A Note on Subjunctive and Counterfactual Conditionals by Alan Ross AndersonReview by: Charles A. BaylisThe Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Dec., 1953), p. 338Published by: Association for Symbolic LogicStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2266579 .

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338 REVIEWS

GIUSEPPE VACCARINO. Discussion. English translation. Ibid., pp. 117-120. B. V. JUHOS. Answer to Mr. Vaccarino. English translation. Ibid., pp. 120-122. The author discusses the relevance of quantification theory to certain traditional

metaphysical problems. He notes that the existence of a thing cannot be asserted by means of a quantified sentence unless the sentence attributes to the thing at least some relation or property. He then criticizes the concept of a thing-in-itself (which he identifies with that of a thing which has no properties and which is related to nothing) on the ground that the existence of such a thing cannot be asserted by means of a quantified sentence. He also discusses some of the philosophical problems associated with the concept of causality, but he does not touch upon the logical problems as- sociated with the contrary-to-fact conditional. RODERICK M. CHISHOLM

BELA VON JUHOS. Die Erkenntnisanalytische Methode. Zeitschrift fur philo- sophische Forschung, vol. 6 (1951-2), pp. 42-53.

A condensed version of the preceding paper. RODERICK M. CHISHOLM

A. C. LLOYD. On arguments for real universals. Analysis (Oxford), vol. 11 (1950 -1), pp. 102-107.

The author urges that although sound supporting arguments for realism may be derivable from mathematical logic, the traditional arguments based on ordinary discourse can be answered. His discussion focuses on two of these, the "in respect of" argument and the "resemblance" argument.

The former is to the effect that a nominalist who tries to define, say, 'red' by saying 'a is red =_ a resembles s," must add some such phrase as "in respect of color," where color is a universal. For any two individuals will be alike in an infinite number of respects and to indicate the resemblance intended without an infinite regress, some determinable must be referred to in the description. Lloyd urges that realists cannot prove that an infinite conjunction of resemblances is necessary, but agrees that nominalists cannot prove that a finite set is sufficient.

Lloyd states the "resemblance" argument this way: Nominalists define the "re- sembles" of "a resembles s" in some such way as this: (1) aRs = (aRs) R1 (sRt). But if R. be admitted to be the same as any other R, then they have admitted one universal, viz. resemblance. To avoid this they must define R, in some such way as this: (2) (aRs) R1 (sRt) - [(aRs) R1 (sRt)] R2 [(sRt) R1 (tRv)]; and so on, ad infinitum. Lloyd then tries to show that this infinite regress, if indeed there be one, is not a vicious one. But to state the argument in this way is, I think, to miss its point. The point is, rather, that even in step (1) a universal is admitted, for the R's of aRs and of sRt are two tokens of the same (universal) type. And the relations they symbolize are two instances of the same (universal) relation. CHARLES A. BAYLIS

ALAN Ross ANDERSON, A note on subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals. Ibid., vol. 12 (1951-2), pp. 35-38.

As evidence of his thesis that not even a true subjunctive conditional in the past tense implies the falsity of its antecedent, Anderson offers this example: Suppose a doctor investigating Jones's death states, "If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show." We should be in- clined to take such a statement as evidence that Jones had taken arsenic.

He proposes that we take subjunctive conditionals as not implying the falsity of their antecedents and define counterfactual conditionals as subjunctives in which the antecedent is false: (AcB) = df. AsB & -A. CHARLES A. BAYLIS

A. C. LLOYD. Mr. A nderson on subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals. Ibid.,

pp. 113-115. The author rejects Anderson's account (above) on the ground that Anderson

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