911 centers in oregon: efficiencies through consolidation funding... · 911/dispatch centers (psap...

911 Centers in Oregon: Efficiencies through consolidation

By Jeff Rasmussen

EMPA Capstone Portland State University

June 2012

ABSTRACT

As the expenses to operate 911 centers continue to escalate, local governments in Oregon are dealing with a failing funding structure for the 911/dispatch centers. The recent economic recession has reduced the number of devices being taxed and the current surcharge has not been adjusted to reflect inflationary pressure. One solution to improve the efficiency of the system is through consolidation of the forty-eight 911/dispatch centers (PSAP – Public Safety Answering Point) across the state. Technology has advanced to a point that centralized 911/dispatch centers are practical, due to advanced mapping software and radio switching technology that enables transmissions to radio towers via secured internet connections.

The current state-wide funding system does not incentivize consolidation, even though consolidation has the potential to save funds by reducing redundant software computer systems and personnel located in the same county/region. A reduction in centers benefits the entire system by having more funding available to maintain the system’s backbone and advance technology upgrades to handle the next generation of 911 (NG911) communications (for example, text messaging and live streaming video from cell phones).

The purpose of this capstone research study is to incentivize consolidation discussions throughout the state by providing financial tools and information that can be used by PSAP centers to consider consolidation. The research results in the development of a minimal “right sized” 911/dispatch centers to take advantage of “economies of scale”. The report does not consider the political and other organizational issues that are necessarily involved in successful consolidations of PSAP centers.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Page Section I: Introduction & Purpose of the Project ............................................................ 3 Section II: Statement of the Problem ........................................................................... 11 Section III: Research Steps.......................................................................................... 29 Section IV: Research Findings .................................................................................... 50 Section V: Recommendations ..................................................................................... 66 References .................................................................................................................. 73 Appendices.................................................................................................................. 77

Section I: Introduction & Purpose of the Project

…while the consolidation process is complex and difficult, if implemented correctly, it can yield improvements in service levels, regional interoperability, responder safety, employee retention, and potential cost savings. L.R. Kimball’s (Oregon) Consolidation Analysis and Next Generation 9-1-1 Implementation Study (2012).

This project addresses the failing funding structure for the 911/dispatch centers

in Oregon counties and cities. One solution to improve the efficiency of the system is

through consolidation of the forty-eight1 911/dispatch centers (PSAP – Public Safety

Answering Point)2 across the state. Technology has advanced to a point that

centralized 911/dispatch centers are practical, due to advanced mapping software and

radio switching technology that enables transmissions to radio towers via secured

internet connections.

The current state-wide funding system does not incentivize consolidation, even

though consolidations save funds by reducing redundant software and computer

systems located in the same county. A reduction in centers benefits the entire system

by having more funding available to maintain the system’s backbone and advance

technology upgrades to handle the next generation of 911 (NG911) communications (for

example, text messaging and live streaming video from cell phones).

1 Forty-eight is the current number of PSAPs with Santiam Canyon Communication Center recently contracting with Willamette Valley Communication Center to provide service. The change occurred after the 2012 Kimball Report was completed (Oregon Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials, 2012). 2 In this paper the term PSAP and 911/dispatch center will be used interchangeable. PSAPs have two classifications, a Primary PSAP receives 911 calls directly and Secondary PSAPs only receive 911 calls from a Primary PSAP. The term PSAP in this paper always refers to Primary PSAPs. Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) 403.105 (11) “’Public safety answering point’ means a 24-hour communications facility established as an answering location for 9-1-1 calls originating within a given service area. A ‘primary public safety answering point’ receives all calls directly from the public. A ‘secondary public safety answering point’ only receives calls from a primary public safety answering point on a transfer or relay basis.

https://sites.google.com/a/santiam911.org/home/

The Oregon Office of Emergency Management (OEM) is prone to advance a

large technology investment without dealing with the inefficient system of 911 delivery

from 48 different locations that house 279 different “telecommunicater stations.” The

OEM plan is to convert the state-wide system to NG911 technology.

NG911 refers to an upgraded infrastructure that moves beyond the traditional

voice 911 call. These upgrades allow for an IP based system that can support text

messages, photographs, and video from citizens reporting emergencies. In addition,

this infrastructure allows an entire system to communication across regions and

provides support for the existing voice 911 call (National Emergency Number

Association, 2008). Image “1” is a representation of NG911 integrated system that

supports new and legacy communication systems.

Image 1 – NG 911 Technical Architecture Integrated Command Center

SOURCE: Federal Communications Commission - Communications Security, Reliability and

Interoperability Council Working Group, 2010

The OEM plan contemplates investing hardware costs of almost $50,000 per

station (10 year lifespan) without addressing a review of the need to have 48 locations

or the need for 279 separate stations (LR Kimball, 2011). OEM had delayed a State

Legislative mandate to produce a report “on the relative merits of public safety

answering point consolidation throughout the state with the intent of reducing

redundancy and creating a more cost-efficient delivery system” (Oregon State

Legislature, 2009). This report was due in 2010. It was in its 10th draft and the state

budget notes stated that funding would have been withheld in the 7th and 8th quarters of

the biennial budget if it was not delivered by the end of the 5th quarter (April 2012)

(Association of Oregon Counties, 2011, p. 67).

On February 1, 2012, OEM delivered the required report (hereinafter referred to

as the “Kimball Report”) to the Oregon Legislature’s Joint Ways and Means Committee

that included two state-wide consolidation scenarios and cost estimates of NG911

upgrades (Oregon State Legislature - Joint Ways and Means Committee, 2012). The

Kimball Report concludes that “[Oregon’s] emergency communications statewide would

benefit from further consolidation efforts” (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, pp. 5, 46, 69).

In response to the Kimball Report, the Oregon Legislature included a budget note that

states:

The Military Department (OEM) is directed to prepare a statewide information technology plan for upgrading Oregon’s 9-1-1 system(s) to Next Generation technology. The plan shall include a detailed component to consolidate the state’s Public Safety Answering Points based upon the 2012 L.R. Kimball Consolidation Analysis and Next Generation 9-1-1 Implementation Report (Oregon Senate Bill 5701 – 2012).

The next chapter reviews the impact of the economic recession on 911 tax

revenue and discusses the benefits of consolidation and moving to NG911 technology.

This chapter also evaluates the need to reduce costs and prepare for the conversion to

NG911 that will ultimately provide a vast improvement in service levels.

Section two reviews the history of 911 systems, technology, and funding history

in Oregon. This section also discusses the history of 911/dispatch consolidation in

Oregon. Sections three and four review financial and statistical data from Fiscal Year

2010-11 of 463 PSAPs to determine a minimal “right sized” 911/dispatch center that can

take advantage of “economies of scale” to assist jurisdictions in viewing consolidation

as a regional financial effort to improve service delivery, especially in rural Oregon.

Section five will offer recommendations to assist jurisdiction in evaluating consolidation

options. This project will only outline the steps in the first stage of a multistage process

necessary to evaluate 911 consolidations. The first stage consists of financial modeling

methods to assist jurisdiction to evaluate the potential financial benefits of consolidation.

The driver of this research was initiated after Jefferson County projected a 221% cost

increase in providing 911/dispatch services in the next five years. Although many

factors could be identified that have pushed part of the financial crisis on 911/dispatch

centers, this project purposely avoids discussing public employee union’s collective

bargaining that is a likely factor in jurisdictions reviewing consolidation.

PURPOSE OF THE PROJECT

The balkanized nature of 911 systems across jurisdictions and their Byzantine funding mechanisms obscure a simple but profound development: our nation’s emergency system is getting left behind by technological change. … the limits of the legacy technology used in emergency communications can be best understood by viewing today’s 911 system as an analog island in a digital sea. …..policymakers must recognize that the system is stressed to its limits and change is required Health of the U.S. 911 System (911 Industry Alliance, 2008, p. 5).

3 As of March 16, 2012, Coos County and Santiam Canyon Communication Center have yet to report data to OEM. Warm Springs (Tribe) is not required to report data to OEM.

The purpose of this project is to assist jurisdictions in reviewing 911 consolidation

projects as a means to reduce costs and/or improve services levels. Identifying benefits

and barriers is important for jurisdictions early in a review process. Additionally, if a

jurisdiction’s main purpose of reviewing consolidation is financial, the project will

develop financial and budgeting templates that will track cost history and develop

projects for the current operation as well as projects for consolidation scenarios.

Many rural Oregon counties are facing budgetary shortfalls caused by the current

recession. Out of Oregon’s 36 counties, 33 of them have a PSAP within their

jurisdiction. The state of Oregon has total of 48 PSAPs that are operated by a special

district, county, tribe, or city (see Attachment “A” for a map) (Oregon Military

Department, 2011). In the past four years, rural county 911/dispatch centers have seen

costs escalate and state revenue decrease.

These escalating costs and revenue reductions, in some cases have forced

jurisdictions to remove law enforcement positions from the street to be able to maintain

minimum staffing levels in 911/dispatch centers. Other jurisdictions will be facing the

same decision, as financial reserves will be exhausted in two years. The 911 tax

provides enough revenue to fund about thirty-eight percent (38%) of the PSAP’s

operation, with the remaining funds made up locally (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, p. 14).

Vision & Values of NG911 Technology and Consolidation

The vision of a future NG911 system in Oregon is a highly efficient operation that

takes advantage of technology and maximizes the existing $0.75 per month telephone

tax. Transitioning all 911/dispatch centers into NG911 technology would allow for the

following enhanced services:

• Standardizing the underlying technology of the state's separate 911/dispatch

centers using IP technology and internet-based communication links.

• Interconnecting 911/dispatch centers to allow unlimited transfers of calls,

distribution of overflow 911 calls to other 911/dispatch centers.

• Allowing the 911 system to accept and handle advanced information from

citizens, including video, photos, text messages, etc.

• Interconnecting with private services, such as telematics providers (e.g., OnStar),

to handle automatic crash notification (ACN) and other similar data.

• Creating of a state-wide voluntary database that citizens can add medical

information that would be accessed immediately. This same database could also

include medical call history.

• Outsource (contract) with an emergency medical dispatching (EMD) call center

services that would provide critical incident medical advice staffed with

emergency room doctors and nurses. This system would allow the doctor or

nurse to provide the pre-arrival instructions directly to the citizens, while allowing

the dispatcher to remain on the line. The in-route medical team would be able

listen to the ongoing incident to allow a highly efficient transition upon arrival (911

Dispatch Magazine, 2011) (911 Dispatch Magazine, 2011).

This vision would require a large investment in technology upgrades. It would

most likely include a cloud-based software that would reduce reoccurring costs (LR

Kimball, Inc, 2012). Reducing the number of 911/dispatch centers would not only save

upfront cost, but has the potential to save local jurisdictions funds by consolidating

administrative, building, and personnel costs (LR Kimball, 2011).

The Kimball report estimates an upfront two year investment of $18 million. The

conversion to an interconnected “cloud software” would reduce costs by an estimated

$5.7 million per year. A reduction in the number of PSAPs and telecommunicator

stations can decrease the upfront costs and reduce ongoing costs. Currently if two

jurisdictions combine 911/dispatch centers the entire burden of equipment modification

is their responsibility. The Kimball report, discussed in more detail in section five

estimates, that if consolidation occurred to a point of nine regional PSAPs the savings

increased to $9.3 million per year (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, pp. 66-67).

The 2009 (Minnesota) Governor’s Work Group on PSAP Consolidation reported

that cost savings achieved from a consolidation come from two sources. The first

potential source of savings is in personnel. The report cautioned that substantial

reductions of staff are usually not feasible, but some saving can be achieved.

Multi-county consolidated 911/dispatch centers have the potential to save funds.

Potential savings can be achieved by combining the overhead and personnel needed to

operate facilities 24/7. Personnel costs are the largest expenditure category in PSAPs’

budgets. Independent rural county operations have higher staffing levels (per capita)

compared to larger jurisdictions during non-peak hours. This is due to the minimum

staffing levels that cannot take advantage of economies of scale.

The second source of savings is in equipment:

The real cost savings come from the elimination of redundant and expensive technology such as CAD, 911 answering equipment, radio consoles, and logging recorders. The single set of technology and systems found in a consolidated environment reduces costs associated with procurement, connectivity, and maintenance costs. (Governor’s Work Group on PSAP Consolidation, 2009, p. 6)

In small to medium sized PSAPs, the non-peak hour operations routinely do not

have the workload to independently justify a minimum staffing level of 1.0 FTE. The

need to have at least one person on per shift is a clear operational need, but can be

considered a wasteful use of resources. Combining operations with multiple PSAPs to a

point when non-peak hour workloads can justify a minimum staffing level of 2.0 FTEs is

more economical. A PSAP consolidation is a way that smaller operations can achieve

cost savings by combining resources to take advantage of staffing economies of scale.

In smaller jurisdictions, consolidation can improve service levels. Currently,

thirty-nine percent (39%) of the PSAP receive less than one 9-1-1 call per hour.

However, when multiple incidents occur simultaneously, one dispatcher struggles to

maintain adequate service levels. It is not uncommon when a vehicle accident occurs

that between fifteen and twenty 911 calls are generated. Dispatchers struggle to

repetitive calls, while having to handle a separate incident, all the while dispatching fire

and ambulances to the accident scene. In a consolidation model, the organization

would have at least two dispatchers able to assist during these critical incidents.

Section II: Statement of the Problem

This section outlines the history of 911, the 911 funding history in Oregon, history

of consolidation efforts in Oregon, and other funding issues facing the 911 system in

Oregon.

HISTORY OF 911

Believe it or not, the 911 emergency number isn’t available in every single county of the United States (911 Dispatch Magazine, 2011).

Pre-911. Prior to a single phone number to report emergencies, citizens

reporting crime, fires, or medical emergencies used their telephone in the same manner

as making non-emergency telephone calls. They would need to consult a telephone

book that listed the various local police, fire, and ambulance agencies. The caller would

determine the agency that seemed appropriate and dial a seven-digit number. Valuable

time is lost during these steps, particularly if the caller is a child, is not familiar with the

local area, or does not know the address they are located.

The 911 concept was developed in response to these problems. The central idea

is that a person should be able to dial a single number, from any phone, at any location

at any time, to report any kind of emergency. The citizens would then be assured of the

quickest and most appropriate response.

Basic 911. The phone number 911 in the United States was reserved as the

nation’s emergency telephone number in 1967. Great Britain first developed the

concept for a nationwide number in 1937. It took another year for the system to be put

in place. The first system to implement 911 was by the Alabama Telephone Company

in Haleyville, Alabama. The first (ceremonial) 911 call was on February 16, 1968, when

then Alabama Speaker of the House Rankin Fite called and at the receiving end was

Congressman Tom Bevill (Michigan State 9-1-1 Committee, 2011, p. 5).

The Basic 911 system did provide a one number solution for citizens reporting

emergencies; however, the technology only allowed one centralized center to handle all

of the incoming calls. These early Primary PSAPs were usually the largest law

enforcement agency in a community (Oregon Emergency Management, 2000, p. 2).

Since all calls went to one location, if the call was not the jurisdiction of the answering

agency, the PSAP would make another call to the appropriate agency and relay the

nature of the emergency. As technology progressed, PSAPs could transfer the call to

the appropriate agency, but this required the citizen to repeat critical information to a

second person.

Shortcomings of Basic 911 included that citizens needed to know the location of

the emergency and in the case of a dropped call the citizen must redial 911, since the

PSAP did not know the caller’s phone number. In 1981, the Oregon Legislature set the

mandate that by the end of 1991 there would be a state-wide 911 system in the state.

In January 1991, Oregon became the sixth state to have border-to-border 911 services

(Oregon APCO/NENA, 2011, p. 9).

Enhanced 911 (E911). E911 systems started to emerge in the 1980s as

technology improved. The new systems provided technical solutions to three problems

inherent in Basic 911. E911 implements a database system for each telephone number

that allows “selective routing” of the 911 caller to the appropriate PSAP. This solves

many of the call transfer issues that occurred in communities that have overlapping

service boundaries (Oregon Emergency Management, 2000, p. 4). The E911 database

system’s other advancement includes, the phone number of the caller (Automatic

Number Information [ANI]), as well as the address (location) of the phone number

(Automatic Location Information [ALI]).

This database system continued to improve response times. PSAPs are able to

“populate” database fields on every phone number based upon the address. This

allowed the advent of Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD), which identifies the appropriate

law enforcement agency, fire district, and medical response agency of each phone

number as the call comes into the PSAP.

In June 1991, the Oregon State Legislature mandates that enhanced 911

services be provided by all 911/dispatch centers by 2000. This upgrade was completed

in 1999 (Oregon APCO/NENA, 2011, p. 9).

Wireless E911: Phase 1 & 2. In 1996, the Federal Communications

Commission (FCC) mandated that the same level of notification for landlines shall

become available for the growing number of cell phones. Phase 1 was required to

provide the cell phone number and the location of the cell tower (antenna) the call

originated. In Phase 2, the FCC required an accurate location (latitude/longitude

coordinates) for the calling device (LR Kimball, 2008, p. 12). As of December 31, 2005

all of Oregon’s 911/dispatch centers were capable of phase II delivery of information

(Oregon Office of Emergency Management, 2012).

Next Generation 911 (NG911)4: IP-based communication of emergency-related

voice, text, data, photos, and video. In a report on Vermont’s 911 funding structure, the

4 P.L. 112-96 (Next Generation 9–1–1 Advancement Act of 2012) Section 6503 (e): (4) EMERGENCY CALL.—The term ‘emergency call’ refers to any real-time communication with a public safety answering point or other emergency management or response agency, including: (A) through voice, text, or video

911 Board stated that technology has progressed to a point that interactions with 911

from citizens is becoming problematic. They pointed out that the current system is

completely based on landline and cellphones as the instrument of communication, when

technology allows many devices to be used to communicate emergencies. Those

include laptops, tablet computers, and stand-a-lone texting devices. They concluded

from an operational and taxing standpoint that “it may become problematic to

determine what a phone call actually is or even what a phone is” (State of Vermont

Enhanced 9-1-1 Board, 2012, p. 15). “Callers to 911…generally assume that the newer

technologies they are using to place a call are matched by the same level of technology

at the 911 call centers” (Congressional Research Services, 2011, p. 29).

HISTORY OF 911 TAX RATES IN OREGON

In 1981, when the Oregon Legislature instituted the plan to have (basic) 911

services statewide they imposed a three percent (3.0%) tax on all telephones monthly

bill. This tax was increased to five percent (5.0%) in 1991. The additional two percent

(2.0%) tax was dedicated to the funding of equipment changing to enhanced 911

services statewide. In 1995, the Oregon Legislature removed the five percent (5%) tax

and imposed a flat seventy-five cent ($0.75) per month surcharge on “any retail

subscriber who has a telecommunications service capable of accessing 911 services”

and related data; and (B) nonhuman-initiated automatic event alerts, such as alarms, telematics, or sensor data, which may also include real-time voice, text, or video communications. (5) NEXT GENERATION 9–1–1 SERVICES.—The term ‘Next Generation 9–1–1 services’ means an IP-based system comprised of hardware, software, data, and operational policies and procedures that: (A) provides standardized interfaces from emergency call and message services to support emergency communications; (B) processes all types of emergency calls, including voice, data, and multimedia information; (C) acquires and integrates additional emergency call data useful to call routing and handling; (D) delivers the emergency calls, messages, and data to the appropriate public safety answering point and other appropriate emergency entities; (E) supports data or video communications needs for coordinated incident response and management; and (F) provides broadband service to public safety answering points or other first responder entities.

(Oregon APCO/NENA, 2011, p. 9). This change also included language that made it

clear that cellular phones would now pay a tax to support 911 services (Oregon

APCO/NENA, 2011) (Oregon Emergency Management State 9-1-1 Program, 2009).

The change to the flat tax included a six year sunset clause. Including this

sunset clause has remained with renewal of the tax in 2001 and 2007. This tax is up for

renewal in 2013.

Table “A” – History of 911 Tax Rates in Oregon

Year Rate Notes 1981 3.0% 1991 5.0% Additional 2% for E911 1995 $0.75 Six Year Sunset (2001) 2001 $0.75 Six Year Sunset (2007) 2007 $0.75 Six Year Sunset (2013)

Source: Oregon Department of Revenue (http://www.oregon.gov/DOR/BUS/IC-603-625.shtml)

The current taxing structure has not kept up with technology. Currently prepaid

cellphone plans are not taxed in Oregon. In Vermont, they estimate that up to twenty-

five percent of the cellphone plans are now prepaid wireless plans (State of Vermont

Enhanced 9-1-1 Board, 2012, p. 12). In July 2011, the New Millennium Research

Council (NMRC) released a report that three out of five new wireless subscriptions in

2010 were prepaid wireless plan (New Millennium Research Council, 2011). This tax

inequity is likely one of the causes of the reduced revenue in Oregon. It is estimated

that if this loophole is fixed it would add $6 million per year into the 911 revenue stream

(Oregon APCO/NENA, 2011, p. 6).

http://www.oregon.gov/DOR/BUS/IC-603-625.shtml

HISTORY OF 911 TAX REVENUE

The Oregon 911 tax revenue in down substantially. Since 2008, the revenue

from this tax has declined almost nine percent (8.8%)5 (Oregon Emergency

Management, 2011). Using the FY 2011 third quarter revenue distribution, the 911

revenue will be at the same level of collection as it was in 2006 (Oregon Emergency

Management State 9-1-1 Program, 2009, p. 18). The Oregon 911 funding system

receives its funding from a $0.75 per month tax on all telephones in the state (except

pre-paid cell phones) (Smith, 2011). Currently the revenue is shared with counties and

cities. Just over sixty percent (60.5%) of the funds are distributed to counties and cities

based upon population. All counties are guaranteed one percent (1%) of the amount

distributed (Oregon Revised Statute - 403.240(9)). Twenty-Seven of the 36 counties

are “one percent counties” (Caldwell, 2011, p. 19). The funds are restricted to activities

directly related to 911 (Oregon Military Department, 2010, p. 22).

The State of Oregon’s Department of Military, through the Office of Emergency

Management (OEM) receives just over thirty-nine percent (39.5%) of the tax. OEM

must use the funds to pay for PSAP common network services, Federal

Communications Commission regulations, and costs associated with the Enhanced 911

program costs related to providing state-wide wire line and wireless 911 services

including equipment. The remaining one half percent (0.5%) is kept by the Department

of Revenue for administrative processing cost recovery (Oregon Military Department, p.

22).

The State of Oregon is one of seven states identified by the Federal

Communication Commission (FCC) that used 911 tax revenue “to fund programs other 5 Comparing 4th Quarter 2008 ($10,294,562) to 3rd Quarter 2011 ($9,384,854).

than 911/E911 services” for calendar year 2010 (Federal Communications Commission,

2011, pp. 10-11). Currently, the Oregon Legislature is transferring the investment

interest on the balance of the 911 equipment account to the state’s general fund. The

OEM estimates that this diversion of investment income totaled $817,000 for fiscal year

2009-10 (Oregon Emergency Management, 2010, p. 22). The 2010 FCC report states

that Oregon transferred $3.6 million of 911 funds in the general fund in 2009 (Federal

Communications Commission, 2010, p. 11). In 2002, the Oregon Legislature

transferred $9 million of 911 surcharges into the state’s general fund. At the time, this

represented 14% of the total revenue stream for fiscal year 2001-02 (Oregon

Emergency Management, 2010, p. 22).

With the passage of the Next Generation 9-1-1 Advancement Act of 2012, (P.L.

112-966) that President Obama signed on February 22, 2012, Oregon is at risk to miss

out on the $115 million that will come available in federal 911 grants. A summary of this

legislation by LR Kimball, indicates that any entity that diverts 911 funds for other

purposes will be ineligible for grant funding (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012).

Alternative 911 Revenue Resources for Local Jurisdictions

Oregon is one of 21 states that does not allow local jurisdictions to adopt local

911 tax surcharges (Federal Communications Commission, 2011, p. 5). Five counties

have used alternative methods to support 911/dispatch centers in Oregon. Deschutes

and Hood River Counties have created (with voter approval) “County Service Districts” 6 P.L. 112-96 – Section 6503(c)(3): CONDITION OF GRANT.—Each applicant for a grant under this section shall agree, as a condition of receipt of the grant, that if the State or other taxing jurisdiction within which the applicant is located, during any period of time during which the funds from the grant are available to the applicant, obligates or expends designated 9–1–1 charges for any purpose other than the purposes for which such charges are designated or presented, eliminates such charges, or redesignates such charges for purposes other than the implementation or operation of 9–1–1 services, E9–1–1 services, or Next Generation 9–1–1 services, all of the funds from such grant shall be returned to the Office.

authorized by Oregon Revised Statue (ORS), Chapters 198 and 403. These districts

retain the Board of County Commissioners as the governing body and are adopted with

a permanent property tax levy.

Columbia, Klamath, and Tillamook Counties have created (with voter approval)

“911 Communications (special) District”. These districts are authorized by ORS

403.300 to 403.380. These districts’ governing bodies are an elected board (five to

seven members), that oversee all operations of the district. These districts are also

established with a permanent property tax levy.

Another option for jurisdiction is ORS 280.040 to 280.090, which allows a

governing body to seek voter approval for an option property tax levy. These types of

property tax increase are usually referred to as “local option levy”. This type of levy may

not be greater than five years in length. Deschutes County currently has an active local

option levy for 911 operations. This levy expires in 2013 and the county has submitted

a ballot proposal to increase the permanent property tax rate of the County Service

District to relieve the necessity to seek voters’ approval of this additional amount every

five years (Deschutes County, 2012).

HISTORY OF 911 CONSOLIDATION IN OREGON

In 1981, when the Oregon Legislature put in motion the 10-year plan for a

statewide (basic) 911 system, there were 280 different 911/dispatch centers. Over the

years these numbers have decline (see Table “B” for history). The current number of

911/dispatch centers is 48.

Table B – History of the Number of Oregon PSAPs (911/dispatch centers)

Year Number

of PSAPs

Pre-1981 3007 1981 280 1991 91 1995 64 2000 57 2003 52 2009 50 2010 49 2012 48

Source: OEM, Oregon APCO/NENA, OEM 911 Efficiency Study (1994)

While the number of 911/dispatch centers continues to drop, 11 counties in

Oregon have more than one 911/dispatch center within their jurisdiction (see Table “C”).

These range from two in Jefferson County with a population of 21,750 to four in Lane

County with a population of 352,010. These 11 counties have a total of 26 of the 48

911/dispatch centers in the state.

Oregon has gone through several studies on 911 consolidations. The first study

was ordered by the Oregon Legislature during the 1991 session for OEM to “conduct an

efficiency study of Oregon's 9-1-1 system” (Oregon Emergency Management, 1994, p.

11). This study was not completed until 1994 and it took and additional piece of

legislation (Enrolled House Bill 3517 – 1993 Session) to clarify the nature of the study.

One of the eight specific areas the legislature wanted studied was an “assessment of

the optimal number of PSAPs” (p. 11) (Enrolled House Bill 3517, Section 5(e)).

7 “The number of dispatch centers and/or 9-1-1 centers … is estimated at something in the vicinity of 300” (Oregon Emergency Management, 1994, pp. 44-45).

Table C - Counties with Multiple PSAPs (2012)

County Number of PSAPs Population

CLACKAMAS 2 376,780 CLATSOP 2 37,070 COOS 2 63,035 CURRY 2 22,355 JEFFERSON 2 21,750 LANE 4 352,010 LINCOLN 3 46,135 MALHEUR 2 31,345 MARION 2 315,900 UMATILLA 3 76,000 YAMHILL 2 99,405

Source: OEM and PSU Population Research Center

The final recommendation regarding the optimal number of PSAPs was as

follows:

• “The optimal number of PSAPs in a given geographical area should be

determined at the local level after consideration of the most effective and efficient

use of total resources to provide this and other associated services required by

the local constituency.

• Local governments are strongly encouraged to evaluate their 911 systems to

determine if they are providing the service in the most effective and efficient

manner based on cost and service delivered.

• OEM working with the Oregon 9-1-1 Advisory Committee and Oregon's public

safety community, will work to complete a criteria based matrix to be used by

local governments in evaluating their 911 systems.

• The 9-1-1 Efficiency Study Committee supports the local consolidation of 911

PSAPs if it is supported by the local public and private safety agencies and

results in improved service to the public served” (Oregon Emergency

Management, 1994, p. 51).

In 1995, the Oregon Legislature passed a requirement8 that all 911/dispatcher

centers located in a county that includes more than one center provide a report to the

state. This report was to be submitted to OEM prior to December 31, 2000. The

required report was expected to demonstrate the benefits of having multiple 911/centers

within a county jurisdiction. The benefits were defined as “providing better service or

cost savings that has been verified” (Oregon Military Department, 2010, p. 18).

In response to this report requirement, OEM conducted is its own report and

study on multiple PSAPs located inside one on county. The Multi-PSAP County Report

Evaluation Study was completed in October 2000. The Report among other things

concluded:

• PSAPs in multi-PSAP counties tended to have higher call transfer rates between

PSAPs, that increase response times, and

• Some of the PSAPs in multi-PSAP counties are very small, often with only one

person during low-activity hours. This creates a potential for lower service to the

public when two or more calls are received simultaneously (Oregon Emergency

Management, 2000, p. 12).

One of the conclusions of the 2000 report was that most “high-value”

consolidations have taken place and the remaining consolidation opportunities would

8 Section 14, Chapter 276, Oregon Laws 1995

have “marginal benefits, incur high capital costs, and/or encounter entrenched and

vigorous political opposition” (Oregon Emergency Management, 2000, p. ES4 & 25).

The report recommended that the state should focus on other improvements to the 911

system, instead of forcing consolidation efforts. The report concluded that

“consolidation has decreased in importance in comparison to other current critical public

safety communications issues” (p. 25).

The Oregon Legislature ignored the recommendation to stay away from forced

911 consolidations. In June 2001, Governor Kitzhaber signed into law HB 3977, which

required PSAPs in multi-PSAP counties to submit a plan for consolidation,9 restricted to

no more than one PSAP in each county (effective September 1, 2002),10 and

emphasized the intent not to fund more than one PSAP per county after July 1, 2003

(Oregon Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials, 2012, p. 3).11 In

addition to these requirements, the legislation created a Primary Public Safety

Answering Points Consolidation Incentive Fund,12 but stated that OEM is not allowed to

spend any funds without legislative approval during the next legislative session that

would not begin until January 2003.13

The plans to force 911/dispatch centers into no more than one center per county

hit a double whammy. The first was a recession in 2002, that created a $1.7 billion

shortfall in income tax projections requiring five special session (Seattle Times, 2002).

During the third special session, the legislature transferred $9 million from the 911 funds

into the state’s general fund to help close the shortfall (Oregon Emergency

9 Oregon HB 3977 – 2001 Session, Section 1 (2)(a). 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid., Section 7 12 Ibid., Section 5 13 Ibid., Section 9

Management, 2010, p. 22). The second was local backlash, which cause legislators to

submit not less than five different bills14 to remove the forced consolidation in multi-

PSAP counties (Oregon Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials, 2012,

p. 3). Ultimately, HB 3154 was passed and signed by Governor Ted Kolongoski in July

2003. This legislation removed the forced consolidation and eliminated the Primary

Public Safety Answering Points Consolidation Incentive Fund15.

The effect of the 2001-03 effort to force consolidation did have residual effects.

A total of five 911/dispatch centers in multi-PSAP did consolidate between 2001 and

2005 (see Table C on page 19). These included one in Clackamas County (City of

Milwaukee), one in Douglas County (Myrtle Creek), one in Jackson County (Ashland),

one in Umatilla County (Pendleton), and one in Washington County (Forest Grove).

Persuasion Through Budget Notes

Since the 2001 mandate and reversal in 2003, the legislature has stayed out of

openly calling for 911/dispatch center consolidation. They have turned to including

“budget notes” attached to the legislation that enacts state spending, otherwise known

as the budget bill(s). These budget notes focusing on 911/dispatch center have

appeared in the 2009, 2011, and 2012 budget bills.

In a Budget Information Brief – Budget Note (2007), Legislative Fiscal Officer,

Ken Rocco explains the history and authority of budget notes. In this brief, he states

that “...a budget note is a formal directive to a state agency expressing legislative intent

for a particular budget issue” (p. 1). The history of budget notes goes back 36 years,

but was only recently formalized with the adoption Joint Committee on Ways and Means

14 HB 2833, HB 3124, HB 3154, HB 2707, and HB 3257 15 Oregon HB 3154 – 2003 Session, Sections 1 & 2

Committee Rule #13 in the 74th Legislative Assembly (2007). Budget notes do not have

the “force of law.” However a note “carries greater authority than an instruction but

lacks the legal basis of administrative rule for revised state” (p. 3). In his report, Rocco

includes a continuum (see Image “2”) of the authority regarding a budget note in

comparison to administrative rules and statutes.

Image 2 – Continuum of Authority of Legislative Action

Source: Legislative Fiscal Office, Budget Information Brief – Budget Note (2007, p. 3)

Rocco concluded that state agencies are not legally required to comply with

budget notes, but states that historically the Executive, Judicial, and Legislative Branch

agencies comply for three reasons. The first is that agencies have a mutual interest in

the outcome. The second reason is that the agency has an interest in maintaining good

relations with the Legislative Assembly. The third reason is that agencies recognize

that compliance may avoid “unnecessary statutory language to satisfy legislative

concern over a technical or non-policy issue” (p. 3).

In the Oregon Military Department’s 2009 budget bill (SB 5536), the legislature

attached a budget note that the department “will conduct a study of the relative merits of

Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) consolidation throughout the state with the intent

of reducing redundancy and creating a more cost-efficient delivery system” and deliver

this study during the 2010 legislative session (Oregon State Legislature, 2009, p. 7). In

response, OEM put together a Consolidation Task Force that included public safety,

local government, and private sector partners. This task force met numerous times and

developed a draft report that was never submitted to the legislature. The OEM website

includes the “10th draft” version of this study.

In the Oregon Military Department’s 2011 budget bill (HB 5037), the legislature

attached a more strongly worded budget note. The budget note states that OEM has

failed to provide the consolidation study requested in 2009 and that if a study was not

submitted to the legislature in 2012, the Legislative Fiscal Office would complete a study

using 911 funds (Oregon State Legislature, 2011, p. 10). The Association of Oregon

Counties (AOC) reports in their 2011 Legislative Summary, that the state budget has

withheld expenditure authorization from the OEM budget for the last two remaining

quarters of the biennial budget. The report states that this $20 million dollar holdback is

to “ensure that the report will be done” (Association of Oregon Counties, 2011, p. 67).

The OEM did complete the task of the consolidation study by contracting with LR

Kimball company. The report was submitted to the 2012 legislature. In the report, LR

Kimball reviewed the merits of consolidating PSAPs and the cost analysis of upgrading

the entire state 911 system to software and equipment that would be able to handle

NG911 requirements. The report analyzed three scenarios. The first was the status

quo of 49 PSAPs. The second was a centralized single statewide PSAP. The third was

system of nine regional PSAPs. This report will be analyzed in Section Five.

In the 2012 budget bill (SB 5701), the legislature included a budget note that

instructs OEM to prepare a plan for upgrading the state 911 system to NG911

technology. In addition, the budget note states that this plan “shall include a detailed

component to consolidate the state’s Public Safety Answering Points” based upon the

2012 Kimball report (Oregon State Legislature, 2012, pp. 28-29). The budget note did

not specify which consolidation scenario that OEM should pursue, but in the report

Kimball does state that a single statewide system is not recommended and the “perfect

world” solution is a long-term goal of nine regional PSAPs that offer the best level of

service and cost efficiencies (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, p. 69).

Summary

The Oregon 911 system needs to prepare for the conversion of expensive

technologic upgrades to NG911. The expense can be daunting, but the return on the

investment has less than a four year payback and will have ongoing savings of close to

$5.7 million per year. These savings would not be a windfall to 911/dispatch centers,

but would be retained by OEM in the 911 subaccount. Additionally, this savings can be

increased to $9.3 million per year if the 48 PSAPs are able to find a way to voluntarily

consolidate (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, pp. 66-67). Failure to pursue voluntary

consolidations may have the state legislature repeat the 2001-styled forced mandates.

Locally funded 911/dispatch centers are feeling economic pressure. Rising

personnel costs and aging equipment16 coupled with a reduction in 911 tax revenue

have put some 911/dispatch centers on an unsustainable path. If the Oregon

legislature does not modify the 911 tax to include pre-paid cellphones, the 911 system

should plan on continued reduced revenue even if a rebounding economy restores

consumer confidence.

Many of the 911/dispatch centers in Oregon are considered small (less than 4

workstations17) or receive less than one 911 call per hour18 (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, pp.

16 Over forty-five percent (45%) of the Computer Aided Dispatch hardware in Oregon 911/dispatch centers is over eight years old (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, p. 23). 17 Thirty-Four of forty-nine PSAPs have less than four workstations. Twelve PSAPs have two workstations.

13-18). The infrastructure costs of computers, software, and emergency power systems

for these centers are expensive to maintain. When factoring in the volume of 911 calls

received for these smaller PSAPs the economics of maintaining these centers

operationally is difficult to justify. In addition, many of the smallest PSAPs have only

one telecommunicator on duty at any one time. While call volume is less than one per

hour, the potential risk to service levels are great, since it is difficult to handle more than

one 911 call and dispatch the first responders.

These small 911/dispatch centers are justifiably overstaffed, due to call volume,

but are simultaneously understaffed when you consider the operational need to be able

to hand a flurry of multiple 911 calls that cannot be anticipated. Seconds count in

responding to 911 calls, the citizens of these smaller PSAPs are at risk when multiple

911 calls are received. At the same time, these same citizens are potentially

overpaying for a 911/dispatch center that receives less than one call per hour. Six

911/dispatch centers receive less than six 911 calls per day.

The concept of consolidation of 911/dispatch centers is fairly straight forward.

With today’s technology of selective routing a telephone number that dials 911 across

the state is immediately routed to two hubs (Portland and Eugene). At each of these

hubs the location of the call is identified either by the ALI (automated location

information) if it is a landline or by cell tower location. Once the location of the call is

determined, it is selectively routed back to the appropriate 911/dispatch center. In other

words, the old technology (Basic 911) of “centralized switches” in each community

effectively restricted 911 calls from leaving a community and rerouted those calls back

18 Nineteen of forty-nine PSAPs receive less than 911 call per hour. Thirty-eight of forty-nine receive less than 4 calls per hour.

to a local 911/dispatch center requiring a locally based 911/dispatch center. The new

technology makes remote 911/dispatch centers even more feasible with breakthroughs

in internet based radio command systems. If a radio tower can be connected to an IP

(Internet protocol) system, either by fiber optic or microwave, a telecommunicator can

communicate by radio with police, fire, and EMS personnel without a need to be located

within the local community.

The governing bodies of 911/dispatch centers need additional tools to evaluate

potential 911 consolidations. The employees of these 911 centers are not likely to raise

the issue without inquiry. When this inquiry is requested many times 911 staff quickly

raises many reasons a consolidation cannot happen, without taking into consideration

that service levels will usually improve and the potential to save financial resources is

an important factor. The problem is that without hiring a consultant that may cost up to

$100,000, a governing body of a small jurisdiction is left wondering what consolidation

efforts may produce in service level benefits and potential cost savings. The purpose of

this research is to develop financial templates that can be used to project operation

costs and find the “right sized” 911/dispatch center that is based upon consolidated

911/dispatch centers’ call volumes and population.

Section III: Research Steps

…comparing the cost of current, non-consolidated PSAP operations with that of a consolidated environment is not an apples-to-apples comparison. An analogy may be a 1985 model ambulance and a brand new ambulance, which can get from the scene of an accident to an emergency room in a similar manner. However, the older model is less reliable, less safe, less efficient, and not equipped with the most current medical devices. These devices can be the difference between life and death. Consolidation Guide: Office of Statewide Emergency Telecommunications (Office of Statewide Emergency Telecommunications: State of Connecticut, 2012, p. 5)

This section outlines the research undertaken to collect information that can

assist 911/dispatch centers in evaluating possible consolidations. This research

consists of four sets of data. The first includes a summary of financial and call data

from 4619 of the 49 Oregon PSAPs that were operational in FY 2010-11. The second

includes a review of the different types of 911 consolidations. The third is a review of

the recent NG911 and PSAP consolidation report completed by the LR Kimball

Company on behalf of OEM. The fourth is a summary of data used to compare the

number of PSAPs with other states.

OREGON PSAP FINANCIAL & CALL VOLUME DATA

The source of data for this project is the annual report that is required by state

law20 for all 911/dispatch centers. These reports include information on how state 911

tax revenues were spent in different categories, including amounts of local funds spent

on 911 activities. The report (see Appendix “2” for report template) requires thirty-four

categories for revenue and expenditures, two categories for the number of employees,

and two categories for call-taking data. This can be used to determine the ideal “right-

sized” PSAP in terms of cost efficiency.

19 Missing PSAP data is from Coos County, Santiam Canyon, and Warm Springs. 20 ORS 403.120(1)(c)(A) and 403.240 (11).

Since 911 tax revenue is shared with cities and counties, additional analysis was

conducted to further refine cost factors into “gross” (does not include 911 taxes) and

“net” (includes 911 taxes). The purpose of including gross and net calculations is

because the 911 tax revenue is not shared proportionally by population. As stated

earlier, state law21 guarantees each county one percent (1.0%) of all revenue collected

based upon the county’s unincorporated population. A list of the counties and there

“1% minimum” status is included in Table “D”.

In reviewing the efficiency of a 911/dispatch center solely relying on the “net” cost

of providing services does not give an accurate accounting, since smaller counties

receive a disproportionate amount of 911 tax revenue. For example, the smallest

county in the state is Wheeler County with a total population of 1,435. Using the 2011

3rd quarter distribution of 911 tax revenue, Wheeler County is projected to receive a

total of $228,830. That is equal to $159 per resident (See Table “E”). The largest

county that does not receive a minimum one-percent is Washington County,22 with a

population of 536,370 is projected to receive $1,018,810 for a total of $1.90 per

resident. This disproportionate funding tax distribution should not be ignored when

reviewing financial analysis in attempting to find more efficient 911/dispatch centers.

21 ORS 403.240(9) 22 Although Multnomah County has a total population of 741,925, its unincorporated population is 17,637 which makes it eligible for a “1.0% minimum” allocation.

Table D – Oregon Counties – “1% Minimum” 911 Tax Status

County Population July 1, 2011 (PSU)

Unincorporated Population (OEM)

1% Minimum 911 Tax Revenue (Yes/No)

BAKER 16,215 4,811 Yes

BENTON 85,995 18,641 Yes

CLACKAMAS 378,480 170,682 No

CLATSOP 37,145 12,975 Yes

COLUMBIA 49,625 22,104 Yes

COOS 62,960 25,530 Yes

CROOK 20,855 11,758 Yes

CURRY 22,335 12,615 Yes

DESCHUTES 158,875 51,240 No

DOUGLAS 107,795 57,935 No

GILLIAM 1,880 580 Yes

GRANT 7,450 2,889 Yes

HARNEY 7,375 3,075 Yes

HOOD RIVER 22,625 14,055 Yes

JACKSON 203,950 62,530 No

JEFFERSON 21,845 13,464 Yes

JOSEPHINE 82,820 46,335 Yes

KLAMATH 66,580 42,722 Yes

LAKE 7,885 5,350 Yes

LANE 353,155 96,245 No

LINCOLN 46,155 19,365 Yes

LINN 117,340 35,805 Yes

MALHEUR 31,445 14,485 Yes

MARION 318,150 83,620 No

MORROW 11,270 4,270 Yes

MULTNOMAH 741,925 17,637 Yes

POLK 75,965 16,658 Yes

SHERMAN 1,765 615 Yes

TILLAMOOK 25,255 15,670 Yes

UMATILLA 76,580 21,865 Yes

UNION 25,980 6,445 Yes

WALLOWA 6,995 2,955 Yes

WASCO 25,300 9,254 Yes

WASHINGTON 536,370 213,763 No

WHEELER 1,435 675 Yes

YAMHILL 99,850 23,655 Yes Source: PSU Population Research Center and OEM 2011 3rd Quarter Report

Table E – 911 Tax Revenue per County per Resident

County Population 1% Minimum 911 Tax Revenue (Yes/No)

Projected 911 Tax Revenue Distribution per Resident* +

MULTNOMAH 741,925 Yes $0.31 MARION 318,150 No $1.25 LANE 353,155 No $1.30 JACKSON 203,950 No $1.46 DESCHUTES 158,875 No $1.54 WASHINGTON 536,370 No $1.90 LINN 117,340 Yes $1.95 CLACKAMAS 378,480 No $2.15 YAMHILL 99,850 Yes $2.29 DOUGLAS 107,795 No $2.56 BENTON 85,995 Yes $2.66 JOSEPHINE 82,820 Yes $2.76 UMATILLA 76,580 Yes $2.99 POLK 75,965 Yes $3.01 KLAMATH 66,580 Yes $3.44 COOS 62,960 Yes $3.63 COLUMBIA 49,625 Yes $4.61 LINCOLN 46,155 Yes $4.96 CLATSOP 37,145 Yes $6.16 MALHEUR 31,445 Yes $7.28 UNION 25,980 Yes $8.81 WASCO 25,300 Yes $9.04 TILLAMOOK 25,255 Yes $9.06 HOOD RIVER 22,625 Yes $10.11 CURRY 22,335 Yes $10.25 JEFFERSON 21,845 Yes $10.48 CROOK 20,855 Yes $10.97 BAKER 16,215 Yes $14.11 MORROW 11,270 Yes $20.30 LAKE 7,885 Yes $29.02 GRANT 7,450 Yes $30.72 HARNEY 7,375 Yes $31.03 WALLOWA 6,995 Yes $32.71 GILLIAM 1,880 Yes $121.72 SHERMAN 1,765 Yes $129.65 WHEELER 1,435 Yes $159.46

*Based on CY 2011 3rd Quarter Distribution +County Distribution only - Does not include revenue distributed to cities located within each county)

Source: PSU Population Research Center and OEM 2011 3rd Quarter Report

The reports submitted by the individual PSAPs were reviewed to evaluate

consistency in the reporting of population. Many PSAPs did not use recognized

population data from the PSU Population Research Center. In reviewing the data,

some PSAPs operating in counties that have multiple PSAPs did not reduce the

population of the PSAPs that larger PSAPs surround. Prior to data analysis, the

population data was adjusted to match the July 2011 certified population figures

provided by PSU’s Population Research Center (See Appendices “3”, “4”, and “5” for

PSU population data).

In counties that have multiple PSAPs, population was adjusted to conform to

known PSAP boundaries. In some jurisdictions, PSAPs’ boundaries do not follow city

boundaries. For example, the city of Brookings’ PSAP receives calls and dispatches for

an adjacent fire district that does not have an identified population from PSU. In these

cases, the submitted PSAPs’ populations are not adjusted from their reported

population. However, the larger PSAPs population was adjusted downward from the

PSU data for populations of PSAPs of cities. For the above example, the Brookings

PSAP’s (located in Curry County) reported population is 16,000. The PSU data for

Brookings is only 6,360. The Brookings PSAP population is not adjusted. The

remaining PSAP in Curry County is operated by the county. The PSAP population for

Curry County PSAP is reduced by 6,360 from the PSU population estimate for Curry

County.

The FY 2010-11 PSAP reports were analyzed to determine the following

information:

1. 911 calls per resident (911 calls divided by population).

2. 911 tax revenue per resident (tax revenue divided by population).

3. Percentage of expenditures paid by 911 tax revenue (tax revenue divided by

total expenditures).

4. “Gross” cost per resident (total expenditures divided by population).

5. “Net” cost per resident (total expenditures minus 911 tax revenue divided by

population).

6. “Gross” cost per 911 call received (total expenditures divided by 911 calls).

7. “Net” cost per 911 call received (total expenditures minus 911 tax revenue

divided by 911 calls).

8. Residents per 911/dispatch center total employees (FTE) (residents divided

by total FTE in 911/dispatch center).

9. 911 calls per total employee (FTE) (residents divided by total FTE).

10. 911 calls per hour (911 calls divided by 365/24).

Assumptions and Methodology

Using the data from the FY 2010-11 OEM reports it is possible to determine that

certain characteristics of PSAP lead to lower costs. In order to complete this task some

assumptions were made.

• Average Cost per FTE. According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics the

average wage of a dispatcher is $37,500. The Kaiser Family Foundation

reports the average employer cost for health care in 2011 was $10,944.

Oregon Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) reports that the

average employer contribution in FY 11-13 is almost 11 percent (10.8%) and

that 70 percent (70%) of employers contribute the six percent (6%) into

employees Individual Account Program (IAP) (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,

2012) (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011) (Oregon Public Employees

Retirement System (PERS), 2011). Together, the combination of the above

pieces of information resulted in the following assumption: Average PSAP

total FTE employee cost is $54,744 [(37,500*1.168) +10,944].

• Exclude PSAPs for inconsistent data. To be able to confidently compare

PSAP data, an examination was completed to check that the reported number

of total employees (FTEs) was consistent with the reported total expenditures.

The 46 PSAPs total FTE was multiplied by $54,744, then divided by the total

expenditures reported to determine the percentage of expenditures assumed

to have been spent on personnel. If the above calculation of personnel

costs is greater than 100 percent (100%) of the reported expenditures it

resulted in the following assumption: the reported financial data is flawed

and should be excluded. Table “F” includes the three PSAPs that have an

assumed error by having personnel costs greater than the reported total

expenditures.

Table F – Excluded PSAPs for Inconsistent Employee Data

PSAP Reported

Total FTEs

Reported Total

Expenditures

Assumed FTE Cost ($54,744)

Assumed Percent of

Budget Spent on Personnel

South Clatsop (Seaside) 8.00 $97,117 $437,952 451.0% Josephine County 15.00 $623,069 $821,160 131.8% Lake County 6.25 $336,533 $342,150 101.7%

• Excluded PSAPs if multiple secondary PSAPs exist within the same county

boundary. To be able to confidently compare PSAPs an examination was

conducted to determine if primary PSAPs data would be biased. Primary

PSAPs that have more than one secondary PSAP within the same jurisdiction

would likely have a lower staffing ratio, since the telecommunicators would be

transferring calls to other dispatch centers and would not be required to staff

personnel for those tasks. The potential of comparing different PSAPs that

have different staffing requirements resulted in the following assumption:

Primary PSAPs that transfer 911 calls to multiple secondary PSAPs have a

lower staffing level, since they do not dispatch field personnel and should be

excluded from the study. Table “G” includes the three PSAPs that have been

excluded.

Table G – Primary PSAPs Excluded – Multiple Secondary PSAPs

County Number of Secondary

PSAPs* Secondary PSAPs Excluded Primary PSAPs

Coos 3 Bay Cities Ambulance, Myrtle Point PD, and North Bend PD

Coos Bay PD and Coos County Sheriff

Lane 3 Junction City PD, Lane County Sheriff, and Springfield PD

Central Lane Communications, East Lane 911, South Lane 911, and West Lane 911

Linn 3 Sweet Home PD, Lebanon PD, and Albany PD Linn County Sheriff

* Not including Oregon State Patrol (OSP) or Department of Public Safety & Standards secondary PSAPs.

Source: OEM (http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/OEM/OR911/docs/psap_directory.pdf?ga=t)

• PSAPs Staffing. In the PSAP Staffing Guidelines Report (2003) adopted by

the National Emergency Number Association (NENA), the staffing of PSAPs

recommended two methods for determining staffing levels. The first method

relies on available call data (volume, duration, and queuing theory). The

second method relies on using the following three categories of PSAPs based

upon population size: small (0 to 19,000), medium (19,000 to 100,000), and

large (100,000 to 140,000). The report stated that using population size was

based upon the comparison of using call data and actual staffing of existing

PSAPs. Using a population matrix the Report staffing requirements will be

similar for jurisdictions that have similar characteristics (pp. 2-3,19-21). Table

“H” outlines the total FTEs recommended based on PSAP size.

Table H – Recommended Staffing – PSAP Size

Population Recommended

Staffing* Small PSAP Up to 19,000 9.0 Medium PSAP 19,000 to 100,000 16.0 Large PSAP 100,000 to 140,000 25.6

* Total FTE including training, data base administration, and administrative support positions

Source: National Emergency Number Association (NENA), PSAP Staffing Guidelines Report (2003), Pgs 20-21

The report provides a method for calculating the number of FTEs

required to staff a position 24 hours per day for 365 days per year. The report

suggests an “available working man-hours” calculation to determine a

“manning ratio”. The first step in the process is to deduct the total number of

hours an employee is expected to be absent from work. These deductions

include, vacation, sick leave, and training. Those hours are deducted from

2,080 hours (52 weeks times 40 hours). This number is then divided by

8.760, which is the total hours in a year (24 hours times 365 days). The result

is the number of FTEs needed to cover one position every hour of a year.

Table “I” does this calculation based upon an employee receiving nine

holidays, 15 vacation days, 12 sick days, and four days of training. The

resulting “manning ratio” is that for each telecommunicator position needed

for each hour of the day a PSAP needs at least 4.98 FTEs to cover all

available hours if each employee used all vacation and sick leave during the

year. Using the above pieces of information resulted in the following

assumption: the minimum manning ratio is 4.98 employees to provide 24/7

coverage of a PSAPs center position.

Table I – “Manning Ratio” Calculation to Determine Staffing Needs for 24/7 Positions

Days Hours Notes A Paid Holiday 9.0 72.0 B Sick Days 12.0 96.0 C Vacation 15.0 120.0 D Training 4.0 32.0 E Total Hours "off" (A+B+C+D) 320.0 F 40 hours at 52 weeks (40 x 52) 2,080.0

G Total Employee Hours Available per Year (F-E) 1,760.0 Available working man-

hours per year Posts

H 24 hours @ 365 Days (24 x 365) 1.00

8,760.0 FTEs I FTEs @ 24/7 coverage (H ÷ G) 4.98 Manning ratio

Source: PSAP Staffing Guidelines Report (2003), Pgs 30-31 and Appendix D

Data Set. With the exclusions mentioned above the analysis undertaken to

determine a “right-sized” PSAP includes call volume and financial data from 37 of the 49

PSAPs that were operational in FY 2010-11. Three PSAPs failed to provide reports to

OEM, three PSAPs were excluded due to inconsistent data, and six PSAPs were

excluded due to the presence of multiple secondary PSAPs within their jurisdiction. The

remaining PSAPs had a collective total of 1,298,146 911 calls during the reporting

period and spent a total of $83.6 million. Attached is Appendix “6” provides a summary

of the data set and the analysis used for this study.

COMPARISON OF PSAP CONSOLIDATION MODELS

Research was undertaken to evaluate the four different models of PSAP

consolidations. The state of Connecticut’s Consolidation Guide (2012) outlines four

consolidation models and eight “key issues” to consider when determining

consolidation.

The four consolidation models are:

• Full Consolidation Model: This is the consolidation of 911/dispatch

functions for all public safety agencies within a defined geographical area

into one agency. This new organization can be their own entity or a

separate department within another agency (Michigan State 9-1-1

Committee, 2012, p. 33).

• Co-Location Model: This model combines one or more PSAPs into a

single physical space. In addition to sharing space, this may also include

shared technology such as CAD, telephone systems, radios, and

recorders while remaining separate entities (Michigan State 9-1-1

Committee, 2012, p. 32).

• Partial Consolidation Model: This model combines different public safety

agencies, but not all into one location. The model is more likely to occur in

jurisdictions that have multiple PSAPs, which may consolidate disciplines

(Law Enforcement, Fire, and EMS) in different buildings and different

locations (Office of Statewide Emergency Telecommunications: State of

Connecticut, 2012, p. 6).

• Virtual (Hybrid) Consolidation Model: This model can include variations of

what is listed above wherein a PSAP maintains separate physical

locations, but shares common phone equipment, radio equipment, CAD,

and other public safety dispatching equipment over a secure IP network.

This model may include creation of a new organization or agreements

between entities to consolidate policy and procedures (Michigan State 9-

1-1 Committee, 2012, p. 34) (Office of Statewide Emergency

Telecommunications: State of Connecticut, 2012).

The recommended eight key issues to be considered when determining the

preferred consolidation model include the following:

• Potential for Service Improvements. Reducing or eliminating the number

of 911 calls between PSAPs. Desire to increase effectiveness during

large-scale incidents. Greater utilization of existing telecommunicator

employees (Office of Statewide Emergency Telecommunications: State of

Connecticut, 2012, pp. 7-8).

• Potential for Cost Savings. Reduction in employee costs. Reduction in

duplicate equipment. Increased ability to afford advance technology (pp.

8-9).

• Potential for Improved Communication. Increased communication

between disciplines (Fire, Law Enforcement, and EMS). Improved

coordination during incidents require activation of mutual aid responses.

Improved tracking of resources and field personnel (p. 10).

• Potential Benefits from Shared Technology. Improved ability to purchase

new technology that small jurisdictions cannot afford. Ability to upgrade

aging equipment (p. 11).

• Potential for Consistent Training. Improved training opportunities.

Standardized training and improved on the job training (p. 12).

• Potential for Organizational Expansion/Career Path. Ability to

create/increased supervision, training, and quality assurance positions

that do not exist in small organization. Additional career opportunities may

increase retention and decrease costs associated with hiring and training

(p. 13).

• Degree of Control Loss (Loss of Control). The degree a model would

require changes in operations through standardization. Some

organizations may be less accepting of losing control of employees or

operation standards. The blending of fire and law enforcement cultures

can be difficult (pp. 13-14).

• Degree of Change in Managing Non-Dispatch (ancillary) Tasks. The

degree a model would require organizations to reassign (or hire

replacement employees to perform) non-911 duties. This change usually

impacts smaller organizations that have low call volumes or have used

PSAP personnel in police stations to have a 24/7 presence (p. 15).

The Consolidation Guide encourages organizations considering consolidation to

review their goals and determine to what degree they desire to affect a new

organization. A matrix of the four models and the eight key issues are included in Table

“J”.

Table J – Model Comparison Summary Chart

Key Issue Full Consolidation

Partial Consolidation

Co-Location*

Virtual (Hybrid)

Consolidation

Potential for Service Improvement High Medium Low-High High Potential for Cost Savings Low-High Low-Medium Medium Low-High Potential for Improved Communication High Low-Medium Medium High Potential for Benefits from Shared Technology High Medium High High Potential for Training Consistency High Medium Low High Potential for Organization Expansion (Career Ladder) High Medium Low High Degree of Control Loss High Medium Low High Degree of Change for Management of Non-Dispatch (Ancillary) Tasks High Low-High Low High

* "Level of impact is dependent upon the level of sharing space and technology, as well as the political environment. Achievement of maximum benefits requires a high level of sharing technology and physical space, as well as a cooperative political environment to achieve maximum benefits."

Source: Consolidation Guide, Office of Statewide Emergency Telecommunications: State of Connecticut.

(2012). Page 16.

REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF 2012 LR KIMBALL REPORT

During the 2012 legislative session, OEM finally delivered a report on PSAP

consolidation that the legislature had been requesting since 2009. It had taken three

budget notes and the ultimate threat of removing authorization to spend state resources

to finally achieve the requested report. The original request in 2009 was that OEM “will

conduct a study of the relative merits of Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP)

consolidation throughout the state with the intent of reducing redundancy and creating a

more cost-efficient delivery system” (Oregon State Legislature, 2009, p. 7).

OEM combined the PSAP consolidation with an additional study to determine the

costs to transition into a statewide NG911 system. The consolidation section of the

report gives an overview of the consolidation process, the current PSAPs system in

Oregon, and consolidation options.

The report states that PSAP consolidations “can yield substantial improvements

in service levels, regional interoperability, responder safety, employee retention, and

potential cost savings” (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, p. 1). Kimball indicates additional

benefits from a state-side perspective are that consolidation encourages interagency

cooperation, more effective use of resources, and improved large-scale incident

management (p. 6).

The Kimball study reviews two consolidation scenarios. The first scenario is to

consolidate all 911 call taking duties into one statewide primary PSAP.23 This would

leave the current 48 PSAPs to act as secondary PSAPs.24 The system would have all

911 calls received at a centralized location. Once the call taker determines the location

and nature of the incident they would transfer the call to the local secondary PSAP.

Transitioning the 48 PSAPs into secondary PSAPs would have a major impact on local

government, since secondary PSAPs are ineligible to receive any 911 tax revenue for

equipment and personnel (Rees, 2012, p. 2).

Kimball argues that the advantages of a single statewide PSAP includes call

taking standardization, centralized quality assurance, and lower infrastructure costs of

23 Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) 403.105 (11) “’Public safety answering point’ means a 24-hour communications facility established as an answering location for 9-1-1 calls originating within a given service area. A ‘primary public safety answering point’ receives all calls directly from the public. A ‘secondary public safety answering point’ only receives calls from a primary public safety answering point on a transfer or relay basis. 24 Ibid.

converting to a NG911 environment. The lower infrastructure costs are based upon the

current number of 911 consoles (279) and the single statewide PSAP would only

require 31 consoles. The disadvantages are that all 911 calls would be required to have

at least one call transfer and a greater reliance on technology as opposed to local

knowledge. Ultimately, Kimball discourages this type of scenario stating that the

financial benefit does not outweigh the substantial and overwhelmingly negative25

aspect that every 911 call would have at least one inherent delay in transferring calls to

a secondary PSAP (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, p. 37).

The second scenario that was studied by Kimball was a regional PSAP system of

nine centers. The study recommends dividing the state into regions based upon 911

call volume, existing partners, and state geography. The nine region concept is an

attempt to balance 911 call volumes into the state geography. The nine regions are: 25 “When 911 call takers are located in a separate facility, such as a single statewide 911 center, the 911 call taker must conduct a preliminary interview to determine the nature and location of the emergency for each incoming 911 call. This preliminary interview serves two key purposes. First, it allows the call taker to identify the secondary PSAP to which the call must be transferred. Second, and more importantly, the preliminary interview ensures that the caller’s location, at minimum, is received should the call be lost unexpectedly. This allows help to still be sent. The call must then be transferred to the appropriate secondary PSAP for dispatch. The dispatcher then must re-interview the caller to ensure the call has been delivered to the correct dispatch point, that the address and call nature are correct, and to gather further details regarding the incident. At times, a second transfer is needed, which would include a third similar interview, to ensure all needed services such as police, fire and EMS are dispatched. In addition to the frustration experienced by the 911 caller, this system creates unnecessary delays in the dispatch of emergency personnel. The average length of time added to a call during this process is 30 seconds for each transfer. While 30 seconds seems like a short period of time, consider that 30 seconds may be the difference between:

• A person being rescued from a house fire or becoming a fatality • A violent criminal being apprehended or escaping • A heart attack victim being resuscitated or dying • A drowning victim suffering brain damage or recovering fully • A hunting accident victim bleeding to death or recovering

While these are dramatic examples, they are examples of real situations that occur daily in public safety. In emergencies, seconds count. Should a call need to be transferred a second time, another 30 seconds is added to the call processing time. The transferring of calls creates additional problems by creating a delay in getting vital information to field personnel. For example, multiple calls are often received for the same incident. Each caller often has different information to share. If each 911 caller is routed to the statewide center first and then transferred to the secondary PSAP, the dissemination of information critical to field personnel is delayed” (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, pp. 37-38).

Central, Eastern, Eugene Metro, Gorge, Multnomah, North Coast, Portland Metro,

Salem Metro, and South Coast. A map of the proposed regions is attached as

Appendix “7”. Table “K” summarizes how the 911 call volume was used to develop the

regions (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, pp. 40-42).

Kimball argues that the nine regional model would result in the following

advantages: service level improvements, reduction or elimination of transfer of 911

calls, quicker call processing, standardized training, and lower infrastructure costs in the

transition to the NG911 environment. The lower infrastructure costs result from the fact

that the current number of 911 consoles is 279 and the regional plan would only require

70 consoles. Kimball identified the following disadvantages of the regional model: a

perceived loss of local control, accommodating ancillary duties26 performed by

dispatchers in small organizations, and a long delay in cost savings if a new buildings

had to be found to house the newly consolidated center (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, p. 42).

26 “In small PSAPs, it is not cost effective or logical to have call takers/dispatchers sitting idle for the majority of their shifts, especially when taking into account that many of the PSAPs statewide receive less than a single 9-1-1 call per hour on average. Therefore, a wide range of additional duties are commonly assigned (front desk, administrative calls, monitor prisoners, monitor alarms, and clerical duties). Often, these additional duties fall outside the realm of emergency communications. Ninety-four percent of the State’s PSAPs assign their 9-1-1 telecommunicators duties outside of true emergency communications (call taking and dispatching) functions. The number and significance of the additional assigned tasks is dependent on the PSAP, call volume, and the time of day. In many instances, after normal business hours, PSAP personnel are the only ones remaining in the building and interface with citizens looking for a safe haven or in need of assistance. As a 24/7 operation, the PSAP is also often assigned the responsibility for taking after-hours calls for other municipal departments whether or not the calls are related to public safety. Often, when actual emergency communications responsibilities comprise the smallest portion of job responsibilities, then the employees’ focus is primarily on non-emergency communications-related tasks rather than the other way around. Given the stakes associated with emergency communications, creating an environment that allows the employees’ focus to be on receiving and processing 9-1-1 calls first is strongly recommended. Re-assignment of these ancillary duties is a key issue in many consolidation efforts. In order to consolidate, municipalities must either re-assign these duties to existing employees, hire additional staff to handle them, or alter the type and level of service offered to citizens after hours” (LR Kimball, Inc, 2012, pp. 20-21).

Table K – Kimball Nine Region 911 Call Volume

Kimball Recommended PSAP Regions

Number of Current PSAPs

CY 2010 911 Calls

Percentage of Total

Central 3 144,963 8.6% Eastern 10 68,911 4.1% Eugene Metro 6 237,699 14.0% Gorge 7 48,466 2.9% Multnomah 1 387,923 22.9% North Coast 7 78,505 4.6% Portland Metro 3 272,025 16.1% Salem Metro 4 242,556 14.3% South Coast 7 212,198 12.5% TOTAL 48 1,693,246 100.0%

Source: Consolidation Analysis and Next Generation 9-1-1 Implementation Study (Oregon), LR Kimball,

2012

The second part of the Kimball study estimated the costs of converting the entire

statewide 911 system into a NG911 environment. Since the Kimball report does not

recommend a single statewide system, but a nine regional center plan it is best to

compare the costs estimates between the 49 PSAPs and the recommended

consolidation plan.

The cost of the current 911 system’s infrastructure totals approximately $12.1

million per year. OEM receives about $13.5 million per year in 911 tax revenue to pay

for these costs. In both scenarios, the NG911 equipment will replace most of the

current equipment, referred to as “legacy equipment”. Both legacy and NG911

equipment have contracts that require maintenance of the equipment or ongoing costs

to maintain. During the transition to NG911 equipment the legacy equipment must

remain operational, so the three year transition has added costs that mostly disappear

in the fourth year. In both scenarios, the remaining legacy equipment will have a $1.0

million maintenance cost.

The difference between the two scenarios is that the current system has 49

PSAPs that utilize 279 telecommunicator workstations, as opposed to 70 workstations

in the regional plan. In addition, the reduction of 40 PSAPs would eliminate the costs

associated with emergency power generation systems, computer aided dispatch (CAD)

systems, 9-1-1 answering equipment, radio consoles, and logging recorders. With less

equipment to purchase and maintain, Kimball estimates that the 10 year cost difference

between the two scenarios is $94.0 million for the 49 PSAP system and $62.5 million for

the regional plan, a difference of $31.5 million (see Table “L”).

Table L – Kimball Estimate on NG911 Transition – 49 PSAPs & 9 Regional PSAPs

Year

49 PSAPs 9 Regional PSAPs

Annual Difference Maintenance

"legacy" Equipment

Purchase & Maintenance

NG 911 Equipment TOTAL

Maintenance "legacy"

Equipment

Purchase & Maintenance

NG 911 Equipment TOTAL

1 $12,120,444 $12,120,444 $12,120,444 $12,120,444 $0

2 $6,782,660 $6,237,096 $13,019,756 $5,951,327 $3,353,696 $9,305,023 ($3,714,733)

3 $1,277,323 $9,982,208 $11,259,531 $3,896,690 $4,937,548 $8,834,238 ($2,425,293)

4 $1,000,000 $7,657,208 $8,657,208 $1,000,000 $4,037,548 $5,037,548 ($3,619,660)

5 $1,000,000 $7,157,208 $8,157,208 $1,000,000 $3,537,548 $4,537,548 ($3,619,660)

6 $1,000,000 $7,157,208 $8,157,208 $1,000,000 $3,537,548 $4,537,548 ($3,619,660)

7 $1,000,000 $7,157,208 $8,157,208 $1,000,000 $3,537,548 $4,537,548 ($3,619,660)

8 $1,000,000 $7,157,208 $8,157,208 $1,000,000 $3,537,548 $4,537,548 ($3,619,660)

9 $1,000,000 $7,157,208 $8,157,208 $1,000,000 $3,537,548 $4,537,548 ($3,619,660)

10 $1,000,000 $7,157,208 $8,157,208 $1,000,000 $3,537,548 $4,537,548 ($3,619,660)

TOTAL $27,180,427 $66,819,760 $94,000,187 $28,968,461 $33,554,080 $62,522,541 ($31,477,646) Source: Consolidation Analysis and Next Generation 9-1-1 Implementation Study (Oregon), LR Kimball,

2012, Pages 66-67.

COMPARISON OF OTHER STATES – PSAP AREA AND POPULATION

Research was undertaken to compare Oregon with the other states. A recent

report by the Michigan 9-1-1 State Committee surveyed Oregon and 26 other states in

the number of PSAPs per state, average square miles per PSAP, and average

population per PSAP (Michigan State 9-1-1 Committee, 2012, pp. 107-110). During

subsequent research other state data was obtained. This data is summarized in Table

“M”.

Table M– States PSAP Average Population and Average Size

State PSAPs Population

Average Average

Size Arkansas 92 31,695 566 Arizona 75 85,227 1,515

California 465 80,116 335 Colorado 97 51,847 1,069

Connecticut 106 33,718 46 Delaware 9 99,770 217 Florida 163 115,982 331 Hawaii 6 201,923 1,071 Iowa 117 26,037 478

Illinois 275 46,657 202 Indiana 134 65,611 268 Kansas 117 24,386 703

Kentucky 112 38,744 355 Louisiana 110 41,212 396

Maine 26 51,091 1,187 Maryland 24 240,565 407

Massachusetts 259 25,280 30 Michigan 161 61,389 353 Minnesota 115 19,174 692 Mississippi 117 25,362 401

Missouri 171 17,353 403 Montana 53 18,668 2,746 Nebraska 82 22,272 937

North Carolina 128 73,288 381 North Dakota 22 30,572 3,136

Nebraska 74 24,680 1,039 New Hampshire 4 329,118 2,242

New Jersey 187 47,015 40 New Mexico 47 43,812 2,582

New York 205 94,527 230 Nevada 23 117,415 4,775

Ohio 357 32,315 115 Oklahoma 187 20,061 367

Oregon 49 78,185 1,959 Pennsylvania 69 184,092 650

Tennessee 160 39,663 258 Texas 572 43,961 458

Virginia 124 64,524 319 Vermont 8 78,218 1,156

Wisconsin 154 36,928 353 Wyoming 34 16,577 2,856

AVERAGE 129 67,781 918 MEDIAN 112 43,961 407

Source: FCC, Kansas 911, Massachusetts 911, Missouri 911 (2007), US Census

Section IV: Researching Findings

(W)e had to deal with personnel, we had to deal with budgets, and the old notion of merger, centralization, combining services – and there is still out in the rural area some element of suspicion about whether or not this is going to work. The proof is in the pudding, the citizens of Owensboro and Daviess County are served more swiftly and completely than they were in the past – it will save taxpayer dollars and it will save taxpayer lives. Judge Executive Reid Haire, Daviess County (KY) on consolidating 911 services with the City of Owensboro (KY) (9-1-1 Magazine, 2010).

This section summarizes the research findings and recommends a minimally

sized PSAP that takes advantage of economies of scale that are present in larger

jurisdictions.

Reasons to Consider Consolidation

Local governments have seen a decrease in 911 tax revenues since the

beginning of the current economic recession. In addition, more citizens are switching to

emerging pre-paid cellphone plans that evade the 911 tax in Oregon. These

circumstances have led to a decrease in 911 tax revenue by 8.8% to local jurisdictions

since 2008. One of the main reasons for jurisdictions to consider consolidation is

financial, but a more important reason is an improved level of service to citizens. The

911 system is the lifeline for citizens in some type of crisis and local government needs

to reevaluate the most effective and efficient manner to provide assistance to these

hyper-critical calls for help.

Today’s emerging technologies have left the current 911 systems behind.

Citizens have an expectation that the same technologies they have on their mobile

devices are available to 911 centers. Texting, sending pictures, and videos occurs with

little problem with today’s smartphones, laptops, and tablet devices. The technology

enhancement (NG911) for 911 centers to interact in this same manner requires a large

investment in new equipment. Small 911 centers are not likely to be able to afford

these large investments with a relatively low volume of critical incidents. However, if

three or four small 911 centers join forces, they have the ability to afford these new

technologies and offer improved service.

Enhanced service levels from consolidation include higher utilization of existing

telecommunicators. Small 911 centers are likely to only have one person on duty 24

hours per day. Many of the 911 centers receive less than one 911 call per hour.

However, when multiple calls occur, telecommunicators can become quickly

overwhelmed while at the same time, surrounding communities have

telecommunicators available sitting idle. By consolidating, these peak incidents can be

handled by the combined strength of regional 911 centers. In addition, these

communities no longer need to each pay for expensive computer systems, emergency

power generation systems, and training.

The possibility of cost savings is achievable by taking advantage of the

economies of scale that become available in larger organizations. Larger 911 centers

make staffing allocations based upon call volume, as opposed to maintaining a minimal

staffing level of one person in small 911 centers. Larger organizations only need one

building, one director, and one set of computer infrastructure.

OEM just received a consolidation report with cost estimates to upgrade the

entire statewide system to NG911 technology. The two scenarios estimated costs for

the 49 current 911 centers compared to a “perfect world” consolidation of 911 centers

into nine regional centers. The cost difference between these plans is $31 million over

a ten-year period. Local jurisdictions would likely save costs in these regional 911

centers by being able to have fewer employees sitting idle in their individual 911centers

waiting for the next 911 call, while their counterpart in the next community is dealing

with multiple critical incidents.

Finding the Right-Sized 911 Center

To find the “right-sized” 911 center call and financial data was used from 37

centers in Oregon. Determining efficient 911 centers’ characteristics and analyzing the

applicability of consolidating small and medium 911 centers is feasible with the correct

analysis and incentives from the state.

Analyzed 911 Centers. The thirty-seven 911 centers analyzed received

1,298,146 calls in FY 2010-11, this represents approximately 76.6% of the calls

received in the state. The remaining 23.4% of the calls went to twelve 911 centers that

were not included in this analysis because they either did not complete the OEM report,

had inconsistent data, or had multiple secondary PSAP within their jurisdiction that

would skew staffing comparisons.

When the National Emergency Number Association (NENA) produced a report

entitled, PSAP Staffing Guidelines, in 2003 it classified PSAPs into three categories

based upon population size. A small PSAP is under 19,000. A medium PSAP is

between 19,000 and 100,000. A large PSAP is between 100,000 and 140,000. Table

“N” includes a list of the 37 PSAPs used in this analysis. This table also includes the

population served, NENA PSAP size category,27 and average hourly 911 call volume.

27 The category of large PSAP will include the six PSAPs that over 140,000 population.

Table N – PSAPs Analysed, Population Served, NENA Size Classfication, and Average Hourly 911 Call Volume

COUNTY PSAP Population Served #

911 Calls per

Hour

NENA PSAP Size

Classification

Lincoln Toledo Police Department# 4,695 0.18 Small Gilliam TRI County Comm# 5,080 0.27 Small Wallowa *Wallowa County Sheriff# 6,995 0.21 Small Umatilla Milton-Freewater Comm# 7,045 0.30 Small Harney Harney County Sheriff# 7,375 0.17 Small Grant *John Day Comm Center# 7,450 0.21 Small Lincoln Lincoln City PD# 7,960 0.95 Small Morrow *Morrow County Sheriff# 11,270 0.63 Small Malheur Ontario 9-1-1 15,300 0.51 Small Curry *Curry County Sheriff 15,975 0.63 Small Curry Brookings PD 16,000 0.75 Small Baker Baker County# 16,215 0.76 Small Jefferson Jefferson County Sheriff# 18,712 1.12 Small Malheur Malheur County Sheriff 20,070 0.69 Medium Crook Prineville 9-1-1# 20,855 1.11 Medium Hood River Hood River County District# 22,625 1.17 Medium Tillamook *Tillamook County District# 25,255 1.89 Medium Wasco Wasco County 9-1-1 25,300 1.25 Medium Union Union County Comm# 25,980 1.07 Medium Clatsop Astoria 9-1-1 27,000 1.40 Medium Umatilla *Hermiston PD 30,000 1.16 Medium Lincoln Lincoln County Comm Agency# 33,500 3.05 Medium Yamhill Newberg-Dundee Comm 40,000 1.57 Medium Columbia Columbia 9-1-1 Comm District# 49,625 2.42 Medium Umatilla Umatilla County Sheriff# 50,605 2.73 Medium Klamath Klamath Comm District# 66,580 5.43 Medium Marion N. Marion County Comm (NORCOM) 74,000 2.75 Medium Yamhill Yamhill County Comm# 74,445 3.43 Medium Benton Corvallis Regional Comm# 79,297 2.67 Medium Clackamas Lake Oswego Communications 82,375 1.96 Medium Douglas Douglas County 107,795 5.06 Large Deschutes Deschutes County District# 158,875 5.93 Large Jackson Emerg. Comm S. Ore (Jackson)# 203,950 10.39 Large Marion Willamette Valley Comm (Salem) 330,000 16.50 Large Clackamas Clackamas County# 343,568 12.44 Large Washington Washington County Comm# 534,809 13.95 Large Multnomah Bureau of Emerg. Comm (Portland)# 739,626 41.48 Large

* Missing data from OEM was added using data from the 2012 LR Kimball Report. # Population was adjusted using PSU Population Research Center data (Additional adjustments were made. See section four for details).


Disproportional Share of 911 Tax Revenue and Higher Costs. Analysis shows

that smaller PSAPs tend to receive a disproportional share of the 911 tax revenue and

have higher costs per residents (See Chart “1”). The formula for revenue sharing favors

small counties by guaranteeing at least one percent (1%) of the revenue.

Chart 1 – Gross Cost per Resident and 911 Tax Revenue Per Resident

* Missing data from OEM was added using data from the 2012 LR Kimball Report + Population was adjusted using PSU Population Research Center data (additional adjustments were made. See section four for details).


Economies of Scale. The 37 agencies were analyzed by grouping them into their

NENA size classification to review differences in size between: annual 911 calls per

resident, average hourly 911 call volume, resident per PSAP FTE, annual 911 calls per

PSAP FTE, cost (gross) per resident, and cost (gross) per 911 call. The purpose of this

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Gross Cost Per Resident & 911 Tax Revenue Per Resident Gross Cost Per Resident

911 tax per resident

Small Size PSAPs Large Size PSAPs

Medium Size PSAPs

analysis is to quantify the extent to which medium and large PSAPs take advantage of

economies of scale.

• Annual 911 calls per resident. The average of the 37 PSAPs was 0.39

annual 911 calls per resident. The three groups are comparable (see

Table “O”). The agency with the highest rate of 911 calls per resident was

Lincoln City with 1.04 annual calls. This is likely attributed to the high

volume of tourism that inundates the city during the summer months.

Harney County had the lowest rate at 0.21 annual calls per resident.

Harney County’s low rate is likely attributed to its low population density28

and very few visitors.

Table O – Annual 911 Calls per Resident by NENA PSAP Size

NENA PSAP Size

Number of PSAPs

Annual 911 Calls per Resident

Small 13 0.42 Medium 17 0.44 Large 7 0.38 COMBINED 37 0.39


• Average hourly 911 call volume. The average hourly call volume for the

37 agencies is 148 call per hour. There is a significant difference in the

volume of calls (see Table “P”), that not surprisingly increases as the

population served increases. The agency with the highest volume was

Portland with an average of over 41 calls per hour. This represents

almost 28 percent (27.9%) of the entire volume of calls for the 37

28 Harney County has the lowest population density in Oregon at 0.75 residents per square mile (Association of Oregon Counties, 2011).

agencies. The least busy agency was Harney County with an average of

0.17 calls per hour. At this rate Harney County receives less than 29 call

per week.

Table P – Average Hourly 911 Call Volume by NENA PSAP Size

NENA PSAP Size

Number of PSAPs

Average Hourly 911 Call Volume

Small 13 0.51 Medium 17 2.10 Large 7 15.11 COMBINED 37 148.19

Source: OEM

• Resident per PSAP FTE. The average for the 37 agencies is that each

FTE serves 4,423 residents. The difference between the groups is

significant. The small PSAPs’ FTEs only are only serving 1,446 residents,

the medium group increases its efficiency over the small group by 132%

serving 3,356 residents. The large PSAP group, at 5,597 residents per

FTE is serving 287% more residents per FTE than the small PSAP group

(See Table “Q”). The agency that has the least amount of residents

served per FTE is Tri-County Communication (Gilliam, Sherman, and

Wheeler Counties) at only 535 residents. The agency with the highest

resident per FTE ratio is Clackamas County with 8,279.

Table Q – Ratio of Residents serve per PSAP FTE by NENA PSAP Size

NENA PSAP Size

Number of PSAPs

Residents per PSAP

FTE Small 13 1,446 Medium 17 3,356 Large 7 5,597 COMBINED 37 4,423


• Annual 911 calls per PSAP FTE. The average for the 37 agencies is that

each PSAP FTE receives 1,737 calls per year. The difference between

the groups is significant. The small size PSAP FTEs only receive 575

calls per year, which is 142% less calls per FTE than the medium group,

who handle 1,395 calls per year. The large PSAP group, at 2,094 calls

per FTE is handling 264% more calls per FTE than the small PSAP group

(See Table “R”). The agency that received the least amount of calls per

FTE is Tri-County Communication (Gilliam, Sherman, and Wheeler

Counties) at only 248 calls per FTE. The agency that receive the highest

amount of calls per FTE was Klamath County at 3,068.

Table R – Annual 911 Calls per PSAP FTE by NENA PSAP Size

NENA PSAP Size

Number of PSAPs

Annual 911 Calls per

PSAP FTE

Small 13 575 Medium 17 1,395 Large 7 2,094 COMBINED 37 1,737

Source: OEM

• Cost (gross) per resident. The average for the 37 agencies is a cost per

resident of $25.29. The difference between the three groups is significant.

The small size PSAP average cost (gross) is $60.74 per resident, which is

85% higher than the medium group that has an average cost of $32.84

per resident. The larger group’s average was $23.72, which is 156% less

expensive per resident than the small PSAP group (See Table “S”). The

agency with the highest cost (gross) per resident is Tri-County

Communication (Gilliam, Sherman, and Wheeler Counties) at $121.61.

The agency with the lowest cost per resident is Douglas County at $14.41.

Table S – Average Cost (Gross) per PSAP resident by NENA PSAP Size

NENA PSAP Size

Number of PSAPs

Cost (Gross) per

Resident

Small 13 $60.74 Medium 17 $32.84 Large 7 $23.72 COMBINED 37 $25.29


• Cost (gross) per 911 call. The average for the 37 agencies is a cost per

911 of $64.41. The difference between the three groups is significant.

The small size PSAP average cost per 911 call is $161.92, which is 105%

higher than the medium group that has an average cost of $78.97. The

larger group’s average was $67.28, which is 140% less expensive per 911

call than the small PSAP group (See Table “T”). The agency with the

highest cost per 911 call is Tri-County Communication (Gilliam, Sherman,

and Wheeler Counties) at $262.56. The agency with the lowest cost per

resident is Klamath County at $30.18.

Table T – Average Cost (Gross) per 911 Call by NENA PSAP Size

NENA PSAP Size

Number of PSAPs

Cost (Gross) per 911 Call

Small 13 $161.92 Medium 17 $78.97 Large 7 $67.28 COMBINED 37 $64.41

Source: OEM

Factors influencing costs. Analysis was undertaken to determine characteristics

of PSAPs that influence the cost (gross) per resident. The factors identified are

compared to two cost efficiency calculations. The first calculation is the cost (gross) per

resident. The second calculation is the cost (gross) per 911 call received. While both

calculations are a good indicator of efficiency, jurisdictions that have higher rate of 911

calls per resident can use call volume data to analyze PSAP staffing, as recommended

by the NENA PSAP Staffing Guidelines Report (2003) using Erlang’s queing theory (pp.

13-16).

• Annual calls per resident. The fluctuation between PSAPs size groups is

not significant. The fluctuation between individual PSAPs indicates that

12 of the PSAPs have a +/- variation of greater than 25% of the combined

average. The data indicates that a PSAP having a higher or lower amount

of 911 calls per resident does not influence cost per resident (See Chart

“2”).

Chart 2 – Annual Calls per Resident


• Average hourly 911 call volume. The fluctuation between PSAPs size

groups and individual PSAPs is significant. The data indicates that

PSAPs that receive more 911 calls per hour are more efficient (See Chart

“3”).

0.00

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Annual Calls per Resident

Gross Cost per resident Gross Cost per 911 Call 911 calls per resident

Chart 3 – Average Hourly 911 Call Volume


• Residents per PSAP FTE. The fluctuation between PSAPs size groups

and individual PSAPs is significant. The data indicates that a PSAP with a

higher ratio of residents being served per PSAP FTE is more cost efficient

(See Chart “4”).

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Average Hourly 911 Call Volume Gross Cost per resident Gross Cost per 911 Call 911 Calls per Hour

Chart 4 – Residents per PSAP FTE


• Annual 911 calls per PSAP FTE. The fluctuation between PSAPs size

groups and individual PSAPs is significant. The data indicates that a

PSAP with a higher ratio of annual calls per PSAP FTE is more cost

efficient (See Chart “5”).

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Chart 5 – Annual 911 Calls per PSAP FTE


The analysis of the data does show that the medium and large PSAPs have

significantly less cost than the small PSAP group. Further analysis indicates that

PSAPs that have a higher hourly volume of 911 calls per hour, a higher ratio of

residents per PSAP FTE, and have more 911 calls received per PSAP FTE have the

lowest cost per PSAP resident. Although data suggests that having a higher volume of

911 calls per hour is an indicator of cost efficiency, these PSAPs also have a

-

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Gross Cost per resident Gross Cost per 911 Call Annual 911 Calls per PSAP FTE

significantly higher ratio of residents per PSAP FTE (See Chart “6”) and this factor is a

more likely predictor of cost efficiency.

Chart 6 – Residents per PSAP FTE and 911 Hourly Call Volume


Medium and large PSAPs are able to take advantage of economies of scale by

having a higher number of residents being served per PSAP FTE. This higher ratio of

residents served per FTE is a compelling factor that appears to translate into lower

costs per resident and lower costs per 911 call received. Jurisdictions with higher rates

of 911 calls per resident will likely need to have higher staffing ratios, but queuing theory

calculations are available to fine tune staffing desirability.

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911 Call Hourly Call Volume & Residents Per PSAP FTE Residents per PSAP FTE 911 Calls per Hour

These savings can be achieved by increasing the population each PSAPs serves

by consolidating small and medium PSAPs into regional 911 centers. Increasing the

population size of PSAPs through consolidation should allow these new agencies to

decrease cost to residents.

Improvement of service levels can also be achieved by consolidating to a

population size group that would necessitate a consolidated PSAP having at least two

telecommunicators working during non-peak call hours. Having minimal staffing of two

telecommunicators 24/7 would be an improvement in service levels to small and

medium sized PSAPs. In reviewing the data and using a “manning ratio” (see section 4)

of 4.98, an organization needs 4.98 FTEs to staff one position 24/7. Therefore, a PSAP

would need a total FTE greater than 10.0 to have the ability to staff two positions 24/7.

Of the 37 PSAPs, 43% have a total less than 10.0 FTEs. Therefore are not likely

to have two telecommuncators on duty 24/7. As mentioned earlier, the low call volume

of small PSAP does not justify more than one telecommunicator, but this puts the

residents of a PSAP at risk when multiple critical incidents occur. A better service

model is a PSAP that is “right-sized”, which can take advantage of economies of scale

and provide a higher level of service during multiple incidents.

Section V: Recommendation

The primary responsibility of government is Public Safety, and one of the most significant components of that responsibility is communication. This 911 center is the public’s lifeline for assistance. – Mayor Ron Payne, Owensboro, Kentucky (9-1-1 Magazine, 2010).

The public test is very simple. Ask your friends, coworkers, neighbors or strangers at the coffee shop if they care what 911 center answers their call for help, which police department shows up when they dial 911, which court handles the parking tickets online, or who is managing the emergency medical response team that comes to your kids’ soccer game to attend to a broken leg or unexpected seizure. - M. Scott Sotebeer (Sotebeer, 2012). The thing people have to get out of their minds is county and jurisdictional lines. It’s not the technical hurdles; it’s the hurdles we’ve created for ourselves, those invisible county lines. - Sheriff John Haukos, Big Stone County (MN) (Freedom Foundation of Minnesota, 2010).

This section sets forth a data-driven decision making process that can assist

jurisdictions in assessing whether consolidations are a viable budgetary strategy. The

section seeks to answer three questions: What is the “right-sized” PASP? What is the

minimally-sized PSPA? And, What are the key financial elements that need to be

included in making a consolidation decision?

“Right-Sized” PSAP Characteristics

Research indicates that small sized PSAPs are more costly to operate than

medium and large sized PSAPs. Small PSAP are unable to take advantage of

economies of scale. Research indicates that the ten PSAPs that have the lowest cost

per resident, have an average a resident to PSAP FTE ratio of 5,273 (see Table “U”).

To be able to achieve the efficiency of these PSAPs, higher resident to FTE ratio

necessitates combining PSAPs into regional 911 centers.

Table U – PSAP with the Lowest Cost per Resident and Resident to PSAP FTE Ratio

County PSAP Name Gross

Cost per Resident

Resident per PSAP

FTE

Douglas Douglas County $14.41 5,673 Clackamas Clackamas County $14.57 8,279 Umatilla Hermiston PD $19.66 3,333 Marion Willamette Valley Comm (Salem) $19.88 5,500 Marion N. Marion County Comm (NORCOM) $20.39 4,353 Clackamas Lake Oswego Communications $21.10 6,337 Washington Washington County Comm $21.25 5,992 Klamath Klamath Comm District $21.56 4,295 Multnomah Bureau of Emerg. Comm (Portland) $21.89 5,734 Malheur Malheur County Sheriff $22.76 3,237 AVERAGE $19.75 5,273


PSAPs using the recommended resident to PSAP FTE ratio (5,273) in

considering consolidation scenarios, should also consider sizing the potential merger to

a population size that achieves a service level enhancement. If consolidated PSAPs

can achieve a population base that can justify a minimum staffing level of two

telecommunicators, service levels will be improved. This level of staffing enables a

PSAP center to handle multiple incidents during non-peak hours.

Using a “manning ratio” of 4.98 (total FTEs needed to cover a position 24/7/365)

a PSAP would need a minimum staffing level of 10.0 FTEs. Taking into account that

staffing needs fluctuate between different hours of the day, it is important for efficiency

to increase the population that can justify 10.0 FTEs even during the slowest shift. The

NENA PSAP Staffing Guidelines (2003) indicates that a “normal call volume” can be

assumed for two of three (eight hour) shifts (p. 27). This report calculated staffing

requirements on 54 different PSAPs using a queuing theory calculation (Erlang B

formula). Of the 54 PSAPs, 32 required a staffing level of two during normal call

volume. The guidelines indicate that the third shift should be staffed to handle the “peak

call volumes.” None of the 32 PSAPs that required a staffing level of two during normal

call volume required a peak call volume staffing greater than three (National Emergency

Number Association (NENA), 2003, pp. 27-29).

Using the “manning ratio” of 4.98 and an “average servers” of 2.33 (two shifts of

2.0 and one shift of 3.0) the PSAP Staffing Guidelines indicate that a total

telecommunicator staff size should be 11.6 FTE. Rounding this up to 12, plus adding

one additional FTE to serve as a Director brings the total FTE to 13.

Recommended Minimally Sized “Right-Sized” PSAP

Based on the recommended resident to PSAP ratio and the recommended

minimum sized PSAP staff, the smallest PSAP that can take advantage of some

economies of scale and improve service levels during non-peak hours is 68,549 (5,273

times 13). Using the data from the PSAP call volume, financial reports, and NENA

PSAP Staffing Guidelines, it is possible to calculate the volume, workload, and

equipment needs of a PSAP with a population of 68,549 and staff size of 13.0 FTEs.

The proposed PSAP of nearly 70,000 would be considered by NENA guidelines

as a medium sized PSAP. Using the average 911 calls per residents for medium sized

PSAPs, the PSAP would receive 30,161 calls per year (.44 times 68,549). The annual

number of 911 calls received per FTE would be 2,320. The average hourly 911 call

volume would be 3.44.

The proposed PSAP would be most similar to Klamath County Communications

that serves 66,000 residents, has 15.5 FTES, and receives 47,557 calls per year. The

annual number of 911 calls received per FTE is 3,068. The average hourly 911 call

volume is 5.43.

In the NENA guidelines, the report completed queuing calculations on 54 PSAPs

to recommend staffing requirements. Of the PSAPs that also provided population data,

eight were of similar size to the proposed PSAP. The average staffing requirements

was 12.44 FTEs (See Table “V”), which is very similar to the proposed PSAP staffing of

12.0 FTEs.

Table V – Similar Sized PSAP – Queuing Calculation Staffing Requirements

Source Data Queuing Calculations

PSAP Code State Population Average Servers

Manning Ratio

Telecomm. Required

(FTE) Agency B27 PA 62,000 2.33 4.89 11.42 Agency B29 IL 68,277 2.33 4.89 11.42 Agency B30 TX 73,334 2.33 4.89 11.42 Agency B31 IN 75,000 2.00 4.89 9.79 Agency B32 PA 75,259 2.33 4.89 11.42 Agency B34 MI 80,000 3.33 4.89 16.31 Agency B35 LA 89,974 2.33 4.89 11.42 Agency B36 NC 94,536 3.33 4.89 16.31

Average 77,298 2.54 4.89 12.44

Source: NENA PSAP Staffing Guidelines (2003), Pgs. 33-35 and 41-42

Recommended Financial Template

To assist jurisdictions contemplating consolidation, a template has been

developed (Appendix “8”). This template can assist jurisdictions in estimating costs of a

consolidation scenario. The template also calculates staffing solely based on

population.

The template allows jurisdictions to begin the discussions of the value of

consolidating with only three data entries (911 tax revenue, population, and call volume)

for each jurisdiction. The user will need to decide how to split the FTEs between

telecommunicators, supervisors, director(s), clerical, and IT/network positions. The

template has predetermined costs of these five positions; however, the user can

customize these settings. The user will need to estimate the costs of materials and

services. The template instructions suggest this figure should be in the range of

$60,000 and $100,000 per consolidated PSAP. The template has predetermined

projected increases of one percent growth in 911 tax revenue, six percent (6%) growth

in personnel costs, and two and one half percent (2.5%) growth in materials and

services; however, the user can customize these settings.

Although research indicates a minimally “right-sized” PSAP should be above the

population of 68,549, instructions will list an alternative smaller sized PSAP, based upon

20-hours of two telecommunicators on duty with a 4-hour gap with one

telecommunicator on duty. The likely time this would occur would be from 2:30 A.M. to

6:30 A.M. This could be accomplished with combining eight-hour and ten-hour shifts.

In this scenario, the staffing need for telecommunicators would be 9.12 FTE (manning

ratio of 4.98 times agency servers of 1.83). In this smaller organization, the director’s

position could fill in shifts for the equivalent of 0.12 FTE (equal to 4.8 hours per week);

thereby the organization would only need to be 10.0 FTE. This smaller consolidated

PSAP could handle a population size of 52,730 (10 FTEs times 5,273), but would lack

of double coverage 24/7.

Conclusion

Historically 911 centers were built and operated by single agencies for their own

users. These organizations were designed to meet technology constraints of the 1980s

and have led to inefficient use of scarce resources and higher costs with little

opportunity to benefit from economies of scale. Consolidation allows for the elimination

of duplicate equipment, supports coordinated regional responses, and leads to more

effective and efficient service.

The legislature has expressed concern over lack of action from OEM and PSAPs

to consolidate operations voluntarily. The most recent budget note requests OEM to

develop a plan implementing the NG911upgrades and include a “detailed component to

consolidate the state’s Public Safety Answering Points” based upon the 2012 Kimball

report (Oregon State Legislature, 2012, pp. 28-29). Research indicates that regional

centers having a population size of at least 69,000 can increase cost efficiency and

provide a higher level of service than standalone centers, which put the citizens at risk

when multiple incidents occur.

In conducting this research it is clear from the history of 911 in Oregon and the

emerging technology that is now available, that the 2013 legislative session is likely to

become a watershed year for 911. The 911 tax is set to sunset and it is estimated that

sixty percent of new cellphone plans will evade this tax unless the legislature closes this

loophole. The legislature has received a 911 consolidation and NG911 upgrade report

that would bring new technology to 911 centers, which would allow citizens to text, send

pictures, and even stream video in reporting emergency situations. This study

estimates the state would save $31 million over a ten-year period if 911 centers

consolidated into nine regions.

Consolidation is a complex, multi-dimensional issue that represents a cultural

change for employees and organizational leaders that have complete control of 911

services in their communities. This project only addresses the first step in the

consolidation process. It is intended to allow jurisdictions to compare the status quo of

stand-alone 911 centers to a consolidated regional system. Organizations will need to

be convinced that loss of control is offset by the benefits realized in joining a

consolidated regional system. The potential political and organization resistance will

need to be addressed in consolidation steps beyond the financial evaluation

recommended.

The data-driven approach to this project offers the opportunity for jurisdictions to

review consolidation scenarios and the advantages that it offers. A likely outcome of

the 2013 legislative session is the instigation of the first steps in forced consolidations.

These steps could range from specific mandates to reduced funding for small stand-

alone centers. This project allows jurisdictions to review multiple scenarios that could

be advantageous in promoting an alternative regional approach suggested by Kimball.

The estimated savings of $31 million of a regional system is not likely to be

ignored by the legislature. Jurisdictions that voluntarily initiate consolidation efforts

might be able to convince the state legislature to fund some consolidation costs or

initiate some type of pilot project funding that would not be available for jurisdictions that

wait for state mandates.

Works Cited

911 Dispatch Magazine. (2011, October). EMD Resources. Retrieved December 28, 2011, from 911 Dispatch Magazine On-Line: http://www.911dispatch.com/info/emd/index.html

911 Dispatch Magazine. (2011). Hot Issues. Retrieved April 29, 2012, from 911 Dispatch Magazine: http://www.911dispatch.com/hot-issues/

911 Dispatch Magazine. (2011, October). Next Generation 9-1-1. Retrieved December 21, 2011, from 911 Dispatch Magazine On-Line: http://www.911dispatch.com/911/nextgen_911.html

911 Industry Alliance. (2008). Health of the U.S. 911 System.

9-1-1 Magazine. (2010). Owensboro, Kentucky - where Johnny Depp, BBQ and consolidated 9-1-1 can appear in the same sentence. Retrieved 12 2012, May, from solacom.com: http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=14&ved=0CFsQFjADOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.solacom.com%2FOpenFile.aspx%3FgID%3D7a9e0915-bf33-4d33-962a-205ecd9e380e&ei=zpquT56YMbHQiALQs4SSBA&usg=AFQjCNF-W84EFcQRWS9ujMS-Pu-YXkk2dw&sig2=TtLd

Association of Oregon Counties. (2011). 2011 Legislative Summary.

Association of Oregon Counties. (2011). AOC 2011 Legislative Summary. Salem, OR: Association of Oregon Counties.

Association of Oregon Counties. (2011). Guide to Oregon Counties - 2011-2012.

Caldwell, M. (2011). Interim 911 PSAP Workgroup & Taskforce Powerpoint Presentation.

Congressional Research Services. (2011). Funding Emergency Communications: Technology and Policy Considerations.

Deschutes County. (2012). 9-1-1 Ballot Measure information. Retrieved April 29, 2012, from Deschutes County`: http://www.deschutes.org/getattachment/cab07902-2f3d-43d4-ac8a-a7ac2514e681/Deschutes-9-1-1-County-Service-District.aspx

Federal Communications Commission - Communications Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council Working Group. (2010). Key Findings and Effective Practices for Public Safety Consolidation.

Federal Communications Commission. (2009). REPORT TO CONGRESS ON STATE COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF 911 AND ENHANCED 911 FEES AND CHARGES.



Freedom Foundation of Minnesota. (2010, May 17). Counties Call 911 for Budget Savings. Retrieved May 13, 2012, from freedomfoundationofminnesota.com/: http://freedomfoundationofminnesota.com/counties-call-911-for-budget-savings

Governor’s Work Group on PSAP Consolidation. (2009). Public Safety Answering Point Consolidation: A Guidebook for Consolidation Strategies. St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Department of Public Safety.

Kaiser Family Foundation. (2011). Employer Health Benefits: 2011 Summary of Findings. Retrieved May 26, 2012, from Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research & Educational Trust: http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/8226.pdf

LR Kimball. (2008). Next Generation 9-1-1 Funding Study (Washington State).

LR Kimball. (2011, December 8). Kimball Phase 2 Presentation at December Quarterly - 12/08/11. Retrieved Janurary 10, 2012, from Oregon Emergency Management: http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/OEM/OR911/docs/Kimball_OEM_presentation_12082011.pdf

LR Kimball. (2011, June 9). Review of the Next Generation 9-1-1 Cost Analysis. Retrieved 13 2011, September, from Oregon Emergancy Management - Conference Presentation: http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/OEM/OR911/docs/Kimball_OEM_presentation_06092011.pdf?ga=t

LR Kimball. (2011, June 9). Review of the Next Generation 9-1-1 Cost Analysis. Retrieved Janurary 14, 2012, from Oregon Emergancy Management - Conference Presentation: http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/OEM/OR911/docs/Kimball_OEM_presentation_06092011.pdf?ga=t

LR Kimball, Inc. (2012). Consolidation Analysis and Next Generation 9-1-1 Implementation Study (Oregon). LR Kimbal, Inc.

LR Kimball, Inc. (2012, February 29). February 2012 Typepad. Retrieved April 29, 2012, from LR Kimball, Inc: http://kimball.typepad.com/lrkimball/2012/02/index.html

Michigan State 9-1-1 Committee. (2011). STATE 9-1-1 PLAN.

Michigan State 9-1-1 Committee. (2012). Report on Efficiencies in 9-1-1.

National Emergency Number Association (NENA). (2003). PSAP Staffing Guidelines Report. Retrieved March 31, 2012, from NENA: http://www.nena.org/resource/collection/0ACCC545-208F-4185-BF27-FE2AF801B213/NENA_54-501A_PSAP_Staffing_Report.pdf

National Emergency Number Association. (2008, September). What is NG911? Retrieved June 3, 2012, from Transportation Safety Advantment Group: http://www.tsag-its.org/docs/NG9-1-1DefinitionFinal1_1.pdf

New Millennium Research Council. (2011, July). MAJOR MILESTONE FOR U.S. CELL PHONE CONSUMERS. Retrieved April 21, 2012, from New Millennium Research Council: http://newmillenniumresearch.org/news/072811_nmrc_prepaid_trends_news_release.pdf

Office of Statewide Emergency Telecommunications: State of Connecticut. (2012). Consolidation Guide.

Oregon APCO/NENA. (2011, August 22). 9-1-1 in Oregon, History – Funding – Future. Retrieved April 21, 2012, from Oregon APCO/NENA: http://orapconena.homestead.com/9-1-1_in_oregon_its_history_-_funding_-future_08_22_11__4_.pdf

Oregon Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials. (2012). Oregon APCO/NENA Consolidation Talking Points.

Oregon Emergency Management. (1994). 911 Effeciency Study - Final Report.

Oregon Emergency Management. (2000). Multi-PSAP County Report Evaluation Study.

Oregon Emergency Management. (2010). Draft 10 of Consolidation Task Force Report.

Oregon Emergency Management. (2011, September 19). 9-1-1 Tax Amounts History Chart. Retrieved September 19, 2011, from Oregon Emergancy Management 911 Program: http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/OEM/OR911/docs/911_Tax_Amounts_History_Chart.pdf

Oregon Emergency Management State 9-1-1 Program. (2009). Five Year Strategic Plan 2010-2014.

Oregon Legislative Fiscal Office. (2007). Budget Information Brief - Budget Note.

Oregon Military Department. (2010, November 23). Draft 10 of Consolidation Task Force Report. Retrieved September 18, 2011, from Oregon Military Department: http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/OEM/OR911/docs/consolidation_task_force_draft_vers_10.pdf

Oregon Military Department. (2011, August 11). PSAP Directory by County. Retrieved September 18, 2011, from Oregon Military Department: http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/OEM/OR911/docs/psap_directory.pdf

Oregon Office of Emergency Management. (2012, March 23). 911 Program. Retrieved April 19, 2012, from Oregon Office of Emergency Management: http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/OEM/OR911/911_program.shtml

Oregon Public Employees Retirement System (PERS). (2011, March). Oregon PERS At A Glance - March 2011. Retrieved May 26, 2012, from Oregon PERS: http://oregonpers.info/library/Download.aspx?docid=1404

Oregon State Legislature - Joint Ways and Means Committee. (2012, February 1). Military Department – 9-1-1 Consolidation Study. Retrieved April 21, 2012, from Oregon State Legislature: 2012

Oregon State Legislature. (2009). Budget Report - Senate Bill 5536-A.

Oregon State Legislature. (2011). Budget Report - House Bill 5037-A.

Oregon State Legislature. (2012). Budget Report - Senate Bill 5701-A.

Rees, R. F. (2012, January 27). Letter to Oregon Legislature's Joint Ways and Means Committee on the LR Kimball Report. 2012, Oregon.

Seattle Times. (2002, September 1). Oregon Legislature Calls Special Session. Retrieved May 5, 2012, from Seattletimes.com: http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20020901&slug=orexgr01

Smith, C. (2011). 911 Funds - Interoffice Memo to Governor John Kitzhaber.

Sotebeer, M. S. (2012, February 1). Viewpoint: Looking to cut costs? Take a good look at consolidation. Retrieved May 12, 2012, from americancityandcounty.com: http://americancityandcounty.com/blog/government-consolidation

State of Utah 911 Committee. (2010). THE UTAH STATE 9-1-1 PLAN.

State of Vermont Enhanced 9-1-1 Board. (2012). EMERGENCY 9-1-1 SERVICE FUNDING STUDY.

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2012, May 26). Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2012-13 Edition: Police, Fire, and Ambulance Dispatchers. Retrieved May 26, 2012, from Bureau of Labor Statistics: http://www.bls.gov/ooh/office-and-administrative-support/police-fire-and-ambulance-dispatchers.htm

Attachment “A” – Oregon Map of PSAPs

Source: OEM

Appendix 2 – OEM FY 2010-11 Budget Report

Appendix 3 – County Population – July 1, 2011

County July 1, 2011 Population Estimate

BAKER 16,215 BENTON 85,995 CLACKAMAS 378,480 CLATSOP 37,145 COLUMBIA 49,625 COOS 62,960 CROOK 20,855 CURRY 22,335 DESCHUTES 158,875 DOUGLAS 107,795 GILLIAM 1,880 GRANT 7,450 HARNEY 7,375 HOOD RIVER 22,625 JACKSON 203,950 JEFFERSON 21,845 JOSEPHINE 82,820 KLAMATH 66,580 LAKE 7,885 LANE 353,155 LINCOLN 46,155 LINN 117,340 MALHEUR 31,445 MARION 318,150 MORROW 11,270 MULTNOMAH 741,925 POLK 75,965 SHERMAN 1,765 TILLAMOOK 25,255 UMATILLA 76,580 UNION 25,980 WALLOWA 6,995 WASCO 25,300 WASHINGTON 536,370 WHEELER 1,435 YAMHILL 99,850

SOURCE: PSU – Population Research Center

Appendix 4 – City Population – July 1, 2011

Source: PSU – Population Research Center

Appendix 5 - Populations for Incorporated Cities Located in More than One County - July 1, 2011

City and Counties Population

Albany 50,520 in Benton 6,698

in Linn 43,822

Lake Oswego 36,725 in Clackamas 34,165 in Multnomah 2,551

in Washington 9

Portland 585,845 in Clackamas 747 in Multnomah 583,546

in Washington 1,552

Source: PSU – Population Research Center

Appendix 6 – OEM FY 2010-12 DATA SET (37 PSAPs) (PDF version is included)

Appendix 7 – 2012 Kimball Report Recommended Regions

Source: Consolidation Analysis and Next Generation 9-1-1 Implementation Study (Oregon), LR Kimball, 2012, Page 41

Appendix 8 – Financial Template for PSAP Consolidation Scenarios (MS Excel file attached)

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