7 risk assessment & disaster management...

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) – EMP with Risk Assessment & DMP Report

For proposed EXPANSION in existing Synthetic Organic Chemicals unit of M/s. Yashdeep Chemicals (India) Pvt. Ltd.at Plot No. 676, Jhagadia Notified GIDC Industrial Estate, Tal- Jhagadia, Dist - Bharuch, Gujarat State, India

Chapter 7. Risk Assessment & Disaster Management Plan

Siddhi Green Excellence Pvt. Ltd., Ankleshwar Page 215 of 270

7 RISK ASSESSMENT & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

7.1 BACKGROUNDRisk Assessment is a management tool for determining the hazards and risk associated with the various activities ofa project and compute the damage potential of these hazards to life and property. Risk Assessment provides basisfor determining the safety measures required to eliminate, minimize and control the risks as detailed in DisasterManagement Plan (DMP) to handle onsite and offsite emergencies.In Chemical Industry, Risk Assessment is carried out for the various hazards involved in storage and handling ofhazardous raw materials, intermediates and finished products as well as for the manufacturing processes used bythe unit.

7.2 OBJECTIVESThe given study was focused to fulfill the following objectives : Identification of safety areas Ientification of process and storage hazards Visualization of maximum credible accident (MCA) scenarios Consequence analysis of scenarios Determination of quantities released, impact zones Estimation of damage distances for the accidental release scenarios with recourse to Maximum Credible

Accident (MCA) analysis Preventive and control measures required for reducing the risk factors Delineation of Disaster Management Plan

7.3 SCOPE OF WORKBased on the objectives as defined above, the scope of work for the given study has been framed as under :

1. Hazard Identification General description of project Study of manufacturing activities Study of plant facilities and layout Hazardous inventory Associated process and storage hazards Safety measures as proposed by the proponent

2. Hazard Assessment Identification of MCA and worst case scenarios using standard techniques Consequence analysis of selected scenarios using EFFECT model on ALOHA software

3. Determination of risk reduction measures4. Preparation of DMP5. Recommendations

7.4 METHODOLOGYFollowing methodology has been followed for given Risk Assessment Study as described in “Guidelines forChemical Process Quantitative Risk Assessment” by CCPS with the help of frequency data from “Purple Book” ,2008.

The guidelines given by SEAC as well as Technical Guidance Manual of MoEFCC have also been followed. Collecting Input data about Process,Inventories and Site conditions Hazard Identification Defining the Potential Accident Scenarios Evaluation of Consequences and Estimation of Accident Frequencies




Siddhi Green Excellence Pvt. Ltd., Ankleshwar 16 of 270

Estimate the Impacts Estimate the Risk Identify and Prioritize the Risk Reduction measures.

7.5 HAZARD IDENTIFICATIONThis is important and critical step in risk assessment. It is critical because Hazard omitted is hazard not analyzed.The tools used for identification are experience, detailed process knowledge, engineering codes, checklist, HAZOPsetc.The unit handles hazardous materials and have a defined and organized hazard control and prevention system inplace. The following statutory compliances are applicable to the unit :

1. Gujarat Factories Rules, 19632. Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals (Amended) Rules, 20003. Petroleum Act, 1934, Petroleum Rules, 20024. Gas Cylinder Rules, 2004

The hazards involved in the process are due to major two factors, Process conditions: High pressure, High temperature Material handled: Flammable, Toxic

The hazards of the materials are identified from the MSDS. The major hazards are toxic, fire and explosion.Flammable material will form pool on leakage and this pool can sustain a pool fire. In case of toxic material thevapors evaporated from pool disperse in downstream direction and may cause problem for people in process units /buildings

7.6 STORAGE HAZARDS AND CONTROL MEASURESThe materials involved are of toxic and flammable nature. The major hazardous materials, their inventories and theirhazardous properties are tabulated in annexure-26.The existing and proposed additional inventories are such that unit shall not be an MAH installation in accordancewith the schedule 3 of MSIHC rules, 2000.





Table 7-1 List of Hazardous chemicalsBags Storage (Solids)

Sr.No.

Raw Material Name State Size ofcontainer

No. Ofcontainers

total storagequantity

1 Para formaldehyde(Formaldehyde 98%)

Solid 25 kg bags 120 3 MT

2 Navdeepol- 99 (2 -Nitro- 2-bromo -propane diol)

Solid 25 kg bags 400 10 MT

3 Boric Acid Solid 25 kg bags 40 1 MT4 Surfactant (Ethylene oxide condensate) Solid 200 kg HDPE /

MS drums10 2 MT

Liquid Storages (drums, carboys, IBCs and bottles)Sr. No. Raw Material

NameState Size of container No. Of

containerstotal storage quantity

1 Phenol semi-Solid 200 kg MS drums 15 3 MT2 Epi ChloroHydrine Liquid

200lit HDPE drums /carboys

10 2 MT

3 Methyl Amine (42%soln) Liquid 50 10 MT

4 Ethyl Amine (42%soln) Liquid 50 10 MT

5 2-Octanol Liquid 25 5 MT6 Acetic Acid Liquid 25 5 MT7 Butanol Liquid 25 5 MT8 Mesitylene Liquid 10 2 MT

9 MonocylcoHexylamine Liquid 25 5 MT

10 Ethylene Diamine Liquid 50 10 MT11 Nitromethane Liquid 15 3 MT12 Acetophenone Liquid 25 5 MT13 Propargyl alcohol Liquid 5 1 MT14 Butyl Benzene Liquid 15 3 MT15 n-Heptane Liquid 15 3 MT16 Isopropyl alcohol Liquid 50 10 MT17 Cumene Liquid 1 MT IBC 15 15 MT18 Formaldehyde-37% Liquid

200lit HDPE drums /carboys

50 10 MT19 Formic Acid Liquid 50 10 MT

20 HydrogenPeroxide-50% Liquid 25 5 MT

21 Dimethyl myristylAmine Liquid 10 2 MT

22 Bromine Liquid carate of 3 kg bottles x 6nos. 167 3 MT

Liquid Storage (Above ground Storage Tanks)Sr.No.

Full name of the rawmaterial

State i.e, solid/ Liquid / Gas

Equipment considered Existing No. oftanks & Size at

site

Additional No. oftanks & Size

Total no. oftanks and

storage capacity

1 Sulphuric Acid 98% fuming liquid horizontal Storage tank 1 x 10 = 10 KL 1 x 10 = 10 KL 2 x 10 = 20 KL2 Oleum fuming liquid horizontal Storage tank 0 1 x 10 = 10 KL 1 x 10 = 10 KL3 Caustic Lye-47% liquid horizontal Storage tank 1 x 10 = 10 KL 0 1 x 10 = 10 KL4 Liquor Ammonia (20%) liquid Vertical fixed roof

Storage tank1 x 20 = 20 KL 1 x 20 = 20 KL 2 x 20 = 40 KL

5. PTSA mother liquor liquid Vertical fixed roofStorage tank

2 x 20 = 40 KL 0 2 x 20 = 40 KL

All storage tanks shall be at atmospheric temperature and pressure.





Liquid Storage (Under ground Storage Tanks)Sr.No.

Full name of theraw material

State i.e,solid / Liquid /

Gas

Equipment considered Existing No. oftanks & Size at

site

Additional No. of tanks &Size

Total no. oftanks andstoragecapacity

1 Toluene liquid horizontal Storage tank 2 x 25 = 50 KL 0 2 x 25 = 50 KL2 Xylene liquid horizontal Storage tank 0 1 x 25 = 25 KL 1 x 25 = 25 KL3 Methanol liquid horizontal Storage tank 0 1 x 25 = 25 KL 1 x 25 = 25 KL

Gas Storage Cylinders:Sr.No

Haz.chemicals

State i.e Liquid/ solid/gas No. of container &size at site

qty. in onecontainer

No. of containers

Type MT1 Ammonia gas Liquified gas under pr. Cylinder 2 50 kg 40

Preventive Measures providedFlammable storage tanks are kept underground & in CCOE Licensed premises, Earthing and Bonding, SOP fortanker unloading, Flame arrester provided on flammable U/G tank vent, the acid, caustic & ammonia solution tanksare kept inside dyke with acid brick lining in dyke area.

Control Measures Provided: - Fire hydrant system, Portable Fire Extinguishers, Self Contained BreathingApparatus, SCBA, Medical facilities, Spill control procedures, Dyke wall for containment.

7.7 PROCESS HAZARDS AND THEIR CONTROL MEASURESTable 7-2 Process Hazards and their Control MeasuresSr.No.

Cause Reason Type ofHazardspossible

Probability /Severity

PreventiveMeasuresprovided

ControlMeasuresprovided

1. Leakagefrom line /valve

Failure of valveor joints

ChemicalSpill,ToxicRelease,Fire

Low/Medium

• All lines / valvesperiodicallychecked,

• preventivemaintenance ofall safetydevices

• Operatorstrained for theprocess andSOPs

• PPE provided toworkers

• Spill kits• Flameproof

fittings areprovided.

FireExtinguisher,Fire hydrantsystemSand buckets,First-aid andMedical facilities

2. Failure ofpart ofvessel orjacket

Overpressureand failure ofsafety device

3. Spillagefrom drums /bags

Manual error,rupture

7.8 OTHER HAZARDS & CONTROLFollowing are the other possible hazards :

Explosion due to Natural gas – this hazard shall exist only after unit gets NG supply from GSPL or GGCL Structural failure – this hazard is related to other hazards Transportation hazards - proponent has taken adequate fire protection and control measures as mentioned

in later sections. Toxic Release from outside – taken care by GIDC fire station, mutual aid and District authorities Natural Calamity (Flood, Earthquake, lightning etc.)





The project area is sufficiently away from major river - Narmada river and the site is at an elevation of ~ 40 m fromthe MSL. Storm water drainage network is inplace and also the floods or abnormally high precipitation may obstructblock the internal roads and SH-64 & 165 only for a short period owing to the good drainage towards the sea.

Jhagadia GIDC estate falls in the Seismic Zone III. Since the estate is located at sufficient height from sea, thereare no instances of Tsunami in the recorded past.

7.8.1 Sensitive locations around the projectTable 7-3 Sensitive locations around the project

Receptorstation no.

Receptor Approx. AerialDist. From the

site, km

Direction w.r.tproject site

Upwind or downwindw.r.t project site andpredominant winddirection (SW-NE)

1. Dadheda 1.26 343.32°, N Downwind2. Talodara 2.24 65.61°, NE Downwind3. Randedi 2.00 159.59°, SSE Crosswind4. Sardarpura 3.88 319.25°,NW Crosswind5. Internal road connecting SH64 to

GIDC 0.77 244.42°, SW Upwind

Study Area Map (Area within 10 km radius from the project site)

The study area comprises of :- 73 nos. residential areas and agricultural land uses Ponds and lakes Part of Ankleshwar GIDC Industrial estate Full land of Jhagadia GIDC Industrial estate Part of Valia GIDC Industrial estate Narmada, Amravati and Kaveri river stretches Kondh ki khadi Part of National Highway no. 8, SH 13, SH 175, SH 165 and SH 64 Railway track of Ankleshwar – Rajpipla rail line








Receptorstation no.


site, km














Receptorstation no.


site, km











7.9 PROPOSED RISK REDUCTION MEASURES FOR THE PROJECTProponent is committed to provide advanced risk reduction measures as already exists in the unit.

7.9.1 Plant In-built safetyExisting Safety Features Systems

The Plant is built as per engineering codes & standards such as ASME, applicable Indian standards (IS).The reactor vents are directed to scrubbers and vent gases (NH3,HBr,EDA etc) are scrubbed with water.

Control & Monitoring System and Emergency Shutdown SystemAll the reactors are provided with temperature sensors. The indication of these sensors is provided insidethe operator’s room. Alarm is provided on stoppage of the reactor agitator. The operators have definiteinstruction for the action to be taken on agitator stoppage.

Defined Standard Operating Procedures Maintenance systemsHazardous materials like Xylene, Bromine, Ammonia, Cumene, EDA are handled in the plant. Definedmaintenance procedures are followed for maintenance of lines or equipments handling these hazardousmaterials.Standard Operating procedures are available for all critical activities like hazardous chemical tankerunloading. Every tanker unloading and loading is done in presence of operator only.

Area Segregation :- Production plant will be segregated Flame proof and Non Flame proof area .Flame proof fittings/Equipments will be provided in flame proof area.

Fire Water Network:Fire water ring is provided around all process units of the plant. The ring is kept pressurized bycontinuously running jokey pumps. The network ring is provided with hydrants placed sufficiently to coverall process areas.

7.9.2 Fire Fighting Arrangements

Fire hydrant detailsAn underground Fire Hydrant System is installed in the plant with rings around all blocks to achieve maximumcoverage. Water reservoir of 250m3 (Hydrant tank) + 100 m3 (GIDC Storage tank with feed from the GIDC watersupply has been provided at highest point in the plant. Following are the details of the system.Source of Water : GIDC water supplyFire pumps details Jockey pump – Head=_50meter, Cap=10.8m3/hr, 10 HP

Electrical pump – Head=70 meter, Cap=137m3/hr, HP=60Hydrant System DetailsArea/plant Nos. Of Hydrant with Hose Box -14Production area Hydrant – 4

Hose box- 4 Monitor = 2Aboveground tank farm area Hose box- 4Underground tank farm area Hose box- 2 Monitor = 2ETP Hose box- 1Ware house Hose box- 1Boiler Hose box- 1Admin building Hose box- 1Auto changeover switch operated DG set System ensures that the hydrant pump is kept working.

List of Fire ExtinguishersThe company has trained personnel for fire fighting and it intends to improve the fire fighting skills of their employeeby conducting training on Fire fighting. There are 58 portable fire extinguishers, the break-up of which is as under: -

Sr.No. Area Location Type Capacity





Sr.No. Area Location Type Capacity1 MCC ROOM MCC DCP CO2 9 KG 4.5 KG2 DG ROOM DG DCP CO2 9 KG 4.5 KG3 BOILER ROOM TFH DCP CO2 9 KG 4.5 KG4 PLANT AREA PLANT DCP CO2 FOAM 9 KG 4.5 KG 9 KG5 GAS STATION GAS STATION DCP CO2 9 KG 4.5 KG6 ETP ETP DCP CO2 9 KG 4.5 KG7 TANK FARM TANK FARM DCP CO2 FOAM 9 KG 4.5 KG 9KG

Total Fire Extinguisher:Sr. No Types of

ExtinguisherCapacity

1 DCP 5 kg 010 kg 42total 42

2 CO2 3 kg 06.5 kg 12total 12

3 FOAM 50 lit 29 kg 2total 58

Sand Buckets: 40 Nos.

Emergency EquipmentExplosive meter YESFire entry suit w/o breathing apparatus 1Electric siren with 3 km range YESNo. of trained firefighters : 11 (including all shifts + general shift)Trained for :- Fire Fighting / Rescue / SCBA/ First Aid

Further suggestions from EIA consultant Emergency power for all critical drives / instruments Intelligent / Fuse less MCC for entire site Civil foundations and structural work shall take into account protective measures for earthquakes, cyclones,

landslides, flooding etc. Seamless pipelines to be used wherever necessary. Flange guards to prevent splashing incase of gasket failure. Scheduled testing and maintenance of earthing pits by certified agency

For emergency management :- Garland drains covering the plant to contain contaminated water during fire emergency Dedicated storage for fire water Eye washers / showers to be provided at all required locations Personal protective equipments to be provided to all the employees related to the type of work and hazard

associated Periodical medical checkup of employees shall be done & health records shall be kept and health card

issued to each and every employee. All the equipment and pipelines shall be marked for identification All the safety devices and instruments like safety valves, shall be tested, inspected and recalibrated as per

safety norms.





Fire hydrant system, fire alarms, LEL detectors shall be be examined periodically and preventivemaintenance to be undertaken.

Hydraulic testing of pressure vessels, and tanks shall be done through Government approved CompetentPerson. (As per rule).

Match boxes, Cigarettes, Mobile, any petroleum product prohibited. Visitors required to deposit such itemsat security gate.

Fire fighting team with adequate firefighters in each team and having proper training Trained first aid team (min. 5) Ignition exclusion Zones of the Plant shall be clearly marked with ‘No Sparks Zone’. Use of portable electrical instruments such as transistor radio or cellular phone handsets should not be

allowed to be carried in the Plant premises. Head count of all employees inside the Plant premises will be maintained by the Duty Security Head in a

register on the Gate. Similarly, head count of all contract workers and labourers shall be maintained.

The proponent has consented to implement the above to the best possible extent.

Safety at Storage areas Explosive Tank Farm storage (Toluene, Xylene , Methanol, Cumene, etc)

All flammable storage tanks and vessels are separated with sufficient distances. They are placed underground.The fire water hydrants are placed around the storage areas sufficiently.Flame arresters are provided on the underground tank vents. Explosive and flammable tankfarms areconstructed with full compliance with applicable rules and regulations

Toxic Material storage (Oleum, Sulfuric Acid, Caustic Lye, Ammonia Solution etc)All non flammable material storage tanks and vessels are separated with sufficient distances. They are placed inconcrete dike. The fire water hydrant and monitors are placed around the storage areas sufficiently. All pumpsare kept outside dike area.

Common features of Storage Tanks Located and marked in the designated area for hazardous material storage. The bulk chemicals storage area to be kept away from the main production areas. Concrete Dyke wall provided to contain spillage / leakages, acid proof tiles provided for each material tanks

separately. Fire water ring with hydrants is available in storage area.

In addition, a well planned disaster management system is in place through onsite emergency plan implemented by

dedicated team of experience professionals. Abstracts of onsite plan are annexed as Annexure -35. Appropriate PPE and safety equipment for workers Training of SOPs and emergency handling are given to all employees as per training calendar

Testing of Equipment :-All the equipment are tested as per statutory requirement to keep them in healthy condition.

Lightning arrester:-Lightning arrester is provided at tallest places on plant building and tank farm area.

Audit/ Inspection:-Safety inspection and audit is carried out at fixed intervals.

General:- Total enclosed process system Instrument & Plant Air System for control all parameters Static earthling and electric earthling (Double) will be provided.





static earthing on pipeline flanges of flammable chemical provided Flame proof light fitting installed where ever it is required. Emergency handling equipments like SCBA sets, Fire extinguishers, Gas mask, PPEs, provided. Storage tank area is away from the process plant and Separation Distance has been maintained. Dyke wall provided to all above ground storage tanks, collection pit with valve provided. Fencing and caution notes and hazard identification boards displayed Only authorized person are permitted in storage tank farm area. Safety permit for hazardous material loading unloading is prepared and implemented. Static earthing provision is made at all loading unloading Points of flammable chemical storage tank farm

area. Wind direction indicators are provided. Tele Communication system and mobile phone is used in case of emergency situations for communication. Emergency siren installed at main gate. Training programme are being conducted regularly and induction training shall be provided to all employees

on chemical safety and process safety.

7.10 VISUALIZATION OF ACCIDENT SCENARIOSBased on the inventory, physical and chemical properties as well as the activities associated with storage andhandling of hazardous chemicals, the largest potential hazard inventories are considered. Different releasescenarios are visualized for these inventories and short-listed for carrying out the consequence analysis.

One scenario considered is ‘Catastrophic Failure’, which is the worst case (WC) and frequency of which is very rarein the lifetime of the plant. Catastrophic failure of atmospheric tanks and drums is considered as ‘worst casescenario’

MCA (Maximum Credible Accident) analysis is considered the most appropriate consequence analysis method forrisk assessment since it does not involve quantification of the probability of occurrence of an accident and estimatesthe consequent effects of an accident scenario in terms of damage distances of heat radiation, toxic releases, vaporcloud explosion, pool fire etc. Major hazards posed by hazardous chemical storages can be assessed using MCAanalysis. Hence most credible accident scenarios (MCA) are also considered primarily leaks from tanks, vessels orpipelines.

Leak in the vessel or leak from the flange joints of these connections is possible. The leak through flangefailure is considered from 50% of flange perimeter and accordingly equivalent area is calculated. This areais approximated to hole of 10mm or 10% of pipe diameter. The small bore pipes less than 2” is consideredfull bore leak.

For our analysis we consider leak from pipeline which are at pump discharge, hence it shall be pressurizedand feeding to reactor or storage.

7.10.1 Selection of Initiating Events And ScenariosFollowing event tree is followed for deciding toxic and/or flammable effects:





Based on the inventory of hazardous chemicals and their hazardous properties, following accident scenarios havebeen visualized for the given project.





Table 7-4 Worst Case (WCS) and Most Credible Accident (MCS) Scenarios selected for the study

No Hazardous Material PressureBar g

TemperatureDeg C

EquipmentConsidered Scenario Selected Type of

ScenarioLeak Size

mmReleaseDuration

minsConsequence

1 Methyl Amine Ambient Ambient Drum Drum Failure MCS - - Flammable2 Ethyl Amine Ambient Ambient Drum Drum Failure MCS - - Flammable3 Acetic Acid Ambient Ambient Drum Drum Failure MCS 10 10 Flammable4 Butanol Ambient Ambient Drum Drum Failure MCS - - Flammable5 Ethylene Diamine Ambient Ambient Drum Drum Failure MCS - - Flammable6 Nitromethane Ambient Ambient Drum Drum Failure MCS 10 10 Flammable7 Acetophenone Ambient Ambient Drum Drum Failure MCS - - Flammable8 Butyl Benzene Ambient Ambient Drum Drum Failure MCS - - Flammable/Toxic

9 Toluene 4 Ambient Transfer PumpStorage Tank

Leak from 10mmdia. Hole MCS - - Flammable

10 Cumene Ambient Ambient IBC IBC Failure MCS 10 10 Flammable11 Oleum Ambient Ambient Storage Tank Catastrophic Failure WCS 10 10 Toxic12 Formaldehyde-37% Ambient Ambient Drum Drum Failure MCS - - Toxic13 Formic Acid Ambient Ambient Drum Drum Failure MCS - - Toxic14 Hydrogen Peroxide-50% Ambient Ambient Drum Drum Failure MCS - - Toxic

15 Methanol 4 Ambient Transfer PumpStorage Tank

Leak from 10mmdia. Hole MCS - - Toxic

16 Bromine Ambient Ambient Bottle Bottles Damage MCS 10 10 Toxic

17 Ammonia Gas 11 Ambient Cylinder Leak through 10mmhole MCS 10 10 Toxic

18 Ammonia Solution Ambient Ambient Storage Tank Catastrophic Failure WCS 10 10 Toxic

19 Flammable Hydrocarbon(Butanol) Ambient Ambient Drum Stored Drums

Engulfed in Fire WCS - - Flammable

20 Ammonia Gas Ambient Ambient Vent scrubber Scrubber operationfailure MCS - - Toxic

WCS : Worst Case Scenario MCS : Most Credible Scenario





7.11 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSISHazardous substance on release can cause damage on a large scale in the environment. The extent of damage isdependent upon the nature of the release and the physical state of the material. It is necessary to visualize theconsequences and the damages caused by such releases. The quantification of the damage can be done by meansof various models, which can further be related in terms of injuries and damage to exposed population and buildings.

Software used for consequence analysis for proposed project :ALOHA (AREAL LOCATIONS OF HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERES)

Is part of the CAMEO suite developed by US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), ALOHA® is an atmosphericdispersion model used for evaluating releases of hazardous chemical vapors, including toxic gas clouds, fires, andexplosions. Using input about the release, ALOHA generates a threat zone estimate. A threat zone is the area wherea hazard (such as toxicity, flammability, thermal radiation, or damaging overpressure) is predicted to exceed a user-specified level of concern. Threat zones can also be plotted on maps with MARPLOT to display the location offacilities storing hazardous materials and vulnerable locations (such as hospitals and schools). Specific informationabout these locations can be extracted from CAMEO information modules to help make decisions about the degreeof hazard posed.

In order to assess the damage, the damage criteria have to be first defined.There are three principle types of exposures to hazardous effects

Heat radiation from a jet, pool fire, a flash fire or a BLEVE

Explosion,

Toxic effects, from toxic materials or toxic combustion productsA basis for the weather conditions (Temperature, wind speed etc.) is chosen for input in these models.

7.11.1 Frequencies Estimation:The risk is computed as product of consequence of event and frequency of occurring of the event.As part riskassessment frequency estimation is one of the activity.In literature and published guidelines the frequencies ofcatastrophic failure of various equipments are published. For this assessment the used set of frequencies is takenfrom Dutch Purple book,2008.Also for credible scenarios the frequencies for leaks from equipments or pipelines are available in the same sourceas above. For credible scenario the frequency of leak event is calculated as summation of frequencies of eachelement in the considered vessel.No Item Mode Of Failure Failure Frequency

1 Atmospheric Storage Tanks Catastrophic Failure 10E-9 /yrSignificant Leak 10E-5 /yr

2 Process Pipelines<=50mm Dia Full Bore rupture 8.8 x 10E-7 /yr

Significant Leak 8.8 x 10E-6 /yr>50mm<=150mm Dia Full Bore rupture 2.6 x 10E-7 /yr

Significant Leak 5.3 x 10E-6 /yr<150mm Dia Full Bore rupture 8.8 x 10E-7 /yr

Significant Leak 2.6 x 10E-6 /yr3 Hoses Rupture 3.5 x 10E-2 /yr4 Pressure Vessel Catastrophic Failure 3 x 10E-6 /yr

Significant Leak(6" nozzle) 7 x 10E-6 /yr5 Liquid Line Pipeline Leak 3 x 10E-7 /yr

Fittings Leak 5 x 10E-6 /yr





No Item Mode Of Failure Failure Frequency6 vapor line Leak 3 x 10E-6 /yr7 6" Pipe Leak (1 kg/s) 6x 10E-6 /yr8 3" Pipe Leak (1 kg/s) 6 x 10E-5 /yr9 Flange Leak (1 kg/s) 3 x 10E-4 /yr10 Pump Seal Leak (1 kg/s) 5 x 10E-3 /yr

For warehouse where the drums of chemicals are stored and handled the frequencies are as follows,No Item Mode Of Failure Failure Frequency

1storage of substances inwarehouseswith protection levels 1 and 2

Liquid Spill 1 x 10E-5 Per handling

Fire 8.8 x 10E-4 / yr

2storage of substances inwarehouseswith protection level 3

Liquid Spill 1 x 10E-5 Per handling

Fire 1.8 x 10E-4 / yr

Failure History DataTable 7-5 Failure History dataSl.No.

Item International Data Indian Data

1 Process Controller 2.4 x 10-5 hr-1 3.0 x 10-5 hr-12 Process Controller Valve 2 x 10-6 hr-1 2.4 x 10-5 hr-13 Alarm 2.3 x 10-5 hr-1 4.6 x 10-5 hr-14 Leakage at biggest storage tank 5 x 10-5 yr-1 3.0 x 10-5 yr-15 Leakage pipe line 1 x 10-7 m-1yr-1 3.0 x 10-8 m-1yr-16 Human failure 1 x 10-4 (demand)-1 1.8 x 10-3 (demand)-1

Assumed Failure Rate For The StudyTable 7-6 Assumed failure rate for the studySNo. Item Rupture (yr-1) Leakage (yr-1)1 Pipe lines

<3”3”-15”>15

10-610-7--

10-510-610-8

2 Vessel- pressurized- Atmospheric

5 x 10-61 x 10-5

5 x 10-51 x 10-4

Damage Due To Incident Radiation IntensityTable 7-7 Damage Due To Incident Radiation IntensityIncident RadiationIntensity (kJ/m²s)

Type of Damage

62.0 Spontaneous ignition of wood37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment25 Minimum energy required for ignite wood at infinitely long exposure (non piloted)12.5 Minimum energy required of piloted ignition of wood, melting plastic tubing etc.4.5 Sufficient to cause pain to personnel is unable to reach cover within 20 sec.; however

blistering of skin (1st degree burns) is likely1.6 Will cause no discomfort on long exposure





Physiological Effects Of Threshold Thermal DosesTable 7-8 Physiological Effects Of Threshold Thermal DosesDose Threshold (kJ/m²) Physiological Effect37525012565

Third Degree BurnsSecond Degree BurnsFirst Degree BurnsThreshold of pain, no reddening or blistering of skin caused

1st Degree Burns Involve only epidermis, blister may occur2nd Degree Burns Involve whole of the epidermis over the area of burns plus some portion of

dermis3rd Degree Burns Involve whole of epidermis and dermis. Subcutaneous tissues may also be

damaged

Heat Radiation & Escape TimeTable 7-9 Heat Radiation & Escape TimeRadiation Intensity BTU/hr/ft² Time to Pain Threshold (Seconds)440 (1.39 kW/m²) 60550 (1.6 kW/m²) 40740 (2.33 kW/m²) 30920 (2.9 kW/m²) 161500 (4.7 kW/m²) 92200 (6.93 kW/m²) 63000 (9.5 kW/m²) 53700 (11.66 kW/m²) 46300 (19.9 kW/m²) 2

Tolerable Over Pressure Limits For Various ObjectsTable 7-10 Tolerable Over Pressure Limits For Various ObjectsIncident OverPressure (Bar)

Object

0.02 Schools0.04 Domestic Housing0.05 Public Roads0.07 Ordinary Plant Buildings0.10 Buildings with shatter resistant windows fixed roof tanks containing highly

flammable or toxic materials0.20 Floating roof tanks, other fixed roof tanks, cooling towers, utility areas site roads0.40 Other hazardous plants0.70 Non-hazardous (if occupied) plants. Control room designed for blast resistance.

7.11.2 Assumptions Common for all ScenariosMaximum Temperature Deg.C 41.5Minimum Temperature Deg.C 11.5Maximum Wind speed m/s 11.2Minimum Wind speed m/s 2.1Average Wind speed m/s 3.6 - 5.7Wind Direction From South WestHumidity % 70Ground Roughness Urban or ForestCloud Cover % 50





As minimum wind speed 2.1 is only present at less than 1% of year, for atmospheric stability class 3m/sspeed is selected and accordingly “D” class is default value by ALOHA. But to get more stable weathercondition, this stability class is overridden to “E”. Hence at lower temperature to analyze for more stableatmospheric condition stability class 3E is considered.

For higher temperatures i.e. day time condition the atmospheric stability class is taken as D and wind speedis taken as 6m/s.

The analysis will be done for both cases. For any particular case if other stability class is chosen, it is included in its detail analysis. The transfer of chemicals from storage tanks to process area/reactor is by means of centrifugal pumps. The

discharge pressure of pumps is assumed in range of 4 –7 barg.For calculation, it is assumed that all materialtransfer from tank farm to process area is done when reactor is in depressurized condition. Hence the pumpdischarge pressure is taken as 4 barg.

For credible scenario the leak may be from chemical transfer lines or from pump seals. The leak may be frompump suction piping also. But for conservative results the leak is assumed from discharge piping or seals aspressure will be higher in this case

In case of credible scenario, the release is from 10mm hole and release duration is 10 mins. This timeincludes detection, response and isolation during event. This assumption is based on the DCS controlsystem, emergency shutdown system and leak detection systems are available in the plant and discussionwith plant personnel. Following points considered,

Sufficient indications and Alarms are configured for effective monitoring Interlocks and Emergency Shutdown valves are provided which isolates the required stream through ON/OFF

valves or stops the pump. This time includes detection, response and isolation during event. The discharge through leak is modeled as liquid flow through sharp edged orifice and calculated using

API520 Liquid Discharge equation. For gas services the flow through leak is calculated in ALOHA by modeling leak through pipe with closed off

(i.e. isolated portion).But this will give the rate which will be present only after isolation. The decreasingpressure inside pipe will affect the discharge rate. The rate of discharge before isolation will be at constantpressure and hence will be more than the rate calculated by ALOHA.

All storages at atmospheric pressure and temperature. At respective class atmospheric temperatures, flash point is higher and chemical may not ignite. But to

assess the radiation effect at such situations, the radiation effect is calculated assuming burning is starteddue to other ignition source.

For chemicals having flash point more than 45degC,the effect is analsyed only for class D. For all toxic material release LC50 with reference to hours of exposure and IDLH are taken as the toxic end

points. If LC50 is not available then LD50 values are considered and IDLH values are not available ERPG2values are considered.

For thermal radiation the distances for radiation level 37.5 kw/m2, 4kw/m2 and 1.6kw/m2 are calculated. For vapor cloud explosion the distance for overpressure of 0.5psi is calculated Fire water system comprises of FW network mains, hydrants, monitors throughout the plants.

Specific assumptions are mentioned in the detailed description of each scenario in following sections.The ALOHA text summary output for each scenario is annexed as Annexure -12.





7.11.3 Summarized Table for effects of Consequences7.11.3.1 Toxic End PointsTable 7-11 Toxic End points of Consequence Analysis

No HazardousMaterial

EquipmentConsidered Scenario Selected Material

ReleasedEnd

PointEndpoint

ConcentrationStability

ClassMaximumDistance

MaximumDistanceto IDLH

IDLH distance – within plant,onsite or Offsite

1 Methylamine 200lit Drum Drum Damage 71.4/170 LC50 3500 D (6) 17 122 Offsite – but within estate3500 E(3) 26 188

2 Ethylamine 200lit Drum Drum Damage 68.04/162 LC50 3000 D (6) 14 39 Onsite3000 E(3) 17 49

3 Formaldehyde 200lit Drum Drum Damage 74/200 IDLH 20 D (6) 116 116 Offsite – but within estate20 E(3) 256 256

4 Formic Acid 200lit Drum Drum Damage 242 LC50 6204 D (6) <10 68 Onsite6204 E(3) <10 50

5 Hydrogen Peroxide 200lit Drum Drum Damage 240 LC50(4hr)

2000 mg/m3 D (6) <10 <10 Onsite2000 mg/m3 E(3) <10 <10

6 Oleum Storage Tank Catastrophic Failure 10KL LC50(1hr)

1136 D (6) 70 858ERPG2 Offsite – but within estate

1136 E(3) 25 530ERPG2

7 OleumUnloadingPump &

DischargeLine

Leak through 10mmhole 909 LC50

(1hr)1136 D (6) 36 438

ERPG2 Offsite – but within estate1136 E(3) 14 276

ERPG2

8 AmmoniaSoln(20%) Storage Tank Catastrophic Failure 20KL LC50 7338 D (6) <10 95 Offsite – but within estate7338 E(3) <10 62

9 Ammonia Cylinder Leak through 10mmhole 50 LC50 7338 D (6) <10 63 Onsite7338 E(3) <10 69

10 Bromine Bottles Package of BottlesDamage 180 LC50 435 D (6) 17 241 Offsite – but within estate435 E(3) 13 220

11 Ammonia Stack Ammonia Scrubberfailure LC50 7338 D (6) <10 <10 Within plant7338 E(3) <10 <10





7.11.3.2 Flammable EndpointsTable 7-12 Flammable End points of Consequence Analysis


EquipmentConsidered

ScenarioSelected

MaterialReleased

StabiltyClass

FlashFire

EnvelopeDiameterLOC(60%of LEL)

ExplosionOverpressureDistance for

0.5psi0.05bar

pool/JetFire

BurnDuration

Heat Iradiation Maximumdistances,

m

Heat IradiationMaximum

distance – withinplant, onsite or

Offsitekg m m mins 37.5Kw/m2 4Kw/m2 1.6Kw/m2

1 Methylamine 200 Lit Drum DrumFailure 71.4/170

D (6) <10 - PoolFire 3 <10 <10 12 Within plant

E(3) <10 - PoolFire 3 <10 <10 14

2 Ethylamine 200 Lit Drum DrumFailure 68.04/162

D (6) <10 - PoolFire 3 <10 12 16 Within plant

E(3) <10 - PoolFire 3 <10 13 18

3 Acetic acid 200 Lit Drum DrumFailure 205 D (6) <10 - Pool

Fire 7 <10 <10 <10 Within plant

E(3) Material is solid at atmospheric temperature

4 Butanol 200 Lit Drum DrumFailure 158


E(3) <10 - PoolFire Material Below flash point (68degC)

5 EthyleneDiamine 200 Lit Drum Drum

Failure 178D (6) <10 - Pool

Fire 5 <10 11 15 Within plant


6 Nitromethane 200 Lit Drum DrumFailure 221

D (6) <10 - PoolFire 12 <10 <10 <10 Within plant


7 Acetophenone 200 Lit Drum DrumFailure 202 D (6) <10 - Pool


E(3) Material is solid at atmospheric temperature






EquipmentConsidered

ScenarioSelected

MaterialReleased

StabiltyClass

FlashFire

EnvelopeDiameterLOC(60%of LEL)

ExplosionOverpressureDistance for

0.5psi0.05bar

pool/JetFire

BurnDuration

Heat Iradiation Maximumdistances,

m

Heat IradiationMaximum

distance – withinplant, onsite or

Offsitekg m m mins 37.5Kw/m2 4Kw/m2 1.6Kw/m2

8 Butyl Benzene 200 Lit Drum DrumFailure 169



9 Cumene IBC(1000Lits) IBCFailure 845



10 MethanolTransferPump &

DischargeLine

Leakfrom

10mmdia. Hole

1214D (6) <10 - Pool


E(3) <10 - PoolFire 20 <10 13 17

10 TolueneTransferPump &

DischargeLine

Leakfrom

10mmdia. Hole

1265D (6) <10 - Pool

Fire 4 14 35 49 Onsite

E(3) <10 - PoolFire 5 10 35 52

11Flammable

Raw Materials(Butanol)

FlammableDrums

Storage Area

MajorFire

engulfingdrum

storagearea

231000

D (6) - - PoolFire 55 33 75 105 Offsite – but within

estate

E(3) - - PoolFire Analysed for class D only as it is severe

Note : ‘Material Released’ is the total material discharged to atmosphere. In case of Liquid Pool, from this released material some of the material will be evaporated and dispersed indirection of wind. This evaporated quantity will be less than total quantity depends on the properties of material spilled and atmospheric conditions.Detailed output of aloha and mapping of consequences on google earth image of site plan is attached as annexure – 12.





7.11.4 Inference of Consequence analysis

Within the plant Onsite OffsiteChemical scenario Consequence Chemical scenario Consequence Chemical scenario ConsequenceAmmonia Failure of scrubber

operationToxic Ethylamine 200 Lit Drum failure Toxic Methylamine 200 Lit Drum failure Toxic

Methylamine 200 Lit Drum failure Pool fire Formic Acid 200 Lit Drum failure Toxic Formaldehyde 200 Lit Drum failure Toxic

Ethylamine 200 Lit Drum failure Pool fire HydrogenPeroxide 200 Lit Drum failure Toxic Oleum Catastrophic failure of

storage tankToxic

Acetic acid200 Lit Drum failure Pool fire

Ammonia Leak in cylinder through10mm hole

Toxic Oleum Leak in Unloading Pump& Discharge Line through10mm hole

Toxic

Butanol200 Lit Drum failure Pool fire

TolueneLeak in Transfer Pump &Discharge Line through10mm hole

Pool fire AmmoniaSoln(20%)

Catastrophic failure ofstorage tank

Toxic

EthyleneDiamine

200 Lit Drum failure Pool fire Bromine Package of BottlesDamage

Toxic

Nitromethane200 Lit Drum failure Pool fire Flammable Raw

Materials(Butanol)

Major Fire engulfing drumstorage area

Pool fire

Acetophenone 200 Lit Drum failure Pool fireButyl Benzene 200 Lit Drum failure Pool fire

Cumene IBC(1000Lits) failure Pool fire

MethanolLeak in TransferPump & DischargeLine through 10mmhole

Pool fire





Toxic release within the plantAmmonia can be released in the plant if scrubber fails to operates or operates inefficiently due to malfunction.

Pool fires emitting heat radiation within the plantMost of the flammable raw materials are stored and handled in 200 lits drums and drum failure during handling isanalysed as most credible scenario. Heat radiations from pool fires from drum and IBC failures shall be limited toplant. Leakage of methanol from Transfer Pump & Discharge Line through 10mm hole shall also result inpoolfire with heat radiation within the plant.

Toxic release within the site (onsite)200 lits Drum failures of Ethyl amine, Formic acid and Hydrogen peroxide shall result in onsite emergency as theIDLH (Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health) distances fall outside the storage area but within the site. Theeffect shall be toxic. Leakage of ammonia from cylinder may also cause onsite emergency with toxicconsequence.

Pool fires emitting heat radiation within the site (onsite)Toluene leak from Transfer Pump & Discharge Line may cause poolfire radiating heat beyond plant area butlimited within site resulting onsite emergency.

Toxic release outside the plant (offsite)Drum failures of Methyl amine and formaldehyde have potential for offsite emergency for toxic effects.Oleum release by both catastrophic failure of storage tank as well as leakage from Unloading Pump & DischargeLine through 10mm hole shall result in offsite emergency for toxic effects.Catastrophic failure of storage tank of ammonia and that of Package of Bottles of bromine both shall causeoffsite emergency for toxic effects.

Poolfires emitting heat radiation outside the plant (offsite) The scenario of drum storage area engulfed in fire is analysed. The frequency of this scenario is rare in life

span of plant. But it is analysed to ensure the safety systems of the plant. The heat radiation from resultingpool fire shall go beyond the site and calls for offsite emergency action.

7.11.5 Risk to Individuals from a Major Release The risk to health to an individual at a specific point in the direction of the plume or heat radiation is

dependent on a number of factors, the most important being:o the direction of the wind when the release takes place; ando mitigating factors, such as whether the individual might be indoors or out of doors.

In the case of the wind direction, the plume width may be represented by the sector of a circle having anincluded angle of 15o. In such a case, on the basis that wind direction arise, it is possible to approximatethat an individual present in a single location for one year may be exposed for only 15/360ths of that year, or4 x 10-2

In reality, it is unlikely that a person would be present at any one location in the open air for 100% of theyear. Allowing for periods at work or indoors, a risk reduction factor of 3 is reasonably conservative.(threeshift operation is considered)

Also the fatality % due to radiation is assumed at 50%.This assumption is based on the reposne time andthe duration of fire in our case.

The overall consequence of the mitigation due to wind direction and indoor/outdoor location would be theproduct of these three factors, namely 1.33 x 10-2.

The overall chance of an individual being affected at a specific location by exposure to the toxic gases wouldbe as indicated in following table. From the table it is clear that for catastrophic failure the distances for 50%fatality is more than MCS scenarios.





No HazardousChemical

Incident/DifferentCases

ConsequenceEffectOverpressure(psig)/Radiation(kw/m2)

Radiation(kw/m2) /Overpressure(psi) for 50%fatality

Distanceto 50%fatality(m)

FrequencyofOccurance

per yr

No ofVessels/Reactors(No of ProbableSources)

FrequencyofOccurance

per yr

ConsequenceMitigationfactor

Frequency ofOccurance

peryr

(RepresentingIndividual

Risk)

CummulativeIndividual

Risk(Areawise)

1 Butanol Drum Failure Radiation(Pool Fire) 14 <10 1.00E-05 170.00 1.70E-03 1.33E-02 2.26E-05 2.26E-05

2 Methanol Pipeline/TubingLeakage

Radiation(Pool Fire) 14 <10 1.00E-06 15.00 1.50E-05 1.33E-02 2.00E-07 2.28E-05

3 Cumene IBC Failure Overpressure 14 14 8.80E-04 10.00 8.80E-03 1.33E-02 1.17E-04 1.40E-04

4 Toluene Pipeline/TubingLeakage

Radiation(Jet Fire) 14 23 1.00E-06 15.00 1.50E-05 1.33E-02 2.00E-07 1.40E-04

5 Drum StorageFire (Butanol)

Catastrophic Fire Radiation(Pool Fire) 14 49 1.00E-08 1.00 1.00E-08 1.33E-02 1.33E-10 1.40E-04

No HazardousChemical

Incident/Different Cases DownwindDistance for

LC50m

Frequency ofOccurence

per yr

No ofJoints/Flanges/

Valves(No of Probableleak locations)


per yr

ConsequenceMitigation factor


per yr(RepresentingIndividual Risk)

CummulativeIndividual Risk

(Areawise)

1 Ammonia Pipeline/Tubing Leakage <10 5.00E-06 10.00 5.00E-05 1.33E-02 6.65E-07 6.65E-072 Ethyl Amine Drum Failure 17 1.00E-06 70.00 7.00E-05 1.33E-02 9.31E-07 9.31E-073 Methyl Amine Drum Failure 26 1.00E-06 70.00 7.00E-05 1.33E-02 9.31E-07 1.60E-06

Bromine Bottles Pack Spillage 17 1.00E-06 1722.00 1.72E-03 1.33E-02 2.29E-05 2.38E-054 Oleum (SO3) Pipeline Leakage 36 3.00E-08 100.00 3.00E-06 1.33E-02 3.99E-08 1.64E-065 Oleum (SO3) Catastrophic Failure of

Storage Tank70 3.00E-05 1.00 3.00E-05 1.33E-02 3.99E-07 2.03E-06





7.12 RECOMMENDATIONS7.12.1 Major scenarios

The plants are handling highly toxic materials like methyl amine, ethyl amine, oleum, bromine andAmmonia etc. and flammables like toluene, Xylene etc. The gas detection will provide early informationof the leak and it will provide some time to take corrective action (isolation, stopping of pump etc) toavoid the incident. Consider placing gas detectors at strategic places in storage area, boundary area andscrubber area ( on the top of building)

Gas detectors for SO3 and NH3 should be placed in storage are. SO3 detectors can be used to getalarm for oleum or sulfuric acid leakage.

The underground storage tanks should be fitted with breather valve to facilitate in & out breathing duringpumping out & filling operation.

Spiral wound gaskets are recommended for hydrocarbon lines. Screwed fittings should not be usedexcept for stainless steel instrumentation.

Fire water network providing hydrants and monitors should be around reactor building/ process area.. The hydrocarbon solvents are handled in the reactors at large quantities (>1.5MT).hence fireproofing

requirement of structure and equipment supports needs to be analysed and fireproofing to be providedaccordingly.

As the operation involves handling of hydrocarbon solvents like toluene, Xylene, butanol, the processarea should be classified area for selection of electrical equipments and instruments.

The most of the raw material are handled in drum or plastic bags. The storage of flammable materialsshould be segregated and marked. The storage area of flammable should be adequately ventilated.

The construction and fabrication should be as per standard codes and practices (ASME /ANSI / IS etc)as the failure frequencies will be valid for such construction. If there is some deviation then thefrequencies may increase.

Small Release of flammable solvents / chemicals (Most Credible scenarios) Small flammable solvent fires can be extinguished with extinguishing powder. Spiral wound gaskets are recommended for hydrocarbon lines. Screwed fittings should not be used

except for stainless steel instrumentation. All routine operation and maintenance activities should be identified and standard procedures for all such

activities should be prepared. All maintenance activities “permit to work” system should be followed. On long pipelines of solvents, thermal relief valves should be fitted, the relief valve must vent to a safe

location, e.g. the storage tank as this is liquid relief.

7.12.2 General The plant handles flammable materials. The handling of these materials requires control of spark, ignition

source, and open flame. This is ensured by selecting equipments as per Hazardous area classificationanalysis. Ensure that all electrical installations and instruments are as per hazardous areaclassification(ref IS 5571 & 5572)

Critical switches and alarms shall always be kept online especially in reactor area. Provide training for employees in the procedures established for their operating and maintenance

functions. Also a refresher training program at specific intervals is to be prepared to keep operatorsupdated.

Shut off and isolation valves shall be easily approachable in emergencies A wind direction pointer shall also be installed at cavern site so that in an emergency the wind direction

can be directly seen and downwind population cautioned The vegetation in underground storage area and the area around above ground storage area may cause

fire in summer conditions.Hence the area should be either cleaned of vegetation or graveled. Smoking shall be prohibited in designated locations. Work likely to involve flame or sparks, such as,

welding or burning, shall be performed only after the area is checked for no presence of flammablematerial and other safety arrangement as required.




Siddhi Green Excellence Pvt. Ltd., Ankleshwar 7 of 270

A proper training shall be given to the staff to handle any emergency situation and use of PPE during thework and emergency.

Self-Contained Breathing apparatus (SCBA) shall be well maintained for emergency handling. Personal protective equipments to be provided to all the employees related to the type of work and

hazard associated Mutual aid from neighbouring industries to be made available whenever need arises. To check preparedness of workers for emergency control, mock drills on regular basis and disaster drills

as per factory inspectorate guidelines to be conducted.

7.13 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLANThe proponent YCIPL is an established group and already the existing unit is already carrying out productionactivities with a good record of safety management. The proposed new plants shall be more of a replica of theexisting w.r.t production, manufacturing processes, utilities, chemical inventory, process control, safety aspects etc.and with better plant technology.

There shall be inbuilt safety in the plant through monitoring instruments and alarm system. Also the technologyadopted is the most proven technology already implemented in similar units of the group. The plant design andlayout aspects also comply with the applicable regulations and requirements of industrial ergonomics. Thus, therisks associated with the project are having low probability and severity.

YCIPL has developed and put in practice DMP in compliance to the requirements of The Chemical Accidents Rulesand Factories Act. The DMP includes emergency preparedness plan, emergency response team, emergencycommunication, emergency responsibilities, emergency facilities, and emergency actions.

The plan includes an OFF site emergency plan for the concerned government authority giving details about steps tobe taken to inform related Government agencies, Medical Centers, Rescue teams and other local agencies, in anevent where the emergency poses danger to surrounding area requiring evacuation.

The abstracts of the plan are annexed as Annexure -35.

EIA Consultant has reviewed the latest plan for suitability and adequacy w.r.t proposed expansion. The reviewpoints are mentioned herewith.

7.13.1 Objectives of DMP

As per latest plan - Any additions or modifications required for expansion -To localise the emergency and thereafter, totallyeliminate it.To minimise the effects of the emergency on human,environment and property.

Attainment of these objectives calls for promptmobilisation of all available resources and activatingcounter-emergency procedures by all employees.

Following objectives may be added :- To inform Employees, the general public and the authority

/ risk assessed, safe guard provided. Residual risk if anyand the role to be played by them in event of emergency.

To secure the safe rehabilitation of affected area and torestore normalcy.

To ensure safety of the works before personnel re-enterand resume work.

7.13.2 Components of DMPAs per latest plan - Any additions or modifications required for expansion -

Emergency Organization - structure, dutiesand responsibilities of authorities responseteam, their coordinators

Communication Key Personnel Emergency Action

No additions or modifications are required





Facilities Hazard Assessment Identification of Emergencies and action Post emergency action Training

7.13.3 Emergency ResponseAs per latest plan - Any additions or modifications required for expansion -

Written procedures for controlling differenttypes of emergencies

Training of workforce for procedures andindividual roles and responsibilities

Availability of emergency response equipmentwith location and quantity and incharge

Additions for new product manufacturing sections and storagesshall be made inline with the results of consequence analysisand other risk assessment studies carried out by themanagement as per requirement

Following points shall be kept in mind while preparing theprocedures :

- The exposure of workers to be limited as much as possibleduring the operation

- Contaminated areas should be cleaned and, if necessarydisinfected

- Limited impact on the environment at the extent possible.

Levels of Emergency

As per latest plan - Any additions or modifications required for expansion -Siren Codesare known toconcerned personsbut not mentionedclearly in the plan.

Emergency siren codes should be defined as under :Sr. Sirens Indicates Authority1. 30 second Continuous On site Emergency (alert siren) Incident controller2. 1 minute Continuous Emergency Controlled (all clear) Site controller3. 90 second interrupted Evacuation siren Incident controller4. 2 minute Continuous Off site emergeny siren Site controller

Note: 1) emergency siren to be sounded only if required2) all employees in areas other than affected to continue work unless disaster siren is blown.3) no emergency organization member will leave the emergency spot unless `all clear’ siren

blown.The emergency siren should be tested every week on a fixed day and time

Emergency Communication (Available system at YCIPL)FOUR LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS

Sr. No. Communication to & by equipment During General Shift After general shift1 Internal communication (by phone & P.A. System) Concerned plant staff Concerned plant staff2 Neighboring factories and public in vicinity by

phone, messenger & PA system of fire tender)Security telephone operatorofficer P & A

Security officer

3 Key personnel available inside & outside ( byexternal phone)

Telephone operator otherADMN. Employee

Duty staff officer of other plant

4 Outside emergency services and authorities ( byexternal phones)

Telephone operator otheradministration employee

Officer of other plant

The communication system beginning with raising the alarm,declaring the major emergency and procedure to make itknown to others shall include the following :

Following system of communication is formulated at siteAssembly points is designated Near Main Gate

ECC is also designated at Admin office near main gate andequipped with required items as per list. ECC in charge asidentified for individual ECC will maintain it.

Declaring the major emergency Emergency Siren Code Information And Warning Safe Assembly Points Declaration Of Emergency





Emergency Management TeamThe following emergency management executive/personnel are required to play stellar role in combating theemergency.

1. Site Main Controller2. Incident Controller (Manager (Oprns.) /manager (Maintenance))3. Deputy Incident Controllers (Deputy Manager / Asst. Manager)4. Essential Workers5. Key Personnel6. Plant Supervisor/Operator7. Communication Controller/Telephone Operator8. Personnel Officer9. Security Officer10. Safety Officer

The plan designates all positions and also defines the roles and responsibilities of Site Controller, Incident Controllerand other key personnel for emergency control. No additions or changes are required. The designations for the newplants shall be made and added to the plan.

Controlling emergencyThe existing DMP includes the following :

Onsite action and emergency control procedures based on consequence analysis results Evacuation & Transportation Safe Close-Down Use Of Mutual Aid Use Of External Authorities Medical Treatment Accounting for personnel Access to Records Rehabilitation Mitigation of Environmental Impact during emergency for -

Fire, Explosion Chemical Spillage Mitigation of Environmental Impact during emergency for -Fire, Explosion and Chemical Spillage

All above components need to be amended to include all new plant sections and new chemicals handled in them.

7 risk assessment & disaster management...

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