a first book of metaphysics

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A FIRST BOOK IN METAPHYSICS


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THE MACMILLAN COMPANYNEW YORK " BOSTON " CHICAGO

DALLAS " SAN FRANCISCO

MACMILLAN " CO., LIMITED

LONDON " BOMBAY " CALCUTTA

MELBOURNE

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.TORONTO


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A FIRST BOOKIN

METAPHYSICS

BY

WALTER T. MARVINCOLLEGIATE CHURCH PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND MENTAL

PHILOSOPHY IN RUTGERS COLLEGE

"DfomTHE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1912All rights reserved


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COPYRIGHT, 1912,BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Set up and electrotyped. Published November,

PRESS OF T. MOREY " SON

GREENFIELD, MASS.. U. S. A.


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TOA. H. M.


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PREFACEThis book is planned to be a student's firstbook in

philosophy, though the course which it outlines mayeitherprecede or follow a course in the historyof philosophy. In writing the book I have had in mind to fulfilthe following three purposes: First,I wished the bookto be simple, clear and definite,and as brief as possible

in order that the student using itmight devote byfar the largerpart of his time to further reading. Thatis,the book should form a system of closely connectedtopics,an outline to be filledin by extensive outsidereading and an outline to keep thisreading from becoming hopelesslyconfusing. This reading should be selectedfrom current philosophicalliteratureand especiallyfromthose philosophical classicswhich are intelligibleo thebeginner.

Secondly, I wished to write,not an outlineof the historical development of the problems of metaphysics,nor a long discussion regarding the definitionand division of philosophy, nor again an account of rivalphilosophical schools and their theories, but a book inmetaphysics, a book representing consistentlyone contemporary philosophicaltendency. This forced the bookto be partisan,but I believe that the beginner demands,and has the right to demand, a modern philosophicalcreed. Later he may have to outgrow this creed, but

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V1U PREFACE

in the meantime he insistsupon being a partisan andtakes littleinterestin being led through a philosophicalmuseum. Accordingly, following my own philosophicalconvictions,I have tried to formulate brieflyand rigorously that type of neo-realism which is a return at leastto the spirit,though not always to the letter,of Platoand of Aristotle.

Lastly, I wished to adapt the book especiallyto theOxford or preceptorialmethod of instruction. According to this method, the text-book and the lectures inclass should serve to give a general view of the subjectbut should play a far lessimportant part than the student's independent reading and study. The results ofthis reading and study should be expressed in a weekly,or better fortnightly,essay submitted to the preceptorand afterward discussed with him in an informal conference held preferably in hisprivate study and attendedby not more than three or four students. This enablesthe teacher to deal with his students as individuals andto vary greatly the amount and kind of reading he assigns to each. Some will do not only more difficultreading than others but three or four times the amountof reading.

Besides being adapted especiallyto the use of undergraduate students in philosophy, the book is,ifI mistakenot, adapted also to the use of graduate students as anoutlineof a course of reading in metaphysics.

A few words should be added regarding the reading Ihave selected to which to refer the student. One hasto select from writings which are easily available and,unfortunately, as far as possibleonly from those in the


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PREFACE IX

English tongue. Hence, it is often a matter of goodfortune to find articlesor chapters which fit preciselythe subjectf study and which are suitablefor the beginner. However, this responsibility will be sharedwith me by every instructorwho uses the book, for notonly can he add to or select from the listof readingswhich I give but he can do what of course the book itselfcan not do, keep selectingfrom new articlesand booksas they appear. My chief regret is that many of thegreat classics,especially the logical and metaphysicalwritings of Aristotle,are not intelligibleo the beginnerand therefore have had to be eitheromitted or assignedonly for advanced reading. WALTER T. MARVIN.

GREENSBORO, VERMONT,August i, 1912.


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CONTENTSPART I. INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER I. DIFFERENT VIEWS REGARDING THE NATURE OFPHILOSOPHY 3

i. Introduction. 2. The beliefthat philosophy isa matterof feelingand appreciative insight. 3. The beliefthat philosophy isa science. 4. The standpoint of the present book.

CHAPTER II. THE DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY AND OFMETAPHYSICS 12

i. The difficultyof defining philosophy. 2. The cause ofthis difficulty.3. Popular philosophy. 4. The definition ofphilosophy. 5. Metaphysics denned. 6. The program ofthis book.

PART II. THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

CHAPTER III. THE NATURE OF THAT WHICH is KNOWN ... 25i. The nature of information. 2. The nature of truth.

3. The nature of propositions. 4. The knowledge of propositions. 5. The ascertainment of truth. 6. The nature of explanation. 7. The world. 8. Existence.

CHAPTER IV. EVERYMAN'S THEORY OF REALITY 42i. Introduction. 2. The world as perceived. 3. The world

of common sense. 4. Appearance and reality.CHAPTER V. THE NATURE OF SCIENCE 53

i. The nature of science. 2. Faith. 3. Two ultimate typesof fact. 4. The definitionof science.

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Xll CONTENTS

CHAPTER VI. THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE 62i. The progress of science. 2. The place of metaphysics in

science.

PART III. PROBLEMS OF GENERAL METAPHYSICS

CHAPTER VII. ROMANTICISM AND LOGIC 75i. The problem. 2. Can what we perceive be analyzed into

terms and relations? 3. Can what we perceive be explained?4. Can what we perceive be fullyexplained?CHAPTER VIII. LOGICAL MONISM AND LOGICAL PLURALISM 86

i. The problem. 2. The significance of the problem.3. Arguments for monism. 4. Arguments for pluralism.

CHAPTER IX. THE CRITERION OF TRUTH 96i. The problem. 2. Consequences of the two rivaltheories

regarding the ultimate test of truth. 3. Arguments againstthe coherence theory. 4. Progress in perception. 5. Empiricismvs. Rationalism.

CHAPTER X. NOMINALISM vs. PLATONIC REALISM 106i. The problem. 2. Existence and subsistence. 3. A de

fense of Platonic realism. 4. Conclusion.

CHAPTER XI. CAUSATION 115i. Introduction. 2. Causation reducible to implication.3. The different types of causes. 4. Causal pluralism.

5. Chance, or spontaneity. 6. Conclusion.

CHAPTER XII. TEMPORALISM AND EVOLUTION 128i. Two problems. 2. Temporalism. 3. Evolution.

CHAPTER XIII. THE LOGICAL STRATA OF REALITY 136i. Introduction. 2. Logical continuity and discontinuity


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CONTENTS Xlll

inreality.3. The logicaltrata ofreality.4. The logicalependence of the sciencesupon one another. 5. The passagefrom simplicityto complexityin evolution.6. Conclusion.CHAPTER XIV. SUPERNATURALISM 150

i. Introduction. 2. Supernaturalism. 3. Originof super-naturalism. 4. The issuebetween naturalism and super-naturalism.

APPENDIX: THEOLOGY AS A METAPHYSICS 160i. Introduction. 2. The ontologicalargument for God's

existence. 3. The cosmologicalargument for God's exist- ^ence. 4. The teleologicalargument for God's existence.5. The nature of creation. 6. The relationbetween God andthe world.

CHAPTER XV. THE SUBSTANCE HYPOTHESIS 169i. Introduction. 2. A more rigorousformulationof the

substancehypothesis.3. Criticismofthesubstancehypothesis.

APPENDIX: THE METAPHYSICS OF SUBSTANCE 180i. Introduction. 2. The kinds of substance. 3. Pluralism ./and monism. 4. The relationbetween thesubstances.5. The

problem of change.

CHAPTER XVI. IDEALISM 186i. Introduction.2. The idealisticypothesis.3. The evi- *

dence offeredinsupport ofidealism.4. The refutationftheidealisticypothesis.

APPENDIX: IDEALISTICHYPOTHESES 196i. Introduction. 2. Representativerealismand phenom

enalism. 3. Subjectivend objectivedealism.


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XIV CONTENTS

CHAPTER XVII. DOGMATISM vs. CRITICISM 201i. Introduction. 2. Criticism. 3. The issue between crit

icism and dogmatism. 4. The refutation of criticism.5. Conclusion.

APPENDIX: THE METAPHYSICS OF CRITICISM 211i. Introduction. 2. A classificationof epistemological

theories. 3. The metaphysics of these theories.

PART IV. PROBLEMS OF SPECIAL METAPHYSICS

CHAPTER XVIII. THE LOGICAL 221i. Introduction. 2. The subjectatter of formal logic.

3. Logic and existence.

CHAPTER XIX. THE MATHEMATICAL 227i. The nature of mathematics. 2. Mathematics deducible

from formal logic. 3. Mathematics as a non-existentialscience. 4. Some mathematical resultsof great philosophicalimportance.CHAPTER XX. THE PHYSICAL 236

i. Introduction. 2. The definitionof the physical. 3. Mechanics and energetics. 4. The relation between physicaltheory and physical existence.

CHAPTER XXI. LIFE 248i. Introduction. 2. Mechanism and vitalism. 3. Bio

logicalatomism.

CHAPTER XXII. THE MENTAL 256i. Introduction. 2. The subjectmatter of psychology.3. The nature of consciousness. 4. The relation between

mind and body. 5. The soul.


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PART I

INTRODUCTORY


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A FIRST BOOK IN METAPHYSICS

CHAPTER IDIFFERENT VIEWS REGARDING THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

i. Introduction. In this chapter we are to reasonabout philosophy, not to study philosophy itself. Weare forced to do thisin beginning an elementary book inphilosophy because radically different opinions existamong philosophers themselves as to what philosophy is,that is,as to itsproper subject-matternd as to the validmethods of philosophical research. Some thinkers believethat philosophy is a science and that it should bediscovered and reasoned out by methods which aredistinctlyscientific;hereas other thinkers regard it asfundamentally unlike science. Either they believe thatit is an imaginative or esthetic insight,as is poetry orpainting, or they believe that it is a different sort ofintellectualprocedure from the research which gives usthe specialsciences.

To understand these differentopinions regarding thenature of philosophy without taking sides in the issueitselfforces us to study them from the point of view ofpsychology. In so doing, we shallsee that the differencesinvolved resultfrom differencesin the mental lifeof thevarious philosophers. Philosophers are men of markedlyunlike temperament. For some the scientificinterestis

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4 A FIRST BOOK IN METAPHYSICS

dominant, for some the religiousinterest,for others themoral, and for stillothers the esthetic interestsare supreme. The philosopher with the scientificemperamentisnot always troubled ifphilosophy failsto furnishhim areligion;whereas the philosopher with strong religioustemperament may have as his soleinterestin philosophythe insightitcan give him into the world as the environment of man's spirituallifeand as the means of fulfillinghis spiritualaspirations. Similarly the man with pronounced artistictemperament may seek in philosophyonly the means of satisfyinghisestheticdesiresregardingthe world; and finally the man whose mental bias iswholly moral may narrow his philosophical interest tothe one problem, the world as the scene in which manfightsfor the good and wins the victory over his basernature.

Philosophers are men not only of unlike temperaments but alsowith differentexperiences,men possessingdifferentsorts of knowledge, men who react differentlytothe abstractarguments and resultsof the specialsciences.One man's experience may be narrow and provincial,another's extensive and even world wide. One may betrained in the exact sciences,another may be chieflyapsychologist, sociologistor anthropologist. One may bea student of theory, the other may be a man of action.One may be interestedin the abstract sciences,may beimpressed with the exactitude of mathematical and experimental research; the other may dislikesuch studybut love the concrete world of nature and of lifewithitswealth of detailand with itsunfailingvariety.

It would take us farbeyond the purpose of thischapter


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VIEWS REGARDING THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY 5to trace out the resultsof allthese mental factorsin thehistory of philosophy. It fulfilsthe purpose to emphasize two general types of beliefregarding the nature ofphilosophy, thebeliefhatphilosophyis a matter offeelingor estheticinsightand thebeliefhatitis a science.

2. The beliefhatphilosophyis a matter offeelingndappreciativensight. Ifphilosophy isa matter of estheticinsight,philosophy cannot be called eithertrue or false,it cannot be demonstrated or given a rigorous verification. Rather it will be like the styles and customs inliteratureor art. Now this philosophy, now that, willbe widely received and welcomed by differentpeoplesand differentages. There willbe as many philosophiesas there are differenttemperaments and differenttypesof human experience. There will be mysticism withitsdistrustof reason. There willbe naturalism with itsdistrust of religion. There will be obscurantism andthere will be radicalism, there will be allegiance withecclesiasticismand again bitter hostilityto the church,there will be optimism and pessimism, there will bestoicism with its single-hearted devotion to the morallaw, and there willbe rationalismwith itsemphasis uponthe universal reign of order. Under such conditions itis utterly idle to expect men to agree philosophically orto endeavor to bring about a consensus of opinion regarding the solution of fundamental philosophicalproblems.In short, the world cannot be understood, it cannot bemade the subjectf theory, it can only be felt andlived.

However, the philosopher himself who holds theseviews regarding philosophy is very often an advocate of


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a distinctphilosophicaltheory, and perhaps we can bestexpress the differencebetween him and other philosophersby callinghim a perceivernd them thinkers. The per-ceiverloves the concrete, and distruststhe abstract. Toknow the world you must be part of it,live it,drinkdeeply of the cup of life,in short you must perceiveheworld. The world cannot be known in terms of theabstract sciences,in terms of logic. The world is not alogicalpuzzle. It is rather a living,growing, evolvingconcrete object,f an infinitevariety which completelybafflesabstractthought and system. This type of philosopher is usually called a romanticist. He refuses to beheld down to precise and rigorous logic. He needs anddemands poeticlicense.

j. The beliefhatphilosophyis a science. Opposed toromanticism is the beliefthat philosophy is a science.If philosophy isa science then not only isittrue or falsebut it can be demonstrated. Philosophers may disagreeas to what the words true and falsemean and as to thelimits to which philosophical research can attain; butin any case there isagreement that the philosopher as aseeker after truth is called upon to verifyhis assertions.The differencesin beliefamong philosophers are not dueto any cause which makes a consensus of opinion impossible,rather they are due to the difficultyof the problems,to the imperfect insightof the student or to the errors ofhis training. These differences between philosopherswill in time gradually disappear as further knowledgeand insight,further mutual understanding and discussion,make the problems and theirsolutionsthoroughlyexplicit.


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VIEWS REGARDING THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY 7

In general, however, there is a radical differenceofopinion within this philosophical group itselfregardingwhat science is and therefore regarding the nature ofphilosophy. To one, science seems to be a mere instrument invented by man, by means of which he can adjusthimself to environment and satisfyhis needs. To thisphilosopher, truth is not something absolute, fixed,orinvariable. It is but another name for perfect adjustment. To the other philosopher truth is absolute andinvariable. Science is the discovery of something entirelyindependent of man, and of his struggle for existence and happiness. As a consequence of thisdifference,philosophy seems to the former thinker to be solely astudy of man, of his history and of the processes bywhich he has become in part master of his environment.But to the latter thinker philosophy is a science of theworld, a world not made by man, a world whose generalnature is fixed and determined regardless of humanhistory. The former philosophers are nowadays calledpragmatists or subjectivistsnd the latter might becalled objectivistsr intellectualists.But these namesare quite ambiguous, and they should be used thereforewith utmost caution.

The objectivistarty, or better,the scientificarty inthe narrow sense, isagain divided into two distinctgroupsor types. Let us for convenience callthem the monistsand the pluralists,though again these names are thoroughly ambiguous. The monist starts with the convictionthat the goal of scienceisto understand the worldas a unity. Any knowledge of things that leaves themindependent and not unified brands itselfipsofacto


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as incomplete and imperfect. The ultimate and soleproblem of science for the monist then is to understandhow the many things of the world, how the infinitevariety and change found in the world, all constituteone system or whole. This philosopher is compelled tobuild up such an understanding not by starting withthe many and various objectsnd events of nature butby starting with certain axioms or a prioriconvictionsregarding the world and deducing his theory of realitylargely therefrom. He cannot really use the knowledgeput at his disposal by the special sciences,because itis never complete enough for his purpose. He must getsome infallibleand universal truths

by directmeans. Inshort, he is what is called an absolutistand his methodis a prioriand deductive. As a consequence, under hisleadership philosophy becomes quite divorced from therest of science. It isof little,fof any, help to the specialsciencesas they are of littleassistanceto it. Moreover,the doctrine is entertained that the special sciences areless certain,lessvalid, than philosophy, that they areonly relative or imperfect truth, whereas philosophyis absolute or perfect truth.

This divorce from science seems to the pluralisticopponent not only unfortunate but disastrous forphilosophy. Thoroughly as he may agree with themonist that we are to seek to unify our knowledge, tosearch for the interconnection between things, nevertheless he is convinced that the monist's method leadsdirectlyand inevitably back to romanticism and mysticism. It may indeed be that the world is a unity butthere are no sound methods of research known to man


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VIEWS REGARDING THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY 9

other than those used and developed in the specialsciences. We must be content to go slowly; we mustbe content to wait for the results of science, to acceptprobabilitiesand to live by them; we must be satisfiedwith an imperfect incomplete knowledge. The mostcertainbody of knowledge isscience,especiallythe exactsciences;and the philosopher can ignore this only at hisgreat peril. Thus the pluralistisin closesympathy withscience. His methods are the methods of science,hisinformation starts from science. He believes that thephilosophical problems must be kept open as scientificproblems are kept open. There is no short cut to thegoal. There is no infalliblejudgeto tellus when ourwork is done and the race completely won. There areonly the individual daily triumphs to assure us that weare making progress.

4. The standpointof the presentbook. The authorconfesses that he belongs to the lastparty, the pluralists,but he confesses at the same time his fear of allpartisanship. No doubt the world's work gets done by strongpartisans,but strong partisans are seldom wholly rightinwhat they deny. The philosopher especiallyneeds to distrust his own party enthusiasm even though he needs alsoto cherish itin the interestof progress. The chances arethat in the long run we shallneed allthe help, the suggestion,and the insight the great philosophers of everyparty and creed have given the world. The chances arethat one man's eyesight is better in one environmentthan is another man's, that our differencesare thus inpart due to the greater emphasis differentfacts receive.The fieldof perception is far broader than the fieldof


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precise and verifiableknowledge; and this means thatthe pluralistshould be most tolerant toward the viewsof other philosophers and of leaders in religion,art,literatureand life,for though their views may not bescientifichey may contain the raw material of science.We must not forget the historyof scienceitself.Scienceisof humble parentage, for itgrew out of vague insights,analogies,and obscure feelings. Yet though the fieldofvague perception isbroader than that of preciseperception,thisdoes not indicate a permanent state of affairs.It indicatesrather the need of growth and the likelihoodof growth.

However, letthisbe as itmay, even should the pluralistbe wrong in what he denies,surely he cannot be wrongin what he affirms. There is,undeniably, a philosophyof science or a scientificphilosophy. Though this mayhave limits which will forever prevent it from fulfilling the philosopher'shighest aspiration for knowledge;stillitis a body of valid knowledge having a right to aplace in the hierarchy of the sciences. In short, thepluralisticmetaphysics must be given a place somewhere in the philosophy of allthoughtful men.

Of course my own conviction remains that the pluralist is right also in what he denies, that he is right inmaintaining that the sole path of progress open tophilosophy is the scientifichighway. No matter howhelpful side excursions may be in tellingus of the country beyond, such pathways end in swamps and jungles.To drop figuresof speech, philosophy should be broughtinto closestrelationto scienceand should be the genuineresultof man's entirescientificchievement. Of course


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VIEWS REGARDING THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY II

it must be the result also of man's religious,moral andestheticinsight. But even as such it must stillremainrigorously scientific. Perhaps I can indicate to thestudent of the history of philosophy my point in nobetter way than to urge that the modern philosopherwould do well to take as his idealthe greatest of ancientphilosophers, if not the greatest of all philosophers,Aristotle.FOR FURTHER STUDY READ:

Woodbridge, The Enterprise of Learning, Columbia UniversityQuarterly,une,1912;

Santayana, The Life of Reason, I, 1-32;James,Pragmatism, Lect. I;James,The Will to Believe,Essay "The Sentiment of Rational

ity;"James,A PluralisticUniverse, Lect. I, "The Types of Philo

sophic Thinking;"Boodin, Truth and Reality, 3-14;Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, Chap. II, "Scientific

and Religious Motives in Philosophy;"The New Realism, New York, 1912, Introduction;Sheffer,Ineffable Philosophies, /. ofPhil.,Psychol.,etc.,1909,6, 123.

FOR MORE EXTENSIVE STUDY READ!Stein, Philosophische Stromungen der Gegenwart;Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies.


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CHAPTER II

THE DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY AND OF METAPHYSICS

j. The difficultyofdefininghilosophy.This book isintended to acquaint the student with an importantbranch of philosophy called metaphysics, by revealingits chiefproblems and by expounding certain solutionsof these problems which philosophers have offered.Unfortunately, a difficultyconfronts us at the verystart, for, as we have seen, men disagree as to what ismeant by the words philosophyand metaphysics,andit is not easy to make their precise meaning apparent.As a consequence, many of the firstpages must bedevoted to the preliminary work of learning what we areto study, when it would seem so much more direct tobegin at once with the main subject-matter.et infact we shallbe beginning with the main subject-matterfor to understand precisely what the words philosophyand metaphysics mean, isto solve some important philosophicalproblems and thereforeto be already wellstartedin the subject.

2. The cause of this difficulty.The cause of thisdifficultyin defining philosophy is twofold. First, thethings, or entities,which the philosopher studies, arehighly abstract; and the truths which he seeks to discover are highly general. Now it is easy to point outanimals or rocks or stars, and to say, " These are whatwe are to study," for these things are concrete and are

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DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY AND OF METAPHYSICS 13

readilyperceived ;whereas things which can be seen onlyby the educated or discriminating eye, like the thingsdenoted by the symbols and formulas of the abstractsciences, for example, of mathematics, cannot be perceived until we have been technically trained. Again,it is easy to make clear even to a child the particulartruth, "This fireis hot and will burn;" but it is mostdifficultto make clear the general truth, "All forms ofcombustion are instancesof oxydation." Hence philosophy, the most abstract and the most general of all thesciences, studies things and problems which usuallyquite escape our notice and which can be revealed onlyto the thoughtful and discriminating mind. On thisaccount, too, philosophy is one of the latest subjectswhich we should study and one in whose pursuit we canprofitably employ allthat we have ever learned.

A second cause of difficultyisthe differenceof opinionamong philosophers regarding the nature of theirscience.To the beginner this disagreement cannot failto be confusing and incomprehensible; but, as every other fact,ittoo isreallyfullof meaning ifonly we examine itwithinsight. It means that all the world grows slowly inmatters philosophical,and that men are more liabletobe old fashioned in their philosophical opinions than intheirother beliefs. Again, it means that men are liableto be one-sided, narrow-minded, or prejudicedhen itcomes to taking a profound and a broad view of theworld and of their lifein the world; for our particularand specialinterestsare attended to so much more frequently and seem so much more important, that ourjudgmentsalready biased when we come to the problems


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which are world wide. Let us then comfort ourselvesthat the very difficultyof definingphilosophy but showshow great is our need to study philosophy. We needto study it in order to become intellectuallymature,in order to become modern, broad-minded, wide-awake,and alive to allthe fundamental interestsof mankind.

j. Popular philosophy.The easiestmeans of gaininga clearidea of the nature of philosophy isto notice thatevery normal person isalready something of a philosopherand then to consider the problems and opinions whichmake him a philosopher. One of these opinions is,Everything has a cause. The child asks over and overagain, Why this? why that? who made this? who didthat? Again, children often ask, Who made the world?How big isthe world? How old isthe world? From whichitappears that even to them the world stretcheson intodistant space and time, yet constitutes a totality,andas a totality,callsfor explanation. Further, the brightchild soon outgrows itsbeliefin fairiesand magic. Thisindicates how quickly we become at least dimly awarethat order and uniformity reign everywhere. It isremarkable too how early we begin to distinguishthesubjectiverom the objective,r the mental from theexternally real. Dreams soon seem unreal or rathersubjective,ur thoughts and feelingsare soon discoveredto be peculiarly our own, and in general we begin tomake the great divisionbetween thingsmental and thingsnon-mental, between minds and material things. Manyother important general divisionsare made by allmen:between the livingand the lifeless,etween things thatendure and things that quickly perish or vanish, be-


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DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY AND OF METAPHYSICS 1$

tween things and their qualities,between growth anddecay, between characteristicstrue of a few things andthose true of almost everything, between good deeds andbad deeds, between beautiful things and ugly things.Let us formulate as problemsthis philosophy of allcivilizeden.(i)Had the world a beginning in time, will it evercome to an end? Has it a beginning in space? Isthere but one world or are there many worlds? Has theworld a creator or is it self-existent? (2)What arespace and time? (3)Has everything a cause, or do somethings come into existence without a cause? (4)Musta cause produce justthe effectthat itdoes, or are therefree causes, for example, our wills,whose doings areabsolutely unpredictable? What is fate? Is everythingfated? Is there such a thing as chance, luck, or magic?(5)What are laws of nature, and in what sense dothings obey these laws? (6)What is a thing? What isa quality? (7)Are there things which never arise orpass away, that are eternal? (8)What features,aspectsor attributes of the things in the world about us areeternal? Or isnothing eternal or changeless? (9)Whatare change, growth and decay? (10)What isthe difference between minds and things that are not minds?How does our mind inhabit the body, and determine itsconduct? How does our body influence the mind? Isthere such a thing as the soul? Is it immortal? (n)What is life? Is the livingradicallydifferentfrom thelifeless? (12)What makes one deed good and anotherbad? (13)What isitin one thing that makes itbeautifuland in another that makes itugly; in other words, what


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isthe nature of beauty? (14)Is there a God? How canwe know that there is? How are we to picture or toconceive Him? What isHis relationto the world? (15)Can we be absolutely certain about anything we know?Or is all knowledge at best probability? What partsof our knowledge come nearest to certainty or are certain?What istruth? (16)Why are we so confident about thepropositions of arithmetic and geometry and so littleconfident about many other things,such as to-morrow'sweather? These problems are philosophical. Whatthen isthe nature of philosophy?

4. The definitionofphilosophy.(i)Philosophy pointsout the notions which turn up so often in our thinkingand which seem indispensable to our thinking, for example, cause, thing, space and time, good, knowledge,true. (2)Philosophy endeavors to define these notionswith utmost precision. (3)Philosophy triesto ascertainthe fundamental truths regarding the world and thethings and events which constituteit. By a fundamentaltruth I mean a truth that seems to be an indispensablepart of our way of thinking. Thus we seek the causeof thisor that event and thereby presuppose that eventsmust have a cause; we try to discover what happenedmillions of years ago, thereby presupposing that therewas such a time; we investigatethe originof things andthereby presuppose that all or most things have an origin; we say that we are certain about some matters anddoubtful about others,and thereby presuppose that partsof our knowledge are betterfounded than other parts, andthat some parts are surely true. (4)Philosophy endeavors to answer the most general questions we can ask


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regarding the world and the things within it. Is thereonly one world? Did the world have a beginning intime? Are there things which are eternal or changelesssuch as the ultimate parts of matter? Is allnature underthe universal reign of law, or is there truly such a thingas chance?

These four points regardingphilosophy may be broughttogether under two headings provided we understandthe meaning of three very useful terms, "logicallyfundamental," "indefinable" and "indemonstrable." By"logicallyfundamental" is meant whatever must be truein order that other things can be true, or whatever mustbe understood in order that other things can be understood. Thus ifthe sum of the angles of a plane triangleequals two right angles, it must be true that the wholeequals the sum of itsparts. If there can be a perpetualmotion machine, it must be true that frictioncan betotallyeliminated. That is,whatever isan indispensablepremise of any conclusion islogicallymore nearly fundamental; and ifso, some truths must be genuinely fundamental. If C must be true that D may be true and ifBmust be true that C may be true, evidently we shallcomein time to a beginning, a proposition which must be truethat othersmay be true but which we cannot demonstrate.Such a proposition is an "indemonstrable." In short,an indemonstrable is a proposition which is genuinely afirstpremise. Some of the laws of logicmust be indemon-strablesfor we use them in proving and should have touse them as premises in order to prove them true. Again,to understand what a triangle is we must understandwhat a plane figure is;to understand what coal is,we


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1 8 A FIRST BOOK IN METAPHYSICS

must understand what carbon is; to understand whattheftis,we must understand what property is. In short,one notion is logicallyfundamental to another providedit isindispensable in denning that other. If C enablesus to define D, and B is required to define C and A todefine B; we must come sooner or later to the end ofthe linewhere we cannot define without "a circlein thedefinition." If A is the ultimate, not only isitlogicallyfundamental to B, C, and D, but itis an "indefinable."We are now ready for the brieferstatement of the natureof philosophy, (i)Philosophyseeks the logicallyfunda-mentalj that is, the indefinablesnd the indemonstrablesofallour knowledge. (2)Philosophyendeavorstoformulatethe highestgeneralizationswarranted by the sum totalofinformationan possesses.In seeking the former, philosophy may be called TheStudy ofthe Logical Foundations ofKnowledge. In endeavoring to do the latter,itmay be calledThe Unification ofKnowledge. This last name is quite appropriatebecause as man discovers laws of higher and highergenerality,the sciences tend to merge into one anotherand to raiseeven the question whether or not allsciencesare not reallyparts of one universal science. If they areone science,that science is philosophy. For example,every student of zoology and botany knows that manytruths hold of allforms of lifeand that thislargebody ofinformation regarding alllifeis a sort of trunk scienceof which botany and zoology are branches. Some callitbiology. Again, every student of chemistry and physicsknows that many truths are common to both sciences;and the question has often been raised,may not chemis-


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try some day in the distant future be explicitlya branchof physics? Indeed there are hardly any two scienceswhich have not many truths in common, that do notturn out to have more and more in common as our knowledge increases,and that do not thereby suggest one treeof knowledge of which all sciences are branches. Wehave now our definitionof philosophy, (i)Philosophyisthe scienceof the logicalfoundations of allknowledge.It isthe First (logically)cience. (2)Again, Philosophyis the highest generalizations which scientificresearchthus far warrants or suggests. It consists of the greatunifying truths and as such is,The Science of Sciences.

5. Metaphysics defined.I have said that withinphilosophy this book will be confined to a part calledmetaphysics. What is metaphysics? We can now findthe answer quickly and easily. Philosophy, as justdefined,has to do with all knowledge. Metaphysics hasto do with only a partof knowledge. Philosophy includesnot merely the knowledge revealed in mathematics,chemistry and biology but also the study of the good,the beautiful,and anything elsethat can be called true.Briefly put, man endeavors to know not only what is,but what ought to be; not only what exists,has existed,or willexist,but what ought to existand what isin anyway truly desirable. More brieflystill,e seek to knowthe Real and the Ideal. Sometimes we limit the wordscience to denote the former study. In any case metaphysics isthe philosophy of the real;and other divisions,such as ethics and esthetics,constitute the philosophyof the ideal. Hence we may define metaphysics asfollows,remembering of course our definitionof philoso-


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phy: Metaphysics is(i)the study of the logicalfoundations of science,or of the real; (2)the theory of reality,or the highest generalizationsregarding the realwarrantedby our present knowledge. As the former itisthe FirstScience (sciencesed in the narrow sense or the study ofthe real).As the latter,it is The Theory of Reality.6. The program of this book. Within metaphysicswe shall confine our study to the former, the logicalfoundations of man's knowledge of the real world. Accordingly,we shallhave to seek the fundamental notionsin terms of which man is and has been endeavoring tointerpret reality. When found, we should try either todefine these notions rigorously or to admit that theyremain stillundefined. Again, we shallhave to seek thefundamental premises upon which the scientificconvictions of the present and of past ages rest logically,especiallythose ultimate premises, the indemonstrables.But to do even thisfullyand rigorouslywould be a vastand a most difficultenterprise and would far outstripthe ambitions and purposes of an elementary book.Consequently we shallseek not a detailedand exhaustiveknowledge of thisfieldof metaphysics but only a bird's-eye view, a general outlook, enough to make us feelacquainted and somewhat at home. Our study will bedivided into three parts. The firstpart will be introductory leading to the answer of the question,What dowe mean by the words science,reality,and universe?The second part will introduce the student to certainfundamental metaphysical hypotheses. Some of thesewill have been deliberatelyavoided in the firstpart andothers will have been intentionallyruled out as false


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by the very definitionswhich the firstpart formulates.This part willacquaint the student also with the foundations of man's older theory of reality,which I entitle,The Substance Hypothesis, and with a more recenttheory of reality,a theory widely entertained by thethinkers of the past two hundred years, The IdealisticHypothesis. The last part will give a brief sketch ofsome of the more prominent metaphysical hypothesesfound within the specialsciences.FOR FURTHER STUDY READ:

Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, 1-50;Butler, N. M. Philosophy;Windelband, History of Philosophy, 1-8;Woodbridge, Metaphysics (inLectures on Science, Philosophy

and Art, Columbia University Press)Sidgwick, Philosophy, Its Scope and Relations, 1-75, 76-121.

FOR MORE EXTENSIVE STUDY READ:Sidgwick, Philosophy, Its Scope and Relations.


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PART II

THE NATURE OF SCIENCE


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In this part I shall define a number of fundamentalterms and point out several indefmables. These termsare: " Information, Term, Relation, Truth, Implication,Proposition, Postulate, Fact, Theory, Explanation,Existence, World, Science, Faith, Value. This listofwords sounds at firstformidable : but itwillprove to bea very important list;for to see clearlywhat these wordsmean is to gain a profound insight into our knowledgeof things and isto secure fargreater rigorand definitenessin our thinking. Hence, though these words sounduninteresting, a careful study of them will more thanrepay us for the time and labor required.


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CHAPTER III"

THE NATURE OF THAT WHICH IS KNOWN

i. The nature of information.What, precisely, isinformation? "Whatever we know." But what do weknow, or better,what as such isknowable? How doesthe presence of information differdirectly from the absence of information? The answer is: Whenever weknow, we are aware of some relationbetween one entityand another. Thus I know that this is the sixteenthday of October, that is,I am aware of a relationbetweento-day and the other days in the system we call thecalendar. I notice that Mr. E. is on my right hand andMr. F. on my lefthand and that Mr. G. stands behindthem. In allthese cases evidently I know relationsbetween things. Further, we know that whales are mammals, that the anopheles mosquito is a carrierof themalaria parasite, that Napoleon was a Corsican, inother words, that one class of objectss included inanother class of objectsr that one objects a memberof a given class. Here, likewise, we know relationsbetween terms. We know also that things are relatedas cause and effect. For example, we learn that thewind causes the waves, that the volume and pressureof a gas are functions of one another. Again, all sortsof comparisons of one objectith another by means ofsome standard of measurement lead to information,such as, A ismore beautifulthan B, C ishotter than D,

25


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F isheavier than G, L islonger than M, Mr. R. isolder,richerand wiser than Mr. S. Finally,mathematics givesus most explicitlyinformation regarding certain relations between terms, thus (a+b)2 a2+2ab+b2.

There are cases where thisrelationshipbetween termsisnot so apparent, such cases as: thisflagisred; the dogruns; the house isbuilding;the load iscarried;the cometwas seen; the race was run; the jarwas broken. But inthese and similarinstancesanalysisrevealseithera complex of relationsand several terms or some conventionaland fairlydefinitetype of relation,as, for example, therelation between a thing and its quality, between athing and

itsacts, or again the relationbetween a thing

and changes in its quality or in some of its relationsbrought about by an outside agent. In most of thesecases a fairlysimple statement verbally may convey amost complex bit of information: as, the building wastorn down; the machine was put together; the childis growing. Of course, preciselywhat our words meanto us and to our audience willdepend largelyupon whatwe and they know about the matter involved. Theimportant point is,however, that if that informationis carefully analyzed, it will be found to be made upof bitsof information and these bits of information willin theirturn prove to be relationsbetween terms. Hencethe information in my mind "my house is building" isprobably equivalent to a long listof simpler bits of information, such as "the bricks and other pieces of materialare being placed in this,that and the other specialrelationto one another," "the hands, arms, and legs ofthe artisans go through certain motions with certain


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THE NATURE OF THAT WHICH IS KNOWN 27

mechanical effects/'many conversations take placebetween me and the builder and architect," and so onindefinitely. In any case all information will proveto be simple or complex systems of terms in relation.

It may seem to the reader that information mightsometimes be merely terms, as when I see merely abright light,or hear merely a strange noise, or beholdmerely some thing quite new to me. But to see a thingis not^to know a thing. A baby may see a watch andknow nothing. You and I see it and know it to be acomplicated mechanism. The child merely gets certainsensations of color and sound, possibly without anyawareness of relationshipwhatsoever. Of course, merelyto notice "the colored objectconnected with ticking"would be to know something but itwould be a perceptionof relation. Prof. Jamesexpressed thispoint well in hisdistinctionbetween "acquaintance with" and "knowledge about." A brute may be acquainted with things,that is,may get sensationsfrom them, but know nothingabout them. Such must be the state of affairsas the cat"hears" the conversation in the home, or the dog"watches" us write a letter. In short, ifall awarenessof relationis lacking, whatever we may rightly be saidto have, we cannot be said to have information.

2. The nature oftruth. There is a further characteristicessential to information: " it must be true or false.Indeed, itis the only thing in allthe world which is oneor the other, and conversely whatever is either true orfalsemust be information. Hence, ifa man tellsus heknows something, he means at least that he believessomething to be a truth. Here we introduce a word,


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and a very important word, without having denned it;for, what is truth?1 Unfortunately this seems to bea question which itisimpossible to answer. As has beenstated, some notions are so nearly ultimate that whenyou try to definethem you find that you have no notionsmore nearly fundamental by means of which the definingcan be done. In thiscase you will,ifyou proceed,run into what logic calls a circulardefinition,for youwill use notion x to definey and then when you define x,you willhave to do so in terms of y. Thus in the foregoing section we did not define "term" or "relation." Aterm isthat which can stand in a relation,and a relationis that which can

hold between terms; but thisis not adefinition,foreach notion presupposes the other. So too,I believe that an examination of any definitionof truthwillreveal that the notion defined ispresupposed in thedefinition. Of course, the fact that these terms areindefinable does not prevent our recognizing a truth ora relationwhen we find one; for,ifitdid,not only wouldthe notion be useless but we should not have it at all.

j. The nature of propositions.Though we cannot1 The word truthisambiguous. It isused here as a property of propo

sitions,as in the statement, "it is true that the earth revolves on itsaxis." It is often used as a property of our beliefs,thoughts or judgments. They are true when that which we think or assert istrue (inthefirstsense).Those who use the word true in this second sense, use thewords real or facts the equivalent of true in the firstsense. But as itisawkward to say "a real proposition" instead of "a true proposition"and as true so used must be one of the fundamental notions of logic,Iprefer to use the word correct or some equivalent for true in the secondsense. The words factand real will be defined later. I use them in adifferent sense from that justmentioned. Truth in the second sensecan be defined.


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definetruth, we can point out one remarkable characteristicpossessed by all truths and falsehoods: they neverstand alone. Always if one thing is true, another mustbe true or false;or, ifone thing isfalse,some other mustbe true. This characteristicis called implication. Itis an ultimate relation obtaining between truths andfalsehoods,and isusually regarded as indefinable. Somedefineitby taking the notion "either-or" as indefinableand by using thisnotion as a basis of definition. In thatcase (apiece of information)implies (anotherieceof information)when eithery is true or x isfalse. Forexample, ifit is true that B is the son of A, it must betrue that A is a parent of B. In other words, ifitisnottrue that A is a parent of B, itcannot be true that B isthe son of A. Either A isa parent of B or B isnot a son ofA. Notice moreover that itmay be true that A isa parentof B but falsethat B isa son of A, for B may be a daughter. In short,X implies Y means: " ifX istrue, so isY;and ifY isfalse,so isX; but X may be falseand Y stillbe true. All thisissummed up in the words, "if X, thenY."

All cases of argument, or demonstration, are illustrationsof how one truth or falsehood "leads on" to others;and thereforeevery book in mathematics or any otherscienceis made up almost entirelyof statements that one thingimpliesanother. For example, iftwo sides of a triangleare equal, theiropposite angles are equal. If the volumeof a gas decreases, itspressure willincrease. If a bodymoves in empty space, it will move in a straight linewith uniform velocity.

If the nature of implication isclear to us, we are ready


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3O A FIRST BOOK IN METAPHYSICS

to define another technicalterm. Whatever impliesor isimpliedis a proposition;hich in turn means that weknow already many things about propositions. Ifpropositionsimply one another they must be either truths orfalsities.Moreover, if they are truths or falsitiesheymust be information and if they are information theymust consist of relationshipsbetween terms. In otherwords, propositions are units or bitsof information, andas such they are made up of relationsbetween terms,they are eithertrue or false,and they imply one another.(SECTIONS1-3)FOR FURTHER STUDY READ:Read, The Metaphysics of Nature, 26.ed.,Chap. XIII, Pt. I;

Moore, G. E. The Nature of Judgment,Mind, 1899, 8.FOR ADVANCED STUDY READ:

Russell,Principlesof Mathematics, Chap. Ill;Erdmann, Logik, 2te Aufl.,Bd. I, 55-258;Sigwart,Logic, Pt. I, 23-235.4. The knowledge of propositions.From the fore

going definitionof the term propositiont follows thatwhenever a man says, he knows a proposition,itisproperfor us to ask him three questions: first,What preciselyis the relationshipbetween terms, that is,the proposition which you have before your mind? secondly, Is ittrue or isitfalse? thirdly,What does itimply? Ifhe cananswer correctly these three questions, he does indeedknow that proposition. However, as is evident, hemight be able to answer the firsttwo without being ableto answer the last;and again, he might be able to answerthe firstand the third but not the second; and finallyunless he is able to answer the firsthe cannot answereitherof the other two, for he does not know even what


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he is talking about. Let me illustrate. If a patientsays to me, his physician, "My wound is painful," itmight be that before I can decide whether his assertionistrue or falseand before I can ascertainwhat itimplies,I shallhave to learn preciselywhat itmeans. Now thisparticularillustrationischosen because psychologistsfindthat individuals very often disagree as to what is andwhat is not painful and because this disagreement canhardly be due to a man's inabilityto observe his ownfeelings. They find rather that few men mean by theword "pain" precisely the same feeling. Could wefind, however, some means by which all men and ourpatient in particularwould agree upon a standard feeling,calledpain, then each could very quickly decide whetherhis present feelingispainful or not. Let us assume thatwe have been able to do this. There would stillremainthe question, Is our patient tellingthe truth or is heendeavoring to deceive us? Let us assume firstthatthis second difficultyalso has been met, and that ourpatient is tellingthe truth. There will stillremain athird question, What does this truth imply? Does itimply that blood poisoning is beginning or somethingelse? Evidently we may not know. This isa case whenwe may know the proposition to be true without knowing what itimplies. In contrast to thisletus assume thatwe do not know the patient to be truthful. Then weshould know the meaning of the proposition and wemight know also regarding its significanceor what itwould imply iftrue; but we should be in doubt as to thetruthfulnessof the man's statement, for we might suspecthim to be a coward or a malingerer. In this case we


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know the proposition and what itimplieswithout knowing whether itistrue or false.

Granting the pertinency of these questions, howshallwe answer them? (i)How do we know a proposition? (2)How do we ascertain whether it is true orfalse? (3)How do we learn what itimplies? The firstquestion we shall answer brieflyat once; the answer tothe others we must postpone. Ultimately we revealthe propositions we are asserting only by pointing outwhat we mean or acting out what we mean; but whereothers are already familiar with most of our thoughtsand beliefs,e can point out indirectlyeitherby description or by definition. To a baby we point out a cow or ahorse and so the childlearns the meaning of these words.To a zoologistwe describe a new species and he understands. To a mathematician we offer a rigorous definition of a curve heretofore unknown to him and he may beable at once to deduce many of its further properties.But neither the zoologist nor the mathematician couldunderstand us unless much information were alreadycommon to him and to us. Thus to know a proposition,means to be able to point out itsterms and theirrelation,to be able to describe them or to be able to define them;and, as we have seen, we might be able to do allthisandnot yet know whether the proposition is true or false.

5. The ascertainment oftruth. How do we ascertainwhether a proposition is true or false? Three methodsare actually employed although one is only a necessarymakeshift, (i)Firstwe may simplyguess at itstruthor acceptit tentatively. Indeed this is what we have to domost of the time. Fortunately for us, however, our guess


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isseldom wholly blind;foroften though we do not know aproposition to be true, we do know it to have somechances of being true. Thus whether a tossed coin willfallheads or tailswe cannot foretellwith certainty;butshould we have to guess, we know we have one chancein two ofbeing correct. So throughout lifewe can seldomknow from the beginning the finaloutcome of our enterprises;but as we cannot wait we have to act in the waywhich seems most likelyto be successful,which means,we have to make the fieldof pure guess, or venture assmall as our knowledge permits. We insure our livesthough we may lose money in so doing. We choose acallingthough we may afterward prove unfitted. Webreathe the airof our streets though itmay contain thegerms which willkillus. In short,nothing risked,noth- iing accomplished; and thisistrue not merely of practicalaffairsbut also of the sciences. All scientistshave theirworking hypotheses; and every scienceis based in partupon unproved assumptions, or as we shall henceforthcallthem, postulates.he future alone can tellwhetheror not our present theoriesare true; for,as historyshows,many things confidentlybelievedin by people in bygonecenturies were really false and some things we haveto call mere superstitions. How will our convictionsappear to men centuriesfrom now? Well, itisnot ourbusiness either to ask this question or to be concernedabout the matter, but to forge ahead fearlesslyas bestwe can.(2)The second method by which we ascertain the

truth or falsityof a proposition is to infertfromotherpropositionshich we know or believeto be true. That is,


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we get our information by reasoning. The most wonderful and perfect example of the successful employmentof this method is the science of mathematics. In ourelementary geometry we started with a few propositionswhich we assumed and then we deduced proposition afterproposition until we acquired an extensive body of information. However, mathematics is by no means theonly place where we reason; for some reasoning is tobe found in almost allour intellectualprocesses. Indeedmost psychologists believe that this abilityto reason orto inferis a traitwhich quite marks offthe human intellectfrom the mind of even the highest brutes; and allmust agree that man's intellectualachievements wouldhave been impossible had his learning remained solelyof the trialand error type.

But our rationality has one serious shortcoming.To reason is to infer conclusions from premises, to derive the truth of one proposition from the assumed truthof another. How then do we know that our premisesthemselves are true? Did we get them too by reasoning?If so, thisonly pushes our question back to the premisesof an earlierinference,itdoes not give an ultimate proof.If to reason is then but to guess and afterward to inferfrom the proposition guessed, wherein does it give us agenuine hold on truth? The answer is,ifthese two wereour only methods, we could not know the truth of anyproposition. We might guess rightly and do so often;but we should never know when we had or even when wehad not. We should be likethe lowest forms of lifewhichadapt themselves often most successfullyto the objectsand forces of nature surrounding them and acting upon


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them, but which cannot know, as we know, eitherfalsityor truth.(3)The firstand second methods of ascertainingtruth

leave a gap which isfilledby the thirdmethod. Not onlydo we guess at truth, not only do we infertruth but alsowe perceiveruth. For example, ifwe guess heads or tailswhen a coin istossed we soon perceive whether or not weare right. If a man has a device for accomplishing someend, he can put itto the test and perceive ifitwillwork.If a scientisthas a theory, he can deduce some of itsconsequences and put them to a crucialtest in hislaboratoryand perceive ifhis theory isfalse. Thus day by day weare putting our beliefsand plans to the test of perception.If they agree with what we perceive or ifthey work, weare confirmed in our intellectualventure. If they do notagree with what we perceive or ifwe perceive that theydo not work, we tend to discard them and should discardthem for new beliefsand new plans. Perception thengives us our ultimate warrant. It tellsus when we areright and when we are wrong. It tellsus that somethings are thus and that other things are not. In short,ittellsus allthat we know to be true.

This enables us to give a technical meaning to afamiliarword. Henceforth we shallalways mean by theword fact, perceived truth. Fact then is opposed totheory,for theory isalways either a guess, or an inferencein part from guesses. Facts are as such true. Theorieson the other hand are sometimes true, sometimes false.This iswhat we mean when we say a theory should conform to the factsand ifitdoes not, the theory must giveplace to another.


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(SECTIONS AND 5) FOR FURTHER STUDY READ:Mill, Logic, Bk. Ill, Chap. VII; Bk. IV, Chap. I;Venn, Empirical Logic, Chaps. I, XIV, XXI;Tyndall, Fragments of Science, "The ScientificUse of the

Imagination;"Clifford,Lectures and Essays, "On the Aims and Achieve

ments of ScientificThought;"Mach, Popular ScientificLectures, "On the Part Played by

Accident in Invention and Discovery;"Aikins, Principlesof Logic, Chaps. XXXIII-XXXVI;Marvin, Introduction to Systematic Philosophy, 349-373, 412-

Hobhouse, Theory of Knowledge, 15-59;Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Chaps. V and VI, XIII

and XIV;Stout, Immediacy, Mediacy and Coherence, Mind, 1908, 17.

FOR MORE EXTENSIVE STUDY READ:Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV,

Chaps. I-VI;Russell,The Problems of Philosophy;Schmidt, Critique of Cognition and itsPrinciples,/. ofPhilos.,

Psychol., etc.,1909, 6;Jevons,rinciples of Science,Bk. IV;Sigwart, Logic, Pt. II, 295-325; and Pt. III.

FOR ADVANCED STUDY READ:Hobhouse, Theory of Knowledge.6. The nature of explanation.This in turn enablesus to define precisely another familiarword, namely,

explanation.What do we do when we explain? Wediscovera premiseor set ofpremisesfrom which a given'actor factsollow,r can be deduced. For example, Ihear a strange noise on the hearth, and after listeningattentively I decide it is made by a cricket. That is,"if a cricketis on the hearth, it would follow that we

/"


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should hear such a sound." The noise is my fact; thata cricketison the hearth, isthe premise I have assumedto account for,or to explain,thisfact. Ifthisfact followsfrom my premise and from no other premise which Imay have overlooked, then no doubt I have discoveredthe correct explanation. As another example we mighttake the undulatory theory of light. No one has actuallyseen the ether or its undulations. These undulationsthen are not a fact but a theory, and as a theory theirwhole significanceis that they agree with other theorieswhich we hold and that theirassumption gives us premisesfrom which the facts of light can be deduced. Thesame istrue even of the proposition,the earth isa sphere.Nobody has seen this sphere; yet since so very manyfacts can be deduced from the assumption and since noknown fact disagrees with it,he who would question itto-day, would be considered insane. Stillit is only anexplanation; and there is no other reason to regard itas true, except that it does explain.FOR FURTHER STUDY READ:

Mill, Logic, Bk. Ill, Chaps. XI-XIV;Hobhouse, Theory of Knowledge, 442-474;Joseph,Introduction to Logic, Chap. XXIII.Nunn, On Causal Explanation, Proc. Aristotel.Soc., 1906-7, 7.

FOR MORE EXTENSIVE STUDY READ:Russell, The Problems of Philosophy;Smith, Norman, Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy, Chap. II;Descartes, Discourse on Method;Descartes, Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii.

FOR ADVANCED STUDY READ!Nunn, Aim and Achievements of ScientificMethod.


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7. The world. Having learned to distinguishbetweenfacts,or what we perceive, and theirexplanation, wecan define the term, world. The word "world" or "universe" isthename forthe true and completeexplanationofallfacts.s an illustration,et us assume that the solar system, as studied in astronomy, isthe whole world.Now the solar system is the theory which astronomyoffersin explanation of a multitude of factsor perceivedtruths. These truths include the risingand settingof thesun, moon, and stars, the succession of day and night,summer and winter, the elevation of the sun in theheavens, the erraticmotion of the planets,the phases ofthe moon, the eclipsesof both sun and moon, as well ascountlessother facts. Notice that "the solarsystem" isindeed a theory, or explanation. Nobody ever perceivedthe earth revolve, or the planets go about the sun in theirorbits,or even the earth itselfs a sphere. The only warrant forbelievingthese propositionsisthat theyexplainsowellwhat we do perceive.We do perceive the sunset, thephases of the moon, and so these are not theory but fact;but the solarsystem isnot only a theory, a theory with ahistory,but one among other conceivable or rivaltheories. Before 1600 A. D. men believedin a very differenttheory, which made the earth the immovable centreof the universe with the sun revolving about it;and ifnow we have fullconfidence in our present heliocentrictheory, this is simply because all rival theories haveproved false,inadequate, or inconvenient, and becausethis theory agrees with all perceptual tests to date.Notice, moreover, that our complete confidence in thistheory expresses itselfin the assertionthat the solar


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system exists.Yet, sincenobody has ever perceived " thesolar system," this assertion,analyzed logically,is nomore than the assertion"the solarsystem" explainsandalone explainswhat we perceive.

If the perceived did not raise problems or call forexplanation,ifwe could accept itnot only as itisgivenbut as allthat istrue ;then we should have no world. Weshould live,as do the lowest brutes, from moment tomoment, reactingblindly now to thissensation and nowto that; but we should never assert existence. But theperceived does raiseproblems in our minds; and so man,from childhood to the grave, from prehistoricdays tothe present, has been seeking and discovering theirsolution. As he does so, the world as conceived by himkeeps growing and changing, and must continue to doso untilthe true and fullexplanation isfound of allthathe perceives. Of this perfect explanation most peoplebelieve we have already a part; but how much there remains to add and how many truths remain to be perceived, is a question no one can answer. However wecan define the world. The universe,or world is a theory.It is a theory in answer to questions which in theirorigin are always regarding the perceptual. To repeat,itisthe complete explanation of allfact.The word "all" must be emphasized. The world isthe complete explanation of allfacts. All facts includenot only those man has perceived or does perceive,but will perceive, or can perceive, or should perceive.They include allperceivable truth. Again, they includenot merely the truths our eyes perceive in the fieldorlaboratory or through the telescope,but also the truths


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that the moralist,the artist,the religiousperceive. Theyinclude, then, all facts whose explanation we seek fromsciencein the very broadest sense of thisword.

8. Existence. Finally, in denning the term "world"we have at the same time been defining the term "toexist." Whatever belongs to the world, or is a part oraspect of the world, exists. Otherwise expressed, whatever explains or in part explainsany factand isconsistentwith all other facts and their explanation, is rightlysaid to exist. Thus, hearing many unfamiliar noisesat night, the superstitiousman may say, "A ghost ismoving about the house." This is his explanation of aperceived truth, the noises;and accordingly he assertsthe ghost's existence. But should he inform himself offurther perceivable truth, there is littledoubt that hewould rejectis old hypothesis and entertain a quitedifferentone. However, what istrue of the superstitiousisin part true of allmen. In the lightof our knowledgeor the darkness of our ignorance we explain what weperceive and then assert existence. In so doing we arepresupposing some world hypothesis or another, perhapsa crude and primitive one or perhaps one of a modernand an enlightened adult. Moreover, we fitthe thingwhich we assert to existsomehow into thisworld conception and into the system of other existents in whichwe believe. As long as we feelsatisfiedwith the resultwe do not question the thing'sexistence;but should theclash be too severe for our intellectualconscience wehave to give up either the old or the new and offerourselves some other hypothesis. Thus the highway ofman's intellectualprogress from savagedom to the


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civilizationf to-day islined on both sideswith discarded"existents." They perished because the logical loadthey were carrying was too much for them or becausestronger carrierswere found to take theirplace. Therefore, whenever we say anything exists we are merelyofferingour present explanation of some fact or other.

(SECTIONS AND 8) FOR FURTHER STUDY READ:Marvin, The Existential Proposition, /. ofP kilos.,Psychol.,etc.,1911, 8;

Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Sect.IV.


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CHAPTER IV

EVERYMAN'S THEORY OF REALITY

i. Introduction. The "world" or "universe" hasbeen defined as "the true and complete explanation ofwhat we perceive." This definitionisour most importantresultthus far. Through it we learn that the world asthought or conceived by each man depends upon twothings: first,upon what he has perceived; secondly,upon his success in explaining what he has perceived.As men differgreatly in both these respects,they differalso in the way in which they think or conceive theworld. The world of the child is far differentfrom theworld of the adult,and the world of the savage or of thepeasant ismarkedly unlike that of the scientist.Moreover, men differin theirway of conceiving the world notonly as individuals but also as social groups and asmembers of this or that historicalperiod. The worldas conceived by the orientalis differentfrom the worldas conceived by the man of western Europe. The worldof modern scienceisextremely unlike the world of eventhe most learned men of the thirteenthcentury.

Great as are these differencesand great as may be thedifferencesin the future which the advance of knowledgemay bring about, stillall ages and all individualshavebeen engaged upon a common task and allhave contributed something to itsfulfillment. Our ways of conceiving the world may be different,and the factsknown to us

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EVERYMAN'S THEORY OF REALITY 43

may be different;stillne common problem faces us all:What isthe true and complete explanation of that whichisperceived? Moreover, differentas are our worlds, allmen have some resultsin common; for the lowest savageand the normal childare not so foreignto civilizedan'sways of thinking that he cannot communicate with them.In other words, his world is not a separate world fromtheirs. Not only has the world as conceived by themodern scientistand philosopher grown out of the worldas conceived by the child and by the ancient; but ithasremained in parts virtually unchanged. Indeed, logically behind or beneath science stands the world ofeveryman, the world of the learned and of the ignorant,the world of the ancient and of the modern. We mightcallit the world of common sense.

The purpose of this chapter willbe to show that thisworld of everyman, or of common sense, is already anelaborate and complicated explanation of what we perceive,and that itshould never be confused by the metaphysician with the perceived.

2. The world as perceived.The ordinary adult is anold fogy biased and set in his ways of explaining andperceiving facts. The cause of this bias is that he hasbecome habituated to the explanations of these factswhich have been taught him from childhood and that hefuses the facts and the explanations so thoroughly thathe seldom distinguishesbetween them. But as studentsof metaphysics we must now do so.

First, let us imagine ourselves on the platform ofa railway station watching an approaching train. Aswe look at the locomotive, it keeps getting bigger and


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bigger slowly at first,hen more and more rapidly as itdraws near. As adults we say, the locomotive has notchanged in size but a mile away was reallyas large ashere twenty feet away; yet perception says, it grewlargerand larger. We board the trainand itissoon underway. We look through the windows. Objectsre flyingby, those "near us" very rapidly,those "farther away"less rapidly. Looking through the rear window of thelast car, we see that the railsin the distance meet at apoint and form the two sidesof an extremely elongatedtriangle. Near by, the sidesof this triangleare rapidlyreceding and at the same time moving rapidly together.Finally we notice that the "distant" objects,

en,

animals, trees, houses, mountains, are small; the "nearones " much larger. All thisiswhat perception says; butcommon sense gives a very differentaccount.

Secondly, let us imagine ourselves walking along acity street. As we look down the street the buildingsare in "perspective," the street grows narrower in thedistance as did the rails,the linesof windows and roofsdescend and meet the distant horizon. As we pass abuilding, if we watch sharply, we shall see that it ischanging itsshape. As we look at this or that personapproaching, we shall see him not only increasing insize, but also changing in many other respects. Hisclothing increasesin detail. The detailsof itscoloringand itsshape, of itspattern and itsparts grow, literallyspring intoexistence. Likewise his face takes on featuresand expression. To make a long story short,letus recallthe following few out of many familiar yet remarkablepercepts. A "straight" stickpartly immersed in water


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EVERYMAN'S THEORY OF REALITY 45looks bent. Sometimes " tepid" water feels to onehand hot, to the other cold. The crater of an extractedtooth is much bigger according to the testimony ofthe tip of the tongue than it is according to that ofthe end of the finger. A warm radiator is warmer whenfeltby the back of the hand than when feltby the palm.

To make clearer this picture of things as perceivedlet us add to the listsome things which we do not perceive. No one ever saw the earth, that is,the planet,but only parts of its surface. No one ever perceivedthe earth turn on itsaxis. No one ever saw a thousandmiles of railroad,even ifhe has tramped twenty thousandon that highway. We are told that the sun is90,000,000miles away, but when you look at the sun you do notseem to see between you and it a space of that diameter.Similarlyin the case of time, we never perceive as long aspan as fiveminutes, and a year isas truly an impossiblepercept as isinfinitespace. Finally, to come nearer towhat we do perceive, no one ever saw WestminsterAbbey or his own house. You have seen the west side ofyour house, but when you were looking at this you didnot see the east side. Again, if your house has manyrooms and two or more stories,you have seen now thisroom and now that, but the "house," that is,all therooms, windows, doors, walls, front,side and rear elevations: allthese and allin their correct geometrical andmetrical relations one to another, you have never seen.It isevident too that a man has never perceived his ownbody, that is,the body as fullydescribed in the ponderous volumes on human anatomy.

But enough said. It isevident that the world, or mani-


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fold,perceived by you and me isvery differentfrom theworld we ordinarilythink about. The perceived worldis spatiallya small world. It is a world of a moment.In it men, houses and locomotives change their shape,size,and color. Walk across the room and your tablechanges its shape and size and probably color! Holdyour hand close to your eyes and the hand becomes asbig as the room!FOR FURTHER STUDY READ:

Santayana, Life of Reason, I, 35-291;Berkeley, Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision;Clifford,Lectures and Essays, "The Philosophy of the Pure

Sciences," I, Statement of the Question;Pearson, Grammar of Science,Chap. VI.

5. The world of common sense. " In contrast to thisperceived world consider the world as ordinarily conceived,the world of common sense. In thisworld objectsare stationary and do not fly by the windows of themoving train. The rails are parallel and motionless.The men and trees and houses at a distance are nosmaller than those near by. The sizeof the locomotive isconstant and does not alteras the locomotive approaches.The straightstickimmersed in the water remains straight.Houses do not altertheirshape as we pass, fortheirshapeisconstant. The street and houses are not in perspective.Their lines are parallel. The crater of the extractedtooth does not change itssize nor the radiator itsheatunder the conditions aforegiven. Though we may notperceive "the house," what we do perceive is part ofa realhouse of such and such dimensions, parts, numberof rooms, and materials. And of course a man's hand


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EVERYMAN'S THEORY OF REALITY 47is never as big as the room, and the furniture does notalteritsshape, sizeand color as we walk up and down theroom.

Now, every student of psychology knows that thisworld of common sense isnot known by the very youngchild. To it,a distant man or house is small; the moondoes race through the clouds; the sun does riseand set.As for the earth being a globe and revolving on itsaxis,that isa fantastic,incomprehensible way in which grownpeople talk. It requires years of training for the childto learn the truths of common sense; and this showsthat the world as believed in by common sense or asthought of in daily life,instead of being a perceivedworld, isa most elaborate and wonderful world hypothesis.It isnot perceived but conceived; and the way in whichwe adults conceive it has not only grown but has growncontinuously from babyhood to our present state. Ofcourse ithas developed under the control of our percepts.It has grown out of our percepts. It has been constantlytested and corrected by our percepts. Yet itis not theworld we actually perceive, and in many respects it isradicallydifferentfrom what we do perceive. The twoworlds, or systems of terms and relations,are not onlydifferent in character but are numerically different.They cannot be logically identified,though they areconnected logicallyand most intimately. To sum up:The world of common sense is man's firstreat worldhypothesis;tis not a world ofperceivedact,atheritis aTHEORY, no matter how well establisheda theory.

Out of thistheory, which we callthe world of commonsense, sciencehas grown; and though science has gradu-


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allyreconstructed it,sciencenever totallyrejectst,andseldom ceases to be logicallydependent upon it. As aconsequence, the metaphysics of common sense is important not only in and by itself,but also for its influence upon science and because of itspresence withinscience. Indeed, where sciencehas outgrown the metaphysics of common sense, it has done so very graduallyand often not thoroughly. All of thiswillbecome apparent as we proceed.FOR FURTHER STUDY READ:

Russell,The Problems of Philosophy, Chaps. I and II.FOR ADVANCED STUDY READ!

Nunn, Aim and Achievements of ScientificMethod, Chaps. Iand II.

4. Appearance and reality. The study of the relation of the world as perceived to the world of commonsense introduces us to one of the most vexed questionsin metaphysics. This question is,what is the place inreality occupied by the world of perception? A laterchapter willgive part of the answer to thisquestion,butthe fundamental point at issuemay be taken up at once.If to explain my perceptions of my desk I assert a rectangular desk of a standard size,if to explain my perceptions of the oncoming locomotive I assert a locomotive of constant size;what relationobtains between theobserved facts and the theoreticalentity,do both belongto reality? Most metaphysicians reply, "the manyunlike and changing data of perception are not real butare appearance, whereas the standard objectn whose fexistence we come to believe is the genuinely real."


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EVERYMAN'S THEORY OF REALITY 49

That is,the oncoming locomotive which I see isnot real.The reallocomotive isconstant in size. Thus the relationbetween the two is said to be that of a reality and ofitsappearance. The objectiono thisanswer isthat itisfalseto the data in question and that itclearsup no difficulties.

As we have found, the relation between the worldas perceived and the world, as conceived is that of factand itsexplanation. Moreover, that is allthereis to theproblem. The conceived rectangular changeless desk isa theory, and the only reason for asserting itsexistenceis that it explains the desk I do perceive. With it as apremise I am able to infermany of the properties of thedesk I perceive and I am able to do thisfar more readilythan did I use any particularpercept as my premise. Ican give instructions to a cabinet maker to make meanother desk much more easily and intelligiblyif Ipresent him with rectangular plans than ifI give him aphotograph of the desk. A similartruth holds of the plansof a house given to the builder. In short,theory is a farbetter guide to conduct than are photographs or isolatedpercepts. All this,however, does not make the conceptual desk real and the perceived desk mere appearance.Both are real.It will here be objected,A desk cannot change insize and shape and at the same time be constant. Doyou mean that there are two real desks and not merelytwo but a hundred, for as you go about the room youcould easily get a hundred different photographs ofyour desk?" This question reveals much confusion inthe mind of the questioner. There is not one desk in


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the sense that several differentphotographs are identicalor duplicate pictures. If a man has several differentphotographs taken of himself in quite differentpositionsevidently they are not the same picture. If they were,why should he not be satisfiedwith one? In this sensethere are indeed thousands of desks in my study, and youand I are thousands of differentindividuals. But thisisnot what we mean when we say allare one desk or allareone man. We mean that the various data are parts ormembers of one system intimately and logicallyrelated.So much so that the system stands quite distinctfromother systems and forms what we calla thing.

That a thing should have many differentpropertiesin itsdifferentrelationsto the world about it,should nottake us by surprise. A bag of coffeeon the earth mayweigh a pound and on the moon but a small fractionof apound. A bell in the air may have a sound and in avacuum no sound. So a desk in one set of relations,therelationsin which I perceiveit,may be markedly differentfrom the desk in the relationsin which you perceive itand from the desk as we both conceive it. We should notcallthe bag of coffeeand the belltwo bags and two bellsbut one bag and one bell;and there isno more reason forcallingthe desk conceived and the desk perceived twodesks.

Similar arguments might be made regarding allothercases where the objectf theory and the objectf perception differ. The heat of the fire,the color of theocean, the sound of a whistle are differentas our point ofperception is different;whereas the theoreticalobjectmay have constant properties. The confusion here as


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EVERYMAN'S THEORY OF REALITY 51in the foregoing cases allcomes from not understandingthe true relationbetween the perceived and the conceivedand the sense in which the two are the same object.To repeat: the relationis a logicalrelationwhich bringsthem into an identicallogicalsystem. The relation isnot literalidentitywhich of course leads to the absurdityfelt by the puzzled metaphysician. The conceptualis a premise from which together with other premises(inmany cases the particularspatialrelations)he perceived objectan be deduced. From such premises, forexample, an artistcould deduce a ship as perceived froma given distance and at a given angle and paint the pictureof this object.From his plans and other premises anarchitect can deduce many of the aspects of a buildingand foretelltheirharmony and beauty.

Thus the relationbetween the conceived objectnd theperceivedobjects not that between a real objectnd itsappearancesbut that between a premiseand a conclusion.In practicalaffairsthe conceived objects a more usefulguide to our conduct and to the conduct of those whom weinstruct. This, and thischiefly,leads so many to regarditas the more genuinely real. Again, the world isso muchsimpler ifwe think of objectsnly as we conceive them,if we ignore the many and varying aspects of the perceived. This too impels us to sacrificetruth to convenience. Habit completes the work and soon we cannotbelieve what we perceive. Moreover, there is no contradiction in maintaining the reality of both the perceived and the conceived. There is no contradiction insaying that the changing locomotive is also constant, asthere is none in saying that two photographs taken of


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a man from differentpositions are pictures of the sameman. There is no contradiction,because the same thingcan have radically differentproperties in differentrelations.1FOR FURTHER STUDY READ:

Moore, Nature and Reality of Objectsof Perception, Proc.Aristotel.Soc., 1905-6, 6;

Stout, Primary and Secondary Qualities,roc. Aristotel.Soc.,1903-4, 4;

Nunn, Are Secondary Qualitiesndependent of Perception?Proc. Aristotel.Soc., 1909-10, 10.

FOR MORE EXTENSIVE STUDY:Cf . references,Chapter XVI.1 These relations are often complicated and puzzling; and this some

times leads us into errors, especially the errors called illusions. Butthese errors do not liein the perceived entity but in the assertion of thewrong theory, or conceived entity.


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CHAPTER V

THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

i. The nature of science. We are now prepared tostate preciselythe nature of science. Science is the explicitnd demonstrated explanationofallfacts.That is,the business of scientificresearch is to explain allfacts,to make thisexplanation logicallyexplicit,and to demonstrate rigorously its truth. But science thus definedis evidently an ideal;for to demonstrate any theory requires not only sufficientpremises but also knowledgeof the truth of these premises. Indeed such a demonstration is a task that has nowhere been accomplished, except perhaps in formal logicand in mathematics. Still,our definitionis justified;or as our sciences progressthey draw nearer to this ideal. In alltheir stages, thesciencesdifferentiatethemselves from the knowledge andopinions of daily life,from the opinions of the ignorantand of the careless,of the child and of the savage,

a first book of metaphysics

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