.2. Security and trust in service discoveryIn a centralized discovery approach there is a registry playing the
role of a yellow pagewhichmust be considered as a trusted third partyby both clients and services. In a decentralized discovery approach, onthe other hand, service discovery relies on peer-to-peer advertise-ments and direct exchanges between clients and services.
Possible threats in service discovery include denial of service andman-in-the-middle attacks. The registry may also become unavailableby ooding registration messages. Service lookup queries may alsoreveal the intentions of a client and thus have an impact on privacyrequirements. Masquerading attacks in which a malicious agent fakesthe identity of the registry, as well as replay attacks, may also exposeimportant condential information. Messages to a registry, both clientrequests and registration messages, may also be modied or dropped.Moreover, services may be registered, deregistered and discovered byunauthorized parties.
Possible countermeasures to these threats include the use ofsigned certicates to authenticate both servers and clients, black-listing of untrusted parties, setting up secure channels, use of messageauthentication with signature or authentication codes, redundancymechanisms to guarantee message delivery, adding signed sequencenumbers to registration messages, registry authentication, signatureof registration requests, use of restrictive policies obstructing servicediscovery by unauthorized parties, and so on.
The registry may act as a kind of early authorization decision pointby restricting the clients that will be able to contact a service andhiding the service prole from unauthorized users. Discoverymessages may include certicate, key or token credentials authenti-cating the client .
In decentralized solutions, where a trusted third party is absent, asimilar level of protectionmay be enforced by using encryption schemessuch as attribute-based encryption [62,66] or policy based encryption. In these schemes, the user may encrypt messages according to apolicy, and only users with the appropriate credentials will be able todecrypt them. In , attribute-based encryption is used to protectsensitive information included in the discovery messages.
In  a solution to secure service discovery was proposed. In thissolution an entity provides a Service Discovery Service playing the roleof a secure information repository or registry. Another early worktargeting the security aspects of service discovery can be found in .
Both works focus only on the condentiality of the messages duringthe discovery process. Service discovery security requirements andthreats to service-oriented architectures using registry supportedservice discovery were presented in . Finally, a work addressingprivacy protection aspects of the discovery service was presented in.
4.5. Security in peer-to-peer service architecture distribution
Peer-to-peer architectures are characterized by their ability tofunction in the presence of a highly transient set of nodes, network,and computer failures without the need of a central server . Insta-bility and transient connectivity is thus the norm.
Ensuring content security in distributed peer-to-peer environ-ments is challenging. The owners of data resources may send theirdata to data servers for further distribution according to the securitypolicies associated with the data. The advantage of this scheme is thatspace requirements are removed from the data owners, making thisapproach specially appropriate to devices with limited storagecapacity, as sensors, Smartphones, PDAs, etc. On the other hand, thisfeature also separates enforcement of access control policies from thestorage of data and removes from the owner of the data resource thecapacity to enforce access. Typically, authorization systems assumethat the resource owner has the capability to enforce access controldecisions, whereas access control decisions may be taken separatelyby both, the resource owner and the virtual organization according tospecic policies. The latter still holds true for peer-to-peer contentdistributions systems, but the PEP is now controlled by the virtualorganization. In this case, we may say that it is the VO that owns theresource. The security concerns that arise from this situation may besolved either by assuming that data servers are trusted, or by usingcryptographic methods allowing the original resource owner todecide who will be able to read the data.
In an open environment, the rst solution might be inappropriate.However, in virtual organizations, where the participants are boundby a contract, these solutions might be adequate by imposing a trustmodel where data servers are given a trust level corresponding totheir functionality.
Harrison and Jensen  propose a cryptographic access controlscheme that relies exclusively on cryptography and that provides bothdata integrity and condentiality. Files are stored in an encrypted formand access control is enforced by distributing the correspondingsymmetric keys.
4.5.1. Publish/subscribe systemsSecurity for published and stored content relies on cryptographic
algorithms and protocols. Secure storage, secure routing, availability,privacy, condentiality, integrity, authentication and access controlare security goals that represent particular challenges in peer-to-peercontent distribution architectures .
In a publish/subscribe system typically, a publisher publishes anitem through a broker, which is responsible for dispatching this eventto subscribers which have subscribed previously with the broker tothis specic kind of event and have been authorized to receive it.
Availability and condentiality requirements in the context ofthese systems typically imply that events are made available toauthorized subscribers and only to authorized subscribers respec-tively. Thus, key management plays a crucial role here, as well asefcient cryptographic methods.
4.5.2. Secure storageSelf-certifying data can be used to ensure integrity. This is done
by calculating a cryptographic hash to produce a le key, cf. the CFSsystem  and PAST , based on signed les and use a hash-derived signature as the le's access key.
Information dispersal algorithms, rst considered by , are also
used for secure and reliable content storage. A le is split into n pieces
240 J.L. Vivas et al. / Computer Standards & Interfaces 32 (2010) 230245in such a way that it can be reconstructed by any m pieces, wheremn. Systems that use this method are Mnemosyne , Publius, and FreeHaven .
Secret sharing, e.g. Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme, is also used byseveral systems (Publius , PAST . MojoNation ). A le isencrypted with a key which is split into n shares such that any mshares, such that mn, but no m1 shares, can reproduce the key.
Anonymity may be provided by Anonymous Cryptographic Relays,a mechanism used in PAST  in which a publisher sends via ananonymous connection encrypted shares of a le to several selectedforwarders, which thereafter forward the shares to other selectednodes acting as storers for the shares. The contents may thereafterretrieved by clients by contacting the forwarders, which will thencontact the corresponding storers which decrypt the shares and sendthem back to the client.
In Distributed Stenographic File Systems , employed in Mnemo-syne , blocks together with random data are encrypted and thenplaced at pseudo-randomlychosen locations,making themundetectable.
Erasure Coding is amechanism implemented by OceanStore  inwhich data is broken into blocks and spread over many servers, in away that only a fraction is needed to reconstruct the original block.
4.5.3. Authentication and authorizationIn peer-to-peer systems with highly transient nodes that employ
content replication or fragmentations schemes, a particular securitythreat in the presence of several identities for the same physical entityis posed by the Sybil Attack . The only effective countermeasurehere is the presence of a central identication authority. Identicationchallenges may also be employed but are much more resourcedemanding and assumes that the resources of the attacker are limited.
In the absence of authentication, distribution of keys to a set ofprivileged users may be used for allowing content access. Accesscontrol can be enforced by the use of access control lists (ACLs) thatare assigned to objects by their original authors through the use ofsigned certicates, as in OceanStore . ACL entries may also extendprivileges by describing the privilege granted to users. All contentmodication is veried against the ACL assigned to the object.
4.5.4. AnonymityAnonymity requirements may refer to the content publisher, the
identity of the storing node, content identity ormetadata and retrievalquery details.
An approach to the provision of anonymity is the dissociation ofcontent source and requestor, as implemented in Freenet . Itemploys a mechanism to make it unfeasible to track the true origin ordestination of a le whereby a le is passed from the node that holds itto the originator of a request through each node that forwarded therequest, and by allowing any node along this path to claim being thesource of the data.
Another approach is by the use of infrastructure for providinganonymous connection layers, e.g. onion routing , mix records[14,8], or Freedom anonymity system . Serjantov  uses a schemeinwhich documents are split into encrypted shares stored in nodes thatare selected by an anonymizing layer of nodes called forwarders thatconstruct onions around those nodes and anonymously forward theshares together with their anonymous return addresses. A similarsystem is FreeHaven . The Tarzan system , on the other hand, is adecentralized anonymizing network layer infrastructure that allows aclient to communicate with a server anonymously to other entities bybuilding anonymous IP tunnels between an open-ended set of peers.
4.5.5. EncryptionMultimedia security focuses on protecting video, audio and
image data. This is made possible by allowing safe communicationor by protecting the multimedia against piracy, for example, using
watermarks.When the multimedia data is static (i.e. it does not need real-timestreaming) it can be treated as binary data and can be encrypted usingconventional algorithms such as DES or AES.
Nevertheless, the multimedia encryption has to face, on the onehand, the excessively large quantity of information  and on theother, the need for the multimedia data to be processed in real-time(the speed for MPEG-2 can be greater than 40 Mbps). When the videoand audio data need a high transfer speed, for example real-timestreaming, the previous solution is not suitable. Conventionalcryptosystems are too slow to process multimedia data, and thereforethe security of many multimedia applications in real-time cannot beensured. As a result, selective encryption  is necessary where onlysome portions of the bitstream are encrypted. These portions will beselected according to the data compression format. How the multi-media encryption algorithms access the data depends on thecompression format, for example, in the case of the MPEG videoformat, headers, frames, vectors of movement, etc. are encryptedusing algorithms such as DES or AES.
To improve multimedia encryption algorithms, mechanisms couldbe applied to increase the speed of encryption although this would bedetrimental to the security. Given that the multimedia data does notgenerally need high levels of condentiality, this would be a goodsolution for journalistic information, since its monetary value is not sohigh as to make it attractive to attacks, and a lightweight encryption(degradation) would be sufcient. On the other hand, informationrelated to industrial, governmental or military secrets needs a highlevel of security, so highly secure encryption algorithms would beapplied to the detriment of the encryption speed. Therefore, thesealgorithms should be implemented according to the different securitylevels, both in the grid by means of GSI extensions, and in securitylibraries for wireless connections.
There is awide spectrum of multimedia applications with differentsecurity requirements available, ranging from military applicationsthat need a high level of security to applications needing to see thedata in order to view and search a database. The characteristics thatthese algorithms must fulll are :
They should provide sufcient security for every application. They should substantially reduce the computational cost withrespect to total encryption.
They should produce a bitstream compatible with the standardformats.
4.6. Security for mobile applications
Mobile devices have limited capabilities, which must be taken intoconsideration when their security mechanisms are designed. Fordevices with limited computational capacity, for instance, public keycryptography would not be a good option. It should also be pointedout that these are personal devices and, therefore, users taken themwith themselves everywhere, considerably increasing the risk of theftor loss, with the resulting security risk.
Mobile devices exhibit some security problems due to their features:
The physical weaknesses and limitations of wireless communica-tions, e.g. high error rate, have an impact not only on features suchas performance, but also security.
The completely exposed environment associated with wireless airradio devices provides much more opportunities for maliciousattacks and is more prone to accidental interferences.
The suggested security architecture for mobile devices is anattempt to improve some of their exhibited weaknesses. It is endowedwith, among other features, a pseudorandom number generator(PRNG), support for secure storage, client authentication with certi-
cates, and code signing. Furthermore, this architecture adds new
security services to mobile devices. Its API provides a set of securityfunctions for mobile devices which will facilitate the integration ofsecurity aspects within mobile applications.
This architecture is build up of several layers (Fig. 5):
Application security: This layer provides a high-level security APIfor wireless application programmers.
Security services: Security services use protocols, policies andhigh-level security functionalities in order to provide protection toresources.
Security management: The security management layer providesthe maintenance of the security elements. The maintenance of anelement involves tasks such as creation, deletion, modication, etc.
Security utilities: This layer provides very specic functionalities,which require a special treatment.
Security data: This layer provides storage capacities to securitydata.
The integration of mobile devices into the grid raises someproblems [Isa05]. Although the connection does not require modica-tions in the existing infrastructure, it might undermine the operationof the grid due to the high level of error that these devices present.
In order to avoid it, mobile devices could access the grid via aproxy, which would be responsible for interacting with the gridon behalf of the device that it represents. In this way, the mobile
In this gure we include three different areas: the mobile side, theproxy, and the whole grid.
The modules on the gure contain one or two different blocks.Lighter colours mean existing GSI functionalities, whereas dark blocksmean extended GSI functionalities.
The extended GSI architecture contains four layers:
Security services: Security services use of protocols, policies andhigh-level security functionalities in order to provide protection toresources.
Security management: The security management layer providesthe security elements maintenance. The maintenance of anelement involves tasks such as creation, deletion, modication, etc.
Security utilities: This layer provides very specic functionalities,which require a special treatment.
Security data: This layer provides storage capabilities to securitydata.
Next we will explain in more detail the elements included in theselayers.
Condentiality is provided by GSI at two levels: the transport leveland the message level. The GSI Transport provides transport-levelsecurity by using TLS, and it is used by default in GT4. The message-level security is based on the WS-Security and WS-SecureConversa-tion specications. Both security levels lack multimedia encryption
241J.L. Vivas et al. / Computer Standards & Interfaces 32 (2010) 230245device could delegate functions involving a high computational costto the proxy. On the other hand, the proxy is not only a potentialperformance bottleneck, but it represents a man-in-the-middlewhich has implications for the privacy of the communication.Though the data are encrypted, any person with access to theproxymight see the data in cleartext, and this would be unacceptablefor applications that need a high degree of security, such as bankingand military applications. To avoid this, a trusted proxy could beestablished.
5. The integrated security architecture
In the following, we will present the integrated security frame-work. Fig. 6 shows this framework and also what extensions of GSI areneeded.Fig. 5. Security architecturalgorithms. Thus, multimedia encryption algorithms, and protocols toexchange the related encryption information such as keys, algorithmnames, etc., must be implemented. Data encryption algorithms suchas AES or DES, which will be used in multimedia encryptionalgorithms, will be provided by third-party libraries (e.g. BouncyCas-tle libraries).
The Authentication method of GSI is based on PKI. All users andhosts have their identity certicates in X.509 format. Nevertheless,the mobile client authentication is not implemented in SSL of JavaMIDP2. An application-level mobile client authentication protocolusing identity certicates will be implemented. Fig. 7 shows thesuggested protocol.
The mobile client sends its X.509 identity certicate to the proxyserver. But the certicate does not prove the mobile client identity(certicates do not need to be kept secret, thus anybody could havee for mobile devices.
242 J.L. Vivas et al. / Computer Standards & Interfaces 32 (2010) 230245the mobile client certicate). Thus, signed data is also sent to theproxy server. The mobile client uses his private key which is onlyknown by itself to sign data, and when the proxy server receives theauthentication response it veries the signature with the public keyincluded in the X.509 identity certicate. In this way, the mobile clientproves its identity to the proxy. Furthermore, the proxy server veries
Fig. 7. Mobile client
Fig. 6. Grid securitthe identity supplied by the mobile client by using identity certicateX.509 searching in an access control list.
GSI provides functions to calculate and verify the message integrity-signed messages. These functions work within the GSI environmentbecause they use GSS security context arguments (GSI implementsGSSAPI interface). But these functions are not suitable outside the
243J.L. Vivas et al. / Computer Standards & Interfaces 32 (2010) 230245GSI; therefore the mobile client signature verication, explained inlast paragraph, could fail. Extended GSI integrity functions will beneeded in order to implement the mobile client authenticationprotocol.
Trust is not providedbyGSI. Thus, a trust frameworkmight beneeded.Furthermore, a protocol between the mobile and the proxy might beimplemented in order to integrate mobile devices to this framework.
GSI provides functionality to manage identity components, suchas X.509 identity credentials or proxy credentials. Nevertheless,extended GSI have to be able to handle access control lists used bythe extended authentication service, and identity information used bythe trust framework.
The authorization mechanisms included in GSI allow simpleauthorization scenarios. The Gridmap Authorization, provided byGSI, is based on the Gridmap le, which contains a list of dis-tinguished names that are allowed access to a service. For morecomplex authorization scenarios, Globus Toolkit provides an infra-structure to deploy other authorization mechanisms. An authoriza-tion model, such as Open PMI, could be improved and deployed forthe grid. The authorization data exchange protocol between themobile device and the proxy will be implemented. This protocol willprovide a way to integrate mobile security into the authorizationmechanisms.
Privilege management is provided by Globus Toolkit for mana-ging Gridmap authorization les, which is basically an access con-trol list. The new authorization mechanisms integrated in the gridwill need to operate with attribute certicates (which associatea subject to several attributes or privileges), and with informationrelated to privileges, such as privilege delegation. These new autho-rization mechanisms can be fully integrated into the grid. Moreover,the trust management system will use the information provided bythe privilege management in order to derive the trust values of theusers.
The grid auditing infrastructure will provide grid users withmechanisms to dene auditing policies. Extended GSI will provideclasses to achieve these tasks andwill integrate the new infrastructureinto the GSI.
GSI offers secure storage, i.e., a mechanisms to prevent users tosteal private data from other users. The les containing private dataare encrypted using a password, and the data is recovered entering thepassword to decrypt the encrypted data. GSI uses this mechanism tostore private keys. The extended GSI must implement classes to storesecurity information in a safe mode. This type of information includesattribute certicates used by the authorization service, access controllists, etc.
Sometimes it is not necessary to store data in a safe mode. Forexample, GSI stores the private key of the proxy in a local storagesystem without being encrypted. Extended GSI must implement newclasses to be able to deal with this type of storage, such as log les usedby the auditing service, access control lists, and conguration les.
Credential delegation and single sign-on are dealt with by the GSIwith the aid of proxy certicates. It is thus not necessary to extend anyfunctionality of these services.
6. Future work and conclusions
This paper introduces the security framework that will bedeveloped for the grid platform in the GREDIA project. We havefollowed the OGSA standards, and in order to design the securityframework we have used the GSI, Grid Security Infrastructure. GSIalready contains some of the most important security services thatare needed for ensuring security in grid environments, but othersmust be implemented by the developers. In particular, we have paidspecial attention to authorization. Thus, we have mentioned themost important existing authorization models and have indicated
which of these are most useful for the GREDIA framework. Webelieve that PERMIS and VOMS are the most suitable models in thiscontext.
Aspects that are not included in the GSI but are needed in GREDIAinclude encryption and a security framework for mobile applications.We have highlighted the most important security features that needto be added to Application Development Platform, the core of theapplication execution of the GREDIA platform.
In the future work we intend to integrate PERMIS and VOMSwithin the GREDIA platform.We also intend to develop the encryptionalgorithms required by the multimedia les that will be used in themedia application pilot of GREDIA.
Thiswork has beenpartially supported by the EuropeanCommissionby the research project GREDIA (IST-FP6-034363) and the SpanishMinistry of Science and Education through the research project CRISIS(TIN2006-09242).
 R. Aleri, R. Cecchini, V. Ciaschini, L. dellAgnello, A. Frohner, A. Gianoli, K. Lorentey,F. Spataro. VOMS: An authorization system for virtual organizations. Proceedingsof the 1st European Across Grids Conference, Santiago de Compostela, Feb. 2003.
 R. Anderson, R. Needham, A. Shamir, The steganographic le system, Proceedingsof the Second International in Information Hiding, Portland, Oregon, USA, April1417, 1998, LNCS, vol. 1525, Springer.-Verlag, 1998, pp. 7382.
 S. Androutsellis-Theotokis, D. Spinellis, A survey of peer-to-peer content distributiontechnologies, ACM Computing Surveys, vol. 36, 4, December 2004, pp. 335371.
 V. Atluri. Security for Workow Systems, Information Security Technical Report,Elsevier Science, vol. 6, 2, 2001, pp. 5968.
 W. Bagga and R. Molva, Policy-based cryptography and applications, in 9thInternational Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC'2005),28 February03 March 2005, Roseau, The Commonwealth of Dominica.
 S. Bajaj, et al., Web Services Policy 1.2 Framework (WS-Policy) W3C MemberSubmission, 2006.
 Web Services Policy 1.2 Attachment (WS-PolicyAttachment), W3C MemberSubmission, 2006.
 O. Berthold, H. Federrath, and S. Kpsell, WebMixes: A system for Anonymous andUnobservable Internet Access. In Proceedings of Designing Privacy.
 B. Bhargava, C. Shi, S.Y. Wang, MPEG video encryption algorithms, MultimediaTools and Applications, vol. 24, 2004.
 S. Boeyen, et al., Liberty trust models guidelines, in: J. Linn (Ed.), Liberty AllianceProject, Liberty Alliance, draft version 1.0, 2003.
 A. Bullock and S. Benford. An Access Control Framework for Multi-userCollaborative Environments. In ACM GROUP. Phoenix, AZ. 1999.
 D.W. Chadwick, A. Otenko, E. Ball. Role-Based Access Control with 470 X.509Attribute Certicates. IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 7, No 2, March-April 2003.
 D. Chadwick. Authorization in Grid Computing. Information Security TechnicalReport, Elsevier, 10(1)33:40, 2005.
 D. Chaum, Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses and Pseudonyms. Com.ACM 24, 8488.
 I. Clarke, O. Sandberg, B. Wiley, Freenet: a distributed anonymous informationstorage and retrieval system, Proceedings of the Workshop on Design Issues inAnonymity and Unobservability. Berkeley, CA, July 2000.
 M. Covington, W. Long, S. Srinivasan, A. Dey, M. Ahamad, G.D. Abowd. Securingcontext-aware applications using environment roles. In ACM Symposium on AccessControl Model and Technology. Chantilly, VA. 2001.
 S.E. Czerwinski, et al., An architecture for a secure service discovery service,Proceedings of MobiCom '99, Seattle, WA, August 1999.
 GREDIA Integrated Architecture. www.gredia.eu. F. Dabek, M. Kaashoek, D. Karger, R. Morris, I. Stoica,Wide-area cooperative storage
with CFS, Proceedings of the ACM (SOSP'01) Conference, Banff, Canada, 2001. http://eu-datagrid.web.cern.ch/eu-datagrid/. http://datatag.web.cern.ch/datatag/. R. Dingledine, M. Freedman, D. Molnar, The FreeHaven project: distributed anony-
mous storage service, Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobserva-bility, 2000, pp. 6795.
 J. Douceur, The Sybil attack, Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop onPeer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS'02), MIT Faculty Club, Cambridge, MA, 2002.
 P. Druschel and A. Rowstron, Past: A Large-Scale, Persistent Peer-to-Peer StorageUtility. In Proceedings of the Eight Workshop on Hot Topics in Operative Systems.
 www.earthsystemgrid.org. I. Foster, J. Geisler, W. Nickless, W. Smith, S. Tuecke, Software infrastructure for
the I-WAYmetacomputing experiment, Concurrency: Practice & Experience 10 (7)(1998) 567581.
 I. Foster, C. Kesselman, S. Tuecke, The anatomy of the grid: enabling scalable virtualorganizations, International Journal of High Performance Computing Applications
15 (3) (2001) 200222.
 S. Rhea, C. Wells, e(2001) 4049.
 A. Sahai, B. WaterEurocrypt'05, LNCS
 R. Sandhu, P. Samartions 32 (9) (1994)
 R. Sandhu, E.J. Coymodels, IEEE Comp
 A. Serjantov, AnonyInternational WorkCambridge, MA, 20
 http://www.shibbo F. Siebenlist, V. Welc
Nadalin. OGSA Security Roadmap, Global Grid Forum, Document 5, Open Grid
 J. Treadwell, Open gogf.org/documents/
 R. Thomas, R. Sandactive and enterprisStatus and Prospects
 R. Thomas. Team-Workshop on Role-B
 M.R. Thompson, A.a PKI Environment.Volume 6, Issue 4 (
 S. Trabelsi, J.C. Pazzchallenges of ubiqServices (ECOWS 2
244 J.L. Vivas et al. / Computer Standards & Interfaces 32 (2010) 230245 I. Foster, C. Kesselman, J. Nick, S. Tuecke, The physiology of the grid, Global GridForum, 2002.
 M. Freedman, E. Sit, J. Cates, and R. Morris, Introducing Tarzan: A Peer to PeerAnonymizing Network Layer. In Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop onPeer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS'02).
 The Freedom anonymity system. Web site http://www.fredom.net. B. Furht, D. Socek, A.M. Eskicioglu, Fundamentals of multimedia encryption
techniques, in: B. Furht, D. Kirovski (Eds.), Multimedia Security Handbook, CRCPress LLC, Boca Raton, Florida, 2004.
 http://www.globus.org/. C.K. Georgiadus, I. Mavridis, G. Pangalos, R. Thomas. Flexible Team-Based Access
Control Using Contexts. In ACM Symposium on Access Control Model and Technology.Chantilly, VA. 2001.
 http://www.ggf.org. https://forge.gridforum.org/sf/projects/ogsa-authz/. T. Grandison, M. Sloman, A survey of trust in Internet applications, IEEE Commu-
nications Surveys, 2000. D. Goldschlag, M. Reed, P. Stevenson, Onion routing for anonymous and private
Internet connections, Comm. ACM 42 (2) (1999) 3941. www.Gridalliance.org. S. Hand, T. Roscoe, Mnemosyne: peer-to-peer steganographic storage, Proceedings
of the 1st International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS'02), MITFaculty Club, Cambridge, MA, 2002.
 A. Harrison, C.D. Jensen, Cryptographic access control in a distributed le system,Proceedings of the eighth ACM Symposium on Access Control Models andTechnologies, Italy, 2003.
 G. Herrmann, G. Pernul. Viewing business process security from differentperspectives, in 11th International Bled Electronic Commerce Conference, Slovenia,1998.
 H. Humphrey, M.R. Thompson, K.R. Jackson, Security for grids, Lawrence BerkeleyNational Laboratory, Paper LBNL-54853, August 14 2005.
 R. Sheary, Internet Security Glossary, 2000 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2828.txt. A. Jsang, R. Ismail, C. Boyd, A survey of trust and reputation systems for online
service provision, Decision Support Systems 43 (2) (March 2007) 618644. F. Kerschbaum, J. Haller, Y. Karabulut, P. Robinson, A trust-based reputation service
for virtual organization formation, in: Ketil Stlen, William H. Winsborough, FabioMartinelli, Fabio Massacci (Eds.), iTrust2006: Proceedings of the 4th InternationalConference on Trust Management, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3986,2006, pp. 193205.
 J. Kubiatowicz, D. Bindel, Y. Chen, P. Eaton, D. Geels, S. Gumadi, H. Weatherspoon, W.Weimer, C. Wells, B. Zhao, Oceanstore: an architecture for global scale persistentstorage, Proceedings of ACM ASPLOS, 2000.
 G. von Laszewski, B.E. Alunkal, I. Veljkovic, Towards reputable grids, ScalableComputing: Practice and Experience, vol. 6, 3, 2005, pp. 95106.
 R. Lepro, Cardea: Dynamic access control in distributed systems, Technical ReportNAS-03-020, NASA, 2003.
 X. Liu, A.M. Eskicioglu, Selective encryption of multimedia content in distributionnetworks: challenges and new directions, IASTED International Conference onCommunications, Internet and Information Technology (CIIT 2003), Scottsdale,AZ, November 2003, pp. 1719.
 T.Y. Li, H. Zhu, K.Y. Lam, A Novel Two-Level Trust Model for Grid. InternationalConference on Information and Communications Security, ICICS 2003. S. Qing, D.Gollmann, and J. Zhou (Eds), LNCS 2836, pp: 214225.
 M. Lorch, D.B. Adams, D. Kafura, M.S.R. Koneni, A. Rathi, S. Shah, The PRIMA Systemfor Privilege Management, Authorization and Enforcement in Grid Environments.In Fourth International Workshop on Grid Computing, 2003.
 M. Lorch, B. Cowles, R. Baker, L. Gommans, P. Madsen, A. McNab, L. Ramakrishnan,K. Sankar, D. Skow, M.R. Thompson. Conceptual Grid Authorization Frameworkand Classication, Global Grid Forum, 23 November 2004, www.gridforum.org/documents/GFD.38.pdf.
 D. Martin, et al., Bringing semantics to web services: the OWL-S approach,Proceedings of the 1st SWSWPC, USA, 2004.
 MojoNation. The MojoNation web site, http://www.mojonation.net. http://www.globus.org/toolkit/security/myproxy/. A. Nadalin, et al., OASIS WS-SecurityPolicy 1.2, December 4 2006. The Open Grid Services Architecture, Version 1.0, Global Grid Forum, 29 January
2005. Object Management Group (OMG), UML 2.0 Infrastructure Specication, Novem-
ber 7 2003. http://www.omg.org/docs/ptc/03-09-15.pdf. ITU/ISO Recommendation. X.509 Information Technology Open Systems Inter-
connection The Directory: Autentication Frameworks, 2000. TechnicalCorrigendum.
 ITU-T Recommendation X.509. Information Technology Open Systems Intercon-nection - The Directory: Public-Key and Attribute Certicate Frameworks, 2000.ISO/IEC 9594-8:2001.
 L. Pearlman, V. Welch, I. Foster, C. Kesselman, S. Tuecke, A Community Autho-rization Service for Group Collaboration, Proceedings of the 3rd InternationalWorkshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks (POLICY02), 2002.
 M. Pirretti, P. Traynor, P. McDaniel, B.r.e.n.t. Waters, Secure attribute-based systems,Proceedings of the 13th ACMConferenceonComputer andCommunications Security(CCS '06), Alexandria, Virginia, USA, 2006.
 T. Priebe, E.B. Fernandez, J.I., Mehlau, G. Pernul. A Pattern System for AccessControl. Proc. 18th Annual IFIP WG 11.3 Working Conference on Data and ApplicationSecurity, Sitges, Spain, July 2004.
 M. Rabin, Efcient dispersal of information for security, load balancing and faulttolerance, J. ACM 36 (2nd April 1989) 335348. S. Trabesi, Y. Roudier, J.C. Pazzaglia, Service Discovery: Reviewing Threats andSecurity Architectures, Research Report RR-07-197, Institute Eurecom, MobileCommunications Department.
 S. Trabelsi, L. Gomez, Y. Roudier, Context-aware security policy for the servicediscovery, 3rd IEEE International Symposium on Security in Networks andDistributed Systems (SNDS'07), Niagara Falls, Canada, May 2123 2007.
 S. Tueche, et al., Internet X.509 public key infrastructure proxy certicate prole,IETF draft, 2001.
 Vollbrecht, P. Calhoun, S. Farrell, L. Gommans, G. Gross, B. de Bruijn, C. de Laat, M.Holdrege, D. Spence. AAA Authorization Framework, RFC 2904.
 M. Waldman, A.D. Rubin, and L.F. Cranor, Publius: A Robust, Tamper-Evident,Censorship-Resistant Web Publishing System. In Proceedings of the 9th USENIXSecurity Symposium.
 WS-Discovery Specications, http://msdn.microsoft.com/ws/2005/04/ws-discov-ery/.
 http://www.uddi.org. www.oasis-open.org/committees/wsn. www.globus.org/wsrf. F. Zhu, M. Mutka, L. Ni, Facilitating secure ad-hoc service discovery in public
environments, Proceedings of the 27th IEEE Computer Software and ApplicationsConference, USA, 2003.
 F. Zhu, M. Mutka, and L. Ni, Prudent exposure: A private and user centric.
Jose L. Vivas received his MS and PhD in Computer Sciencein 1996 and 2001, respectively, from the Royal School ofTechnology KTH, Stockholm, Sweden. From May 2002until December 2003 he worked as senior researcher atHewlett-Packard Laboratories in Bristol, UK, and thereafteras researcher at the Computer Science Department of theUniversity of Mlaga, Spain. His research activities arefocused on formal methods, security engineering, gridsecurity, and security assurance.
Carmen Fernndez-Gago is a postdoctoral researcher atthe Department of Computer Science at the University ofMalaga. She received her degree in Mathematics at theUniversity of Malaga in 1996 and her PhD in ComputerScience from the University of Liverpool (UK) in 2004. Shealso worked at this department as a postdoctoral research-er before taking up her current position. Her main researchareas are Trust Management and Reputation System,mainly by using formal methods. Currently she is workingactively on the European Commission funded projectsGREDIA and SPIKE, from FP6 and FP7 respectively. She isalso member of several program committees of interna-tional conferences and workshops as well as of a journal.Globus Toolkit 3 Programmer's Tutorial. Access Control withwww.casa-sotomayor.net/gt3-tutorial/multiplehtml/ch15.
rid services architecture, Glossary of Terms, 2006. http://www.GFD.81.pdf.hu. Task-based Authorization Controls (TBAC): Models fore-oriented authorization management. In Database Security XI:, T.Y. Lin, X. Qian, Eds. North-Holland. 1997.based access control (TMAC). In Proceedings of 2nd ACMased Access Control. Fairfax, VA. 1319. 1997.Essiari, S. Mudumbai. Certicate-Based Authorization Policy inACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC),Nov. 2003), pp 566-588.aglia, Y. Roudier, Secure Web service discovery: overcominguitous computing, 4th IEEE European Conference on Web006), Zurich Switzerland, December, 2006.Security Architecture Security Working Group, July 2003. B. Sotomayor, Thet al., Maintenance-free global storage, IEEE Internet Compu.
s, Fuzzy identity-based encryption, advances in cryptology-3494, Springer, 2005, pp. 457473.ati, Access control: principles and practice, IEEE Communica-4048.ne, H.L. Feinstein, C.E. Youman, Role-based access controluter 29 (2) (Feb. 1996) 3847.mizing censorship resistant systems, Proceedings of the 1stshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS'02), MIT Faculty Club,02.leth.internet2.edu.h, S. Tuecke, I. Foster, N. Nagaratnam, P. Janson, J. Dayke and A.
Javier Lopez received his MS in Computer Science and PhDin Computer Engineering in 1992 and 2000, respectively,from University of Malaga. After a period of four years assystem analyst in the private sector, he joined theComputer Science Department at the same university,where he actually is Full Professor. Prof. Lopez hasparticipated in research projects of the V, VI and VIIFramework Programme, and in more than eighty programcommittees of international security and crypto events.Additionally, he is the Co-Editor in Chief of Springer'sInternational Journal of Information Security, and memberof the Editorial Boards of Computers & Security, ComputersCommunications, Security and Communications NetworksJournal, International Journal on Critical Infrastructure
Protection, Wireless Communications andMobile Computing, and Computer Networks,among others. Additionally, Prof. Lopez is the Spanish representative of the IFIP TC-11WG (Security and Protection in Information Systems).
Andres Benjumea received his Bachelor's degree in Com-puter Science in 1996 from the University of Malaga. From1996 to 2005, he worked as a System Analyst. In 2006 hestarted working at the Computer Science Department at theUniversity ofMalaga. He has participated in several (nationaland international) security projects, including the OpenPMIauthorization framework, and the European project GREDIA(GRid enabled access to rich mEDIA content).
245J.L. Vivas et al. / Computer Standards & Interfaces 32 (2010) 230245
A security framework for a workflow-based grid development platformIntroductionGrid security architectures and infrastructuresOGSA securityThe Globus ToolkitThe Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI)Dynamic creation and management of overlaid trust domainsTransport-level and message-level security
Security services and mechanismsSome definitionsAuthorization, authentication and access control in gridsAccess controlAuthorization systems and modelsAuthorization modelsThe GREDIA platform
Trust managementTrust management for grids
GREDIA security frameworkGREDIA architectureGREDIA workflows securityVirtual organization securitySecurity in service discovery and service descriptionSemantics of service descriptionsSecurity and trust in service discovery
Security in peer-to-peer service architecture distributionPublish/subscribe systemsSecure storageAuthentication and authorizationAnonymityEncryption
Security for mobile applications
The integrated security architectureFuture work and conclusionsAcknowledgmentsReferences