NILE 1798 Nelson's first great victory

ABOUT THE AUTHOR AND ILLUSTRATOR

GREGORY FREMONT-BARNES holds a doctorate in Modern History from Oxford University and serves as a Senior Lecturer in War Studies at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, dividing his time between teaching cadets on-site and commissioned officers of the British Army posted to garrisons throughout the UK and abroad. His wider work for the Ministry of Defence has taken him to Iraq, Afghanistan and both republics of the Congo. He has written extensively, with his principal naval works including: Trafalgar 1805, Nelson's Sailors, Nelson's Officers and Midshipmen, The Royal Navy, 1793-1815, Victory vs Red ou table: Ships of the Line at Trafalgar 1805 and The Wars of the Barbary Pirates.

HOWARD GERRARD studied at the Wallasey School of Art and has been a freelance designer and illustrator for over 20 years. He has worked for a number of publishers and is an associate member of the Guild of Aviation Artists. He has won both the Society of British Aerospace Companies Award and the Wilkinson Sword Trophy and has illustrated a number of books for Osprey.

C A M P A I G N • 2 3 0

NILE 1798 Nelson's first great victory

GREGORY FREMONT-BARNES ILLUSTRATED BY H GERRARD Series editor Marcus Cowper

First published in 2011 by Osprey Publishing Midland House, West Way, Botley, Oxford 0X2 OPH, UK 44-02 23rd St, Suite 219, Long Island City, NY 11101, USA

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 5

CHRONOLOGY 10

OPPOSING COMMANDERS 13 British commanders - French commanders

OPPOSING FORCES 18 The British squadron . The French squadron - Orders of batt le

OPPOSING PLANS 24 French plans . British plans

THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE 29 Cat and mouse . French arrival in Egypt and the cont inuing British search British approach and French reaction . Action commences Crescendo of batt le . The final phase

AFTERMATH 81 Tactical analysis

THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY 90

GLOSSARY OF NAVAL TERMS 93

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND FURTHER READING 94

INDEX 95

INTRODUCTION

The battle of the Glorious First of June, fought off Ushant in 1794, was the first fleet action of the French Revolutionary Wars. Earl Howe, with a fleet of 25 ships of the line sought to prevent an immense French grain convoy from reaching home port. In this Howe failed, though the British claim victory on the strength of the six ships of the line they captured and one sunk. (Author's collection)

The battle of the Nile ranks as one of the most decisive engagements in naval history. The action not only stranded the young general Napoleon Bonaparte and his army in Egypt; it thrust Horatio Nelson forward as a brilliant naval tactician, with the coming victories at Copenhagen and, above all, Trafalgar, confirming him as history's pre-eminent naval commander. Furthermore, it encouraged resistance to Revolutionary France, bringing into being a powerful coalition including Britain, Austria, Russia, Turkey, Naples and other powers. Finally, victory at the Nile restored the Royal Navy's ascendancy in the Mediterranean - a grave strategic setback for the recent Franco-Spanish alliance, which had until then denied Britain her century-old strong naval presence east of Gibraltar. The battle of the Nile compounded the effect of Britain's previous successes - notably at Camperdown and St Vincent, fought the year before - by setting for the Royal Navy a standard for fighting prowess that continued well beyond the era of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.

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Nelson's triumph formed a line of departure from all previous major naval encounters of the 18th century - indeed, of virtually any era - constituting as it did a battle of annihilation: a truly decisive victory resulting in the loss of nearly every ship in the opposing force. In the age of fighting sail no precedent existed for an action in which two forces of approximately equal size ended with such a disproportionate result. In all respects - leadership, discipline, gunnery, training, organization and morale - the British demonstrated a marked superiority against an opponent undoubted for its fighting spirit, but seriously lacking in tactical imagination, adequate training and initiative.

Beginning in 1792 Europe was convulsed by war. Austria, Prussia, many of the smaller German states, Spain, Holland and other powers sought to force the French revolutionary genie back in its bottle, restore the Bourbon monarchy to the French throne and turn back the tide of radicalism that the French republic had carried across its frontiers - thanks in part to the sheer size and number of its newly raised conscript armies - threatening the whole political and social stability of Western and Central Europe. By 1798 the struggle that had begun between Britain and Revolutionary France five years earlier had reached a stalemate of predictable geographical limits: Britain stood supreme at sea - thanks to successes in 1797 at St Vincent against the Spanish and at Camperdown against the Dutch - while France boasted unchallenged mastery on land, the same year proving decisive as the occasion for the young Napoleon Bonaparte's stunning victory over the Austrians at Rivoli in northern Italy and the subsequent imposition upon them of the punitive Treaty of Campo Formio.

With this humiliating settlement came the fall of Britain's last great continental ally - Prussia and Spain having left the First Coalition by the Treaty of Basel in 1795 - by which Austria ceded much of northern Italy and the Dalmatian coast to French control and acknowledged as a fait accompli the republic's occupation of the Rhineland and the Low Countries. French power and influence extended still further with the acquisition of Corfu, the creation soon thereafter of a Roman republic in central Italy and the exaction of millions of gold ducats in reparations from the Pope and several northern Italian states. Capitalizing on these conquests, and unhindered by further opposition from Vienna, the French invaded defenceless Switzerland, establishing a satellite state which the revolutionaries dubbed the Helvetic Republic - applying the name given by Imperial Rome and thus confirming the French desire for conquest on a grand scale. In short, the events of 1797-98 offered irrefutable proof that, far from benignly offering fraternal protection and liberation from the yoke of monarchical tyranny, which their propaganda had selflessly promised since 1792, the French revolutionaries confirmed what most contemporaries had long since feared; the war machine created for the defence of the republic had now become an instrument of shameless conquest, with France bent on territorial aggrandizement at the expense of adversaries and neutrals alike. Relentless campaigning, conscription and the recasting of the Army based on merit rather than privilege had meanwhile paid dividends; by 1798 French occupied territories stretched from the Low Countries to the Rhineland, and from Switzerland down the Italian peninsula.

After Campo Formio only Britain - reeling from a financial crisis, rocked by two major naval mutinies at Spithead and the Nore, and forced to withdraw her fleet from the Mediterranean as a consequence of a recent Franco-Spanish alliance - stood in any position, albeit a very weak one, to oppose French expansion. Under these circumstances Britain unsurprisingly

opened peace talks with France at Lille, but with no result; in truth, apart from possessing most of the French and Dutch colonies in the West Indies - certainly lucrative, though not indispensable, to the French economy - Britain could bring little to the bargaining table. Under such advantageous circumstances Bonaparte, the hero of the Italian campaign, returned to Paris in December 1797 and received command of an army stationed along the Channel coast designated for the invasion of England. There could be no question but that France, albeit experiencing a financial crisis of her own and still struggling to recover from the period of political instability that marked Robespierre's Terror in 1793-94, stood in the ascendant.

In the ascendant, certainly, but only on land; crossing the English Channel was no mean feat in light of British naval dominance. As such, the prospect of a successful strike across the Channel had shifted in 1797 from merely problematic to downright remote as the next year dawned. In early 1798 Bonaparte, faced with this strategic deadlock and keen for a distant command to avoid the turmoil in Paris - indeed, the Directory, wary of his widespread popularity within the Army, stood just as anxious to be rid of his potentially dangerous presence -conducted an inspection of the camps around Boulogne, the staging ground for the optimistically named Armee de l'Angleterre.

Bonaparte reckoned he could do much with this fine instrument - but much farther afield than the south coast of England. Egypt satisfied many needs at once: it strongly appealed to his sense of romantic adventure, for little was known of the region in Europe and he could do more than merely conquer this land of mystery and ancient culture - he could enlighten its people. There lay at once the opportunity for French scholars to study the archaeology and natural history of one of the cradles of civilization, while at the same time introduce Western ideas of liberalism and the modern social and political institutions of which most Frenchmen were proud. In addition, a team of scientists, mathematicians, botanists and other scholars accompanying the

Bonaparte secured Egypt through the application of force on land, but Nelson's application of sea power made it impossible to retain -a perfect example of the profound influence that naval operations can exert on their land-based counterparts. (Author's collection)

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expedition could confirm their country's justifiable reputation for rapidly expanding mankind's understanding of the world in the continuing tradition of Enlightenment thought. If naked conquest and commercial and strategic advantage underpinned the primary French motives for the conquest of Egypt, at the very least their later discovery of the Rosetta Stone, with its inscriptions in Greek, Demotic and Hieroglyphs - which would eventually enable scholars to translate many of the texts of the ancient world - confirmed France as Europe's leader in scientific scholarship.

The idea of invading Egypt was not new; it had originated during the reign of Louis XV in the mid-18th century, but the notion remained dormant until resurrected by Talleyrand, the French foreign minister, who in July 1797 presented a lecture on the subject to the Institut de France, followed by correspondence exchanged with Bonaparte while that commander still remained at the Italian front. The scheme appealed to the young and ambitious general, not merely on the grounds of adventure and cultural advancement, but also at the prospect of funding the expedition by seizing en route to Egypt the vast wealth held by the Knights of St John of Jerusalem, an ancient order dating from the time of the Crusades, which had ruled Malta since the early 16th century. Bonaparte deemed the Knights - who were known to be corrupt and unpopular and who numbered fewer than a thousand men - incapable of mounting an adequate defence; in short, Malta was ripe for the picking.

The island's prominent place in Bonaparte's strategy for conquering Egypt lay beyond its mere wealth; situated in a prime position in the central Mediterranean, with Valetta one of the world's great deep-water ports, French occupation would extend the republic's naval dominance in the Mediterranean still further at a time when the Royal Navy maintained no meaningful presence beyond Gibraltar. With the French not only ensconced at their great port at Toulon - and across much of Italy, at Corfu and along the Dalmatian coast thanks to Campo Formio - the occupation of Malta could extend their power farther east with virtual impunity. To this end, Talleyrand reinforced the argument for a descent on Egypt in February 1798, when in a report to the government he outlined the particular commercial and strategic advantages of such a campaign, its relatively low cost and the benefits to be derived from establishing a colony that could compensate

LEFT The Paris National Guard marches off to join the Army at the front in 1793. Having executed or driven into exile its aristocratically dominated officer corps, the French government sought to compensate for this loss by raising vast numbers of recruits, appealing to the patriotic instincts of potential volunteers and establishing a meritocratic system of promotion - expedients that together succeeded first in holding at bay and, later, defeating the armies of the First Coalition (1792-97). (Author's collection)

RIGHT Fighting around Charleroi, June 1794. Having held back the invading Austrian and Prussian armies in 1792, the French revolutionaries went on the offensive, invading the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) and Holland with armies consisting of a few veterans but mostly comprising a torrent of eager young men raised via the levee en masse, the first instance of universal conscription in Europe. Partly on the basis of numerical superiority, by the time of the Nile campaign France controlled most of Western Europe, including the Low Countries, the west bank of the Rhine, Switzerland and northern and central Italy. (Author's collection)

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• - •

France for the loss of her lucrative West Indian possessions, progressively captured by Britain since 1793. Not only would control of Malta and Egypt extend French control to the eastern Mediterranean - thus choking off the whole of British commerce in that sea - it could serve as a springboard for either an eventual expedition to India or as a base for the supply of indigenous forces seeking to oust the British from the Indian subcontinent.

Finally, even so distant an objective as Egypt appeared an increasingly viable option for French naval and military strategists, who appreciated that they simply could not operate in those seas where British naval mastery denied them the exercise of substantial power: the North Sea, the Channel and the Atlantic coasts of Europe. Only in the Mediterranean could French ships not only navigate with relative impunity, but imperil Britain's trade on a large scale and even threaten her possessions in India by a shorter route across the Sinai to the Red Sea in contrast to the exceedingly circuitous journey around southern Africa.

On the outcome of the Nile campaign, therefore, rested the fate of French and British interests across the Mediterranean and beyond.

Malta, a point of great strategic importance in naval and commercial terms, yet incapable of mounting any meaningful defence despite boasting some of the most impressive fortifications in Europe. (Author's collection)

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CHRONOLOGY

1798

8 April

13 April

28 April

Nelson, in the Vanguard, leaves the anchorage at St Helens, off the Isle of Wight, and accompanies 11 merchantmen with naval stores to Lisbon.

Vice-Admiral Brueys takes command of the Toulon fleet.

The British government resolves to send ships immediately to the Mediterranean under Earl St Vincent.

Vice-Admiral Brueys. On the same day, Nelson weighs anchor from Gibraltar, making a course for Toulon.

17 May Nelson, off Cape Side, acquires intelligence from a captured enemy vessel informing him that there had been 19 ships of the line in Toulon, 15 of which were ready for sea, together with a large force of troops, under Bonaparte, preparing to embark for an unknown destination.

30 April

2 May

4 May

8 May

10

Having recovered from the wound he suffered at Tenerife the previous year, Vice-Admiral Nelson rejoins the fleet off Cadiz.

Very anxious about the purpose of French naval preparations under way at Toulon, the Admiralty orders St Vincent to detach Nelson to the Mediterranean to investigate the size and destination of the expeditionary force. He leaves on this day in the Vanguard.

Nelson reaches Gibraltar, there joined by two ships of the line and three smaller vessels.

Bonaparte reaches Toulon from Paris to assume command of 36,000 troops to be escorted by a large fleet under

19 May The Toulon fleet gets under way and sails towards Genoa, where it is joined by troop transports.

20 May Vice-Admiral Brueys weighs from Toulon with 22 warships, 130 merchantmen and transports carrying 11,000 troops.

21-22 May Nelson's squadron suffers severely in a gale south of Hyeres, in the Gulf of Genoa, with several ships being separated. The following day, the crippled Vanguard, under tow by the Alexander, anchors in the road of San Pietro, Sardinia, where she begins to refit.

23 May The Toulon fleet reaches Cape Corse in Corsica, remaining in the vicinity until the first week of June waiting for

further transports from Civita Vecchia 10 June which, in the event, never materialize.

The French land troops at seven places on Malta.

24 May Off San Pietro, in need of repair, the Vanguard is refused access to land owing to Sardinia's recent alliance with France.

27 May After four days of frantic refitting, the Vanguard and her two consorts put to sea and make for Toulon. On the same day the British squadron enters the Mediterranean.

28 May A vessel out of Marseilles informs Nelson that the French fleet had left Toulon on the 20th. On the same day, the French reach Civita Vecchia, on the Corsican coast.

31 May Nelson arrives off Toulon, now aware that the French have sailed, but still with no information about their destination.

12 June Bonaparte accedes to the Grand Master's request for a 24-hour cease-fire. That same night the Knights sign a convention abandoning their forts and forswearing sovereignty of the island, together with neighbouring Gozo and Comino. The French also take possession of the two 64-gun ships, one frigate and three galleys in Valetta. On the same day, Nelson's squadron, having steered for Corsica, reaches a position between the islands of Monte Cristo and Giglio off Cape Corse, and proceeds down the Tuscan coast.

13 June The British squadron encounters a Tunisian warship and obtains second-hand information that the French were sighted off Sicily on the 4th.

7 June

9 June

Reinforcements, consisting of ten 17 June ships of the line dispatched by St Vincent, join Nelson with orders that he proceed in search of the Toulon fleet. While this increases his command to a squadron of 13 ships of the line and a 50-gun 18 June ship, the admiral has no frigates, which had been detached earlier, thus denying him the ability to conduct reconnaissance with more than a single brig-rigged sloop. On the same day Brueys' fleet passes Mazzaro del Vallo, on the south-west coast of 20 June Sicily.

The French, off Malta, are joined by 70 transports from Civita Vecchia. Bonaparte sends messengers ashore demanding right of access to the harbour for his ships to take on 22 June water. On the same day, in London, Henry Dundas, Secretary of State for War, writes to Earl Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty, conjecturing that Egypt might be Bonaparte's destination.

Nelson stands into the Bay of Naples, where Sir William Hamilton, the British ambassador, informs the admiral of his suspicions that the French have gone to Malta.

Most of Bonaparte's troops having re-embarked, the French fleet sails eastward with a favourable wind, leaving behind 3,000 men under General Vaubois to garrison the island.

Nelson, sharing Hamilton's views, enters the Strait of Messina where he learns from the British consul at Messina that Malta has fallen, and that the French are thought to be off Gozo.

Nelson, about 35 miles (56km) south-east of Cape Passaro, receives intelligence that the French had left Malta on the 18th with a north-west wind. This suggests Alexandria as the expedition's destination. Nelson therefore steers south-east under all sail

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28 June

30 June

l j u l y

2 July

4 July

8 July

19 July

24 July

Nelson sights Alexandria, but 28 July frustratingly the harbour contains no enemy vessels.

Nelson leaves the Egyptian coast, steering north-east.

1 August

Morning

1430brs

Brueys anchors at Alexandria and immediately lands his troops; Nelson has failed to intercept his opponent.

After light resistance, the French seize Alexandria.

The British squadron reaches the coast of Anatolia.

Judging the harbour at Alexandria unsuitable for ships of the line, Brueys sails his fleet to Aboukir Bay, 12 miles (19km) eastwards.

Nelson's squadron puts into Syracuse for provisions and water. 1900hrs

Almost certain that the French were neither at Corfu nor to the west of that island, Nelson leaves Sicilian waters and sails for Alexandria, steering first for the Morea (the Greek Peloponnese).

While off Cape Gallo, Nelson learns from the governor of Coron (Koroni, on the south-west corner of the Greek mainland) that about four weeks earlier the French had been seen off the coast of Candia, heading south-east.

HMS Alexander sights Alexandria. This time the harbour is crowded with French shipping, but almost all of it merchant vessels and empty transports.

Having probed eastwards in search of the enemy, the Zealous discovers French warships anchored in line of battle in Aboukir Bay. Nelson immediately sails to engage the French.

The battle of the Nile commences.

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OPPOSING COMMANDERS

Nelson, whose true genius lay in his understanding that the 'Fighting Instructions', first issued by Admiral Blake in 1653 during the Anglo-Dutch wars, were far too rigid. Nelson established regular contact with his captains to explain his thoughts on particular tactical situations, but did not lay down doctrine in a strict sense. Captains were expected instinctively to understand the best course of action as circumstances suggested. (National Maritime Museum, BHC2889)

BRITISH COMMANDERS

'I do assure your Lordship that the arrival of Admiral Nelson has given me a new life; you could not have gratified me more than in sending him.' With these words, Lord St Vincent, the commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, expressed to Earl Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty, his total confidence in the commander of the detached squadron. Rear-Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson was born in Norfolk in 1758, the son of a pastor. He joined the Royal Navy at the age of 12 through family connection, serving in the West Indies and later in an expedition to the Arctic. His first command came in December 1778 when he joined the brig Badger, protecting British trade along the coast of Central America from American privateers. As post captain of the Hincbinbrooke in 1779, the 21-year-old Nelson served in the disastrous expedition against Fort San Juan, in modern Honduras, during which time he fell ill with fever and left for Jamaica to recuperate. Invalided home, he later sailed for Canada in 1782 and again to the West Indies under Viscount Hood.

When war with France began in early 1793, Nelson commanded the 64-gun Agamemnon in the Mediterranean, where he fought on Corsica, losing the sight in his right eye at Calvi in July 1794. Promoted to commodore in April 1796, he reached prominence less than a year later against the Spanish at the battle of St Vincent on 14 February 1797, after which he was knighted and promoted to the rank of rear-admiral. Five months later he led an abortive attack against the Spanish base at Santa Cruz, Tenerife, where surgeons amputated his severely wounded right arm. Invalided home, it appeared Nelson's disability would mark the end of his career, when in fact the Admiralty thought otherwise, appointing him to command the 74-gun Vanguard in April 1798 with orders to rejoin the Mediterranean Fleet.

What of Nelson's captains? Nelson wrote of them: 'I have the happiness to command a Band of Brothers... Each knew his duty, and I was sure each would feel for a French ship.' This single statement, with its allusion to Henry V's speech at Agincourt as conceived by Shakespeare, encapsulates the admiral's belief in subordinates of exceptional ability, in whose discretion and judgement he placed absolute confidence. Such men, particularly Berry, Ball, Saumarez, Troubridge, Hood, Miller, Louis, Hallowell, Thompson, Foley and Hardy, represented the greatest combination of ships' captains of their day -and probably in the entire age of fighting sail.

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LEFT Nelson carries the San Nicolas (84) and San Josef (112) by boarding at the battle of St Vincent, 14 February 1797. Acting without orders from his superior, Admiral Sir John Jervis (later raised to the peerage as Earl St Vincent), Nelson broke away from the line and deployed his ship, the Captain, in the path of nine Spanish ships of the line, in the course of which fighting he captured two by boarding them in quick succession. (Author's collection)

RIGHT Some 18 months before the battle of the Nile, Nelson established a reputation for daring exploits by seizing two Spanish ships of the line off Cape St Vincent. Here he is shown receiving his counterpart's sword on board the San Josef. Nelson embodied the spirit of offence, as a line from a letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty during the Nile campaign conveys: 'I will bring the French fleet to action the moment I can lay my hands on them.' (Author's collection)

Captain Sir James Saumarez, by seniority second in command of the squadron, came from a naval family in the Channel Islands. He gained his captaincy in 1782, fought with success in a frigate action in the first year of the war and transferred to the Orion (74) in 1795, in which year he took part in the action off the lie de Groix. Two years later he served with the Mediterranean Fleet at St Vincent.

Born in 1756 to a family of gentry from Gloucestershire, Captain Alexander Ball, like so many of his fellow officers of similar age, served as a lieutenant in the War of American Independence, where he impressed Admiral Rodney enough to receive promotion to commodore and then to captain. He served throughout the first five years of the war with France, but saw little action in that time. Nelson maintained particular respect for Ball as a result of that captain's assistance during a storm off Sardinia during the Nile campaign. He was a man of great courage and with considerable ability in seamanship. Possessing a sound grasp of international politics and economics, Ball read widely.

Captain Henry Darby, captain of the Bellerophon, was the nephew of Vice-Admiral Darby, commander of the Channel Fleet in 1780. Since the outbreak of war he had served in convoy escort and with the Channel Fleet, in which post he did not see much action.

Captain John Peyton, also from a naval family, had received his promotion to captain after service in his grandfather's flagship in North American waters. In the first years of the war against France he served as a frigate captain under St Vincent, taking over command of the Defence, despite poor health, only in 1798.

Captain Thomas Troubridge was an exceptional commander whom St Vincent considered to be 'the greatest man in that walk that the English Navy has ever produced'. He had no family naval connections and is thought to have begun life at sea as a cabin boy in the East India Company, after which he became a midshipman on a frigate. He served in a number of engagements in the war against the American colonists. He was taken prisoner by the French in 1793, but regained his freedom the following year when the ship in which he was interned was recaptured at the battle of the Glorious First

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of June. Troubridge was appointed to command the Culloden in 1795 and served with great distinction at the battle St Vincent two years later. At Tenerife he served as Nelson's second in command, until authority devolved upon him after the admiral fell wounded, leaving Troubridge to oversee the evacuation of the troops from the island.

Though many of his fellow captains were products of undistinguished naval families, Captain Samuel Hood could claim association with two famous cousins, Lords Hood and Bridport, who commanded large fleets, and two brothers, also in the Navy, to his credit. Serving in the War of American Independence, he became a commander in 1782 at the young age of 20, but was not promoted to captain for another eight years, during which time he served in the West Indies. In the war with France Hood commanded the frigate Juno in the Mediterranean, where in 1794 he nearly fell into enemy hands. He was promoted two years later and transferred to the Zealous, in which he served under Nelson and Troubridge at Tenerife. Like Ball, Hood took a keen interest in learning, studying a wide array of subjects aside from those that had a direct application to naval affairs, such as navigation and geography.

Captain Davidge Gould, of the Audacious, served in action under Admiral Hotham in 1795, but was not distinguished for more than the detailed manner in which he crafted his instructions to his officers and crew.

Born in 1759, Captain Thomas Louis served as a lieutenant in the War of American Independence, and from 1794 as captain of the Minotaur. He joined the Mediterranean Fleet only six months before the beginning of the Nile campaign and had not served under Nelson before.

Aged about 53, Captain George Westcott, of the Majestic, was the eldest of the captains who fought at the battle of the Nile. His background is somewhat obscure, but he appears to have been the son of a baker and probably rose from the lower deck. Westcott did not receive his lieutenancy until his thirties and became a captain only in 1790 at the ripe age of about 45. He had not served under Nelson prior to the Nile campaign.

Captain Thomas Foley, of the Goliath, was the son of Welsh landowners, with a naval connection through his uncle. Promoted to the rank of captain in 1790, he spent most of the years of war before the battle of the Nile as a flag captain to three admirals in succession. He served at St Vincent in that capacity and took command of the Goliath shortly thereafter.

Captain Ralph Miller of the Theseus, also well known to Nelson, was born in New York in 1762. When the War of American Independence began in 1775, his father remained loyal to the Crown, and young Ralph joined the Royal Navy to serve against the rebels. He became a commander in 1794 and, like Hallowell and Nelson, also fought at Calvi, where the latter, recognizing his good conduct, took Miller on as his flag captain aboard the Captain at St Vincent in 1797. Miller transferred to the Theseus later that year, gaining the great respect of his crew, a part of which he led ashore during the raid on Tenerife.

Captain Thomas Thompson, the nephew of Commodore Edward Thompson, took command of the 50-gun Leander in 1796 and, like Miller, served the following year at Tenerife.

Captain Thomas Hardy, of the brig Mutine (38), is best known as Nelson's flag captain seven years later at Trafalgar. The two officers met in December 1796 when Hardy was a lieutenant in the frigate Minerve, with Nelson aboard as commodore. Hardy commanded that ship's boats and those of the Lively (32) off Tenerife during the capture of the French brig Mutine (14), as a result of which prize he was promoted to the rank of commander.

Captain Thomas Troubridge, one of Nelson's ablest captains. In 1797 he fought at St Vincent and Tenerife, and at the latter he assumed command when Nelson fell wounded during a clash with Spanish boats. Troubridge tried unsuccessfully to bluff the Spanish garrison into surrendering by threatening to set fire to the town, but he did secure an honourable withdrawal in exchange for a promise not to mount any further attacks on the Canary Islands. (Author's collection)

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LEFT The Vanguard's captain, Edward Berry, from Norfolk like Nelson, had served under the admiral as a lieutenant aboard both the Agamemnon and the Captain, from the latter of which he led boarders onto the San Nicolas and San Josef at the battle of St Vincent. Berry's promotion to the captaincy of the Vanguard constituted his first command. (National Maritime Museum, BHC2554)

RIGHT Vice-Admiral Brueys. A 45-year-old aristocrat who had managed to survive the Terror, he commanded a squadron based in Corfu that performed well in supporting Bonaparte's Italian campaign. This in turn explained his appointment to lead the naval side of the expedition to Egypt. (Author's collection)

Captain Benjamin Hallowell, of the Swiftsure, had a close association with Nelson. Born in Boston in 1760, he became a lieutenant in 1783, with promotion to captain ten years later in the first year of the war with France. He served on land at Calvi in 1794, together with Nelson, who greatly praised his conduct in that action. Hallowell fought at St Vincent in 1797 and in January the following year took command of the Swiftsure, in which he shortly thereafter assisted in the capture of three French privateers.

FRENCH COMMANDERS

The commander-in-chief of the French squadron at the battle of the Nile, Vice-Admiral Francois Paul Brueys d'Aigalliers (better known as the Comte de Brueys), was born in Uzes in 1753, the son of a captain in the artillery. He first went to sea from Toulon in 1767 at the age of 13, joining the Marins de la Garde in August 1768 and participating in the bombardment of Tunis in 1770 while serving as a volunteer in the frigate Atalante. In 1779 he went aboard the frigate Gracieuse as naval ensign and received a promotion the following year to lieutenant, transferring to the 110-gun Terrible. During the War of American Independence, during which time France aided the rebels, Brueys sailed in the Zele (74) as part of the squadron under Admiral de Grasse, commander-in-chief of the fleet serving in American waters. Brueys fought in an engagement off Martinique against Admiral Hood in April 1781, at the decisive battle of the Chesapeake on 5 September of that year, and at St Kitts on 25-26 January 1782. After the war he served at Martinique, returning to France, where he commanded the Poulette in the Levant and in the Adriatic for two years from 1790. As the captain of the 74-gun Tricolore Brueys served in operations off Naples and Sardinia. He was arrested in 1793 owing to his aristocratic origins and discharged from the Navy, but the critical shortage of officers led the revolutionary government to reinstate him in June 1795, when he became a

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chef de division. The following year, with the rank of rear-admiral aboard the Guillaume Tell (74), he held command of a squadron in the Adriatic based at Corfu. In Italy he met General Bonaparte, whose abilities the admiral soon came to admire. Promoted to the rank of vice-admiral in April 1798, in the capacity of commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Fleet based at Toulon, Brueys led the fleet and troop transports that sailed for Egypt in May.

His second in command, the quiet and reserved Rear-Admiral Pierre Charles de Villeneuve, was born in 1763, descended from an ancient line of aristocrats, including one who had fought with Roland against the Moors in Spain and another who had died in the entourage of Richard I (the Lionheart) in the Crusades. Villeneuve joined the Royalist navy of Louis XVI in 1778 and served in the War of American Independence under Admiral de Grasse in the West Indies, participating in the capture of Tobago. He assumed command of a ship of the line in 1793 and met Bonaparte at the siege of Toulon in that year. Shortly thereafter the revolutionary government suspended him, but the desperate shortage of experienced officers led to his reinstatement two years later in the post of naval chief of staff at Toulon. At the age of only 33, in September 1796, Villeneuve became a rear-admiral, a remarkably speedy promotion for such a young officer. Two years later he would lead the rear of the French squadron at the battle of the Nile.

Rear-Admiral Villeneuve, who on 2 August led away the remnants of the French squadron from Aboukir Bay. Seven years later he commanded the Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar. (Bridgeman Art Library)

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OPPOSING FORCES

THE BRITISH SQUADRON

The fighting efficiency of the British squadron was without rival, its ships' crews representing a genuine naval elite. Nelson possessed complete confidence in the preparedness of his officers and men, remarking to Earl Spencer on 15 June that 'The whole Squadron is remarkably healthy, and perfectly equal to meet the French Fleet'. Thomas Trotter, a well-known naval physician, noted some of the qualities of the British sailor of the time:

That courage which distinguishes our seamen, though in some degree inherent in their natural constitutions ... is increased by their habits of life, and by associating with men who are familiarized to danger, and who, from natural prowess, consider themselves at sea as rulers by birthright. By these means, in all actions there is a general impulse among the crew of an English man of war either to grapple the enemy, or lay him close aboard: Frenchmen shudder at this attempt.

The standard armament at the battle of the Nile was the smoothbore 'long' or 'great' gun, varying in size depending on its position in the ship. The number of such guns, which varied in calibre according to the weight of shot they fired, in turn determined a ship's 'rate': first-rates carried 100 guns or more, second-rates mounted 90-98 - both categories having three gun decks - and so on down to sixth-rates. At the battle of the Nile the British squadron had no first- or second-rate vessels, both types having three gun decks. Instead, the whole of his squadron consisted of third-rates (of 64-84 guns); specifically, all were ships mounting 74 guns on two decks, apart from the 50-gun Leander, which was a fourth-rate (50-60 guns), though still a two-decker. Third-rates formed the bulk of ships of the line, with 74s being the most numerous, since they offered the best compromise between speed and firepower. They handled better than the more heavily armed three-deckers and yet offered sufficient weight of broadside to be able to withstand fire themselves - at least for a few hours - from larger opponents. Virtually no fourth-rates remained in the Royal Navy by this time, rendering the 50-gun Leander virtually obsolete, for she was not really up to the job of taking on a 74, nor was she as good a sailer as the class of vessel below her: the frigate.

Frigates mounted between 32 and 44 guns on a single gun deck. Known by contemporaries as 'the eyes of the fleet', these sleek vessels sought out and maintained contact with the enemy, assessing his strength and tracking his course, so enabling an admiral to bring an opposing fleet to battle. Even in the aftermath

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of an engagement frigates played a vital role, chasing damaged opponents and towing friendly vessels and prizes. Nelson had no frigates either during the pursuit of the French fleet across the Mediterranean or at the battle of the Nile, a deficiency about which he regularly complained to the Admiralty, declaring to Earl Spencer: 'Was I to die this moment, "Want of Frigates" would be found stamped on my heart.'

The bulk of the fighting power of the British squadron at the battle of the Nile fell to the 74s, which in the Royal Navy typically measured 165ft (50m) in length (not including the jib-boom and bowsprit), with a 46ft (14m) beam and a draught of about 21-23ft (6.4-7m). The gun deck stood just above the waterline and mounted 32-pdr guns on each broadside, with approximately l i f t (3.4m) intervals between the guns. The upper deck differed only in so far as the size of the guns, which were generally 18-pdrs or 24-pdrs. Whenever possible British ships were constructed of domestically grown oak, a commodity regarded as superior in strength and endurance to other varieties of timber and foreign-grown oak. A third-rate required a prodigious amount of wood: 80 acres (32 hectares) of trees, with particularly thick planking along the gun decks for protection against enemy gunfire.

The rate of British ships did not account for the presence of carronades - short, large-bore guns that fired a very heavy shot a short distance, and at their most effective when opposing vessels lay alongside one another. A carronade could fire a shot weighing between 241b and a gargantuan 681b, inflicting a devastating body blow to an enemy ship's hull, with a particular capacity for reducing planks to showers of deadly wooden splinters. Of light construction, the carronade required a smaller charge than its 'long' or 'great' gun counterpart, and could thus operate on a slide mechanism instead of a wheeled carriage.

LEFT A typical sailor of the Royal Navy. Men such as this formed the basis for Britain's dominance at sea for the whole period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. (Philip Haythornthwaite Collection)

RIGHT A lieutenant in the Royal Navy. These officers, immediately subordinate to the captain, organized the crew, set the watch and oversaw the midshipmen. (Stratford Archive)

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French ship of the line. French ships enjoyed a reputation for superior handling, but any advantage in this regard played no part at the battle of the Nile, since they fought nearly the whole of the action at anchor. (Author's collection)

THE FRENCH SQUADRON

The French squadron consisted of 13 ships of the line, nominally armed with 1,030 guns, though some of these could not come into action on the landward side for reasons that will become clear later. Broken down by rate, this included one first-rate, UOrient, with 124 guns, three 80-gun second-rates and nine 74s. There were also four frigates, with 164 guns between them, which gave the French force a total of 1,194 guns and approximately 11,000 crew. Most of the line-of-battle ships had been designed by Jacques-Noel Sane, which meant that, whereas their British counterparts tended to be designed by various naval architects, the French warships at the battle of the Nile were of a more standard construction. The advantage here lay in a uniformity which enabled simpler refitting and repair, since the ships' specifications tended to be the same, or at least similar. The French ships at the battle of the Nile were built at the principal naval arsenals of Toulon, Lorient, Rochefort and Brest, mainly from locally acquired oak.

The flagship, L'Orient, was the only three-decker present in the battle, measuring 200ft (61m) long, 50ft (15.2m) at the beam and displacing 3,500 tons. She carried a crew of 1,100 and mounted an extraordinary 124 guns, with the weight of a single broadside approaching 1,4001b (by comparison the Victory, Nelson's flagship seven years later at Trafalgar, could unleash 1,148). On the quarterdeck and forecastle stood 18 8-pdrs and six 36-pdr naval howitzers (something akin to the carronade). Mounted on the upper gun deck were 34 12-pdrs, with 34 24-pdrs on the middle deck and 32 36-pdrs on the lower deck.

Classed as third-rates, the two-decked French 80-gun ships at the battle of the Nile were constructed from 3,500 to 3,700 loads of timber, or the

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equivalent of about 180,000ft3 of wood before conversion - the approximate yield of 80 acres (32 hectares) of woodland. These vessels normally carried 30 36-pdrs on their lower deck, 32 24-pdrs on their upper deck, 20 8-pdrs on the quarterdeck and forecastle and either four or six 32-pdr howitzers on her poop deck. This translated to a broadside weight of 1,052 or 1,1121b. Their gun decks measured approximately 195ft (60m) long and they had a crew of about 690 men. It is important to note that while a French 80-gun ship carried only six more guns than a standard British ship of the line, she fired a disproportionately heavy broadside, with 24-pdrs on the upper deck instead of the 18-pdrs used in the Royal Navy.

The nine French 74s at the battle of the Nile required approximately 170,270ft3 of timber before conversion, or about 70 acres (28 hectares) of woodland. Their gun decks measured approximately 182ft long and each ship's company numbered 640 men. They carried 28 36-pdrs on their lower gun decks, 30 18-pdrs on their upper gun decks and 18 8-pdrs on their quarterdecks and forecastles. A typical 74 could therefore deliver a broadside weight of 8461b, employing about 2821b of gunpowder. By comparison with the standard British 74, a French third-rate was greatly superior in firepower.

Brueys had no equivalent to the British 50-gun Leander - effectively a heavy frigate - since most fourth-rate vessels had been all but withdrawn from the French naval service after the War of American Independence (1775-83) on the grounds that they could not withstand the firepower of a 74. However, he did have four frigates, two carrying 48 and 44 guns respectively, and two of 36 guns each, together with two brigs, three bomb vessels for shore bombardment and a flotilla of small gunboats.

If the difference in guns between the opposing forces stood nearly equal, it remains pertinent to add that the French mounted 36-pdr guns on their lower decks, as compared with the British 32-pdrs. This may appear but a cursory advantage, but in sheer tonnage - and therefore in terms of the strength of their ships' hulls - the French well exceeded their opponents. Thus, whereas Nelson's largest vessel was the Minotaur, of 1,718 tons, Brueys' Spartiate displaced 1,949, the Franklin 2,257, and the Tonnant 2,281 tons. Several other French ships, including L'Orient and the Guillaume Tell, were also superior in size to any other ship available to the British, who laboured under still further disadvantages: the Culloden would take no part in the action, and Nelson, as explained, had no frigates, while the French had four, mounting 152 guns in all. On the other hand, any advantage in this regard was more than lost by Brueys' foolish decision to order substantial groups of men ashore in search of water, resulting in his ships suffering from understrength crews. As a result, whereas the French squadron probably exceeded 11,000 men, on the actual day of battle Brueys probably mustered only between 8,000 and 9,000.

The French generally concentrated their fire on enemy rigging rather than the hull, partly out of their desire to disable their opponents and prevent them from approaching too closely, and partly as a consequence of their gunnery techniques, which involved firing as the ship gently rolled upward. The slight delay in ignition resulting from the use of the slow match in preference to the gun-lock - with the former the powder burned down the touch-hole rather than exploded instantly as when a lanyard was pulled - meant that shot often travelled at a higher trajectory because the ship had reached its maximum position in the roll by the time the gun fired. In this way, their shot tended to strike the enemy's rigging and masts rather than the hull.

A French captain. By mere strength of numbers, the force under Brueys only qualified as a squadron, yet in all other respects it resembled a fully fledged fleet: commanded by a vice-admiral with a captain of the fleet in the capacity of chief of staff, plus three rear-admirals, two aboard ships of the line and one commanding the frigates and smaller vessels. Like most fleets, it also contained a three-decker as its flagship, in this case the magnificent 124-gun L'Orient, as well as three 80-gun ships, two of which served as flagships for the subordinate admirals. (Author's collection)

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ORDERS OF BATTLE

BRITISH SQUADRON

COMMANDER: REAR-ADMIRAL SIR HORATIO NELSON

Total number of guns: 1,030

If the Culloden and Mutine, which took no part in the battle, are excluded: 938

Complement: c.8,000 officers and men

Vanguard (74) Rear-Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson (wounded)

Captain Edward Berry

Orion (74) Captain Sir James Saumarez

Culloden (74) Captain Thomas Troubridge (grounded and saw no action)

Bellerophon (74) Captain Henry Darby

Minotaur (74) Captain Thomas Louis

Defence (74) Captain John Peyton

Alexander (74) Captain Alexander Ball

Zealous (74) Captain Samuel Hood

Audacious (74) Captain Davidge Gould

Goliath (74) Captain Thomas Foley

Theseus (74) Captain Ralph Miller

Majestic (74) Captain George Westcott (killed)

Swiftsure (74) Captain Benjamin Hallowell

Leander (50) Captain Thomas Thompson

Mutine (brig) (18) Captain Thomas Masterman Hardy

FRENCH SQUADRON

COMMANDER: VICE-ADMIRAL FRANCOIS PAUL BRUEYS D'AIGALLIERS, COMTE DE BRUEYS

Total number of guns: 1,194

Ships of the line only: 1,030

Complement (excluding frigates): c.11,000 officers and men, but probably only 8,000-9,000 actually

aboard ship dur ing the batt le

L'Orient (124) (destroyed by fire and explosion) Vice-Admiral Comte de Brueys,

commander-in-chief (killed)

Rear-Admiral Ganteaume, chief of staff (killed)

Captain Casabianca (killed)

Rear-Admiral Blanquet (wounded; captured)

Captain Gillet (captured)

Rear-Admiral Villeneuve (escaped)

Captain Saulnier (escaped)

Captain Dupetit-Thouars (killed)

Captain Trulet, Sr. (captured)

Captain Trulet, Jnr. (captured)

Captain Dalbarade (wounded)

Franklin (80) (captured)

Guillaume Tell (80) (escaped)

Tonnant (80) (captured) Guerrier (74) (captured)

Timoleon (74) (burnt) Conquerant (74) (captured)

Spartiote (74) (captured)

Aquilon (74) (captured)

PeupleSouverain (74) (captured)

Heureux (74) (captured)

Mercure (74) (captured)

Genereux (74) (escaped)

Captain Emereau (wounded)

Captain Thevenard (killed)

Captain Raccord (wounded)

Captain Etienne (wounded)

Captain Cambon (wounded)

Captain Le Joille (escaped)

Frigates

Diane (48) (escaped)

Justice (44) (escaped)

Artemise (36) (burnt)

Serieuse (36) (sunk)

Rear-Admiral Decres (escaped)

Captain Soleil (escaped)

Captain Villeneuve, Jnr. (escaped)

Captain Estandlet (escaped)

Captain Martin (escaped)

Note: A small number of French gunboats and bomb vessels, each mount ing a single weapon

which cannot be considered in a calculation of overall naval strength, stood to landward and

took no part in the action.

While naval historians traditionally describe Brueys' force as a 'fleet' by dint of that officer's senior

rank and the presence of three rear-admirals, this factor alone cannot justify such a designation

when one considers that the French force stood almost exactly equal to the British, the number

of whose vessels rightly qualified in the minds of contemporaries as only a 'squadron'. The case

stands all the more compelling when comparing the strengths of opposing squadrons at the Nile

with the much more formidable numbers composing the genuine 'fleets' at the battles of the

Glorious First of June (1794), Copenhagen (1801) and Trafalgar (1805).

A British ship of the line. This mighty engine of war constituted the most complex technical achievement of its day. (Bridgeman Art Library)

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OPPOSING PLANS

FRENCH PLANS

If by 1797 France stood pre-eminent on land, her position at sea continued to pose problems. This was highlighted when Bonaparte toured various northern ports from which the invasion of Britain was to be launched, determining as a consequence that an expedition across the Channel was unsound so long as the enemy commanded that vital waterway and the North Sea. As an alternative, he recommended to the government, known as the Directory, an offensive into north Germany or an expedition to Egypt in order to threaten Britain's greatest overseas possession - India. The idea was neither new nor unique to Bonaparte, for it was amongst various schemes first proposed by the Due de Choiseul, Louis XV's foreign minister, decades before, and, as discussed, Talleyrand, the current foreign minister, had himself advocated the scheme, later corresponding with Bonaparte while that general was still in Italy. Consistent with his spoliations throughout Italy, Bonaparte recognised the potential of taking Malta en route - a point of vital strategic interest in the central Mediterranean - and in so doing seizing the vast wealth of the Knights of St John of Jerusalem, who had ruled the island since the

Review of troops of the Armee d'Orient at Lyons. With transports conveying these men to protect, the huge French fleet moved exceedingly slowly. Most of the ships were badly overloaded, with many seriously deficient in experienced seamen and crowded with seasick soldiers. (Author's collection)

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LEFT Cairo, where Bonaparte intended to establish his seat of power in the Middle East Beginning in July 1798 he did so in grand style by reordering the country, levying taxes, establishing a postal service, a department of health and a mint to coin money. The Institut d'Egypte studied the country intensively, so laying the basis for modern Egyptology. (Author's collection)

BELOW The Admiralty, London. From here Earl Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty, and his subordinates formulated naval strategy and directed its implementation via forces deployed on station across the world: two squadrons off North America (Newfoundland and Nova Scotia), and one each off Ireland, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, the Cape (i.e. southern Africa) and in the Indian Ocean. Entire fleets operated in the North Sea, the English Channel, the Mediterranean and the Baltic. (Author's collection)

early 16th century. In September he observed that: 'Four hundred Knights and at most a regiment of 500 men are the sole defence of the town of Valetta, whose inhabitants ... are very well disposed to us and thoroughly disgusted with the Knights.'

French plans advanced further when in January 1798 Talleyrand formally recommended an invasion of Egypt to the Directory, to which the following month he sent a lengthy study of the question, outlining the relatively minor expense and substantial strategic and commercial benefits to be accrued by colonizing the area in compensation for the loss in 1795 of the (formerly Dutch) Cape Colony and various West Indian possessions. In theory the idea had much to recommend it: French naval forces could not hope to control the Baltic or North Seas, much less the Atlantic, which left only the Mediterranean as an area of French supremacy. With the Royal Navy withdrawn to Gibraltar from 1796 and France occupying Corsica and much of the Italian mainland, together with an important naval base at Corfu, Malta and Egypt would

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LEFT William Pitt, Prime Minister, 1783-1801 and 1804-06. A determined opponent of revolutionary France, he and his foreign secretary, Lord Grenville, played the principal part in constructing the Second Coalition, which renewed the war on the Continent from 1799 to 1802. (Author's collection)

RIGHT Lord St Vincent, commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, which in 1798 served off Cadiz blockading the Spanish. He detached Nelson with a squadron to seek out and destroy the French fleet at Toulon before it could reach its unknown destination. Until 1797 he was known as Sir John Jervis, whose victory at the battle of St Vincent earned him the title for which he is best remembered. He later served as First Lord of the Admiralty (1801-04). (Author's collection)

cement French dominance in the eastern Mediterranean, eventually driving British commerce from the region and providing a springboard for giving assistance to indigenous opponents of the British in India. More ambitious still, from its base in Egypt, the French could conceivably dispatch an overland expedition to the sub-continent or by water via the Red Sea. Of course, such a scheme rested on the assumption that the Franco-Spanish pact would permanently exclude the Royal Navy out of strategic necessity; this was to ignore the offensive nature of Britain's maritime policies and the natural instincts of her naval commanders.

Popular belief has it that Paul Barras, a key figure in the Directory, seized upon the idea of an expedition to Egypt and placed Bonaparte in command in order to banish his political rival to a point remote from Paris; but the evidence for this remains circumstantial, and Barras in fact spoke against the wisdom of such a scheme, only to be outvoted by other members of the Directory. Still, political machinations may very well have played a part, for the directeurs may have feared the ambitious general would use his popularity within the Army to launch a coup (which ultimately he did in 1799), or simply wished to be rid of him while they consolidated their power or altered government affairs without his interference. In all probability, however, the idea for an expedition evolved as a natural response to French naval impotence in all other theatres apart from the Mediterranean, where navigation remained unchallenged and where the republic could make some attempt at endangering Britain's eastern possessions without recourse to the lengthy route around the Cape.

Whatever the origin of the plan, a descent on Egypt appealed to Bonaparte's romantic sensibilities, keen as he was to establish French dominion first in the Nile Valley, then the Holy Land and, finally, farther east, like a latter-day Alexander the Great. The 28-year-old general had conquered the Habsburg possessions in Italy; now he would do the same as far as India. He duly devoured all the books he could find on the Near East and gathered around him a coterie of the leading archaeologists, astronomers, artists, surveyors, engineers, mineralogists and other scientists to accompany his army,

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together with civil servants to administer the conquered lands into which he would introduce his conception of sound government and Western civilization. There is no question but that Bonaparte saw himself as the guiding force behind the expedition, for he went so far as to direct his naval counterpart, Vice-Admiral Brueys, who was to command the escorting fleet, how to array his ships and whom he should appoint as his chief of staff - proof that, whereas no Royal Navy commander would tolerate such behaviour from his military counterpart, in France the Army remained the senior service.

Bonaparte arrived at Toulon, where the expedition was to be launched, on 10 May, and addressed the troops, many of whom had served with him in the campaigns of 1796-97. He delivered moving speeches in which he alluded to previous successes in Italy and promised them, on their return, sufficient funds with which to purchase 6 acres (2.4 hectares) of land. Preparations continued until the 19th, when the fleet weighed and put to sea.

BRITISH PLANS

Prime Minister William Pitt and Earl Spencer appreciated in early 1798 that the strategic withdrawal of the Royal Navy from the Mediterranean had been only a temporary expedient in response to the immediate Franco-Spanish threat. The government was negotiating the formation of a second coalition with Austria, who, in addition to her desire to retake her northern Italian possessions, wished to protect her client state, Naples (formally known as the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies). But even without consideration of Austrian interests, it was paramount that the French not be permitted to strengthen their position in the Mediterranean, and therefore the Admiralty sought to identify the destination of the Toulon expedition as its main priority. Such a large flotilla of transports there and at other bases did not necessarily exclude the possibility of operations prosecuted beyond Mediterranean waters. Even distant Ireland, for instance, was not beyond the bounds of possibility: the recent rebellion there had been quelled with relative ease, but any material aid given by the French, which might arrive without interception if they managed to pass Gibraltar, especially in the form of a major expedition, could conceivably revive the revolutionary spirit so brutally suppressed.

Thus, on 29 April, Earl Spencer wrote to Earl St Vincent (before his peerage merely Admiral Sir John Jervis), commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, now off Cadiz, advising him that 'the appearance of a British squadron in the Mediterranean is a condition on which the fate of Europe may at this moment be stated to depend,' and recommended for command Nelson, 'whose acquaintance with that part of the world, as well as his activity and disposition, seem to qualify him in a peculiar manner for that service.' Formal instructions later followed from the Admiralty, ordering St Vincent to detach 12 ships of the line and a force of frigates to enter the Mediterranean in search of the Toulon fleet 'to take or destroy it'. In order not to reduce his ability to continue with the blockade of Cadiz, he was sent eight line-of-battle ships from Admiral Bridport's

A British sailor on shore leave. Ships plying the Mediterranean, such as during the Nile campaign, could dock at Gibraltar, Calignari, Naples and other ports for resupply. (Philip Haythornthwaite Collection)

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fleet off Brest. St Vincent was judicious in the choice of ships he detached from his inshore squadron, placing them under the command of his favourite captain, Thomas Troubridge, in the Culloden. On 24 May, as the mizzen royals of the detachment from Bridport's fleet could be seen on the horizon, St Vincent signalled Troubridge to make way.

Nelson was already en route to St Vincent's fleet off Lisbon. At Spithead he hoisted his flag aboard the 74-gun Vanguard at 2000hrs on 29 March, and within two months he would be given command - jumping the queue over two of his seniors, Sir William Parker and Sir John Orde - of a squadron of 12 ships of the line, to search for Brueys' fleet out of Toulon. But that is to anticipate events. Nelson reached St Vincent's fleet blockading Cadiz on 30 April. Time was of the essence, so St Vincent immediately dispatched the newly arrived admiral into the Mediterranean in command of a small observation squadron, comprising Nelson's own Vanguard and two other 74s, the Alexander under Alexander Ball and the Orion under Sir James Saumarez, together with three frigates - the Caroline, Emerald and Flora, each of 36 guns - and the 32-gun Terpsichore and the 20-gun Bonne Citoyenne. St Vincent instructed him to determine the purpose of the French 'armament' and its destination.

On 7 May Nelson issued definitive orders to the captains of the Orion, Alexander and Vanguard that the squadron not be separated; concentration was key. Two days later he passed Gibraltar into the Mediterranean. On the morning of the 17th he received intelligence gleaned from a captured French corvette, which confirmed that an expedition under Brueys was preparing to sail from Toulon, though its destination remained unknown. British naval intelligence also underestimated the strength of the troops the expedition contained by more than half. Still, by 17 May Nelson's squadron was approximately 70 miles (113km) south of Toulon, waiting for the opposing fleet and its transports to make for the open sea.

The British plan was quite simple: to destroy the convoy of troops and the warships serving as its escort. Nelson issued a general order to this effect on 8 June, the day that Troubridge reinforced him, admonishing his captains to keep the squadron concentrated:

As it is very probable the enemy may not be formed in regular order on the approach of the squadron under my command, I may in that case deem it most expedient to attack them by separate divisions; in which case, the commanders of divisions are strictly enjoined to keep their ships in the closest order possible, and on no account whatever to risk the separation of one of their ships. The captains of the ships will see the necessity of strictly attending to close order; and, should they compel any of the enemy's ships to strike their colours, they are at liberty to judge and act accordingly, whether or not it may be most advisable to cut away their masts and bowsprits; with this special observance, namely, that the destruction of the enemy's armament is the sole object...

The commanders of divisions are to observe that no consideration is to induce them to separate in pursuing the enemy, unless by signal from me; so as to be unable to form a speedy junction with me; and the ships are to be kept in that order that the whole squadron may act as a single ship.

With the British squadron well placed to observe and then intercept Brueys' fleet, all seemed well.

THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE

CAT AND MOUSE

Toulon: home of the French Navy's Mediterranean Fleet. One of Europe's finest deep-water ports, Toulon was the site of Bonaparte's first military success when, as a young artillery officer in 1793, he sited his guns on the heights overlooking the harbour, thereby obliging the Anglo-Spanish fleet, there to support the pro-Royalist inhabitants, to withdraw. (Author's collection)

On 19 May Brueys' fleet weighed from Toulon and put to sea, with the 28-year-old Bonaparte aboard the flagship, UOrient. As it headed east around Corsica other transports joined him as he steered south for Malta. The force as a whole amounted to over 30,000 troops, as well as 1,230 cavalry and draught horses for 171 pieces of artillery, with the expectation of requisitioning more horses in Egypt. Bonaparte spent his time conversing with the academics he had brought with him and reading, blissfully unaware that Nelson was looking for him. The French fleet sailed eastwards to rendezvous with some 300 transports from Genoa and Corsica. Two divisions under General Desaix were supposed to be at Civita Vecchia but did not arrive in time. These would later rendezvous with the fleet off Malta.

Indeed, the day after Brueys' departure, on 20 May, all of Nelson's frigates parted in search of the French. The first major setback in Nelson's pursuit took place on the 21st in the Gulf of Lyon, when a gale not only scattered his squadron but inflicted serious damage on his own Vanguard, whose maintopmast toppled over the side at 0200hrs on the 23rd, followed later by

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Bonaparte and his troops disembarking at Malta. The island yielded up not only a vast fortune in gold, silver, jewels and fine art, but a first-rate anchorage in the central Mediterranean. (National Maritime Museum, PY7932)

the mizzen-topmast and the foremast. Driven towards a lee shore (the rocky shore of eastern Sardinia) by the storm, the Vanguard was saved by Captain Ball in the Alexander, who towed the flagship and saved not only Nelson's ship, but probably his life and reputation, as well. At one point Nelson ordered Ball to cut him loose, but the latter refused and carried on despite the great risk to his own vessel. Shelter was found to windward of the little island of San Pietro, where in an astonishing two days' repairs were made, allowing the Vanguard to set sail north-west. The storm seriously upset Nelson's plan, for not only had it inflicted considerable damage on the Vanguard but it also left the admiral, as it were, blind, for his intelligence of Brueys' route immediately dried up when British frigates, on the assumption that the Vanguard would make for Gibraltar for repairs, proceeded there on their own initiative. On the other hand, the absence of pursuing enemy frigates left Brueys ignorant that the British were looking for him - though this constituted no consolation for Nelson.

Still, he undertook repairs and was off Toulon again on 31 May, with the much larger force under Troubridge in the Culloden, dispatched by St Vincent, sailing towards its rendezvous with Nelson. A week later, on 7 June, Troubridge arrived off Nelson's station, bringing welcome orders from St Vincent: Nelson was to command over ten additional ships of the line. There were the Culloden, Goliath (Foley), Minotaur, Defence (Peyton), Bellerophon (Darby), Majestic (Westcott), Audacious (Gould), Zealous (Hood), Swiftsure (Hallowell) and the Theseus (Miller). These, together with his own three 74s - the Vanguard (Berry), Orion (Saumarez) and Alexander (Ball) - along with the 50-gun Leander (Thompson) and the 18-gun Mutine (Hardy), constituted 13 ships of the line, a 50-gun fourth-rate and a brig sloop; in all, one of the finest squadrons Britain had ever assembled. Nelson was 'to proceed with them in the quest of the Armament preparing by the Enemy at Toulon and Genoa... On falling in with said Armament, or any part thereof, you are to use your utmost endeavours to take, sink, burn or destroy it.' The Mutine, under Hardy, joined him at dawn on 5 June, followed two nights later by the Leander. Nelson set about organizing his reinforced squadron by

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BOTTOM Nelson's squadron anchored in the Bay of Naples, 17 June 1798. The Kingdom of Naples, under Ferdinand IV, aided the British cause and formally joined the Second Coalition, prompting the French to invade the country in January 1799, proclaiming the 'Parthenopean Republic' but failing to occupy Sicily. (National Maritime Museum, neg.2374)

TOP The main gateway at Valetta. The Order of the Knights of St John of Jerusalem, originally formed to resist the expansion of Islam in the Near East and the Mediterranean, very much rested on laurels earned during their spectacular defence against the Turks in the great siege of 1565. By the time of Bonaparte's arrival more than two centuries later, however, the Order had grown irretrievably weak, utterly incapable of putting up more than perfunctory resistance. (National Maritime Museum, PU1717)

dividing it into three divisions, commanded by himself, Saumarez and Troubridge. By this time, unbeknownst to Nelson, whose level of frustration at this point can only be imagined, Brueys was over 400 miles (645km) to the south-east, nearing Malta. Nelson was aware of when the French had sailed - three weeks earlier - but he had no idea of their destination.

Still ignorant of the fact that the British were even looking for them, the French arrived on 10 June at Valetta where the Grand Master granted permission for only two French ships at a time to enter port. Bonaparte refused and landed a large contingent of troops, contemptuous of the Knights' ability to defend themselves notwithstanding some of the most formidable defensive works in Europe: three forts, 900 guns and miles of battlements. As the Knights remained ignorant of the British pursuit they saw no purpose in resisting and promptly surrendered - a decision encouraged by French agents having already infiltrated the political and military ranks, fomenting discontent amongst a population long chafing at the anachronistic style of rule imposed by the Knights. The rapid conquest of Malta proved yet another opportunity for Bonaparte to finance his campaign with loot. Reputed to be worth millions of francs, a colossal horde consisting of 500 years' accumulated coin, gold, silver, artwork, statues and precious gems from the Knights' treasury, churches and palaces fell into the hands of the invaders, who stowed the fortune in the hold of UOrient.

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Routes of French convoys to Malta, May-June 1798

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Nelson, meanwhile, continued his search, cruising along the west coast of Italy, passing Cape Corse on the morning of 12 June and sending the Mutine to look into Telamon Bay, which she discovered was empty. He continued between Plenosa and Elba and at noon on the 14th was off Civita Vecchia, the principal seaport near Rome. He wrote to Earl Spencer on the 15th that 'If they pass Sicily, I shall believe they are going on their scheme of possessing Alexandria, and getting troops to India... but be they bound to the Antipodes, your Lordship may rely that I will not lose a moment in bringing them to Action, and endeavour to destroy their Transports.' Intelligence, Nelson believed, was key, and he gathered information from whatever sources he could, including British legations along the Italian coast and the embassy at Naples under Sir William Hamilton, to whom he sent Troubridge on 20 June not merely to make enquiries, but to remind the King of Naples that the fleet had arrived for that sovereign's protection. In return, the admiral expected the kingdom to supply masts, yards, stores and ammunition, to which requests the Neapolitans obliged. Benefit was also to be derived from Tunisian and Greek vessels - the former of which had spotted the French off north-western Sicily on the 4th, steering easterly - but thus far nothing that could confirm the armada's destination.

Nelson proceeded southwards through the Strait of Messina and on 22 June, while off Cape Passaro in south-eastern Sicily, learned that the French had taken Malta, left a garrison behind, and that the fleet and its transports had departed on the 16th (actually on the 19th), destination unknown. He could now rule out Sicily as Brueys' destination, and, armed with knowledge of the French admiral's departure from Valetta with a westerly wind in his favour, Nelson reckoned that his enemy's objective lay somewhere to the east. Accordingly, at a council on the 22nd at which Nelson, Saumarez, Troubridge, Ball, Darby and Berry were present, it was decided to steer for Egypt, bypassing Malta and proceeding towards Alexandria against a strong west-north-westerly wind.

Little did Nelson know that his superior speed and short cut through the Straits of Messina had brought him within a few miles of the French, whose enormous fleet, spread out over several square miles, consisted of 13 ships of the line, seven 40-gun frigates, eight corvettes and almost 300 transports, together with two Venetian 64s and eight Venetian frigates, all about 40 miles (65km) south-east of the southern tip of Sicily. In all, the fleet carried 55,000 men, including 36,500 soldiers and over 1,000 civilians. There were also 60 field and 40 siege guns, 45,000 tons of gunpowder, 12,000 tons of lead, rations for 100 days and fresh water for 40 days. The close encounter between the opposing forces took place on the foggy night of 23-24 June; signal guns were heard by the French but by daylight had died away. A decisive moment had passed, for had the two forces met the whole course of European history might have been altered; Nelson would have devastated the encumbered enemy force with its vulnerable transports; the expedition would never have reached Egypt; and Bonaparte himself might have been captured or killed - and thus never become Emperor of France and conqueror of Europe.

Still, if Brueys continued to elude Nelson, the latter had at least persuaded himself that he was proceeding on the correct course. Writing on the 26th to the British Consul at Alexandria, George Baldwin, the admiral stated his belief that the object of the French was 'to possess themselves of some Port in Egypt, and to fix themselves at the head of the Red Sea, in order to get a formidable Army into India'. Nelson believed the French were aware of his search and had accordingly put into Corfu. In fact, the admiral was ahead of

the French, who had left Malta on the 19th, three days later than Nelson's intelligence claimed, and unencumbered as he was by troop transports and a host of other vessels, Nelson proceeded at a much swifter pace than Brueys. Consequently, when on 28 June the British squadron spotted Alexandria's telltale monument, Pompey's Tower (an ancient, 30m-tall column of red granite), the French were nowhere to be seen, being still two days' sail behind their pursuers.

The opportunity finally to confront his opponent now beckoned him. But by a quirk of fate Nelson weighed anchor only 24 hours later and put to sea; had he waited only a few more hours, Brueys would have appeared on the horizon and found himself caught in the open, with his transports easy prey. The three divisions into which Nelson had divided his squadron - two to confront the enemy line of battle ships and the other to smash the helpless transports - would almost certainly have achieved a decisive result under these circumstances, highlighted by enormous French losses and the capture of the Malta treasure.

FRENCH ARRIVAL IN EGYPT AND THE CONTINUING BRITISH SEARCH For Nelson, the discovery of an empty harbour at Alexandria left him despondent, for it demolished his theory about enemy intentions. Remaining off the Egyptian coast until the 30th, he resumed the search northwards in the direction of Turkey. He missed the French by a whisker; for on the following morning, 1 July, Brueys arrived at the anchorage his pursuer had just left. Thanks to the excitement generated by the arrival of the British squadron off Alexandria, the French were at last aware that the British were looking for them - and, indeed, that they were nearby - which alerted Bonaparte to the necessity of immediately disembarking his troops. By the evening of the 2nd Alexandria was in French hands and the campaign of conquest against the Mamelukes could begin.

The attack on Alexandria, a wretched town of only 6,000 inhabitants defended by a mere handful of poorly armed Mamelukes and Bedouins with only a single barrel of gunpowder for their artillery. Unsurprisingly, the French secured the place with a minimum of effort by 1100hrs on 2 July. (Author's collection)

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Bonaparte at the battle of the Pyramids, 21 July 1798. Arrayed in squares with guns deployed at the corners, the French swept the field with disciplined musketry and artillery fire, driving off brave but foolhardy opponents armed and dressed in medieval fashion. (Author's collection)

Having landed his stores and artillery, Brueys believed it sensible to sail the fleet north to Corfu - away from the vulnerable open Egyptian coast where there were no sheltered anchorages - so that it could benefit from the protection of a safe harbour yet remain a threat to any attempt by the British to isolate French troops in Egypt by blockading Alexandria. Bonaparte, for reasons not known - but probably out of a desire to keep the squadron close at hand and within contact - ordered Brueys to anchor the squadron inside the harbour. Brueys grudgingly agreed, but soundings quickly determined that, if moored there, ships could emerge only singly, and that therefore even a lone enemy vessel could block the means of escape. Aboukir Bay, 12 miles (19km) to the east, remained the only local alternative, since it offered a theoretically impressive natural form of protection within the confines of its 16-mile (26km) breadth. Brueys proceeded there and anchored his ships on the western side in a slightly convex line in 5-6 fathoms (9-1 lm) of water, with his vessels' bows pointing towards Aboukir Island, on which the French had mounted a few 6-pdr guns and two mortars, but only at the periphery of their effective range. From there a shoal extended towards the coast and terminated at a low spit of sand, on which stood a dilapidated structure known as Aboukir Castle, containing 20 guns, mostly in poor condition, with a crew of 50 men. But this position offered no protection to the ships as its 6-pdr guns were completely out of range. Farther south, the fort perched at the mouth of Lake Etko similarly offered no support to Brueys.

Captain Berry, in the Vanguard, later described the enemy position thus:

The enemy appeared to be moored in a strong and compact Line of Battle, close in with the shore, their line describing an obtuse angle in its form, flanked by numerous Gun-boats, four Frigates, and a battery of guns and mortars, on an Island in their Van. This situation of the enemy seemed to secure to them the most decided advantages, as they had nothing to attend to but their artillery, in their superior skill in the use of which the French so much pride themselves, and to which indeed their splendid series of land victories are in a great measure to be imputed.

Thus, Brueys' defence appeared ostensibly strong - certainly so if the winds blew southerly or south-westerly - but in actual fact suffered from a number of flaws. The French admiral sought to protect his vessels by placing the van as close to the shoals surrounding Aboukir Island as possible, with his line arrayed on the fringe of shallow water just beyond the 4-fathom (7.3m) line. Confident that attacking ships could not skirt his leading vessels on the landward side, he positioned his 74s (i.e. his weaker ships) in his van, with three of the four larger ships (the Franklin, UOrient and Tonnant) in his centre and the Guillaume Tell, of 80 guns, anchoring the rear. But whereas the 74s required only 30ft of water beneath them, the larger vessels displaced more, obliging Brueys to deploy his squadron at an oblique angle away from the 4-fathom line - farther than he had originally intended.

Nevertheless, he clearly believed that an attack from the north was still out of the question owing to the proximity of the shoals, as his disposition confirms that he expected to fight only with his starboard broadsides. Opposing squadrons thus arrayed seldom achieved anything but indecisive results, unless the attacker chose to penetrate the line or outflank it and force combat on two sides of the defender's line, a tactic known as 'doubling'. Proof that he did not anticipate a British attack - irrespective of direction - lay in

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the fact that when Nelson's squadron rounded the shoals north-east of Aboukir Island several hundred French seamen were ashore - indeed no less than 4 miles (6.4km) from the coast - gathering fresh water, which meant that the already understrength French crews were depleted still further.

Brueys ordered all ships anchored with a single anchor at the bow, with cables extended to several times the actual depth of the water in order to provide the necessary weight to hold the ships in a fixed position, notwithstanding the soft sand and mud on the harbour bottom. The ships were not to be utterly stationary, however; the single anchor would allow them to swing with the wind, which in turn meant that allowance had to be made to ensure that the vessels did not shift into water too shallow to keep them buoyant. Gaps of approximately 145m were left between the ships so that, as they swung gently in the wind, their cables did not become entangled. Brueys' line of battle therefore measured at least IV2 miles (2.5km) long.

The direction of the wind posed another potential problem for Brueys, for on 1 August breezes blew in from the north-west, directly down the length of the French line of battle, rendering it impossible for the rear rapidly to aid the centre or van if the British attacked with the wind at their backs. Any attempt by the rear to support the van would involve the lengthy process of weighing anchor, proceeding east into the heart of the bay on the port tack before shifting to a starboard tack and steering for the desired point in the line - by which time the action would almost certainly have been decided. Still, Brueys believed himself secure and on 13 July informed Bonaparte of his strong anchored position, in which he claimed to have 'less to fear at the head of the line than at the rear, where the enemy is most likely to direct his efforts.' This false supposition was to prove his undoing. At the same time, Bonaparte was moving up the Nile in the direction of Cairo, the focal point of Mameluke resistance. On the 21st, with disciplined firepower supported by artillery, the French infantry swept back the charging horsemen, opening the way for Bonaparte to cross the Nile the following day and take Cairo.

Meanwhile, locating the French proved immensely frustrating for Nelson, with lack of intelligence his chief concern, for he had by now searched the eastern Mediterranean in vain. On 20 July he reached Syracuse, where he took aboard fresh fruit, vegetables and cattle but lamented the good fortune of the French. 'It is an old saying,' he wrote to Sir William Hamilton while off Syracuse, that '"The Devil's children have the Devil's luck." I cannot find, or to this moment learn, beyond vague conjecture where the French Fleet are gone to. All my ill fortune, hitherto, has proceeded from want of frigates.'

LEFT Bonaparte's troops advancing on Cairo, July 1798. Nelson's failure to maintain contact with Brueys' fleet enabled the French to disembark their forces at Alexandria, after which they advanced on the Egyptian capital by land as well as by river. (Author's collection)

RIGHT The battle of the Pyramids: an almost story-book clash of modern and ancient forces amidst the romantic backdrop of the great monuments of ancient Egypt. So long as the French remained steady in their ranks, the helter-skelter attacks of the Mameluke horsemen could not hope to drive off troops who shot them down in droves with sustained volley fire. (Author's collection)

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A 19th-century French map of the battle of the Pyramids. Note the manner in which Bonaparte deployed his forces in mutually supporting positions, so enabling him to stave off furious yet undisciplined and uncoordinated cavalry attacks. In short, courage and tenacity proved futile against withering musket fire. (Author's collection)

Still off Syracuse two days later, he informed his captains of his belief that had the French fleet proceeded westward from Malta, Hamilton would have informed him of the fact based on intelligence received from Sicilian ports. As the ambassador had not sent word, Nelson intended to steer directly for Cyprus, via Crete (then known as Candia), and thereafter to Syria and back to Egypt, in search of the enemy fleet. He weighed on the 24th, making for the Greek archipelago, known to contemporaries as the Morea; four days later a Turkish governor at Koroni, in the Peloponnese, informed him that the French were in Egypt, whereupon, with the benefit of a westerly wind, he made full sail for the African coast.

Upon approaching Alexandria at dusk on the 31st, Nelson - still without frigates - detached the Alexander and Swiftsure to scout the roadstead. In mid-morning on 1 August they again sighted Pompey's Tower and just after midday sailed in close enough to observe the harbour crowded with French transports, but only two ships of the line. The despair felt by Nelson and his captains that they had missed their chance to come to grips with the enemy proved short-lived, for at 1430hrs both the Zealous and Goliath observed the masts of Brueys' fleet from across the low-lying ground surrounding Aboukir Bay. The Zealous immediately signalled the presence of 16 ships of the line at anchor - though in fact there were only 13, plus four large frigates. Nelson and his squadron were elated, for nearly three months had passed since the search began. 'The utmost joy seemed to animate every breast on board the squadron at the sight of the enemy,' Berry wrote, 'and the pleasure which the admiral himself felt was perhaps more heightened than that of any other man.'

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Since Nelson's squadron was strung out over several miles when the French were finally sighted, it was necessary to concentrate his force. The Alexander and Swiftsure were several miles away from their consorts, having been detached to observe the interior of the harbour at Alexandria, while the Culloden was 7 miles (11.3km) away to the east, towing a brig captured off Koroni. The ships of the main body remained in sight of one another, but were not arrayed in line of battle, the whole squadron being extended over a distance of about 10-12 miles (16-19km). The fact that Nelson's ships were scattered did not pose any tactical disadvantage, as it might otherwise have done, for the French sat anchored in Aboukir Bay, with no plans to depart.

Once the French squadron was sighted - at a distance of about 9 miles (14.5km) around 1430hrs - it remained for Nelson to decide if he was to engage it that day or wait till the following morning. As the British force was making about 5 knots (9km/h), two hours would pass before it could reach the enemy position provided it deployed all its sails. In order to concentrate its ships a further 90 minutes were required, and still more time if Nelson wished to form his ships in line of battle. With sunset expected at around 1900hrs, in an age when naval actions were seldom fought at night, much risk attended Nelson's decision, especially since the waters of Aboukir Bay were virtually uncharted, posing an attacker with the serious risk of running aground. Still, to delay the battle, when Nelson's men were eager to fight, would be a mistake, for to do so would allow the French ten hours to prepare or possibly to slip their cables and escape his grasp. The other consideration was the wind, which at the time was particularly favourable, with no certainty that it would remain so into the following morning.

BRITISH APPROACH AND FRENCH REACTION

Determined to fight that day, Nelson decided there was no time for the squadron to concentrate and form into a line of battle, for nightfall would have descended before the engagement could begin. On the other hand, any attack necessarily entailed difficulties inherent in an approach known to be dogged by treacherous shoals and rocks whose locations were only vaguely identified by old charts. As far as Nelson was concerned, by attacking without delay the first ships to arrive on the scene could be trusted to make the best disposition while light remained, furnishing the attacker with the element of surprise. Consequently, just before 1500hrs, he gave the order to steer for Aboukir Bay on the larboard tack. He recalled the Alexander and Swiftsure and shortly after 1500hrs signalled Culloden to release her tow. For the moment, the vessels closest to the French were the Goliath and Zealous, followed by the Vanguard, with the Theseus, Bellerophon and Minotaur close at hand.

Just before 1600hrs Nelson's ships passed round the end of the shoal at the western end of the bay, putting them within 3 miles (4.8km) of the French line, at which point the admiral hailed Hood in the Zealous to enquire if that captain believed it safe to approach so close to the shore. Hood answered that his soundings showed them sailing in 11 fathoms (20m) and requested permission to serve as the lead vessel, making regular measurements as he went, signalling this information to vessels astern and finally engaging the foremost ship in the enemy van. Shortly thereafter Nelson hove to and signalled the Mutine to pass within hailing distance. Meanwhile, Captain

Miller's Theseus was making good progress, but Berry in the Vanguard hailed him with instructions to remain with the flagship, sailing just ahead of the Theseus, so that the Orion and Audacious could overtake her.

At 1730hrs, while the Goliath and Zealous were competing for the lead, Nelson signalled his ships to form line of battle as circumstances permitted. Hood in the Zealous was overtaken by Foley in the Goliath, which rounded the spit of land extending from Aboukir Island - almost certainly a fortunate circumstance, for Foley had a French atlas that was accurate enough to guide him without fail, whereas Hood possessed, according to his signalman, a deficient English one. Foley was delighted to be the first in the line, though with his approach at about 90 degrees it exposed his bow to the full power of French broadsides, albeit for a short period, since the wind favoured the attacker, who, proceeding at 5 knots (9km/h), would be out of that particular danger within two minutes, giving the French time for one or perhaps two broadsides. John Nicol, one of Goliath's gun crew, described the scene at this point:

The sun was just setting as we went into the bay, and a red and fiery sun it was. I would, if I had had my choice, have been on deck; there I would have seen what was passing, and the time would not have hung so heavy; but every man does his duty with spirit, whether his station be in the slaughter-house [the colloquial name for the lower deck, near the mainmast, which often takes a great deal of enemy fire] or in the magazine. My station was in the powder-magazine with the gunner. As we entered the bay we stripped to our trousers, opened our ports, cleared [for action], and every ship we passed gave them a broadside and three cheers. Any information we got was from the boys and women who carried the powder. They behaved as well as the men.

In Brueys' fleet, meanwhile, the day had opened with no expectation of a British attack, partly owing to the admiral's failure to dispatch frigates outside the bay to detect any signs of an enemy approach. Nothing, therefore, seemed to militate against efforts to alleviate the fleet's shortage of water, and hence working parties had been sent ashore to sink holes for a fresh supply. To protect these men from local tribesmen, each ship had also landed 25 armed men to accompany them. This reduced still further ships already weakened by understrength complements.

The French first became aware of Nelson's presence at 1400hrs, when lookouts from the Heureux spotted the approaching vessels, identifying 12 ships of the line to the east-north-east. Indecision took over immediately aboard the French flagship, for the admiral took an hour to determine if Nelson's force represented friend or foe, on the discovery of which he ordered hammocks stowed and signals hoisted to recall the shore parties. Many of the ships' boats, however, had undertaken other duties and were not therefore immediately to hand. Brueys also dispatched two small brigs, the Alert and Railleur, to reconnoitre; the former tried to lure the attackers into shallower water so that they might run aground, but the British ignored this primitive ruse.

Even while no evidence existed to suggest that Nelson would await the new day before engaging, Brueys did not confirm in his own mind the inevitability of a night battle until about 1700hrs, at which time, in order to compensate for the large body of sailors operating ashore, he ordered some of the frigates to dispatch their ablest gun crews to the ships of the line.

Serieuse and Artemise between them provided 150 seamen to be distributed amongst the crews of UOrient, Tonnant and Franklin. Brueys followed with a signal that the battle would be fought at anchor. His flagship and the vessels astern and aft of him now stood at about full strength, while the remainder of his ships averaged 200 men short of complement if calculated without reference to returning shore parties. His decision to fight a static action was probably sound, for his understrength crews could then concentrate on gunnery without having to concern themselves with seamanship.

This did not mean that his ships could not manoeuvre in battle, however; ships were ordered to fit a spring to their cable in the form of a hawser passed out of the ship through an after gun port and run to the opposite side from the anchor cable before being attached to it 30ft (9m) from the ship. By hauling on this hawser the crew could rotate their vessel to face an attacker if necessary. Further precautions involved each ship lowering a second anchor from her bows and extending a cable to the ship astern to prevent attacking vessels from manoeuvring between them. With the British only an hour away and the French short of men, many of these tasks remained unfulfilled, though most ships appear to have succeeded in linking themselves by cable, with the exception of the Tonnant and Heureux.

French preparations were summed up by Rear-Admiral Blanquet's account, one of the few left by the French:

At five o'clock, the Enemy came to the wind in succession. This manoeuvre convinced us that they intended attacking us that evening. The Admiral got the top-gallant-yards across, but soon after made the signal that he intended engaging the Enemy at anchor - convinced, without doubt, that he had not seamen enough to engage under sail; for he wanted at least 200 good seamen for each Ship. After this signal, each Ship ought to have sent a stream-cable to the Ship astern of her, and to have made a hawser fast to the cable about twenty fathoms in the water, and passed the opposite side to that intended as a spring. This was not generally executed. Orders were then given to let go another bower-anchor, and the broadsides of the Ships were brought to bear upon the Enemy [with] the Ships' heads S.E. from the Island of Bequier [Aboukir], forming a Line about 1,300 fathoms N.W. and S.E. distant from each other 80 fathoms, each with an anchor out, in the S.S.E.

Here we must pause to consider Nelson's options. Since the mid-17th century the standard method of attack was line ahead, with ships positioned bow to stern, since this made maximum use of the broadside, where all but a few of the guns were mounted. Yet by fighting in this manner a decisive outcome was rare, even where one side possessed more guns or superior gunnery. The resulting exchange of fire, often at long range, caused little damage, unless one side broke off the engagement and fled, a circumstance which might allow the pursuer to isolate damaged vessels unable to effect an escape.

In order to obviate a drawn battle a fleet could employ two tactics, the first of which involved breaking the line. If supported by a favourable wind, the attacker could turn and manoeuvre through the enemy line, either as individual ships or in groups. By cutting through the line each passing ship could make best use of its broadside to strike the bow and stern of the enemy on either side - the most vulnerable section of the vessels - causing crippling damage as round shot bounded down the length of the gun decks causing mayhem in their wake. This tactic was known as 'raking'.

The second method of attack involved concentration against one particular part of the enemy line by decreasing the distance between one's own ships and thus bringing a greater proportion of fire to bear on a smaller number of opposing vessels. In Nelson's case, this might be achieved by positioning two British ships against each of the first six French vessels - one against the bow and another against the stern. The other means of accomplishing the same sort of concentration lay in 'doubling' the enemy: stationing a ship to both port and starboard of each opposing vessel, destroying it with fire directed from two directions. This could be potentially crippling to the defender, but also caused problems for the attacker, not least the risk of firing against the friendly vessel opposite, especially in darkness. Moreover, if the ships were not at anchor and therefore enjoyed immediate freedom of movement, the effort expended to position ships on either side of the defender translated into valuable lost time - time in which the enemy could direct his fire with greater effect while the opposing ships sought to take up their respective stations. On the other hand, a ship so 'doubled' eventually found its firepower reduced as its gun crews, forced to man guns on both sides rather than concentrating their efforts from a single broadside, grew less efficient through fatigue and consequently offered a slow rate of fire.

Such were the options that Nelson must have considered as his squadron approached the French position.

ACTION COMMENCES

At 1622hrs, after all the ships had rounded the head of the bay, Nelson hoisted the signal to drop anchor, with cables to be passed through the stern port with a spring attached, in order to enable each ship to manoeuvre in its otherwise static position. At the same time the ships cleared for action, the men taking up their appointed stations, the bulkhead partitions removed and stowed and the guns made ready. Sand was strewn on the decks to provide traction and to soak up water and blood, gun ports were opened and the guns run out. By a signal hoisted at about 1700hrs, the attack was to be conducted against the French van and centre - the correct decision in light of

The British squadron's approach to battle. The Nile put Nelson on the map, not merely establishing his name across Europe - a process begun at Cape St Vincent the year before - but, more importantly, giving him recognition in the naval world. (National Maritime Museum, PU5565)

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Tactical situation at the commencement of battle

Wind

NELSON

Shoals

French gun battery (four 6-pdrs and two mortars) ty

Aboukir Island

Shoals

To Alexandria 14 miles (22.5km)

Shoals

_ CP Gunboats

ABOUKIR BAY

N A

Frigates

The French line lay 4 miles (6.4km) east of Aboukir Castle, anchored bow to stern for 1 1 /2 miles (2.4km) with gaps of approximately 160yds (146m) between the vessels. The 4-fathom line lies to leeward, further inshore of which no line-of-battle ship could sail without grounding on the shoals. It was into this narrow gap that Captain Foley daringly brought the head of the British line for a landward attack fraught with potential disaster, while the remaining vessels doubled the French to seaward.

Guerrier \ Conquerant

* , * x

fy Peuple Souverain \ Franklin Bl

\ L'Orient Tonnant

^ Heureux o Jfc Mercure

* iane^ \

Atemise

ToRoset ta12mi les (19km) across bay, at mouth of the Nile

0 1 1 mile

1 0 1km

the fact that Brueys, by recalling his crews and strengthening his centre and rear, incorrectly calculated that his opponent would strike those portions of the line. Nelson's decision almost certainly derived from observation and deduction: he could make out L'Orient, with her three decks, and thus could identify her as the most powerful vessel and consequently the flagship. He may also have been able to distinguish the 80-gun ship ahead and astern of L'Orient as well as possibly the powerful Guillaume Tell to the rear. But it is certain that his calculations could not have been influenced by knowledge of the strength of the French van, of which he was ignorant, insofar as he could clearly make out the number of gun decks but would not have been aware that those vessels were operating with weakened complements, many of their men having been ordered to reinforce the three ships in the centre. Nor would Nelson have been aware of the age of the ships making up the van: the Conquerant, over half a century old and mounting only 18-pdrs; the Guerrier, at the head of the line, 45 years old; and the Peuple Souverain,

British ships approach the head of the French line. While, prior to the action, Nelson issued to all his captains a lengthy memorandum explaining his intentions, he offered them a wide degree of discretion, leaving no fixed tactical plan in place. The same would apply seven years later on the eve of the battle of Trafalgar; hence, the admiral's famous instruction: 'In case signals can neither be seen nor perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.' (National Maritime Museum, BHC0515)

scarcely younger. Nelson's great advantage, which he must have fully appreciated, lay in the fact that the wind would carry his squadron straight down the enemy line, reducing the time in which the ships would be exposed to fire before finding themselves in a position to engage the French, and free to proceed down the line as they saw fit with an obliging wind, notwithstanding any damage inflicted on their rigging. In contrast, the enemy rear, facing a headwind, would experience great difficulty were it to seek to support the van.

Action commenced as the leading ships passed Aboukir Island, when they came under fire from the guns and mortars mounted in the fort there; however, because this was fired from more than a mile away, no damage or injuries were sustained. Aboard the lead vessel, the Goliath, Captain Foley realized that a unique opportunity presented itself, as his signal midshipman, George Elliot, later identified:

When we were nearly within gun-shot, standing as aide-de-camp close to the captain, I heard him say to the master that he wished he could get inside of the leading ship of the enemy's line. I immediately looked for the buoy on her anchor, and saw it apparently at the usual distance of a cable's length - i.e. 200 yards - which I reported; they both looked at it, and agreed there was room to pass between the ship and her anchor (the danger was, the ship being close up to the edge of the shoal), and it was decided to do it... I heard Foley say, that he should not be surprised to find the Frenchman unprepared for action on the inner side, and as we passed her bow I saw he was right. Her lower-deck guns were not run out, and there was lumber, such as bags and boxes, on the upper-deck ports, which I reported with no small pleasure.

Hood, aboard the Zealous, immediately astern the Goliath, expressed concern at the dangers inherent in following this unorthodox manoeuvre: 'The van ship of the enemy being in five fathoms of water [we] expected the Goliath and Zealous to stick on the shoal every moment and did not imagine we should attempt to pass within her.' Clearly, this had not been Nelson's intention, but that is not to say he did not approve. He had issued general instructions that the ships were to prepare their anchors and to concentrate

44

After months of frustration in seeking out the French fleet, British crews stood anxious to engage. John Nicol later wrote: 'We rejoiced in a general action; not that we loved fighting, but we all wished to be free to return to our homes and follow our own pursuits. We knew there was no other way of obtaining this than by defeating the enemy.' (National Maritime Museum, PY9506)

their firepower on the French van and centre; but he did not stipulate what course his ships were to take and he was well known for leaving the initiative to his captains, in whose abilities he regularly placed sufficient confidence to allow them considerable discretion in interpreting what - at least in the case of the battle of the Nile - amounted to only the broadest outline of orders. Foley appreciated this and acted accordingly.

Berry later claimed - an assertion widely accepted as accurate - that Nelson appreciated the situation at virtually the same moment as Foley, declaring 'that where there was room for an enemy's ship to swing, there was room for one of ours to anchor'. The absence in the Vanguard's log of any reference to the admiral's intention suggests that Nelson did not have an opportunity to signal Foley to this effect, a course in any event now superfluous.

Action soon commenced. Passing the bow of the Guerrier, the Goliath unleashed a broadside, causing considerable damage at short range. The crew soon discovered, upon reaching the inshore side of the French ship, that she was unprepared for action, with her gunwales crowded with bags and boxes encumbering the upper decks and her lower-deck guns not run out. Although the Goliath prepared to drop anchor, complete with cable and springs extending out of her stern port, as a result of damage sustained during the approach and the inability of the crew to furl the sails rapidly or control the cable, the cable was let out to its farthest extent, about 120 fathoms (220m), four times the distance desired. This obliged Foley instead to place the Goliath between the second and third ships of the enemy's line, not beside the Guerrier as Foley had intended.

The Zealous, under Hood, being close behind the Goliath by a few hundred metres, could therefore follow safely in Foley's wake, firing into the Guerrier's bows as the Zealous rounded past her, bringing down her foremast as a consequence of her own and the Goliath's broadside. As Foley had proceeded farther than he had intended, Hood assumed a station opposite the Guerrier's port bow, though not within close range. The Guerrier, already pummelled, now proceeded to come under heavy fire from Hood's two-decker. Other British ships fired on Guerrier as well, as they passed the head of the French line. Around 1900hrs, just as the sun was setting, Captain Trulet's battered mainmast and mizzenmast toppled, though her crew continued to issue fire.

45

HMS GOLIATH ROUNDING THE BOW OF THE GUERRIER (pp. 46-47)

George Elliot, a midshipman aboard the Goliath, left this account of the opening moments of the batt le of the Nile: The French captains were all on board their Admiral's ship, and did not expect us to come in that night. They had sent for their boats to return f rom the shore where they were procuring water. The senior officer of the van division, seeing us stand on under all sail, got anxious, and sent his own boat to hasten off the boats of his division w i thou t wai t ing to fill w i th water. She had not go t back when we were get t ing very close, and as his own launch was passing the flag-ship, half-laden w i th water, he got into her, but she pul led up slowly against the fresh sea-breeze and did not reach his ship ti l l we had passed her. I saw him waving his hat, and evidently call ing to his ship, when still at a considerable distance. An officer was leaning against his ensign staff l istening. At last this officer ran forward to the poop and down to the lower deck. We knew what was coming, and off went their whole broadside, but just too late to hit us, and

passed harmlessly between us and Zealous, and before he could give a second broadside Zealous was past his range. We therefore both got up to our places w i thout injury of any sort, and were able to take up the exact positions we wished, neither ship returning a single shot. Zealous exactly fol lowed Goliath's example, but the enemy being occupied, she furled her sails, and anchoring a little more to windward, veered into the place just left by the Goliath... Not a shot could miss at the distance. The Zealous d id the same, and in less than a quarter of an hour this ship was a perfect wreck, w i thout a mast, or a broadside gun to f ire... From this moment the Guerrier never fired a shot, except f rom her stern guns; she had been practically destroyed in five minutes by her t w o opponents. As the Goliath passed her quarter the Guerrier1 s foremast fell, and also the main of the Conquerant... As the Theseus passed the Goliath in get t ing to her station, she gave her three t remendous cheers.'

4 8

British attack on the French van and centre

Culloden aground on reef

1.5 miles (2.4km) to NE

P Defence [7A)

Bellerophon (74)

Leander (50)

Majestic (74)

v. Wind Audacious

(74)

Orion (74)

/ Zealous (74) Q

Gunboats *

Spartiate (74)

© Serieuse (36)

Sunk

X lellerc dismasted

Frigates

Artemise(40) '

X Mercure^kfr Hi)

(74) *

Guillaume Tell (80) ^

Navigating just east of unseen shoals, Goliath, Zealous, Audacious, Orion and Theseus sail down the narrow channel between the lead French ship and the shoals. Once in their desired positions, the attacking ships anchor and commence firing. Leading the British van approaching to seaward, Nelson completes the doubling of the French line. Foolishly unleashing a broadside against the 74-gun Orion, the frigate Serieuse signals her own demise when much heavier return fire sinks her. Outgunned during an extended exchange of fire with L'Orient, Bellerophon loses all her masts and drifts off. Mauled at point-blank range after her bowsprit becomes entangled in the rigging of Heureux, Majestic manages to release herself and engage Mercure. The severely-damaged Bellerophon having drifted out of the line, Swiftsure and Alexander replace her and double the French flagships.

Diane (40)

Genereux (74)

Timoleon^k (74)

Justice (AO) N A

French ship at anchor

III British approach

0 British final, anchored position

< Track of British ship

< Track of British ship after first contact

0 1 0.25 mile

I 0

1 1

0.25km

4 9

Prior to engaging the enemy, Nelson signalled his squadron to hoist four lanterns to be suspended vertically in line from the mizzenmast, so enabling friendly vessels to identify their consorts in the dark and avoid unnecessary casualties - a very real risk in a night action. (National Maritime Museum, PW4695)

A quarter of an hour later the Audacious, captained by Davidge Gould, followed, bringing down the Guerrier's mainmast with three broadsides as the British ship passed, though after the battle other captains, especially Miller, claimed credit for the feat. With a gap available between the Guerrier and the next astern, Conquerant, Audacious occupied it and anchored. Next, the Onow, under Saumarez, came round the French position by passing the Zealous and thus getting even closer inshore, though without incident. Passing the Spartiate, third in the enemy line, Saumarez sought to anchor opposite the Aquilon, in the fourth position, but was distracted by fire directed at him by the frigate Serieuse, lying at anchor close to the shoals. Captain Martin made a serious misjudgement here - not least because he wounded two of the Orion's crew - for the difference in weight of broadside suggested the inadvisability of such a course - quite apart from the long-standing understanding in naval circles that frigates were not to engage their more powerful counterparts; in turn, they would likewise not be fired upon. Having violated this principle, the Serieuse suffered accordingly. Saumarez waited for her to approach, which she did, whereupon he unleashed his broadside - a minimum of 7811b if single-shotted (and the guns were probably double-shotted, as was often the case with the initial broadside in battle) as opposed to the mere 2961b fired by Martin's ship. Predictably, the frigate, its anchor cut and bereft of its masts, drifted onto the shoals, where she began to take on water. The only benefit accrued to the French by Martin's foolhardiness was to prevent Saumarez from taking up the station he had planned, for the Orion had sailed too far downwind and to the east to be able to confront the Aquilon, which occupied the fourth position in the enemy line. He nevertheless assumed a sensible station: off the bows of the fifth vessel, the Peuple Souverain.

The final British ship to confront the French from the landward side was the Theseus, under Captain Ralph Miller. Like his fellow captains, he too pounded the Guerrier as he rounded the head of the French line, as he later recorded: 'I closed [with] them suddenly, and, running under the arch of their shot, reserved my fire, every gun being loaded with two and some with three round shot, until I had the Guerrier's masts in a line, and her jib-boom about six feet clear of our rigging; we then opened with such effect that a second breath could not be drawn before her main and mizzen mast were also gone.'

50

(It should be noted that, as observed earlier, Gould of the Audacious later disputed Miller's claim of bringing down the Guerrier's mainmast.) As Miller was concerned that Saumarez had manoeuvred his vessel dangerously close to the shoals by steering wide, he chose to proceed through the gap separating the Zealous and Guerrier, confident in his belief that the former's crew would cease firing while the Theseus sailed within a few metres of her consort, which they did, both crews enthusiastically cheering one another in the process. Miller then proceeded to sail his vessel south, past the starboard side of the Goliath, and anchored in a fine position opposite Spartiate's bow.

Nelson, meanwhile, leading the remaining vessels from his post on the quarterdeck of the Vanguard, was approaching the French line and decided to attack from seaward, possibly on the basis that space did not permit so many vessels to negotiate to landward - with the added problems of nightfall approaching - and almost certainly in order to profit from the known advantages of doubling his opponent. Clearly there were sufficient ships already engaging the enemy's van and centre - the objects stated in Nelson's signal - so attacking the outside of the French line offered the best prospect of success. He did not signal for the as yet unengaged ships to follow him, but that, in the event, is what they did, and he was correct in sailing so as to ignore the Guerrier and the Conquerant, which were already all but defeated by the Goliath, Zealous and Audacious, thus saving his efforts for the vessels farther down the line. Moreover, by remaining on the outside of the French line and engaging the centre, he could prevent the ships of the enemy rear from weighing anchor, tacking up the line and thereby supporting their consorts in the van. Keeping all such considerations in mind, he steered his vessel towards the Spartiate, the third ship in the French line, arriving on the scene only minutes after the Theseus had reached her position on the enemy's port side, anchored and begun to fire.

This caused the Theseus to cease her attack for fear of hitting the friendly flagship and instead to redirect the fire of all the guns forward of her mainmast against the Aquilon and all those abaft against the Conquerant. Attempting to fire at two such separated targets was no mean feat, for the angle of fire was restricted, and Miller and his crew were subject to precisely the same danger his ship posed to the Vanguard: round shot passing over the deck or through the rigging of the Spartiate and striking the Theseus, which appears to have been anchored close to the Spartiate. Theseus' log specifically stated Miller's acknowledgement that he should hold his fire to allow the admiral pride of place - more evidence in support of the argument that Nelson did not set out a specific plan of action for the attack on Aboukir Bay.

Following the Vanguard were the Minotaur, Defence and Bellerophon, which passed the admiral's flagship closely as they made their way down the French line. The Minotaur took up station and anchored beside the Aquilon, the fourth ship, already dogged by the forward guns of the Theseus. Captain John Peyton, in the Defence, anchored his ship opposite the Peuple Souverain, immediately astern the Aquilon. Evidently Peyton did not concern himself with the fact that the Peuple Souverain was already vigorously engaged with the On'ow, on her port side, and thus subjecting his own vessel to possible injury from the guns of Saumarez's vessel. Whereas Captain Darby of the Bellerophon wished to come alongside the Franklin and anchor, this British 74's anchor extended farther than intended and Darby instead discovered himself athwart the bows of the powerful enemy flagship, L'Orient, on whose port side this mammoth was not yet distracted by another British ship.

KEY A Theseus (Br) B Spartiate (Fr) C Vanguard (Br) D Aquilon [Fr) E Minotaur (Br)

SITUATION OF THE SPARTIATE, THESEUS, VANGUARD, AQUILON AND MINOTAUR, 1830 -2030HRS

EVENTS

1 In her first position, Theseus anchors on Spartiate's port side, where the two ships exchange broadsides. When the Vanguard arrives off Spartiate's starboard side, Theseus then sails ahead approximately 200m so as to avoid striking his superior's flagship.

l a In her new position, Theseus anchors by a stern cable and engages the Aquilon.

2 Nelson's Vanguard anchors approximately 60m from the Spartiate, whereupon the two commence a withering exchange of fire at point-blank range.

3 By hauling on her cable, the Aquilon brings her starboard guns to bear against the Vanguard while simultaneously exchanging fire with the Theseus. Thus engaged by close-range fire from the Spartiate and raking fire from the Aquilon, the Vanguard suffers heavy losses.

4 Minotaur's arrival obliges Aquilon to cease engaging Nelson's ship so as to concentrate on her new adversary - as well as the Theseus - thus bringing relief to the British flagship.

52

From Nelson's main group, the Majestic, under Captain Westcott, entered the battle last, appearing on the scene around 1900hrs. She approached with the Vanguard to starboard, with the intention either of anchoring close to UOrient, then engaged with Bellerophon, or within range of the Tonnant, immediately astern of the French flagship. But, as with so many of Nelson's ships, the Majestic"s anchor cable extended too far, forcing Westcott against the starboard side of the Heureux, entangling the former's bowsprit with the French 74's rigging and placing the Majestic in a perilous position, her starboard broadside guns unable to bear against her opponent and leaving her upper decks exposed to small-arms fire.

The Culloden, meanwhile, under Captain Troubridge, had released her prize a few minutes after 1500hrs, in accordance with Nelson's signal, and had made good progress in linking up with the main body, reaching the bay before the Alexander and Swiftsure, which were returning from their reconnaissance into Alexandria. While the Goliath and Zealous were busy making their way around the head of the French line, Troubridge was proceeding round Aboukir Bay, but closer in than even the Zealous had managed. This proved to be a mistake, for at about 1840hrs the Culloden struck rock, prompting her captain instantly to issue a signal to that effect and to warn the two ships following him to take a wider course to avoid the shoals.

Not unnaturally, this navigational error caused Troubridge the most immense frustration; he took immediate steps to bring his vessel off the rocks, first by dispatching a ship's launch to the Mutine for assistance, whereupon Captain Hardy anchored about 800m to the north. Men from the Mutine rowed over to the Culloden bearing two anchor cables, which Troubridge's crew drew through the wardroom window in the stern and fixed to capstans, which in turn were rotated to try to extricate the Culloden from her predicament. This expedient, and throwing overboard casks from the hold to lighten the load, nevertheless failed to assist, leaving Troubridge's ship stuck at both her stern and bow.

Appreciating Culloden's travails, the Alexander and Swiftsure avoided the reef and made for the seaward side of the French line, but did not come into action until 2000hrs, by which time darkness had descended over the whole scene, illuminated only by the flashes of the guns which, combined with the heavy smoke, rendered difficult the two ships' abilities to establish useful stations. The Alexander, under Captain Ball, anchored opposite L'Orienfs stern quarter, while Bellerophon remained in action against her. The Swiftsure, under Captain Hallowell, determined not to fire until she had furled her sails and anchored at a predetermined station. This proved a sensible decision, for Hallowell nearly fired on a ship that was showing no lights, but decided against it for he was determined to adhere to his original instructions. In the event, the ship in question proved to be the Bellerophon, by that time bearing heavy scars from her exchanges with L'Orient. Amidst the darkness and gloom created by smoke, Hallowell dropped anchor just after 2000hrs and opened fire two minutes later. Despite difficulties in visibility, Hallowell had chosen a fine position, enabling him to fire into the stern of the Franklin, not yet in action, and the bow of L'Orient.

The last of Nelson's ships to come into action was the 50-gun Leander, bearing fewer guns than would normally justify her taking up a position in the line of battle. Initially assuming the role of a frigate, Captain Thompson approached the Culloden, still grounded on the reef and being tended to by the Mutine. At 1900hrs he dispatched a boat to Troubridge's ship, offering to

assist and enquiring whether he was to proceed into action. The officer bearing the message was ordered to row to the Mutine with instructions for that vessel to go astern of the Culloden and drop anchor. The messenger was then to return to the Leander, notifying Thompson immediately to make for the line of battle and take his place. This Thompson accomplished only at around 2100 or 2130hrs, by which time the first five ships in the French line had already sustained heavy damage. Such tardiness did not, however, reflect badly upon his record; Captain Berry wrote that: 'Captain Thompson of the Leander of 50 guns, with a degree of skill and intrepidity highly honourable to his professional character, advanced towards the enemy line on the outside and judiciously dropped his anchor athwart [the] hawse of Le Franklin, taking her with great success, the shot from the Leander's broadside which passed that ship striking L'Orient, the flagship of the French commander in chief.'

Apart from the Culloden, still stuck fast on a reef, all of Nelson's ships were now engaged.

CRESCENDO OF BATTLE

At approximately 2030hrs, as Nelson was examining a sketch of Aboukir Bay while standing on the quarterdeck of the Vanguard with Captain Berry, a piece of langridge fired from the Spartiate struck the admiral on the forehead over his right (blind) eye, causing a 3in. (8cm) gash which left a flap of skin hanging down over his left (good) eye, and persuading Nelson that the wound was mortal. In the cockpit the admiral insisted on waiting his turn with the surgeon, but Jefferson came to his aid very quickly, applying linaments to the injury, covering it with sticking plaster and afterwards pronouncing the laceration fairly superficial, though clearly painful. Whilst dictating a letter to the Admiralty, Nelson regained some of his sight and began to pen the communication himself; he was out of danger but remained below as the fight continued.

The Majestic, having been mauled by UOrient and Tonnant, had her bowsprit stuck in the rigging of the Heureux, and French musketry and double-shotted guns had inflicted heavy casualties on her gunners and left Captain Westcott dead. When her jib boom snapped, the Majestic managed to extricate herself, passing alongside the Heureux so closely that men fought between the yardarms for a short period. Seeking to manoeuvre astern the Heureux, the Majestic became fouled on the cable connecting the Heureux to the Mercure - notwithstanding which her position between the two vessels was a good one - and lowered an anchor through a stern gunport. In this position the Majestic could direct her fire on the Mercure's port bow and the Heureux's stern, aboard which Captain Etienne was wounded.

At the head of the French line and farther south the action became one of individual fights involving between two and four ships at a time, with the Guerrier having suffered the greatest damage from the initial attack, the Goliath, Audacious, Orion and Theseus having unleashed their successive broadsides against her as they came round her bow and port side. The Zealous, anchored off the Guerrier's port bow, continued to inflict punishment, forcing her gun crews on the quarterdeck and forecastle to seek safety below decks. Notwithstanding Miller's and Gould's claims, the Guerrier may have lost all her masts as a consequence of gunfire from the Goliath and Zealous alone, though not all their shot struck her above decks,

LEFT Nelson wounded, struck by a metal fragment fired from the Spartiate. 'lam killed,' he exclaimed in his usual melodramatic style as he collapsed into Captain Berry's arms. 'Remember me to my wife.' (National Maritime Museum, PW8204)

RIGHT Nelson having his wound dressed below decks. Some historians attribute the admiral's subsequent erratic behaviour and poor judgement while ashore at Naples - particularly his interference in political affairs and his refusal to return home - to the trauma caused to his head on this occasion. (Stratford Archive)

for Hood found that 'from her bow to her larboard gangway, the ports of the main deck are entirely in one, and her gunwale in that part entirely cut away, two of the main deck beams [having] fallen upon the guns in consequence.' Given the Guerrier's state, Hood repeatedly called upon her to surrender, but to no avail. Three hours into the action, tired of the battering, he sent a lieutenant to the stricken ship, aboard which almost certainly hundreds now lay dead and wounded. Captain Trulet submitted, a pre-arranged signal in the form of raised and lowered lights from the rigging acknowledging the fact.

Meanwhile, the Conquer ant, just astern of the Guerrier, being an old ship, suffered considerable damage from enemy shot, which crashed through the hull with little effort, while the French ship could answer only with 18-pdrs instead of the standard lower-deck complement of 36-pdrs. She was also seriously undermanned, with her crew down to 400 from 700. Two British ships, the Goliath and Audacious, were offering sustained fire against her port side, as a result of which her captain fell wounded. The second in command, the first lieutenant, assumed control, with strict instructions to continue the fight, as Captain Dalbarade was carried below. Nonetheless, so hot was the fire on the upper decks that the 12-pdr crews abandoned their stations, leaving only the 18-pdrs firing. In due course the Conquerant surrendered to the Audacious, the men of the French ship refusing to obey their officers' orders to stand at their guns.

The third ship in the French line, the Spartiate, found herself with opponents on either side - the Theseus at first on her port side and later Nelson's Vanguard on her starboard side - an instance of doubling that soon tired the French ship's overstretched gun crews. Notwithstanding her reduced complement - down by 200 men - Spartiate inflicted over 100 casualties aboard the Vanguard and over 30 in the Theseus. On the other hand, the French 74 lost both her mainmast and mizzenmast early in the fight, and suffered considerable structural damage to her hull, where serious leaks below the waterline put 9ft of water into her hold in short order. By 2100hrs the Spartiate had suffered 200 casualties, with most of her remaining crew having been shifted from the guns to the pumps below. At about this time, she hauled down her flag, Captain

56

Development of the action until around 0330hrs on 2 August

.W ind

Culloden (run aground) r n

French bomb vessels and gunboats ^

/ Guerr

Audacious zft J^ Conquerant

Goliath -^ Vanguard

\ Aquilon

reupie 7 \Souverain*% X j ,

Leander v Or/on/

/ Franklin^

/ \ / \ Alexander

A \ * \ T L'Orient

! Tonnant i

Atemise

. \ T V *

^Genereux

H I British 4 M 1 French

Final position Final position of ship of ship

0.25 mile

0.25km

* 4 1 A''

Justice Timoleon N

A

57

Nelson, his head bandaged, returns above decks. He may have survived the battle, but Captain Hallowell of the Swiftsure felt obliged to remind the admiral of his mortality by later sending him a macabre gift: a coffin fashioned out of the mainmast of L'Orient. Nelson happily accepted it, and his body now rests inside, itself sealed within a marble sarcophagus in St Paul's Cathedral. (National Maritime Museum, PW4343)

Emereau handing his sword to Lieutenant Galwey, whom Berry had sent with marines in a boat to accept the surrender. Berry duly brought it below to the cockpit to show to Nelson, still somewhat disoriented from his wound.

The fourth ship in the line, the Aquilon, stood initially undamaged, for the Orion had not assumed her correct position on the French ship's port side. However, the Minotaur later fired upon her, as did some of the guns of the Theseus - enough to drive her gun crews from the quarterdeck and forecastle, as well as from the 18-pdrs on the upper deck - in favour of the comparative safety of the 36-pdrs on the lower deck, and thereby probably inadvertently aided those crews who were busy fighting both sides of the ship. As with the Spartiate ahead, the Aquilon had lost all three masts by now; at 2130hrs, with practically all her guns dismounted, severely stung with losses of 87 men killed and 213 wounded, she surrendered to Captain Thomas Louis' Minotaur.

Astern of the Aquilon lay the Peuple Souverain, which was also doubled by British ships, with the Orion engaging her on her port bow while

the Defence fought her to starboard. With a complement of just under 600 she boasted a substantial crew, though she nevertheless failed to inflict serious damage on her tormentors, with the Defence losing only her foretopmast. After a brief lull in the firing as the men of the Orion prepared to keep at bay an approaching flaming raft which, in the event, came within 25m of the ship's bows, firing resumed, causing the Peuple Souverain's masts to fall in succession. In the exchange, Saumarez received a wound to his thigh from a splinter broken off from his own ship's spare topmasts. While he declined medical attention, a piece of flying metal struck one of his midshipmen, who eventually required the amputation of his arm and shoulder.

Not long after, the Peuple Souverain's cable was severed, whether intentionally or not is not known, causing her to drift between the Orion and Franklin, leaving a gap in the French line and exposing the bows of the Franklin, immediately ahead of L'Orient. In short order the French van thus collapsed and the three strong ships in the centre of Brueys' line became the target of the British onslaught from several directions. Hitherto the Franklin had played a relatively minor part in the action, for she had as yet come under fire only from the after guns of the Swiftsure, while that ship was already deploying her forward guns against the flagship. Nevertheless, these proved sufficient to wound Rear-Admiral Blanquet in the head. The Franklin came under increasing pressure with the Peuple Souverain leaving the line, for into the gap provided sailed the Leander, which, seeking to assist the Orion, at first mistook her for an enemy vessel. When the latter ship hoisted the signal of recognition - lights hung horizontally - all was well and no shots were exchanged. The confusion over, Leander proceeded to engage the Franklin's bows, only to force the more heavily laden Orion to cease firing.

At about the same time the Defence, with the Peuple Souverain now absent, manoeuvred to engage the Franklin, attacking her bows. Her captain, Gillet, was wounded and a chest of musket cartridges, lying on the deck for

58

If credit for attacking on the landward side must rest with Foley, the evidence suggests that Nelson appreciated the merits of this manoeuvre at virtually the same time and that, in all probability, he would have signalled for part of his squadron to hazard the at tempt (National Maritime Museum, PU5577)

the sake of the marines, exploded and cast flames across the poop and quarterdeck. The crew doused them and carried on with the fighting, but eventually the mainmast and mizzenmast collapsed and the main deck guns were dismounted amidst intense fire. Morale was fast deteriorating, not only because the Franklin had become separated from the friendly vessels ahead, whose fire could no longer be heard, but UOrient, 150m astern, now clearly stood in mortal danger.

UOrient had passed the initial phase of the battle without serious mishap. The Majestic had intended to engage her but Captain Westcott's anchor cable extended his reach too far, instead putting his vessel into contact with the Heureux. The Bellerophon had tried her hand against the powerful French flagship, but had received heavy damage for her efforts, losing her mizzenmast, and then her mainmast, in the course of the first hour of contact. The Swiftsure soon came to assist, however, taking up post off L'Orienfs bows, while the Alexander anchored in a prime position opposite her stern, from where she issued crippling broadsides down the whole length of L'Orienfs gun decks. Admiral Brueys' wounds to the head and arm at an early phase of the action, followed by a round shot to the stomach that practically cut him in half, may have been a consequence of this devastating

The wreckage of the battle, hours into the fighting. In this sort of slogging match Nelson had complete confidence in the abilities of his men, commenting: 'I knew what stuff I had under me, so I went into the attack with only a few ships, perfectly sure that the others would follow me, although it was nearly dark.' (National Maritime Museum, PU4036)

59

KEY A Leander (Br) B Franklin (Fr) C Peuple Souverain (Fr) D Swiftsure (Br) E L'Orient (Fr) F Alexander (Br) G Bellerophon (Br)

1 The Swiftsure arrives in the stead of the crippled and dismasted Bellerophon, which drifts off.

2 The Alexander, which initially followed the same track as the Swiftsure, forces her way through the French line, bears up into the wind, anchors on L'Orients port quarter and engages her.

3 The Leander, last of the three British ships to arrive, occupies the space left by the Peuple Souverain and establishes a commanding position from which to rake both the Franklin and L'Orient. The combined fire of these three British vessels, all engaging from different directions, later causes the conflagration that destroys the French flagship.

L'Orients predicament: Even after driving off the Bellerophon, Brueys and his flag captain, Casabianca, must endure fire from two ships of the line and the 50-gun Leander, the last of whom engages her from a raking position to which the French flagship cannot reply. L'Orient cannot depend on support from the Peuple Souverain, which has drifted into a useless position after gunfire cuts her cable.

EVENTS

L'ORIENT UNDER PRESSURE, 2000-2100HRS 60

61

raking fire. Brueys insisted on remaining on deck, but a quarter of an hour later he succumbed to his wounds, causing a temporary desire amongst his crew for revenge, followed by a dip in morale as the gunfire ahead gradually slackened with the progressive capitulation of the ships of the French van.

It was not long before the stern cabin of the flagship caught fire, the flames spreading to the poop and soon defying all attempts to bring them under control; it is rumoured that the disaster could be attributed to containers of paint carelessly left on the decks. The dark skies, otherwise illuminated only by the sporadic flashes from the guns, soon gave way to the haunting glow of the fire raging aboard L'Orient. Captain Hallowell, in the Swiftsure, identifying the mizzen chains as the source of the flames, ordered his gun crews, together with his musket-armed marines, to focus their fire on that area in order to interfere with the enemy's ability to extinguish the fire.

Spreading flames not only imperilled L'Orient, but all the ships around her, for if fire reached the powder magazine, a vessel became a giant bomb. All the vessels in the vicinity of the flagship consequently began to move away as best they could. The Bellerophon, now stripped of her mainmast and mizzenmast and with her foremast fouled by fallen rigging, was obliged to cut her cable and hang a spritsail under her bowsprit for what motive power that expedient offered - though this carried the risk of bringing too much pressure to bear against her damaged foremast, which could not take the strain of the vessel's increased speed resulting from wind caught in the spritsail. In the event, it proved so, and the foremast collapsed over the port bow, forcing the men to clear the wreckage as quickly as possible and set sails on the stumps of the masts to propel the ship as far from danger as possible.

Saumarez, aboard the Orion, sat only about 300m away, with very little space in which to navigate to a place of safety and, in any event, now in command of a damaged ship. To protect the ship as best he could, he ordered the guns run in and the ports shut. The magazine was sealed and the sails -the most likely parts of the ship to catch fire - were rapidly lowered, detached from the masts and stowed below. In order to tow the Orion away from the French flagship, the Theseus detached boats carrying hawsers for the aid of her consort. The Alexander, under Ball, as yet fairly unscathed, cut her stern

The destruction of L'Orient. According to Reverend Cooper Willyams, chaplain aboard the Swiftsure, some of the flagship's gunners continued to fire even as the doomed ship neared its end. The flames could be seen at Rosetta, 12 miles (19km) away. (National Maritime Museum, BHC0509)

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cable within a few minutes of observing flames aboard L'Orient, thus allowing her to drift south until her bow anchor was lowered, which caused her to swing round and settle alongside another ship, almost certainly the Tonnant. Owing to the possibility that the French flagship, now fully engulfed in flames, might drift in the same direction, a few minutes later Ball decided to sever his bow cable as well.

Meanwhile, the Swiftsure, still firing on L'Orient and the Franklin simultaneously, and less threatened in her more secure position upwind of the burning ship, nevertheless discovered that the tar between her planks was melting from the heat, obliging her crew to shorten her cable. Captain Hallowell, believing his present position the best to ensure his ship's protection, determined not to allow anyone to interfere with that decision by placing sentries to protect the cable against being cut. Following the same procedure instituted by Saumarez in the Orion, Hallowell had all Swiftsure's gunports closed and the magazine sealed up. His men found positions best suited for their protection against the impending explosion, and armed themselves with buckets of water to douse whatever flaming objects might descend into their midst.

The French captains also appreciated the danger: the Tonnant, Heureux and Mercure all cut their cables in rapid succession, placing those ships, as it happened, beyond the reach of the Majestic, which was still engaging them. The Tonnant drifted south and dropped anchor near the Guillaume Tell, while the Heureux encountered problems with her crew, who in the wake of Captain Etienne's wounding and his succession by Lieutenant Foucaud exhibited a reluctance to emerge from below decks to execute their officers' orders, which were to drop anchor and set topsails and topgallants while still under fire. Instead, drifting west, the Heureux went aground on shoals, losing her rudder in the process; the Mercure soon followed, both her port and starboard sides still under fire from the Majestic and Alexander. Three further French ships - the Guillaume Tell, Genereux and Timoleon - remained undamaged, having extended their cables to allow the wind and current to shift them several hundred metres from the ticking bomb.

Nelson, who despite his injury emerged from below decks to observe the conflagration, ordered the only intact boat aboard the Vanguard to be lowered in order to save as many sailors who might survive as possible. Small groups from UOrient had already jumped overboard and were swimming for their lives, clutching any floating debris they could find; 14 sailors, including the first lieutenant and the purser, got as far as the Swiftsure and

LEFT Action at the battle of the Nile. Captain Berry, in the Vanguard, described the first phase of the battle thus: The action commenced ... with an ardour and vigour which it is impossible to describe. At about seven o'clock total darkness had come on, but the whole hemisphere was, with intervals, illuminated by the fire of the hostile fleets.' This image depicts events around 2200hrs, with L'Orient disintegrating as flames reach her magazine. (National Maritime Museum, PU4067)

RIGHT L'Orient explodes. The mighty ship originally bore the name Dauphin Royal, but the revolutionaries changed its name to San Culottes (without breeches), the nickname for the working class, who wore trousers as opposed to aristocrats who wore breeches. Just prior to the expedition to Egypt she was renamed L'Orient (the East) on account of her destination. (National Maritime Museum, BHC0510)

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L'ORIENTFLAMES (pp. 64-65)

Purser Samuel Grant, standing on the poop of the Goliath, observed the French flagship 'in a blaze to the water's edge very near to us. It was the most melancholy but at the same t ime the most beautiful sight I ever beheld.' When L'Orient eventually exploded the French garrison and populace in Alexandria clearly heard the manner of her demise.

The ship's destruct ion elicited mixed reactions, f rom elation aboard the Theseus, whose men cheered her into obl ivion, to the compassion shown by the crew of the Orion, who threw ropes to a handful of survivors, plucking 14 seamen out of the water. Two French officers and nine sailors swam to the Swiftsure, whi le t w o others were rescued by the Bellerophon, dismasted and dr i f t ing nearby. Foley in the Goliath sent his prisoners f rom the exposed forecastle to the steward's room for food and clothing, whi le in the Alexander the purser issued shirts and trousers to the small number of men - all rendered naked by the heat and force of the explosion - w h o managed to reach her lower gun ports.

In all, the evening's f ight ing and the explosion that sent L'Orient to the bo t tom of Aboukir Bay, together w i th at least some of the Maltese treasure trove, resulted in the death of all but 70 of her crew of 1,010 men - a staggering loss of more than 90 per cent. Midshipman John Theophilus Lee, who was then only ten years of age, recorded his memories of L'Orients end 40 years later, yet w i th great vividness:

' the scene was awfully grand: each fleet as if by consent had ceased f rom fir ing, the w ind had fallen to a calm f rom the heavy discharging of artillery, and all seemed to await in suspense the eventful moment , w i th a feeling of anxiety indescribable. Every moment the dreadful explosion was expected - the least noise could now be heard, where the din of war before raged w i th such incontrol lable violence - ti l l at last an awful and terrific glare of l ight bl inding the very sight showed L'Orient b lowing up, w i th an astounding crash, paralyzing all around her, by which near a thousand brave spirits were hastened into eternity.'

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were dragged through the lower deck ports by the crew. Men on the lower decks of L'Orient continued to fire even as their own destruction approached, but the middle deck soon cleared of officers and men, including Rear-Admiral Ganteaume, the chief of staff, who reached one of the frigates via one of the ship's boats and then continued to shore. Motard, the adjutant general, swam to the Swiftsure, the nearest place of safety, while the captain, Commodore Casabianca, as well his ten-year-old son, reached a floating mast, only to die in the explosion that followed.

Accounts vary regarding the time, but at approximately 2200hrs L'Orienfs magazine exploded in a tremendous roar heard for miles around. Chaplain Willyams, nearby in the Swiftsure, recorded that the vessel 'blew up with a crashing sound that deafened all around her. The tremendous motion, felt to the very bottom of the ship, was like that of an earthquake. The fragments were driven to such a vast height into the air that some moments elapsed before they could descend.' John Nicol, a seaman below decks aboard the Goliath 800m away, thought that the explosion came from his own ship. 'When the French Admiral's ship blew up,' he wrote, 'the Goliath got such a shake we thought the after-part of her had blown up until the boys told us what it was. They brought us every now and then the cheering news of another French ship having struck [surrendered], and we answered the cheers on deck with heartfelt joy.' Blanquet also recorded his impressions: 'Immediately after the tremendous explosion, the Action ceased everywhere, and was succeeded by the most profound silence. The sky was obscured by thick clouds of black smoke, which seemed to threaten the destruction of the two Fleets. It was a quarter of an hour before the Ships' crews recovered from the kind of stupor they were thrown into.' Berry, too, witnessed the spectacle:

The Tonnant in action. By dawn she was a complete shambles, unable to move. Her crew might have surrendered earlier, but on the morning of the 2nd her opponents were busy attending to their own wounded and repairing their ships. She finally surrendered when the Theseus and Leander approached. (Author's collection)

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CAPTAIN DUPETIT-THOUARS DEFIANT TO THE LAST (pp. 68-69)

Shortly before L'Orient blew up, the Tonnant slipped her cable to avoid catching fire f rom the impending explosion. Throughout this t ime Captain Dupetit-Thouars remained on the quarterdeck, albeit mortal ly wounded, having lost both arms and a leg to separate round sho t It is thought he had chosen life at sea owing to his chi ldhood fondness for Robinson Crusoe. Like Brueys, he had served under Admiral de Grasse in American waters dur ing the War of Independence, later emigrat ing to the United States dur ing the Terror (1793-94) and only just returning to sea in t ime for the Nile campaign. Dupetit-Thouras was held in high regard by his fel low officers, w h o deemed him one of the more competent and promising officers in the Navy.

Officially, the valiant captain died of severe haemorrhaging, whereas, according to the diary of General Damas, he announced to his first l ieutenant that 'I m igh t lose my head along w i th my b lood and do something fool ish if I keep the command. It is t ime I gave it up.' Accordingly, he shot himself in the head w i th his pistol. The method of his demise may never be ful ly known. In any event, his ship cont inued to fire unt i l 0330hrs on 2 August, str iking her colours in the af ternoon after having suffered 120 men kil led and 150 wounded - nearly half her complement .

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The light thrown by the fire of L'Orient upon the surrounding objects enabled us to perceive with more certainty the situation of the two fleets, the colours of both being clearly distinguishable. The cannonading was partially kept up to leeward of the centre till about ten o'clock, when L'Orient blew up with a most tremendous explosion. An awful pause and death-like silence for about three minutes ensued, when the wreck of the masts, yards, etc. which had been carried to a vast height, fell down into the water, and on board the surrounding ships.

Despite her close proximity to L'Orient, the Swiftsure survived with minimal damage. Although two large pieces of timber descended onto her main- and foretops, none of her crew was injured owing to Hallowell's foresight in ordering all hands away from these stations, and no structural damage occurred to the other parts of the ship. The Alexander, slightly farther away from the scene of destruction than the Swiftsure, found herself the target of burning embers raining down on her decks and amidst her rigging and sails, setting fire to her jib, positioned over the bowsprit. With no chance of dousing the flames, sailors cut away the jib-boom, spritsail and spritsail topsail yards, releasing the burning sail into the water. The highest sail on the mainmast, the main royal, also caught fire, and was also cut down at great risk to the sailors involved. Flaming debris, including splinters, large pieces of timber and rope, showered down on the Franklin, ahead of L'Orient, but though the ship caught fire the crew managed to extinguish the flames.

A pause followed the explosion aboard L'Orient, though sources disagree about its extent, for they range from three to 30 minutes. Though British ships largely escaped further damage from the destruction of the French flagship, many had already sustained their fair share - the Majestic and the Bellerophon being hardest hit as a result of their respective confrontations with the Heureux and L'Orient. The Majestic was short her mainmast and

The battle of the Nile, which resulted in the moral ascendency of the Royal Navy over its greatest adversary, though at no small cost: 16 officers, 156 seamen and 46 marines killed, and 37 officers (including three captains), 562 seamen and 78 marines wounded - a total of 895 casualties. (National Maritime Museum, PY7940)

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The battle of the Nile. On observing a forest of masts in Alexandria harbour on 1 August initial elation aboard the Alexander and Swiftsure was understandably great, but when the French flags were perceived flapping above transports rather than warships, enthusiasm immediately turned to severe disappointment. Considerable relief therefore pervaded the squadron when scouting vessels discovered the anchorage at Aboukir Bay some hours later. (National Maritime Museum, PW4700)

mizzenmast and much of her fore rigging was gone. Apart from her bowsprit, the Belleropbon was mastless and thus hors de combat. Those ships that had attacked from the landward side quite naturally suffered relatively limited damage, whereas those fighting the French from seaward fared less well. Nelson's Vanguard, still sporting a jury rig as a consequence of the damage sustained by the storm in May, had suffered at the hands of the Spartiate, while the Minotaur, which had supported the Vanguard, retained her masts while losing a great deal of rigging. The Alexander continued to sail, but had lost her main yard and some of her sails. The Defence, in her duel with the Peuple Souverain, had no foretopmast, while Swiftsure's maintopmast had collapsed under the fire of L'Orient. Orion's masts were still standing, but seriously damaged by shot.

But if damage to the British was not light, the French had suffered considerably. By the time of UOrienfs destruction the leading four ships in the line had already surrendered, as well as the Peuple Souverain, the fifth ship, and most of the others had no sticks standing. The Franklin, still engaged, continued to fly the tricolour, but was missing her mainmast and mizzenmast. With L'Orient now absent from the line, this left the Tonnant, missing all three masts, though retaining her bowsprit. Her captain, Dupetit-Thouars, had meanwhile suffered extensive injuries, losing both of his arms and a leg to round shot. He ordered his crew to prop him up in a barrel of bran, but he later died of blood loss. The frigate Serieuse had run ashore without its masts and the Heureux and Mercure had grounded. In short, all that remained of the French squadron in a fairly undamaged state were three ships of the line and three frigates.

THE FINAL PHASE

Rear-Admiral Villeneuve, in command of the rearguard, was left in a difficult situation, for Brueys had not issued orders to guide his conduct beyond holding his position and Villeneuve was not blessed with the power of initiative. Contrary winds prevented him from proceeding up the line to aid ships forward - several of which were already in enemy hands in any event.

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Moreover, raising anchors would take precious time and he was not willing to cut his cables and sacrifice anchors that could not be replaced. Brueys had issued orders before the battle involving a strategy that called for the van supporting the rear - not the reverse. Since ships forward of him were, in the event, drifting in his direction, he chose to remain in position - a course in any event conforming to his orders.

The only surviving French vessel forward of UOrient was the Franklin, which resumed firing after the explosion, so signalling the resumption of battle. Blanquet, though wounded, now assumed command of the squadron, for Brueys was (correctly) presumed dead. The Franklin opened fire against the Defence and Swiftsure, but the Swiftsure could now concentrate on the French ship, and together with her consorts she easily overwhelmed their opponent, whose crew was probably already reduced to two-third's strength, with many guns dismounted. When her lower deck had been reduced to a mere three guns the Franklin surrendered to the Defence, a lieutenant from which reached her deck just before one from the Swiftsure did so.

Blanquet recorded his ship's last period of action. At about 2300hrs he wrote:

The Franklin, anxious to preserve the trust confided in her, recommenced the Action with a few of her lower-deck guns; all the rest were dismounted, two-thirds of her Ships' company being killed or wounded, and those who remained much fatigued. She was surrounded by Enemy's Ships, some of which were within pistol-shot, and who mowed down the men [with] every broadside. At half-past 11 o'clock, having only three lower-deck guns that could defend the honour of the Flag, it became necessary to put an end to so disproportioned a struggle.

Still, French resistance did not end, for at the southern end of the line there were signs that the battle was far from over. The Heureux and Mercure were aground, but continued to fire, while the Tonnant, Guillaume Tell (Villeneuve's flagship), Timoleon and Genereux remained intact and were confronted with only two British ships - the Alexander and the Majestic -

ABOVE Captain William Hoste, one of many young officers for whom Nelson served as an inspiration. In 1799 he served off Naples in the Mutine, but is best known for his command of four frigates at Lissa, off the Dalmatian coast, where on 13 March 1811 he flew the signal: 'Remember Nelson!' He proceeded to force the French flagship ashore (where it blew up), capture three frigates and drive off the rest of the enemy squadron. (National Maritime Museum, BHC2784)

BELOW The 80-gun Tonnant in a stricken state, with Captain Dupetit-Thouars stoically at his post on the quarterdeck despite horrendous wounds. It is well to remember that what many French ships' officers and crews lacked in gunnery they made up for in fighting spirit. (Author's collection)

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A 19th-century French map of the battle of the Nile. Contemporaries, French and British, tended to refer to the action as 'la bataille d'Aboukir1

or 'the battle of Aboukir' respectively, but the same location's association with the subsequent Turkish and British landings of July 1799 and March 1801, respectively, suggested the alternative 'battle of the Nile' in order to avoid confusion. (Author's collection)

which remained active during the later hours and early morning. The course of this fighting is not well documented and seems to have been sporadic and disjointed. The Majestic, under the command of Lieutenant Cuthbert since the loss of Captain Westcott, fought the grounded vessels Heureux and Mercure, as well as the Tonnant. At around 0200hrs the Majestic lost her masts as a result, but from whose fire it is not known. The Alexander, under Ball, drifted for two hours after L'Orienfs destruction, doing her best to douse fires attacking her sails before repairing other damage. Some time after midnight she returned to the fray, apparently engaging the Tonnant, Guillaume Tell and Timoleon.

The exact movement of ships at the southern end of the line is obscure, but it is clear that many ships spent time tending to their wounded, putting their ships back in order and securing prizes. In the case of the Theseus, Captain Miller observed the dismasted and grounded frigate Serieuse, reduced to a hulk by the much more powerful Orion. A lieutenant was dispatched to the stricken vessel, which allowed him aboard, where he found 30 survivors, including the captain and three officers eager to give themselves up. The Swiftsure spent some time repairing damage to her hull below the waterline, while the Bellerophon, seriously damaged, cut her cable and drifted for over three hours to avoid the flames of L'Orient. At some point early the next day she erected jury sails on what remained of her masts and managed to steer out of range of the French, later fitting a spare anchor, releasing the mainmast (which continued to hang over the side) and committing to the deep almost 50 officers, sailors and marines killed as a result of L'Orienfs broadsides.

Firing died down again around 0300hrs owing to the damage suffered by both sides: the Alexander's rigging was sadly cut up, and she had lost many

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of her sails; at some point in the night (logs were not always dependable about timings) the Majestic was dismasted. British fire had, in the meantime, severed the cables of both the Timoleon and Guillaume Tell, causing them to drift away. At about 0400hrs, as the first light of dawn began to break, Nelson dispatched his flag lieutenant to several ships with orders to proceed down the line and engage those French vessels still resisting. Victory had already been achieved, but Nelson wished for it to be comprehensive and therefore decisive.

Some ships had already taken the initiative to move as Nelson wished, including Miller in the Theseus and Hood in the Zealous, the former vessel being the first of Nelson's relatively uninjured ships to come to the aid of the Alexander and Majestic. Foley's Goliath had damage to the rigging of her mainmast and mizzenmast, but despite this at around 0600hrs he ordered the cable cut and, though having little left in the way of sails, his vessel began to drift south, steering with her foretopsail, which had been deliberately cut down and allowed to fall on either side of the stay in order to keep a steady course. The Leander responded to Nelson's repeated signals sometime between 0500 and 0545hrs and eventually reached the fighting to the south. Theseus anchored near the Alexander and Majestic, opposite the Artemise and to the north of the Mercure and Heureux, both of which had long since grounded. Goliath, Zealous and Leander moved down in her support and when the Guillaume Tell got under way after her anchor cable was severed by gunfire, the Theseus began to fire on her, as well as on the Tonnant, just as the sun rose above the horizon. The Majestic and the Alexander soon joined in, followed by the Leander, which anchored east of the Alexander, thus completing a new line of four British ships.

At about the same time the Guillaume Tell re-anchored somewhat south of her original position and the Timoleon established herself inshore of the Genereux, the latter as yet undamaged. The French were nearly beyond range now, though the Heureux and Mercure were immobile and harassed by three adversaries. At last the former struck her colours, followed soon thereafter by the Mercure, which had suffered losses of 105 killed and 148 wounded. The

If there was ever any possibility of Bonaparte reaching India, Nelson's victory at the battle of the Nile put paid to such an ambitious project. On a grand strategic level, the battle not only boosted British morale in the midst of a national banking crisis and the aftermath of two major naval mutinies, it galvanized resistance amongst France's enemies and enabled Pitt to form a new coalition including Russia and Austria. (National Maritime Museum, BHC0512)

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Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 80yds/73m

KEY A Goliath (Br) B Theseus (Br) C Majestic (Br) D Alexander (Br) E Leander (Br) F Zealous (Br) G Artemise (Fr) H Heureux (Fr) 1 Mercure (Fr)

J Tonnant (Fr) K Timoleon (Fr) L Genereux (Fr) M Guillaume Tell (Fr)

EVENTS

1 The Majestic anchors by her stern and resumes fighting, losing her masts around 0200hrs.

2 The Alexander arrives on the scene at about 0030hrs, probably opposing the Tonnant, Guillaume Tell and Timoleon and extinguishing small fires of her own around 0300hrs.

3 The Theseus arrives during a lull in the fighting and manoeuvres to position her stern to the French.

4 The Leander reaches the scene of action sometime after 0600hrs.

5 The Goliath engages the grounded Heureux.

6 The Zealous attempts to interdict Villeneuve.

7 The crew of the Artemise surrenders and then sets her on fire.

8 Heureux and Mercure sit helpless, aground.

9 Tonnant drifting without masts.

10 Timoleon first drifts at approx. 0300hrs, then goes aground as Villeneuve flees.

11 Genereux masked by other ships.

12 Guillaume Tell drifts around 0300hrs before Villeneuve decides to escape with what vessels he can.

13 Throughout the hours of darkness, boats from shore convey men to the Genereux, Timoleon and Guillaume Tell.

ENGAGING THE FRENCH REAR DURING THE EARLY HOURS OF 2 AUGUST

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The heroic defence of the Tonnant. The French, like the British, find consolation for their defeats by highlighting those exploits that reflect well on their conduct, such as the fighting spirit exhibited by individual ships like the Tonnant. The same principle applies to the sinking of Le Vengeur after its sensational duel with HMS Brunswick at the battle of the Glorious First of June (1794), and more famously to Captain Lucas and the crew of the Redoutable at Trafalgar (1805). (Author's collection)

frigate Artemise now found herself at the mercy of the guns of the Goliath and Theseus. Understrength, owing to Brueys' original order to send much of her complement to reinforce the ships of the line prior to battle, she struck her colours to the Theseus, though Lieutenant Hoste of that vessel, on being rowed over to take charge of the prize, turned back to his ship when a lieutenant from the Alexander was seen to approach with the intention of taking possession of the frigate. Still, the officer from the Alexander never boarded her, for the captain of the Artemise ordered his ship to be set on fire - in violation of the rules of war - after which he and his crew set off for the shore in boats. The fire raged for half an hour before the magazine exploded, following the example of the French flagship, albeit on a much smaller scale.

The Zealous pursued the frigate Justice for a while, but eventually Nelson recalled Hood and redirected his attention to the Bellerophon, sitting helpless about 6 miles (10km) to the east of the main fighting. But elsewhere the battle continued for almost five more hours after the Mercure surrendered. Nelson himself, though not seriously wounded, nevertheless was probably not at his fighting best and could not join the main fight in the damaged Vanguard. As his most senior captains, Saumarez and Troubridge, were also not engaged, no coordinated action characterized the battle in the south. Such a circumstance was probably impossible in any event, for hailing distances between ships were too great, the vessels were at anchor, the crews were exhausted after many hours' combat and most of the ships' boats were too damaged to be lowered. Signalling was also impaired by the failure to provide all ships with a complete set of signal flags. Meanwhile, the Culloden, despite the best efforts of Troubridge's crew and assistance from the Mutine, failed to extricate herself from the reef. In any event, her hull began to leak during the night, with 5ft (1.5m) of water collecting each hour. Between operating the pumps and coping with a ship with a missing rudder, Troubridge knew, bitterly, that he would take no part in the battle. When the sun came up the extent of the other ships'

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achievement was clear, but this welcome news could not dispel the immense despondency that hung over the Culloden's company.

The time had now come for Villeneuve to make a decision: to continue resistance or effect an escape with whatever vessels remained in a condition to do so. He later explained his predicament:

I had hesitated long about setting sail. I counted the cost of abandoning the Timoleon, the Tonnant as well as the Mercure and the Heureux. It was probable that the enemy would cut me off at the exit from the bay, with the five or six ships I could see with their rigging intact and I would be obliged to succumb and run aground on a beach, where it would be difficult to save my crews. The frigate Justice, which had set sail, had been obliged to re-anchor by an enemy ship of the line which cut off her route. However, this was the only means which offered any hope of saving the remains of the squadron, seeing the Mercure and the Heureux given up and taken as prizes, and the enemy ships directing their fire on me.

By deferring a course of action for so long, Villeneuve sealed the fate of the French squadron. His failure to assist the leading vessels is understandable given the state of the wind, but when it had become clear that the van and centre were effectively destroyed, he might yet have saved the rear; specifically, the Guillaume Tell, Genereux and Timoleon, which as a trio might have reached safety given the damage already sustained by Nelson's force. On the other hand, the Timoleon's ability to escape was questionable, for she had suffered heavily from the fire of the Alexander and the Majestic in the course of the night, and later at the hands of the Leander and Theseus. With a broken rudder, her rigging disabled in various places and her masts injured from shot, Captain Trullet signalled to Villeneuve that he would fight as long as possible before setting his vessel on fire - to the admiration of the latter.

They left an appalling scene in their wake, which John Nicol, a seaman in the Goliath, later described:

When we ceased firing, I went on deck to view the state of the fleets, and an awful sight it was. The whole bay was covered with dead bodies, mangled, wounded, and scorched, not a bit of clothes on them except their trousers. There were a number of French, belonging to the French Admiral's ship, L'Orient, who had swam to the Goliath, and were cowering under her forecastle. Poor fellows! They were brought on board, and Captain Foley ordered them down to the steward's room, to get provisions and clothing.

At 0600hrs on 2 August the Zealous, Goliath and Theseus weighed anchor. The Zealous then went in pursuit of the frigate Justice, which was proceeding toward the crippled Bellerophon with the intention of obliging her to strike. But the Zealous foiled this plan and remained to protect the Bellerophon. Meanwhile, the Alexander and Leander pursued the Heureux and Mercure, which, after a brief exchange of fire, they obliged to surrender. While this accounts for the activities of the Zealous, Goliath, Theseus, Alexander and Leander, this left a number of French vessels virtually, or in some cases entirely, unengaged: the Guillaume Tell, Genereux, Timoleon, Tonnant, Diane and, eventually, the Justice, which had to abandon her attempt to menace the Bellerophon.

Crippled vessels and the detritus of war litter Aboukir Bay on the morning of 2 August. The artist has employed considerable licence here, depicting what appears to be the Serieuse sinking in open water, very close to a British 74, when in fact the French frigate grounded on a shoal some 400m from her closest opponent. (Bridgeman Art Library)

The Tonnant, completely dismasted, sat dead in the water. The Timoleon had managed to get herself among the shoals to leeward, and in the course of trying to make sail on the port tack, inadvertently beached herself on shore. As noon approached Villeneuve realized that he could not delay the inevitable any longer and signalled to the surviving ships to cut their cables and leave the bay. Several ships had room for manoeuvre and duly took advantage of the fact by hauling close on the port tack and making their best efforts to escape. On seeing this, the Zealous gave chase, and within a few minutes found herself singlehandedly taking on the four fresh ships and trying to block the path of the rearmost frigate. The possible results cannot now be known, for Nelson recalled her, in consequence of which Villeneuve escaped to the north-east with the Guillaume Tell, Genereux, Diane and Justice; that is, two ships of the line and two frigates. The few French ships that remained in Aboukir Bay soon succumbed. The Theseus and Leander confronted the Tonnant and compelled her to surrender, while later that day the crew of the Timoleon, having been grounded, set her ablaze and abandoned her to eventual explosion. The French squadron had all but ceased to exist.

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AFTERMATH

The battle of La Hogue, 22-24 May 1692, which, together with the Anglo-French engagement off Barfleur, proved the decisive naval encounter of the War of the English Succession. An Anglo-Dutch fleet burnt and sank three French ships of the line in Cherbourg Bay before trapping in the Bai de la Hogue another 12, together with transports assembling for the invasion of England. All of these warships and many of the transports fell prey to fireships. (Author's collection)

'Victory is not a name strong enough for such a scene,' Nelson wrote without exaggeration. For the French the battle of the Nile was nothing short of disastrous: the greatest naval defeat since the battles of La Hogue and Barfleur in 1692, over a century earlier. Of the 17 ships of the line and frigates present at the battle, only four escaped capture or destruction. If Nelson's figures are correct, French casualties of 5,225 out of 11,230 men in the squadron represents a loss of 46 per cent. Those French ships that bore the brunt of the fighting, that is, the van and centre, naturally suffered severe damage. Five of these lost all three masts and endured such appalling punishment to their hulls that they could barely remain afloat. Two other vessels possessed a single mast each, and their hulls were riddled with shot. Brueys, it will be recalled, was among the dead, together with four captains. Of the nine vessels taken from the French as prizes, three of them - the Guerrier, Heureux and Mercure - were so severely damaged that they were fit only to be burned by their captors. The Peuple Souverain was renamed Guerrier and left at Gibraltar as a guardship. The other five ships reached Plymouth and were added to British service: the Franklin was altered to Canopus, the Aquilon changed to Aboukir, and the other three preserved their original names. The fates of those French ships that had escaped from the battle were thus: the Genereux

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ABOVE The Hon. Henry Blackwood, a lieutenant aboard the Theseus at the battle of the Nile and later captain of the frigate Penelope (36) with which, together with the Lion (64) and Foudroyant (80), he captured the Guillaume Tell off Malta on 30 March 1800. Nelson described men like Blackwood in his 3 August dispatch to St Vincent thus: Their high state of discipline is well known to you, and with the judgement of the Captains, together with their valour, and that of the Officers and Men of every description, it was absolutely irresistible. Could anything from my pen add to the character of the Captains, I would write it with pleasure, but that is impossible.' (National Maritime Museum, BHC2557)

LEFT Arrival of the Vanguard at Naples, 22 September 1798. In a letter to his wife three days later Nelson described his reception from Lady Hamilton: 'Up flew her ladyship and exclaiming: "Oh God is it possible," fell into my arms more dead than alive. Tears however soon set matters to rights.' From the admiral's long residence in Naples can be dated his public affair with this noted beauty. (National Maritime Museum, PX9746)

was captured on 18 February 1799, followed by the Guillaume Tell on 30 March and the Diane on 24 August 1800. Finally, the Justice fell into British hands on the French surrender of Alexandria on 2 September 1801.

In sharp contrast, British losses numbered only 218 killed and 677 wounded out of a total strength of 8,068 - amounting to only 11 per cent, with no vessels lost. Out of the British casualties, 55 per cent were sustained by only three ships - the Vanguard, which lost 105 officers and men, the Belleropbon, with 197, and the Majestic, with 193. Nelson himself numbered amongst the wounded, struck in the forehead by a splinter early in the fighting - a relatively minor injury. Later, however, at Naples, his sometimes erratic behaviour and severe headaches may have been the result of this otherwise apparently superficial head wound. In terms of material damage, almost without exception British ships suffered damage aloft, with the Belleropbon losing all three masts, and the Majestic losing her mainmast and mizzenmast. No other vessels lost lower masts, and damage to topmasts was generally minor. A few vessels, including the Belleropbon, Majestic and Vanguard, received serious damage to their hulls.

On 5 August Nelson sent dispatches on the outcome of the battle to St Vincent, care of Captain Berry who, while proceeding in the Leander, was captured en route to Cadiz by the Genereux. However, Thomas Bladen Capel, a lieutenant from the Vanguard, sailed for Naples by sloop on the 13th with duplicates and eventually reached London overland. On the following day, the bulk of the squadron, under Saumarez, including those prizes deemed worthy of retention, weighed anchor, and on the 15th headed west. Four days later Nelson, in the Vanguard, accompanied by the Culloden and Alexander, steered for Naples, leaving the Zealous, Goliath, Swiftsure, Seahorse (28), Emerald (36), Alcmene (32) and Bonne Citoyenne (20) to continue the blockade of Alexandria, all under Captain Samuel Hood, who was the senior officer among them.

On the 22nd Nelson sailed into the Bay of Naples to receive a rapturous welcome from the King, who was rowed out to meet him: 'His Majesty took me by the hand and said such things of our Royal Master [George III], our Country, and myself, that no words I could use would in any degree convey what so apparently came from the Royal Heart. From his Majesty, his Ministers, and every class, I am honoured by the appellation of "Nostro Liberatore".' The population feted the hero of the battle of the Nile, who soon began his scandalous affair with Emma, Lady Hamilton, wife of the British ambassador.

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In the wake of the battle British fortunes in the Mediterranean continued to improve. On 15 November troops conveyed by Royal Navy ships recaptured Port Mahon in Minorca from the Spanish, which became a base for watching Toulon, while a squadron composed of the Zealous, Swiftsure, Emerald, Alcmene, Seahorse and La Fortune continued to cruise off Alexandria. Several ships of the line - the Orion, Defence, Belleropbon, Theseus and Majestic - steered for Gibraltar with the prizes taken at the battle of the Nile. On 5 September 1800 British land and naval forces succeeded in forcing the surrender of the French garrison on Malta, the colonial governorship of which fell under the exceptionally successful charge of Alexander Ball. From this time the island remained under British occupation - the Congress of Vienna in 1814 confirming its formal transfer to the Crown - and became the main base of the Mediterranean Fleet east of Gibraltar for the next century and a half.

As for Bonaparte, he did not abandon hope after the loss of the squadron, but French defeat at the battle of the Nile marked the beginning of the end of his dream of carving out an empire in the Middle East. Having conquered Egypt, in early February 1799 he took an expedition of 13,000 troops north along the coast through Palestine, seizing Jaffa. On 18 March he approached Acre, which was garrisoned by a Turkish force supported with naval ordnance brought ashore three days before by Captain Sir Sidney Smith, RN, who supervised the renovation of the town's defences. As it was impossible to proceed with an enemy behind him, Bonaparte encircled the place, but, vitally, he possessed no siege train - Smith having captured it at sea. Simple assault remained the only option, and a poor one at that: short of provisions, fatigued by the long march from Egypt and suffering from the first signs of bubonic plague, the troops' morale and fighting effectiveness was seriously flagging. Successive assaults against the town all failed until, at last, on 20 May, after 63 days, Bonaparte raised the siege and ordered the retreat to Egypt. Still, despite the ravages of the campaign, he reached Cairo and on 25 July defeated a Turkish landing at Aboukir Bay, thus saving his reputation as the all-conquering hero attributed to him by the French public, whose physical remoteness blinded them to the genuinely perilous situation facing the Armee d'Orient.

LEFT Bonaparte leaving Egypt, 23 August 1799. After the battle of the Nile he remained cut off from supply and reinforcement. Learning of a series of French military setbacks in Europe, he eventually abandoned his army and slipped past the British blockade with a small retinue. (Author's collection)

RIGHT General Jean-Baptiste Kleber, commander-in-chief of the Armee d'Orient after Bonaparte's departure in August 1799. Kleber concluded an agreement with Sir Sidney Smith at El Arish for the French evacuation of Egypt and its safe passage home, but when Pitt's government repudiated the terms the French general was left to continue the fight against the increasingly aggressive Turks. (Author's collection)

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TOP Admiral Sir Sidney Smith, the Royal Navy officer instrumental in shaping Acre into a proper state of defence in anticipation of a French assault Arrogant, at times insubordinate and brash, Smith proved a thorn in Nelson's side, perhaps because both men were cut from the same cloth: shameless self-promoters, yet fearless and utterly devoted to duty. (Author's collection)

BOTTOM The battle of Aboukir, 25 July 1799. Bonaparte, with 7,700 men and 18 guns was confronted with 18,000 Turks and 30 guns put ashore and entrenched under the command of Ahmed Pasha. Supported by an artillery bombardment, French infantry and cavalry penetrated the defences and took 5,000 prisoners, including the enemy commander. In all, the Turks lost their entire force, with 2,000 dead and 11,000 drowned while fleeing into the sea. (Author's collection)

Aware that his isolation could end only in eventual catastrophe and keen to reverse the Allied military successes in Europe, Bonaparte determined to elude the British blockade and reach the south coast of France. On 23 August, in a shameful bout of betrayal of his troops, he secretly boarded a frigate and slipped away from Egypt, disembarking on 9 October at Frejus, where cheering mobs clamouring for peace, an end of government corruption and the return of economic stability, enthusiastically welcomed his return from a campaign universally interpreted as a glowing success. Promising internal reforms, in the coup of Brumaire (9-10 November) Bonaparte abolished the constitution, the Directory and the elected councils and installed himself as First Consul with almost limitless power - the other two consuls served as mere ciphers - opening a period of military dictatorship that would continue

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until 1814, with a brief return to power in 1815. The troops still in Egypt remained there for a further two years before a British expedition arrived in 1801 under General Sir Ralph Abercromby, who defeated them and forced their evacuation back to France.

TACTICAL ANALYSIS

What factors contributed to so one-sided a result, given the relative numerical equality of the rival squadrons? Even counting the guns of the Culloden, which was grounded and consequently took no part in the battle, Nelson was inferior to Brueys in both tonnage and, by a narrow margin, guns. Nelson had 14 (actually 13 in light of Culloden's absence) ships of the line to Brueys' 13, but while the British ships carried 938 guns, the French had 1,030, not counting the frigates. The French mounted, moreover, in general, larger-calibre guns and thus fired heavier broadsides from bigger ships.

Initiative played a major part in Nelson's success - specifically, his immediate determination to engage Brueys with imaginative tactics, in combination with the superiority of his crews' morale and training. By isolating a portion of the French line by striking its van and centre from both sides, Nelson attained a temporary superiority in ships and guns to which Brueys could offer no effective answer. This underlines the negative, not simply the positive, factors responsible for British victory. Although personally brave, Brueys demonstrated extremely poor judgement in disposing his ships. Formed into an angle, at the apex of which sat L'Orient, they were incapable of mutual support. Against the advice of his captains

The battle of Heliopolis, 20 March 1800. Following the Turkish seizure of Cairo, General Kleber assumed the offensive, routing Ibrahim Bey's force of 70,000 with only half as many French. Three months later Kleber fell victim to a knife-wielding assassin and was succeeded by General Menou. (Author's collection)

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TOP The Cairo revolt of 21 October 1798. Many factors contributed to the uprising, including the imposition of unpopular taxes, various forms of requisition, forced sales of land and the razing of blocks of houses and a mosque to clear fields of fire from the ramparts of the Citadel. The French brutally suppressed the insurrection, killing approximately 2,000 Egyptians at a cost to themselves of about 300. (Author's collection)

RIGHT Map of the battle of the Nile, c.1808. Very little was known about Aboukir Bay at the time of the action, though Bellin's Petit Atlas Maritime of 1764 did contain a chart of the 'Rade du Bequier', complete with soundings. The copy now in the National Maritime Museum may have been the one used by Foley during his approach. (Author's collection)

Brueys chose to remain at anchor, thereby handing the initiative to Nelson. Moreover, he refused up until the last moment to believe that the British would attack him at his apparently secure anchorage, even were they to discover his position.

If this were not folly enough, Brueys failed to ensure, if he were wrong and the British did wish to engage, that he was in a position to know this well in advance. In short, though Brueys possessed many frigates and other small, swift vessels, both with him at Aboukir Bay as well as at Alexandria, he had failed to dispatch any patrols to watch for signs of British naval activity, and

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thus had absolutely no intelligence on the approach or strength of Nelson's squadron when it eventually surprised him. Under these circumstances, the French commander compounded his troubles by foolishly ordering hundreds of seamen to go ashore in search of water when the squadron badly needed all hands aboard ship.

Nor did Brueys even bother to take soundings of the waters of Aboukir Bay or the passage through which, if the British were to appear, they might pass between the head of the French line and Aboukir Island, so enabling them to attack from landward as well as seaward. Proper consideration of his situation would have led a more competent commander to assume an enemy could manoeuvre around the head of his line. With such knowledge he could shift his ships towards the shore, manoeuvre them to block passage round their head or, at the very least, clear for action both to starboard and to port. Brueys took none of these simple, yet crucial, precautions in improving his defence.

The evidence of the wholly inadequate manner in which the flagship prepared for action may be gleaned from the fact that no efforts were made to remove the cabin partitions that had been specially erected to accommodate military and civilian passengers. Nor did Brueys' subordinates commanding the rear assume any initiative to support their consorts in the centre and van. Disaster might have been averted had the rear got under way, stood out from the bay, and opposed the five or six British vessels that had yet to join the engagement. In so doing they would doubtless have taken the Culloden, marooned as she was on the shoal, and denied passage of the Alexander and Swiftsure into the bay. At about 1900hrs the six ships of the French rear might yet have changed the whole course of the battle by taking advantage of the wind, as it then blew, to leave the bay, tack when the wind shifted north as it eventually did, and operate as the new French van.

Yet the French failure to protect their landward side did not in itself seal their fate; someone in the attacking force had to observe this weakness and duly profit by it. The identity of that individual remains open to debate, with a critical question at its heart: had Foley come to the independent conclusion that an attack could be made on the landward side as a result of his own initiative or was this decision the product of a preconceived idea of Nelson's? The log of the Vanguard indicates that Foley, Troubridge and Ball had been summoned to meet with Nelson on 7 July, but this was three weeks before the French had even been discovered. It is extremely unlikely that Nelson could have predicted the circumstances under which he would meet the enemy -whether at sea or anchored, with a favourable or adverse wind, in fine or poor weather, a combined French force or individual groups of ships, and any number of other variables that might confront him. Moreover, this tactic would depend on Foley's Goliath reaching the enemy first, whereas any number of other vessels might have been in a position to do so - and yet only Ball and Troubridge had seen the admiral on the last occasion when Nelson had met with a group of captains.

Admiral Bruix, who escaped from Brest (then under blockade by Lord Bridport) in April 1799 with a force of 19 ships of the line and ten smaller vessels. By entering the Mediterranean he posed a danger to Minorca and Naples, proving that, though in the wake of the battle of the Nile the British exercised dominance in that sea, it was still possible for the French to penetrate past Gibraltar and threaten British interests. Bruix eventually reached Toulon on 14 May and then Genoa on 4 June, but he failed to develop a joint strategy with the Spanish, rendering his cruise largely ineffective. (Author's collection)

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Whereas Berry later maintained that Nelson had always intended to execute the attack in the manner actually employed - indeed, claiming plans

had been settled two months before and that their details were known to all the ships' captains - he does not describe the circumstances under which such a plan was conveyed to commanders. Certainly it was neither distributed on paper nor signalled on the day, for the records (both the admiral's correspondence and ships' logs) reveal no such communication or intention. Foley, moreover, happened to be the only captain in possession of a fairly accurate French chart; those astern of him who chose to follow could do so - once the Goliath succeeded without grounding - confident that they would not run aground, but it remains conjectural whether any captain apart from Foley would have

attempted such a daring manoeuvre. Moreover, if, as Berry contended, Nelson had conceived of the idea two months before, this would have

pre-dated the very formation of the squadron itself. It is possible Nelson and his captains conferred, at some point developing contingency plans for the scenario that they ultimately encountered on 1 August; but if any such meetings took place no minutes record the decisions reached. All in all, Foley makes a thoroughly persuasive case that, observing the opportunity to attack the French from the landward side, he seized the initiative and sought to pursue that course, and that Nelson, almost simultaneously, drew the same conclusion, but did not have time to signal the fact - which in any event was superfluous in light of Foley's action. The fact that, by his own admission, Hood, aboard the Zealous, did not anticipate Foley's manoeuvre, offers further evidence that Nelson had not conceived of the idea beforehand.

With due credit to the captain of the Goliath, the battle of the Nile marked Nelson's first major victory in independent command - and an extraordinary one at that. His tactics were brilliantly conceived: he had explained his plan clearly to his subordinates prior to battle, but was not inflexible, allowing Foley to appreciate the unique circumstances that the enemy's dispositions made possible by allowing him to attack from inshore; Nelson wasted no time in engaging his opponent, leaving him no time to prepare, confident that superior British discipline and firepower would prevail, especially in the approaching darkness; and, finally, he concentrated his force, isolating part of the opposing line, appreciating that Brueys could not properly respond owing to adverse winds and his own faulty dispositions.

BELOW A prayer service aboard the Vanguard after the battle. Joy must have been partly tempered by the inevitable toll, for some ships suffered heavily, not least the Bellerophon, 16 of whose guns were out of action by the end of the fighting and which suffered almost 200 casualties - accounting for nearly 25 per cent of total British losses. (Royal Naval Museum)

ABOVE Vice-Admiral Nelson. In recognition of his victory in 1798 he was raised to the peerage as Baron Nelson of the Nile and of Burnham Thorpe (his birthplace). Parliament voted him a pension of £2,000 per annum while the East India Company granted him a staggering single payment of £10,000. The King of Naples conferred on him the title of Duke of Bronte and an estate in Sicily. (Author's collection)

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The battle of the Nile ranks as one of Britain's greatest naval triumphs and unquestionably the most complete victory achieved at sea during the 18th century. After an 18-hour action - the longest naval engagement of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars - the Royal Navy had reasserted its supremacy in the Mediterranean and isolated Bonaparte in Egypt. The French defeat not only persuaded Turkey to declare war, but brought Russia into the Second Coalition, which in 1799 retook most of Bonaparte's gains in northern Italy from 1796-97. Above all, the original French scheme of threatening Britain's presence and trade in India lay in tatters. By any standards, therefore, it was a brilliant victory for the British; both sides fought with dogged determination and by dawn on 2 August Nelson had more than defeated a numerically superior opponent - he had all but annihilated his squadron. Thereafter Bonaparte could not look to reinforcement and the Mediterranean could no longer be regarded as the preserve of the French.

British forces landing at Aboukir Bay, 8 March 1801. General Sir Ralph Abercromby's expeditionary operation heralded more than merely the expulsion of the French from Egypt; it demonstrated the rising combat effectiveness of the British Army after nearly a decade of poor performance. (Bridgeman Art Library)

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THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY

As with practically all actions fought at sea, almost no visible evidence remains of the battle site, although Aboukir Bay itself (properly known as Khalij Abu Qir), remains virtually unchanged since 1798, with very little development, unlike nearby Alexandria, which two centuries have transformed out of all recognition since Bonaparte's arrival there. Nevertheless, some extant features of the battle merit attention. The wreckage of the three French ships that lie at the bottom of Aboukir Bay rested undisturbed for nearly two centuries. However, what remained of L'Orient after the explosion did not settle in deep water for some years after the battle, and HMS Foudroyant actually touched the wreck on entering the bay as part of Admiral Keith's fleet in 1801. Indeed, Keith's ships of the line, escorting Abercromby's troop transports, anchored in almost exactly the same place as Brueys had done three years before.

The actual wrecks of L'Orient and the frigate Artemise were discovered in 1983 by marine explorer Jacques Dumas, conducting a survey of the area with A French Navy boat. Dumas died soon thereafter, but in 1996 one of his

General Sir Ralph Abercromby, who on 21 March 1801 commanded the successful landings at Aboukir Bay, where he fell mortally wounded. He and Sir John Moore strongly contributed to Army reform in the closing years of the French Revolutionary Wars, so creating a fighting force that in the course of the Peninsular War (1808-14) under Wellington would prove itself the finest army Britain had ever fielded. (Author's collection)

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collaborators, Franck Goddio, a marine archaeologist, conducted a satellite survey of the bay, in the course of which he located the third sunken French ship, the frigate Serieuse. Two years later, with permission from the Egyptian Supreme Council of Antiquities, Goddio returned to the work begun by Dumas 15 years previously, and recovered a large number of artefacts connected with the battle, including gold coins from numerous Mediterranean states - almost certainly part of the loot seized from the treasury at Valetta -round shot, musket balls, small arms, an octant, a telescope, buttons, a watch, cutlery, glassware and even a human jawbone with intact teeth, lodged under the flagship's hull.

Excavations on land have unearthed other relics of the battle; in 2000, on Aboukir Island (known unofficially as 'Nelson's Island'), British archaeologists uncovered the remains of 30 British naval officers, sailors, soldiers, marines and their dependants, dating from both 1798 and the landings of the expeditionary force three years later. In 2005 the remains were moved to Chatby Commonwealth War Cemetery in Alexandria. The island itself is accessible and makes a pleasant vantage point from which to survey the bay, whose low sandy shores and underwater sandbanks are largely as they were when Nelson's squadron rounded Aboukir Point, where the ruins of the fort remain, as of course does the reef where the Culloden ran aground as she approached the French anchorage. A few relics from L'Orient, including bottles and navigational instruments, as well as a sheet of copper sheathing from the ship's bottom, are on display in the maritime museum housed in the castle of Qait Bey, which was erected in 1840 from stones taken from the ancient lighthouse known as the Pharos.

A gun from the flagship L'Orient, probably a 36-pdr. (Franck Goddio/Hilti Foundation, photograph by Christoph Gerigk)

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Those interested in further study of the battle of the Nile will profit immensely from visits to the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich, south-east London, and the Royal Naval Museum, Portsmouth, both of which house an abundant collection of artefacts, uniforms, weapons, paintings and other items connected with the Royal Navy of Nelson's day, with plenty of displays devoted specifically to the Nile campaign. The French counterpart to these treasure houses of maritime history is the superbly maintained Musee national de la Marine, located in the Palais de Chaillot in Paris, with branches at several prominent ports including Toulon, from which Brueys' fleet embarked in May 1798.

Finally, while HMS Victory of course did not serve at the battle of the Nile (she was at that time docked at Chatham dockyard, awaiting conversion to a hospital ship owing to old age, a fate that she ultimately avoided), this magnificent engine of war is the only remaining British ship of the line of the period and thus a unique example of the sort of vessel under Nelson's command at the battle of the Nile, albeit a 100-gun three-decker rather than a 74. This carefully preserved vessel, which sits in dry dock at Portsmouth Historic Dockyard opposite the Royal Maritime Museum, is open to the public.

HMS Victory. Although larger and more heavily armed than the 74-gun ships that fought at the battle of the Nile, she nevertheless provides a superb understanding of the vessels under Nelson's command. (Bridgeman Art Library)

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GLOSSARY OF NAVAL TERMS

Aft To the rear of the vessel, e.g. 'to go aft'.

Aloft Up in the masts or rigging.

Astern Behind the vessel.

Boarding Coming aboard an enemy vessel by force.

Boom A light spar extending a yard to support an additional sail.

Bow The forward (front-most) part of a vessel.

Bowsprit A mast extending from the bow to support the foremast stays.

Broadside The simultaneous firing of all the guns positioned on one side of the ship.

Canister shot A type of ammunition consisting of a cylindrical tin case packed with many iron balls, which when fired from a cannon at short range spread out to kill and maim enemy personnel.

Carronade A short-barrelled, heavy-calibre gun employed only at close range for devastating results against the enemy's hull and crew. Only the Royal Navy carried such weapons, which were not counted in the rating of a vessel.

Chains Metal fittings on the side of the hull to which shrouds are fastened. For example, the mizzen chains are those which hold in place shrouds supporting the mizzen (i.e. the rearmost) mast.

Chain shot A type of ammunition consisting of two iron spheres or half-spheres, connected by a short length of chain, mainly used to damage masts, rigging and sails.

Fathom A nautical unit for depth or length. One fathom equals six feet.

Flagship The ship of the officer commanding a squadron or fleet, usually a vice- or rear-admiral, and flying his flag.

Fleet A large force of ships, approximately 20 or more.

Flotilla A force of small vessels, sometimes troop ships and gunboats.

Fore To the front of the vessel.

Forecastle A short deck positioned at the front of the ship.

Frigate A single-decked warship mounting between 24 and 44 guns.

Grapeshot A type of ammunition consisting of a canvas bag filled with small iron balls, which when fired from a cannon spread out to kill and maim enemy personnel.

Gun A cannon. These fired round shot weighing between 12 and 361b. Small arms, technically speaking, were not 'guns', but were referred to by their specific type (e.g. musket, pistol, etc.).

Gun deck A deck on which a battery of guns is mounted.

Hawser A small cable.

Heave to To reduce to minimum sails in heavy weather.

Jib One of several triangular sails above the bowsprit.

Jury rig An improvised device used to sail a damaged (e.g. dismasted) vessel pending permanent repair, usually at the nearest port.

Langridge A type of shot consisting of jagged pieces of iron which when fired spread out to damage rigging and sails and killed men on the upper deck.

Lee The side of a vessel opposite to that from which the wind is blowing. A ship 'to leeward' was one downwind.

Lee shore A shore towards which the wind is blowing.

Leeward In the direction towards which the wind is blowing.

Line of battle The positioning of warships in a line with their broadsides facing an enemy against whom they intend to engage in battle.

Masts The vertical spars, all of which carried sails, yards, gaffs and smaller, horizontal spars. All ships had three masts: the main (tallest, in the centre, which supported the principal sails), the fore (towards the front of the vessel) and the mizzen (to the rear of the vessel).

Poop A short deck situated above the quarterdeck at the rear of the vessel.

Port The left-hand side of a ship when looking towards the bow. Opposite of 'starboard'.

Prize A captured enemy vessel.

Prize money Funds paid to officers and men, according to their respective ranks and the value of the captured vessel, upon sale of a captured ship to their own naval establishment.

Quarterdeck The deck above the upper deck extending from the far end of the waist (the middle section of the ship) and above it to the stern. This was the part of the ship where the captain or the officer of the watch commanded the ship.

Rake To fire at an enemy ship's bow or stern when it is at a right angle to one's own vessel, so enabling the shot to travel down the length of the enemy ship.

Rigging Ropes used for two purposes: standing rigging supported the masts; running rigging was used to raise and lower sails and to shift spars.

Ship As distinct from a boat, a square-rigging vessel with three masts.

Ship of the line Warship carrying a minimum of 64 guns that by virtue of its size and armament could fight in a line of battle; the standard type was a 74.

Shrouds Ropes used to support the masts of a ship which run from the mast to the ship's side.

Spar A substantial pole or piece of timber from which sails are hung.

Spring A rope passed out of one end of a ship and attached to a cable extending from the other end, when the vessel is lying at anchor. It is also used to mean a rope extending diagonally from the stern of a ship to the head of another which lies alongside or abreast of her, at a short distance.

Spritsail A rectangular sail about the bowsprit.

Squadron A detachment of ships employed on any particular expedition.

Square rig A rig in which the principal sails are roughly rectangular in shape.

Starboard The right-hand side of a vessel as one looks forward. Opposite of 'port'.

Stays Ropes running fore and aft that support the masts.

Stern The rearmost part of the hull, usually ornamented and especially vulnerable to enemy fire.

Strike (one's colours) To haul down the national flag to indicate a desire to surrender.

Topgallant The highest of the three spars which, fitted together, comprise a mast.

Van The leading vessels or squadron.

Yard Spar suspended horizontally from a mast, which holds up a square sail extended across the breadth of a ship.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY AND FURTHER READING Battesti, Michele, La Bataille d'Aboukir 1798, Paris, 1998 Bennett, Geoffrey, Nelson the Commander, London, 2002 Bradford, Ernie, Nelson: The Essential Hero, London, 1999 Clowes, William Laird, The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to 1900, 7

vols., vol. 4, London, 1997 Coleman, Terry, Nelson: The Man and the Legend, London, 2002 Crowdy, Terry, French Warship Crews, 1798-1805, Oxford, 2005 Davies, David, Fighting Ships: Ships of the Line, 1793-1815, London, 1996 Foreman, Laura and Phillips, Ellen Blue, Napoleon's Lost Fleet: Bonaparte, Nelson and

the Battle of the Nile, London, 1999 Fremont-Barnes, Gregory, Nelson's Officers and Midshipmen, Oxford, 2009

, Nelson's Sailors, Oxford, 2005 , The Royal Navy, 1793-1815, Oxford, 2007 , Trafalgar 1805, Oxford, 2005

Gardiner, Robert, ed., Nelson vs. Napoleon: From the Nile to Copenhagen, 1798-1801, London, 1997

Hardman, William, and Rose, J. Holland, eds., A History of Malta during the period of the French and British Occupations, 1798-1815, Valetta, 1994; orig. pub. 1909

Hayward, Joel, For God and Glory: Lord Nelson and His Way of War, Annapolis, 2003 Herold, Christopher, Bonaparte in Egypt, London, 2005 Hewitt, James, ed., Eye-Witnesses to Nelson's Battles, Reading, Berkshire, 1972 Hibbert, Christopher, Nelson: A Personal History, Reading, MA, 1994 Howarth, David, and Howarth, Stephen, Nelson: The Immortal Memory, London, 1998 Ireland, Bernard, Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail, New York, 2000 Konstam, Angus, British Napoleonic Ship-of-the-Line, Oxford, 2001 Knight, Roger, The Pursuit of Victory: The Life and Achievement of Horatio Nelson,

London, 2005 Lambert, Andrew, Nelson: Britannia's God of War, London, 2004

, War at Sea in the Age of Sail, London, 2000 Lavery, Brian, Nelson and the Nile: The Naval War against Bonaparte, 1798, London,

1998 , Nelson's Navy: The Ships, Men and Organization, 1793-1815, London, 1989

Lewis, Jon E., ed., The Mammoth Book of Life Before the Mast, London, 2001 Lloyd, Christopher, The Nile Campaign: Nelson and Napoleon in Egypt, Newton

Abbott, 1973 Mackesy, Piers, British Victory in Egypt, 1801: The End of Napoleon's Conquest,

London, 1995 Nicolas, Sir Nicholas Harris, ed., Dispatches and Letters of Lord Nelson, 7 vols., vol. 3,

London,1997 Oman, Carola, Nelson, London, 1996 Padfield, Peter, Maritime Power and the Struggle for Freedom, 1788-1851, London,

2003 Pocock, Tom, Horatio Nelson, London, 1994 Tracy, Nicholas, Nelson's Battles: The Art of Victory in the Age of Sail, London, 1996 Tunstall, Brian, Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail: The Evolution of Fighting Tactics,

1650-1815, London, 1990 Vincent, Edgar, Nelson: Love and Fame, New Haven, 2004 Warner, Oliver, Nelson's Battles, London, 1965

, The Battle of the Nile, London, 1960

INDEX Numbers in bold refer to plates, maps and illustrations.

Abercromby, General Sir Ralph 85, 89, 90 Aboukir see Aquilon Aboukir, battle of (1799) 83,84 Aboukir Bay 36, 90-91 Aboukir Castle 36 Aboukir Island 36, 91 Acre, siege of (1799) 83 The Admiralty 25 Agamemnon 13, 16 Alcmene 82, 83 Alert 40 Alexander

after the battle 82 damage 72, 74-75 French failure to block passage 87 Nelson's life saved by 30 later involvement in the battle 73-74,

75, 76-77, 78, 79 and L'Orient 54, 59, 60-61, 62-63,

66, 71 search for French squadron 28, 38, 39 summoned to the battle 39, 54

Alexandria 35, 35, 38-39, 82, 83, 90-91 American Independence, War of (1775-83)

16, 17 Aquilon (later Aboukir) 50, 51, 52-53,

58,81 Artemise 41, 75-78, 90-91 Audacious 15, 30, 50-51, 55, 56

Ball, Captain Alexander after the battle 83 background and character 14 during the battle 54, 62-63, 74 Nelson's life saved by 30 role in Nile strategy 87 search for French squadron 28, 30, 33

Barras, Paul, 26 Bellerophon

after the battle 83 casualties and damage 59, 62, 71-72,

74, 78, 79, 82, 88 and L'Orient 51, 54, 59, 60-61, 66 search for French squadron 30, 39

Berry, Captain Edward 16 after the battle 82 during the battle 45, 55, 58, 63, 67-71 on French position 36, 38 on Nelson's Nile strategy 88 search for French squadron 30, 33, 40

Blackwood, the Hon. Henry 82 Blanquet, Rear-Admiral 41, 58, 67, 73 Bonaparte, Napoleon 36, 83

and Brueys 17 conquest of Malta 30, 31 and de Villeneuve 17 Egyptian expedition 7-9, 24-27, 35,

36, 37, 37, 38, 83-84 and invasion of England 7, 24 Italian campaign 6 later life 84-85 voyage to Egypt 29-35

Bonne Citoyenne 28, 82 British squadron

approach to French squadron 39-42, 42, 44

commanders 13-16 order of battle 22 overview 18-19 plans 27-28 search for French squadron 28, 29-35,

34,37-39 see also Royal Navy

Brueys d'Aigalliers, Vice-Admiral Francois Paul 16 background and character 16-17 battle preparations and plans 36, 40-41,

43, 75 Bonaparte's orders to 27 death 59-62 Nile performance assessed 85-87 voyage to Egypt 29, 30-35

Bruix, Admiral 87

Cadiz, blockade of 27-28 Cairo 25, 37, 37 Cairo revolt (1798) 86 Calvi, battle of (1794) 13, 15, 16 Campo Formio, Treaty of (1797) 6 Canopus see Franklin Capel, Thomas Bladen 82 Casabianca, Commodore 67 casualties 71, 81, 82 Charleroi, fighting around (1794) 8 Conquerant 43, 48, 51, 56 Corsica campaign (1794) 13, 15, 16 Culloden

after the battle 82 French failure to capture 87 search for French squadron 28, 30 stuck on rocks 54-55, 78-79, 91 summoned to the battle 39

Cuthbert, Lieutenant 74

Dalbarade, Captain 56 Darby, Captain Henry 14, 30, 33, 51 Defence 30, 51, 58, 72, 73, 83 Diane 79,80, 82 Dupetit-Thouars, Captain 68-69 (70),

72, 73 Dumas, Jacques 90

Egypt British relief of 85, 89, 90 French expedition (1798) 7-9, 24-27,

29, 33, 36, 37, 37, 38, 83-85 strategic significance 8-9, 25-26

Elliott, George 44, 48 Emerald 28, 82, 83 Emereau, Captain 56-58 England, French proposed invasion

(1797-98) 7 ,24 Etienne, Captain 55, 63 Europe: map 4

Foley, Captain Thomas background and character 15

during the battle 44-45, 59, 66, 75, 79 role in Nile strategy 87, 88 search for French squadron 30, 40

Fort San Juan expedition (1779) 13 France

Egyptian expedition 7-9, 24-27, 29, 33, 36, 37, 37, 38, 83-85

size of empire in 1798 6 Franklin (later Canopus)

after the battle 81 during the battle 54, 55, 58-59, 60-61,

63, 71, 72, 73 gun crew 41 position at start of battle 36 size 21

French Army 8, 24 French Navy: captains 21 French squadron

battle position 36-37, 40-41 British approach 39-42 commanders 16-17 order of battle 22-23 overview 20-21 plans 24-27 troops aboard 24 voyage to Egypt 29-35, 32, 34

Galwey, Lieutenant 58 Ganteaume, Rear-Admiral 67 Genereux 63, 73-74, 76-77, 79, 80, 81-82 Gillet, Captain 58-59 Glorious First of June, battle of (1794) 5, 78 Goddin, Franck 91 Goliath

after the battle 82 during the battle 44-45, 46-47 (48),

55-56, 66, 67, 75, 76-77, 78, 79 search for French squadron 30, 38,

39, 40 Gould, Captain Davidge 15, 30, 50-51 Grant, Samuel 66 Guerrier (French ship) 43, 44-51, 46-47

(48), 55-56, 81 Guillaume Tell

after the battle 82 during the battle 63, 73-74, 75,

76-77, 79, 80 earlier service 17 position at start of battle 36, 43 size 21

guns 18,19,20-21

Hallowell, Captain Benjamin background and character 16 during the battle 54, 62, 63, 71 and Nelson's coffin 58 search for French squadron 30

Hamilton, Emma, Lady 82 Hamilton, Sir William 33, 37-38 Hardy, Captain Thomas 15, 30, 54 Heliopolis, battle of (1800) 85 Heureux

after the battle 81 anchorage method 41 goes aground 63, 72, 75, 76-77

95

and Majestic 55, 59, 71 spots British approach 40 surrender 75, 79

Hood, Captain Samuel after the battle 82 background and character 15 during the battle 44-45, 48, 56, 75, 78 search for French squadron 30, 39, 40

Hoste, Captain William 73, 78 Howe, Earl 5

Jervis, Admiral Sir John see St Vincent, Earl Justice 78, 79, 80, 82

Kleber, General Jean-Baptiste 83, 85

LaHogue, battle of (1692) 81 Leander

after the battle 82 during the battle 54-55, 58, 60-61,

75, 76-77, 79, 80 rating and size 18 search for French squadron 30

Lee, John Theophilus 66 Lissa, battle of (1811) 73 Louis, Captain Thomas 15, 58

Majestic after the battle 83 casualties and damage 82 during the battle 54, 55, 59, 63, 71-72,

73-74, 75, 76-77 search for French squadron 30

Malta 9 ,31 French capture 30, 31, 33 French surrender 83 strategic significance 8-9, 24-25

Martin, Captain 50 Mercure 55, 63, 72, 75, 76-77, 79, 81 Miller, Captain Ralph 15, 30, 39-40,

50-51, 74, 75 Minorca 83 Minotaur

during the battle 51, 52-53, 58, 72 search for French squadron 30, 39 size 21

Moore, Sir John 90 Mutine 30, 33, 39, 54-55, 78

Naples 31, 33, 82, 82 Nelson, Rear-Admiral Sir Horatio 13, 88

after the battle 82,88 background and character 13 coffin 58 during the battle 42-45, 51, 58, 58,

63, 75, 78, 80 near-shipwreck and death 30 Nile performance assessed 85-89 on the battle 81 relationship with subordinates 13, 14,

15, 16, 45 search for French squadron 28, 29-35,

37-42 and tactics 13, 87-88 wounded 55, 56, 82

Nicol, John 40, 45, 67, 79 Nile, battle of the (1798)

aftermath 80

battlefield now 90-92 British approach 39^12, 42, 44 French position 36-37, 40-41 maps 43, 49, 57, 74, 86 origins of name 74 preparations 40-42 significance 5-6, 89 tactical analysis 85-89

L'Orient description 20, 21 destruction 62-71, 62, 63, 64-65

(66), 79 during the battle 51, 54, 55, 58, 59-62,

60-61, 72 gun crew 41 and Nelson's coffin 58 position at start of battle 36, 43 voyage to Egypt 29 wreck and relics 90-91, 91

Orion after the battle 83 during the battle 50-51, 55, 58, 62,

68, 72, 74 earlier service 14 search for French squadron 28, 30

Peuple Souverain after the battle 81 age 43-44 during the battle 50, 51, 58, 60-61

Peyton, Captain John 14, 30, 51 Pitt, William 26 ,27 pyramids 7 Pyramids, battle of the (1798) 36,

37,38

Railleur 40 Royal Navy

deployment 25 lieutenants 19 sailors 19, 27 see also British squadron

St Vincent, battle of (1797) 13,14 St Vincent, Earl (Admiral Sir John Jervis)

13, 14, 26, 27-28, 30, 82 San Josef 14 San Nicolas 14 Sane, Jacques-Noel 20 Saumarez, Captain Sir James

after the battle 82 background and character 14 during the battle 50-51, 62, 78 search for French squadron 28, 30,

31,33 wounded 58

Seahorse 82, 83 Serieuse 41, 50, 72, 74, 91 ships

British 18-19,23 French 2 0 - 2 1 , 2 0 , 4 3 ^ 4 frigates 18-19,21 identification signs 50 manoeuvrability at anchor 41 see also individual ships by name

Smith, Admiral Sir Sidney 83, 84 Spartiate 21, 50-51, 52-53, 55, 56-58, 72 Spencer, Earl 13, 18, 19, 27, 33

Swiftsure after the battle 82, 83 damage 72, 74 and Franklin 73 and L'Orient 54, 58, 59, 60-61, 62, 63-67, 71 search for French squadron 30, 38, 39 summoned to the battle 39, 54, 87

tactics 21, 36, 41-42, 56, 85-89 Talleyrand, Charles Maurice de, Prince 8,

24, 25 Tenerife, English attack on (1797) 13, 15 Theseus

after the battle 83 and Aquilon 51, 52-53, 58 and French rear 75, 76-77, 78, 79 and Guerrier 50, 55 and L'Orient explosion 62, 66 search for French squadron 30, 39-40 Serieuse captured by 74 and Spartiate 51, 52-53, 56 and Tonnant 80

Thompson, Captain Thomas 15, 30, 54-55 Timoleon 63, 73-74, 75, 76-77, 79, 80 Tonnant

in action 55, 67, 68-69 (70), 73-74, 75, 76-77, 78

damage 67, 72, 73 gun crew 41 and L'Orient explosion 63 position at start of battle 36, 41, 54 size 21 surrender 79, 80

Toulon 29 Trafalgar, battle of (1805) 78 Trotter, Thomas 18 Troubridge, Captain Thomas 15

background and character 14-15 role in Nile strategy 87 search for French squadron 28, 30,

31,33 stuck on rocks 54, 78

Trulet, Captain 45, 56

uniforms and appearance 19, 21

Vanguard after the battle 82, 82, 88 captain 16 casualties and damage 82 during the battle 51, 52-53, 55, 56,

63, 72, 78 Nelson appointed to command 13 search for French squadron 28, 29-30,

39, 40 Victory 20, 92, 92 Villeneuve, Rear-Admiral Pierre Charles de

17,17, 72-73, 79, 80

Westcott, Captain George 15, 30, 54, 55 Willyams, Reverend Cooper 62, 67

Zealous after the battle 82, 83 during the battle 44-51, 55-56, 75,

76-77, 78, 79, 80 search for French squadron 30, 38, 39, 40

96

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Accounts of history's greatest conflicts, detailing the command strategies, tactics and battle experiences of the opposing forces throughout the crucial stages of each campaign

NILE 1798 Nelson 's f i r s t g r e a t v i c t o r y

The battle of the Nile, the first of Nelson's trio of victories, which include Copenhagen and Trafalgar, represented the most impressive blow to French sea power in a hundred years. Of the approximately 50 major naval engagements fought in the 18th century, the Nile stands unrivalled as the most decisive, for it enabled the Royal Navy to wrest control of the Mediterranean back from the French, at the same time isolating Bonaparte's army in Egypt by severing its lifeline of sea-borne reinforcements and supplies. If there was ever any possibility of Bonaparte reaching India, Nelson's victory put paid to such a grand project. This book uses the latest research, new maps and specially commissioned artwork to tell the story of one of the great sea battles of the era.

Full colour battlescenes • Illustrations • 3-dimensionarbird's-eye-views'• Maps

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