22 may 2014 cde competition: defence against airborne threats presentation

UK Missile Defence Centre

Defence against airborne threats Centre for Defence Enterprise (CDE) themed competition

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Overview

The UK Missile Defence Centre (UK MDC) is seeking innovative solutions to defending against attacks from: ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; hypersonic munitions

3 challenges: 1. defence without interceptor missiles 2. kill assessment for non-destructive defences 3. improve the efficiency or cost-effectiveness of existing defences

Consider innovation across the whole system and its elements

Closing date for proof-of-concept submissions 3 July 2014 at 5pm up to £420k to support these

Possible wider exposure to UK MDC or Ministry of Defence (MOD) funding

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Content

What is the UK Missile Defence Centre?

Defeating the threat

Defensive terminology

Military perspective

CDE competition challenges

The ‘small print’

Summary

Questions

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The UK Missile Defence Centre

Ballistic missile threat reduction

lethality

Scenario simulation

& wargaming

Maritime theatre ballistic

missile defence studies

Systems engineering

Threat characterisation

Novel technologies


Support to policy (MOD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Cabinet Office)

Science and technology support to future capability development

International collaboration and support to NATO

Industrial opportunities

Support to WMD disablement

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UK MDC established July 2003

Joint MOD/industry construct

Provides timely scientific and technical advice on ballistic missile defence to Ministers and MOD Head Office

Supports UK industry in sustaining strategic capabilities

UK MDC: understanding missile defence & sustaining strategic capabilities

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Defeating the threat

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Ballistic missiles

Similar to a space launch vehicle, but designed to re-enter the atmosphere immediately and at extreme speed. the fastest means of hitting any point more than 300km away

Powered and guided for first few minutes; generally purely ballistic thereafter

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SS-20 intermediate range ballistic missile Short-range ballistic missile launch

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Ballistic missiles

Shorter range ballistic missiles (<600km) remain as single entity

>600km only the re-entry vehicle that delivers payload onto target

Recent uses in Libya and Syria

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SCUD missile on launcher Various intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles

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The US perception of the ballistic missile threat

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Ballistic missile times-of-flight challenge defences

5500km ground range

3500km

2000km

`1000km

300km

`600km

Further reading: NASIC ‘2013 ballistic missile and cruise missile threat’ AFD-130710-054.pdf from http://www.mda.mil

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Cruise missiles

Essentially expendable unmanned aircraft

Cost-effective deep target attack vastly reduced risk versus aircraft carrying direct attack

munitions

Can achieve <10m accuracy

Will fly a range of trajectories to avoid air defences

Key component of modern warfare more than 200 used in Libya

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Various cruise missiles

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Hypersonic munitions

>Mach 5 and within the (upper) atmosphere

Not currently deployed

Technology being examined by US, Russia, China, France and India

Very high speeds & significant manoeuvre potential likely to defeat ‘conventional’ defensive solutions

Target size likely to be bigger than ballistic missile re-entry vehicle

Defense Advanced Research Projects

Agency (DARPA) concepts

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Integrated air and missile defence

In reality, current defensive systems can engage some, but not all of the threats

Systems Ops Center

Intelligence Means

CommandAuthority

Integrating Networks

Battle Management

Surveillance

Weapon Delivery

Warning

Systems Ops Center

Intelligence Means

CommandAuthority


Battle Management

Surveillance

Weapon Delivery

Warning

Systems Ops Center

Intelligence Means

CommandAuthority


Battle Management

Surveillance

Weapon Delivery

Warning

Warning

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They are layered to provide: efficiency redundancy shared understanding

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Military considerations

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Theatre ballistic missiles (TBM) and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM)

TBM pose a significant threat to deployed operations TBM are a threat to static formations, ports, airfields, bases and key

infrastructure ASBM able to strike maritime platforms at any point within effective

area (Anti Access Area Denial – A2AD)

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Limited engagement windows for defensive systems

Ability of UK forces to defeat this threat? surveillance systems – some

capability effectors – little capability

‘Duncan passing Clydebank leaving for first sea trials’ by Mark Harkin is licensed under CC Attribution 2.0 Generic license. Source : http://www.flickr.com/photos/markyharky/7899777334/

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UK Missile Defence Centre Subsonic and supersonic land attack cruise

missiles

Threat missiles avoid detection using terrain masking and route to avoid defensive systems

Key infrastructure would be defended by ground-based air defence systems surface-to-air missiles anti-aircraft guns UK has point defence and local area defence systems

How are defensive systems cued? early warning available from airborne sensors ground-based sensors will provide short reaction time

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“BrahMos missile. MAKS-2009” by Allocer is licensed under CC Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license. Source : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:BrahMos_MAKS2009.jpg

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Subsonic and supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles

‘Cat and mouse’ - advancement in offensive missile development requires improvement of defensive systems Iran/China introducing new/novel capabilities and technologies almost

annually responsive insertion of technology difficult to achieve

Increased situational awareness (SA) important to maintain reaction time against difficult air targets for maritime platforms challenging flight profiles

height / speed / low observability

Desire for integrated hard/soft kill capability of defending against current and emerging difficult air targets looking for increased probability of escaping hit

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Hypersonic

May not be tracked by current surveillance systems

Reduced reaction time

Challenging target for an interceptor missile

Need improvements in: cueing decoys amount of decision time available – human factors? automation

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Defensive terminology

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UK Missile Defence Centre Defensive measures of interest in CDE

submissions

Active defence - soft kill interaction, including physical contact, but without an

immediate response from the threat system being observable. Includes techniques covering deception, spoofing, masking, jamming etc but excludes classic passive defence solutions such as hardening and camouflage

Active defence - hard kill interaction with the threat system and, in particular, payload

delivery mechanism following which a catastrophic observable event takes place

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UK Missile Defence Centre Defensive measures of interest in CDE

submissions

Counterforce pre-emptive attack of the origin of the threat weapon against persons

and/or equipment essential for the initiation of the threat’s mission

Defence also encompasses other measures (not considered here) deterrence diplomacy passive defence etc

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The US missile defence solution to countering ballistic missiles

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1. Defence without interceptor missiles

2. Kill assessment for non-destructive defences

3. Improving the efficiency or cost-effectiveness of existing defences

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Competition guidelines

Proposals should address at least 1 of the challenges, could address more than 1 challenge, but do not have to address all challenges

We will favour solutions capable of dealing with the most challenging threats ie ballistic and hypersonic missiles

The proposed solutions do not necessarily need to be mounted on or controlled by the defended asset many current air and missile defence solutions are entirely separate

military units to the assets they defend

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Challenge 1: defence without interceptor missiles

Consider entirely new methods for providing defence at range

How can we effectively defend against complex weapon threats without using interceptor missiles, such that the threat does not successfully damage its target? ideally at ranges greater than circa 10km

Examples hard-kill techniques such as lasers and other directed energy systems soft-kill applications such as sensor burnout due to energy

concentration novel methods of employing counterforce techniques

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YAL-1A airborne laser

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Challenge 2: kill assessment for non-destructive defences

Soft-kill defences generally interfere with the internal electronics of the complex weapon, so the external appearance of the weapon might remain largely unchanged

This is a particular issue for ballistic missile defence, since these threats will continue to follow a ballistic trajectory even if completely electronically disabled

How do we assess whether or not a damaged threat weapon still poses a threat to us given that its trajectory is largely unchanged?

Solutions should be usable from a stand-off range, in a timely manner and produce information high in confidence

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Challenge 3: improving the efficiency and/or cost effectiveness of existing defences

Apply innovation to existing methods for hard-kill active defence (eg interceptor missiles and guns) such that the efficiency is increased

Consider innovation at the whole-system level, as well as the sub-system level. Consider intra-system interactions

Proposals will be expected to explain how the concept might improve a performance metric such as cost effectiveness, volume, probability of hit or fly-out time an order of magnitude in improvement is required to be considered

effective

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The ‘small print’

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What we want

Proof-of-concept research proposals not previously used: novel technologies (up to the concept-definition stage) developed technologies elsewhere

Proposals applicable to a wider range of threats are more likely to be funded

Solutions to defence against ballistic and hypersonic missiles, or an order of magnitude improvement against less-stretching threats

Identify the consequences of intercepting (or failing to intercept) the threat

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What we want

Solutions are not limited to a particular theatre of operation, threat nation or level of conflict intensity

Priority will be given to proposals demonstrating or de-risking a concept

Clarify the possible limitations of the proposed solution eg: environmental issues physical characteristics target characteristics operational considerations economic considerations

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What we don’t want

Proposals that pose an excessive risk of friendly fire or collateral damage (eg interceptors with nuclear warheads)

The same proposal that is already being funded as part of another MOD research programme

Solutions with political sensitivities are highly unlikely to be considered

We will not fund any proposals that: fall outside the remit given here provide only marginal improvements to current solutions require significant government-provided equipment or infrastructure

but you should identify alternative, non-government-provided sources

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Exploitation

Phase 1 is this CDE themed competition MOD/Dstl will assess proposals MOD will ensure bidders intellectual property is protected

On successful completion of phase 1, up to £500k is available from UK MDC for phase 2

Subsequent phases are likely to be the subject of long-term exploitation in partnership with

If a successful bid does not fit comfortably within our strategy, with bidders permission UK MDC will expose the project to other funding sources within MOD via an appropriate contracting route

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Summary

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Summary

Proposals must be submitted to the CDE portal by 5pm on 3 July 2014

Challenges: 1. defence without interceptor missiles 2. kill assessment for non-destructive defences 3. improving the efficiency or cost-effectiveness of existing

defences

Innovation is vital as defence against airborne threats has been studied from many perspectives over the years

There are opportunities for further exploitation of successful proposals

For challenge/technical queries contact: [email protected]

For submission/process queries contact: [email protected]

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22 may 2014 cde competition: defence against airborne threats presentation

Technology

official official ss

cruise missile threat

uk industry

strategic capabilities

airborne threats centre

surveillance systems

significant threat

interceptor missiles