(8) thomas kuhn

8/13/2019 (8) Thomas Kuhn

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THOMAS KUHNS

PHILOSOPHY OF

SCIENCE

The history of science

could produce adecisive transformation

in the image of science

by which we are now

possessed (TSSR, 1).


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THOMAS KUHN (1922-1996)

He is one of the most influential philosophers of science of

the twentieth century. His academic life started from physics,the history of science, and to the philosophy of science

His book The Structure of Scient i f ic Revo lut ion sis one of

the most cited academic books of all time. His contribution to

the philosophy of science marked a break with several key

positivist doctrines, & inaugurated a new style of philosophy

of science that brought it closer to the history of science.

In seeing philosophy as historically-conditioned, his account

of the devt. of science held that science enjoys periods of

stable growth punctuated by revisionary revolutions.

Ex: (Philosophy) Scholasticism to Modern Philosophy

He added the controversial incommensurability thesis, that

theories from differing periods suffer from certain deep kinds

of failure of comparability.


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ROLEOFHISTORY

Traditional History presents science as:

a. Developed by accumulation provided by textbooks (facts,theories and observations)

b. Result of scientistscontribution

Kuhn emphasized on the importance of the history of

science for philosophy of science. Kuhn proposed a dialectical (non-linear) form of historical

reading of the history of the philosophy of science, which

traversed different forms and stages of struggles.


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KUHNS PERCEPTION OF SCIENCE

Science is not a stable, cumulative acquisition of knowledge.

It does not move in a linear path.

Sciences progress is not uniform but has alternating normal

& revolutionary phases. The revolutionary phases are not

merely periods of accelerated progress, but differ qualitatively

from normal science. Normal science does resemble the

standard cumulative picture of scientific progress(superficially, at least). Kuhn describes normal science as

puzzle-solving(TSSR, 3542).

Science is a series of breaks interrupted by intellectually

violent revolutions. After an important revolutions, oneconceptual world view is replaced by another. Ex: From

Ptolemaic understanding of the world to Copernican

Revolution. From NewtonsGravitational Theory to Einsteins

Relativity Theory.


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Philosophy of sciencestraditionalsubject matter is scientific

knowledge, and the relevant philosophical questions concern

the aim, structure, sources, methods, and justification of

scientific knowledge. What is Kuhnsposi t ion?

He ridiculed the conception of scientific knowledge as

the subject matter of philosophical reflection as one

derived from the presentation of science in pedagogicaltextbooks.

For Kuhn,animageof science drawn mainly from the study

of finished scientific achievements . . . is no more likely to fit

the enterprise that produced them than an image of anational culture drawn from a tourist brochure or a language

text(TSSR).


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KUHNS VIEW OF A SCIENTIST

Contrary to traditional belief, Kuhn maintained that a

scientists is not an objective & independent thinker. They are not conservative individuals who simply accept

what they have been taught & apply their knowledge to

solving the problems which their theories speak.

He/she is a puzzle-solver who aims to discover what theyalready know in advance. The man who is striving to solve a

problem defined by existing epistemology & technique is not

just a naval contemplator. He/she knows what to accomplish.

He/she designs instruments & directs his thought accordingly.

Is th is perspect ive a under the context of normal or

revo lut ionary science?


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Scientificknow ledge, l ike language, is

int r ins ica lly the common property of a

group or else nothing at al l . Tounderstand i t , we shal l need to know the

special character ist ics of the groups

that create and use it(TSSR, 210).


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THESTRUCTUREOFSCIENTIFICREVOLUTION

The central idea of this influential book is that the

development of science is driven, in normal periods ofscience, by adherence to what Kuhn called aparadigm.


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It is a universally recognized scientific achievement which

provide model problems and solutions to a scientific

community (by employing shared concepts, symbolic

expressions, experimental & mathematical tools &procedures).

The functions of a paradigm are to supply puzzles for

scientists to solve and to provide the tools for their solution. A

crisis in science arises when confidence is lost in the abilityof the paradigm to solve particularly worrying puzzles called

anomalies. Crisis is followed by a scientific revolution if the

existing paradigm is superseded by a rival.

Moreover, a paradigm allows scientists to work successfully

without having to provide a detailed account of what they are

doing or what they believe about it.


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TWOSENSESOFPARADIGMS

1. Paradigm is an exemplar.

2. Paradigm is a matrix.

Exemplar

- Kuhn noted that scientists canagree in their identification

of a paradigm without agreeing on, or even attempting toproduce, a full rationalization of it. Lack of a standard

interpretation or of an agreed reduction to rules will not

prevent a paradigm from guiding research(TSSR, 44).

- It consists of sets of methods, principles, assumptions,concepts & evaluative standards (blue print).


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Paradigms are thus first and foremost to be understood as

large eyeglasses. They are accepted examples of actual

scientific practice, which include law, theory, application, and

instrumentation together. They provide models from whichspring particular coherent traditions of scientific research.

In science, the heliocentric theory is a paradigm that

superseded the geocentric theory and moderates mans

scientific optimism.

In philosophy, Analytic and

Continental philosophies are

examples of paradigms.


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2. Paradigm as a matrix.

- It refers to clusters of methods & principles which organizes

how research should be conducted & identifies what

constitute a good scientific explanation.- In working with these shared models of successful work,

scientists open a field of research possibilities, a disciplinary

matrix.

This matrix is the context within which shared concepts,symbols, apparatus, procedures, & theoretical models are

used. It articulates a domain of phenomena as a field of

research possibilities, which present opportunities,

challenges, and dead ends.

Ex: Newtons Law of Motion grounds the explanation of

projectile motion


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Is a scient i f ic theory a parad igm?


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A paradigm is essential to scient i f ic inquiry. Accordingto Kuhn, "no natural history can be interpreted in theabsence of at least some implicit body of intertwinedtheoretical and methodological belief that permits selection,

evaluation, and criticism(TSSR).

Paradigms help scientific communities to bound theirdiscipline in that they help the scientist to:

1. create avenues of inquiry;

2. formulate questions;3. select methods with which to examine questions, and

4. define areas of relevance.

"In the absence of a paradigm or some candidate forparadigm, all the facts that could possibly pertain to thedevelopment of a given science are likely to seem equallyrelevant(TSSR).


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HOWAREPARADIGMSCREATED, ANDHOWDO

SCIENTIFICREVOLUTIONSTAKEPLACE?

1. Inqu i ry begins wi th a random col lect ion of "mere facts"

a. During these early stages of inquiry, different researchersconfronting the same phenomena describe and interpretthem in different ways.

b. In time, these descriptions and interpretations entirelydisappear.

2. A pre-paradigmatic schoo l appears.

a. Such a school often emphasizes a special part of thecollection of facts.

b. Often, these schools vie for preeminence.

3. From the compet it ion of p re-paradigmat ic schools, oneparadigm emergesTo be accepted as a paradigm, atheory must seem better than its competitors, but it neednot, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it

can be confronted", thus making research possible.


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4. As a paradigm grows in strength and in the number ofadvocates, the preparadigmatic schools fade.

a. "When an individual or group first produces a synthesisable to attract most of the next generation'spractitioners,the older schools gradually disappear".

b. Those with "older views . . . are simply read out of theprofession and their work is subsequently ignored. If theydo not accommodate their work to the new paradigm, they

are doomed to isolation or must attach themselves tosome other group", or move to a department of philosophy.

5. A paradigm transfo rms a grou p into a pro fession or, atleast, a disc ipl ine.

A paradigm gu ides the whole group 's research, and it isthis criterion that most clearly proclaims a field a science.


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INCOMMENSURABILITY

Kuhn claimed that science guided by one paradigm would

be incommensurable with science developed under adifferent paradigm, by which is meant that there is no

common measure for assessing the different scientific

theories.

What is the pr imary role of incommensurabi l ity? This thesis of incommensurability, rules out certain kinds of

comparison of the two theories and consequently rejects

some traditional views of scientific devt., such as the view

that later science builds on the knowledge contained within

earlier theories, or the view that later theories are closer

approximations to the truth than earlier theories.


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He initially used incommensurability predominately to

challenge cumulat ive characterizations of scientific

advance, and to challenge the idea that there are

unchanging, neutral methodological standards forcomparing theories throughout the devt. of the natural

sciences (like in evolution).

He used the term incommensurable to characterize the

holistic nature of the changes that take place in a scientific

revolution.

Problems whose solution was vitally important to the older

tradition may temporarily disappear, become obsolete or

even unscientific. On the other hand, problems that had not

even existed, or whose solution had been considered trivial,may gain extraordinary significance in the new tradition.


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For Kuhn, the history of science reveals proponents of

competing paradigms failing to make complete contact with

each other's views, so that they are always talking at least

slightly at cross-purposes. Ex: (1) The Newtonian paradigm is incommensurable with

its Cartesian and Aristotelian predecessors in the history of

physics.

These competing paradigms lack a common measurebecause they use different concepts and methods to

address different problems, limiting communication across

the revolutionary divide.

The process of scientific change is eliminative and

permissive rather than instructive. In the process of

confronting anomalies, certain alternatives are excluded, but

nature does not guide us to some uniquely correct theory.


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For Kuhn, The reception o f a new paradigm often

necessi tates a redef in it ion of the corresponding

science. Some old problems may be relegated to

another science or declared ent i rely " uns cient i fic ."[e.g. alchemy] Others that were previously non-

existent or tr iv ial may, with a new paradigm,

become the very archetypes of signi f icant

sc ient i f ic achievement. [e.g., t ido logy, the stu dy of

the tides] The normal-scient i f ic tradi t ion that

emerges from a scient i f ic revolut ion is not only

incompat ib le but o ften actually incommensurable

wi th that which has gone before" (TSSR, 103).


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"AWARENESSISPREREQUISITETOALLACCEPTABLECHANGESOF

THEORY" (TSSR, 67).

It is a significant transformation from one framework to

another. It is conditioned by the dialectic

movements/struggles of different societal and

epistemological factors.

H d di h b t?


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How does paradigm change come about?

1. Discoverynovelty of fact.

Discovery begins with the awareness of anomaly.

The recognition that nature has violated the paradigm-induced

expectations that govern normal science.

A phenomenon for which a paradigm has not readied the

investigator.

Perceiving an anomaly is essential for perceiving novelty(although

the first does not always lead to the second, i.e., anomalies can beignored, denied, or unacknowledged).

The area of the anomaly is then explored.

The paradigm change is complete when the paradigm/theory has

been adjusted so that the anomalous become the expected. The result is that the scientist is able "to see nature in a different

way.

N.B.: But assimilating new information does not always lead to

paradigm change.

Not all theories are paradigm theories.


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Why should a paradigm change be called a revolu t ion?

What are the funct ions of scient i f ic revolut ions in the

development of science?

A scientific revolution is a noncumulative developmentalepisode in which an older paradigm is replaced by an

incompatible new one. A scientific revolution that results in

paradigm change is analogous to a political revolution.

It comes about when one paradigm displaces another after aperiod of paradigm-testing that occurs only after persistent

failure to solve a noteworthy puzzle has given rise to crisis. As

part of the competition between two rival paradigms for the

allegiance of the scientific community.


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When paradigm s change, the wo r ld i tsel f changes w ith

them. How do the beliefs and concept ions of sc ient ists

change as the resu l t of a paradigm shi f t?

It is really difficult to fit nature into a paradigm.

How does science progress?


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SOME EXAMPLES:

Geocentric Theory Heliocentric Theory

Creationism Theory of Natural Selection Theory of Spontaneous Generation Theory of Biogenesis

Contraction Theory Plate Tectonics Theory

Newtonian Mechanics EinsteinsSpecial Relativity


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NORMAL VS. REVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE

The central distinction of Thomas Kuhns TSSR (1962) is

that between normal science and revolutionary science.

Subsequent devts. in cognitive psychology have vindicated

Kuhns departures from standard theories of cognition. It

may even be the case that what is worth saving in Kuhns

treatment of revolutions depends on the account of

cognition that he developed for normal science. After all,Kuhns own most informative characterization of

revolutionary science is that it is extraordinary nonnormal.

Kuhns account of normal scientific cognition as puzzle-

solving practices is guided by the exemplary problemsolutions that he called exemplars, together with what he

termed anacquired similarity relation.


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How does science work? Scientific work is highly routinary

suggests that we might be able to characterize modern

scientific practice in terms of a method. There is, of course,

a long history of such claims, beginning with Plato andAristotle but dating especially from the time of Francis

Bacon and Rene Descartes.

Today the idea that there is a single general method that

defines scientific inquiry (the scientific method) remainspopular among school administrators and the general

public, but it has been virtually abandoned by historians,

philosophers, and sociologists of science.

Kuhn stated that nearly all mature science is normal science &


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Kuhn stated that nearly all mature science is normal science &

that normal science is, in some sense, routine.

How did he explain norm al science as a rout ine?

Indeed, for him, the existence of routine problems (& problem-

solving activity) is the hallmark of a mature science. This, if

anything, is his criterion of demarcation of mature science from

immature science and nonscience.

Many issues, including our overall conception of what science

is, who scientists are, and what they do, hinge on the answer tothis question. At one extreme is the view that scientific work is

methodical, dull routine and that scientists themselves are

rather plodding people with tunnel vision.

Yet Kuhn strongly denied that scientific work, in its salientaspects, proceeds on the basis of logical or methodological

rules. Scientists, he said, do not employ many rules explicitly,

nor will any set of rules that captures past practice be reliably

projectable onto the future of science (TSSR, V).


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In short, Kuhn confounded the Popperians, logical

positivists, & others by claiming that scientific work is far

more routinized yet far less methodical than they had

imagined. How is th is possib le?

The answer to this question is that Kuhn denied that routine

scientific work is normally methodical in the sense of

applying a set of rules. Rather, scientists directly model their

current problem-solving efforts on concrete cases consisting

of previous problem-solving achievements, which Kuhn

termed exemplars.

Stated in another way Kuhns point is that traditions and


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Stated in another way, Kuhn s point is that traditions and

established, successful practices cannot be invented overnight

by an act of will on the part of an individual or a group.

Kuhn rejected the Enlightenment view that rational political

societies and scientific communities can be created at will bysimply destroying established traditions and replacing them by

a rationally planned enterprise by means of a Popperian

constitutional convention. His conception of science was pre-

Enlightenment in several respects, including appreciation ofthe importance of tradition.

Kuhns main efforts, in explaining the emergence &

maintenance of normal science, were devoted to the human,

social-constructive side of normal science. Even given the right

sort of world, it takes a very special sort of community torealize normal science. Kuhns twin focus here was on the

recruitment and training of new members of the community

and on the maintenance of order within the community and the

policing of its boundaries.


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Kuhn suggested that the scientific community operates

surprisingly like a medieval guild:

(1) It is a community of practitioners who possess expert

knowledge.(2) The community sharply distinguishes itself from the non-

expert, lay public, including other expert scientific

communities. Boundaries are maintained by the high costs

of admission and expulsion, enforced by professors, journaleditors, peer reviewers, and other gatekeepers.

(3) There is a standard training procedure for novices in a

given specialty area. They are trained on the same

problems, using the same or similar textbooks & laboratoryexercises. At advanced stages, the training typically

involves something akin to a masterapprentice relation.

(4) The knowledge is imparted by example far more than by

rule.


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(5) Hence, the crucial knowledge that distinguishes an

expert from a well-read novice remains largely tacit,

inarticulate, & more knowing-how than knowing-that. It

involves teaching by showing & knowing by doing. (6) Strong personal commitment to the imparted tradition is

expected. Being too critical of community presuppositions

and practices threatens both the community and onesown

career prospects.


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How does a normal science wo rk?

Kuhn popularized the view that scientific work is problem

solving, not in Poppers grand sense but as a matter of

routine. In order to secure their position in the communityand thereby gain a professional reputation & accessto more

resources, normal scientists must pose and/or solve puzzles

that further articulate the paradigm without breaking with its

central thrust.

The problems they tackle must be challenging and the work

in solving them original but not radically innovative. Normal

scientists must walk a tightrope, one held taut by Kuhns

essentialtensionbetween tradition & innovation


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How is it that scientists can recognize their own kind, so to

speak, that is, recognize a piece of work and its author(s) as

belonging to their specialty area? More specifically, how is it

that scientists can recognize that a problem falls within theirdomain of professional expertise and responsibility in the first

place, & subsequently determine whether dealing with it is

feasible, given current intellectual and socioeconomic

resources?

First, normal science screens out as irrelevant the vast

majority of potential problems that might present themselves.

It further screens out many of those that do fall within the

general domain of the particular specialty

in question, on the ground that these problems are not yet

solvable because there exist no suitable exemplars to

indicate what a good answer would look like.


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What is the role of an exemplar in a paradigm?

The exemplars in a particular puzzle are not merely abstract

models but also contain the primary computational resources

relevant to solving the new problems with which they arematched. One or more exemplars, suitably adapted, provide

a model of ones current puzzle and the sought-for solution.

One figures out how to solve the current puzzle by finding

sufficiently close matches to puzzles solved previously.

REVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE


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REVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE

How is revolu t ionary scient i f ic inquiry pos sib le?

Therefore, in seeking to understand revolutions, we are

drawn back to the nature of normal science (my central topic)and how tradition-bound inquiry, almost inevitably, leads to

crisis.

Even subtle developments, such as one can find in the

tradition-bound work of normal science, can haveevolutionary implications, once those implications are

explored and explicitly embodied in theoretical and

experimental practice.


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POPPER-KUHN DEBATE

Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn met at a conference in

swingingLondonto compare and contrast their views on thenature of theory change in science.

The debate was recorded & extended in an influential book

called Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Although

Kuhn was at pains to begin his paper (1970) by stressing

similarities between his own views of scientific development

and those of SirKarl,and albeit Kuhnsofficial line was that

the differences between Popper and himself were

comparatively secondary, it soon became clear that those

differences were in fact sharp and apparently rather deep. Kuhn claimed, that Popper has characterized the entire

scientific enterprise in terms that apply only to its occasional

revolutionary parts.

A d h t d th t t t hi t f


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And he suggested that to accept his own account of

science was, in effect, to turn Sir Karlsview on its head

by accepting that itis precisely the abandonment of critical

discourse that marks the transition to a science(ibid.).

Popper responded by, amongst other things, admitting that

Kuhns normalscienceis a real phenomenon and that he

had indeed hitherto failed fully to recognize it

Normal science is, said Popper, adanger to science and,

indeed to our civilization!(p. 53), adding for good measure

that [i]nmy view, the normalscientist . . . is a person one

ought to be sorry for(p. 52).

O th b i f thi i P i tl


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On the basis of this comparison, Popper succinctly

characterized his basic position in the form of seven

propositions:

1. It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, fornearly every theory if we look for confirmations.

2. Confirmations should count only if they are the result of

risky predictions; that is to say, if, unenlightened by the

theory in question, we should have expected an event

which was incompatible with the theory which would

have refuted the theory.

3. Every good scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids

certain things to happen. The more it forbids, the better it

is.

4. A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event

is nonscientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as

people often think), but a vice.

5 E i t t f th i tt t t f l if it


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5. Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it,

or to refute it. Testability is falsifiability; but there are

degrees of testability: some theories are more testable,

more exposed to refutation, than others; they take, as it

were, greater risks.

6. Confirming evidence should not count except when it is

the result of a genuine test of the theory; and this means

that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful

attempt to falsify the theory. . . .

7. Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be

false, are still upheld by their admirers for example by

introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by re-

interpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapesrefutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it

rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of

destroying, or at least lowering its scientific status. . . . (pp.

367)

Popper does not explicitly include in this list his view on the


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Popper does not explicitly include in this list his view on the

correct scientific attitude to take when a theory fails a test.

However, he does explicitly say in the preamble that If

observation shows that the predicted effect is definitely

absent, then the theory is simply refuted. Popper did take into account the possibility of a theorys

admirers continuing to uphold a theory, even when

refuted, that is, foundto be false,but he claimed that such

a move carries the priceof destroying, or at least loweringits scientific status.

On the contrary, Kuhn argued that theresonly 1 clear-cut

sense where a scientist can be said to be testing a

theorywithin the context of normal science (within acontext in which the scientist simply postulates), & takes for

granted, his basic theory & basic methods; what can then

be tested are statements of an individualsbest guesses as

to how to connect his own research problem w/ corpus of

accepted scientific knowledge.

Kuhn insisted that


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In unusual sense, however, are such tests directed to

current theory. On the contrary, when engaged with a normal

research problem, the scientist must premise current theory

as the rules of his game. His object is to solve a puzzle,preferably one at which others have failed, and his current

theory is required to define that puzzle. . . . Of course the

practitioner of such an enterprise must often test the

conjectural puzzle solution that his ingenuity suggests. Butonly his personal conjecture is tested.(45)

If [this personalconjecture]fails the test, only [the cientists]

own ability not the corpus of current science is impugned. In

short, though tests occur frequently in normal science, thesetests are of a peculiar sort, for in the final analysis it is the

individual scientist rather than current theory which is tested.

(5)

As Kuhn, of course, recognised, the teststhat Popper had in


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, , g , pp

mind were, on the contrary, ones that (allegedly) do

challenge fundamental theory.

Kuhn listed, on Poppersbehalf, Lavoisiersexperiments on

calcinations, the eclipse expedition of 1919, and the recentexperiments on parity conservation. Rather perplexingly, he

conceded that classic tests such as these can be

destructivein their outcomeand concentrated initially on the

criticism that such tests, contrary to Poppers claims, areextremely rare in the history of science. This led to the

already quoted remark that Sir Karl has characterized the

entire scientific enterprise in terms that apply only to its

occasional revolutionary parts(p. 6).

The whole rhetoric of refutation and falsification suggests


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gg

disproofs or at least results that will compelassent from any

member of the relevant professional community (p. 13). But

there are no such things. His real position, then, was that

what Popper seemed to be saying about tests never reallyapplies either in normal or in extraordinary science.

The fundamental flaws in Poppers position on testing and

falsificationstem, for Kuhn, from his complete misreading of

the role and importance of normalscience. That is, of Kuhnstwo comparativelysecondarypoints of disparity with Popper,

the firsthis emphasis on the importance of deep

commitment to traditionwas indeed the more impt. Poppers

misconception of the role & importance of normal science led

him both to an incorrect demarcation criterion between

science & pseudoscience and to a misappraisal of the merits

of holding on to a basic theory when it runs into experimental

difficulties.

Poppers view was that astrology, for example, is a


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pp gy, p ,

pseudsoscience because it is unfalsifiable. Kuhn argued that

this is incorrect at least if unfalsifiability involves never

making predictions that were agreed, on the basis of

evidence, to fail. (Kuhn here cited Thorndike for mainly 16thcentury examples of failed astrological predictions.) The real

reason astrology fails to be scientific, for Kuhn, is that it has

not yet developed, and of course may never develop, a

puzzle-solving tradition; it has not progressed to the stage ofsustaining normal science.

For the 16th century astronomer, the failure of an individual

prediction was a fertile source of research problems. He had a

whole armory of ideas for reacting to failure: there were clear-cut ways in which the datamight be challenged & improved)

&, if that was unsuccessful, clear-cut proposals for modifying

theory by manipulating epicycles, eccentrics, etc. No such

puzzle-solving ideas were available to the 16th-century

astrologer.

On the central issue of reacting to falsifications (anomalies


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g (

for Kuhn) by continuing to defend the central theory, he

argued that Poppersaccount is again quite wrong, since he

always acknowledged that it is possible to defend a theory

against a potential refutation by, for example, introducinganauxiliary or by questioning the data. But, as we just saw, he

suggested that although undoubtedly possible, any such

maneuver is automatically under suspicion: [Such a

defensivemove] is always possible, but it rescues the theoryfrom refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least

lowering its scientific status.

Kuhn argued that, to the contrary, not only is it true that all

theories can be modified by a variety of ad hoc adjustments

without ceasing to be, in their main lines, the same theories,

but it is moreover important. . . that this should be so, for it is

often by challenging observations or adjusting theories that

scientific knowledge grows(p. 13).

What is Kuhnsreact ion against Poppersfalsi f icat ion?


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g pp

Is falsi f icat ion sim i lar to anomalies?

A major step in resolving Kuhnsdiscontent is made once we

accept that falsifications are of theoretical systems rather

than central theories.

Kuhns anomalies are at least in the simplest case,

falsifications of overall theoretical systems that scientists

regard (at any rate for the time being) as likely to be resolved

by replacing that theoretical system with another that sharesthe same central theory and differs only over some

auxiliary/instrumental assumption. Most Newtonians in the

19th century regarded the observations of Uranus orbit as

anomalies for, rather than falsifications of, Newtons theorybecause they expected that the best replacement

theoretical system that predicted the correct orbit for

Uranus would also be built around Newtons theoryand

would differ from the current one onlyover some auxiliary.

This attitude was, of course, dramatically vindicated by


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y y

Adams and Leverrier, who, holding on to Newtons theory,

replaced the auxiliary assumption about the number of other

gravitational masses in the solar system and hence produced

an overall system that not only correctly accounted forUranus orbit, but also predicted the existence of a new

planet Neptune.

This success, in turn, made it more plausible to regard the

difficulties with Mercurysorbit (known about, of course, longbefore Einstein) as similarly anomalous (rather than

falsifying). It seemed likely that, by working within the basic

Newtonian approach (that is, revising some auxiliary within

the theoretical framework based on Newtons theory), a

successful account of Mercurysmotion could eventually be

found.

There are also a couple of other passing remarks in Poppers


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work about the importance of background knowledge and of

a scientistsbeing immersed in a problem-situation. But he

seems to have done nothing towards developing this outline

idea into a systematic account. On the other hand, Kuhns account of the puzzle-solving

tradition that comes as the benefit of buying into a paradigm,

and his insistence on the importance of exemplars, were both

attempts to put some flesh on this outline idea of maturescience buildingon itself.

In sum,Kuhns,should be seen not as advocating dogmatism,

but rather as advertising the fact that commitmentto the sort

of framework supplied by well-developed science bringsenormous epistemic benefits. Without such commitments,

mature science would be incapable of making the progress it

has in fact made. Poppers claim that normal science is a

danger to realscience & indeed to our civilizationbetrayed

complete misunderstanding.


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1. Popper sees philosophy of science as historically-conditioned.


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1. Popper sees philosophy of science as historically conditioned.

His account of the development of science holds that science

enjoys periods of stable growth punctuated by revisionary

revolutions called incommensurability.

2. Kuhn proposed a dialectical form of historical reading of thehistory of the philosophy of science. This is in reaction against

traditional textbook science which is merely a narrative of facts,

theories and observations of scientists.

3. Science is for Feyerabend a non-cumulative acquisition of

knowledge. Sciencesprogress is not uniform but has alternatingnormal & revolutionary phases.

4. Scientists are not conservative individuals. They strive to solve a

problem defined by existing knowledge & technique called

paradigm which is within the context of revolutionary science.

5. A crisis in science arises when confidence is lost in the ability of

the paradigm to solve particularly worrying puzzles called

anomalies. Crisis is followed by a scientific revolution if the

existing paradigm is superseded by a rival.

6. In paradigm constructions, a pre-paradigmatic school appears first

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before a random collection of facts. As a paradigm grows in

strength and in the number of advocates, the pre-paradigmatic

schools fade.

7. The process of scientific change is eliminative and non-permissive.

In the process of confronting anomalies, certain alternatives are

excluded, but nature does guide us to some uniquely correct theory.

8. A scientific revolution that results in paradigm change is analogous

to a political revolution. It comes about when one paradigm

displaces another after a period of paradigm-testing that occurs only

after persistent failure to solve a noteworthy puzzle has given rise to

normal science.

9. Kuhn stated that all mature science is normal science & that normal

science is, in some sense, routine. He confounded the Popperians,

logical positivists, & others by claiming that scientific work is far

more routinized yet far less methodical than they had imagined.

10. Kuhnsmain efforts, in explaining the emergence & maintenance of

normal science, were devoted to the human, social-constructive side

of normal science. Even given the right sort of world, it takes a very

special sort of community to realize normal science.

11. The scientific community operates surprisingly like an ancient

i ti It i it f titi h t


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organization: It is a community of practitioners who possess expert

knowledge. Moreover, the community sharply distinguishes itself

from the non-expert, lay public, including other expert scientific

communities.

12. In a scientific community, there is a standard training procedure for

novices in a given specialty area. They are trained on the different

problems, using the same or similar textbooks & laboratory

exercises.

13. Normal science screens out as irrelevant the vast majority of

potential problems that might present themselves. It further screensout many of those that do fall within the general domain of the

particular specialty in question, on the ground that these problems

are already solvable because there exist no suitable exemplars to

indicate what a good answer would look like.

14. The exemplars in a particular puzzle are not merely abstractmodels but also contain the primary computational resources

relevant to solving the new problems with which they are matched.

One or more exemplars, suitably adapted, provide a model of ones

current puzzle and the sought-for solution.

15 Popper did not take into account the possibility of a theorys


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15. Popper did not take into account the possibility of a theory s

admirers continuing to uphold a theory, even when refuted,

albeit such a move carries the price of destroying, or at least

lowering its scientific status. On the contrary, Kuhn argued

that theres only 1 clear-cut sense where a scientist can besaid to be testing a theorywithin the context of

revolutionary science.

II. Answer this question in not more than 5 sentences. Whenparadigms change, the world itself changes with them: how

do the beliefs and conceptions of scientists change as the

result of a paradigm shift? (10 pts.)

(8) thomas kuhn

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