a history of the first regiment of massachusetts cavalry volunteers

; ^^Ho, ^^-n. .-^9.

COLORS OF THE FIRST MASSACHUSETTS CAVALRY

The Silver Eog'le ivas ffiren hy his associate Aides o7i Gov. Andrevi's

staff as a compliinent to Lt. Col. H. B. Sargent.

A HISTORY

OF THE FIRST REGIMENT OFMASSACHUSETTS CAVALRY

VOLUNTEERS

BY

BENJAMIN W. CROWNINSHIELDMAJOR FIRST MASSACHUSICTTS CAVALRY AND BREVET COLONEL U. S. V.

Wiit}) Hoster anu ^mistka

By D. H. L. GLEASONBREVET MAJOR

FOR THE FIRST MASSACHUSETTS CAVALRYASSOCIATION

.

,i,, or coA/^-

AIM 2 ]m

BOSTON AND NEW YORKHOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY

1891

A HISTORY

OF THE FIRST REGIMENT OFMASSACHUSETTS CAVALRY

VOLUNTEERS

BY

BENJAMIN W. CROWNINSHIELDMAJOR FIRST MASSACHUSICTTS CAvibRY AND BREVET COLONEL U. S. V.

Mitt) Ho6ter anu ^mi&tit&

By D. H. L. GLEASONBREVET MAJOR

FOR THE FIRST MASSACHUSETTS CAVALRYASSOCIATION

^f^fnt^kr

IAN 2^^.N^^K^'f^

BOSTON AND NEW YORKHOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY

1891

GO ^ M

Copyright, 1891,

Bt b. w. crowninshield.

All rights reserved.

The Riverside Press, Cambridge, ^fass., U. S. A.Electrotyped and Printed by H. O. Houghton & Co.

PREFACE.

This history, written after so many years have gone by, is

necessarily imperfect. It is mainly the recollections of an offi-

cer of the regiment who was present with the colors continu-

ously longer than any other. He has relied largely upon a

good memory, fortified by a daily journal and his letters sent

home ; but has also consulted the journals and letters of many

other officers of the regiment, and, in considering many events,

has had discussion of such with all available authorities.

Opinions as to some events have differed considerably ; but

the following pages are very nearly accurate. Individuals nat-

urally see the same thing with different eyes, and in the con-

fusion of a battle two men seldom see precisely the same thing

when together. How, then, shall two at different parts of the

field agree as to what took place ?

Since much of the work was completed, late volumes of the" Rebellion Records," published by the United States Govern-

ment, have given information and dispatches which were at the

time of writing unobtainable. It is probable, also, that new

light will for some time be given, as more is written about

the war.

The author wishes to acknowledge valuable assistance given

by Colonel Greely S. Curtis, Majors D. H. L. Gleason, CharlesG. Davis, George H. Teague, Captain J. J. Higginson, Lieu-

IV PREFACE.

tenants C. A. Longfellow and Parsons, Sergeant A. A. Sher-man, Co. C, S. N. Davenport, Co. A., and many others.On July 27, 1864, the writer was detached from tlie regi-

ment, and the history from that date has been written fromdiaries and letters sent him, principally by H. T. Bartlett,Co. H, who at the time Avas detailed as orderly at division head-quarters.

The history of the old companies I, K, L, and M, later theIndependent Battalion, has been comj)iled from various sources,largely from the notes and letters of Sergeant Andrew J. Clem-ent, of Company M (old).The statistical part of the history, involving great labor and

time, has been written by Major D. H. L. Gleason. It hassaved the record of no' less than one hundred private soldiers,improperly reported on the rolls as deserters, principally be-

cause correct information at the time could not be acquired.

No doubt many soldiers of the regiment will look in vain tofind an account of something in which they were particularlyengaged. It aims to be rather the history of the regiment than

of individuals. As already said, it is mainly the recollectionof one officer. This will explain Avhy some events seem to be

given undue prominence over others which, perhaps, deservedmore notice.

Such as it is, it has taken no small amount of the writer's

time. He has aimed at truth and justice. If it shall assist inrecalling the stirring days from September, 1861, to July, 1865,

in many fields of strife where the men of the First Massa-chusetts Cavalry followed the flag, the writer will be content.

In its preparation he has been actuated by no other feelingthan the most cordial affection for aU his brother soldiers of theregiment.

B. W. C.

CONTENTS.

HISTORY OF THE REGIMENT 1

CHAPTER I.

Cavalry in Virginia during the War of the Rebellion .... 3

CHAPTER II.

In Massachusetts, September 11 to December 30, 1861 40

CHAPTER III.

In South Carolina, January 1 to August 19, 1862 51

CHAPTER IV.

Antietam Campaign, September 1 to November 28, 1862 68

CHAPTER V.

Winter before Fredericksburg, November 28, 1862, to April 12, 1863 93

CHAPTER VI.

Spring Campaign, April 12 to June 17, 1863 118

CHAPTER VII.Battle of Aldie, June 17, and Gettysburg Campaign, to August 1, 1863 143

CHAPTER VIII.

Summer along the Rappahannock. To Centreville and back inquick time. Mine Run and to Winter Quarters at Warrenton,August, 1863, to January, 1864 167

VI CONTENTS.

CHAPTER IX.Winter Quarters at Warrenton. Reenlistment. New Battalion,January to May, 18G4 193

CHAPTER X.Spring and Summer Campaign. Rapidan to Petersburg, Mat to Sep-tember, 1864 203

CHAPTER XI.Muster out of Old Men. Reorganization of Regiment. WinterBEFORE Petersburg, August 1, 1864, to July 18, 1865 237

CHAPTER XII.The Third Battalion, from August 19, 1862 255

CHAPTER XIII.Miscellaneous Recollections. Horses, Arms, Equipments. Names ofBattles on the Flag, etc 283

ROSTER OF FIELD, LINE, AND STAFF OFFICERS, ETC 311Statistics of Companies 339

APPENDIX 459The Regimental Band 461Engagements of the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry 466

Engagements of Cos. I, K, L, and M, old 3d Battalion 468Losses of 1st Massachusetts Cavalry 469

Casualties of 1st Massachusetts Cavalry 469

Summary of Losses in the Union Armies 471Who raised the First National Flag at Richmond ? 474Commemorative Monuments 475

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.For alphabetical arrangement, see Index, under " Illustrations."

Colors of the First Massachusetts Cavalry Frontispiece

Map to illustrate the Campaigns of the First Massachusetts Cavalry in Vir-ginia and Maryland, 1862-1865 in pocket

Abraham Lincoln ^Gov. John A. Andrew Generals U. S. Grant, George B. McClellan, George G. Meade, P. H. Sheri-

dan 12

Generals W. W. Averell, A. N. Duffi^, Judson Kilpatrick, J. Irvin Gregg,J. B. Mcintosh, H. E. Davies 18

Generals Alfred Pleasonton, David McM. Gregg, John Buford, George Stone-man, George A. Custer, A. T. Torbert 22

Capt. Robert Williams, 1861 28

The Ideal Cavalryman ; the Real Cavalryman 32

Col. Robert Williams 38

Col. Horace Binney Sargent 42

Camp Brigham, Readville, Mass., Sept. 6 to Dec. 29, 1861 46Col. Samuel E. Chamberlain 52

Beaufort Island 56

G Company, Drayton Plantation, S. C '^Hilton Head, Jan., 1862, to Aug. 19, 1862 62

Camp Williams, Beaufort, S. C, Jan. 21 to Aug. 19, 1862 64Lieut.-Col. Greely S. Curtis 72

Antietam Bridge, Md. ; Potomac Creek Bridge, Va 78

Lieut.-Col. Lucius M. Sargent "-'

Lieut.-Col. John L. Tewksbury 88

Plan of Camp at Potomac Run, Winter of '62-'63 94

The Soldier's Dream ; Hut at Potomac Creek, Va 96

Hartwood Church and Vicinity 1""'' Mai. Wm. F. White 1^^Maj. Henry Lee Higginson ^^"Maj. Atherton H. Stevens, Jr H"Mai. T. Lawrence Motley 12^

Maj. Benjamin W. CrowninshieldMaj. Charles G. Davis 1^^

Maj. Edward A. Flint 1^^

Maj. Amos L. HopkinsMaj. Geo. H. Teague 1'*^

Surg.-Maj. James Holland J^^Surg.-Maj. Albert Wood 1^^

vm LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

Surg.-Maj. Samuel W. Abbott 160Asst.-Surg. Albert R. Rice 164Asst.-Surg. Homer H. Warner 170Group of Officers, Horse Artillery 174Asst.-Surg. George S. Osborne 180Asst.-Surg. Samuel H. Durgin 184Lieut. Lucius W. Knigbt 190Camp at Warrentou, Va 194Lieut. Jolin L. Brigbara 200Lieut. Benjamin G. Mann 204Captains Lucius Ricbmond, D. B. Keith, Caspar Crowninsbield 210Captains Jas. H. Case, Horace N. Weld, Arnold A. Rand 214Captains Henry P. Bowditch, Randolph M. Clark, Myron C. Pratt .... 220Captains Moses F. Webster, Joseph C. Murphy, Herbert P. Curtis .... 224Captains D, H. L. Gleason, James J. Higginson, John Drew 230Captains James A. Baldwin, David W. Herrick, George L. Bradbury . . . 234Lieutenants Walter Miles, Edw. R. Merrill, Francis Washburn 240Lieutenants Lucius H. Morrill, George Blagden, Alton E. Phillips 246Adjutants Nathaniel Bowditch, Greenleaf W. Batchelder, William W. War-

dell 250Lieutenants Albert F. Ray, C. Chauncey Parsons, George M. Fillebrown . . 256Lieutenants Charles A. Longfellow, P. T. Jackson 260Lieutenants Edward J. Russell, L. N. Duchesney, John W. Martin, Timothy

P. Lyman 266Lieutenants Harry D. Littlefield, George W. Flagg 272Lieutenants C. W. Dyer, Duett C. Clark, J. O. Josselyu 276Q. M. Sergeants Edw. H. Adams, Horatio Wood, Josiah N. Brackett . . . 280Capt. B. W. Crowninsbield 288

Regimental Band.

William Finney, W. J. Caswell, A. R. Bryant, E. H. Gooding, Frank M. Lund 292Dugald Mclnnis, Henry F. Wood, S. N. Davenport, A. W. Tyler, Henry C.

W^eston 296Tyler Harding, Geo. A. Abel, George W. Filley, William H. Rice, Gerry R.Walker " . . 302

A Company.J. Heinrich Hess, Lorenzo L. Howes, Thos. F. B. McDevitt, Corp. Gustave

Evers, Edw. W. F. Macinaw, Chauncey Pettibone, Herbert Maycock . . . 308Sergt. Richard Walsh, Sergt. George H. Cavanaugh, Josiah D. Patterson, J. W.

Richardson, Sebastian Zimmerman, Elijah Willard 314

B Company.Lemuel Wood 318Corp. Joseph Gay, Peter S. King, Alexander McDonald, Isaac H. Preseott,

Albert S. Shepard, Herbert L. Sliepard, Corp. George M. Washburne . . 322Alvan Barrus, Corp. William B. Buchanan, Sergt. William Tobey, Sergt.Thomas Preston, Jeremiah T. Daly, Andrew J. Dunham, Edward Fahey . . 328

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. ix

C Company.

Lucius B. Angier, William Boyd, Henry C. Davis, Alfred H. Keay, WilliauaH. Legg, William H. Overton, George H. Whitney 332

Com. Sergt. Ethan E. Cobb, Sergt. William N. Davis, Sergt. John A. Glines,Q. M. Sergt. Samuel D. Gale, Sergt. A. H. D. Hobbs 336

Corp. George Kendall, Corp. Oren H. Webber, Sergt. Charles A. Legg, Corp.Augustus Severance, Bugler Joseph F. Ennis 344

D Company.Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers D Company, Gen. Meade's Escort . 348Bugler Murray V. Livingston, Daniel Shannon, S. D. Rogers, Q. M. Sergi. Eli

A. Smith, Almon L. Switzer, Chas. H. Whiting 354D Company, Gen. Meade's Escort 358William Blasland, George Hobson, Sergt. John H. George, Wagoner Nathan

C. Hooper, Richard W. Lakeman 364

E Company.Robert J. Cochran, Henry H. Galloway, Sherman W. Hubbard, Sergt. Horace

A. Sunbury, John D. Littlehale, John Melenfy^ Andrew A. Mason .... 370Amasa C. Morse, Jarius H. Shaw, Farnum Southwick, Hosea L. Thayer, Ed-ward W. Vial, Sergt. William O. White 374

Caleb F. Abbott, Robert Bellew, Marcus Butler, Corp. Charles M. Smith,James W. Carpenter, Franklin Chase, Alphonzo F. Childs 380

F Company.Sanford W. Lasor, Bugler William H. Sisson, Ciarles Lynde, Joseph E. Stack-

pole, William E. Stewart 384Joseph Beals, Franklin L. Cannon, Com. Sergt. Edwin O. Hyde, Chauncey E.

Peck, Sad. Daniel B. Couch, Benjamin F. Davenport 390Joseph E. Felch, John M. Fiske, Corp. Ichabod Sampson, Corp. George E.

Woodbury, Seymour Gardiner, Andrew J. Hunt 396

G Company.George H. Lombard, Bugler James T. Walsh, Sergt. J. Warren Ball, Sergt.

Albert A. Sherman^qq

Irving R. Cheney, Nathaniel H. Fish, Sergt. Frederick O. Crocker, Sergt. Or-rin W. Harris, Robert P. Skelton 406

H Company.Michael Nennery, Daniel M. Ross, Bugler Henry T. Bartlett, Bugler William

S. Sampson, Bartlett Shaw 410Bugler William Barker, E. A. Burnham, Sergt. Samuel W. Bartlett, Lewis

Jones, Charles A. Kihlgreen 416

I Company (Old).VirgU Marcellus Blaisdell, Com. Sergt. Edw. T. George, Samuel M. Patterson,

Q. M. Sergt. J. H. Walker, Moody K. Stacy, William A. Vining, CharlesE. Groton

^ 422

X LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

I Company (New).Irving Waterman, Stanton P. Allen, Corp. Charles B. Belcher, Nelson O.Bowen 426

K Company (Old).Corp. L. Bartel, Alfred C. Belcher, Com. Sergt. Charles D. Bacon, Sergt.Frank A. Blaisdell, Bradford Hawes, William Welch 432

K Company (New).Com. Sergt. Thomas H. Coville, Jacob Jackley 436

L Company (Old).Corp. Amos Pierce, Corp. Gabriel Strang, Sergt. Edwin Chapman, Corp. James

A. Willard, Lorenzo Bruce 442Sewall P. Ridley, Corp. A. R. Storer, Sergt. Lindley H. Stockbridge, Sad.

William H. H. Wall, Preston Wood 448Merrick Cowles, Henry J. Hanks, Q. M. Sergt. William H. Fessendon, GeorgeH. Hill, Oliver D. Pratt 452

L Company (New).Q. M. Sergt. H. W. Otis, Augustus M. Davis 456

M Company (Old).Sergt. Robert Glenn, Sergt. Thomas Hickey, Orlando S. Kiff, Farrier Herman

Mills 462

M Company (New).1st Sergt. John Fisher, Edward Crabtree, George Crabtree, Farrier CharlesW. White 468

Monument First Massachusetts Cavalry, Gettysburg, Pa 474Monument First Massachusetts Cavalry, Aldie, Va 476

HISTORY OF THE REGIMENT.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

FIRST MASSACHUSETTS CAVALRY.

CHAPTER I.

CAVALRY IN VIRGINIA DURING THE WAR OF THEREBELLION.

Before entering upon the history itself of the regiment, a good pre- Prelimi-paration will be to consider the general story of the cavalry of the two ^i^^-

opposing armies in Virginia during the war of the Rebellion.The following account, in which the cavalry of the Army of the Poto-

mac is described, with its difficulty of organization, its painful and slowsteps towards excellence, then its sudden burst into power, and finally itstriumph, contrasts the Union cavalry with the cavalry of Lee's armv, inwhich tlie march of events was just the contrary. There, almost in thebeginning, was a combination which gave it the supremacy. Gradually,as the Northern cavalry approached it in equality, the Southern cavalrybegan to decline. The two became equal in the spring of 18G3. In 18G4the superiority of the Northern riders was very marked, and at the end,in 1865, Lee's cavalry was almost annihilated, while Grant's began at FiveForks the downfall of the Army of Northern Virginia, and pressed it toits end at Appomattox.

This article was written for, and delivered before, the MassachusettsMilitary Historical Society by the writer of this history in 188G.

Several of the statements contained in this account will appear later iuthe regimental history, more elaborated. It has been thought better tobrave the repetition this causes, rather than make either account barrenby omission of anything that seems necessary to make it complete.

When the war broke out, the North was by far less The Northprepared for the struggle than the South. The two prepTrnsections afforded a very different material from which the South.to organize an army.

4 FIRST MASSACHUSETTS CAVALRY.

The North In the North, particularly in the East, the populationunaccus- ii-i itomed to ot tarmers and mechanics, devoted to peaceful ])ursuits,amis.

1 11was unaccustomed to all manner of arms, and as a rulestrange to any horse but a work-horse

; and not one ina hundred a good rider, while a very large propor-tion had never fired a gun. Nearly all horses keptfor pleasure were trotters used in harness and never

miifa"*^mounted. In the South, every man and boy was fami-

withweap- liar with all kinds of weapons, and especially skilled inthe use of firearms. The entire population was used tohorses, and all were good riders.

Regular The regular army remained with all its organizationmained (cxccpt such officcrs as " wcut with their States " to thewith the

r^ c ^ n-iititiNorth. Contederate army) with the North, and furnished the

model for all three branches of the service. This modeldeveloped a steady infantry, a superlatively good artil-lery, never equaled in the South, and a cavalry betteradapted to fight in line than the Confederate, which ex-celled in individuality, and consequently for scoutingand irregular work. The Confederate cavalry waslargely composed of Virginia regiments, Avho foughton their own soil and were familiar with the remarka-ble system of by-roads, and who furnished scouts, spies,and raiders on our lines of communication, of singularability.

The regru- To tlic Federal army were left the five old regularlarcavah"y.

. , . .

cavalry regiments, to which was added in April, 1861,a sixth. It was at first proposed to confine the cavalryof the Federal army to these six regular regiments

;

and for good reasons, as things looked then. Thatwas the time when many of those who ought to haveknown thought the war would be an affair of ninetydays.

CAVALRY IN VIEGINIA. O

Accordino: to European ideas, a cavalry soldier is not The cav-o i '^ 1 t o

airy soldier

supposed to be of any use in the field before a very ^^i^J^^^'^^^^^

careful training at a cavalry depot, lasting from one to training.

two years; and his horse requires the same time, or

longer. In many armies the horses are specially reared

for cavalry service in immense breeding establishments

by government, and in time of peace the cavalry is

mounted exclusively on such animals. Each regiment

has a depot battalion, where the men are drilled and

horses prepared for service in the field. Such an estab-

lishment is thought indispensable. The regular cavalry

of the United States has a cavalry depot at Jefferson United1 , T , States cav-

Barracks, Missouri ; but, owing to the great distance airy depot.

from where the cavalry is stationed, few horses are

trained there, and the men are " licked into shape " in

much less time than is the custom in Europe. Theterm of enlistment three years here and at least seven

in Europe largely determines this, and the recruit has

to learn his duty with his regiment principally. Fortu-

nately, a large proportion of the enlisted men are vet-

erans of many terms of enlistment.At the beirinnino' of the war it was impossible to Training

properly train cavalry before putting it into the field, possible.

and consequently whole regiments of exquisite green-

ness were thrust into the Virginia mud in winter, thereto try to learn, practically without a teacher, from

books and hard knocks, in a few weeks or months at

best, what in Europe in the best schools, under chosen

instructors and on trained horses, years only can accom-

plish.

It cannot, then, be wondered at that the government

hesitated to enhst volunteer cavalry, and only yielded

when the battle of Bull Run had shown the hoUowness


Expense ofequippingmountedtroops.

Early cav-alry com-panies.

of the ninety-day idea. Another obstacle was the enor-mous expense o equipping and maintaining cavah*y.

The equipments for a regiment of twelve hundredmen alone cost nearly $300,000, the officers' pay wasgreater than that of the infantry, and a larger numberof artificers was necessary. It cost, in favorable times,

probably fifty cents a day for each horse, and in inac-cessible places three or four times that, for forage alone.

It was obviously questionable whether at any expensean effective cavalry force could be evolved out of the

peaceful Yankee citizen, unused to horses and arms, inany reasonable time. But mounted troops were a ne-cessity, and with its lavish bounty the government didnot shrink at the expense, nor hesitate at the difficulty

of the task.

At first, the volunteer regiments were made up ofthe militia cavah-y companies, both North and South

;

and all the companies in the first organized regimentsbore high-sounding names, which, in the Federal service

at least, were soon forgotten. In the Confederate cav-

alry the troopers generally owned their horses, and con-tracted for a certain pay (forty cents a day) to keepmounted. I can recall only one regiment in the Armyof the Potomac where the soldiers owned their horses,the 3d Indiana cavalry.We find in a Southern book, McClellan's" Campaigns

of Stuart's Cavalry," the following apropos of horses

and equipments :

Cavalry of A consideration of the difficulties under which the cavahy of theof NortTJ Army of Northern Virginia labored will not be uninteresting to one

who would form a true estimate of the services rendered by it.At the beginning of the war, the Confederate government, charged

as it was with the creation of an army and of war material of all

ern Vir-ginia.

CAVALEY IN VIRGINIA. 7

kinds, felt itself unable to provide horses for the numerous cavalry

companies which offered their services, especially from the State of

Virginia. Many companies, organized as cavalry, were rejected.With those that were enrolled the government entered into a con- Contract111 1 with thetract, the substance of which was that the cavah-ymen sliould supply goveru-and own their horses, which would be mustered into service at a fair ^

"

valuation ; that the government should provide feed, shoes, and a

smith to do the shoeing, and should pay the men a per diem of forty

cents for the use of their horses. Should a horse be killed in action,

the government agreed to pay to the owner the muster valuation.

Should the horse be captured in battle, worn out, or disabled by any

of the many other causes which were incident to the service, the loss

fell upon the owner, who was compelled to furnish another horse,under the same conditions, or be transferred to some other arm of

the service.

That the government should have adopted such a policy at the

beoinning of the war was a misfortune ; that it should have adhered

to it to the very end was a calamity against which no amount of zeal

or patriotism could successfully contend.

It is not in the spirit of unfriendly criticism that we to-day pro- Unwisdom

claim the unwisdom of such a policy. At the time, all acquiesced poUey.in it ; the cavalryman most cheerfully of all. Virginia was full of

horses of noble blood. The descendants of such racers as Sir Ar- BloodedhorsGs

chy, Boston, Eclipse, Timoleon, Diomede, Exchequer, Red-Eye, and

many others more or less famous on the turf, were scattered over

the State. Gentlemen fond of following the hounds had raised these

horses for their own use. They knew their fine qualities, their speed,

endurance, and sure-footedness, and they greatly preferred to intrust

their safety in battle to their favorite steeds rather than to any that

the government could furnish. But the government might have fur-

nished these horses at the outset, and by suitable activity it might

have provided for replenishing the losses incurred in the service.

The cavalrymen were kept mounted, but at an enormous loss of effi-

ciency in the army, and by a system of absenteeism which sometimes Absentee-

deprived the cavalry of more than half its numbers. Why should ithave been thought that the people of Virginia would hold back their

horses, when they refused nothing else to the government?

The evil results of this system were soon apparent, and rapidly

increased as the war progressed. Perhaps the least of these was the

personal loss it entailed upon the men. Many a gallant fellow whose

ism.


Loss sus- liorse had been irrecoverably lamed for the want of a shoe, or rld-

the^menf ^^" ^^ death at the command of his officer, or abandoned in the en-emy's country, that his owner might escajje capture, impoverishedhimself and his family in order that he might keep his place in theranks of his comrades and neighbors. Nor should it be a cause forwonder if this property question affected the courage of many arider ; for experience soon proved that the horse as well as the man

was in danger during the rough cavalry melee. If the horse werekilled the owner was compensated ; but a wounded horse was a badinvestment.

Loss to the By far the greatest evil of the system was the fact that whenever

from'^dis- ^ cavalryman was dismounted, it was necessary to send him to hismounted liome to procure a remount. To accomplish this required frommen.

__

' ^

thirty to sixty days. The inevitable result was that an enormousproportion of the command was continuously absent. Many of themen were unable to procure fresh horses within the time specified

in their " details," and the column of "Absent without leave " alwayspresented an unsightly appearance. To punish such men seemed an

injustice, and the relaxation of discipline on this point was abusedby some with impunity. We have already seen that Fitz Lee's bri-gade, which should never have presented less than twenty-five hun-

dred sabres in the field, was reduced to less than eight hundred at

Kelly's Ford, on the 17th of March, and numbered less than fifteenhundred men at the time of the battle of Chancellorsville, whenmany of the absentees had returned.

Detriment Great as was this evil among the Virginia regiments, it operated

ton'sTrl- with tenfold force upon the cavalry of Hampton's brigade. Thinkgade.

^ ggj,(j}ng a man from Virginia to South Carolina, North Carolina,

Georgia, or Mississippi, to procure a horse! Recruiting camps were

established in Virginia and in North and South Carolina, and every

means which the cavalry commanders could devise were used toameliorate this state of affairs. But the inevitable tendency was

downwards ; and in the last year of the war hundreds of men were

gathered together in the " Dismounted Camp," or, as the men called

it, " Company Q," in the vain attempt to utilize good, but misi)lacedmaterial. Special officers were appointed for these men, and the

attempt was made to use them, dismounted, in various ways ; butDisheart- with no success. The men were disheartened. Esjyrlt du corps

could by no possibility be infused into such an assemblage. Every

man looked and longed for the time when his horse might be re-

ened men.

:#^

GOV, JOHN A. ANDREW

CAVALEY IN VIRGINIA. 9turned from the recruiting camp, or when some other kind provi-dence might remount him, and return him to his comrades. Thepenitentiary could not be more loathsome to him than his presentcondition, and yet even this was better than to give up all hope, andconsent to a transfer to the infantry or artillery.The want of proper arms and equipments placed the Southern Deficien-

cavalry at a disadvantage which can hardly be overestimated. At equipment,the beginning of the war the troopers furnished their own saddlesand bridles. The English round-tree saddle was in common use,and sore-backed horses multiplied with great rapidity. After a timethe government furnished an unsightly saddle which answered avery good purpose ; for although the comfort of the rider was disre-garded, the back of the horse was protected. Our best equipmentswere borrowed from our cousins of the North. The question ofarming the cavalry was far more serious. Some of the more wealthy Armingof the Virginia counties armed their cavalry companies with pistols ^^''^^'when they were mustered into service, but whole regiments weredestitute of them. Breech-loading carbines were procured only inlimited quantities, never more than enough to arm one, or at mosttwo squadrons in a regiment. The deficiency was made up, gener-ally, by Enfield rifles. Robertson's two North Carolina regiments,which joined Stuart in May, 1863, were armed with sabres andEnfield rifles. The difPerence between a Spencer carbine and anEnfield rifle is by no means a mere matter of sentiment.

Horseshoes, nails, and forges were procured with difiiculty ; andit was not an uncommon occurrence to see a cavalryman leading hislimping horse along the road, while from his saddle dangled thehoofs of a dead horse, which he had cut off for the sake of the soundshoes nailed to them.

But in both armies the cavalry was a sort o elite Thecav-corps, and men preferred to enhst in that branch, prob- l/S corps,ably at the North because the would-be trooper pre-ferred riding to walking, with perhaps an idea that atthe end of a march his horse would be put up at someperipatetic livery stable. Certainly none had any defi-nite idea of the duties.The men were enlisted from all ranks of life with no


Enlist- reference to previous occupation and capability. Nofrom all selcction was even made according to size and weight,life. In Europe, except for the showy, expensive, and almost

useless heavy cavalry which graces processions, opera-

house entrances, imperial or royal drawing-rooms and

staircases, and such pomps and vanities, a cavalry sol-

dier must be light and active, and is especially selected

for that branch of the service. An EngHsh authority.Beamish, says :

European The men, therefore, intended for cavalry service should be se-

"^"**u'alil-Ifi^^ted with the utmost care respecting their disposition, size, and

cations for vigor of constitution, and should, above all, be chosen from thosetliis sGr~vice. who have been accustomed to horses from their youth, such as the

sons of farmers, hostlers, and others who love horses, and are capable

of taking care of them and likewise of the harness and equipments

with which they are intrusted. From other men than these it is

difficult, almost impossible, to form a good cavalry. "What, for in-

stance, can be expected from a stocking manufacturer, or a linen

weaver, who considers the horse a wild beast ? We all know thatsucli men rarely have confidence in their horses, but look upon them

as their greatest enemies, against whom, for the future, they must

struggle for their lives. They never learn to ride, never can pre-

serve their balance, but hang on the horse like a senseless lump,

which, in order to preserve its equilibrium, unnecessarily wastes a

large portion of its strength, and on this account is soon wasted.

The injudicious selection of men for cavalry may be productive of

infinite mischief.

Fitness But such principles were ignored in the great United

Federfi'" States voluutccr army, and the men ranged from pigmy'"^*

to giant, and there was never any authority for chang-

intr them, after enlistment, into other branches of the

service, according to fitness. Even later in the war,

when experience should have taught better, whole regi-

ments were recruited after the same ideas ; and as late

as 1864 perfectly inexperienced company officers were


put over them, and in some cases even the field of&cers

were quite as ignorant as the men.

In the South things were better managed. The cav- Southern

alrv service was especially well ora^anized. All South- better or-'111 i? 1 1 gamzed.

erners were good riders, particularly those or the better

class. A good horse was a gentleman's pride, and themore important the gentleman, the better his horse.

Consequently, their cavalry combined the men of the

best class, mounted on the best horses in the early

days of the war largely thoroughbred or very well-bred

animals.

The officers were well-known men, of good social Well officered.

standing, and the field officers were many or them ot

the old regular United States cavalry, I have under-

stood that a considerable number of the old cavalry vet-

erans of the regular army went South with their officers

in 1861. Thus at the very beginning the Confederacy

had a large force of capital cavalry ; every man a bold

rider, well mounted, expert with revolver and rifle.

In one respect alone was the Federal cavalry supe- Federal

rior, namely, in arms and equii)ments, for these were oi better'

'''

'- ^\ ^

armed andthe newest pattern. And yet even in this respect the equipped.advantage was questionable, for the government issued

an overwhelming outfit. The poor soldier was oppressedwith his trappino-s and arms, and mounted for a marcli An over-

>~ >~ ^^

^

whelming'with three days' rations for himself and his horse, with outfit.

saddle and bridle, wateruig bridle, lariat rope and picket

pin, nose-bag, carbine and its sling, revolver and its

holster, ammunition for both in their receptacles, sabre

and belt, he looked little like the trooper Detaille or De

Neuville loved to paint. The most difficult thing a re-cruit had to do when ready for the march was to get in

and out of the saddle, and a derrick, sometimes, would

not have been a bad thing.


Disposition The regulars, arriving from tlieir Western fields, wereof the reg- ii* iniii -r>uiars. at first pushed into the field by companies. Reorgan-

ized later, they were so largely used as orderlies andheadquarter guards as to seriously impair their effi-

ciency. As regiments they were not brigaded until1863, and were then small.

Should It has always seemed to me that they should haveformed a becii filled up to the maximum and formed as a divi-

sion, of three brigades of two regiments each ; whichshould have held in check, if it did not destroy, the

Confederate cavalry in those early days when volunteerregiments were no match for the rough riders of theSouth, who also possessed the immense advantage of" fighting upon their own dunghill."

At first, The regulars, in larger or smaller detachments, dur-smaii \\\cr the fii'st part of the war did brave work ; but theybodies. o 1

_

? J

were almost always used in small bodies, were usually

outnumbered by the Confederate cavalry, and their ef-forts were frequently unsuccessful. At Gaines's Millsa most gallant charge was made by a small body of the5th cavalry, a desperate diversion to enable a new line

to be formed, which succeeded in its object at the ex-pense of the cavalry, a gallant and heroic service.

Nosepa- The volunteer cavalry, until 1863, took the fieldairy organ- usually as regimciits attached to separate commands;

and also, occasionally, by brigades. Under good com-manders, notably under Buford, it did some handsomefighting. There was no cavalry bureau at Washingtoncharged with its organization and equipment, and par-ticularly there was no general having command overthe whole cavalry to direct its detail, and combine it forfield work. Thus the regiments were not systematicallyrecruited, or remounted as the horses became used up

GEO. B. McCLE_LAN

Major General

U, S. GRANT

General

GEO. G. MEADE

Mnjor General

P. H. SHERIDAN

General

CAVALRY IN VIRGINIA. 13

or killed. There was no combined movement of cav-alry, and no separate cavalry organization. The officerscommanding divisions and corps to which cavalry wasattached seemed greedy for as large a force of cavalryas possible, and very commonly nsed it up with unnec-essary and thankless work. There were many defeats,great discouragement, and demoralization resulting fromthis abuse. As a rule, success attended the Confeder-ates, and it seemed doubtful if volunteer cavalry in theFederal army was to be of any good.

Until the summer of 1862, in the Federal army, the stuart ori-cavalry was groping about for its place in the field, the raid.while learning the elements of its duty. During thePeninsular campaign, under change of commanders, itdid nothing to gain a name, being hardly mentioned indispatches ; while Stuart won a brilhant reputation byhis march around McClellan's army, and originated the"raid" which afterwards became such a feature inevery campaign. Pope, in his retreat, exhausted his Pope ex-mounted troops by hurrying them hither and thither in mountedwild-goose chases. If his cavalry had been kept,on hisflanks and always close to his enemy, he would not havelost sight of him, and eventually found him in his rear.This short campaign illustrates most forcibly what I in-sist upon, that the Federal cavalry at that time hadno general who understood its proper use. On the con- Use oftrary, it was wasted and ruined in a service which stu- troops not

.-.-

.

understoodpidly not only e^ave it no rest to prepare for an emer- by Federal

^. .

eommand-gency, but placed it where it could not even do good ers.

service. Lee used his intelligently, and with half thework it did not only good service, but gained a brilliantrenown.

During the Antietam campaign the cavalry of Mc-

14 FIEST MASSACHUSETTS CAVALRY.

Inaction of Clellaii's armv did nothing; worthy of it. It moved aim-lan's cav- lesslj about. At the battle itself, about 8 a. m., theAutietam. wliolc division ci'ossed the Antietam on the Sharpsburg

pike, and took a position close to Lee's centre, where hehad concentrated about thirty-five pieces of artillery,with which, at times, without infantry support, he held

the town.

Porter Portcr's entire corps, also, was within striking dis-

strikeLee. tance, but lay all day just out of fire on this road, andamong the lost opportunities of the whole war none wasmore conspicuous than this. General Lee spoke of the

Federal cavalry, " with a bravery worthy of a bettercause " taking up this menacing position. Several timesduring the day the men mounted, and sabres weredrawn, as all supposed, to charge, but the men were dis-

mounted again without attempting anything.The artillery fire of Lee's guns Avas fierce, and to-

gether with the fire of our own, of probably double the

same number, across the Antietam Creek, the noise wasinfernal. This fire lasted all day, and this division ofcavalry lay here accomplishing nothing, losing a fewmen by artillery fire. McClellan, by his inaction, per-

McCiei- mitted Lee to take troops from his right (while Bum-tionanad- sidc did Hot cross) to rchcvc his sorely pressed left.

Lee. And then, after he had, with their help, stayed the ad-verse tide there, he took them and others back andfought Burnside's tardy troops when they did cross.On both right and left there were natural obstacles toMcClellan's troops getting into position to attack, be-

sides Lee's veterans. In the centre was no natural ob-

stacle. The bridge was intact and securely held, theroad excellent. It led straight to Lee's centre. More-

over, it was already crossed by the cavalry, 4320


strong, and this force was within five hundred yards The roadof Lee's centre, well protected by the ground, and all centre.ready formed for battle. Antietam was my first largebattle, and I vividly recall the crossing of the creek.We suddenly came into the artillery fire before reach-ing the bridge, and it seemed as if the whole groundwas ploughed up by shells, and the air full of them.The bridge was particularly exposed. On it, as Icrossed, lay the dead body of the colonel of the 4thPennsylvania cavalry and his horse. He had just beenkilled by a shell. The casualties were here numerous.But very soon after crossing, cover was found for thecavalry division, and could have been found for Porter'scorps had it crossed, and a better place to put in troopswas impossible. Attention has lately been called to thisby an officer of the regular United States infantry,Avhose command was ordered out in front of the massedcavalry as skirmishers. He noticed the weakness of Weakness

.

of Lee'sLee s centre, unsupported by mfantry, and the excellent centre.

opportunity to pierce it. He returned to General Por-ter and reported the situation in McClellan's presence,and entreated him to make the attack. At the momentPorter did not answer, but said later to McClellan," Recollect, my corps is your only reserve." ^

The morning after Lee had, with perfect success. The daycrossed the Potomac, the cavalry rode down to the high retreatriver banks, looked across, stood and received the fire Potomac.of twenty-seven guns in battery at Shepherdstown for along time, and collected the very meagre leavings ofLee's army, a few abandoned wagons, a caisson or two,and other worthless trash. This was heralded in Mc-Clellan's dispatches as "the cavalry pursuing Lee's

1 This story has been denied by General Porter, although asserted byothers.


routed columns across the Potomac, with captures of

guns," etc.

The (lay before (September 18), Lee's army wasMagnifi- beaten, not routed, and a magnificent opportunity of-tunityiost. fered for a dashing commander to score a real victory,

one that might have gone far to end the war. That

day the whole army rested while Lee prepared to cross

the river. How he must have rejoiced that the Federalcommander was not an enterprising man !

During the rest of the autumn the cavalry of botharmies was rendered almost useless by an epidemic,

Stuart called " greased heel," among the horses. Yet Stuart,prestige, in wliosc commaud the same disease raged, managed to

ride around McClellan's whole army, without any loss

to his cavalry, capturing over a thousand horses and

much other plunder, and causing our men no end ofwild-goose chases ; but, better than all that, so adding

to his already great prestige, that his cavalry was feared

as masked batteries were at one time.

Picketing The following winter, in front of Fredericksburg,

S ^ Whi- the Federal cavalry did picketing and scouting, notiil!" " merely on the flanks of Burnside's and Hooker's army,

but kept open and protected the rear and in fact all the

country from Washington down to the Rappahannock,and all about Washington, a duty that required the ut-

most exposure, wear, and tear ; and at the same time

added nothing to the glory of that ill-used branch of

the service.

In the spring of 1863 came a great change, which,

for the Federal cavalry, might be called an emancipa-

Hooker tiou. In February Hooker reorganized the entire Army

izeTfed- of the Potomac. The cavalry was newly divided into

airy.''^''' brigades and divisions, better officered than before.


Probably at no time during the war was tlie army inso good condition as in May, 1863. The cavah-y had May, i863.been ill-used during the winter, and the horses were notin good condition, but the discipline was first-rate, theregiments well officered, and fairly well drilled. Whilenot in comparatively such good condition as the in-fantry, the cavalry had greatly improved, and wantedbut a dashing general to win laurels.

General Stoneman was supposed to be such a man ; stone-but he made quite as marked a failure with the mounted ure.troops as Hooker did with the whole army in thewretched battles about Chancellorsville. His carefullyprepared raid came to naught. For this the exceedinglybad weather was largely to blame.

For nearly eighteen months the work had been scout-ing, picketing, and little encounters by companies orregiments, without any general leadership, without dash,enterprise, or success. How diiferent in the Confeder-ate cavalry ! TJiere, at the very outset, was an efficient

force led to victory, and under such leaders as Ashby, Confeder-Stuart, and Fitzhugh Lee, made to feel they could do S^eadere.anything. They twice rode round the entire Federalarmy, in front of Richmond, and in Maryland, each timewith perfect success, and almost with impunity, underJ. E. B. Stuart, accomplishing excellent results in de-stroying and capturing, but particularly in learning thatconstant motion is the cavalry's forte, and boldness andaudacity are its protection.

But the younger officers were getting to know theirduties, and the troopers were becoming educated to theirwork, and in the spring of 1863, under a new leader-ship, the Federal cavalry first asserted itself against theConfederate troopers at Kelly's Ford, and showed itself


At Kelly's at the battle of Brandy Station, June 9, 1863, fully aFord and

i p ri ? i i'J

Brandy match foi* Stuart s cavalry, and never afterwards provedotation.

.

''

a contemptible foe.

I do not intend to say there were not gallant fightsmade by some cavalry commands, but that on the whole

Unsuccess- the rcsult was thus far unsuccessful and unsatisfactory.Stuart and Fitzhug-h Lee and Hampton were con-stantly making successful raids upon the cavalry linesof pickets, and capturing men, horses, and wagons.They had the prestige, or, as it came to be expressed," the bulge " on us.The battle of Brandy Station was a severe fight, in

which the Federal cavalry, about ten thousand strong,crossed the Rappahannock on a reconnoissance in force.

Attack on and attacked all Stuart's cavalrv, of nearly the sameStuart. II- .^ J

strength, on his own ground. The artillery was freelyused on both sides, and the number of guns was verynearly equal. After heavy and successful fighting allday, the enemy was put on the defensive, and made todevelop his entire force, and even bring up his in-fantry. In the late afternoon our troops recrossed the

river unmolested, having fully accomplished the objectaimed at. There Avas more fighting than generalshij).This was, for the cavalry, the turning point in the war.^

Confeder- The Confederates were never met before or afterwardsate pres-

. i i itige lost, in such force. They here lost their prestige and never

recovered it.

Daily skir- 111 rapid successioii followed severe contests of theluislies.

cavalry, successful for the Federals at Aldie, Upper-

ville, etc., June 17 to 22, and engagements of more orless importance daily all through the campaign. Thecavalry of both armies was in constant contact.

^ McClellan says " it made the Federal cavalry."

GENL. W. W. AVERELL GENL. A. N. DUFFIE

GENL. JUDSON KILPATRICK GENL. J. IRVIN GREGG

GENL. J. B. MclNTOSH GENL. H. E. DAVIES


Ordered by Lee to keep on his right flank, and im- Stuart sep-

able to break through the Federal cavalry, Stuart rode trom Lee.

round its rear and crossed the Potomac between it and

Washington, and, severed from him by the whole Fed-

eral army, only joined Lee at Gettysburg the secondday of the battle.

General Lee has claimed that Stuart's absence caused

him great inconvenience, and perhaps ruined his cam-paign of invasion. Stuart's historian indignantly denies

this, and apparently gives good reasons. Be this as it

may, it is sure that during this campaign, in a series of

almost daily encounters, the Federal cavalry came out

best, not without getting roughly handled at times, but

always making itself respected ; and up to July 3 keptLee's cavalry separated from his army, and prevented

their help when most needed by him.Durin


The Con-federatepartisan.

Meade'scavalry-grains inefficiency.

GeneralSheridantakes com-mand.

brought up the rear in the retreat. It was well handled

and beautifully manoeuvred, and won the admirationof all who saw it ; but no chance for great distinctionoccurred.

This year developed the Confederate partisan. Theflank of Meade's army and his long line of communica-tion by the Orange and Alexandria Railroad were ex-posed to constant attack by Mosby's battalion, White'sbattalion, company H of the 4th Virginia cavalry,the so-called " Black Horse Cavalry," and by othercommands who operated in that district, where the menwere at home. These attacks, which with little dangerto the attacking force were very sure of success, caused

the presence of a large body of Meade's cavalry atWarrenton and other points on his flank and rear, be-sides a cavalry brigade at or near Centreville. TheFederal force accomplished little against Mosby andthe other partisan battalions, but this service allowed

something like rest to Meade's cavalry, and guardedthe flanks and rear against any attack from regularConfederate troops.

Meade was not a believer in mounted troops, yet heused his cavalry better than any previous commander,and under him that branch gained largely in efficiencyand prestige. Wintering in places where with the leastwear and tear the flanks of the army could be protected,and at the same time the men and horses drilled, it im-j^roved by good care and good food during the winterof 1863-64.

Just before the campaign of 1864 opened, GeneralSheridan took command of the cavalry corps of theArmy of the Potomac, reviewing each of the three divi-sions in turn. May 2, 1864, his cavalry crossed the

CAVALBY IN VIRGINIA. 21

fords of the Rappahannock, uncovered the roads on the

south side, reconnoitred, and cleared the way until

Meade and Lee were face to face. In doing this therewas some severe fighting with Stuart's cavalry, in which

the Federal cavalry invariably had the best of it.On May 9, as the Wilderness offered no chance for

mounted troops, the raid to Richmond began, followedby a series of bloody engagements which ended at Yel-low Tavern and Richmond. Stuart's cavalry was veryrouo;hly handled and he himself killed. This loss to Death of

.

Generalthe Confederacy was never made good. There were Stuart.

enough good leaders amongst his generals, notably Fitz-hugh Lee ; but Stuart had been the leader for nearlythree years. Nobody doubted his right to the place,and after his death nobody quite filled it. He died ata good time for his own fame, for not even he couldhave chanofed the inevitable result that followed. It

is no discredit that it was so. The Confederate cav-alry had fought long and well. The material for therank and file was constantly deteriorating. Their pres-tige became always comparatively less as it increased onour own side. Now we had a leader, and not one only.From inferior grades had sprung up a plenty of ablecommanders of divisions, brigades, and regiments. Cas-ualties in any rank, with a change of personnel, did notchange the efficiency of organization.

The Confederate cavalrymen became better armed as Deteriora-the war went on, largely from captured weapons. Their Southern

fine, well-bred horses went, never to return, and in 1864 men.

they were not so well mounted as their Federal oppo-nents. Their granaries were laid waste, and a generaldecay set in that could not be stayed. All this was not

without its consequences ; and we find all tlu^ough the


rest of the war an almost invariable success attendingthe Federal cavalry in its battles.

Reverses Somc rcvcrscs wcrc inevitable. Success urjres alwaysand sue- " jcesses. to morc daugcrous deeds, and sooner or later to the

impossible. Such was Wilson's raid to destroy Lee'ssouthwestern communication with Petersburg. Sheri-dan's Trevillian Station raid resulted in hard fio^htino:and equal honors. It did irre23arable damage to Lee'scavalry, for the losses of men and horses, particularlythe latter, could not be replaced. The Federal cavalryaccomplished little else that was tangible.The desperate attempt of Early to make a diversion

in favor of Lee, by invading Maryland, led to theThe Vai- Valley campaio^n, and Sheridan took with him the lai-leycam- ^ ^ ^ ^ .paign. gest part of the cavalry, which in turn caused Lee to

send most of his to oppose it.Here was a better country for cavalry than we had

seen before during the war, and here the supremacy ofthe Federal cavalry was most marked. Here, for thefirst time, did the cavalry attack infantry in line on a

large scale. By small bodies this had been done be-fore on both sides.

Capture of At the battle of Winchester, the Confederate divisiona Lonied- 'eratedivi-

^f Gcucral Wliartou was ridden over in perfectly opencountry by our cavalry, and almost the entire division a small one was captured. I will go into this

somewhat in detail, as it has been often asserted thatcavalry never during the war accomplished this feat.At the end of August, 1864, Sheridan, in obedience

to his instructions, had withdrawn his army to Hall-town, near Harper's Ferry, on account of Anderson'sdivision of Longstreet's corps coming to reinforceEarly ; the Confederate infantry was pushed close up.

ALFRED PLEASONTON

Major Geiil. U. S. V.DAVID McWI. GREGG

Brvi. Major Genl. U. S. V.

JOHN BUFORD

Major Genl. U. S. VGEORGE STONEMAN

Ma/or Genl. U. S. V.

GEO. A, CUSTER

Major Genl. U. S. V.A. T. TCRBET

Major Genl. U. S. V.


While General Sheridan was at Halltown, he wanted Skirmish-. n . p PI- ing of pick-

to have prompt inrormation oi any movement oi this eta.

division, and accordingly Colonel Lowell, in commandof the " reserve brigade," ordered, in the early morn-

ing, an attack by two squadrons of the 2d Massachu-setts cavalry ujion the infantry pickets. The charge wassuccessfully made upon what proved to be a South Car-olina brigade, and the greater part of a regiment wascaptured most gallantly. The attack was made at thesame hour and the same place on two successive days.On the IGtli of September, the 3d New Jersey cavalry a recently organized regiment captured an entire

infantry regiment (the 8th South Carolina of Conner's sth Southbrigade, colors, colonel, officers, and men) in front of infantryWinchester, on the Berryville pike. These small affairswere duly heralded, and inspired the cavalry with dar-ing.

The battle of Winchester was fought on the 19tli of Battle ofWinciiGS"September, Grant allowing Sheridan to attack Early, ter.

after going to meet him at Charlestown. Grant says,speaking of General Sheridan : " I met him at Charles-town, and he pointed out so distinctly how each armylay, what he could do the moment he was authorized,and expressed such confidence of success, that I saw Grant bids

, 111 IP* Sheridan,there were but two words or instruction necessary, "Go in."Go IN."At this time. Early, with his inferior force, had his Early's po-

army spread out between Winchester and Martinsburg.His communications were upon a splendid road, the val-ley pike, and he could rapidly concentrate ; but his ex-treme divisions were twenty-two miles apart.

Sheridan was at Berryville, eight miles from Win- Sheridan'sChester, his army well in hand and fortified with breast-


works along part of the line. The road to Winchesterwas fairly good, but the Opequan, with steep banks onthe east side, lay between, and had to be crossed. Adifficidt and narrow defile lay between the Opequan andWinchester, and it Avas not easy to rapidly concentratein front of Winchester, though the distance was not sogreat as that of Early's most distant division from thatplace.

Attempts Sheridan previously sent all his cavalry but one divi-Early's siou, wliicli protcctcd the left flank, down to Summit

Point, to cross there, and then march up the road toWinchester and come in on the enemy's flank. If histroops could get into position quickly enough, Early's

divisions could be beaten in detail, and perhaps thegreater part captured.

A very slight obstacle of water will cause great delayin crossing, and the little stream of the Opequan, nottwo feet deep, proved no exception.

A race for Earlv soou fouud out wliat was ffoina: on, and forWinches-

-i , ^ ^ .ter. hours it was a race between the armies to get into po-

sition, one to attack and the other to defend Winches-ter. The gi'ound becomes open and quite clear asthe town is approached, and AVinchester is surroundedby rising ground, which commands all the approaches.Here Early's infantry was posted. The battle wasfought at most points in perfectly open country. Themovements of the Confederate troops about the town

could be plainly seen, as they were placed by the offi-cers behind walls, and in some places were slight for-tifications with artillery. This was the case where

Wharton's division was in line, late in the afternoon.

As the troops came up slowly, Sheridan, impatient ofthe delay, attacked with the 6th and 19th corps, be-


fore either Crook's 8th corps or the cavalry got on the

field.

The attack was delivered just as Early had put his Sheridan

infantry in position. On his left he had placed Gor- liariy.don's division in a piece of woods at a considerable an-

gle with his front. The horse artillery was in battery

on our right flank and poured in a very severe fire as

our fine advanced. The 6th corps attacking on the left

and centre was successful, with its 2d division on the

left. On the right the 3d division, 6th corps, and 2ddivision, 19th corps on the extreme right, were repulsed

and had to retreat, but the enemy made no attempt tofollow up his advantage at this point. The reserve,

Russell's splendid 1st division, 6th corps, advanced and

restored the 6th corps fine, Russell being killed; and

on the right Dwight's 1st division, 19th corps, came

into line and put things to rights there. Meanwhile,

the 8th corps was coming up, and the cavalry in the

distance was engaging Early's troopers. His flank be- Early's

ing thus threatened by our cavalry. Early withdrew the thr|at-

horse artillery and Gordon's division, closing in nearer

to the town.

Torbert, in command of the Federal cavalry, was driv- J^'^f^^s^ing Fitzhugh Lee steadily, slowly at first, then more treats.

rapidly, and when the attack in front of Winchester was

renewed with the 8th corps, he came up in chase of

Fitzhugh Lee, whose forces speedily and energetically

retreated towards and through the town.

Our cavalry in pursuit, in line of battle, more or less

disturbed by the speed of pursuit, came through the

open fields until they suddenly saw in front of them

Wharton's division of infantry in Hue, protected by a

small fortification and by artillery. Instantly taking in

26 FIEST MASSACHUSETTS CAVALRY.

Our men tlie situatioii, tliey charged the line and carried all be-

Wharton's forc them, riding over the opposing infantry and cap-

turing many prisoners. I went over the ground the nextmorning at daylight, and carefully examined the place

where this successful charge was made. Where Whar-ton's division had been in line was a slight hill sloping

away north ; a large house was on his right, and in

front of it a small work, in which had been apparently

two pieces of artillery. Wharton's infantry had been

in Hue to the northwest from the house, facing about

northeast. Their arms lay in piles, or windrows rather,

Where the wliere they had dropped them when the cavalry struckchl^^. them. The plain across which the cavalry had charged

was dotted with dead horses, and many dead cavalry sol-

diers lay about; one, that I particularly noticed, be-

cause one half of his head was shot away down the lineof his nose so cleanly that not a drop of blood was vis-

ible, lay just in front of Avhere a gun had been. I

judged him to have been killed by the last discharge ofthe gun, when the soldier was close to it, trying to cap-

ture it. An officer in Colonel Lowell's brigade saysColonel Lowell ordered him to charge this Hne of in-

fantry and the guns, but before he could accompUsh it, having to collect his regiment, another body of

Wharton's cavalry had done the work. Wharton's division at this

moraUzed. time was the extreme rear guard, had been working

hard all day, and was undoubtedly demoralized. Ear-

ly's troops were going to pieces behind them. Defeat

was inevitable and imminent. It v.as not a formidable

force on account of these things. It was a small divi-

sion in line of battle ; a good line admirably situated

to deliver an effective fire. Two guns were there and

in use. But the cavalry saw them only to charge


them instantly, and they did it well. In his book,

" The Shenandoah Valley Campaign," Pond says noth-

ing' of this.

We captured in the battle o Winchester five guns, Captures,some colors, and about 2000 prisoners, chiefly of Whar-

ton's division. Most of Sheridan's cavalry folloAved up

that of the Confederate army, and drove it up the little

valley, or Page Valley, as it is called, and was not pres-

ent at the battle of Fisher's Hill, two days after Win-

chester, where Early's infantry and artillery were drawn

up behind works. Averell's brigade, however, was there. General

In the afternoon he went into camp behind the right relieved.

of Sheridan's line without orders, and when Sheridan,

by a wonderful couj) cVml, had utilized his opportunity,

turning a reconnoissance into a real attack, he sent for

Averell to follow up the victory. Finding he had gone

into camp, Sheridan relieved him on the spot.

Recalled to the main army, Sheridan's cavalry pressed

Early back beyond Staunton, in a succession of eager

but small engagements.

The Confederate cavalry, unable to cope with Tor-

bert's bold riders, was reinforced by another brigade

under General Rosser. Rosser on taking command

boastingly proclaimed what he would do. What he did

was to be fairly dashed out of the way, October 9^ at

the battle of " Woodstock Races," as our men called it. ^'^Wood-

His squadrons were ridden over and pursued twenty-six Races."

miles, at a gallop. Rosser's artillery was all captured

entire, guns, horses, men, and even officers. Rosser's

headquarter Avagons Avere taken, or, as Sheridan re-

ported it, " everything he had on wheels," and Custer

came to headquarters wearing Rosser's best uniform.

Fitzhuffh Lee was wounded at Winchester, and Rosser


Rosser sooii after assumed command of all Early's cavalry. Heinaiid. was not a West Point graduate/ but so well thought of

that he was selected to fill Fitzhugh Lee's place, andwas heralded by somebody at the South, in advance, as"the saviour of the valley." He kept this title after-wards, and I fancy it proved somewhat distressing tohim.

One of the Confederate batteries captured at " Wood-A fallen stock Raccs " had in it as a private soldier a West Point

graduate, an old United States officer, who, at thebreaking out of the war, Avent with the South. At firsthe had a higfh command. Rum ruined him, and hishumiliation must have been complete as the West Point-

ers among Sheridan's officers recognized him that night,when dirty, hungry, a private, and a prisoner, he helpeddrive his own guns to his captors' headquarters.

(General General Early's own report to General Lee of this

woes!'' battle gives a pathetic account of his woes, and an ex-

cellent and impartial account of his cavalry. It is asfollows :

This is very distressing to me, and God knows I have done all inmy power to avert the disasters which have befallen this command ;but the fact is, that the enemy's cavalry is so much superior to ours,both in numbers and equipment, and the country is so favorable to

the operations of cavalry, that it is impossible for ours to compete

with his. Lomax's cavalry is armed entirely with rifles, and has no

sabres, and the consequence Is that they cannot fight on horseback,

and in this open country they cannot successfully fight on foot

against large bodies of cavalry ; besides, the command is and hasbeen demoralized all the time. It would be better if they could all

be put into the infantry ; but if that were tried I am afraid they

would all run off.

1 Was at West Point about four years, and resigned on account of thewar.

ROBERT /'/ILLIAV1S

Capt. 2nd U. S. Dragoons, iSbt


The Confederate cavalry was fairly used up and un-

able to take the field in any considerable force, and it

made no show at the battle of Cedar Creek, October 19,beino- brushed away almost ignominiously by Custer

early in the day. Not so the Federal cavalry, who came increasing1 1 1 T\T effective-

into line with the infantry {Custer on the right and Mer- nessof our^ ^

/->( 1 cavalry.

ritt and Lowell on the left, the whole under General

Torbert). On both flanks they fought infantry, andLowell particularly put in his men mounted against

Kershaw's division of Longstreet's corps, who were notmerely in open country, but were protected by stone

walls. For hours did our cavalry attack and keep back

Kershaw's fine division, and they charged up to the

stone walls, and here Lowell lost his life, and many

brave officers and men were killed and wounded.

Charles Russell Lowell was a man made by nature for Charles1 1 T r 1 n Russell

a cavalry leader. Durnig the eight weeks oi the valley Lowell,

campaign his command, the regular brigade of 1st, 2d,and 5th United States, and 2d Massachusetts cavalry,

was almost daily engaged ; and at one time for twenty-

four consecutive days was in a fight of more or less im-

portance. He had in the eight weeks no less than fif-teen horses killed under him. What he did so conspic-uously, all the rest did in high degree. The losses weresevere, the glory great, the success splendid. Sheridan

had picked Lowell out almost at once as an officer ofexceeding merit.

Cedar Creek may be considered the end of this cam-paign, for no fighting of any importance followed.

In the spring of 1865 Sheridan's cavalry rode downto Grant before Petersburg, sweeping up all that re-

mained north of the James, capturing the last guns left. Early re-and putting a military quietus on Jubal Early, General quietus.

30 FIBST MASSACHUSETTS CAVALRY.

Lee's " bad old man," as he was called. His undoubted

ability as a soldier, his perseverance and couraoe, de-

served a better fate. We knew him as a hard fighterand o-ood hater, and he is still irreconcilable.

Before Pe- Arriving before Petersburg, March 27, Sheridan wasere urg.

^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^j^^ j^|.^ flank witli his cavalry, and howhe helped to push the Army of Northern Virginia to its

At Five fate is a matter of history. At the battle of Five Forks

the cavalry fought infantry, besides what remained of

the Confederate cavalry.

In the final and successful attack in that battle, it

was the 5th corps, particularly Ayres' division, that

turned the flank of the breastworks, and made the vic-tory complete ; but on the front the cavalry, before the

arrival of the 5th corps, drove all the Confederate troops

behind their works and held them there ; and later, at

Cavalry the final battle, rode over the breastworks and followed

the breast- up tlic victory. General Pickett, commanding the Con-

federate infantry at Five Forks, said that while giving

his final orders that day, just behind the breastworks," a Federal cavalry soldier, mounted on a mule, jumpedover the works and called on me to ' surrender, and be

damned.' "

At Appo- No one can doubt to-day, that the final surrender at

Appomattox was due very largely to the cavalry, which

constantly, during those splendid days, pressed against

the Confederate army in front, flank, and rear ; never

hesitating to inquire whether the force in their way was

cavalry or infantry. Like the Irishman with his shille-

lah, " they hit a head wherever they saw it."

^Vlten Lee It was ouly Avlieu General Lee found Sheridan's cav-

that'^the airy finally between his army and its supplies at Appo-

come.' mattox that he reaHzed the end had come, and surren-


clered. Whether the cavahy directly caused the surren-der or not, it is safe to say that the surrender wouldnot have occurred then and there but for the boldness,dash, and perseverance with which Sheridan, with hissplendid force, attacked Lee's army, and relentlessly fol-'lowed his retreating^ columns.

In the Army of the Potomac there were in 1863 about Numericalforty regiments of cavalry, originally of 1200 men andhorses each. In 1864 there were about forty-two. Asthese were recruited from the States in which they wereenlisted, and as the desire was to recruit as many regi-ments as possible, rather than to keep full the regimentsalready in the field, it resulted that these soon becamevery small. Seldom could one be found, unless veryrecently put in the field, with over three hundred men.And many were smaller. To say that this was a very A faultyfaulty way of administration falls far short of a propercondemnation. It prevented efficiency in those regi-ments which were best disciplined, for want of strength.It not only brought into the field useless regiments, be-cause wanting in drill and experience, but it usuallyfurnished plenty of inexperienced field officers, of highrank, who would by mere seniority come into j^romi-nent command, unless specially got out of the way.

This was managed better in Lee's army, where thecompanies of old regiments were kept filled up, insteadof creating new and consequently useless battalions.Their regiments were almost invariably stronger thanours. A comparison by number of regiments^, therefore,gives an incorrect idea of the strength of the cavalry inthe two armies. Lee had about thirty-six regiments.Nobody who has not served in the cavalry can appre- Sources of

ciate the many sources of demoralization constantly at Lldon!


Cavalryservice nosinecure.

Heavylosses incavalryfights.

Unremit-ting hardwork.

work. The man and horse are essentially one ; any ill-ness of either affects both. A false fold in the horse'sblanket may ruin him. Epidemic diseases may formonths paralyze the entire force. " Greased heel " and" glanders" were the most formidable epidemics.

It has been thought by many infantry soldiers, men

and officers, that the cavalry service is easy and not

dangerous. Joe Hooker's exclamation, " Who ever sawa dead cavalryman

!

" was hugely relished by the in-

fantry.

I have already shown that for want of experience and

training, and of proper cavalry generals, until June,

1863, the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac neverhad a fair chance to show its prowess. When it did,later, it improved it nobly, and made up for formerwant of opportunity ; and many of the cavalry battles

were remarkable for the losses. At Aldie, the 1st Mas-

sachusetts cavalry lost, in about an hour, one hundred

and sixty one officers and men out of three hundred.

During the Richmond raid in 1864, the same regimentlost eight of fifteen officers, and nearly half its men, in

eleven days, without fighting a general engagement, but

constantly engaged in small affairs. It is not likely

that such figures are at all peculiar to this regiment.

Certainly General Hooker would never have made hisfamous remark a little later, nor was it deserved then.

As to the work done by the cavalry, it was severe

at all times, and was never remitted, even in winter.

The same terrible picket duty and patrol, with constantskirmishes and hard marches, continued the whole year.

Such a thing as a permanent camp behind w^orks was

unknown. Terms of picket duty sometimes continued,

with the same men, in winter, for two weeks at a time.

'"^^^^J>

THE IDEAL CAVALRYMAN

THE REAL CAVALRYMAN


In the winter of 1863-64 the men averaged more thanhalf their time on picket, and raids and reconnoissances

were extra.

The vedettes were on post alone (not by twos andthrees) two hours at a time. During the winter of1862-63, when Hooker's army was in front of Freder-icksburg, the picket duty was something horrible. The Exp9suresoldiers had only shelter tents, the horses no protection, duty.

The roads were, in places, two feet deep with mud,slush, and water. Sometimes on relieving the vedettes,

horses would be found dead from exposure and hunger.

Oats alone could be taken on picket as forage, and the

horses were always kept saddled. In their hunger they

ate off each other's manes and tails, and a more mis-

erable spectacle than the cavalry horses during this

winter could hardly be found. They died by hun-dreds.

Be it remembered, this was not necessary. It was a Unneees-

wanton and disgraceful and costly misuse of a splendid ships.

body of men and horses. But this misuse was notwithout its benefit. It was an effective school, if ex-

pensive, for when a man has found out what he will notdo, he is on the way to knowledge at any rate.

The daily work of the cavalry soldier cannot be called Cavalry T> 1 n 1 T duties not

easy, even when m camp. Besides all the ordinary du- easy.

ties of the infantry soldier is the care of the horse.

And the soldier has not only his own horse to clean,but the horses of all the men on camp guard, the sick,

and any on extra duty. The forage is to be hauled,and all the horse equipments are to be kept in order,

besides carbine, pistol, and sabre.During a campaign, at the end of a long march, be-

fore a tent is pitched or any attempt at individual com-

rest


fort can be made, forage must be procured, frequently

from a distance. The horses must be unsaddled, cleanedand watered twice a day in camp. *^ Stable call " lasts

Never at two hours cvcry day. In fact, the cavalry soldier is

never at rest, and while in the field all these thingsmust be done in intervals of fighting.

I have known horses to remain saddled fifteen daysand nights at a time, and only a part cleaned and fed.The only sleep the troopers got during the first twoweeks of May, 1864, was on the ground in front of thehorses, holding the bridle in their hands ; and oflicershad to do the same. During the 1864 campaign allofficers had shelter tents, the same as the troopers. Thetroopers acquired a faculty of sleeping on horseback on

the march.

Faacina- As to the comfort, there can be no comparison be-tween cavalry and infantry service, none as to theamount of work. But there is something very attrac-

tive in the service in spite of all. It is more venture-

some and varied. Here to-day, there to-morrow. Morechance for foraging. Sometimes better food ; never somuch hardtack and pork, but not unfrequently greathunsrer and want.

The sauce During the Antietam campaign, from September 2duntil the 20th, neither forage nor rations were issued to

the cavalry. The troopers fed upon green corn, apples,and past recollections, with an occasional feast at some

farmhouse. The sauce of hunger was always plentifuland strono-. The horses fed on screen cornstalks almostentirely, a very poor food by the way, and supposed tohave much to do with producing the epidemic of"greased heel," which broke out among them soonafter.

tion of theservice

of hunger.


In many respects the equipments were faulty and Faulty and, . T f^ . f unneces-

senseless. Cavalry is supposed to enect surprises, it sary equip-

should be able to march silently. Why then the jing-ling- sabre ? The metal scabbard and metal fasteningsmake the noise. They also keep the sabre dull, inviterust, and add to the soldier's work. A wooden orleather scabbard lined with wood is better, would benoiseless, and keep the sabre bright and sharp ; for thesabre is supj^osed to be sharp.

Of the horse equipment much was useless. The lariatrope and picket-pin were born of service on the plains,

where they were necessary in feeding the horses on

grass;parts of the saddle had the same origin, as, for

examnle, the hooded stirrups. The soldier had too Burden-^

1 /~i p 1 ' 1 c ^some out-

many arms. The Confederate, instead or arming the fit.

entire regiment with rifles or carbines, had sharpshooter

companies, thus leaving a part of the regiment with

only pistol and carbine. Until towards the end of1863, their carbines and rifles were muzzle-loading. Bythat time they had captured enough breech-loaders tolargely arm their reduced numbers with them. TheFederal cavalry had breech-loaders of various systems,principally Sharps, and the Michigan brigade had theSpencer magazine seven shooters " coffee mills," theConfederates called them. The various carbines wereof different calibre, and with a variety of ammunitionthat caused confusion.

Compared with this the Confederate outfit was mea-gre and simple, but strong in essential points. I havespoken of their well-trained and well-bred horses. Whenmy own regiment was mounted, the horses were boughtof contractors, and were said at the time to include all ment of

viciousthe vicious and unmanagfeable animals in the State of animals.

36 FinST MASSACHUSETTS CAVALRY.

Canadianliorses.

Dash andenterpriseof rebelcavsilry.

Par nobilefratrum.

]\Iassacliiisetts. They were a motley lot, few havingever been ridden, generally " Canucks," as the Canadahorses are called short-leo-ged animals with thickmane and tail, about fifteen hands high. They provedexcellent animals, and seemed able to endure hardshii)and hunger nearly in proportion to their Canadianblood. These Canucks are supposed to be Norman-French horses, degenerated in size

;good-tempered, and

exceedingly hardy. When they could not get hay theywould eat the bark of trees, leaves, almost anything;and would thrive where horses of some other breedwould starve. The last of these Massachusetts horsesin the regiment was stolen in crossing the Pamunky, atHanovertown, in June, 18G-i, much to the grief of hisrider.

The Confederate cavalry was efficient, well-mounted,and led with dash and enterprise from the very start.It obtained at once the prestige, and held it until June,1863.

Our Southern friends in the cavalry certainly foughtwell, and some of them are evidently as strong with thepen as with the sword, notably Von Borcke, Gilmor,and Mosby.

General J. E. B. Stuart not only commanded theConfederate cavalry, he made it. At Chancellorsville,after Stonewall Jackson's death, he commanded hiscorps, and showed himself a general of very high order.Fitzhugh Lee was far and away next best after Stuart,if not his equal. He Avas called to the chief commandat a time when the task was desperate.The Confederate cavalry started its career in pride,

sti-ength, and success; the Federal cavalry in confu-sion and inefficiency, and had to make itself. This was


naturally not done in a day, nor did any leader of mag-

netic influence call out its powers. It was done pain-

fully, slowly, and with many a humiliating experience.Hard knocks and defeats taught it vigilance, and themost able officers grew up with and out of it.The Federal cavalry, for a long time, was not fortu-

nate in its leaders. Perhaps it is fairer to say that the

faulty system, or want of system, prevented the leaders

from accomplishing anything. A cavalry general is not Rarity ofeasily found in even trained armies, and none appeared generals.

in the Army of the Potomac to hasten the natural pro-cess.

Sheridan, who was the most brilliant commander thewar furnished, perhaps, on either side, was not trained

in the United States cavalry, having been an infantryofficer, and for some time serving as quartermaster.

I find in a most interesting book on cavalry, by Bis-marck (Lectures on the Tactics of Cavalry, 1818), thefollowino' :o

"A sufficient number of able generals of infantry has been found at Bismarck'sall times, in all armies, but very rarely ojie of cavalry." " Cavalry

will jjroljably in future times no longer occupy a place in line of bat-

tle, until some eminent talent on a throne discerns its strength, andout of the whole body of officers places the ablest, most resolute,steady, and boldest at its head, and in future wars overcomes thosenations who, following the spirit of our time (ever less productive of

truly warlike characters), neglect the cavalry." " But all command-ers of armies have not known how to derive advantage from cav-alry," etc., etc.

" The secret of bringing about great effects by cavalry lies in the Secret ofpersonal qualities of the leader. Striking instances are recorded of f^^^,^

"

the opposite effects produced l)y different commanders upon the sametroops. When Murat upbraided Junot for his inaction after cross-ing the Prudisi, Junot alleged in excuse that he had no orders to at-tack, that his Wurtemberg cavalry were shy, etc., that they could


never be brought to charge the enemy's battalions. These wordsInspiration Murat answered by deeds. He rushed on at the head of the troopsleader. who, with a different leader, were quite different men ; he urged

them on, launched them against the Russians, overthrew their sku'-mishers, and then returning to Junot said, ' Now finish the business

!

your glory and your marshal's staff are before you.' A similar an-ecdote is told of Colonel Rousset, an oflBcer of Louis XIV., and Cap-tain Churchill, afterwards Duke of Marlborough, at the siege ofNimeguen (1672). On this occasion the French colonel had beenobliged to abandon a post. Turenne, who witnessed the retreat,betted that Churchill, with half the force, would regain it. He gavehim the command, and after a desperate struggle the future duke, inpresence of the whole army, recovered the position."

" In these wars (1756) amongst other ai'mies were actions ofsingle cavalry detachments and regiments worthy of being handeddown to military posterity. But there was nothing done upon alarge scale. There was hut one Seidlitz."

General Sheridan was selected by General Grant onthis principle, and fully justified his intelligence. Un-der Sheridan only did the Federal cavalry gain theprominence it deserved.

What Think of what might have been effected at severalhave been, battles iu tlic War had there been in command a generalat Antie-

, , ^

^^

tarn.^i^Q ii^^i i\^Q power of seeing his opportunity and im-proving it when it occurred ! At Antietam, McClellanin the centre, above tlie Antietam Creek, on highground, with Porter's large and efficient corps at hiselbow, and all his cavalry within five hundred yards ofLee's guns, which alone connected the two wings of hisarmy, should have seen his opportunity. He was not ac-customed, as was Sheridan, to be on the ground visit-ing in turn all the critical positions, in contact with his

generals, and almost with his enemy, ready to fight hisbattle as opportmiity offered, taking advantage of his

enemy's errors, and snatching victory from him. But

^th.:' ",'*.0^^^i:

m.M

%l\

ROBERT WILLIAMS

Co/, nnd Brvt. Briif. Geiil. U. S. A.


he could not help seeing the chance at Antietam, for it

was thundered into his ears, and must have burned hiseyes. He was of the generals who fight battles in tents,on paper, at a table the day before. His enthusiasmwas shown at reviews, or before the battle. The battle-field showed him nothing.

After Gettysburg, a general of marked ability in com- Duty ofmand of all the combined cavalry of Meade's army after Oet-should have at least captured all Lee's wagons andmuch of his artillery, if not have prevented his crossingthe Potomac.

It is not without interest to notice the remarkable

number of distinguished officers of the Confederacy whoserved in the United States cavalry before 1861 ; mostof them were always cavalry officers : Generals R. E. Galaxy ofLee, A. S. Johnston, J. E. Johnston, Kirby Smith, Har- ate cavalry

oB.C6rsdee, J. E. B. Stuart, Fitzhugh Lee, W. W. Loring,VanDorn, G. B. Crittenden, J. B. Hood, Field, Evans,George H. Stuart, Richard B. Ewell, and many more ofless note.

In the Federal army the list is not so long nor so re- Sedgwickmarkable, John Sedgwick and George H. Thomas being Thomas.the most distinguished.

My sketch is of necessity very imperfect, since, to be Imperfectgeneral, it had to be greatly condensed. I trust it mayhave illustrated to infantry listeners some peculiaritiesof the cavalry. To cavalry listeners I almost feel I owean apology for saying so much that is trite, and partic-ularly in seeming to labor to prove propositions that totliem must be self-evident.

CHAPTER 11.

m MASSACHUSETTS, SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER30, 1861.

The first volunteer rej^iments of cavalry were raised Tiie regu-about September 1, 1861. Prior to that time there formed the

1 TT 1 o model ofwere of resfular cavah-y troops m the United States volunteer~

.

regiments.

army six regiments, of twelve companies each. These

formed the model upon which the volunteer regiments

were built. And in almost all cases volunteer regi-ments Avere organized from the militia cavalry organ-

izations in the different States.

As cavalry was considered a chosen corps, and the

volunteer soldiers had an idea that the work would be

easier, and as the idea of riding upon a horse was an

attractive one, these regiments filled up very rapidly. Volunteer

But no attempt was made to enlist the men with regard regiments. . 1 n 1 p 1

nil rapidly.

to a previous occupation, which should fit them lor that

peculiar service. It would have been better to have se-

lected men of light weight, accustomed to horses, rather

than men of heavy weight who were strange to the ani-mal ; but this is merely one of the things that were not

done as they should have been, owing to the vast un-

dertaking of organizing an immense army suddenly.

The 1st Massachusetts cavalry was made up almostentirely from existing military organizations. Compa- Origin ofnies A and B were made out of the Boston Dragoons ; panies?"'companies C, D, and G from the Boston Lancers ; com-

IN MASSACHUSETTS. 41

panies L and M from the Waltliam Dragoons (the lat- isei,ter company received a large number of men recruited ber.in Haverhill by Lieutenant Batchelder); companies Iand K from the North Bridgewater Dragoons, in theOld Colony ; E and F from near Springfield, from theSpringfield Horseguards ; company H was raised inEssex County, from no cavalry militia company. Its

original officers were from Marblehead.Not a few of the men who had been drilled in these

militia companies enlisted for the service in the regi-

ment. All of these companies elected their officers ac- OfficersdGC

a history of the first regiment of massachusetts cavalry volunteers

Documents

brevet colonel

letters senthome

letters of sergeant

new yorkhoughton

gleasonbrevet majorfor

letters of manyother

time avas

written aboutthe war