a brief history of distributed denial of service

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A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service Attacks Uniforum Chicago August 22, 2000 Viki Navratilova Security Architect, BlueMeteor, Inc.

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Page 1: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service Attacks

Uniforum Chicago

August 22, 2000

Viki Navratilova

Security Architect, BlueMeteor, Inc.

Page 2: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

Tonight’s Talk

• What is DDoS?t is DDoS?

• Famous DDoS incidentsFamous DDoS incidents

• Brief History of DDoS toolsBrief History of DDoS tools

• What’s new in DDoS toolsWhat’s new in DDoS tools

• Where to get more info on DDoS toolsWhere to get more info on DDoS tools

• <break><break>

• How to keep DDoS from getting you downHow to keep DDoS from getting you down

Page 3: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

Denial of Service (DOS)

• An attack to suspend the availability of a service

• Early DOS – smashing computer with sledge hammer

• Network DOS – modern times

• Prevent a Network-based service from doing its job

• Can be as easy as pulling the network plug

Page 4: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

What is DDoS?

• Distributed Denial of Service

• Many “zombie” computers ganging up on one computer, directed by one “master”, which is controlled by the attacker

Page 5: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

The Week of Famous DDoS Attacks

• February 7-11 2000• CNN, Yahoo, E-Bay, Datek taken down for

several hours at a time due to traffic flooding

• Underadministrated computers at California college used as the slave attack computers

• Trinoo, Tribal Flood Network, TFN2K, and Stacheldraht suspected tools used in attacks

Page 6: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

Early DDoS Tools(c. 1990? – 1997)

• Simple 1-tier attacks – computer with bigger bandwidth wins, kicks loser off modem/irc channel

• Ping flood • SYN flood• UDP flood

• Smurf Attack – early 2-tier attack

• Attacker machine imitates victim, gets everyone to flood real victim

• Ping flood

Page 7: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

Smurf Attack (2-tier)

slaves

Broadcast Pings

Ping Replies

31337!

victim

Page 8: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

Modern DDoS Tools

• Once sites blocked broadcast pings, attackers found new ways to accomplish same things

• DDoS tools gave new way to communicate across networks to slave attack computers

• Attacker has to infiltrate several slave computers with DDoS slave client

• Master client sometimes found on ISP’s name server – unlikely to be taken off network

Page 9: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

DDoS Attacks (3-tier)

Master

Slave Slave Slave

Victim

D00d!

Page 10: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

Why DDoS Tools Suck for Your Network

• Hard to Trace to original culprit

• Difficult to cut off flow of traffic attacking you because it’s coming from everywhere

• Difficult to catch pre-attack communications between master and slave machines

Page 11: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

Trinoo – First Publicly Available DDoS Tool (c. 1997)

• Attacker, Master, Slave Communications via unencrypted UDP

• Easy to detect communications and passwords

• Attack Method : UDP Flood

• Solaris & Linux machines

Page 12: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

Tribe Flood Network (TFN) (c. 1998)

• Attacker & Master communicate via unencrypted TCP, UDP, SSH, ICMP, telnet

• No password required to run commands• Commands are sent as pre-determined 16-bit

binary numbers• Master & Slaves talk ICMP• DOS Attacks available : ICMP, SYN, UDP,

&Smurf-style Floods• Linux & Solaris

Page 13: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

TFN2K (1999)

• Builds on TFN• Decoy packets & other measures make

traffic difficult to identify & filter• Fakes source address of communications• New attacks include malformed packet

floods – greater devastation in fewer packets

• Available for Unix & NT Systems

Page 14: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

Stacheldraht “Barbed Wire” Fine German Engineering (late 1999)

• Master – Slave communications require passwords • telnet-like encrypted connections over TCP and

ICMP• Only way to prevent communications is to block

all ICMP traffic (undesirable)• Ability to upgrade master & slave software via rcp

– increases client functionality• Several DOS attacks like TFN• Solaris & Linux

Page 15: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

What’s New in DDoS Tools (since February 2000)

• Shaft (Nov 1999) – modeled after Trinoo– Attacker-master : password : tcp / master-zombie : udp– Can switch master servers and ports on the fly– Uses ticket system to match zombies with their masters– Keeps zombie packet statistics

• Mstream (April 2000) – Still in development– Attacker to master commands sent in one packet over

unencrypted TCP – password protected– Master and zombies talk over udp – All logged in users (attackers) are notified of access attempts

Page 16: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

Where to Find More Info on DDoS Tools

• Dave Dittrich’s White Papers

http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/ddos

• Packetstorm’s Distributed Attack Tools http://packetstorm.security.com/distributed

• CERT Coordination Center

http://www.cert.org

Page 17: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

Break

Page 18: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

How to Keep DDoS Tools from Getting You Down

• Pay attention to your machines!• Egress filter your network, i.e. make sure whatever

comes out of your network only has source addresses that belong to you

• Ingress filter – confirm that packets coming to you have source addresses that aren’t on your inside network

• Use tcpdump on Solaris or Linux to capture logs, and report incident to law enforcement (NIPC)

tcpdump –i interface –s 1500 –w capture_file snoop –d interface –o capture_file –s 1500

Page 19: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

Cisco Router Configuration Options

• Ip verify unicast reverse-path : confirms packets that arrive should be going back on same interface, otherwise drops

• Rate limit ICMP and SYN packets• Filter non-routable address space: Interface xy

ip access-group 101 in access-list 101 deny ip 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any access-list 101 deny ip 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 any access-list 101 deny ip 172.16.0.0 0.15.255.255 any access-list 101 permit ip any any

Page 20: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

Tools to Help Detect DDoS Tools

• NIPC Tools – locates installations on hard drive by scanning file contents

http://www.nipc.gov• Zombie Zapper – puts Trinoo, TFN, Stacheldraht,

and Shaft zombies “to sleep” when flooding http://razor.bindview.com

• Remote Intrusion Detector (RID) : Locates Trinoo, Stacheldraht, TFN on network http://www.theorygroup.com/Software/RID/

Page 21: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

Q & A

Page 22: A Brief History of Distributed Denial of Service

Thank you