25264217-climate-change-and-vulnerability-a-nepalese-scenario (2)

Nepal Climate Vulnerability Study Team (NCVST)December 2009

Climate Change Induced Uncertainties andNepal's Development Predicaments

VULNERABILITY

VULNERABLEThrough theEyes of the

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Climate Change InducedUncertainties and Nepal's Development Predicaments

Climate Change Induced Uncertainties andNepal's Development Predicaments

Nepal Climate Vulnerability Study Team (NCVST)December 2009

VULNERABILITY

VULNERABLEThrough theEyes of the

© Copyright, ISET-N and ISET 2009Reasonable amount of text from this report can be quoted providedthe source is acknowledged and ISET-N and ISET informed.

ISBN: 978-9937-2-1828-3

Published byInstitute for Social and Environmental Transition-Nepal (ISET-N)GPO Box: 3971; Tel: 977-1-4720667, 4720744; Fax: 977-1-5542354E-mail: [email protected]; andInstitute for Social and Environmental Transition (ISET) 948 NorthStreet, Ste. 9, Boulder, CO 80304, USATel: 720-564-0650, Fax: 720-564-0653, www.i-s-e-t.org

2nd reprint with some improvements and corrections.

DisclaimerThis report was prepared for the Kathmandu to Copenhagen 2009: TheWay Forward for Nepal conference in Kathmandu on 2nd September2009. Its primary purpose is to bring the voices from the grassroots tothe fore, to assemble together the knowns and the unknowns onclimate change in the Nepal Himalaya, and to explore potentialdirections for future research as well as adaptive development activities.As an ongoing research initiative, its information range is far fromexhaustive, and its conclusions only exploratory and tentative. Toimprove and refine future research and development initiatives, NepalClimate Vulnerability Study Team (NCVST) actively solicits commentson this report, which should be sent to: [email protected];[email protected]

Citation as: NCVST (2009) Vulnerability Through the Eyes ofVulnerable: Climate Change Induced Uncertainties and Nepal’sDevelopment Predicaments, Institute for Social and EnvironmentalTransition-Nepal (ISET-N, Kathmandu) and Institute for Social andEnvironmental Transition (ISET, Boulder, Colorado) for Nepal ClimateVulnerability Study Team (NCVST) Kathmandu.

Layout Design: Digiscan Pre-press, Naxal, Kathmandu

Cover Photo by: Ajaya Dixit, Saving Assets in SunsariNepal Climate Vulnerability Study Team (NCVST)

NEPAL CLIMATEVULNERABILITY STUDYTEAM (NCVST)

ISET-NepalAjaya DixitDipak GyawaliMadhukar UpadhyaAnil Pokhrel

ISETFawad KhanDr Sarah Opitz-StapletonDr Marcus Moench

SCHOOL OF GEOGRAPHY AND ENVIRONMENTUNIVERSITY OF OXFORDDr Mark NewGil LizcanoCarol McSweeneyMuhammad Rahiz

PRACTICAL ACTION NepalGehendra GurungDr Ahsan Uddin Ahmed, CGC BangladeshKeshav Sharma

CHAPTER 1: Climate Conundrum 1

CHAPTER 2: Mining Climate Change Lessons from Signature Events 7The 1998 Rohini River and other Tarai floods 82008 Koshi embankment breach 92008 Flooding in Far-West Nepal 131993 Mid-mountain cloudbursts and floods 14Recent glacial lake outburst floods 192008/2009 Winter drought 222009 Forest fires 232009 Diarrhoea epidemic in the mid-western hills 26Conclusion 30

CHAPTER 3: A Toad’s Eye View: Vulnerability Throughthe Eyes of the Vulnerable 31National consultation among experts 34Central region consultation in Kathmandu 35Narayani River region consultation in Pokhara 36Karnali River region consultation in Nepalgunj 38Sapta Koshi River region consultation in Biratnagar 40General learning 43

CHAPTER 4: Climate Change Projections for Nepal 45Climate of Nepal 46Limitations of climate models 47Climate change projections for Nepal 51Summary of projections from GCMs for Nepal 51Summary climate change projections from RCMs for Nepal 53

CHAPTER 5: The Socio-economic Scenario for Compensating Adaptation 67The Nepali household 68Impacts 68Adaptation strategies 72Adaptation to climate change 75Energy for adaptation 77Conclusions 84

CHAPTER 6: Transiting Forward along Resilient Pathways 87Key issues 88Wicked problem, uncomfortable knowledge and clumsy solution 94

Bibliographical References 96

CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND BOXES

TABLES

Table 2.1: Damage caused by the 2008 flooding in Far-West Nepal 13Table 2.2: Human and livestock damage caused by the 1993 mid-hill flooding 15Table 2.3: Reduction in storage capacity 18Table 2.4: Numbers of health-related institutions in Jajarkot District 27Table 2.5: Water supply service levels 28Table 2.6: Drinking water and sanitation coverage by region 28Table 2.7: Drinking water and sanitation coverage by development region 28Table 2.8: Condition of coverage according to WUMP 29Table 3.1: Summary matrix of Sapta Koshi consultation 37Table 3.2: Summary matrix of Narayani River consultations 39Table 3.3: Summary matrix of Karnali Region consultation 41Table 4.1: GCMs used in AR4 that reasonably hindcast features of the Indian summer monsoon 50Table 4.2: GCMs used to prepare climate projections for Nepal 51Table 4.3: RCMs used to prepare climate projections for Nepal 52Table 4.4: Change in mean temperature from GCM projections. 56Table 4.5: Change in frequency of hot days from GCM projections. 56Table 4.6: Change in frequency of hot nights 56Table 4.7: Change in monthly precipitation 59Table 4.8: Change in precipitation as heavy events 59Table 4.9: Change in maximum 1-day rainfall 59Table 4.10: Change in maximum 5-day rainfall 60Table 5.1: Average monthly household income by sector 69Table 5.2: Projected damage to an average Nepali family (in NPR) 70Table 5.3: Impact of forest fires 71Table 5.4: Labour force in the formal and informal sectors 73Table 5.5: Actual and targeted sectoral growth rates of GDP 75Table 5.7: Comparison of approaches to energy, growth, resilience and climate-proofing 84

FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Location of signature events 7Figure 2.2: Rohini river system 8Figure 2.3: Koshi embankment breach 10Figure 2.4 a: Rainfall variation in Far-West Nepal 14Figure 2.4 b: 2008 Flood affected region of the Far-West Nepal 14Figure 2.5: 1993 cloudburst and 24 hour rainfall recorded at Tistung 15Figure 2.6: Impact of 1993 cloudburst 16Figure 2.7: Temporary landslide dam on a river (Bishyari) 18Figure 2.8: Glacial lake outburst flood 20Figure 2.9: Comparison of average winter (November to February) rainfall at eight selected weather stations 21Figure 2.10 a: Food sufficiency status of districts 2008 22Figure 2.10 b: Extent of drought in Nepal 23

Figure 2.11: Satellite Image of forest fire in Nepal 24Figure 2.12: Jajarkot district and the locations of infrastructure 27Figure 3.1: Transects in three regions 32Figure 3.2: Rajbiraj-Sagarmatha, Bhairawa-Mustang and Nepalgunj-Jumla transects 33Figure 4.1: Regions of Nepal, 47Figure 4.2: Coarse resolution annual precipitation distribution 48Figure 4.3: Coarse resolution (0.25 x 0.25 ° latitude/longitude) annual precipitation distribution

from the TRMM satellite 49Figure 4.4: Observed and projected changes in mean temperature over Nepal 54Figure 4.5: Spatial pattern of GCM projections of mean temperature over Nepal and surrounding areas,for the A2

scenario, for three 10-year periods in the future. 55Figure 4.6: Observed and projected changes in mean precipitation over Nepal 57Figure 4.7: Spatial pattern of GCM projections of mean precipitation change over Nepal and surrounding areas, for

the A2 scenario, over three 10-year periods in the future. 58Figure 4.8: Projected changes in winter and monsoon mean temperature and precipitation from the Reg

CM3-ECHAM5 simulations, A2 emissions scenario 60Figure 4.9: Projected changes in winter and monsoon mean temperature and precipitation from the

PRECIS-HadCM3 simulations, A2 emissions scenario 61Figure 4.10: Projected changes in winter and monsoon mean temperature and precipitation

from the PRECIS-HadCM3 simulations, A2 emissions scenario 62Figure 4.11: Spatial pattern of GCM projections of change in frequency of "hot days"relative to

hot day frequency over 1970-1999,under the A2 emission scenario. 63Figure 4.12: Spatial pattern of GCM projections of change in frequency of "hot nights"relative to

hot night frequency over 1970-1999,under the A2 emission scenario. 63Figure 4.13: Spatial pattern of GCM projections of change in proportion of precipitation falling in heavy events,

relative to 1970-1999, underthe A2 emission scenario. 64Figure 4.14: Spatial pattern of GCM projections of change in maximum 1-day rainfall, relative to 1970-1999,

under the A2 emission scenario. 64Figure 4.15: Spatial pattern of GCM projections of change in maximum 5-day rainfall, relative to 1

970-1999, under the A2 emission scenario. 65Figure 5.1: Impact of climate change on flood damages 70Figure 5.2: Household consumption patterns 74Figure 5.3: Sectoral contribution to GDP 75Figure 5.4: Nepal energy mix by source 78Figure 5.5: Trends in Nepal’s remittance Flow 83

BOXES

Box 2.1: Threat to biodiversity 25Box 2.2: Drinking water services 28Box 5.1: Kagbeni wind turbine experiment 80Box 5.2: Remittances 83Box 6.1: Bhattedanda milkway 90

BPC : Butwal Power Company

CDM : Clean Development Mechanism

DHM : Department of Hydrology and Meteorology

DSCWM : Department of Soil Conservation and Watershed Management

DST : Desakota Study Team

GCM : General Circulation Model/Global Climate Model

GDP : Gross Domestic Product

GLOF : Glacial Lake Outburst Flood

HDI : Human Development Index

ICIMOD : International Center for Integrated Mountain Development

IDDWSS : International Decade for Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation

INPS : Integrated Nepal Power System

IPCC : Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

ISET : Institute for Social and Environmental Transition

ISET-N : Institute for Social and Environmental Transition-Nepal

ISM : Information System Management

NEA : Nepal Electricity Authority

NEWAH : Nepal Water for Health

NRCS : Nepal Red Cross Society

NSET : National Society for Earthquake Technology-Nepal

NTFP : Non -Timber Forest Product

NWCF : Nepal Water Conservation Foundation

PAN : Practical Action Nepal

RCM : Regional Circulation Model/Regional Climate Model

REDD : Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Degradation

SAM : South Asian Monsoon System

UNFCCC : United Nation Forum for Climate Change Convention

VDC : Village Development Committee

WARM-P : Water Resource Management Programme

WUMP : Water Users Master Plan

ACRONYMS

NCVST would like to acknowledge all the research associatesand assistants across the region who made this report possible.We are also deeply indebted to the participants of the fiveconsultation meetings held across Nepal, from east to west,and from High Himal to Tarai. The team would like toacknowledge the support of Clare Shakya, Simon Lucas, BimalRegmi of DfID Nepal and Simon Anderson of IIED. We alsothank Achyut Luitel of Practical Action Nepal, Tapas Neupane,and Moushami Shrestha of Practical Action Consulting.Kanchan Mani Dixit, Deeb Raj Rai, Madhav P. Thakur of NepalWater Conservation Foundation, Aarjan Dixit of WorldResources Institute and Perry Thapa who provided input toearlier drafts of the report. Thanks also to Elisabeth Casperi ofISET who provided copy editing support to the second reprintof this report and to Sonam Bennett-Vasseux for logisticalsupport.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

1...................................CLIMATE CONUNDRUM

CLIMATECONUNDRUM

1C

HAPTER

In its fourth assessment report, the IntergovernmentalPanel on Climate Change (IPCC) depicts the

Hindukush-Himalaya, including Nepal, as a “whitespot,” a region about which scientific information onclimate change is limited or lacking altogether. Giventhat the rise of this mountain range, the world’s highest,has had a considerable influence on global windcirculation and climate dynamics, this knowledge gapdoes not speak well of our ability to understand climatechange or its potential impact. Indeed, research byHodges (2006) and his team on the Himalayan-Tibetanorogenic system now indicate that there is a positivefeedback between heavy monsoon and geologicaldeformational processes.1 Plate tectonics pushed up theHimalaya, which block the summer monsoon forcingit to dump enormous amount of rain, which in turnwashes away millions of tons of sediment from thesouthern range front between the Main Central Thrustand the South Tibetan Fault behind the HimalayanCrestline. Studies have placed sediment yield from theGanges basin alone at 430 to 729 million tons per yearat Farakka (Mallik and Bandyopadhyay, 2004). Tocounterbalance this mass loss, the weight of the Tibetanplateau forces the fluid lower crust of Tibet to extrudesouth to the range front causing the on-going uplift ofthe Himalaya. This erosion-extrusion process has been

going on since Early Miocene epoch some 20 millionyears ago, with a force incomparably greater than anythat human activity could undertake.

Besides its significance for influencing global climateand in the formation of the fertile Indo-Ganga plains,the Hindukush-Himalayan region is the headwaters ofmany major rivers in Asia, rivers which support the livesand livelihoods of almost a billion people as well as itsunique reservoir of biodiversity. If climate change alterssnow and ice cover in the Himalaya, leads to morefrequent floods and droughts, or catalyses the spread ofdisease vectors, the regional and even globalimplications are enormous for fundamental humanendeavours ranging from poverty alleviation toenvironmental sustainability and even to humansecurity. For this reason, improving our understandingof the impacts of climate change on the Himalaya andidentifying potential adaptive response is essential notjust for Central, South and South-East Asians but forthe entire world.

Exploring these multi-faceted implications with newknowledge is particularly crucial to Nepal since it formsthe southern face of the central Himalaya and since itsvery low development indicators render its population

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VULNERABILITY THROUGH THE EYESOF THE VULNERABLE

particularly vulnerable to climate change. This reportis a first attempt to synthesise existing scientific andsocio-economic information on the likely impacts ofclimate change in the Nepal Himalaya and to assess thecomplex patterns of vulnerability such changes willexpose its citizens to. It has three goals:

1. To pinpoint key areas where improvements in basicclimate-related data and the capacity to analyse itcan strengthen Nepal’s capacity to understand theongoing processes of change;

2. To identify likely impacts of climate change in theregion and their economic consequences; and

3. To outline potential strategies for responding oradapting to the impacts of climate change thataddress the needs of vulnerable populations and/orprotect critical national forests, biodiversity, energyand other resources.

Existing information on climate change in the NepalHimalaya suggests that the key impacts are likely toinclude the following.

1. Significant warming, particularly at higherelevations, leading to reductions in snow and icecoverage;

2. Increases in climatic variability and the frequencyof extreme events, including floods and droughts;and

3. An overall increase in regional precipitation duringthe wet season but decrease in precipitation in themiddle hills.

These trends suggest that recent extreme events mayform the staple of future blueprint of climate changeon the region. For this reason, in its assessment of thecomplex pattern of vulnerabilities in Nepal which could

be exacerbated by climate change, this study begins byreflecting on the impact of recent “signature events” -extreme floods, droughts and diseases that have causedgrievous harm to local populations. Without morescientific investigation, it is impossible to assert thatclimate change was the direct cause of these disasters;but their consequences do suggest what may happen ifindeed the impact of climate change, as is widelypredicted, includes an increase in the frequency andintensity of floods and droughts as wells as shortagesof petroleum products, spikes in the price of food anddisease epidemics.

The eight signature events selected for analysis aremostly water-related disasters since climate change isanticipated to have a particular impact on thehydrologic systems of the region. In analysing them,our analysis pays particular attention to the manner inwhich climate change is expected to exacerbate thevulnerabilities of all groups, including the alreadymarginalised populations. The following events areconsidered in detail:

1. The 1998 Rohini River and other Tarai floods;2. The 2008 Koshi embankment breach;3. The 2008 floods in Far-West Nepal;4. The 1993 mid-mountain cloudbursts and floods5. Recent glacial lake outburst floods;6. The 2008/2009 winter drought;7. The 2009 forest fires across the Himalayan region;

and8. The 2009 diarrohea epidemic in the mid-western

hills.

All of these events caused major harm to localpopulations consistent with the predicted impactsassociated with existing climate change scenarios for


the region. While many of the impacts are localised,the winter drought and the famine it fosters almostdraws attention to the fact that far-off climate-relatedevents such as hikes in the price of oil and a surge inthe demand for bio-fuel can become unforeseendisasters even for communities deep in the ruralhinterlands of the Himalaya. Though Nepal and Nepaliscontribute very little to global climate change throughthe emission of greenhouse gases, they and theirdevelopment endeavours are victims of unbridledemissions elsewhere. The impact of the Himalayanforest fires that occurred in the winter and spring of2009 may have major global implications of anothertype: it will threaten the use of forests for carbonsequestration. Reforestation, such as is seen in Nepal’sglobally-renowned community forestry programme, iscurrently being promoted as a major global strategy forreducing greenhouse gas, but if climate variability andthe increased frequency of drought conditions in themiddle hills lead to increases in the frequency of forestfires, this carbon-banking strategy could quite literallybackfire.

This report is based on a relatively rapidly implementedbut carefully structured set of activities that include:

1. A review of the existing data and information onthe climate system in the Himalaya and theimpacts of climate change in the region;

2. An analysis of key signature events that, althoughthey cannot, at this early stage of scientificinvestigation, be directly attributed to climatechange, are consistent with existing projections offuture effects;

3. Detailed consultations with rural and urbancommunities in eastern, central and western areasof Nepal across ecosystems ranging from the lower

Tarai (plains) to the high Himalaya about theirexperiences with, and observations and perceptionsof climate change;

4. An analysis of the economic consequences of theabove eight signature events; and

5. The production of new downscaled climatescenarios for the region using regional climatemodels.

This report attempts to capture the risk an increasinglycapricious climate poses for Nepal and Nepalis. It linksits unique ground-level “toad’s-eye” perspective withthe results emerging from high-level scientific analysesand suggests the need for intensifying scientificresearch in order to bridge the gap between the two.High-end global climate science and local-level civicscience with their traditional knowledge base must bebrought together. The report also recognises the needto foster institutional pluralism in the planning andimplementation of development programmes ifsustainability is to be ensured and unpleasant surprisesminimised. Nepal is currently engaged in the herculeantask of dealing with the dual stresses of rapid socio-economic transition and the institutionalisation of thepeace process through a restructuring of nationalgovernance. To these immensely challenging goals, itmust add the charting of new development strategiesto adapt to the partially known or even unknownmultiple stresses induced by climate change.

The path that Nepal has followed since the 1950s, thatof fossil fuel-dependent development, is susceptible toextreme climate change-induced stresses; and Nepal’srural communities are finding themselves morevulnerable than most to its effects. These vulnerabilitiesarise precisely because the causes behind them are farremoved from the geographical horizons of most

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villagers; and neither they nor their elected representativeshave much say or control over them. The increase in thedemand for bio-fuel and hikes in the price of oil aredistant climate change-related events, but their impacthas been no less painful for being distant; and thevillagers find this reality frightening. The globalisationof national and local economies has brought newproducts and amenities, sometimes unimagined wealth,but has also been accompanied by invisible threats tosustainable wellbeing.

Since the mid-1990s, rural Nepal has witnessed thewide-scale migration of able-bodied workers to labourmarkets in the Gulf, Malaysia and South Korea inaddition to traditional destinations in Indian cities.The attraction of jobs was the main pull factor; thedecade-long Maoist insurgency, the main push factor.The result of this mass exodus was a shortage ofagricultural labour. According to villagers, depopulation,in combination with vagaries in the weather, includingdelayed monsoon rainfall, flood damage from intensecloudbursts, and rising temperatures resulting in themigration of weeds and plant disease vectors to higheraltitudes, has made their lives difficult. Both agriculturalproduction and livestock rearing plummeted asremittance inflows allowed villagers to buy their foodfrom cities instead of growing it in vulnerable ruralhamlets (DST, 2008).

For years, Nepali hill people have coped with foodshortages through seasonal migration, but recently therates of out-migration have soared. In addition, from2005 to 2007, the demand for bio-fuel accounted foran estimated 60 per cent surge in the globalconsumption of cereals and vegetable oils, and thus fora dramatic rise in food prices (Tangermann, 2008). To

make matters worse for Nepalis, world crude oil pricesreached their highest levels, USD147, in June 2008, justwhen the Nepal Oil Corporation was no longer able toprovide a regular supply of diesel and petrol to itsconsumers (improper pricing practices left it unable topay its long overdue bill to India Oil Corporation, whichcut of supplies in response). It was during this veryperiod, before the Maoist conflict had scarcely cooled,that a new cast of political agitators in the Nepali Taraibegan to call for transport shut-downs. Because hillvillagers no longer grow food for subsistence and areinstead dependent on imported food, the food shortageof 2008 promised to turn into a calamity. Mercifully,the global financial crisis brought the price of oilcrashing down, the demand for bio-fuels subsided andthe near continuous political agitations in the Taraisettled down to sporadic outbursts.

The question that must now be considered is how longwill this breathing space last. The international priceof non-renewable petroleum products is bound toincrease, either because of speculation or simplybecause of the growing scarcity of fossil fuel; and therise will increase the demand for bio-fuels in industrialeconomies. The emigration of able-bodied labourersfrom the Nepali hills and the continued inflow ofremittances will prevent local agriculture productionfrom flourishing. It is expected to decline except inplaces such as the Tarai and hill valleys, wheregroundwater-dependent agriculture will grow, but onlyif the fuel supply for pumping is not disrupted. It is inthis environment, where the existing structuralweaknesses in socio-economic arrangements areamplified by the stresses induced by the second-orderimpacts of climate change that the vulnerability of therural population of Nepal will play out. Addressing the


energy poverty nexus will have to be a key part of ourstrategy to reduce that vulnerability (PAN, 2009).

Today’s climate change problems have emerged fromunbridled growth in fossil fuel consumption globally.For the resolution, Nepal needs to cap the use of thesefuels and shift to locally feasible renewable energysources. This will require a statesman-like decision suchas that made by Iceland. In the 1950s Iceland, likeNepal, was on a typical, fossil-fuel based path of growth;and electricity generation as well as space heating reliedon imported oil. However, a radical decision was madesoon thereafter to shift to renewable hydro andgeothermal power, both sources that Iceland had inabundance. In the 2009 meeting the president ofIceland, Olafur Ragnar Grimsson2 stated that had thisdecision not been made a generation ago, the collapseof Iceland’s banking system in October 2008 wouldhave been much more devastating. As it turned out, theenergy security bestowed by obviating the need toimport fossil fuel (except for limited transportation) hasprovided Iceland with the space to address its bankingproblems while keeping the rest of the economy intact.

Such a transition to non-fossil fuel dependent pathwaymakes economic and strategic sense for Nepal, and alsowould show a historical commitment of one of the leastdeveloped nations re-crafting its political future as itattempts to overcome tumultuous political upheavals.Such a transition notwithstanding, as one of the leastsignificant emitters of green house gases, Nepal andNepali people already face and would continue to facethe problems that they had little role in creating, viz.climate change. The impact is higher cost to its socialand economic development. This study is an attemptto highlight these costs.

Key insights and recommendations generated by thestudy include the following:

The increase in the number and intensity of naturaldisasters will prevent many Nepali households fromrising above the poverty line. Under median climatechange projections, the flood impact on eachhousehold will double and the number ofhouseholds affected directly will increase by 40%.As temperatures increase and the climate becomesmore erratic, the incidence of forest fires mayincrease, thereby reducing the amount of meanresidual energy available in forests for use by localcommunities.Responding to local as well as global socio-economic, political, institutional and climate-induced pressures, Nepal’s population, most ofwhom work in the informal sector, has,autonomously and without government support,made a significant transition away from theprimary agriculture sector and its reliance onnatural resources. It is now leaning towards theservice sector (as opposed to the manufacturingsector), which is less resource intensive andpolluting than fossil fuel-based industrialproduction.The existing energy policy does not serve the nationwell as it ignores the current mix of energy sourcesand over-emphasises making production moreefficient through achieving economies of scale. Theresult is that Nepal is burdened by a slow-growing,supply-driven energy monopoly. This monopolysubsidises electricity for a few (5% of rural and 20%of urban dwellers) as well as of imported petroleumproduct. This factor indirectly taxes the mostvulnerable, those Nepalis who are most dependent

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NOTES1 Hodges’ work quoted above and the implications for mountain-man relationship in the context of uncertainties in the Himalaya are discussed in Thompson and Gyawali (2007).2 Said at the International Hydropower 2009 World Congress held on 23 June, 2009, in Reykjavik.

on dwindling natural resources, while at the sametime draining state coffers and reducing the nation’scapacity to switch strategies to respond to futurechallenges.Provisioning reliable supply of electricity canfunction as an essential gateway service to helpbuild people’s adaptive capacities through incomediversification. Empowering local institutions toimplement decentralised renewable energy systemsalready found in Nepal, including solar, small andmedium hydroelectricity, wind and biogas systemswill halt the widespread burning of biomass as wellas create many “green jobs”. Realising this shift inNepal’s energy profile would also reduce emissionsand reverse the ongoing loss in the sequesteringpotential of Nepal’s national and communityforests.The additional cost of using such alternativesshould be borne by developed nations, whichshould pay Nepal “energy compensation” forexposing it to the climate stresses associated withusing fossil fuel. This payment would provide

financial incentives to Nepal to switch away fromfossil fuel toward an adaptive and non-pollutingdevelopment pathway. The cost of making thisswitch would be about 44 million U.S. dollars peryear for next 20 years.Nepal too must begin its own indigenous effortsin mobilising its resources to engender that shift.The government must introduce well-designedincentives and policies that help channelremittance inflows from Nepalis who work abroad(a source of income which dwarfs both governmentrevenues and foreign direct investments) away fromnon-productive land speculation and jewellerypurchases towards climate-resilient investments.No more than ten per cent of Nepal’s totalremittances, if so directed, could fund the entireinvestment needed to shift towards a renewableenergy pathway. Similar incentives need to beprovided for making local infrastructure such asirrigation systems, roads, and bridges as well aspublic buildings like schools, health posts andgovernment offices climate resilient.

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MINING CLIMATECHANGE LESSONS FROMSIGNATURE EVENTS

2C

HAPTER

Figure 2.1: Location of signature events This chapter presents eight signature events of therecent past that have had impacts consistent with

those projected to occur as a consequence of climatechange. Though it cannot be asserted with scientificcertainty that any of these disasters were directly causedby climate change, they do show what can happen ifclimate change increases the frequency and intensity ofclimate-related hazards and are, in consequence, avaluable source of learning. In the study of these events,it was recognised that many rural regions and villagesalready face problems that are similar to the likely impacts

of climate change projected bymost scenario models,problems they had no hand increating. These signatureevents include: the 1998Rohini River and other Taraifloods, the 2008 Koshiembankment breach, the2008 floods in Far-WestNepal, the 1993 mid-mountain cloudbursts and

floods, recent glacial lake outburst floods, the 2008/2009winter drought, the 2009 forest fires across the country,and the 2009 diarrhoea epidemic in the Mid-Westernhills.

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8


of July till the end of August, newspapers andhumanitarian agencies on site reported myriad deaths,inundation, collapsed houses, eroded riverbanks,breached embankments, sand deposition, disease, anddamage to infrastructure, including roads, bridges andpower lines, occurring daily right across the region.

In Nepal, the floods associated with this rainfall affected279 families in Nawalparasi District, washing away largearea of land and damaging property worth over NPR680,000. India lost 1.393 million hectares of crops—1.224 million hectares in Bihar and 0.131 millionhectares in West Bengal.1 The damage in Bangladeshwas still more devastating: almost two-thirds of thecountry (an area of 100,000 square kilometres) wasinundated for 65 days and 33 million people were

The 1998 Rohini River and other Tarai floods

The Rohini River originates along the southern slopesof the Chure hills in Nepal’s Nawalparasi District andflows into northeast Uttar Pradesh, where it joins theWest Rapti River near Gorakhpur. Though small, it is atypical trans-boundary river in the Tarai and providesvaluable lessons about the occurrence of floods and theirimpact in this region.

In 1998, the monsoon rains arrived in the Rohini basinduring the last week of June and were fully establishedby the beginning of July. As usual, they began in the lowercatchment and spread northward to the foothills thatconstitute the upper catchment. The months of July andAugust were exceptionally wet, with both the upper andlower catchments receiving high volumes of rainfall, threetimes more than usual, in fact. In addition, severalcloudbursts occurred, particularly in the upper catchment,where there were more cloudburst and wet days than inthe lower catchment. According to the IndianMeteorological Department, Gorakhpur had received arecord-breaking 1,232 millimetres of rainfall as of August20. On August 24, another record was broken in theNepal Tarai (in Ramgram municipality, Nawalparasi)when 460 millimetres fell in just 24 hours.

This August precipitation was part of a larger weathersystem that spread from the Bay of Bengal northwestto Central Nepal and Eastern Uttar Pradesh and had ahuge impact on local populations. From the first week

Figure 2.2: Rohini River system

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MINING CLIMATE CHANGELESSONS FROMSIGNATURE EVENTS...................................

displaced, 18 million of whom needed emergency foodand health services (Ahmed, 1999). Dhaka experiencedserious health, housing, food, security, employment, andcommunications problems, and the livelihoods of theurban population were adversely affected by inundation(Nishat et al., 2000).

Nine years later, in 2007, the region faced a similar situationas flood waters caused by the monsoon rains swept overthe South Asian landscape. In parts of the Tarai and thelarger Ganga basin in Nepal, India and Bangladesh, floodinginundated large areas, killed hundreds and displacedmillions. Agricultural and other losses were high anddisease spread across much of the flood-affected region,affecting both rural and urban populations.

The monsoon flooding that occurred in 1998 and 2007,although it exceeded long-term averages, was far fromunprecedented. Floods are a regular feature of life in theregion, important for soil fertility, aquifer recharge, and ahealthy regional ecology. But flooding also brings misery tomany inhabitants of the basin. The fact that they are sowretched despite decades of investment in flood controldemonstrates that current approaches to flood managementare unable to mitigate the impacts of recurrent monsoonflooding on human lives and livelihoods.

Although the scientific data does not allow attributionof weather hazards of 1998 and 2007 to global climatechange, such events are in line with the projectionsscientists have made of the changes that are likely tooccur as a result of climate change. Many of theseprojections suggest that both overall precipitation andthe intensity of individual weather events will increase.If that is the case, both the regional monsoonprecipitation pattern and the types of individualcloudbursts that contributed to the flooding in 1998and 2007 could well become more frequent. Since such

rainfall events have not been monitored on a long-termbasis, however, it is difficult to draw conclusionsregarding trends and changes. More studies are requiredbefore any cause-effect relationship can be established.

Overall, this analysis of the event indicates that ifclimate change projections prove accurate and floodsand cloudbursts do become more frequent or extreme,current approaches to flood management will growincreasingly inadequate. Even at present, such strategiesmust be recognised as partial at best. They consist of(1) a broad array of actions taken by individuals,households and communities to reduce the flood riskthey face; (2) a fragmented system of large-scale floodcontrol infrastructure (primarily embankments)constructed by the government; and (3) weathertracking and early warning systems. Researchundertaken in the Rohini basin suggests thatstrengthening community-based risk managementstrategies and improved early warning systems (whichalso have a large community-based component) couldplay a significant role in addressing disasters of the typethat occurred in 1998 and 2007. Traditional approachesto flood management often emphasise technicalinfrastructures such as embankments over distributedsolutions. There are, however, many questionsconcerning the technical effectiveness and trade-offsassociated with such infrastructure. Similar lessons werealso obtained in lower Bagmati basin in Nepal (The Riskto Resilience Study Team, 2009).

2008 Koshi embankment breach

On 18 August 2008, an embankment along the Koshi Riverin the Nepal Tarai breached unexpectedly, at a time whenthe river flow was almost a third below the long-termaverage flow for that month. Over the following weeks, a

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Figure 2.3: Koshi embankment breach

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Based on the analysis of radar sat-2 Data of September 3, 2008.Adapted from: NRSA, Department of Space GoI

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Schematic of embankment breach at Kusaha 2008 Schematic concept by Ajay Dixit (2008)

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Koshi flood refuge on cannal embankment, Bihar

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disaster slowly unfolded as the Koshi River began flowingalong one of its old courses considerably east of the onedefined by the embankments. Some 65,000 people in Nepaland about three million in India’s Bihar were displaced. InNepal, according to newspaper articles three were reportedkilled with 12 missing while in Bihar people 6,190 died.2

The Koshi drains an area of 60,000 square kilometresin Tibet, Nepal and North Bihar. In a single average year,the Koshi transfers an estimated 95 million cubicmetres of sediment derived from landslides and masswasting to the Ganga River. Much of the sediment isdeposited at Chatara, where the river exits from themountains onto the plains and its slope levels off. Thisphenomenon has created a large inland alluvial sedimentfan, across which the Koshi regularly shifts as sedimentsprecipitate and the riverbed aggrades. In fact, over thelast 220 years, the course of the Koshi River has shifted115 kilometres west in a natural process of riverdynamics. In 1959, this natural process was interruptedwhen, as was stipulated in an agreement thegovernments of Nepal and India signed in 1954, the riverwas jacketed between two embankments.

The completion of the Koshi barrage in 1964 decreasedthe river’s gradient and sediment deposition within thejacketed section of the river upstream of the barrage.Topographic maps indicate that the section of theriverbed within the embankments is now two to fourmetres higher than the adjoining land: in other words,the elevation of the bed has increased approximatelyone meter per decade since the embankments wereconstructed. Following the 2008 breach, the main riverbegan flowing along a course that the construction ofthe eastern embankment had blocked. The breachdemonstrated that instead of permanently protectingthe surrounding area from floods, the embankments hadchanged the morphology of the river. As the bed

gradually aggraded, the river became a time bombrunning several metres above the surrounding lands andwaiting to spill over. Poor maintenance of thoseembankments and institutional inefficiencies simplyhelped to light the fuse. The resulting flood causedwidespread inundation and adversely affected thosesocial and economic systems which depend on the river.

In the four decades after 1959, when the Easternembankment was completed and the area east of the riverwas largely protected from major flooding, the region sawa surge in infrastructural development. Unfortunately, thenewly constructed roads, irrigation channels, railways andother features blocked the natural drainage system evenmore and divided the region into a series of enclosedbasins, low-lying lands and pond, all of which wereinundated after the breach, as the river spread out in afan across 30-40 kilometres, seeking the path of leastresistance. In that vast flooded area, low points werescoured and sand was deposited on fields, in irrigationchannels and drainage ditches in a hydro-morphologicalprocess that has transformed the landscape. While thetwo-kilometer breach has been plugged, there is noguarantee that the river, still flowing perched high abovethe surrounding land, will not breach again in the future.

Every flood-control embankment can breach—this risk isin their very nature—but the risk is particularly great in ariver such as the Koshi, where the riverbed aggrades rapidlybecause of the high sediment load. The 2008 breach wasthe eighth major one in their 50-year history, and therewill no doubt be another. No matter how wellembankments are maintained, breaches are inevitable. Anembankment provides relatively high levels of floodprotection immediately following its construction but itsability to protect declines at rates that depend primarilyon sedimentation and, to a lesser extent, on how well theembankment is constructed and maintained.

13


Kanchanpur districts had been flooded. According toan estimate by the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS),158,663 people in 23,660 households in Kailali Districtand 30,733 people in 5,961 households in KanchanpurDistrict were affected. When people returned homeafter the flood waters had receded, they found thatmost of their cattle were dead and that 35 per cent oftheir paddy had been destroyed (see Table 2.1).

Data collected by Nepal’s Department of Hydrology andMeteorology (DHM) showed that rainfall stations atTikapur in Kailali District and Shantipur in KanchanpurDistrict recorded 282.7 and 249.9 millimetres of rainfallrespectively on 20 September. The next day, Tikapurrecorded only 16 millimetres of rainfall while Shantipurrecorded 124.9. While such large amounts ofprecipitation are not unexceptional in this region, asmore roads and irrigation canals have been built in aneast-west orientation perpendicular to the north- southflow of rivers, drainage has been impeded. In 2008, thisobstruction became a particular problem, one whichprolonged inundation.

If rainfall variability and the intensity of stormsincreases, as climate change projections suggest theywill, man-made structures that impede drainage couldmake populations increasingly vulnerable. Thissignature event clearly illustrates that patterns ofdevelopment will interact with potential climatechanges to increase people’s vulnerabilities. Focusingon unimpeded drainage during the flood season rather

If projections of more frequent and more intenseextreme rainfall events due to climate change proveaccurate, erosion will also increase, as will sedimentloads and deposition on the Tarai and Ganga plains.Since the rate at which riverbeds aggraded will increase,the likelihood of embankment breaches will alsoincrease. The increased flood flows predicted will havesimilar impacts. As the climate changes, flood controlinfrastructure of the type found in the Ganga basin islikely to be particularly at risk even if core maintenanceand design issues are addressed.

A systematic analysis of the potential for futuredisasters of the scale of the August 2008 flood mightassist in identifying strategies for flood control whichhave less inherent risk than structural solutions likeembankments do. “Outside-the-water-box” thinking inaddressing this problem may require searching forsolutions in architecture (“houses on stilts”), domesticsociology (“one member of the family earning non-farming income in cities”) or in rapid communications(“FM stations and information deployment”).

2008 Flooding in Far-West Nepal

Between the 19th and 21st of September, 2008, heavymonsoon rains lashed Far-West Nepal, soaking the Taraidistricts of Banke, Bardiya, Kailali and Kanchanpur andthe hill districts of Dang, Dadeldhura, Doti and Salyan.In just three days, almost all of the Tarai of Kailali and

Table 2.1: Damage caused by the 2008 flooding in Far-West Nepal

Source: NRCS (2008). Detailed Assessment-Kailali District

DISTRICT

11 males and 15 females died2 males and 6 females were reported missing2,152 houses were completely damaged12,962 houses were partially damaged5,647 households lost their entire stock of stored grains12,552 households lost some of their stock of stored grains

18 VDCs and Dhangadhi municipality affected30,733 people in 5961 householdsDekhatbhuli and Shankarpur VDCs and Mahendranagar Municipality worst hit

DAMAGE

Kailali

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1993 Mid-mountain cloudburstsand floods

Incessant rainfall from the 19th to the 21st

of July, 1993, triggered an unprecedentednumber of landslides and floods in South-Central Nepal. The event was caused bya low monsoon weather system, or, moreprecisely, a “break monsoonphenomenon”. The catchments of theAgra, Belkhu, Malekhu, and Mahesh riversin the Gandaki River system, and thecatchments of the Jurikhet, Mandu,Manahari, Lothar and Rapti rivers in theMahabharat range were deluged. TheKulekhani catchment was also affected.The storm then moved eastward andsettled over Ghantemadi in thecatchments of the Marin and Kokajharrivers of Sindhuli District in the Bagmatibasin (MoWR, 1993). A station inTistung in the Kulekhani catchmentrecorded 540 millimetres of rainfall in 24hours on July 19th of 1993, the maximum24-hour rainfall ever recorded in thehistory of Nepal (see Figure 2.5). Thesame station also recorded Nepal’smaximum rainfall intensity ever—65millimetres in an hour.

The rainfall caused both the Bagmati River and itstributaries and the Narayani River and its tributariesto swell, causing major flooding in the mid-hills as wellas in the lower Bagmati basin. The disaster seriouslyaffected seven districts (Table 2.2). In the districts,altogether 1,158 people died or were reported missing,65,367 families were seriously affected, 32,973 houses

Figure 2.4 a: Rainfall variation in Far-West Nepal

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Figure 2.4 b: 2008 Flood affected region of the Far-West Nepal

than diversion control for dry season irrigation mighthave to be the primary focus of hydro-technical designs;and constructing drainage systems that are able tohandle more water will become the priority as theclimate changes.

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were completely or partially destroyed, and about39,676 hectares of cultivated land was washedaway or covered with debris. The floods damaged341 kilometres of roads and 169 large and smallbridges. After flood waters destroyed six concretebridges on the national highways, the supplycorridor to the capital was disrupted for more thana month. In just three days, landslides and floodsdestroyed 376 small and large irrigation schemesand 401 school buildings, hospitals andgovernment offices (see Table 2.2).

The cloudburst severely damaged two major waterprojects; the Kulekhani hydropower plant and theBagmati barrage. At the barrage, equipment, thegate control system, sections of the main canal,and the housing colony for staff were damaged.The barrage was designed for a peak flood of 8000cubic metres per second after evidence that a peakflood of 12,000 cubic metres per second hadoccurred was rejected as a statistical outlier; theJuly flood brought about a peak flood of 15,000cubic metres per second.

The Kulekhani hydropower system, Nepal’s onlystorage plant, consists of two power plants, the 60-MW Kulekhani I and the 32-MW Kulekhani II.

Source: DPTC (1993)

Table 2.2: Human and livestock damage casued by the 1993 mid-hill flooding

LAND LAND NO. OFFAMILY PEOPLE NO. OF HOUSE WASHED AFFECTED LIVESTOCK INFRASTRUCTURE

DISTRICT AFFECTED AFFECTED DEATHS COLLAPSED AWAY (HA) LOST DAMAGE OR COLLAPSED

Makwanpur 14,748 1,01,482 292 3,611 4,656 NA 665 Kulekhani hydropower plant,roads, schools

Sarlahi 15,560 83,265 687 15,560 25,966 17,736 Bagmati barrage, roads, schools

Rautahat 14,644 89,146 111 6,544 1,366 3,211 Schools, roads

Sindhuli 11,051 59,142 52 2,520 4,061 1,930 Schools, roads, bridges

Kavrepalanchok 2,958 10,642 20 1,006 1,030 159 Same as above

Dhading 1,113 23,628 24 919 1,075 301 Same as above

Chitwan 5,293 34,943 22 2,813 1,522 1,012 Same as above

Total 65,367 402,248 1,158 32,973 39,676 25,014

Figure 2.5: 1993 Cloudburst and 24 hour rainfallrecorded at Tistung

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Figure 2.6: Impact of 1993 cloudburst

Khulekhani-I Penstock of Jhurikhet Khola:before and after cloudburst

Damaged Bagmati Barrage

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When a flash flood in Jurikhet Khola cause by thedownpour severed the penstock of Kulekhani I, thecountry lost almost half of its total installed electricitycapacity from the Integrated Nepal Power System(INPS), and a three-month load shedding regime wasimposed. As a result, the 1993 disaster not only affectedthe lives of ordinary people but also adversely affectedthe national economy (UNDP, 1997)

The flood also caused long-term damage because of theunprecedented volumes of sediment deposited in theIndra Sarovar, the reservoir of the Kulekhani plant.When impoundment began in 1981, the reservoir hada total storage capacity of 83 million cubic metres.Based on their estimate that the reservoir would receive

Sources: DSCWM (1993); Nippon Koei (1994) and NEA (1995)

Source: Dixit (2003)

Source: WECS (1987)

Table 2.3: Reduction in storage capacity (in hundreds of thousands of cubic metres)

700 cubic metres of sediment annually from eachsquare kilometre of catchment, the designers assumedthat the economic life of the reservoir would be 100years. The actual rate of sedimentation was two timesthe design rate. Surveys by the Department of SoilConservation and Watershed Management (DSCWM)and the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) showed thatfrom 1981 to 1995, a total of 21.8 million cubic metresof sediment, which is equivalent to an average of 1.56million cubic metres annually, were deposited in thereservoir. In fact, the bulk of this mass came in pulseslike that brought down by the 1993 events.

Sedimentation also caused long-term economic losses.The landslides and debris flow triggered by the 1993

Figure 2.7: Temporary landslide dam on a river (Bishyari)

In the mid-mountains a landslide triggered by a cloudburst often falls into ariver, damming it temporarily and creating a reservoir in the upstream reach.When the dam breaks after it is over-topped or when it fails because of itsinability to withstand the water pressure, a sudden flood is created. This event,which occurs randomly and cannot be predicted precisely, is called a bishyari.Such a flood gouges out beds and banks, thereby increasing the sediment load ofa river substantially. It also brings devastation to lives and properties.

PARTICULARS 1981 MARCH 1993 DECEMBER 1993 SEPTEMBER 1994 NOVEMBER 1995

Gross storage 85.3 83.1 78.3 67.8 63.5

Effective storage 73.3 72.3 70.7 61.3 58.9

Loss in total storage 0.0 2.2 7.0 17.5 21.8

Incremental loss 0.0 2.2 4.8 10.5 4.3

19


cloudburst deposited about 4.8 million cubic metres ofsediment in the reservoir, and in 1994 alone, another10.5 million cubic metres of sediment was deposited.The figure doubled because the unwashed soil loosenedby the cloudburst flowed into the reservoir. Sedimentinflow was unusually high until 1995 (see Table 2.3).Because the sediment began encroaching on the tunnelintake, a new sloping intake was constructed. Expertsfrom the World Bank, which financed the project,estimated that the economic life of the project wasreduced by more than two-thirds, from 100 to just 30years. The possibility that such an extreme event wouldoccur had not been anticipated.

The 1993 cloudburst brings to the fore the problems posedby extreme rainfall events. They can result in bishyari, thetemporary damming of rivers by landslides and the flashfloods that follow their eventual bursting. Like glacial lakeoutburst floods (GLOFs), such events increase the alreadyhigh regional rates of sedimentation and make people morevulnerable. However, GLOFs occur in the sparselypopulated high mountains while bishyaris plague thedensely populated mid-mountains, where the social,economic and humanitarian impacts are far higher.

The 1993 cloudburst and its consequences illustrateseveral key impacts that climate change will probablybring. Since climatic variability and extreme events arelikely to increase, so are cloudbursts of the type thatoccurred in 1993. But more rain is not the onlyprojection for the mid-mountains; climate change isalso supposed to result in a drier climate, particularlyduring the non-monsoon months. If conditions dobecome more drought-like, vegetative cover is likely todecline and hillsides will become more prone to erosionand large-scale mass wasting. Like extreme rainfall,then, the increase in overall aridity will probably

increase sediment loads. The implications forhydropower projects, as illustrated by the Kulekhanievent, are both technically and economically dire. Anyincrease in landslides will also have direct, large andadverse social impacts in the densely populated regionsof the mid-mountains.

Recent glacial lake outburst floods

A warming climate results in the melting of glaciers anda decrease in the amount of water stored in the glaciermass, changes that could alter the regional hydrologicalsystem and pose a major risk to the population livingdownstream. The contribution of glacial melt to theflow of Nepali rivers is yet to be accurately estimated.Sharma (1977) has estimated that glacial melt accountsfor about 10 per cent of the average flow of Nepalirivers. More recent estimate suggest that snowmeltfrom the Himalaya provides about 9% of Ganga’s Riverflow (Jianchu et al., 2007; Barnett et al., 2005).

The melting of glaciers also increases the volume ofwater in glacial lakes (tsho) formed between a moraineand a glacier snout, thereby increasing the threat of aGLOF, which occurs when a moraine dam breachesbecause it is over-topped or disturbed by an earthquake.

According to ICIMOD (2007), Nepal has 2,323 glaciallakes with areas larger than 0.003 square kilometressituated above the altitude of 3,500 metres. ICIMODidentified 1,062 in the Koshi River basin, 338 in theGandaki River basin, 907 in the Karnali River basin and16 in the Mahakali River. The Dudh Koshi sub-basinin the Koshi River basin has the largest numbers ofglacial lakes (Bajracharya et al., 2007). Twelve pose thethreat of a breach.

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Nepal has already experienced 15 GLOFs. The mostrecent was in 1985, when Dig Tsho in the headwaters ofthe Dudh Koshi River breached after a large avalanche slidinto it, over-topping the dam. Two hours later, the peakflood at Phakding registered 1,500 cubic metres per second.The event transferred four million cubic metres ofsediment and destroyed a hydro-electricity project, 14bridges, 30 houses and farmlands worth four million U.S.dollars. In 1981, when Zhangzangbo Lake breached, fourpeople were killed, and the China-Nepal Friendship Bridgeand seven other trail bridges, a hydropower plant, a sectionof the Arniko Highway and 51 houses were damaged. Thebreach of Tam Pokhari in 1998 killed two people, destroyedmore than six trail bridges and washed away arable land.The loss was estimated at 150 million rupees.3

One lake which could very well breach is Tsho Rolpa inDolkha District. Situated at an altitude of 4,580 metresand fed by the Tradkarding glacier, this glacial lake grewfrom an area of 0.23 square kilometres in the late 1950sto 1.65 square kilometres in 1997, when it stored 90-100 million cubic metres of water. In 1997, the Tsho

Figure 2.8: Glacial lake outburst flood

Rolpa reached a critical stage. Butwal Power Company(BPC) in the year 1996 was commissioned to studyTsho Rolpa Glacial by the Government of Nepal due toits feared impact on Khimti hydropower plant if it hadbreached (Gyawali and Dixit, 1997). BPC made variousassumptions and depicted the worst breach could causepeak flood of 7,402 cubic meter per second in the steepnarrow sections of the Rolwaling Valley with water levelreaching 20 metres above the normal level. Budhathokiet al. (1996) estimated the resulting flood frombreaching of Tsho Rolpa Glacier could have directlyaffected more than six thousand people in 1996.

As a temporary measure, Nepal’s DHM, with supportfrom the Dutch government, built a trapezoidal spillwaywith a 6.4-metre bottom and a 14-35 cubic metre persecond capacity to lower the water level by three metresin two years. At the same time, an early warning systemwas implemented in 19 downstream villages; thissystem, as with most ‘dedicated’ flood warning systems(as opposed to systems integrated into village life suchas local FM stations and schools), no longer functions.

In the Himalayan region, glaciallakes are formed between a glacierend and its moraine. Glaciers haveretreated rapidly in the second half ofthe 20th century, forming, in manycases, ice-core moraine-flankedlakes of melted water. Occasionally,there is a breach in a moraine damand a lake empties in a very shorttime. This gives rise to glacial lakeoutburst flood (GLOF), which aremajor hazards and a source ofsediment. The occurrence of GLOF isfrequent and many glacial lakes havebreached in the past. GLOF damagestrails, suspension bridges, landhomes and gouges the bed at banksof the river. GLOF is a huge pulseadding to the rivers’ sediment load.

Source: ICIMOD (2003) Source: DHM

Tsho Rolpa glacial lake Thulagi glacial lake

21


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While GLOFs pose a direct threat to the highmountains and those who live there, they also threatenlowland regions by increasing regional sedimentation.The exact nature of that threat needs furtherinvestigation. The recent inventory of GLOF hazardsis a start in improving our understanding of the threats,but we now need to map out the social, economic andhydrological risks of GLOFs and seek measures tomitigate them, including the draining of glacial lakesand the establishment of early warning systems.

Climate change projections suggest that the potentialfor GLOFs will grow. In fact, increases in temperature,particularly in high regions, are among the most robustprojections from climate change scenarios for Nepal(see Chapter 4). This warming will cause increased rateof glacial melt, and the faster filling of glacial lakes, thusincreasing the likelihood of breaches. There are otherfactors that contribute to glacial melt but the level ofunderstanding about these is very low. The presence ofdust and black carbon from forest fires, for example, canreduce albedo and increase the rate of snow melt, and

as discussed below forest fires in the Himalaya may wellincrease because of rising temperatures and changes inhydrological system.

Source: Dixit (2003)Source: WECS (1987)

Figure 2.9: Comparison of average winter (November toFebruary) rainfall at eight selected weather stations

Source: MOAC (1987)

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2008/2009 Winter drought

The 2008/2009 winter drought exacerbated the foodsecurity concerns brought about by the sharp spikes infood prices registered in 2008. Much of the countryreceived very little or no rainfall between November andMarch 2008, when Westerlies are supposed to bringrain, or at high elevations, snowfall. In normalcircumstances, 80 per cent of Nepal’s total rainfalloccurs during its four summer monsoon months, andthe three months from December to February bringthree to five per cent of the national annualprecipitation. Average winter rainfall is higher in theWest (140 millimetres) than in the East (40millimetres) and accounts for a greater percentage ofthe total amount.

According to the DHM, the period from November2008 to February 2009 saw less than half the averageprecipitation in almost all of Nepal’s 35 rain monitoringstations. In fact, 15 stations recorded monthly rainlevels which either matched, or were lower than thelowest rain levels on record, and almost one-third

Figure 2.10 a: Food sufficiency status of districts, 2008

recorded no rain at all. The resultant winter droughtwas one of the worst on record, measured in terms ofboth the significantly reduced levels of rainfall and thevast area affected. The winters of 2007/08 and 2006/2007 were also unusually dry. In the period of 36 years,from 1971 to 2007, more than 150 droughts eventswere reported in Nepal affecting more than 330,000 haof agriculture land mainly in the Tarai and western Hills/Mountains (NSET, 2009).

Although the 2008 summer harvest was generally good,many of those areas worst impacted by the winterdrought, including the Far and Mid-Western hill andmountain regions, experienced significant summer croplosses due to excessive rainfall and diseases. It remainsto be seen what the 2009 summer harvest will bring.

Projections of wide range of precipitation changes,greater climatic variability and increase in temperatureover the country (0.5-2 degree Celsius with a multi-model mean of 1.4 degree Celsius by the 2030s forexample) suggest that the frequency of winter droughtswill increase. Even without climate change, however, the

Source: MOAC (2009)

23


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increasing prevalence of droughts in Nepal is a matterof great concern as they illustrate the vulnerability ofthe country’s agricultural sector. Incidentally, Nepal’sagriculture has registered food production deficits sincethe 1990s. If Nepal is to achieve and maintain basiclevels of food security, investments in handling both theimmediate food shortages caused by drought as well asin implementing long-term improvements in agriculturemust be forthcoming.

2009 Forest fires

During the spring of 2009, forest fires blanketed muchof Nepal (see Figure 2.11), raging in 634 places anddamaging 105,350 hectares of forestland. According toAcharya and Sharma (2009), the 2009 forest fires caused43 deaths, injured 12, affected about 516 families, killed375 livestock while also damaging 74 houses and 22cattle sheds, causing an estimated loss of NPR 14 crore.Fire also leads to death of a significant number oflivestock due to burning every year. This risk isparticulalry widespread in the Tarai, mountains and some

Himalayan districts. In the two years of 2004-2005 morethan 100,000 cattle were burned to death. In additionto their local impact, fires can have major implicationsfor the rates of glacial and snow melt. As an April 2009satellite picture shows, smoke from the fires blanketedthe Himalaya from Kashmir to Kanchanjunga.

It has been suggested (DfID, 2009), despite the successof community forestry and other local measures(Thompson and Gyawali, 2007), that Nepal has theeighth highest per capita rate of CO2 emissions amongleast developing countries, primarily because ofdeforestation. Recent research suggests that if forestfires continue as a severe issue into the future couldsignificantly increase glacial melt rates in the Himalaya,both by increasing the deposition of soot on glacialsurfaces (thereby reducing albedo) and by releasingaerosols into the middle troposphere (thereby warmingthe atmosphere). While the link between decreasedalbedo and increased melt rates is well established, thelinks between aerosols, middle troposphere warming,and glacial melt rates, is more tenuous though isotopedata do reveal that there was a 2.5oC per decade

Figure 2.10 b: Extent of drought in Nepal (1971-2007)

Source: NSET (2009)

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warming of the Muztagata glacier over the 1990s andaerosols have been isolated as a likely contributor (Tianet al., 2006, Ramanathan, 2007).

The 2009 forest fires may well be indicative of thefuture Nepal will face as a result of climate change,particularly if recent climate projections of the growingaridity in the mid-mountains prove accurate. Forest fireswere reported in just 100 locations in March 2008 butin 1500 locations in March 2009. Most were thoughtto have been caused by the drought though some werereported to have been started by poachers in theirattempt to flush out game. According to dataset of theDisventar data base (1971-2007) maintained by NSET,a total of 3,880 fire events led to 1,108 deaths, 186missing persons, and the fires affected a total of 218,278

Adapted from ICIMOD (2009)

people (NSET, 2009). An increase in the frequency andintensity of drought conditions and heat waves wouldgreatly increase the risk of forest fires. Emphasis onobjectives like increasing bio-mass energy, forests ascarbon sink and conservation of biodiversity (see Box2.1 on Biodiversity) would expand the size of forestsbut under a changing climate, would increase thelikelihood of forest fires.

If there are more fires, the implications for reforestationand carbon banking are dire. In recent decades, Nepal’ssuccess in increasing forest cover through itscommunity forestry programme has achieved globalrecognition. Increasing forest cover is perceived as acost-effective mechanism for carbon banking as itmitigates the impact of greenhouse gas emissions while

Figure 2.11: Forest fire across Nepal, March 2009

Based on Nepal_AMO_2009071_lrg: acquired March 12, 2009http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/NaturalHazards/view.php?id=37518NASA image by Jeff Schmaltz, MODIS Rapid Response Team

(c) Fire incidents (Nepal)-2008/2009

(a) 2008 (b) 2009

Source: ICIMOD (2009) Source: ICIMOD (2009)

25

MINING CLIMATE CHANGELESSONS FROMSIGNATURE EVENTS...................................BOX 2.1: Threat to Bio Diversity

Forest fires destroy grasses, shrubs and trees, threateningNepal’s rich biodiversity. This is especially unfortunate becauseit is already under stress from anthropogenic and climaticfactors. In some areas exhibiting high endemism hotspot,species are found here and nowhere else in the world. Theirimportance lies in regional, national and global interests fortheir conservation. Local people report declines and in theprevalence and coverage of some alien plant species. In the FarWest, over-harvesting has considerably thinned species likeAcacia catechu (khayar), Dalbergia sissoo (sisoo), Madhucabutyracea (kalo chyuri), Embilica officinalis (amala),Terminalia chebula (harro), Terminalia bellerica (barro), andAcorus calamus (bojho) and endangered other flora such asPterocarpus marsupium (bijayasal). Some grass species likekukhure suli, a weed which used to grow on mustard farms inthe Tarai, have disappeared altogether. And some of thosespecies that still have healthy populations are under anotherthreat: the shortening of the flowering and fruiting time ofother plants has lowered their productivity. Locals also reportdeclines in the populations of wild animals. The number ofcertain birds such as parrot and cranes, for example, hasdisappeared from the middle hills in Western Nepal, and insectpests have proliferated.

Another threat to Nepal’s biodiversity is invasion andcolonisation by exotic species, which often displace localspecies. For example, Eupatorium adenophorum (banmara)now covers pasture and grazing lands in the hills, theEichhornia crossipes (water hyacinth) has taken over waterbodies in the Tarai and Lantena camera (phul kanda) hasinhibited the growth of other species such as Cynodon dactylon(dubo) in the Bhabar region. Forest degradation in the Taraihas left behind an Imperata cylindrical (siru)-dominated tallgrass ecosystem with a profusion of other tall grass speciessuch as Eupatorium (banmara) and Mikania micrantha(Chinese creeper), and grasses like Thysanolaena maxima(broom grass) and Saccharum species (kans), all of which aresusceptible to fire.

Though the decline in biodiversity is not a concern of themajority of the population, the shortage of forest products suchas firewood is. The interest of local people in conservingbiodiversity has been weakened as their dependency on farmingand animal husbandry has decreased with increasedopportunities to earn cash elsewhere. This shift ininterdependence has changed the linkages between ecosystemservices and farm based livelihood security (DST, 2008).Another complication is that because Nepal’s conservationpolicy does not differentiate between conserving forests andconserving biodiversity, most conservation interventions aim toaddress general degradation problems but not the endemismof hotspots. Furthermore, although protecting forests is a key

step in conserving biodiversity, the protection of a successionforest developed in a degraded area does not preservebiodiversity. For instance, over the last four decades thedegraded native Shoerea robusta (sal) forests in the Bhabarregion of Far-West Nepal have been replaced by emergence oflow-grade timber species; however, while the later do producefirewood, they do not allow other understorey species to grow.

The examples above are indications of the existing and emergingstresses on Nepal’s rich biodiversity. Unfortunately, neither theanthropogenic nor the climatic causes or full implications ofthreats to plant and animal species are well understood. Muchmore study is needed. Current efforts to preserve biodiversity willalso need considerable reflection. Restoring degradedbiodiversity using the agronomic approach by planting limitednumber of preferred species pursued by most conventionalreforestation programmes raises questions because suchprogrammes not only rely on high subsidies for management butalso focus on achieving a narrow ecological equilibrium with lowbiodiversity, an equillirium whose sustainability will bejeopardised by climate change. An ecological approach torestoring degraded biodiversity, in contrast, seeks to createcommunities and landscapes that can persist not just in staticbut in changing conditions, without continued humanintervention or subsidies. Rather than promote a particularvegetative cover, the ecological approach initiates changes thatunderpin ecological systems and processes. By shifting from theexisting agronomic-dominated paradigm to one that considersecological as its cornerstone, we can sustain biodiversity in thelong run, even as climatic conditions change.

Biodiversity losses also extend to agriculture and have thusdirectly impacted the livelihoods of local communities. Thoughthe cultivation of imported species, the use of hybrid seeds andthe uncontrolled application of agrochemicals has helpedimprove agriculture production in the last four decades, thesepractices have also replaced hundreds of low-producing butlocally-adapted varieties, thereby reducing agriculturalbiodiversity. The choice to go non-indigenous, in part theoutcome of changing food habits and prevailing mono-cropping culture, has limited the scope for using locally-adapted seeds as part of a shifting strategy of adaptation andfor developing crop varieties that can thrive in changingclimatic conditions. How the changing water and temperatureregime will affect improved seed varieties and hybrids has tobe determined. Thus far, the only impact noted by farmers isthat there are more insects and diseases. Exactly how theseblights affect crops, both imported and local, has not yet beenfully examined. It will be important to preserve agriculturalbiodiversity and to develop suitable local varieties as soon aspossible if Nepal is to be able to meet its food productionrequirements in a changing environment.

...................................

26


at the same time providing an array of products thathelp local populations meet their needs and adapt tothe impacts of climate change. However, more forestfires and their attendant ills may be the unintendedconsequence of rising global temperature on a genuineand successful development initiative. To understandthe emerging vulnerabilities will require deeperinvestigations into this previously unforeseen risk inpresent-day policies.

In addition to their direct impact, fires will also increaserates of sedimentation. Intense precipitation on areasdeforested by fire and drought tend to generate highersediment loads and exhibit more “flashy” runoffpatterns than do areas with extensive vegetative cover.This is because fires destroy vegetation, exposing moreland surface, and thereby increasing erosion-transportation processes. If policies designed to increaseforest cover have such negative outcomes, they couldgreatly increase the impact of climate change both atlocal and regional hydrologic levels.

Building our understanding of the interaction betweenforest and water management on the one hand, and ofclimate projections on the other will help us developsignificant but as of now still poorly understood.

Nepal’s own community forest managementprogramme are often highlighted as success stories andefforts are ongoing to include it in the global initiativeseffective strategies for adapting to and mitigating theimpacts of climate change in the mid-hills andmountains of Nepal. As the above discussion illustrates,the impacts of both climate change and humanresponses to it may involve complex systemicinteractions that cross scales and sectors and reachunexpected tipping points. Agriculture, for example,depends on irrigation, which in turn depends on flows

and sediment loads that are themselves affected by localvegetative cover, snow/ice melt rates and erosion-transportation processes. These impacts are furtheraffected by factors such as fires and regional climatedynamics. The implications of these complex systemicinteractions for policy are such as reducing emissionscaused by deforestation and forest degradation(REDD). But unless fire risks can be minimised,changing climate conditions could make relying onforestry for carbon banking and local adaptationcounterproductive both at the local level and at thebasin level scale. If this is the case, attempts to supportlocal livelihoods based non-timber forest products forexample, would not succeed. Should that happen, localpopulations will increasingly resort to migration or seekdirect support from international institutions to meettheir basic needs. The policy implications of suchcross-scale systemic dynamics must be explored.

2009 Diarrhoea epidemic in the mid-western hills

The Mid-Western Development Region has beenexperiencing a diarrheal epidemic since April 2009. Theepidemic was initially limited to Jajarkot District, butas monsoon rains began to fall in the third week of June,the adjoining districts of Rukum and Rolpa, areas thatsaw much destruction of basic infrastructure during theMaoist insurgency, were also affected. By the secondweek of July, deaths were being reported in Dailekh,Doti, Surkhet, Dadeldhura, Kanchanpur, Dolpa, Dang,Bajura, Bajhang, Rolpa and Salyan districts as well. InJajarkot, the death toll had reached 143 by 21 July andmore than 2,000 people were reported to be seriouslyill. Rukum was also hit hard: 42 had died by the end ofJuly. Reports by the NRCS in 2009 showed thataltogether more than 20,000 families had been affectedand that 240 had died by August.

27


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Thirteen of Nepal’s poorest and most remote districtswere affected. Some affected areas are a five-day walkfrom the nearest road-head. Jajarkot, home to apopulation of 151,551 in 30 Village DevelopmentCommittees (VDCs) covering 1,502 km2, is one of thenine backward districts of Nepal’s 75 districts with thelowest HDI (UNDP, 2009). The other eight districts areAchham, Kalikot, Jumla, Dolpa, Bajhang, Bajura, Muguand Humla.

According to government sources, only 50 per cent ofJajarkot’s residents have access to clean drinking waterand only 19 per cent use toilets. Open defecation iswidespread and often takes place close to local watersources. Warm summer temperatures (averages rangefrom the mid 20-30 degrees Celsius) may haveexacerbated the spread of diarrhoea.

Local heath workers attribute the epidemic toinadequate access to safe drinking water and poorsanitation. While officially half of the population has

Figure 2.12: Jajarkot district and the locations of infrastructure

access to water supply systems, this figure obscures thefact that in reality many systems are dysfunctionalbecause of poor maintenance, age or damage by hazards.Poor sanitation complicates matters, as does the factthat the density of health services is very low and accessvery limited (Table 2.4).

Table 2.4: Numbers and their coverage ofhealth-related institutions in Jajarkot District

VDCs 30

Government hospitals 1

Primary health care centres 1

Health posts 8

Sub-health posts 25

health institutions 35

Primary health care outreach clinics 117

Female community health volunteers 270

...................................

28

VULNERABILITY THROUGH THE EYESOF THE VULNERABLE BOX 2.2: Drinking Water Services

SERVICE AVERAGE FETCHING QUANTITY QUALITY OF RELIABILITY CONTINUITY AVERAGE ACCESSLEVEL (SL) TIME (MINUTES)* (LPCD) WATER (MONTHS/YEAR) (HR/DAY) TO SOURCE

Good (SL-1) <15 >45 Good (No risk 12 >6 Easyof Contamination)

Moderate (SL-2) >15 but <30 <45 but Moderate (Risk >11 <5 Moderately>25 of Contamination) Difficult

Poor (SL-3) >30 but <45 <25 but Poor (High Risk >10 <4 Difficult>15 of Contamination)

Very Poor (SL-4) >45 <15 Very Poor < 10 <4 Difficult and(Contaminated) Dangerous

*Fetching Time means total time incurred to go to source, collect water and return back.

Table 2.5: Water supply service levels

PERCENTAGE OF PERCENTAGE WITH ACCESS TOREGION NEPAL’S POPULATION DRINKING WATER SANITATIONRural 85 70 20Hills and Mountains 55 65 20Tarai 40 85 20Bhabar 5 83 78Kathmandu 44 87 95Small Towns 56 80 65

Table 2.6: Drinking water and sanitation coverage by region

Source: Calculated from CBA (2001) NEWAH (2008) and Water Aid (2004)

Table 2.7: Drinking water and sanitation coverage bydevelopment region

POLITICAL ECOLOGICAL PERCENTAGE OF PERCENTAGE WITH ACCESS TOREGION REGION NEPAL’S POPULATION DRINKING WATER SANITATIONEastern Mountain 2 66 53

Hill 7 60 52Tarai 14 54 41

Central Mountain 2 82 47Hill 15 72 58Tarai 17 73 32

Western Mountain 1 78 38Hill 12 77 61Tarai 8 83 36

Midwestern Mountain 1 75 28Hill 6 73 24Tarai 5 63 39

Farwestern Mountain 2 84 15Hill 3 81 27Tarai 4 75 38

When assessing the coverage on drinking water supply, one must consider quantity, quality, time required for water collection, reliability,continuity and access (see Table 2.5). To ascertain the true level of service in Nepal, it is important to disaggregate the macro-levelnational data. In fact, even regional- and district-level data distort the true picture in local communities. Within any given community,disparities between household-level services are significant. Tables 2.6 classifies service levels and Table 2.7 gives a sense ofregional differences in drinking water and sanitation services.

This regional data still conceals the true VDC-levelpicture. In 2002 the Asian Development Bank (ADB,2002), found that in 19 districts of East Nepal, 76 per centof the completed 5,135 drinking water supply schemesneeded major repairs and rehabilitation implying thataccess to safe drinking water services is much lowerthan the macro level data. In Gajuri VDC, which borderPrithvi Highway in the Central Development Region,coverage of drinking water and sanitation is only 27 and34 per cent (NEWAH, 2008), a fraction of the aggregatefigure of 72 per cent coverage among the central hillpopulation.

Instruments such as the VDC-Level Water Users MasterPlan (WUMP) also reveal similar disparities. The WaterResource Management Programme (WARM-P) of the SwissNGO Helvetas used WUMP to assess the conditions ofwater and sanitation of 12 selected VDCs in the Far-Westand Mid-West. The results (see Table 2.8), prepared inOctober 2001 and December 2003, show that just 12 percent the population of these VDCs use toilets and only11.5 per cent have good (SL-1) drinking water services.In contrast, 30 per cent had poor (SL-3) to very poor (SL-4)services. Incongruously, macro-scale data show highcoverage in the regions (see Table 2.7).

The conditions of the VDCs in the districts affected by the2009 cholera epidemic are also characterised by a poorlevel of drinking water services and low level of toiletuse. Gaps in access to drinking water and sanitation, andpoor hygiene conditions contributed to the incidence ofthe epidemic.

29


Epidemics are likely to become more serious in the wake of climate change-induced stresses such as increasedtemperature, extreme rainfall, and droughts if the social political system continues to remain the way it is. Since access tosafe drinking water is one of the core elements for adapting to climate change impacts (Moench and Dixit, 2004), achievingand maintaining a good level of service must continue to be a policy priority. What the above numbers also indicate is thatdevelopment planning, as well as the instruments of that planning including data collection and analysis, must bedecentralised to the lowest level of governance complemented by an equally engaged national-level monitoring andevaluation.

Table 2.8: Condition of coverage according to WUMP

COVERAGEPOPULATION DALIT TOTAL WATER AND SANITATION COVERAGE

PREPARED VDC DISTRICT REGION MALE FEMALE HHS HHS SL1 SL2 SL3 SL4 TOILETS

Dec-03 Gajari Doti FWDR 1,154 1,139 111 351 4 272 73 2 16Nov-02 Khirsain Doti FWDR 1,519 1,565 970 557 0 152 204 201 45Nov-02 Chhatiwan Doti FWDR 1,834 1,698 163 552 0 188 291 73 47Nov-02 Chhatiwan Doti FWDR 1,834 1,698 163 552 0 188 291 73 47Dec-03 Kaphallekei Doti FWDR 2,586 2,501 112 858 303 231 128 196 135Oct-01 Laxminagar Doti FWDR 2,571 2,475 601 850 176 400 189 85 51Dec-03 Goganpani Dailekh MWRO 1,948 1,798 181 627 39 340 222 26 97Oct-01 Duni Achham MWDR 1,013 957 825 402 41 213 89 59 16Dec-03 Dipayal-Silgadhi Doti FWDR 11,369 10,797 986 4,001 257 1,396 1,592 756 775Dec-03 Ghanteshwar Doti FWDR 1,300 1,259 449 541 0 208 306 27 21Dec-03 Ghanteshwar Doti FWDR 1,300 1,259 449 541 0 208 306 27 21Oct-01 Sanagaon Doti FWDR 1,275 1,264 780 473 27 140 34 272 13

Total 9,750 1,122 3,683 3,229 1,716 1,227hhs % hhs 11.5 37.8 33.1 17.6 12.6

Source: WARM-P (2001) and (2003)

Water-borne diseases continue to take lives in Nepal.In fact, over 80 per cent of all illness is attributed toinadequate access to clean water supplies, poorsanitation and poor hygiene practices. According to theMinistry of Health, diarrhoeal diseases account for amorbidity rate of 3.35 per cent, which is second tomorbidity caused by skin diseases (5.51 per cent),another category of illness associated with dirty water,and poor hygiene and sanitation. About 28,000children die each year from diarrhoeal diseases in thecountry. According to official estimates, 89 per cent ofthe nation’s population had access to clean drinkingwater in 2008, substantially up from the 34 per centreported when the International Decade for DrinkingWater Supply and Sanitation (IDDWSS) programmeended in 1990. This macro-level figure does not,

however, provide a real picture of service at the VDClevel. In addition, the data which was used to estimatenational coverage does not differentiate the level ofservice (see Box 2.2).

The data are also deficient in the sense that they donot consider the time taken to collect water, a factorwhich may serve as a disincentive to using clean watersources. According to WaterAid (2004), only 42 percent of communities have access to improved watersupplies within a return journey time of less than 15minutes. Other research demonstrates that the timetaken to collect water has a strong bearing on water usesand on a family’s health. The official figure also doesnot indicate the nature of the water source—whetherit is a piped system, a tubewell, or an improved spring

...................................

30


source—a fact which has bearing on the level of service.National coverage of sanitation is just 40 per cent.Populations which lack access to sanitation, particularlyold, women and children, are more at risk of ill health.In rural Nepal, the nutritional status of children underfive years of age negatively correlates with poorsanitation. This correlation suggests that the healthimpacts of poor sanitation are longer term issue thanimmediate sickness.

Because of limited mobility, the provisioning of healthservices in Nepal’s mid-mountains is generally poor.During the ten-year insurgency, these already poorlydeveloped regions also saw most of their infrastructure(train bridges, VDC buildings etc.) destroyed and theirsocial workers displaced from the villages. In 2008, afterthe monsoon withdrew, most of Nepal received norainfall for almost eight months. In addition, the onsetof the monsoon in 2009 was delayed by 15 days andwas often less than average. The dry winter and lowmonsoon rainfall resulted in the drying up of non-polluted spring and other water sources forcing thepeople to rely on polluted streams. The available healthinstitutional faculties in the district is too thinly spreadout to offer effective support (Table 2.4). That fact,combined with the prevailing social vulnerabilitiesassociated with class, gender and caste, contributedsignificantly to the deadly epidemic.

NOTES1 These details were furnished from questions in the Indian Rajya Sabha see Moench and Dixit (2004) www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2008/avg/avg19/news01.php . Accessed on August

25, 20092 According to (IHD, 2009) losses to the affected region (1,000 villages) were far higher than many earlier official estimates. More than 6000 people died, and the valuation of houses damaged

stands at around INR 880 crore (USD 195 million). Enormous amounts of goods were lost, including food-grains and domestic items worth INR 400 crore (nearly USD 88 million) and INR155 crore (USD 34 million) respectively.

3 www.freewebs.com/climatehimalaya/WWF2005/WWF-1-Regional Overview. pdf

According to Shrestha (2004), temperatures in the regionare rising about 0.02ºC per annum and our climatescenario suggests that by 2030 Western Nepal is likely toregister temperature increase of 1.4 degree Celsius relativeto a mean of 1970-1999 (see Table 4.4, Chapter 4).Scientifically it is not possible to directly attribute theepidemic in the Mid-West to climate change. However,under these changing climatic conditions described above,it is likely that smaller water sources that supply drinkingwater to local communities will dry out and communitiesmight be forced to use contaminated sources increasingthe possibilities of diarrheal outbreaks.

Conclusion

Thus we can see from these eight signature events howclimate change can potentially increase the hazardsfaced by Nepal’s population, in both rural and urbanareas. The possibility of exacerbation of these eventsboth in intensity and frequency means thatdevelopment planning must learn to first deal withincreased intensities of such disasters: increasedfrequencies can then be better handled. But for this tohappen, if the disasters caused by increased frequencyand intensity of changed weather events are to beminimized, the country’s institutions and governancestructures must improve substantially.

A TOAD'S EYE VIEW:3

CH

APTER

The previous chapter tried to capture, by presentinga number of signature events, a mosaic of Nepal’s

vulnerabilities. The events described show just howsusceptible the people, infrastructure and socio-economic systems of Nepal are to the risks of climatichazards. The future bodes still worse for Nepal:according to most scientists, such events will grow inboth frequency and intensity as the global climatewarms. The complexity of Nepal’s interconnectedphysical and social environments presents uniquechallenges to the country’s development goals, andclimate change impacts will only make things moredifficult.

Variations in altitude and precipitation have blessed therelatively small territory of Nepal with diverse climaticconditions from tropical to alpine, and almosteverything in between. This wide spectrum in turnaccounts for its having multiple ecosystems and muchbiodiversity: within its 147,181 square kilometres,Nepal boasts 118 ecosystems, 75 types of vegetationand 35 types of forests as well as 635 species ofbutterflies, 185 species of freshwater fish, 43 species ofamphibians, 100 species of reptile, 860 species of birdsand 181 species of mammals (Bhuju et al., 2007). It alsosupports a highly diverse array of cultures and livelihoods

from the mountain-dwelling Sherpa transhumant tradersand yak herders, to the culturally diverse peoples of thehills and Tarai, most of whom are farmers. Each socio-economic system is finely tuned to take advantage ofthe opportunities afforded by specific micro-climatesand localised ecosystems and to respond effectively tothe constraints on livelihoods they impose.

These human and ecological systems are embeddedwithin three types of river systems classified on thebasis of their dry-season discharge and their origin: theHimalayan, the Mahabharat and the Chure. Nepal hasfour perennial snow and glacier-fed Himalayan rivers: theSapta Koshi, the Narayani, the Karnali and the Mahakali(Nepal’s western border). Mahabharat rivers are alsoperennial but they are rain-fed and originate in themiddle mountains. They include the Mechi (theeastern border) the Kankai, the Trijuga, the Kamala, theBagmati, the East Rapti, the Tinau, the West Rapti andthe Babai. The Chure rivers, as the name implies,originate in the Chure range and have low or, in somecases, no dry season flow. Because monsoon rains aretheir main source of water, their flows are flashy andhighly variable. To develop Nepal’s climate changescenario this report has divided the country into threebroad regions (see Chapter 4 for an explanation), the

VULNERABILITYTHROUGH THE EYES OFTHE VULNERABLE

..................................

32


Sapta Koshi, Narayani and Karnali regions (see aboveFigure 3.1). In each region, three north-south transectswere selected (the Rajbiraj-Sagarmatha, Bhairahawa-Mustang and Nepalgunj-Jumla transects respectively) sothat the dramatic variations in Nepal’s three majorgeophysical regions could be captured-the mountains,the hills and the Tarai plains (Figure 3.2).

The IPCC’s 2007 Fourth Assessment Report ischaracterised by a “Himalayan gap”: it includes very fewreferences to scientific studies conducted in this region.This gap is less an oversight than a reflection of thepaucity of information available. That said, a fewstudies do suggest that the impacts of global warmingon the Himalaya will be considerable. Shrestha et al.(1999), for example, report that in Nepal temperaturesare increasing and rainfall is growing more variable.Though the lack of extensive scientific research and datahas limited the ability of the global scientificcommunity to evaluate the implications of climatechange for the region, there is another source of

information—the local people, who, in contrast to the“eagle’s eye view” of the high science of satellites,provide a “toad’s eye view” rooted in the civic scienceof traditional knowledge and on-the-groundobservation.

Governments and international agencies need high-endclimate science so that they can link emerging globalscientific projections of climate change with national-level conditions and use these connections as thefoundation for their long-term response anddevelopment programme planning. In order to improveclimate understanding, high science will needsignificant investments, but even if such investmentsare indeed made, and they may not produce robustresults useful for development planning or for thosemost vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Tomake up for this discrepancy, it is important to listento the voices of grassroots civic science. As a source ofinsight and information, the perspectives andobservations of local communities are critical in their

Perspective view of Nepal from 582 km above the Earth: South West: Vertical Exaggeration: 5Elevation values are in meters. The elevation range assigned to each physiographic zone is approximate.The prespective shows the diverse ecological subdivisions of Nepal starting from Tarai to Himal.

Figure 3.1: Transects in three regions

Source: USAID, Kathmandu

A TOAD'S EYE VIEW:VULNERABILITY THROUGHTHE EYES OF THEVULNERABLE.................................

33

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own right; indeed, they provide much informationwhich could never even be collected through formalscientific investigation. Observations at the local levelalso often document critical change patterns long beforethey can be quantitatively documented through formalscientific research.

Even more importantly, it is upon perceptions foundedon these ground-level observations that millions uponmillions of households making everyday decisions thatnot only affect their livelihood but also haveimplications for societal resilience in the face ofclimate change uncertainties. Local observations andperceptions drive behaviour. This behaviour, in turnshapes livelihood systems, infrastructure decisions andeconomic activity in ways that centralised, top-downstrategies cannot. As a result, understanding theobservations and perceptions emerging at the grassrootslevel has fundamental importance for developingsystems that are adaptive and resilient to climatechange.

Local people, though they have no access to orknowledge of scientific data and analysis, are capableof identifying changes which have undermined theirability to earn a livelihood from natural endowmentssuch as air, land, water, vegetation, crops, and livestock.While it is difficult for them to assume a macroperspective on climate change (i.e., a eagle’s eye view),they are much better positioned than the globalcommunity of scientists to provide real observations(i.e., a toad’s eye view) of what climate change meanson the ground and how it has affected their lives.

To collect snippets of these toad’s eye views, weorganised three consultative meetings: one each inBiratnagar, Pokahra and Nepalgunj. Participants came

Figure 3.2: Rajbiraj-Sagarmatha, Bhairawa-Mustang and Nepalgunj-Jumla transects

Rajbiraj-Sagarmatha

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from across nine geophysical and hydrological regions:they spanned the mountains, hills and the Tarai regionsof the Sapta Koshi, the Narayani and the Karnali basins.We also organised two consultative meetings inKathmandu; the first involved national consultation

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with experts and senior government officials, while thesecond involved local people from the Tarai, Mid-Mountain and High Himal region of the CentralDevelopment Region. The following sections present afirst-hand account of the changes these people sharedat the meetings.

Drawing upon their experience and observations, therepresentatives of nine geophysical regions providedanecdotal evidence about signature events as well asabout gradual changes in climate and their effects,including their impact on local hydrology andagriculture. Their evidence helps us appreciate theimpacts of climate change even though we have left allattempt to correlate it with scientific data to the future,when universities and other research organisations will,we hope, carry out sustained research into climatechange.

National consultation among experts

A variety of experts, including government officials,highlighted the following concerns in a half-day-longmeeting held at Malla Hotel, Kathmandu on 7th June2009.

One major issue was the natural variability of climatein Nepal. Participants recognised that Nepal’stopography greatly influences its climate and causesconsiderable macro-, meso- and micro-scale variations.Summer monsoon rainfall is greatest in the east anddecreases as one moves west though there are numerousmeso- and micro- scale variations within each region.Because climate change will have impacts on almost allsectors, including water, agriculture, food systems,health, and biodiversity, there is an urgent need to carry

out a national climate change impacts assessmentstudy, especially as many past studies lack reliable andsubstantive evidence.

Participants recognised that the reliability of data is animportant issue. In order to develop climate changescenarios, we must collect original and reliable data, andallocate sufficient resources to verify, analyse, assembleand propagate it. Without the data needed to feed intothe climate change models used to generate futurescenarios, governments will find it difficult to formulateeffective policies. It is important to ensure the qualityand accessibility of data, as well as develop theinfrastructure needed to collect and manage it.

Participants felt that climate science must receive moreemphasis if Nepal is to adequately confront the threatof climate change. A regional climate model such asPRECIS (a high-resolution climate model in a 25-kilometre grid) could generate climate change scenariosfor Nepal but its operation, which must be continuous,would be handicapped by the unreliability of Nepal’spower supply. This limitation must be overcome if ourlocal modelling capacity is to be developed. BesidesPRECIS, there are other regional climate models whoserelative capacity to accurately capture conditions inNepal must be also assessed.

The next issue touched upon in the expert consultationwas knowledge management and capacity-building. Itis not easy to generate new knowledge or build capacitythough it is very important. We need mechanisms thatfacilitate interactions within and between localcommunities as well as with national-level organisationsso that knowledge can be generated, disseminated,challenged and refined through constructiveengagement at various levels. Since climate change


35

impacts are localised, each experience will be different.It is important to understand all these differences.Enriching the capacity of core ministries such as theMinistry of Environment, the Ministry of Science andTechnology and the Ministry of Forest could help uscreate, manage and consolidate our knowledge ofclimate change if such information were made availableto all stakeholders using accessible and easy-to-useplatforms.

Participants also emphasised that coordination andcommunication among agencies must be improved sothat a consensus on solutions can be reached. Effectivemechanisms for communicating climate-relatedinformation on floods and droughts to farmers must alsobe developed.

Another major issue that emerged in the consultationsis that Nepal’s participation in global negotiations mustincrease. Participants stressed that Nepal shouldacknowledge the role global debates and discourses playin shaping climate change policies and that agenciesin Nepal which work on climate change should developa single voice in order to increase Nepal’s visibility inglobal processes such as the United Nations FrameworkConvention on Climate Change negotiations.

Participants emphasised the need to transit, in the longterm, to an economy independent of fossil fuel. To doso, Nepal needs to build infrastructures which are suitedto the country’s geology, resilient to climate impactsand environmentally sustainable. At the same time, itneeds to increase local capacity to minimise theimpacts of climate-related disasters by augmentingsocial resilience and creating opportunities to earn non-agricultural livelihoods.

Central region consultation in Kathmandu

There was a general consensus during this consultationthat surface temperatures are somewhat higher thanthey used to be and that the rate of increase intemperature is more evident in the mountains than itis in the Tarai.

Participants reported that weather patterns are moreerratic both by season and by geographic area. They feelthat common and traditional knowledge can no longerbe applied to predict the increasingly variable and erraticpatterns of rainfall and other weather phenomena. Theyalso reported that normal variations in climateparametres are frequently exceeded. For example, snowfell in the mountains in April, a historic first, andpermafrost thawing can be observed with the naked eye.The rate of melt of snow and ice has also visiblyincreased.

In addition, there are many reports that the lack ofseasonal or timely rainfall has resulted in moisture stressand drought. Agriculture, especially winter crops, issuffering, as is human health because spring watersources are drying up or getting contaminated. Thisstress was particularly evident in the winter of 2008/2009 when, as rainfall records and local testimonydocument, the winter rains failed.

Recent outbreaks of forest fires were attributed toprolonged dry seasons and the resultant dryness ofvegetation as evapo-transpiration rates increasesignificantly. The impact of the forest fires was directlyevident to most people living in central Nepal duringthe spring of 2009: smoke and haze blanketed theregion. Satellite imagery confirms this anecdotalevidence.

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The hydro-geophysical changes observed have greatlyaffected agriculture, often negatively. The 2008/2009drought, for example, resulted in low harvest levels ofcrops in many regions. It also caused mango yields todrop sharply as fruits cannot mature without sufficientwater and simply dry up and fall off. Warmertemperatures have caused declines in potato yields inthe hills in the summer and in the plains in the winter.The yield of black lentils in the Tarai has alsoplummeted. Not all effects are negative, however:horticulture in the hills got a boost as farmers can nowgrow litchis, a tropical fruit and in the Tarai plains paddyis maturing unthinkably early. Other livelihoodactivities have affected too: for example, warmingtemperatures have hampered yak-rearing in themountains.

The overall picture of agricultural harvests has putpeople’s livelihoods at risk. Poor households with smalllandholdings face the greatest hardship because theircrops are not diverse and because they have no otherincome sources. Thus, if their major crop fails, theyhave little to fall back on.

People’s health deteriorates when drought conditionsdry up local surface water sources and they are forcedto use unsafe alternatives. It is not just water-bornediseases that are on the rise; as temperatures rise,mosquitoes and mosquito-transmitted diseases havegrown more prevalent, even in the mountains.

People in the Mid-Mountain, like residents of DhadingDistrict, which lies at an elevation of about 1400metres, have begun, inexplicably, to find earthworms inwater sources. Whether this is due to a shift in thetemperature line bears research. They also report thatthey no longer see eagles or snakes in the district. InTimure VDC of Rasuwa District, for example, when the

warmer temperatures reduced harvests of chillies, theirmain crop, and consequently inhibited their trade withKerung, Tibet, farmers were left at a loss. Theycomplained that they have no options to adapt,change livelihood or diversify. They suggested thatgovernments need to help put systems in place thatwill provide alternative sources of income. Thosecoming to the meeting also suggested that skills levelsof farmers must be enhanced to help them turn to newsource of livelihood as agriculture is at risk.

Narayani River region consultation in Pokhara

Our consultation with residents of the Nayarani RiverRegion was held in Pokhara on June 22. Participantsagreed with our general finding that average surfacetemperatures are rising and that rainfall pattern isgrowing increasingly erratic. In addition, people fromMustang reported unusual and unprecedented weatherevents, including a hailstorm, snowfall in May and anunusually dry July, the peak monsoon month.

Participants said that these changes in climate hadaffected hydro-geophysical phenomena as well likelowering the flow regimes of rivers, drying up ofstreams and increasing drought conditions andmoisture stress. In fact, river flow has dropped somuch, the unimaginable has happened: bridges havebecome redundant in, of all districts, Baglung, whichpioneered indigenous suspension bridges and hasmore bridges than any other district in Nepal.Participants reported that the natural recharge ofaquifers has also declined and that groundwater tableshave been dropping rapidly. They currently stand at50-70 feet below the surface and water availability hasbecome critical even in areas once known to be richin water resources.


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Table 3.1: Summary matrix of Narayani River region consultations

Agriculture

Livestock

Water sources

Forests/pasture

Floods/landslides

Health

Crop calender

Energy

Apple affected byinsects (unusual) andhail. Elevation forgrowing apple movedto higher altitude.

Decreasing wintersnowfall resulted inless moisture andfodder growth inpastures.Unusual hailstorm inMustang

Skills and knowledge adapted to local agriculture andanimal husbandry lost due to outmigrationRice planting delayed, production loss and decline,citrus orchards wiped out by fungus.

Number of cattle decreased due to labour shortage;fodder less as pasture moisture declines; newdiseases seen, migrating plants toxic to goats.

Water source drying, discharge reduced by 90 %during winter compared to past. Water supply systemsfailed. Decreased soil water lowers soil fertility.Absence of winter snowBridges in Baglung (district with most suspensionand suspended bridges in Nepal) useless after riversdried up last winter.Snowfall in the month of May in Ghandrung (2000meters elevation). July was dry.

Grass palatable to livestock rapidly declining.Banmara weed chokes pasture lands. Grazing landshave turned into livestock unfriendly jungle.Forest fires increasing in size; even holy Pipal treesbeing cut down.

Lanslides in unexpected areas and with increasedfrequency, flash floods damaging infrastructures,

Increase in mosquitoe infestation in upper region;increase in skin diseases and eye infections.

Ghandurk summers feel warmerSnowfall on Machhapuchre in March instead ofDecember/January. Early flowering, planting andharvesting of cropsBecause of drying springs, pumps have been used topump drinking water from streams.

Delayed monsoon delays riceplanting, shortening ripening time,hence rice production declining.Diseases in oil seed cropscommonplace

Groundwater level declined from 50to 70 feet, erratic rain and flooddamaged planted rice.

Frequency of flash floods increasedin Chure area. Lower Taraiinundation and sediment castingincreased.

Energy demand for pumping isincreased

MOUNTAINS HILLS TARAI

GANDAKI

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The reported water shortages are of great concern sinceso many people are dependent on rainfall for theirlivelihoods. Just 42% of cultivated land is irrigated,1 soany decline or delay in rainfall reduces a farmer’s abilityto maintain household food security. When rainfall islate, paddy plantation is delayed and unfortunateconsequences will ensue because there will be noharvest.

Increasingly, people are realising that indigenousknowledge is not up to the task of providing earlywarnings against extreme events or of safeguardingtraditional agricultural production practices against thevagaries of nature. Just as climate variability is reachingnew heights, farmers’ ability to cope with it is decliningbecause indigenous knowledge no longer has theanswers.

Participants also see their growing trouble with pestsas climate related. Mustang’s apple harvest has declineddue to the upward migration of a devastating pest whichhas so baffled farmers that they have been unable toimplement effective mitigating measures. They havealso been unlucky in citrus fruit farming as the rise inaverage temperature has encouraged a fungal attackwhich caused widespread morbidity. Farmers haverecently planted pomegranate trees in the hope that thisfruit will, at long last, provide them with a sustainablelivelihood. In addition to pests, other invasive speciesare emerging as problems. For example, Ageratumhoustonianum (neelgandhey), a non-toxic grass speciesnative to the Tarai, has appeared in the hills of Lamjungalong the Marshyangdi Valley, where it is reportedlypoisonous to goats and cattle (DST, 2008). This grasshas probably moved upward from its native locationbecause temperatures at higher elevations areincreasing.

The climate-related changes identified by participantsin the consultation are perceived as having had a majorimpact on the traditional livelihoods of the poor. Theywere considered as a major reason they had respondedto corporate enticements to convert their paddy fieldsinto micro-scale tea gardens, a transformation whichmay serve as an effective adaptation strategy. However,it is not yet clear if tea plantation will be sustainableand the observed decrease in local water resources andambience moisture is not a positive sign.

Karnali River region consultation in Nepalgunj

The participants here felt that temperatures are risingand that rainfall is growing more erratic in its timing,intensity and duration. Participants did not agreewhether total monsoon rainfall is increasing ordecreasing. Some say that it has declined considerably,while people from Tarai report that total rainfall hasincreased slightly in spite of a decrease in the durationof the monsoon season.

In terms of the hydro-geophysical consequences of thechanging climate, people report that the region hasexperienced moisture stress and phonological drought,and attribute this aridity to the delay in the arrival ofand the erratic rainfall during the monsoon. Anotherimportant observation they made is that thegroundwater table is falling, a phenomenon theyattribute to reduced winter rainfall, more intense rainfallevents (which do not allow for slow percolation), andexcessive groundwater extraction.

These drought-like conditions have caused problems forthose engaged in agriculture-based livelihoods in theTarai plains of the Nepalgunj-Jumla transect. People


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Table 3.2: Summary matrix of Karnali region consultation

Agriculture

Livestock

Water sources

Forests/pasture

Floods/landslides

Health

Crop calender

Energy

Drought recurrent, cropfailures

Livestock numberreduced due to lack ofgrazing, Karnali Truck(salt/grain carryingsheep) is out of use

Insects infestationincreased. Fodder inpasture less available.

Mosquito appears inJumla

Decrease in production of crops, Fast maturity ofcrops/plant.

New diseases and pests due to declining population ofparrot and cranes in Dang,Dog mating year round, livestock decreasing due toshortage of labor, one productive buffalo instead ofmany unproductive, interest to produce manure isreduced. Local goats replaced by cross breeds

Total rain in tarai slightly increased, Winter rainfailed, Monsoon rain erratic, untimely and decreased,shortened monsoon period, hotter days increased

Water supply systems have lost water in the sources

Time of flowering and fruiting of some plants haveshortened. Biodiversity affected. Native flora are goingextinct.

Landslide and debris flow events increased

New diseases are appearing

Local agriculture calendar changing

Decrease in crops yield, insect inrice and mustard, caterpillarincreased, empty grains of pulses.

Certain weeds (kukhure suli) lostfrom mustard farms.Tractor replacing drought animalswith added energy demand

Ground water table continues todecline despite rainfall events.Water source emerging in once dryareas.

Deforestation increasing withfirewood pressure

Flood events becoming moredestructive, crop land lost to sandcasting, flash floods increased

Shift to tractor requires moreimported oil


complained that crops mature far ahead of time andthat the total maturation period has decreased resultingin low yields. Crops are also threatened by previouslyunseen pest infestations and diseases, and certainindigenous flora species are endangered, some criticallyso.

Mosquitoes are a new hazard in the hills and some saythat certain animal species, such as dogs, now reproduceyear round, instead of just during a specific period ofthe year. It is not known whether such changes are dueto the impacts of climate change.

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People wonder if it is the past felling of trees in the Taraithat caused the changes, especially the increase inepisodes of drought. Farmers want to know how theycan get access to scientific information aboutimminent changes in weather patterns, approachingstorms or impending droughts, early enough to enhancetheir ability to avoid loss. In a bid to enhance theirresilience, they are looking for access to relevantinformation. They would also like the opportunity toincrease their capacity to face new hazards.

In the Tarai region of the Nepalgunj-Jumla transect,floods are gradually causing noticeable problems, whichwas not the case in the past. People favour having anearly warning system and increasing the flow ofinformation to them so that they can devise local-levelplans to safeguard their agricultural and otherlivelihoods.

Sapta Koshi River region consultation inBiratnagar

The July 13 consultation in Biratnagar revealed anumber of local-level observations that testify to theimpact of climate change. In terms of climate variabilityand change, people’s reports are no different from thosein every other consultation: they see a general warmingtrend and more erratic rainfall patterns. Thetemperature increase is captured by scientific data butthe extreme rainfall variability appears to be a newphenomenon requiring further analysis. Localexperience needs to be validated with scientificobservations.

In terms of observed hydro-geophysical changes, localpeople identified a paradoxical increase in theoccurrence of both-floods and waterlogging as well as

droughts and moisture deficit. Drought appeared to beincreasing in magnitude and becoming more erratic:when once July/August, the peak of the monsoon season,was a month people struggled with excess water, todaythey face extended droughts and moisture stress.

In addition to climate-driven hazards, climate-inducedhazards were also prevalent. The incidence of forest fireshas increased considerably, probably as a result of theprolonged dry season coupled with the associated highevapo-transpiration rates.

The signs of drastic changes are ominous. Because oferratic rainfall and temperature rises, neither thetraditional crop calendar nor long-standing croprotation rules are applicable any longer. While it is truethat legumes in general suffer when topsoil moisture islacking, beans are now failing even during peak monsoonseason. Moisture stress has been taking a toll on tea andsunflower production as well. Tea leaves have dried upand turned black, an early sign of decline in production,and sunflower seeds did not even germinate in the fieldbecause of insufficient moisture. Mustard yieldsdeclined as much as 80% because of the lack of rainfall.Intriguingly, cucumber farmers found that male flowerspredominated and that the relative scarcity of femaleflowers adversely affected cucumber production.

Not all changes are bad, though they are unsettling: wildberries can now be harvested six to eight weeks earlierthan normal due to the early thawing of frost, while theflowering of peach trees has advanced considerably.

Scientific findings confirm local people’s reports ofincreased infestation of pests, weeds and fungi. Anunknown disease reduced the cardamom yield by 60%.Participants suggested that Alnus nepalensis (utis) treeshave been severely infected by a beetle that has


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Agriculture

Livestock

Water sources

Forests

Floods/landslides

Health

Crop calender

Energy

Shift from rice to tea;blackening of tealeaves.

Decline in goat andsheep population dueto lack of access tograzing

Snowline now higherthan ten years ago

Rhododendron, chanp,and katus areflowering/blossomingearlier as compared tothe previous years

Increased events

Garbage problem(plastics and solidwaste) increasing

Tea plantations replacing maize & wheat crops. Maizereplaced by cardamomCardamom becoming yellow due to disease, 60%harvest lostTea leaves getting blackenedNew weeds and insects appeared in maize farmsDisease in orange farms - roots of trees rot and theplants ultimately die out.Vegetable was good initially, now not good. Businessdestroyed by indiscriminate use of fungicide andinsecticide.Oranges and junar replaced by pomegranates due torising temperature.Paddy fields dry since last five years.Crops seeing increased incidents of insects anddiseases.

Decreasing livestock, increasing fallow lands,decrease in livestock manure. Farmers attracted topoultry, pig farming in place of cow, buffalo rearing inplace of cow , goat rearing in place of cow. Reductionin livestock numbers and shift to fewer hybrids.

Drying of spring sources, need to augment supply fromother sources. Water for irrigation is insufficient.Rainfall erratic, drought period is increasing.

Fire decreasing forests and pasture areas

Increasing landslide and bank cutting

Poor water quality, dysentery and diarrhea during therainy seasons. Contagious disease (Scabies etc.) onthe rise.

Farming cycle is changing, Peach and Prunus flowerearly, berries ripe in February instead of March/AprilChanging planting, weeding, harvesting time inagriculture sector due to erratic rain.Hot summer days and cold winter season are causingdiseases on flora and faunaIncreasing rainfall intensity, shifting of rainfall time,affecting production of vegetables and fruits.

Imported expensive oils, LPG inaccessible to manybecause of village poverty. Difficult to manage withkerosene and firewoods.LPG has been in use in towns but fire-woods, maizestalks, cowdung and kerosene are the only energysource in villages for cooking.Positive bio-gas development supported by NGOs.Drinking water is pumped from streams because ofsprings drying in hills.

Beans failed even in July . Sunflower didnot germinate, some died at a hight of 2inches. Lentils (e.g Mung Dal) failedMustard affected by insects, productiondecreased by 80 % Paddy production declining. Productivitynot even 1 mund in 1 Bigha.More male flowers in cucumber due tohigher temperature, hence no cucumber.No rainfall or irrigation in planting time,still no rainfall by end of July. Newplantations dried up.

Rainfall erratic, drought periodincreasing. Water decreasing in riverstreams, canals in winter season. Nowater in Sunsari Morang Irrigation Canalsystem. Water irrigates fields in Bihar.

Sal timber production declined (problemin regeneration?). Embankments aproblem because of water loggingproblem

Increasing inundation, bank cutting andsand deposition

Presence of Arsenic not tested in all ofTarai, some households continue to drinkarsenic contaminated water. Maintainingtoilet in high water table landscape isdifficult.

Deep tube wells for irrigation haveimportant energy dimension. Growingdemand for cold storage increasingdemand for energy.


Table 3.3: Summary matrix of key finding: A Sapta Koshi River region consultation

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significantly lowered its wood quality. Studies have alsorevealed increasing beetle activities with temperaturerise. Another unknown disease affected the root zonesof orange trees and devastated the harvest. In fact, in aconsiderable altitude band, citrus fruit no longer seemsto be a viable crop. Though large landholders have facedsignificant economic losses, it is small landholders whosuffer most from this loss. Maize fields have beenplagued with new weeds and badly affected by insectslocal farmers did not anticipate. In many areas tea andsunflower leaves have dried up and turned black, an earlysign of decline in production, and due to lack ofmoisture sunflower seeds did not even germinate.Intriguingly, cucumber farmers found that male flowerspredominated and that the relative scarcity of femaleflowers adversely affected its production.

The earning opportunities of farmers have shrunkconsiderably due to the widespread failure of crops,especially of vegetable cash crops but also of paddy.Because of late flooding and/or waterlogging, the mostfertile lands along the floodplains of the Tarai, yieldsmaller harvests than their potential. In addition, as soilquality has declined, farmers need to apply even greateramounts of fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides to seethe same yields. Since increased chemical usage is notviable either environmentally or economically, farmingpractices in the Tarai are under threat. The drought of2008-2009 has made a complex situation all the morecomplex.

Ironically, some of the challenges farmers identified areassociated with recent business-as-usual disaster riskreduction activities. For example, in a bid to reducevulnerability to flooding, embankments were builtalong flood-prone rivers. However, in the newhydrological reality these embankments no longer

contain floodwaters; instead, they cause waterlogging.Since paddy cannot be planted in still water, thehousehold food security of poor farmers has beencompromised. Obviously, development plans which donot take climate variability into consideration are athreat to people’s livelihoods. It is not clear if newvarieties introduced will help

Similarly, irrigation projects conceived and implementedwithout taking the increasingly erratic climate intoconsideration do not serve the interests of farmers. Inparticular, business-as-usual drought risk reductionapproaches that focus on irrigation development do notanticipate that a reduction in flow will limit theavailability of water and will leave upstream regions drywhen they most need water. Such approaches will notguarantee climate-safe livelihoods for local people; theywill simply increase their vulnerability.

The recent achievement in improving water supply andsanitation coverage also suffered a heavy blow, asdeclining recharge rates have meant that springs thatonce provided water year-round no longer do so at allor provide reduced flows. In consequence, water supplysystems and sanitation facilities have been rendereddysfunctional, leaving all people, but especially women,more vulnerable to disease and hardship.

In a bid to bring in more income, many poor householdshave switched crops. Instead of cultivating paddy theygrow high-value monoculture crops such as cardamomor fruit, but such single-crop systems are increasinglythreatened with failure as climate grows more erratic.Untimely drought has rendered these strategiesineffective and put food security still more at risk. Thepromise of a better life has not materialised.


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General learning

The participants at all consultations reported thattemperatures have increase, precipitation has grownmore variable and that it is increasingly hard to predictclimate patterns. They also reported that theseobserved changes had somewhat similar impacts acrossall regions:

1. Increases in both flood and drought conditions(and increase in their associated impacts on highand low stream flows and groundwater);

2. Changes in seasonality: seasonal weather patternsno longer hold.

3. Invasion of new undesirable plant and pest species,including fungi, insects, and invasive grasses

4. Changes in the behaviour of key crops and otherplants (earlier flowering, earlier ripening, yielddeclines, shifts in viability)

5. Changes in the presence and behaviour of livestockand other animals (the presence of snakes, changesin yaks)

6. Declining reliability of traditional and indigenousknowledge about climate and plants: historicalconditions can no longer serve as a guide to thefuture.

These commonly observed changes have major impactsat the local level. Livelihoods based on subsistenceagriculture are suffering because of the adverse effectsof climate change. Delays in the onset of the monsoonset back paddy transplantation, which in turn may beresponsible for its early maturation and low yields.Since rice is the staple food for most Nepalese, aconsiderable decline in paddy yields can have adevastating impact on household-level food security.Poor households are at greater risk.

The production of vegetable protein (lentils, chick peas,beans, and the like) has declined due to delayedmonsoon rains and/or vertical shifts in temperatureregime. This decline exacerbates the food-relatedvulnerability of poor households and puts human healthat risk.

Horticulture and vegetable production have beensuffering, too, as water supplies decline when winterrainfall is used up faster than groundwater aquifers canbe recharged. There is no longer a guaranteed supplyof water from known springs.

The prolonged drought-like conditions which arise withthe delay in the monsoon also affect livestockmanagement. People tell stories of selling livestock tocope with the water shortage, and yak rearing in themountains is reportedly on the decline, perhaps becauseof a vertical shift in temperature zones and the resultantshrinkage in the habitat boundaries of yaks.

In some areas, the risk of floods has increased due toepisodic monsoon rainfall (short and high intensitydownpours) during the late monsoon. Untimely snowfalland unprecedented hailstorms are other strikingextreme event anomalies in local climate systems.

Of late, people have tried to adopt new forms oflivelihoods. Either through the influence of thecommunity or of large farmers and corporaterepresentatives, people have begun to embrace newagricultural technologies and monoculture.Unfortunately, focusing on just one or two crops putsfarmers, especially small landholders, at great risk if theircrop fails. In the mountain districts of Manang andMustang, for example, tea, citrus and apple plantationssuffered severe blows. Once a small landholder’s land is

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NOTES

1 Water Resource Strategy Nepal 2001 reports that the total irrigated area in Nepal is 1,104,000 hectares, which is 42% of the total cultivated area.

committed to a long-term plantation programme, thereare very few alternatives open to him when climate-related stress increases. In fact, monoculture cultivationreduces farmers’ capacity to cope and pushes them deepinto crisis. The small gains they achieve through suchan adaptation strategy do not provide sufficientcushion in times of despair.

Besides experiencing losses in agriculture-basedlivelihoods, people have become victims ofinappropriate development. For example, many ruralareas were provided with small-scale water supplysystems which were based only on current realities andignored the implications of climate change. Many ofthe springs that fed these systems have now dried upand the systems themselves have ceased to function.

In the absence of any alternative, people are forced tocollect water from unsafe sources and face the risk ofwater-borne diseases. Participants suggested that thediarrhoea epidemic in Jajarkot is one manifestation ofthe increasing stress on water supply.

The five bottom-up, toad’s-eye-view consultations thatwere held helped provide local perspectives on weathervagaries that might be related to climate change. It isdifficult to assert with certainty without more scientificinvestigations that it is so; but as has been emphasisedpreviously, these vagaries and the increase in theirfrequency and intensity are consistent with mostclimate change predictions. In the next chapter wepresent the different scenarios that climate modelspresent and identify synergies and gaps.

CLIMATE CHANGEPROJECTIONS FORNEPAL

4C

HAPTER

Summary / key points

Rainfall patterns (timing and amount) in Nepalassociated with the South Asian Monsoon System(SAM) are inherently complex due to highly variedtopography over short distances. Temperature patternsare also strongly controlled by elevation and aspect.Topographic complexity over Nepal makesprojecting climate changes more difficult than usual.There is evidence that all-Nepal rainfall (1959-1988)during the monsoon (JJAS) and post-monsoon(OND) season was strongly correlated with theSouthern Oscillation Index (the pressure componentof the El Niño Southern Oscillation pattern). If thisrelationship holds for the future, rainfall projectionsfrom climate models will be dependent on the abilityof models to simulate ENSO and the links to Nepalrainfall.All GCMs currently have difficulty in replicating keylarge-scale features that influence the entire AsianSummer Monsoon System (ASM), such as theIntertropical Convergence Zone, the Madden JulianOscillation and ENSO. Nor are any of the modelscurrently in agreement about the evolution of theselarge-scale features under different SRES greenhousegas scenarios.

General circulation models and regional climatemodels do not, as yet, adequately represent theconvection mechanisms or topography thatinfluence local Nepali rainfall systems embeddedwithin the larger SAM.The performance of GCMs over South Asia istypically validated against the Indian summermonsoon observations. Yet, all-Nepal summermonsoon rainfall is not well correlated with all-India monsoon (ISM) rainfall. It cannot be assumedthat because a particular GCM replicated keyfeatures of the ISM that it will be able to do so forNepal. Thus a GCM and RCM inter-comparisonproject needs to be done for Nepal to see whatmodels are suitable to Nepal.The few climate change projection studies thatcould be accessed for Nepal indicate that GCM /RCM temperature and precipitation outputs canbe strongly biased (too hot/cold and too little/toomuch rain) for most parts of the country, reducingconfidence in climate change projections.In short, making climate change projections forNepal will be difficult and any projections must beinterpreted and used cautiously, given the

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limitations of GCMs, RCMs and observationaldatasets for this region of the world. A great dealof uncertainty exists in the projections.However, uncertainty in climate projections is notnecessarily a barrier to assessing vulnerability andassessing adaptation options.GCM projections indicate a potential increase intemperature over Nepal of 0.5-2.0 °C, with a multi-model mean of 1.4 °C by the 2030s, rising to 3.0-6.3 °C, with a multi-model mean of 4.7 °C, by the2090s. There is very little differentiation inprojected multi-model mean temperature changesin different regions (East, Central, West) of Nepal.GCM outputs suggest that extremely hot days (thehottest 5% of days in the period 1970-1999) areprojected to increase by up to 55% by the 2060sand 70% by the 2090sGCM outputs suggest that extremely hot nights(the hottest 5% of nights in the period 1970-1999)are projected to increase by up to 77% by the 2060sand 93% by the 2090sGCMs project a wide range of precipitationchanges, especially in the monsoon: -14 to + 40%by the 2030s increasing -52 to + 135% by the2090s.Relative changes in precipitation in other seasonsare similarly large.A majority of GCMs project increases in heavyprecipitation events.Only a few Regional Climate Model results areavailable; large-scale changes are consistent withGCM changes, but show considerable variability inregional response.At this stage, there are insufficient RCM outputsto make definitive statements of the range ofpossible future changes at fine resolution acrossNepal.

Climate of Nepal

Nepal’s climate is primarily affected by two majornatural features, the Himalaya mountain range and theSouth Asian Monsoon (SAM). The Himalaya resultsin a strong topographic gradient from SW to NE acrossthe country. Kansakar et al. (2004) divide the countryinto five regions (see Figure 4.1) from south to northwith increasing altitude: the Tarai (<900m), the SiwalikHills (900m to 1200m), the Middle Mountains (1500mto 3000m), the High Mountains (3000m to 5000m)and the High Himalayas (>5000m). The Tarai andSiwalik Hills have tropical to subtropical climates. Aselevation increases, temperature generally decreases,with valleys in the Middle Mountains being warmer(subtropical) than ridges. The High Mountain and HighHimalaya climates are quite cold, yet also block manySiberian fronts from penetrating deep into Nepal,generally precluding snow in the valleys of the MiddleMountains. Rainfall in Nepal is largely associated withthe SAM, and most locations in Nepal receive close to80% of their annual precipitation as rainfall during themonths of June-September. However, such broadstatements belie the true spatial and temporalcomplexity of rainfall distribution throughout Nepal. Inparticular, topography interacts with the SAM toproduce large variations in precipitation.

In general, there are four precipitation seasons: (i) thehot, dry pre-monsoon spanning March – May; (ii) themonsoon season (June – September) in which ~80%of the annual rainfall occurs for much of the country;(iii) the post-monsoon, transitional period of October– November; and (iv) the cool/cold dry winter season(December – February) with occasional snowfall eventsin the High Mountain and Himalaya regions. Onset of

CLIMATE CHANGEPROJECTIONS FORNEPAL...................................

47

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the summer monsoon occurs first in eastern Nepal andprogresses northwest. Withdrawal of the monsoontypically begins in the west. Consequently, themonsoon season is shortest in the NW parts of thecountry. Sharp terrain contrasts (a couple thousandmeter elevation differences) over short distances (<10km) strongly influence local convective processembedded within the larger monsoon complex on sub-daily timescales, but are not adequately captured viathe weather station network. Rainfall gauges tend to belocated in valleys, with ridge top representation sparse.Station density at the highest altitudes of the HighMountains and Himalayas is particularly low.Nonetheless, studies indicate that local variations inrainfall amount and timing can be drastic, with ridgesreceiving 4 to 5 times the rainfall amounts of the valleyssituated nearby (Higuchi et al., 1982; Barros and Lang2003), demonstrating the importance of orography toconvective processes. Above ~3000m, precipitation

amounts tend to decrease with elevation (Ichiyanagi etal., 2007). Additionally, south-facing slopes (windwardside) tend to receive more precipitation than north-facing (leeward side) slopes, as these are often in rainshadows. Strong diurnal signals have also been observed,with daily rainfall peaks frequently occurring during thenight (Barros and Lang, 2003). Spatially, rainfallmaximums are located in the area around Pokhara andthe Kathmandu valley (see Figure 4.2). Even relativelyhigh spatial resolution satellite data do not capture thefull extent of this spatial variability (Figure 4.3).

Limitations of climate models

Before describing climate change projections for Nepal,some the limitations of Global Climate Models(GCMs) and Regional Climate Models (RCMs) areclarified.

Figure 4.1 Regions of Nepal

Adapted from Kansakar et al. (2004: 1647). Base map adapted from wikipedia.org. The black lines indicate the crude basin boundaries of A) the Karnali River, B) the Narayani River and C) theSapta Koshi River. Each was define as Saptakoshi region, Narayani region and Karnali region in chapter 3 (see figure 3.1). In each five broad ecological subdivisions was considered.

.................................

48


GCMs have limited spatial resolution – typically around2.5 x 2.5 ° latitude/longitude – which means that manyof the topographic features important for Nepal’sclimate are not properly represented. Indeed for mostGCMs, Nepal is represented by three grid points,providing some differentiation between east, centraland western Nepal, but no real differentiation of theSW-NE topographic gradient or the complextopography within this overall gradient. Therefore,GCM results can at best produce projections of large-scale response that would occur in the absence finerscale of land-surface influences.

Additionally, GCMs have biases and errors in theirrepresentation of larger scale circulation features, whichcan degrade the reliability of projected climate changes.Of particular relevance for Nepal are the difficulties thatthe majority of GCMs have in replicating key large-scalefeatures of the SAM (Wang et al., 2004; Lin et al., 2006;

Figure 4.2:Coarse resolution annual precipitation distribution based on 67 climate stations from1971-2005 and 337 precipitation stations from 1998-2005

Lin et al., 2008; Zhang and Li, 2008). In particular, theyhave difficulty matching features such as rainfalldistributions (clustering areas of strong convection closerto the equator than actually happens, which implies poorrepresentation of the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone),onset and withdrawal of the monsoon in manylocations, variability on diurnal and subseasonaltimescales (inability to capture the Madden-JulianOscillation that contributes to the active and breakcycles of the monsoon), and biasing certain ocean andatmospheric features (temperatures, vorticity andcirculation patterns, particularly those associated withENSO) in the Indo-Pacific oceans regions. Furthermore,each model has different projections about the evolutionof ENSO under various climate change scenarios (DeSzoeke and Xie, 2008). However, some improvement toGCMs is being seen. Lin et al. (2008) and Lee et al.,(2008) note that certain GCMs capture the interannualand intraseasonal variability better than others.

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49Figure 4.3: Coarse resolution (0.25 x 0.25 ° latitude/longitude) annual precipitation distribution fromthe TRMM satellite for the period 1998 2009.

With regard to the South Asian region, most studiesfocus on the ability of GCMs to replicate the Indiansummer monsoon component, while ignoring modelperformance for Bangladesh and Nepal. Two studieshave recently assessed the performance of AR4 GCMsover South Asia/India (Kripalani et al., 2007; Lin et al.,2008), and report that some GCMs are able to replicatesome mean features (biennial tendency of monsoons,annual precipitation cycle, mean monsoon behavior) ofthe ISM “relatively” well (Table 4.1). However, asShrestha et al. (2000) noted, the all-Nepal monsoonrainfall does not correlate well with the all-Indiamonsoon rainfall. Thus, it cannot be assumed that theGCMs listed in Table 4.1 are able to replicate key featuresassociated with the Nepal summer monsoon rainfall.

In spite of these limitations, a few climate changeprojection studies exist for Nepal. Two, McSweeney etal. (2009) and Khan et al. (2005), summarise GCM

projections for a variety of SRES scenarios over theNepal region. The McSweeney study synthesisedprojections from GCMs utilised in the IPCC AR4, butdoes not attempt to quantify or correct model biases.Therefore, projections are presented “as is”. The APNCAPaBLE project (Khan et al., 2005) also summarised13 GCM projections, probably from the IPCC AR4model outputs, although this is not clear from thereport. The authors did validate the GCMs’performances against CRU temperature andprecipitation datasets spanning Pakistan, Nepal andBangladesh for the period of 1961-1990, but modelbiases are not discussed in the report accessed and it isnot clear that any bias corrections were made to theclimate change projections.

RCMs overcome some of the spatial resolution issuesassociated with GCMs – typical resolutions are 0.5 to0.25 ° latitude/longitude (50 to 25km). However, as

.................................

50


noted earlier, rainfall distribution in Nepal is complexand highly dependent topographically forcedconvection on scales of less than 10 km and over shorttimeframes. Spatial and temporal (timescales rangingfrom less than a day to interannual) variability are highfor Nepalese precipitation. RCMs run at resolutionstypical for climate change projections are insufficientto capture such fine-scale convective or orographicprocesses. RCMs also inherit the biases of the GCMin which they are nested. Yet, evaluating model biasesover Nepal is difficult, due to lack of sufficient (in termsof length, geographic distribution and quality) stationdata and resultant the gridded observational datasets.Opitz-Stapleton et al. (2008) found that for the Nepaliside of the Rohini River basin, located in the centralTarai region, station data with 30 years of length didnot adequately capture the climatology of that area.

Comparison of various RCMs via the Regional ClimateModel Intercomparison Project for Asia (RMIP)actually focused primarily on East Asia (Fu et al., 2005;Feng and Fu, 2006). Publicly available results of theproject for the South Asian region are difficult toacquire, and it does not appear that any RCM outputwas validated over Nepal with station data, onlyinterpolated data. Another smaller RCM comparisonproject for Nepal, Pakistan and Bangladesh was fundedunder the aegis of APN-CAPaBLE. This projectevaluated the performance of RegCM3 and PRECIS,

Table 4.1 GCMs used in AR4 that reasonably hindcast features of the Indian summer monsoon

MODEL MODEL CENTER LAND/ATMOSPHERE RESOLUTION OCEAN RESOLUTION

CGCM 3.1 Canadian Centre for Climate T47 (~2.8°x2.8°)/ 1.9°x1.9°, L29Modelling and Analysis L31 (top = 1 hPa) rigid lid(Canada)

MIROC3.2-Medres Center for Climate Systems T47 (~2.8°x2.8°)/ 0.5°-1.4°x1.4°, L43Research, Nat’l Inst. for Environ. L20 (top = 30 km) free surfaceStudies, & Frontier Research (Medres)Center for Global Change(Japan)

MPI-ECHAM5 Max Plank Institute for T63 (~1.9°x1.9°)/ 1.5°x1.5°, L40Meteorology (Germany) L31 (top = 10 hPa) free surface

although, only RegCM3 was evaluated for Nepal. Theresearchers ran RegCM3 using the MIT-Emanuelconvective scheme and driven at the boundaries by theGCM ECHAM5 (Khan et al., 2005). Modelperformance was validated over the period of 1961-1990against the CRU gridded dataset (New et al., 1999).Significant model biases were found in both meantemperature and mean precipitation in all seasons. Inparticular, Shrestha (2008) found that during the winter(December – February) the model had a significant coldbias (-2 to -10°C) over most of the country, except thenorthern regions where a warm bias ranging from +2to +6°C prevailed. During the monsoon months, thecold bias persists through much of the country, as doesthe warm bias in the north. Precipitation isoverestimated during the winter months in the centraland eastern Tarai/Siwalik areas by 75 to 200%.Precipitation during the winter in western portions ofNepal is overestimated by 25 to 75%, with theoverestimation increasing from south to north. Duringthe monsoon season, precipitation estimates arecomparatively more reliable, showing overestimationsof 10 to 50% for most of the country. The HighHimalaya areas, however, are not well represented andportray monsoon precipitation in excess of 100 to300% of the interpolated CRU data1 . A small area ofthe central Tarai, located near the Rohini River basin,displays an underestimation of 15% during themonsoon season.

Source: Kripalani et al. (2007); Lin et al. (2008)


51

Climate change projections for Nepal

The results presented below are based on GCM andRCM data that were easily available in the timeavailable for this project. For GCMs, 15 models (Table4.2) were chosen that had provided daily and monthlydata from the CMIP3 archive, and for which outputsfrom three SRES emissions scenarios were available: A2,A1B and B2. Of these emissions scenarios, the A2 hasthe highest emissions and shows the closest match toobserved emissions increases since 2000 (Rahmstorf etal., 2007); thus for near term scenarios (out to the2040s), the A2 data are considered more plausible interms of forcing.

For RCMs, data from only two simulations are analysed(Table 4.3). The results from these simulations are noteasily comparable, as they are at different spatialresolutions, driven by different GCMs outputs and havebeen run for different periods in the future. To enablecomparison over the same time period, the results fromPRECIS have been scaled to produce equivalentresponses for the period 2040 – 2070. Given the above,the RCM outputs should be considered as examples ofthe types of local responses that might expected, given

the larger-scale changes simulated by their “parent”GCMs. A far more comprehensive set multi-RCM-GCM simulations is required before a sense can begained of the range of possible climate conditions thatdifferent regions Nepal might experience.

Summary of projections from GCMs for Nepal

TemperatureData are summarised in Figure 4.4 and 4.5, Table 4.4-4.6, and then in further Figures in the supplementarymaterial at the end of the document.

Mean annual temperature across Nepal is projectedincrease by:

0.5 to 2.0 °C, with a multi-model mean of1.4 °C, by the 2030s.1.7 to 4.1 °C, with a multi-model mean of2.8 °C, by the 2060s.3.0 to 6.3 °C, with a multi-model mean of4.7 °C, by the 2090s.

Increases in temperature are lower in the monsoonand post-monsoon season than winter and pre-monsoon, by up to 1.6°C by the 2090s; this

Table 4.2 GCMs used to prepare climate projections for Nepal

MODEL

bccr_bcm2_0cccma_cgcm3_1cnrm_cm3csiro_mk3_0csiro_mk3_5gfdl_cm2_0gfdl_cm2_1giss_model_e_rinmcm3_0ipsl_cm4miub_echo_g

mpi_echam5mri_cgcm2_3_2ancar_ccsm3_0ukmo_hadcm3

INSTITUTE

Bjerknes Centre for Climate Research, NorwayCanadian Centre for Climate Modelling and AnalysisMeteoFrance/Centre National de Recherches Meteorologiques, FranceCommonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) Atmospheric Research, AustraliaCommonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) Atmospheric Research, AustraliaUS Department of Commerce/ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Sciences Geophysical Fluid dynamics LaboratoryUS Department of Commerce/ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Sciences Geophysical Fluid dynamics LaboratoryNASA/ Goddard Institute for Space studies (GISS), USAInstitute for numerical Mathematics, RussiaInstitute Pierre Simon LaPlace, FranceMeteorological Institute of the University of Bonn, meteorological Research Institute of the Korea MeteorologicalAdministration (KMA) and Model and data group, Germany/Korea

Max Plank Institute for Meteorology, GermanyMeteorological Research Institute, JapanNational Centre for Climate Research, USAHadley centre for Climate prediction and research/Met office, UK.

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52


difference is at least partly due to the projectedincreases in monsoon rainfall and cloudiness, whichwill reduce incoming solar radiation and enhancecooling through evaporation.Projected temperature increases are lower inEastern Nepal than Western and Central; by the2090s this difference is about 0.7°C.The frequency of “hot days” (the hottest 5% ofdays in the period 1970-1999) in the pre-monsoonperiod are projected to increase by:

15-55 % by the 2060s.26-69 % by the 2090s.

The frequency of “hot nights” (the hottest 5% ofnights in the period 1970-1999) in the pre-monsoon period are projected to increase by:

15-55 % by the 2060s.26-69 % by the 2090s.

“The frequency of “hot nights” (the hottest 5% ofdays in the period 1970-1999) are projected toincrease most in the monsoon period:

6-77 % by the 2060s.29-93 % by the 2090s.

GCM outputs do not have sufficient spatialresolution to provide information on temperaturechanges across the different elevation zones.

PrecipitationData are summarised in Figure 4.6 and 4.7, and Table4.7 to 4.10, and then in further figures in thesupplementary material at the end of the document.

Projected mean annual precipitation does not showa clear trend with both increases and decreases:

-34 to + 22%, with multi-model mean of +0% by the 2030s.

Only the A2 scenario runs were analysed for this report.

Table 4.3: RCMs used to prepare climate projections for Nepal

MODEL

PRECIS

RegCM3

SPATIAL RESOLUTION

0.44 degrees

0.22 degrees

DRIVING GCM

HadCM3 + HadAM3

ECHAM5

EMISSIONS SCENARIO

A2 (& B2)a

A2

TIME PERIOD

2070 - 2100

2040 - 2070

-36 to + 67 %, with a multi-model mean of+4 %, by the 2060s.-43 to +80 %, with a multi-model mean of+8%, by the 2090s.

Monsoon rainfall projections vary widely, but moremodels suggest an increase than a decrease towardsthe end of the century:

-40 to + 143%, with a multi-model mean of+2 %, by the 2030s.-40 to + 143%, with a multi-model mean of+7 % by the 2060s.-52 to + 135%, with a multi-model mean of+16%, by the 2090s.

Eastern and Central Nepal monsoon rainfall isprojected to increase more than Western Nepal,where the multi-model mean increase by the 2090sis only +6%.Winter precipitation projections show a tendencyfor a decrease, but with several models projectingan increase; the multi-model mean projection is -14 %.Heavy rainfall is projected to increase slightly in themonsoon and post-monsoon seasons, and decreaseslightly in the winter and pre-monsoon seasons:

The proportion of total monsoonprecipitation falling as heavy rain events isprojected to change by -21 to + 34%, with amulti-model mean of +7 %, by the 2060sMost models show an increase in maximum1-day and maximum 5-day rainfall by the2060s, in both the monsoon and post-monsoon periods, and little change in otherseasons.

GCM outputs do not have sufficient spatialresolution to provide information on precipitationchanges across the different elevation zones.


53

Summary climate change projections fromRCMs for Nepal

TemperatureRCM projections for changes in mean temperatureare consistent with 15 GCM outputs, fallingwithin the range projected by GCMs.RCM projected changes in mean temperature tendto be greater than those for their “parent” GCMin the winter period, and lower or the same in themonsoon season, suggesting there are localfeedbacks to surface warming that are not capturedby the parent GCMs.RegCM3 and PRECIS show significant differencesin the spatial patterns of temperature changes:

PRECIS has largest increases in the HighMountains and TaraiRegCM3 has largest increase in the MiddleHillsNote that PRECIS data are from later in thecentury (2070-2100) than RegCM3 (2040-2070) so a larger snow/ice feedback effect maybe coming into play in the High Mountains.

PrecipitationRCM projections for precipitation are within therange projected by GCMsHowever, RCM projections for precipitation candiffer from those of their “parent” GCMs - generallylarger changes are simulated by the RCMs, andsometimes of opposite sign:

For RegCM3-ECHAM5, winter precipitationis projected to increase by 0.0-1.0mm/daywhile in ECHAM5 winter precipitation showsa small decrease over NepalFor both RegCM3-ECHAM5 and ECHAM5,monsoon precipitation is projected to increasein western Nepal and decrease in easternNepal, but the changes projected for RegCM3are larger, with decreases and increases of upto 8mm compared to 2mm/day for ECHAM5.For PRECIS, winter precipitation in 2070-2100 is projected to increase by 1-2mm/dayin the Middle Hills and decrease in the HighMountains of central Nepal; elsewhere,precipitation is projected to increase by lessthan one mm/day.HadCM3 shows a relatively low winterprecipitation over 2070-2100, compared toearlier decades in the century; hence the winterprecipitation changes in PRECIS are likely tobe larger in decades where HadCM3 has greaterprecipitation (see Figure 9 for scaled changesin 2040-2070).PRECIS shows an increase in monsoonprecipitation across the whole of Nepal, butincreases are largest in the Middle Hills, andin central Nepal.

RCM projected changes do not show a strongelevation dependence, although there is a tendencyfor the largest changes (both increases anddecreases to be in the Middle Hills).

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54


Figure 4.4: Observed and projected changes in mean temperature over Nepal, 1960-2100.

The black line shows the observed Nepal-wide temperature trend to 2006. The brown line and shading shows the multi-model mean and range for models forced with observed GHG and aerosolsto 2006. The coloured lines and shading from 2006 onwards show multi-model mean and range of changes under three different emissions scenarios.


55Figure 4.5: Spatial pattern of GCM projections of mean temperature over Nepal and surrounding areas,for the A2 scenario, for three 10-year periods in the future.

Shading shows the multi-model mean change. Figures in each grid box show the multi-model mean, as well as the range across the multi-model ensemble.

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56


Time Period

2030s

2060s

2090s

Annual

1.4 (0.5, 1.8)

2.7 (1.7, 3.3)

4.2 (3.2, 5.4)

Pre-Monsoon

1.5 (0.5, 2.0)

2.9 (1.7, 4.1)

4.7 (3.3, 6.1)

Monsoon

1.3 (0.3, 1.9)

2.3 (1.1, 3.0)

3.5 (2.0, 5.6)

Post-Monsoon

1.1 (0.3, 2.0)

2.5 (1.4, 3.2)

4.0 (2.9, 5.4)

Winter

1.3 (0.5, -2.4)

2.9 (1.8, 4.0)

4.7 (3.4, 6.1)

CENTRAL NEPALTime Period

2030s

2060s

2090s

Annual

1.4 (0.9, 2.0)

3.0 (1.7, 4.1)

4.9 (3.0, 6.3)

Pre-Monsoon

1.7 (0.8, 2.5)

3.1 (1.9, 4.7)

5.4 (3.5, 7.0)

Monsoon

1.4 (0.5, 2.2)

2.5 (1.0, 3.4)

4.5 (1.9, 5.5)

Post-Monsoon

1.2 (0.7, 2.0)

2.6 (1.8, 4.1)

4.6 (3.2, 5.9)

Winter

1.6 (0.9, 2.8)

3.4 (1.9, 4.6)

5.4 (3.7, 7.1)

Time Period

2030s

2060s

2090s

Annual

1.4 (0.8, 2.0)

2.8 (1.9, 3.8

4.9 (3.7, 5.9)

Pre-Monsoon

1.8 (0.8, 2.1)

3.0 (2.2, 4.4)

5.3 (4.0, 6.5)

Monsoon

1.4 (0.5, 2.2)

2.3 (1.4, 3.3)

4.0 (2.8, 5.9)

Post-Monsoon

1.1 (0.5, 2.0)

2.6 (1.8, 4.0)

4.3 (3.3, 5.5)

Winter

1.5 (0.7, 2.8)

3.4 (1.7, 4.5)

5.6 (3.7-6.2)

WESTERN NEPAL

Table 4.5. Change in frequency of hot days (%, relative to mean of 1970-1999) from GCM projections.EASTERN NEPALTime Period

2060s

2090s

Annual

16 (12, 35)

22 (14, 45)

Pre-Monsoon

26 (16, 45)

43 (29, 62)

Monsoon

24 (10, 66)

35 (8, 84)

Post-Monsoon

24 (10, 66)

35 (8, 84)

Winter

26 (19, 80)

53 (31, 91)

CENTRAL NEPAL

WESTERN NEPALTime Period

2060s

2090s

Annual

17 (12, 39)

23 (16, 48)

Pre-Monsoon

26 (18, 55)

40 (26, 69)

Monsoon

21 (11, 63)

39 (16, 84)

Post-Monsoon

23 (7, 48)

45 (19, 58)

Winter

33 (17, 89)

64 (33, 94)

Table 4.6. Change in frequency of hot nights (%, relative to mean of 1970-1999)

EASTERN NEPAL

Table 4.4. Change in mean temperature (°C, relative to mean of 1970-1999) from GCM projections.

Time Period

2060s

2090s

Annual

18 (10, 41)

29 (16, 49)

Pre-Monsoon

25 (17, 52)

48 (27, 66)

Monsoon

25 (14, 75)

43 (14, 85)

Post-Monsoon

26 (9, 49)

45 (28, 61)

Winter

37 (18, 65)

68 (35, 79)

Time Period

2060s

2090s

Annual

6 (7, 30)

37 (22, 44)

Pre-Monsoon

26 (4, 37)

45 (19, 60)

Monsoon

56 (6, 77)

85 (29, 93)

Post-Monsoon

27 (9, 32)

44 (31, 56)

EASTERN NEPALWinter

29 (9, 41)

53 (14, 88)


2060s

2090s

Annual

23 (13, 26)

33 (20, 38)

Pre-Monsoon

26 (3, 34)

45 (6, 56)

Monsoon

55 (25, 71)

77 (44, 89)

Post-Monsoon

23 (16, 36)

38 (25, 51)

Winter

28 (10, 40)

54 (14, 86)


2060s

2090s

Annual

23 (8, 26)

32 (17, 39)

Pre-Monsoon

25 (2, 36)

42 (9, 58)

Monsoon

48 (12, 61)

81 (40, 87)

Post-Monsoon

22 (8, 32)

38 (18, 51)

Winter

27 (6, 40)

54 (9, 77)


57Figure 4.6. Observed and projected changes in mean precipitation over Nepal, 1960-2100.

The black line shows the observed Nepal-wide temperature trend to 2006. The brown line and shading shows the multi-model mean and range for models forced with observed GHG and aerosolsto 2006. The coloured lines and shading from 2006 onwards show multi-model mean and range of changes under three different emissions scenarios

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58


Figure 4.7. Spatial pattern of GCM projections of mean precipitation change over Nepal andsurrounding areas, for the A2 scenario, over three 10-year periods in the future.

Shading shows the multi-model mean change. Figures in each grid box show the multi-model mean, as well as the range across the multi-model ensembl


59Table 4.7. Change in monthly precipitation (%, relative to mean of 1970-1999)

Time Period

2030s

2060s

2090s

Annual

0 (-26,10)

10 (-26, 44)

15 (-43, 80)

Pre-Monsoon

0 (-36, 71)

2 (-37, 53)

18 (-59, 97)

Monsoon

0 (-17, 20)

11 (-21, 71)

25 (-52, 121)

Post-Monsoon

-4 (-35, 24)

2 (-14, 36)

27 (-22, 105)

Winter

6 (-45, 46)

-8 (-52, 35)

-5 (-72, 22)


2030s

2060s

2090s

Annual

0 (-34, 22)

0 (-36, 47)

7 (-32, 64)

Pre-Monsoon

-7 (-32, 11)

-10 (-45, 19)

-13 (-54, 36)

Monsoon

5 (-17, 40)

10 (-37, 79)

19 (-46, 123)

Post-Monsoon

-4 (-26, 86)

4 (-15, 119)

4 (-42, 132)

Winter

-10 (-43, 13)

-11 (-42, 11)

-19 (-56, 21)

Time Period

2030s

2060s

2090s

Annual

0 (-31, 16)

4 (-33, 67)

3 (-23, 74)

Pre-Monsoon

-10 (-40, 16)

-15 (-43, 29)

-17 (-45, 32)

Monsoon

0 (-14, 37)

2 (-40, 143)

6 (-45, 135)

Post-Monsoon

-5 (-23, 125)

6 (-15, 186)

1 (-30, 205)

Winter

-12 (-40, 26)

-6 (-50, 15)

-19 (-49, 32)

WESTERN NEPAL

Table 4.8. Change in precipitation as heavy events (%, relative to mean of 1970-1999)

EASTERN NEPAL

EASTERN NEPALTime Period

2060s

2090s

Annual

2 (-8, 5)

6 (-4, 23)

Pre-Monsoon

2 (-13, 9)

4 (-34, 12)

Monsoon

3 (-4, 20)

6 (-6, 34)

Post-Monsoon

1 (-5, 2)

7 (0, 28)

Winter

-2 (-32, 5)

-5 (-21, 9)


2060s

2090s

Annual

4 (-7, 12)

6 (1, 21)

Pre-Monsoon

0 (-14, 12)

-1 (-17, 16)

Monsoon

4 (-6, 17)

8 (-21, 30)

Post-Monsoon

3 (-9, 24)

8 (-12, 26)

Winter

-4 (-10, 6)

-1 (-13, 13)


2060s

2090s

Annual

3 (-6, 9)

7 (-1, 11)

Pre-Monsoon

-2 (-14, 14)

-3 (-15, 16)

Monsoon

5 (-4, 12)

9 (-13, 15)

Post-Monsoon

3 (-11, 26)

8 (-15, 30)

Winter

-6 (-15, 10)

-3 (-27, 15)

Table 4.9. Change in maximum 1-day rainfall (mm, relative to mean of 1970-1999)EASTERN NEPAL

CENTRAL NEPAL

WESTERN NEPAL

Time Period

2060

2090

Annual

2 (-10, 57)

10 (0, 91)

Pre-Monsoon

0 (-7, 12)

3 (-12, 10)

Monsoon

2 (-3, 61)

9 (-2, 98)

Post-Monsoon

1 (-1, 5)

11 (0, 57)

Winter

0 (-18, 5)

-2 (-7, 7)

Time Period

2060

2090

Annual

3 (-10, 38)

12 (-1, 61)

Pre-Monsoon

0 (-13, 7)

0 (-10, 4)

Monsoon

3 (-3, 43)

5 (-4, 67)

Post-Monsoon

2 (-2, 13)

8 (0, 20)

Winter

0 (-9, 4)

0 (-6, 11)

Time Period

2060

2090

Annual

4 (-9, 43)

11 (-4, 40)

Pre-Monsoon

0 (-11, 8)

-1 (-7, 5)

Monsoon

2 (-3, 45)

4 (-14, 43)

Post-Monsoon

2 (-4, 17)

9 (-2, 16)

Winter

-2 (-8, 6)

0 (-7, 7)

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Table 4.10. Change in maximum 5-day rainfall (mm, relative to mean of 1970-1999)

Time Period

2060

2090

Annual

7 (-18,119)

25 (-2, 224)

Pre-Monsoon

1 (-14, 20)

6 (-22, 25)

Monsoon

6 (-17, 22)

32 (-2, 210)

Post-Monsoon

3 (-3, 22)

18 (0, 135)

Winter

2 (-30, 8)

-4 (-12, 9)


2060

2090

Annual

10 (-27, 95)

15 (0, 170)

Pre-Monsoon

1 (-29, 16)

0 (-22, 12)

Monsoon

8 (-8, 100)

18 (-9, 168)

Post-Monsoon

4 (-7, 33)

15 (-6, 63)

Winter

-2 (-19, 2)

-2 (-17, 14)

Time Period

2060

2090

Annual

8 (-24, 70)

14 (-6, 75)

Pre-Monsoon

0 (-21, 21)

-2 (-12, 13)

Monsoon

9 (-16, 75)

14 (-31, 65)

Post-Monsoon

4 (-6, 20)

16 (0, 36)

Winter

-2 (-17, 6)

-2 (-23, 17)

WESTERN NEPAL

EASTERN NEPAL

Figure 4.8. Projected changes in winter and monsoon mean temperature and precipitation from theRegCM3-ECHAM5 simulations, A2 emissions scenario, for the period 2040-2070.

Air temperature (celsius) change A2 scenario minus reference periodDecember - February

Air temperature (celsius) change A2 scenario minus reference periodJune - September

Total percipitation (mm/day) change A2 scenario minus reference periodDecember - February

Total percipitation (mm/day) change A2 scenario minus reference periodJune - September


61Figure 4.9. Projected changes in winter and monsoon mean temperature and precipitation from thePRECIS-HadCM3 simulations, A2 emissions scenario, for the period 2040-2070

Scaled from the 2070-2100 outputs; see text for details.





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Figure 4.10. Projected changes in winter and monsoon mean temperature and precipitation from thePRECIS-HadCM3 simulations, A2 emissions scenario, for the period 2070-2090.






63Supplementary Figures

Figure 4.11. Spatial pattern of GCM projectionsof change in frequency (in %) of "hot days"relative to hot day frequency over 1970-1999,under the A2 emission scenario.

Shading shows the multi-model mean change, while numbers in each grid box show the multi-model mean, as well as the range across the multi-model ensemble.

Figure 4.12.Spatial pattern of GCM projections ofchange in frequency (in %) of "hot nights"relative to hot night frequency over 1970-1999,under the A2 emission scenario.

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64



Figure 4.13. Spatial pattern of GCM projectionsof change in proportion of precipitation fallingin heavy events, relative to 1970-1999, underthe A2 emission scenario.

Figure 4.14. Spatial pattern of GCMprojections of change in maximum 1-dayrainfall, relative to 1970-1999, under the A2emission scenario.


65Figure 4.15. Spatial pattern of GCM projections of change in maximum 5-day rainfall,relative to 1970-1999, under the A2 emission scenario.


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NOTES1 These differences from the observation based gridded data may arise at least in part due to inaccuracies in the CRU data which, for the High Himalaya, are interpolated from lower elevation

stations.

THE SOCIO-ECONOMICSCENARIO FORCOMPENSATINGADAPTATION

5C

HAPTER

As described earlier, climate change will haveprofound and widespread socio-economic

impacts. However, the inability to identify all impactsand their consequent implications, and because of theuncertainties associated with climate science, there arefew estimates of the economic cost of climate changeat the global level. The first such study was the 2006Stern Review, which opened a floodgate of debate abouteconomic analysis (Heal, 2009) and its limitations, butthe resultant qualitative improvement in techniques ofestimation has not led to improved numbers. Somecountry-level studies about sectoral impacts have beenconducted (Schlenker et al., 2006), but there are noestimates of the economic impact on developingcountries such as Nepal.

The Stern report states that under an optimisticscenario (a 2-3ºC increase in global temperature),developing countries would lose more than 3 per centof their GDP, and if the temperature rise reached 4-5ºC,the loss would exceed 10 per cent. Nepal is one of theten most vulnerable developing countries because of itsgeography, poor physical infrastructure and the low levelof development of its social sector (OECD, 2003).Extrapolating from the Stern figures, the total cost toNepal could reach over a billion dollars at current prices

and possibly more because of the country’s overallsocio-economic fragility.

Although global and macro statistics like those of theStern review are a cause for alarm, they provide littleinformation about the specific details of country-levelimpacts. Such analyses also offer very little guidancein identifying cost-effective, immediately applicablestrategies to build resilience and to increase in-countryadaptive capacity in the face of the impeding impactsof climate change. The Himalayan “white spot” in thefourth IPCC report implies that we need much betterassessments of the physical climatic processes in theregion. The averaging out of extreme conditions thatmay prevail (e.g. heavy rains in the monsoon, a severedrought in the other months or delayed rain during themonsoon) in national level statistics will give a verymisleading picture of the actual stress experienced bythe populace in a complex and unique physical-environmental-social system. Mendelsohn, et al. (2006,pp 174) suggest that national level analysis and thosedone by the poor at the bottom of the pyramid aredifferent, emphasising the point made throughout thisreport that the “eagle’s-eye view” of the climate changeproblem is very different from a “toad’s eyeperspective”.

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“Although these national results are insightful, they donot necessarily predict what will happen to individualpoor people. That is, many countries are large enoughso that different regions will have different effects withinnational borders. Further, what happens to somecountries in aggregate does not necessarily indicate whatwill happen to the poor residents of a country. However,alternative studies such as rural income analysis(Mendelsohn et al., 2006) can identify how effects aredistributed within a nation.”

This chapter attempts to assess the socio-economicimpacts of global warming at the micro and meso levelsin Nepal by estimating the costs of impact of some ofthe signature impacts discussed in Chapter 2. Itattempts to correlate the insights of global climatechange scenario models with observations on theground, and to identify the types of futureinvestigations and socio-economic analysis to aid ourunderstanding of impacts and cost-effectiveness ofadaptation options. The chapter does not aim toprovide exact answers. Indeed, in the absence offundamental and path-breaking research, such analysiscannot be attempted at this stage; but aims to sketchthe broad canvas to pave the way for future analysisthat can help us to ask better questions and guide ustowards identifying effective adaptation strategies forNepal. Some lessons with policy implications are drawnat the end for adapting the energy sector, prioritised onthe basis of the reality of an average Nepali household.

The Nepali household

While it is often argued that there is no such thing inreality as an average (“Mr. Per Capitan has not been

actually sighted who experiences average conditions!”),an analysis of an average Nepali household, instead ofthe Nepali economy as a whole, provides a differentpicture of reality and can be an improvement over thediscussion of national aggregates (see Table 5.1). TheFourth Household Budget Survey done by the NepalRastra Bank in 2005-2006 shows that an averageNepali household earns NPR 27,391 per month, whichtranslates to just over two1 dollars a day per person. Themedian income, a better indication of the realsituation, is even lower as Nepal’s relatively highinequality of income distribution indicates2 . Accordingto the Asian Development Bank, 31 per cent of thepopulation survive below the poverty line (ADB, 2008).Moreover, average rural income is 30 per cent less thanurban income, rendering rural households extremelyvulnerable to natural hazard, not just because of theirreliance on an unpredictable supply of natural resourcesbecause of their extreme poverty. Together, these factsalong with the escalating consumer price index, suggestthat the average income of NPR. 27,391 underestimatesthe actual scale of poverty in the country.

Impacts

Table 5.1 provides a useful entry point to beginanalysing the impact of climate change on a Nepalihousehold. It also opens a logical line of inquiry toexplore what consequences the signature events mayhave on such an average Nepali household. Using paststudies, field observations and bottom-upconsultations, we can calculate the burden perhousehold and extrapolate it to the entire populationexposed to flood hazards. Nonetheless, this approachmust be treated with utmost care because while someof impacts of floods can be minimised relatively quickly,those of forest fires have long-term effects; nature takes

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Source: Fourth Household Budget Survey, Nepal Rastra Bank

Table 5.1: Average monthly household income by sector (in %)

RURAL-URBAN ECOLOGICAL REGIONSSECTOR RURAL URBAN TERAI HILLS MOUNTAIN OVERALL

Agriculture, Livestock & Fishery 8 7 9 6 8 7

Salary, Allowance, Wage & Pension 23 45 24 31 24 28

Business/Service Enterprise & Other Related 29 43 27 30 44 30

Remittance 21 19 21 13 9 16

Imputed Rent 8 17 8 11 10 10

Miscellaneous 9 12 11 8 5 9

Total in NRS 22,225 31,935 25,546 29,023 24,754 27,391

a long time to recover. The context of a flood alsohighlights both conceptual and methodologicaldifficulties. A flood generally affects crops in land closeto rivers and in low-lying areas. The extent of lossdepends upon whether the land is inundated, the bankis eroded, or if sand is deposited on the land. Paddy canbenefit from temporary inundation and the region mayyield an overall surplus production though other assetsmay be lost. Depending on how mature it is, paddy canwithstand inundation for up to 10 days. If nutrient siltis deposited by floods, the crop yield will increase.Prolonged water logging, however, is undesirablebecause the plant will rot. Bank cutting permanentlytakes away land and if flood deposits sand on the fields,long term loss of assets, livelihoods and human capitaldevelopment such as education and health are theoutcomes. Those impacted by Koshi floods in 2008 arefacing such adverse conditions. Yet another challengeis imposed by the fact that the nature of flood hazardsin mountains and Tarai is different. Hence, it isdifficult to quantify the impacts in their entirety. Thisstudy attempts to qualitatively glean lessons to estimatethe losses.

Floods: Not only is the data available on the damageand costs of past floods in Nepal’s mountains, hills andplains scarce, but such historical records tell us nothingabout the likely frequency and intensity of floods in thefuture. Developing a future scenario requiresdownscaling climate models, creating hydrologicalmodels of rivers, and using simulations to estimateflood areas and damages. One such study attemptedthese measures in Rohini River, a trans-boundary river

that begins in Nepal’s Chure hills and joins the WestRapti in India (see The Risk to Resilience Study Team,2009). Though the study focused on lower regions ofthe basin in Uttar Pradesh, the findings can helpestimate impacts of climate change in Nepal for threereasons:

The physical proximity of the Rohini basin toNepal’s Tarai region,The validity of the climate downscaling model inthe basin for the Tarai andThe similarity of land-use, livelihood andsettlement patterns.

Yet, the geomorphologic differences between the upper(Nepal) and lower (Uttar Pradesh) regions of the Rohinibasin need to be recognised. In particular, since thegradient of Nepal’s flood plain is slightly higher thanthat of Eastern Uttar Pradesh, the area of inundationwill be lesser in Nepal. Since damage is proportionalto both area and depth, however, losses are likely to besimilar.

The Rohini flood model provides some key indicatorsand simple yet relevant figures for assessing the quantaof the impacts due to flooding under “with andwithout” climate change scenarios. Even with thecaution mentioned earlier in transposing the numbersacross boundaries, they do make a case for undertakingfurther analysis to help develop cost-effective, pro-activestrategies for reducing damages due to floods. Themodel calculates flood damage to housing, crops, seed,livestock, fodder, debt servicing, wages, health and

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Table 5.2: Projected damage to an average Nepali family(in NPR)

medical services, food and grain stock and supply, andpublic infrastructure as well as the number of lives lost.(Placing financial costs to human deaths does raiseethical issues such calculations bring up but are usefulin understanding the overall economic picture of riskand insurance involved.). Table 5.2 presents damageslikely to occur in the Nepali section of the basin.

Applying the results from Rohini River Model to theentire Nepal Tarai suggests that the basin-wide cost ofrecurrent floods that occurs with historic frequenciesis NPR 2,813 per household per year. Using the medianclimate change scenario projection the loss will almostdouble to NPR 5,581 per household per annum. Theseaverages are useful for estimating basin-wide loss, butto get a household’s perspective we need to look moreclosely at the households likely to be directly affected.

According to simulation results (The Risk to ResilienceStudy Team, 2009), up to 19 per cent of all householdsin the basin are directly affected by a flood occurring with

a return period of 200 years.However, for all the floodfrequencies/intensities combined,on average 40 per cent morehouseholds will be affected whenthe effects of climate change isincluded.3 The average damage perdirectly affected household is shownin Figure 5.1. It is clear that theeffect of climate change is morepronounced for 5 and 10-year returnperiod floods. This means thatimpact of climate change in termsof damages will be felt more stronglyin the frequently occurring events.

The cost of the historic five-year flood damage (NPR38,350.00) is almost twice the average monthly incomeof rural Nepali households (NPR 22,250.00), while thecost under the climate change scenario (NPR63,027.00) is equivalent to its three months of income.With a ten-year historical flood, losses per householdwould be about a third of annual income in thehistorical case and the same frequency flood withclimate change would result in losses in excess of morethan half of a households’ annual income. The averagehousehold with income above the poverty line cannotrecover from such a shock. Any flood of higher than a10-year return period would devastate the averageNepali household.

Though these scenarios for Nepal are interpolated fromstudies done in downstream Uttar Pradesh, and cannotbe said to be robust, the lessons they point to are morethan enough to suggest that a systematic approach tocalculating losses must be adopted. Collecting the dataneeded to make such estimates can help in both

ELEMENTS

Projected basin-wide damages /km2

in million rupees

Per head

Average household size

Per household

HISTORICAL/CURRENTCONDITIONS

0.464

541

5.21

2,813

B1R3 CLIMATECHANGE PROJECTIONS

0.938

1,094

5.21

5,581

Figure 5.1: Impact of climate change on flood damages

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identifying cost-effective adaptation strategies and finetuning the methodology.

Forest Fires: A total of 516 families were affected when105,350 hectares were destroyed in the fires which ragedacross the Nepal Mid-Mountain in the spring of 2009.According to Acharya and Sharma (2009), the total lossto personal properties was NPR 14 crore. This numberdoes not include the families that indirectly depend onthe forested areas, and the impact is probably spread overa much larger population. Table 5.3 shows that the realimpact of forest fires extends far beyond the loss of treesalone and can be severe enough to almost wipe out thetotal capital assets of an average family. Though thefigure might seem counter intuitive because a forestcontains very few man-made assets, it does haveabundance of natural resources which the householdsuse. Thus, the loss incurred is not just assets worth twoyears of income but the loss of an entire natural assetbase, that provides income and livelihood support

throughout the year. The one-time value of timber lossesdue to a forest fire may turn out not to be large but giventhat about 80 per cent of the population depends onforests for daily fuel wood supply and 42 per cent forlivestock fodder (Regmi and Adhikari, 2007), the overallimpact can be devastating. Over 39 per cent of Nepal’stotal geographic area is classified as forest, of which atleast 23 per cent is forested (WB, 2008a). It has beenestimated that a quarter of the country’s forest area isheavily degraded leading to increased landslides and soilerosion that add to regional sedimentation impactsreducing the life spans of reservoirs and posing a threatto all infrastructure on or along the rivers. Other long-term effects are even harder to quantify. For example, ifgroundwater recharge is lowered and winter rainfallreduced, less water will be available and droughtconditions may be exacerbated. With carbon depositionfrom forest fires, glacial melt may increase too. Muchmore rigorous methods than used in this study need tobe followed to work out this calculus.

Table 5.3: Impact of forest fires

LOSS

Timber losses based on the area of land burnt orpartially burntRevenue lossImpact on soil moistureLoss of life and cattleBio-diversity lossCarbon emission/reduced carbon bankingBlack sootAdded erosion/mass wastingIncreased regional sedimentationDecline in the functioning of embankmentsDecreased fuel load and production of forests

Regeneration and stock managementSmoke

IMPACT

83,382 hectare x commercial timber/hectare x average price of timbre from thatforest type + partially burnt x formula above = total commercial valueNTFP estimates/hectare x 83,382 x 50 yrs until regenerationGroundwater recharge reducedFrom reportsSome measured in NTFP losses; others not valued yetIncrease in greenhouse gases and reduction in sequesteringHealth burden and increased rate of glacial meltLoss of landDecreases in reservoir life spans, damage to irrigation appurtenances and turbines.Increased flooding downstream and risk of breaching (see energy section)Less fuel and productivity per unit area of the forestReduction in sequestering potentialNo benefitsHealth impacts

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Since dry winters create conditions ideal for forest fires,forests carrying large amounts of fuels are more likelyto burn intensely and completely, while only thosecarrying less fuel may survive. Over a period of time,the average fuel density of the forests will decline as thethicker forests burn, changing the balance due toreduction in timber and non-timber forest products(NTFPs). This change is likely to reduce the incomestreams from forest and the carbon sequesteringcapacity of forests.

Crop loss due to heat stress and disease vectors: Croplosses, whether partial or total, are other threatsassociated with current weather pattern. The averagehousehold could lose almost half its income because ofthe complete failure of one crop in an area with 200per cent cropping intensity; partial failures or mixedcropping would incur proportionally smaller losses.Nepali families whose derive their primary income fromagriculture will suffer more. Areas with single ratherthan diversified crops will be most likely to fall victimto the predicted increases in heat stress, diseases andpest loads.

Adaptation strategies

Given that stresses attributable to climate change areinevitable, a fundamental question emerges: how willNepal and Nepali people adapt? This begs a questionabout adaptation. According to UNFCCC, adaptationis “adjustment in natural or human systems in responseto actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects,which moderates harm or exploits beneficialopportunities.” While this definition is useful, it offerslittle tangibility to translate into the daily lives of aNepali. We begin by making a distinction between

adaptation and coping as articulated by Adaptation StudyTeam (2008). Adaptation is more than “coping.” Inwell-adapted systems, people are “doing well” despitechanging conditions. They are doing well either becausethey shift strategies or because the underlying systemson which their livelihoods are based are sufficientlyresilient and flexible to absorb the impact of changes.As a result, at its core, adaptation is about the capacityto shift strategies and develop systems that are resilientyet sufficiently flexible to enable vulnerable people torespond to change.

Planned Adaptation: Planned adaptation includesprograms and projects that governments, NGOs, andinternational donors implement as a result of specificclimate impacts and vulnerability assessments. Plannedadaptations are generally made to respond to predictedimpacts on ecosystem and hydrological system and tominimise human vulnerability by focusing on sectoralinterventions, such as those related to watermanagement and flood control.

Autonomous Adaptation: Autonomous adaptationincludes actions that individuals, communities,businesses and other organisations undertake on theirown in response to the opportunities and constraintsthey face as the climate changes. Autonomous actionsare individual or collective responses, almost entirely inthe poorly recorded informal sector. These may involvechanges in practices and technologies, diversificationof livelihood systems, access to financial resources (e.g.micro-insurance, micro-credit), migration,reconfiguring labour allocation or resource rights, andcollective action to access services, resources or markets.Social capital and access to skills and knowledge canbe particularly important to enable these responses. Thedifference between planned and autonomous adaptation

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can be conceptualised by using the analogy of aniceberg: the submerged invisible part representingautonomous adaptation is substantially larger than thevisible tip above the water level which is akin to plannedadaptation.

Autonomous adaptation takes place at the communityand household levels while planned adaptation includesthose strategies and actions initiated by a governmentto shape its policies, programmes, and projects inresponse to global climate change impacts. Mostplanning decisions work in the long term and are path-dependent, whereas autonomous or indigenousadaptation is short-term and spontaneous ascommunities or households respond immediately to thesocial, political and institutional stresses associatedwith the changing climate. The market, both formaland informal, is an important avenue where theresponse is autonomous; and many of the opportunitiesvisible and available at the household’s level is ofteninvisible or beyond the ken of national or internationallevel of planning. The massive rural outmigration seenin Nepal during the last decade is one such example ofmarket provided opportunity for adaptation.

Hayek (1945) has described the market’s ability to setprices as the outcome of cumulative knowledge of thenumerous transactions and decisions made byindividual players with limited but intimateinformation about both unique socio-economic,political and institutional pressures as well asopportunities. Similarly, the quanta of aggregateautonomous adaptation decisions made at the localscale cannot be matched by planning for adaptation atthe national level. In an economy like Nepal, dominatedby the informal sector and with weak formalinstitutions, autonomous adaptation has a particularly

strong influence on the direction of future courses ofaction.

Most economic activities in Nepal are not recorded asthey happen in the informal sector. Although the actualsize of the informal economy is difficult to measure,the Labour and Trade Union Congress of Nepalestimates that its share is 56 per cent of the formaleconomy. Other sources suggest that it is around 20per cent, while some place the figure at 70 per cent,depending upon the assumptions used. In terms ofclimate change adaptations, what is more importantthan the size of the informal economy is the numberof individuals (see Table 5.4) who do not benefit fromthe social security that only the formal sector canprovide. It is those Nepalis in the informal agricultural

Planned Adaptation

AutonomousAdaptation

Adaptation Iceberg

Table 5.4: Labour force in the formal andinformal sectors (in '000)

Source: NLFS (1999)

SECTOR BROAD FORMAL BROAD INFORMAL

Total 879 (9.3) 8584 (90.7)

Male 655 (13.8) 4,082 (86.2)

Female 224 (4.7) 4,502 (95.3)

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sector who are the most vulnerable to the shocksassociated with climate change.

The continued lack of formal safety nets and theongoing stresses of all kinds make the average Nepalihousehold more vulnerable than it was a few decadesago though its dependence may have shifted away fromthe natural resource base. Figure 5.2 shows the changein household consumption patterns over time andindicates that while incomes have increased andlivelihoods diversified, expenditure on food that wasonce a major portion of the average householdexpenditure has shrunk to about 39 per cent. Analysinghousehold expenditure trends, Rankin (2004) suggeststhat expenditure on consumer items has increased. Thisshift is also is one the factors for increased incentivesfor non-agriculture based livelihoods. Income fromsources such as jobs and businesses now constitutes 58per cent of the total household income. A 2006 studysuggests that the proportion of holdings that producemainly for sale is not even 1 per cent, while little over21% farm families use their farm produce almost equallyfor both sale and home consumption (CBS, WB, DFID,and ADB, 2006). For this population whose primaryoccupation is agriculture the vagaries of climate changeis a direct cause of increased vulnerability. The extentof impact of climate change on those people whoseprimary occupation is not agriculture remains to beexamined further.

This shift indicates the preference of Nepalihouseholds towards the service sector andaway from their dependence on the naturalresource base subject to climate relatedshocks. This trend is also changing thenature and functioning of traditionalinstitutions but is yet to be proxied byformal social safety nets (DST, 2008).

Whether this shift is building or depleting household’sresilience needs much deeper analysis than this studyis able to provide. Throughout history, Nepalis haveshown resilience and grit in surviving in a difficultlandscape and the present time is indeed a period ofrisk but can also be one of opportunity.

The face that the structure of the Nepali formaleconomy mirrors global trends is reflected by thehousehold level characteristic discussed above.Approximately 66 per cent of the national populationis engaged in agriculture which contributes only 36 percent to the nation’s GDP.5 In 1987-1988, this share wasalmost 50 per cent and in two decdes has declined to36 per cent. During the same period, the contributionof the service sector has increased from 35 per cent toalmost 50 per cent (see Figure 5.3). The contributionof industrial sector has remained constant. The servicesector is growing faster than industry is, leading thecountry along a development pathway slightly differentfrom the industrial development paradigm mostdeveloped nations followed.

Historically, agrarian economies first turned intoindustrial economies by investing agricultural surplusesinto industry before investing on the service sector. Thetrend in Nepal, however, seems to veer towards importof manufacturing products even while local demands forservices have increased. Increased remittance income

Figure 5.2: Household consumption patterns

Source: Household Budget Surveys, Nepal Rastra Bank

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may also be a driver of the demand for services. Nepalalso has limited space for the growth of industry: afterall, it is landlocked and has only limited and fragilenatural resources. Unlike Japan and South Korea, withtheir many sea ports, Nepal cannot afford to bring largeamounts of inputs into the country and export isconstrained by its neighbours, India and China, bothof which are on the fast track to industrial development.Nepali industries cannot compete with their immenseeconomies of scale or their unquenchable thirst forbasic inputs. A service sector-based pathway todevelopment, in contrast, might well suit Nepal as itwill not stress its already fragile natural environmentwith the harmful externalities of industrialisation andit can keep the ecological footprint of its economysmall.6 The autonomous sector’s response indicates thatthis is happening already.

While Nepal’s development targets still aim for growthin the manufacturing sector, this planned trajectory hasvery little actual effect on the shape of the economy(see Table 5.6). This disconnect may be due to theweaknesses of the institutions and instruments whichshould control the economy, including planninginfrastructure, and fiscal and monetary policies, orsimply be a mismatch between real and desiredopportunities. This disjuncture has great significance:it illustrates the momentum of autonomous strategiescompared to the stagnancy of planned responses. In

terms of planned adaptation response, a good strategymay be to make resilience building a key objective andavoid areas such as heavy manufacturing that wouldincrease national-level vulnerabilities. This discussionbrings us to the question of what can be done in termsof short- and long-term adaptation strategies.

Adaptation to climate change

The following section presents options for adaptationby concentrating on two signature events, flood andenergy which may become more vulnerable as a resultof climate change.

Floods: As qualitative studies show, to ward off thedamage associated with floods, Nepalis actautonomously by raising plinth levels and building grainstorage facilities etc. (Dekens, 2008). Plannedinterventions usually involve large infrastructures whichtend to be useful in the short term but controversial inthe long term once negative externalities begin tooverwhelm the benefits. Depending on the density ofassets in a particular area at risk and the adaptivecapacities of the people living there, one or the otherstrategy may be better (The Risk to Resilience Study

Figure 5.3: Sectoral contribution to GDP

Table 5.5: Actual and targeted sectoral growthrates of GDP (at 2000/01 prices)*

TARGET RATE OFSECTORS 2006/07 2007/08 GROWTH

Agriculture 1.0 5.7 3.6

Non Agriculture (overall) 4.1 5.6 6.5

Industries 3.9 1.8 6.8

Services 4.2 6.9 6.4

*Before deduction of financial intermediation services indirectly measured (FISIM)Source: National Planning Commission and Central Bureau of Statistics.

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Team, 2009). Cost-benefit analysis shows thatautonomous adaptation has better returns thanembankment building in the lower Rohini basin butthat in the urban confluence of Islamabad andRawalpindi, it is structural measures built outside thedensely populated areas that are more cost-effectivethan environmental rehabilitation in densely populatedareas prone to flooding.

Assessing cost benefits of flood mitigation measures inlower Bagmati basin, Dixit, Pokhrel and Moench (2008)have found that constructing embankments for floodcontrol has different implications for different groups.While some people do benefit from embankment in theshort-term, many in the downstream and in otherlocations not directly protected lose out (The Risk toResilience Study Team, 2009). Strategies such as rangeplanting of forest buffers, raising of houses and villages,development of early warning systems and theexpansion of existing local strategies (such as theprovision of boats) for coping with floods appearrelatively resilient to the impacts of climate change.

Before a decision about investment is made, it mustbe recognised that some flood protection strategies, likeembankments, are path-dependent and irreversible (TheRisk to Resilience Study Team, 2009). They representa technological “lock-in” with built in rigidity, whileother choices (e.g. flat roofs, houses on stilts, etc.)present greater flexibility in strategy switching ifunforeseen surprises occur. The cost effectiveness ofdifferent strategies available to Nepal for floodprotection must be explored further in light of socialand technological flexibility (Thompson, 1994).

Crops: Although it is true that pests and the changinggrowing seasons are a menace to current agricultural

practices, global warming and climate change can alsoprovide opportunities for growing new species. Cropand integrated pest management trials can lead toplanned adaptation solutions but until their results areseen, farmers can diversify to reap the benefits ofmultiple crops or simply to spread risk. Cropdiversification can help reduce the burden of pestscaused by the increase in temperatures and humidityat certain times of the year. In the long run, Nepalihouseholds need to reduce their reliance on agriculture,and the government has to increase food securitythrough various planned measures, which may includebetter storage and distribution of food and unhinderedaccess to markets.

Fires: Forest fires, if they continue unabated, will upsetthe current balance of fuel in forests. In particular, theenergy balance will decline as the climate grows drierand hotter, and causes fires in dense forests that aresustainable only under the current climate. If risingtemperatures mean increased forest fire hazard, it maydecrease the ability of forest to function as carbon banksand may put a question on the strategy of reforestationas a mitigation measure. This adjustment may be thetrue residual loss caused by climate change as is pointedout by the Stern Review (2006). The resultant decreasein energy brings to the fore the crucial issue ofincreasing resilience and exploring the link betweenplanned and autonomous adaptation.

This quest brings to the fore the issue of energy securityof an average Nepali household, about 85 per cent ofwhose energy comes from biomass. Any reduction inthat biomass due to forest fires will reduce energyavailability and could force maladaptive trends.Decreased income from forest may result in theiroverexploitation and further degradation. People may

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also resort to using coal and other imported fossil fuelsunless they are provided with alternatives. Options forautonomous adaptation in terms of energy sources arelimited unless planned adaptation measures helpachieve energy security.

Energy for adaptation

Energy is a key input in making the shift towards morenon-agriculture-based livelihood pathways essential forsocial and economic well-being not subjected to climatechange risks. Non-agricultural livelihoods are dependenton access to affordable energy systems. This is also thecase with value added activities in agriculture –commercial milk production, for example, requires bothrefrigeration and transport. If this transition is managedonly on the basis of cost-effectiveness of the energysystem, the outcome could be very polluting and mal-adaptive. Forests are already under threat of a drierclimate and continued dependence on this source willbe further debilitating. In the short term, given the long-term gestation period of indigenous hydro development,thermal generation based on imported fossil fuels maybe a cost effective method of production available to theprivate sector through independent power producers.The local effects of thermal generation may not be ofconcern to developing countries because of Nepal’scurrent low emissions, but such a strategy implies highrisk to Nepal. Because its fragile economic base may notbe capable of coping with increased external dependenceon a volatile fossil fuel market, this path makes theeconomy vulnerable to exogenous shocks as prices andavailability of fossil fuels fluctuate in the global market.Dependence on fossil fuel will exacerbate the fiscalincontinence of the government owned monopoly parastatel Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA).

Climate-based factors can significantly affect theperformance of energy systems in use. In the winter of2008/2009, for example, Nepal’s integrated powersystem (INPS) faced a daily power cut of almost 16hours because of a variety of reasons, including gapbetween demand and supply, poor maintenance,reduced rainfall, and, less significantly, the disruptionof the transmission line due to Koshi embankmentbreach flood. An economy shifting away from theagricultural sector has the need for numerous gatewaysystems to make that shift meaningful. Access to reliablesources of energy is often a pre-requisite for such a shift.On the other hand, the state needs to devise appropriatepolicies to prevent local and national food insecurity,which is made worse if it is built upon an even moreinsecure and volatile energy system.

Taking a view of energy use in the poor rural householdallows us to step back and take a look at the big pictureof energy use in Nepal. Nepali households have littleenergy security, a situation that can only be amelioratedwith serious government efforts. The national plannedadaptation strategy must ensure, as a fundamentalpriority, the easy and reliable availability of affordableenergy. According to the 2008 Operations Plan of theAsian Development Bank, 20 per cent of households inurban areas and only 5 per cent of households in ruralareas have electricity, while for the majority, bio-massremain the primary source of energy (see Figure 5.4).

Figure 5.4 shows that bulk of energy use in Nepalcomes from biomass. Although the burning of biomassis considered carbon neutral because the carbonreleased is equal to the carbon absorbed as biomassgrows, this fuel source is not a clean source: it has amajor negative impact on the health of users and itsover-exploitation can put additional stresses on the

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natural environment. It is also limited in that it cannotprovide the type of energy necessary for moderninformation flow including working, reading,communicating and meeting other basic services. Atthe household level, the provision of electricity is oneof several essential gateway services necessary to helpbuild adaptive capacities.

Despite the theoretical potential, economic feasibility,and the availability of financiers for developinghydroelectric projects in Nepal, progress in this sectoris slow. Social, political, environmental and institutionalconstraints have retarded the construction ofhydroelectric dams. At the same time, climatevariability does not bode well for this mode of energyproduction either. For example, the 2008 droughtreduced river flow and also contributed to the daily 16-hour power cuts. With all but one of Nepal’s plantsbeing run-of-river types, annual as well as seasonalelectricity output is vulnerable to climate change.Another disastrous scenario is the case of the KulekhaniDam: in 1993, a cloudburst in the catchments resultedin the dislodging of mountain slopes that washed awayits penstock. This single massive deposition of

sediment in its 12th year of operation also filled outmore than half its 100-year dead storage capacity. Large-scale hydropower plants, whether they are run-of-riveror storage type, are vulnerable to extreme climate events.What was considered a freak event in the case of theKulekhani catchment may become the norm if even themore moderate climate change predictions come true.

With such scenarios, the sediment budget of a riverbasin can be greatly altered by extreme events.According to Mahmood (1987), “in the Koshi theaverage annual sediment yield based on measuredsuspended load is 2,800 t/km2” He later noted thatduring an extreme event on the 23rd and 24th of June1980, an estimated 55-56 million tons of sediment, analmost 200-fold increase over the annual average, wastransported as mudflow within 14 hours. Such eventscan greatly reduce or even end the life of a proposedstorage reservoir because changes in sediment budgetmean much higher rate of sedimentation shortening theeconomic life. Given that climate change modelspredict an increase in the number of such extremeevents, it is clear that the construction of large-scaleinfrastructure projects, and the economic analysis of the

Figure 5.4: Nepal energy mix by source

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impact of climate change on them become fraught withgreater risks and uncertainties.

Decentralised and renewable methods with lessgeographic exposure offer a more resilient system ofachieving basic electrification for most of Nepal. Theseinclude distributed electricity generation with small andmedium projects owned and operated at the local levelboth by communities as well as local governments, andcan include biogas, solar, hydro and wind energysystems. Besides the increase in risk resilience comparedto single large entities, their other benefits are a smallecological footprint and the promise of reducing the useof biomass and thereby conserving forests (Sathaye andRavindernath, 2008).

The use of renewable sources of energy, especially hydro,photovoltaics and biogas, has witnessed a significantgrowth in the ten years from 1996 to 2006. From anegligible share in the total energy use in 1975, theyhave grown seven-fold. The small and mediumgenerating stations now comprise about a third of thetotal hydro production, which saw a three-fold increasein the same period. In the autonomous sector, theinstallation of peltric set of a few hundred Watts (orpico hydro) has seen significant growth which has notbeen adequately assessed. As recounted earlier, anotherarea where renewable energy promises much is inhydroelectricity-based transport. Nepal’s success inreplacing fossil fuel based three wheelers with electricones or the success with goods carrying ropeways(Gyawali, Dixit and Upadhya, 2004) needs better policysupport both from the national government as well asinternational development agencies. It is safe to assumethat such initiatives in renewable energy, includingphotovoltaics and biogas, have served many morehouseholds per unit of energy production than has the

national grid and that the distribution is moreequitable. Nepal’s natural potential—there are plentyof streams, year-round sunshine and many heads ofcattle and the low average need for energy perhousehold – are not the only reason for its success.

Large power producing enterprises have not servedeither nations or consumers well in developingcountries. Despite the “too-good-to-be-true”economics of large-scale projects, which cantheoretically recover investment costs within a coupleof years of their coming online, their actual performanceis poor if assessed in terms of actual return oninvestment or services provided. Losses in such largeintegrated systems are high and their controllingagencies typically demand subsidies for distributingelectricity to the poor. Eventually, the utilities becomeso inefficient that they cannot even survive withoutgetting government subsidies for meeting theirobligations to even their current customer base. As aresult, the wealthy elite benefit from subsidisedelectricity while the non-served poor pay for it throughindirect taxation.

Pakistan’s Water and Power Development Authority(WAPDA), with technical and managerial losses ofaround 30 per cent, is one of the largest burdens onthe national exchequer but is not able to supply localdemands. NEA is not doing well either and exhibitslosses higher than 24% (ADB, 2008). Though it chargesabout nine cents per kilowatt-hour, NEA is still unableto pay for the capital costs of the installed hydro-electric capacity. On the other hand decentralisedsystems supplying electricity may be more expensivethan large systems per kilowatt of installed capacity butthey provide reliable electricity at rates that consumersare willing to pay (WB, 2008). Such energy systems will

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VULNERABILITY THROUGH THE EYESOF THE VULNERABLE BOX 5.1: KAGBENI WIND TURBINE EXPERIMENT1

In 1989, Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) attempted to produceelectricity from wind energy in Kagbeni, Mustang District. TheKagbeni Wind Power Project (KAWIPOP) was a costly venture(NPR 6.8 million, including administrative costs, in 1989prices) for two 10 kW wind turbine generator sets to supply 60houses with an estimated annual energy production of 12,000kWh. The production value was just NPR 40,000 per year, whilethe cost inclusive of 10 operation, maintenance andadministration staff was NPR 200,000 per year. The turbinesboth began operations on 20 December, 1989, but weredamaged within a few months (Turbine 1 on 20 February, 1990;and Turbine 2 on 12 May, 1990).

An evaluation of KAWIPOP conducted by Dangrid Consult in July1992 reached the following conclusions:

Not enough background information about thewind conditions at Kagbeni was collected;The winds were stronger and more turbulent thananticipated;To cope with the stronger winds, the turbine bladeswere cut on the site and were not properly balancedafterwards;The yaw brake was too weak to prevent fast yawingbecause there were heavy gyro-forces.

In its conclusion, Dangrid observed that, “The importantoutcome of the Kagbeni project is that reliable wind data arenow available.” However, data collection was discontinued in1997.

Sins of unsustainability (or the virtues ofsustainability)

The KAWIPOP experience provides seven sins that Nepal mustavoid in its approach to build a climate resilient future,particularly in choosing a softer energy path. Christensen andKoukios (1997) argue that many soft energy projects that couldcompete with oil at current prices have failed to take root, thatis, to become self-sustaining and self-generating. Drawingfrom the lessons of several demonstration projectsimplemented in the rural areas of various Greek islands, theyconclude that many well-meaning ventures have systemicproblems that have nothing to do with the prices of competingforms of energy. Christensen and Koukios help us examinethese issues in the context of the sustainability of renewableenergy enterprises and their conclusions have relevance for

those who strive to pursue non-fossil fuel dependent pathwaysin Nepal (Also see Chapter 6). They highlight ‘seven sins’ (orconversely seven virtues): a) Irresponsible money, b)Dysfunctional institutions and policy, c) Engineering andengineering ideologies, d) Technical disintegration, e) Socialdisintegration f) Project learning disability and g) Policylearning disability. In the following section we explain theseseven sins—and their corresponding seven virtues.

First sin: irresponsible moneyMany times the problem is not one of insufficient money butrather of its inverse: too much money flowing too freely fromremote sources through planners and initiators with no long-term commitment to on-going operations. The result of theinitial largesse is that the recipients assume money willcontinue to flow in later stages, too. By the time the truthdawns on them, it is often too late to prevent the project fromrunning aground.

Second sin: dysfunctional institutions and policyAll problems regarding equipment and construction aredefined by institutional policies and practices devised in termsof what such non-renewable energy technologies demand, andlittle thought is given to the varying requirements for theoperation and maintenance of different technologies. This sincan be rectified if substantial and systematic attention isdevoted to identifying and modifying dysfunctional,anachronistic policies, institutional arrangements, andprofessional practices associated with older technologies.

Third sin: engineering and economic ideologiesBoth engineering and economics have entrenched ideologies—‘economies of scale’ for the former and ‘price incentives’through favoured taxes and subsidies for the latter—whichfoster designs that lean towards gigantism. When coupled withanother belief in ‘technological utopianism’ or theunquestioned faith that equipment will function as designed,they produce rusting white elephants unable to survive in theirsocial and environmental contexts. Rectifying this sin requiresidentifying and dealing with ideological blinders andassociated professional practices that continue to fosterdysfunctional approaches to the implementation of soft energysystems.

Fourth sin: technical disintegrationThis sin can be avoided if the designs for the technical systemsare made locally suitable after conducting an integratedtechnical analysis of resources, technologies, environmentalrelations, and economics.

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help these communities reduce the risks ofdeforestation (ICIMOD, 2009).

Nepal is at a cross road and faces important choicesabout its development pathways. The country has tomake a choice about its energy path, a choice thatdeveloped countries made before the perils of increasedcarbon emissions become a global scourge, when thatchoice was all about economics. Nepal can either, in abusiness-as-usual manner, follow the path theindustrialised West pursued, or can choose a cleanerdevelopment future. Coal, natural gas and nuclearpower sources may cost as low as one to five cents perkilowatt-hour (Chetri et al., 2008) but this energypathway has additional costs in the form of climatechange and environmental externalities that developedcountries did not pay when they opted for such systems.

The additional cost of implementing such systems,however, remains to be examined. The current sellingprice of electricity in Nepal offers a basis for makingestimates. To compare globally, Foster and Yepes (2006)found that any recovery above eight cents per kilowatt-hour contributes to capital costs of electricity

generation, which includes a mix of thermal and nuclearpower plants. These additional costs should be borneby those very developed countries which closed fossilfuel options for Nepal. Such payment may be called“energy compensation” and should be paid in return forNepal’s employing clean technology options. Thecurrent Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)approaches do not favour small-scale production forNepal to alter its energy pathway.

At this stage it is prudent to estimate, howeversimplistically, the scale of investment necessary to makethis shift. The new technologies depending on the mixof small and medium-hydro, solar and wind could costanywhere between 5–25 c/kWh. Let us assume that onan average this cost is 15c/kWH and given Nepal’sterrain and considering the price of technology transferthis cost can go up to as high as 20c/kWH. CurrentlyNepal sells electricity at an average rate of nine centsper kilowatt-hour. If the cost of taking a renewablepathway per unit produced is 20c/kWh then additionalcost per kWh of about 11 US¢ will be necessary. Toestimate the cost we take projections of NEA whichsays that next year the additional demand would be 400

Fifth sin: social disintegrationWhen plans and designs for hardware are developed withoutexplicit and early considerations of the society that is expected tooperate, maintain and live with the system, projects will beabandoned or forced to shut down. Operators are often anafterthought brought in only at the handover stage after all thecrucial decisions from design to implementation are already afait acompli. To avoid falling victim to this sin, the design anddevelopment of systems must be integrated with the design anddevelopment of effective social capacities—institutions—forthe operation and maintenance of the systems.

Sixth sin: project learning disabilityFailure to recognise and publicise mistakes ensures that errorswill be needlessly repeated. A virtue to strive for, therefore, is to

evaluate the results of programmes not just in terms of thehardware constructed but also in terms of whether aneffective organisation is developed. Without a local bodythat is both able and motivated to engage in critical self-evaluation and learning, renewable energy projects aredoomed to remain pilot schemes that fail as commercialschemes.

Seventh sin: policy learning disabilityCharting a new pathway involves introducing new andrenewable energy technologies. It demands that policymakers at the high end develop the ability to listen to criticalevaluations of ongoing plans of actions. To promote learning,internal and external types of review should be published,widely distributed and discussed at the systemic level.

1 The detail on Kagbeni Wind Turbine is based on Hydro Engineering Services (2002).

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GWh and that the growth rate will be 8% per annum.Using these figures we can calculate the additional costsof using alternative sources as energy compensation.

Energy compensation = incremental cost/kWh xadditional annual generation

= 11c/KWh x 400 GWh= 44 million USD/yr increasing

at 8% annually

Since most of the proposed technologies would bedecentralised, the cost of distribution will be less thancompared to that from centralised agencies, and it willbe cost effective for Nepal to expand its services.According to the NEA, the expansion of transmissionsystems to smaller communities in remote areas withonly 14-400 households using very little energy percapita is not economically viable.

In addition, as the solar and wind power technologiesimprove, production cost is likely to drop. The windenergy potential of Nepal is estimated to be 3,000 MWand places like Kali Gandaki gorge may possesspotential of developing wind farms.7 But thisexperiment, as Box 5.1 shows, failed and in its wakeprovides seven sins of sustainability that must beavoided. On the basis of assessment of global radiationon the horizontal surface of Nepal, Rijal (1992) hasestimated the potential of solar energy in Nepal to be32.15 X 106 MW. According to Asian Sustainable andAlternative Energy Program of the World Bank, 3-4kilowatt-hours of electricity can be generated from everysquare metre of solar panel if an average of 300 sunnydays and eight hours of light is available.8 Accordingto Pokharel (1998), solar energy availability in Nepal isbetween 3-5 Kwh/m2/day on the average whereas it canreach up to 6.2 Kwh/m2/day on bright sunny days.

Because the sun shines for about 300 days in averagein a year Nepal has a high potential for tapping solarenergy too. Despite the promise, solar energy has notbeen harnessed. Only 3,328.42 kWp (per peak kilowatt)of installed solar PV (Piya, 2006) and 130 KW of solarelectric systems have been installed in about 1,200households (AEPC, 2006). Globally, total installed solarPV harness about 12 GW of energy (REN 21, 2007).Similarly, the installation the cost of concentrated solaris also expected to drop significantly.

Besides funding, Nepal needs to develop policies andprocedures for scaling up the installation of renewableenergy sources. Private sector participation,management procedures, and policies for selling excesselectricity to the national grid need to be developed.Incentives for Nepali households to invest in climate-resilient energy sources must be linked with projectfunding and mechanisms for sharing the profitassociated with their production need to be defined.Energy compensation funds can be used as up-frontinvestments for making decentralised systemscommercially viable and to share dividends with theinvesting families. A mechanism for insuring suchschemes needs also to be designed in order to pool riskcaused by climate hazards.

Due to the increasing rate of migration of Nepali labouroutside Nepal, especially to the Persian Gulf states, asizable amount of foreign exchange is remitted. Theaverage Nepali household receives 16 per cent of itsincome from abroad, or almost twice its income fromagricultural pursuits. In the aggregate, remittancesamount to a potentially large resource for investment.Remittances are currently being spent on conspicuousconsumption and the speculative buying of land andother assets. While such investments may enhance an

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THE SOCIO-ECONOMICSCENARIO FORCOMPENSATINGADAPTATIONBOX 5.2: REMITTANCES

individual household’s social status, they are anunproductive use of the surplus capital. In the year2000, remittances amounted to 111 million U.S.dollars, less than one-third of all official foreign aid anddevelopment assistance (see Box 5.2). In 2007, justseven years later, they stood at 3.645 billion U.S. dollars,almost three times the total of official assistance toNepal (WDI database, April 2009). This amount is alsomore than ten times the annual investment (44 milliondollars per annum) in bringing clean energy to Nepal.

Remittance is a fragile and un-sustainable source in thelong turn, subject as it is to global shocks like the 2008financial meltdown. In the short run, creating systemicincentives for its diversion to productive sectors, suchas for achieving energy security, would be a prudentdecision.

While hydropower or other renewables mitigate greenhouse gas emission, access to electricity is one of themost effective gateway services for adaptation (ISET,

Remittances have increased dramatically over the past few years. According to the World Bank (2006), remittances tomiddle- and low-income countries amounted to about $30 billion in 1990. Fifteen years later, remittances had reachedalmost $170 billion, implying annual growth rates well above 10 per cent. Remittances account for about 30 per cent oftotal financial flows to the developing world and provide significant foreign exchange earnings (Acosta et al., 2007).According to a 2008 study by the World Bank, the share of remittances in Nepal is 16 per cent of its GDP and Nepal has the14th highest share of remittances in the world (WB, 2008) and the highest in South Asia (it is followed by Bangladesh at 8.8per cent and Sri Lanka at 8.7 per cent).

In 2006, Nepal received 1.6 billion US dollars as remittances. Figure 5.5 shows that remittances in Nepal increasedsubstantially after 2002, growing from 147 million US dollars in 2001 to 655 million in 2002 and then 1,373 million in2006. This is much higher than the Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) or FDI in Nepal. In 2007, through variousinternational sources, Nepal receivedODA amounting to 598.4 million USDollars1 (see Figure 5.5). According tothe ADB (2008), in 2006 Nepalreceived a net Foreign DirectInvestment (FDI) of 6 million USDollars which was 0.024 per cent ofthe total FDI in South Asia. Indiareceived about 80 per cent of the totalthat year.

The increase of remittances reflectsthe high rates of out-migration tovarious countries by Nepali labourers.Estimates of migrant Nepalis arevariable. Some studies suggest 1.3million registered as migrant workerswith government, while another onemillion may be unregistered. 2

1 http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=MDG&f=seriesRowID:632(Accessed on August 25, 2009)2 Migration News, 2008, Voulme 14 No. 2 available at : http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=3357_0_3_0,(Accessed on August 25, 2009)

Figure 5.5: Trends in Nepal’s remittance Flow

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2008; ICIMOD, 2009.) Electrification bringsinformation and services, and expands capacities fordiversifying livelihoods in those areas toward which theNepali economy is already leaning. Decentralisedservices can strengthen the local social capital neededfor building resilience against climate change (Agarwal,2008; ICIMOD, 2009) and mobilise investmentinjections into the local economy. Investing in locally-managed energy systems not only increases the numberof Nepalis served but also provides those with accessto remittances with returns on their investments. Suchan investment can also provide “green jobs” to thoseinvolved in the installation, repair and maintenance ofsuch systems. The result may be enough growth inNepal’s economy to reduce poverty as well as asignificant step toward energy security.

Table 5.7 has shown fundamental differences betweenthe business-as-usual approach to development policy-making and one that is better adapted to respond tothe impacts of climate change. The later pathway mayrequire up-front investment in developing renewableenergy system because in the long run, fossil-fuelstrategies have negative costs. If the costs of fossil fuels

rise in the future and climate change decreases the lifeof large-scale reservoir projects, renewable energy maywell become a comparatively cheaper option. Despitethe dilemma, Nepal needs the additional resourcesupfront to change its energy pathway which developedcountries need to compensate. At the same time, focusmust made in developing local capacity to adopt andadapt technology. This focus must move beyondrhetoric to pursue a substantive approach to incubatelocal entrepreneurship.

Conclusions

This chapter took a bottom up view of what climatescience means to an average Nepali household. We sawthat a flood which does not result in huge aggregatedamage at a basin-wide scale can nevertheless destroythe livelihoods of those directly affected by it. Withmedian climate change scenarios, the damage perindividual household will double and the number ofhouseholds affected will increase by 40 per cent.Although fire damage could not be calculated due tolack of data, the cost of the timber and income streams

Table 5.7: Comparison of approaches to energy, growth, resilience and climate-proofing

ISSUES

Financing of energy expansion

Guiding principles for expansion

Other resources to be tapped

Institutional options

Assumptions for povertyreduction, growth and energysecurity

Risk profile in terms of climaticvariability

Insurance options

TOP-DOWN APPROACH (CURRENT)

Aid and loans (598 million USD/year)Economies of scale in production, Private sectorparticipation

Target Foreign Direct Investment (7 million US $currently available) and local Private Service Providers

Formal institutions (e.g. NEA) replace old ones.Issues like access of the poor (current 5% in ruralareas) and accountability remain.

Energy is spread among poor (assumed impact)

Growth is spread among poor (assumed impact)

Energy security measured in volume produced in-house

Climate risk accumulates geographically through largeintegrated infrastructures

Only self-insurance possible

BOTTOM-UP APPROACH (PROPOSED)

Decentralised energy investment through energycompensation (44 million USD/year)

Number of households connected (adaptationgateway services)

Target remittances (3.6 billion USD available)New institutions (local electric supplyassociations) build on current local institutionswith local shareholding

Energy is spread among poor(planned target)

Adaptive capacity is spread among poor(planned target)

Local energy security enhanced

Climate risk spreads geographically throughdecentralised energy systems

Risk-pooling option available

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NOTES

1 Calculated in actual dollar value (1 USD =82 NPR) not purchase price parity.2 Income inequality has grown, with an increase in the Gini coefficient from 0.34 to 0.41. Some 78% of the poor depend on agricultural sector as the mainstay of employment (NPC, 2007).

Disparities in poverty between urban and rural areas and between different geographical regions and groups have widened over the same period (ibid) and the level of poverty is high.3 Average of number of households inundated weighted by probability of the flood under B1R3 climate change scenario.4 Agriculture contributes barely 4 per cent to the world’s GDP5 The implication of the growth of the service sector needs deeper enquiry. Some of the questions that needs answer are: What are the drivers of this shift? What are the characteristics

of the infrastructure enabling the transition? How does the shift contribute to enhance backward and forward linkages in the economy? How does this shift influence wealth creationversus higher consumer spending? Analysing the trend of higher household income accrued from garment industry in Kathmandu Rankin (2004) has suggested that participation of familiesin the activities spurred by the industry did lead to higher income, but also to higher consumer spending because avenues for investment in productive sector did not exist.

6 A detailed wind survey needs to be carried out to ascertain its potential.7 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/EXTEAPASTAE/

0,,contentMDK:21042047~menuPK:2900825~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:2822888,00.html accessed August 17, 2009

lost is very large indeed. The knock-on effects ofincreased snow-melt and regional sedimentation andreduced groundwater recharge are among the indirectcosts. Higher regional sedimentation will permanentlydecrease the volume of water stored in both natural andman-made bodies. Additional costs will be incurredthrough the increase in disease vectors and crop losses.

Autonomous adaption to these impacts is taking placeon a massive scale, though the elements of thatadaptation have yet to be captured fully as it shouldbe. Planned adaptation strategies, in particular largeinfrastructure-dependent pathways, also need to becarefully evaluated. From the preliminary analysis of theRohini and lower Bagmati rivers, we have seen thatpeople-centered approaches to flood adaptation arecost-effective. Short-term strategies promoting pestcontrol and crop diversification can minimise theburden of agriculture related-impacts.

Nepal needs reliable and sustainable sources of energyfor two basic reasons: first, to foster economic growthand, second, to build the resilience of communities inthe face of climate-induced disasters by promotingincome diversification. Energy that is available to all—

solar, micro hydroelectric, wind and biogas—does notstrain the natural environment and can help with thesequestering greenhouse gasses in the forests.Decentralised renewable energy systems are viableoptions if developed countries offset the initial set upcost in the form of “energy compensation” to the tuneof 44 million U.S. dollars per year. The NEA estimatesan increased demand of 8 per cent per annum for nextfifteen years. If this were to be coupled with a targetof 8 per cent increase in number of householdconnections, all of Nepali households would beconnected in 20 years. Adopting local investor friendlypolicies can also create incentives to promote suchsystems by diverting income sources like remittancestowards clean energy production. Currently, remittancesare ten times the amount of investment needed to shiftto a climate-resilient development pathway. Those whohave no remittances can still benefit from the essentialgateway system services put in place to foster growthin renewable energies and may be able to find alternativelivelihoods in the numerous “green jobs” that will begenerated. Ultimately, the real debate is about climate-friendly, household resilient pathways to developmentversus the inflexible and mal-adaptive one pursued inthe past fifty years.

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TRANSITINGFORWARD ALONGRESILIENT PATHWAYS

Two key issues are known about climate change inNepal. First, at the level of high science, there is a

fair amount of confidence that average temperatures arerising, more in the high mountains than in the lowlands.Second, the Nepali farmers, ISET-Nepal and PracticalAction consulted across the country, claim that thevagaries in weather patterns are growing more and morepronounced outside of their experience range or thathanded down from their parents and grandparents. Therapid and visible “within one generation” melting ofHimalayan glaciers is a proof to seriously consider thepredictions of climate scientists, and the observationthat lowland pests and toxic weeds have appeared atever higher elevations, mostly in the last five to sevenyears, is a grassroots confirmation of the warming trend,even though high science has yet to investigate, collateand pronounce definitive judgment on theseobservations.

This study, as the title “Vulnerability Through the Eyesof the Vulnerable” indicates, is an attempt to givesalience to the grassroots view, or what we have chosento call the “toad’s eye view” of those that experience thepainful point of the harrow and hoe. High science, incontrast, is akin to the view of the eagle above, whichsees wider and farther. At the lower end is civic science

as practiced by the Himalayan farmers toiling in theirfields, which is not only the carrier of immediateexperience but also one that relates it to the wisdomshaped by generations of traditional knowledge. Thoughunconfirmed by high science and unaware of nationaland international policy debates, it is also that knowledgewhich millions upon millions of households use to makeeveryday decisions that affect their livelihoods, thenational economy and even the global demand for fossilfuels.

The socio-economic dynamics observed in the NepalHimalaya indicate that, on the one hand, theuncertainties of the weather system are a major factorpushing farmers away from farming, while on the other,the attraction of high-paying jobs is pulling them abroad.The end result is that the national GNP rests on a fragileand consumerist remittance economy. While it has beenstated (in Chapter 5 earlier) that a development pathwaythat skips industrialisation and opts for a service sectororiented growth may have environmental benefits forNepal, it is far from clear if the same can be said forgiving up on hill agriculture. While it may make littlebusiness sense for Nepal to try and compete with itsnorthern and southern neighbours in heavy industry, thereis a case to be made for intermediate industries that

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enjoy comparative advantage or are based on agro-processing. The dominating revenue share that nationalTV stations get from advertizing package noodles is proofthat a niche market for creative, service-related medium-scale industrialisation does exist for Nepal. It is withthis in mind that our national and district-levelconsultations focused on climate science and the needto improve not just the high and low ends of it but alsoto foster better linkages between the two. Science ismost valuable when it is solving actual problems, andnothing is more real to the farmers of the Himalaya thanthe implications of the climate vagaries that arethreatening their livelihoods, especially in agriculture andthe production of food.

Key issues

As the signature events and national as well as grassrootsviews indicate, the problems that need urgent attentioncan be summarised as follows:

Climate science: Across the world, a betterunderstanding of the interaction between theatmosphere and geo-physics and the impacts that followis necessary if we are to predict the characteristics offuture changes in the climate, what these changes mightportend and how the country needs to prepare for them.For Nepal, improving our understanding ofmeteorological processes, particularly monsoondynamics and their interaction with the Himalayanmountain system, where the orographic effect ispronounced, is vital. Significant changes in elevation inNepal’s hills and mountain regions result in dramaticvariations in temperature, humidity and evaporation,depending on whether one is in the foothills, on ridges,in valleys or on the wetter aspect of a slope. This micro-scale variation in the Himalayan climate systems are

not captured by general circulation models (GCMs),which have higher grid resolutions. To improve scientificdata about the region will require investment instrengthening and expanding the existing network ofdata-gathering stations and supporting institutions.Applying creative approaches using civic science, suchas installing stations in schools and in village-levelorganisations such as farmer-managed irrigation systemscan help make sure the funds are well spent.

At the same time, we must improve our ability to analyse,synthesise and disseminate the knowledge we gather.Improvements in analysis will increase the security offarmers and horticulturists, trekking operators andimplementers of development programmes as theystruggle to cope with the uncertainties the impacts ofclimate change have added to an already uncertainexistence. Improving data will also require the continuousmonitoring of the discharges of the springs and otherwater sources that feed small systems, particularly at thelevel of water user associations. Such micro-level trackingwill help us understand how the decentralised, unmappedsources upon which the vast majority of Nepalis dependfor their drinking water and other domestic needsrespond to global climate change. Only if we developthis understanding can we effectively operate andmaintain the drinking water and sanitation systemswhich are the basic elements at the core of adaptation.Overall our current understanding at the field level isvery limited; a sustained effort needs to be made in orderto get a better picture of the impacts of global climatechange on local climates and livelihoods.

Farming stress: Climate change-induced impacts suchas extreme weather events as well as pest and weedinfestation seriously debilitate agriculture. In the future,households dependent on agriculture for their livelihoodsare likely to face a variety of additional stresses and

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threats, forcing them to stop farming and migrate toalready overpopulated cities. Government policies needto provide rural households with options for moreclimate-robust livelihoods as well as the means to makethis strategic transition. At the same time, it must ensurenational food security by enhancing the capacity of localfood systems to face the stresses associated with climaticvagaries. Encouraging Himalayan farmers to grow moreand better food in their immediate vicinities will reducethe uncertainty inherent in a food system dependent onimports transported using fossil fuel. Because farmersare vulnerable to climate change, they need to beconfident about whatever new strategies are introduced.These strategies should include establishing centreswhich will monitor and study diseases and providesupport in diverse geographical locations.

Food system: Many families are exiting agriculture notonly because they prefer to do something else but alsobecause it is growing less and less profitable andcharacterised by drudgery. Income from remittances hasgiven people in the hinterlands the cash they need tobuy food from distance markets and to send their childrento school with the expectation that they will get goodjobs. The fact that climate change will alter the regionalwater balance of, for example, the sub-river systems ofthe Ganga basin, suggests that reliance on externalmarkets for food is fraught with threats: prices will bevolatile and distribution may be disrupted, whether byflood damage to roads and bridges or politically-motivated strikes. At the same time, it may be thatdrought-prone areas have reached a tipping point. Thereis a need to explore ways of rebuilding farmers’confidence.

Social and economic vulnerability: The losses causedby increasing temperatures, humidity, and infestations

of insects and diseases are poorly accounted for in thenational GDP. In order to adequately assess the economicvulnerability of farmers, we need to develop new methodsto include such losses. Caste, class, gender and otherstructural characteristics of local communities createmultiple layers of social and economic vulnerabilitiesfor agriculture-based livelihoods. Climate change willworsen these vulnerabilities as well as add additionallayers of stresses. Dealing with these new risks adequatelyrequires understanding and responding to these varioussocio-economic vulnerabilities. As it has been for decades,seasonal migration which provides financial returns fromremittance continues to be a common, autonomousresponse to losses in local livelihoods. But migration isalso associated with creating nuclear families andchanging social values among family members. It haseven given rise to socially unacceptable behaviour thathas caused a rise in the incidence of HIV/AIDS cases.

Alternative livelihoods: Research of over a decade and ahalf (Moench and Dixit, 2004) clearly indicates thatthose who diversify their sources of livelihood survivefloods and droughts best. One way to help people adaptto climate change is to help households whose livelihoodsare based wholly or in large part on agriculture shift somefamily members into the less climate-vulnerableindustrial and service sectors without abandoningfarming altogether. Assuring such a happy state of affairsis dependent to a large extent on the existence of theeffective transport and easy communication systemsthat grant both farm produce and rural labour, especiallywomen, access to markets. These systems, in turn,depend on energy security. Nepal needs creative policiesthat will develop and make easily available indigenousenergy sources which have low carbon footprints andwhich, in their operation and maintenance, will generatejobs.

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VULNERABILITY THROUGH THE EYESOF THE VULNERABLE BOX 6.1: Bhattedanda Milkway

Access and vulnerability: An increase in the number offloods and landslides will make people more vulnerableas these disasters cut off their access to key services. In1993, the scale of disruption was great: for more thanthree months, Kathmandu’s food supply line with theTarai was blocked after floods washed out bridges. Theclosure of parts of the East-West Highway following theKoshi floods of 2008 August is a more recent example.Any such disruptions, whether they are caused bylandslides on mountain highways, GLOFs, or fuel pricehikes, increase overall vulnerability. Access will be furtherreduced when climate change impacts cause food pricesto soar. Ensuring mobility (more than providing transport

itself) is crucial; to this end, Nepal must pursue adiversified, multi-modal transport system. In 1993, thecountry capitalised on its transport diversification:although the highway to Kathmandu was closed due tothe unprecedented floods, the Kathmandu-HetaudaRopeway was able to supply food to the capital. Anotherexample of a climate resilient development pathway isthe Bhattedanda Milkway, whose lessons for adaptationto potential climate change-induced stresses are capturedin Box 6.2.

Climate-resilient infrastructure: Developinginfrastructure resilient to the impacts of climate change

The Bhattedanda Milkway, a goods-carrying cable car is usedto transport milk to the roadhead quickly, before it curdles inthe heat. The system has significantly alleviated povertyamong marginalised farmers in Nepal’s southern KathmanduValley. The ropeway was the brainchild of a fewunconventional Nepali and European watershed managers. Itemerged between 1994 and 1998, when several institutionsfavoured its installation (Gyawali et al., 2004).Unfortunately, the political conditions conducive to thesustained development of this innovative technologicalapproach to combating rural poverty did not and still do notexist in either the Nepali or the EU officialdoms and aidbureaucracies.

There are indicators that made this unconventionalwatershed management project a model of sustainabledevelopment: in its one-and-a-half years of operationbetween 1995 and 1996, the ropeway enabled a marginalisedhinterland village to export one-and-a-half times more milk,vegetables and other rural products to the city than itimported urban goods—a highly unusual trade balance. Theproject obviated the need for farmers to boil milk for manyhours a day (cutting down a lot of trees in the process) toconvert it into the thick khuwa (solidified milk paste) thatcould be transported to the market without spoiling andinstead enabled them to sell milk, a more profitable good,directly. Then, because institutional arrangements were notaddressed properly and because a dirt road was constructednearby, the ropeway fell into disrepair and ceased to functionbefore the second-year mark was even crossed. After six yearsin a moribund state, the ropeway was revived when acloudburst and a flood in July 2002 washed away the road,

and farmers needed to take action so they could continue tosell milk and thereby sustain their improved livelihood.

The farmers’ group eventually did manage to get the ropewayoperating again. They also managed to connect to a nearbycommunity-operated electricity distribution system and switchfrom non-renewable, diesel-generated power (which cost aboutNPR 34,000 per month to operate) to renewable hydroelectricity(for just NPR 7,000 per month). A comparison with anequivalent “green road” between two similar valley bottom toridge top villages showed that it required 53 MJ to transport atonne of goods on roads but only 34 MJ for a ropeway (Gyawaliand Dixit, 2004).They are currently working to expand theropeway to an adjacent valley without roads. A more successfulstory of adaptation that both alleviates poverty and isenvironmentally friendly is difficult to find.

The other major initiative towards shifting Nepal’stransportation away from fossil fuel dependency has been theconversion of soot-belching diesel-run three wheelers intoelectric “safa (clean) tempos”. Not only were imported fossilfuel vehicles replaced by locally manufactured electric-poweredones, but air pollution in Kathmandu was significantlyreduced. Unfortunately, electric transport systems, includingsafa tempos and ropeways suffer from inefficiencies andplanning failures as well as short-sighted taxation and othergovernment policies. The question before policy-makers iswhether or not they have the statesmanship needed tointroduce such climate-friendly, adaptive technologies intoNepal’s development policies. Transportation systems that arefree of fossil fuel will help Nepal transit to a development paththat is adaptive and resilient to the changing climate.

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is a challenge. Attention needs to focus on new ways ofdesigning roads, bridges, culverts, barrages,embankments and reservoirs that will withstandclimate-exacerbated extreme events. The acceptedengineering methodology of designing such anembankment, for example, has required having historicaldata on flood discharges, river stages and sediment loads.As the climate grows more uncertain and erratic, it isunlikely that historical data, the statistical regressionof which lies at the core of all hydro-technical designmethodologies, will prove adequate for the future.Bridges, irrigation and power intakes, and publicbuildings need to be provided with sufficient safetymargins to accommodate the impacts that will resultfrom intensified events related to climate change,whether they be floods or debris and sediment load.

Upgrading standards requires evaluating and improvingexisting design codes and construction practices andimproving engineering education. It requires higherinvestments up-front so that these structures areclimate resilient. While floods affect infrastructuressuch as bridges and culverts in specific locations, theimpact of drought stresses farming systems across thecountry. Participants in the consultations saw droughtas a major threat to drinking water and irrigation systemsas low-river flows reduce the adequacy of water suppliesand eventually harm crop production and health.

Adaptation and development: The discussions aboveshow that efforts to adapt to climate change impactsare embedded within the broader challenges ofdevelopment, which include poverty alleviation,equitable management of natural resources, andsustainability. If adaptation and development isconsidered as a continuum, at one end are development

activities, such as the provisioning of drinking water andsanitation facilities, and energy and food securities, whileat the other end, are efforts necessary to reducevulnerability to climate change and build resilience(McGray et al., 2007). Separating the two approaches iscrucial in order to answer key questions such as whatadaptation is, who will pay for it, how and who shouldgenerate and make national and international fundsavailable, how access to such funds will be determinedand how climate adaptations should be mainstreamed intothe national and international development agenda. Thereare no elegant, neat or silver-bullet solutions to climatechange because, according to climate scientist and founderof the Tyndall Center for Climate Research Mike Hulme,“wicked problems (such as climate change) are essentiallyunique, have no definitive formulation, and can beconsidered symptoms of yet other problems.” (Hulme,2009: 334)

Hulme goes on to argue that “solutions to wicked problemsare difficult to recognise because of complexinterdependencies in the systems affected; a solution toone aspect of a wicked problem often reveals or createsother, even more complex, problems demanding furthersolutions” (p. 334) and suggests that “the descriptionapplies very well to what is conventionally understood asthe ‘problem’ of climate change”. While arguing that the“wickedness” of climate change must be recognised,Hulme contends that elegant solutions will not solve itand “clumsy solutions” merely represent the limits of ourhuman ability to respond. He argues that, since the ideaof climate change is so plastic, it can be deployed acrossmany human undertakings, especially as a resource of theimagination; it can stimulate new, creative thinking abouttechnology, poverty reduction, demographic management,localised trade and many other such areas.

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Building synergy between politics and citizens: The 2009Human Development Report of Nepal (UNDP, 2009)suggest that one challenge facing the country is to builda strong sense of citizenship and political community:

“The restoration of democracy in Nepal in 1990has increased people’s aspirations without fulfillingtheir expectations. The rights enshrined in theInterim Constitution 2006 include the rights to foodand work, the delivery of basic services, and aboveall, guarantees of internal peace and stability. Noneof these legitimate demands have been adequatelymet or addressed. This shortcoming has weakenedthe base of citizenship and increased clientelism.Many civil society actors, including private sectorbodies, have become the clients of the politicalparties rather than true citizens. This has alienatedthe poor in general, especially among the country’sfarmers and agricultural labourers. If the Nepali statefails to address the basic needs and rights of thesecitizens, the country could well relapse into anotherconflict, especially after the immense growth ofpolitical awareness since the 1990s and its evenmore rapid increase during the Maoist insurgency.The state must promote development that isinclusive, humane, and just (HDR, 2009).

All sorts of political and administrative factors, includingpoor governance, low fungibility, weak institutionalcapacity and memory, poor technical and technologicalcapacities, excessive dependence on donors, lack ofcoordination, vertical-structuring of agencies,centralisation and politicisation keep Nepal on the pathof low-level development. For many developing

countries, including Nepal, climate change presents anopportunity to re-evaluate the current approach todevelopment. Nepal is particularly fortunate in that itspolitical shift to a democratic republic and writing of anew constitution will enable it to embrace innovativepathways and reject the status quo as it transits to a re-crafted future. Even though the country is currentlyundergoing the difficult process of moving toward a moreequitable and just social and state structure, thepotential exists for interrogating past practices andcharting out an alternative future.

The shift will also necessitate a re-orientation of itsdevelopmental trajectory. Nepal needs to engage theglobal community, while at the same time pursuing adevelopment pathway that is inclusive, humane andremoving barriers that could restrict its transition. If itdoes not change, Nepal will face a dual menace: thegrowing impacts of global climate change-inducedvulnerabilities intertwined with an exclusive, un-humaneand unjust development pathway. As Nepal writes a newconstitution and re-defines the various components oflocal and national governance, the Constituent Assembly(CA) must take into consideration the challenges andadditional stresses posed by climate change. In particular,decentralised development planning and management,quick local response and accountability, are the key waysto enhance adaptation to climate change, and must bebuilt into the new governance structure.

Global negotiation: Nepal is already highly dependenton foreign aid and international cooperation for itsdevelopment; in the future, assuring the flow of foreigninvestment will be even more crucial. In light of thisneed, it is necessary to build national capacity to engagemore effectively at the global level. Whether it regards

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matters related to the mode of global carbon trade,compacts on bio-sequestration that will have a majorimpact on Nepal’s development pathways, or othersimilar matters, Nepal’s government agencies, civicorganisations and the private sector need to enhancetheir capacity for international engagement so that thebenefits that should accrue to Nepal in fact do so. Thiscapacity is also necessary because global-level policy-making too needs to be aware of local-level concerns sothat adverse impacts of global decisions are obviated atthe very outset through such consultations.

Achieving this goal requires building Nepal’s capacityfor the economic and technical diplomacy. ThereforeNepal needs to engage more effectively with the globalcommunity. Such engagements should enable thegovernment of Nepal to access the Adaptation Fundwhich has been proposed to support adaptive responsesin developing countries. Accessing this fund will dependon the country’s capacity to define the problem, andoffer adaptive solutions to the problem of livelihoodsustainability. At present, the understanding of localresponses is limited: it is not known if such autonomousresponses undertaken build or deplete resilience.Responses within Nepal’s diverse socio-ecological nichesneed to be documented and local perspectivesincorporated into the macro-planning process. Nepalneeds long-term investments in its people to boost theircapacities to deal with climate change and the globaldiscourse that goes with it.

Adaptation fund: For countries like Nepal, which dependheavily on overseas development assistance funding tomeet their basic development needs, securing additionalfunds for climate change adaptation is yet anotherchallenge, one which Bapna and Macgray (2009) contend

emerges from the “impossibility of disentanglingadaptation from development complicating efforts toeven estimate adaptation costs” (Bapna and Macgray,2009). Our very preliminary analysis of the energy sectorput this additional cost at about 44 million US dollars;obviously the amount will increase when the costs ofadaptation in other sectors are added. While making anaccurate assessment would need to examine the scale ofautonomous adaptation, certain ballpark figures alreadyexist. The five currently available estimates of the annualcost of adaptation (UNDP US $86 billion: 2007),(UNFCCC, US28-67 billion: 2007, World Bank, USD9-41 billion: 2006 Oxfam, US $ 50 billion: 2007 andStern Review, USD 4-37 billion) all run in the billions.Even without an exact number, it is clear that the cost ofdeveloping Nepal economically will increase at levels thatcurrent assistance doesn’t even make a dent in. Againaccording to Bapna and Macgray (2009) “the currentlevel of adaptation funding for developing countries isorders of magnitude below even conservative estimateof the costs”.

Shared knowledge: While high science and moderninformation is important for responding to the impactsof climate change, it is equally important that the wisdomof ages contained in traditional forms of knowledge notbe ignored. Such knowledge is based on generations ofexperience, and must be the foundation for the buildingof adaptive capacity that can respond to various stresses,including those associated with climate change. We needto conceive and develop a platform that enables differenttypes of knowledge systems to find salience in the publicdiscourse. Combining high science with the civic scienceof common, everyday Himalayan experience must be aniterative process wherein high science is communicatedand transmitted to those at the local level, and local

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understanding is transmitted back to inform the ways inwhich high science, and development based on it, ispracticed.

Research in Nepal has shown that high science andcentralised development not sufficiently aware of civicand community concerns are, besides being ineffective,also very expensive. Sharma (2004), comparing fourconventional donor-funded Nepal governmentprogrammmes in water supply and sanitation with thatdone by a Nepali technical NGO in partnership withvillage user groups, has shown that the latter’s cost perhousehold is almost three times cheaper and hence morecost effective than the former’s even as the software tohardware ratio for the former is 66:33 and only 33:66 forthe latter. Many local farmers are engaged in developingstress resistant varieties of crops. Such expertise needsto be identified and utilised to preserve and promotelocally adapted varieties of crops. The examples shownby this research also indicate that a two-way feedbackfrom civic science and development planning to thenational and international bodies and vice versa isespecially important given that millions upon millionsof households are making everyday decisions based ontheir very local understanding of events, decisions thatare currently not informed by the concerns of the highscience of GHG emissions and climate change impacts.

Education: Improving climate science and developingclimate-resilient infrastructure require re-crafting theeducation currently dispensed. Climate change is acomplex problem that will need a broad, inter-disciplinaryunderstanding of the issues involved. As is true elsewhere,Nepal’s approach to development is based on gatheringhistorical data within disciplinary boundaries to projectfuture solutions, an approach that assumes thateverything else remains the same. Climate change will

likely make a mockery of such an approach. The currenteducation system defines and imparts knowledge withindisciplinary silos, but the impact of climate change, withits complex physical and social inter-linkages, demandsmuch more. What will be demanded in the future is abetter understanding of how both natural and socialsciences impact each other and how changes in theassumptions of one area of study will have unintendedand profound consequences for the assumptions in otherareas. This osmosis and synthesis between the naturaland social sciences will require redesigning curricula andteaching methods, and include the writing of textbooksthat bring practical insights from the field into theclassroom. This process must start at the school leveland proceed right up to the tertiary level of education.The curricula should include emerging insights into thechanging nature of ecosystem functioning as well as intoits services and conservation.

Wicked problem, uncomfortable knowledgeand clumsy solutions

The problem of climate change, based on the abovediscussions, can indeed be called a “wicked problem”, onethat is very difficult to define, and when attempted exposesunderlying layers of many more underlying strata of nestedand intractable predicaments. Complex inter-linkagesamong unforeseen elements and non-linearity that canquickly transform a small perturbation into a catastrophicevent are the hallmarks of wicked problems. Because thesignature events described earlier in the voices of villagershave such characteristics, any attempt to tinker with themand nudge the situation towards a solution requires“uncomfortable knowledge,” or out-of-the-box thinking(WWAP, 2009) and a broad institutional environmentthat is conducive to bold intellectual forays. Comfortable

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knowledge has put us in the predicament of global climatechange we are in and the built-in filters of existingknowledge generating establishments and their prioritytowards gate-keeping rather than new explorations is oneelement that has to change.

Change is inevitable, but it is not linear. It does nothave one desirable and predictable destination; instead,it may reach pleasant or unpleasant ends with severalmixes in between that are difficult to foresee(Thompson, 2008). And however desirable change maybe, it does not just happen serendipitously or neatly.Indeed, efforts at development are themselves harbingersof planned change, which, if successful, will have beenconceived and re-designed several times, andimplemented through clumsy political compromises ina democratic terrain. The uncertainties associated withclimate change are forcing us to re-think developmentpaths and programmes.

Given the haze of unknowns, responding to climatechange problem raises many questions. Should we optfor that one perfectly optimised solution, or should weopt for many 10 per cent solutions, some of which mayfail while others may exceed our expectations? Shouldsolving the problems of water scarcity and floods,problems that, it is widely believed, will be exacerbatedby climate change, be attempted through one expensivescheme, a concrete dam for instance, or through a bundle

of solutions pursued simultaneously, including waterharvesting, groundwater management and wetlandspreservation? Should embankments in critical locales becomplemented with houses on stilts and villages withraised plinth levels generally? Should livelihooddiversification, and providing opportunities for the same,be considered an intrinsic part of the adaptationstrategy? How will the various voices of justice-seekingcivic movements and of innovative (especially local)markets–voices that seem to listen more carefully to thegrass root concerns than many official bureaucracies–bedovetailed into the programmes of national governmentsand international agencies? Should the problems raisedby climate change be mainstreamed into sectors such aseducation and finance that have traditionally notconsidered them?

Climate change and its implications are perhaps themost serious issues of our times: there is a pressing needto amalgamate them with what has been, and continuesto be, the main mission of countries like Nepal –development. This vital imperative calls for creating anew compact between government and developmentagencies on the one hand and local innovators andcommunity-based civic bodies with the former set onthe other. And this partnership needs to range across thespectrum, from hard physical to soft social sciences, fromresearch to implementation, from centres to far-flunghinterlands.

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