1948 jammu & kashmir

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SPECIAL ARTICLE Economic & Political Weekly EPW march 13, 2010 vol xlv no 11 49 Rakesh Ankit ([email protected]) studied history at Delhi and Oxford. 1948: The Crucial Year in the History of Jammu and Kashmir Rakesh Ankit The involvement of the British in Kashmir even after India’s and Pakistan’s independence, British realpolitik, crystallisation of Cold War politics and an “idealist” infant United Nations – all had major roles to play in the imbroglio between India and Pakistan over the state. A historical overview of the events in 1948 that “sealed the fate of Jammu and Kashmir” is presented here after perusing papers of the British government of that time, which have been released after 60 years. 1 1 948 was a fatal year for Jammu and Kashmir. Containing partisan politics, a year-long war, diplomatic deliberations and nationalistic public space, 1948 set Kashmir on the path to where it is today. It saw India’s military capabilities being exhibited in spring (March-June) and winter (October-December), Pakistan’s moral position being undermined by the involvement of its army in summer (May) and its admission in autumn (August), and, British interests being achieved by its nationals present in warring military-bureaucratic machines. The year which saw the exit of Mahatma Gandhi, Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Louis Mountbatten from the political scene of the sub-continent began with the Kashmir crisis reaching the United Nations and ended with the agreement on the ceasefire which was proclaimed on 1 January, to come into effect from 5 January 1949. If 1948 had the realpolitik of the British interests in south Asia, central Asia and west Asia affecting the evolution of the Kashmir conflict and shaping the international response to it, it also saw the idealism of the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan ( UNCIP ) set up by an infant United Nations. Over and above all, 1948 showed the continuity of the British involvement and its very definite perceptions about the origin, evolution and the impact of the Kashmir crisis on the Imperial/Commonwealth defence strategy – best personified by the elevation of generals Roy Bucher and Douglas Gracey to the post of the commander-in- chief of the Indian and Pakistani armies, succeeding generals Rob Lockhart and Frank Messervy, respectively. This essay is a political history of Kashmir in 1948 which has been overshadowed by the Indian independence and Partition of 1947. It shows that 1948 is, in many ways, more important in the subsequent history of India-Pakistan relations over Kashmir as well as the international involvement in the subcontinent. It was in 1948 that the combustion of 1947, in Kashmir, assumed matu- rity and fulfilment. The tragedy of 1947 was essentially commu- nal while 1948 saw disparate issues – British interests, Indian outrage and Pakistani resentment competing over Kashmir. The spontaneity of the differences in Kashmir (Poonch and Gilgit) in August-September 1947 as well as the raid of October gave way to greater planning and organisation in 1948. Gone were the hasty calls to communalism or nationalism; the whimsical decisions and decision-makers of 1947-48 saw dis- putants digging heels. Interests were entrenched, ideologies clarified and intents established. Most importantly, 1948 saw the crystallisation of the Cold War politics on the “internationalisation” of the Kashmir crisis.

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Page 1: 1948 Jammu & Kashmir

special article

Economic & Political Weekly EPW march 13, 2010 vol xlv no 11 49

Rakesh Ankit ([email protected]) studied history at Delhi and Oxford.

1948: the crucial Year in the History of Jammu and Kashmir

Rakesh Ankit

The involvement of the British in Kashmir even after

India’s and Pakistan’s independence, British realpolitik,

crystallisation of Cold War politics and an “idealist” infant

United Nations – all had major roles to play in the

imbroglio between India and Pakistan over the state. A

historical overview of the events in 1948 that “sealed the

fate of Jammu and Kashmir” is presented here after

perusing papers of the British government of that time,

which have been released after 60 years.

1

1948 was a fatal year for Jammu and Kashmir. Containing partisan politics, a year-long war, diplomatic deliberations and nationalistic public space, 1948 set Kashmir on the path

to where it is today. It saw India’s military capabilities being e xhibited in spring (March-June) and winter (October-December), Pakistan’s moral position being undermined by the involvement of its army in summer (May) and its admission in autumn ( August), and, British interests being achieved by its nationals present in warring military-bureaucratic machines. The year which saw the exit of Mahatma Gandhi, Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Louis Mountbatten from the political scene of the sub- continent began with the Kashmir crisis reaching the United Nations and ended with the agreement on the ceasefire which was proclaimed on 1 January, to come into effect from 5 January 1949.

If 1948 had the realpolitik of the British interests in south Asia, central Asia and west Asia affecting the evolution of the Kashmir conflict and shaping the international response to it, it also saw the idealism of the United Nations Commission on India and P akistan (UNCIP) set up by an infant United Nations. Over and above all, 1948 showed the continuity of the British involvement and its very definite perceptions about the origin, evolution and the impact of the Kashmir crisis on the Imperial/Commonwealth defence strategy – best personified by the elevation of generals Roy Bucher and Douglas Gracey to the post of the commander-in-chief of the Indian and Pakistani armies, succeeding generals Rob Lockhart and Frank Messervy, respectively.

This essay is a political history of Kashmir in 1948 which has been overshadowed by the Indian independence and Partition of 1947. It shows that 1948 is, in many ways, more important in the subsequent history of India-Pakistan relations over Kashmir as well as the international involvement in the subcontinent. It was in 1948 that the combustion of 1947, in Kashmir, assumed matu-rity and fulfilment. The tragedy of 1947 was essentially commu-nal while 1948 saw disparate issues – British interests, Indian outrage and Pakistani resentment competing over Kashmir. The spontaneity of the differences in Kashmir (Poonch and Gilgit) in August-September 1947 as well as the raid of October gave way to greater planning and organisation in 1948. Gone were the hasty calls to communalism or nationalism; the whimsical decisions and decision-makers of 1947-48 saw dis-putants digging heels. Interests were entrenched, ideologies clarified and intents established.

Most importantly, 1948 saw the crystallisation of the Cold War politics on the “internationalisation” of the Kashmir crisis.

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E specially, of the overwhelming British (and by the end of the year American as well) attempt to safeguard its vital interests in the region with respect to the simultaneously emerging Cold War [political and geostrategic (aimed at the former communist S oviet Union in central Asia) and economic and religious (aimed at the “Islamic” west Asia)].

At a time when weak and fragile India and Pakistan had just begun to recreate themselves, they jostled with each other for the control of Kashmir for different reasons. While they knew what they wanted they were not allowed to pursue it the way they wanted by the considerable presence of British individuals and geostrategic interests. The undeclared, limited war of 1948 was fought between groups, not properly led and armies, not even led by their own nationals.

international Geopolitics

Avoiding the existing, essentially domestic, historiography, this paper focuses on the international geopolitics of 1948 and Kash-mir’s role in it due to its location, the deeper significance of its impact on British relationship with the Arab-Muslim world as well as the former communist Soviet world due to its dominant Muslim composition and political accession to India and the h istorical continuity of British concerns on the north-west of the Indian subcontinent. It argues that throughout 1948, the British contained the actual fighting in Kashmir and dominated, not un-naturally given their familiarity, the discussions at the UN. They attempted to bring in the US as an influential mediator between India and Pakistan, with the result that by the mid-1950s the US involvement in the subcontinent was set in stone. It was 1948 which saw the transformation of a regional conflict to a national question and then an international concern. The domestic dis-abilities of 1947 gave way to international involvement in 1948 as the dominating feature of the Kashmir conflict.

The year 1948 shocked the British imperatives, the Indian innocence and the Pakistani insecurities. For the former, it set in stone the strategic necessity to confront the former Soviet Union in the e ntire volatile and difficult region from Turkey to Tibet thus providing the ultimate prism through which Britain per-ceived events in this arc. For the latter two, it so drilled the re-spective sets of nationalist passions, emotions of bitterness and distrust and p olitical imperatives that anything about the other became fundamental to everything about the self. Having mined the archives and observed the prejudices therein, I think that the various p ositions in 1948 were more subjective than each realised but less so than the others charged. Since 1948, “too many truths have been buried”.1

2

As 1948 opened, the Kashmir conflict was the last thing Britain needed – for two reasons. First, the British military minds held that they needed both India and Pakistan to secure “the peace, welfare and security…from the Mediterranean to the China Sea”2 and to confront the “intrigue from Sinkiang and intervention from north” with “implications far beyond Kashmir”3 but was now forced to choose one. Second, they had been worried about the weakening strategic hold in Palestine and Greece, unhappy

with the increasingly autonomous and assertive American i nvolvement there “without due regard to British interests”,4 a nxious about Egypt and Iraq and arguing for “…a pan-Islamic federation/Arab league…to thwart Russia”.5 Against this back-drop, the Kashmir conflict made them concerned about losing control of Pakistan as well.

Losing Pakistan was not an option for London. The British chief of staff (COS) had underlined this five times between May 1945 – when Pakistan was but an idea of a few – and July 1947, when it was about to be a reality for all. They had first reported to W inston Churchill that Britain must retain its military connec-tion with India in view of the “Soviet menace” for India was a valuable base for force deployment, a transit point for air and sea communications, a large reserve of manpower, and, had air bases in the north-west from which Britain could threaten Soviet mili-tary installations,6 then repeated to Clement Attlee the impor-tance of these north-west airfields.7 In July 1946, they identified the crucial arc from Turkey to Pakistan, in view of essential oil sup-plies, defence and communications requirements, with the R ussian threat.8 In November 1946, they summed up that “Western India” (post-1947 Pakistan) – with Karachi and Peshawar – was strategi-cally and ideologically crucial for British Commonwealth inter-ests.9 Five weeks before Partition, the COS concluded:

The area of Pakistan is strategically the most important in the conti-nent of India and the majority of our strategic requirements could be met by an agreement with Pakistan alone. We do not therefore con-sider that failure to obtain the [defence] agreement with India would cause us to modify any of our requirements.10

It was with this mindset that the British COS observed the out-break of hostilities in Kashmir in October 1947. One of its civilian counterparts, the Commonwealth Relations Office (hereafter CRO), saw a weak Pakistan facing a materially stronger and a ggressive India and envisaged the possible downfall of Pakistan with the probable participation of the frontier tribes, Afghans and Soviet Russia. It foresaw either the emergence of another Palestine situation on a greater scale or the disappearance of P akistan with considerable effects, in both cases, on west Asia.11 Consequently, it advised help to Pakistan to prevent its collapse which would be “understood as Her Majesty’s Government’s (HMG) failure as Partition plan was sponsored as a British Act of Parliament” and to prevent “collapse and chaos along the NWFP – North West Frontier Province – (which) will profoundly affect imperial strategy…even at the risk of ruining our present entirely friendly relations with the Indian government”.12

The CRO believed that “powerful forces in India, which bitterly resented Partition, were determined to bring about the collapse of Pakistan…by the method of economic pressure” and would e xploit the Kashmir conflict “as an additional factor” to this end.13 This belief was strengthened by such reports as Claude Auchin-leck’s (Supreme Commander, India-Pakistan, 1947) sent six weeks into Partition:

I have no hesitation whatsoever in affirming that the present India Cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis. In this, I am supported by the unanimous opinion of my senior officers, and indeed, by all responsible British officers cognisant of the situation.14

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the russia angle

Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, too, shared this axiomatic concern that India did not play fair in the division of military and eco-nomic assets leaving Pakistan in a difficult situation which would be worsened by India’s control over Kashmir.15 The CRO further cautioned that Russia was bound to be interested “in what is hap-pening next to the Soviet border”16 and felt that Kashmir ought to go to Pakistan, otherwise it would be “overrun from the north-west and lost to the British Commonwealth”.17 The overarching conviction in 1947 was “to back Pakistan (over K ashmir) in the interests of Imperial Defence”18 to avoid repercussions elsewhere given its “huge Islamic aspect”.19 In 1948, it became imperative to stop a desperate Pakistan from making overtures to Russia20 and this was shared with the Americans to cooperate on policy at the United Nations.21

The Foreign Office (hereafter FO) too viewed the Kashmir con-flict as a religious war which “might be used by Russia as a pretext for intervening”.22 It felt that the “Russians tend to favour India as against Pakistan”.23 Moreover, any initiatives had to keep in mind “the present difficult position over Palestine” which made any “talks about HMG being unfair to Pakistan (over K ashmir) undesir-able”.24 It reminded the Muslim countries via its embassies:

HMG might easily have handed over the whole of India to the Hindu majority. But they loyally protected the Muslim minority, even to the point of facilitating the creation of a separate independent Muslim state by going out of their way. This is what the Muslims themselves demand-ed. We have recognised Pakistan as a Dominion and have supported its admission to UNO. We would always come to Pakistan’s help.25

As Pakistan’s political existence was not considered by the FO “as a good risk”,26 there was to be no question of “throwing the Muslim lamb to the Hindu wolf over Kashmir”27 where events were rapidly deteriorating. On 9 August 1947, the Muslim Poonch started to stir against the Hindu Srinagar. Maharaja Hari Singh responded by getting rid of his Prime Minister Ram Chandra Kak two days later. On 14 August, Kashmir signed a “standstill agree-ment” with Pakistan which was violated by the latter from 9 Sep-tember onwards when it cut off the supplies of sugar and petrol to Kashmir. There then followed a whirlwind of changes in key personnel(s). On 29 September, brigadier Henry Scott (chief of staff, J&K State Forces, 1936-47) left Kashmir and was succeeded by brigadier Rajinder Singh. On 6 October, Sheikh Abdullah was released in Srinagar whereupon he travelled to Delhi to meet J awaharlal Nehru. On 11 October Mehr Chand Mahajan took over as the new prime minister from brigadier Janak Singh who had been holding the temporary charge since Kak’s ouster. Four days later, Mahajan complained to Clement Attlee and Liaquat Ali Khan against the violation of Standstill Agreement by Pakistan; on 18 October, he repeated his complaints to Jinnah. Liaquat and Jinnah denied these charges and invited Mahajan to Karachi for parleys on 19 and 20 October, respectively.

Hari singh’s appeal

While these communications were producing little results, from 20 October onwards the events on grounds moved with discon-certing speed. On that day the first raiders started for Poonch, Domel and Baramulla entering Muzaffarabad two days later.

On 24 October, New Delhi received the first formal appeal from Hari Singh as well as an informal tip-off which George Cunningham (governor of the NWFP, 1937-46 and August 1947-48) sent to Rob Lockhart, the commander-in-chief (C-in-C), August-December 1947. Events of the next three days are still a topic of controversy.

On 25 October, Hari Singh left Srinagar for Jammu. The Times reported that Muslim tribesmen from Pakistan had entered Kashmir and cut the road from Rawalpindi to Srinagar. Lockhart started preparing military plans and officers were sent to Srina-gar to assess the situation along with V P Menon. Nehru outlined the Indian attitude to Attlee. The next day, Attlee wrote to both Nehru and Liaquat urging them to “restore order in Kashmir”. Indian military plans were being finalised as the officers and M enon reported back from Srinagar. On the morning of 27, V P Menon left for Jammu and got M M Batra (Hari Singh’s d eputy prime minister) to sign the Instrument of Accession and the I ndian troops landed in Srinagar.

Lawrence Graffety-Smith, the UK High Commissioner in Paki-stan (1947-51), spoke for many when he sent this report to London two days after Kashmir’s accession to India:

Indian government’s acceptance of accession of Kashmir [was] the heaviest blow yet sustained by Pakistan in her struggle for existence. Strategically, Pakistan’s frontiers have been greatly extended as a hos-tile India gains access to NWFP. This will lead to a redefinition of the Afghan policy for worse. Second, Russian interests will be aroused in Gilgit and NWFP which creates a new international situation which HMG and the US government cannot overlook. Third, there is a serious threat to Pakistan’s irrigation systems; hydroelectric projects from the accession [all five rivers draining the Pakistani Punjab flow from I ndia, three through Kashmir] and finally, two-three million Kashmiri Muslims will worsen the already massive refugee problem with five-and-a-half million Muslims having been driven out of East Punjab.28

On 31 October, the CRO emphasised Kashmir’s “unnatural a ccession to India”, given its Muslim population, transport and communication links and the trade relations with Pakistan estab-lished by the 1870 customs agreement. It also noted that Pakistan had been heavily weakened by the refugee problem and it had considerable difficulty in imposing its authority over local offi-cials. Finally, India had been unnecessarily provocative by a ccepting the provisional accession of Kashmir and sending Sikh troops with no prior consultation with Pakistan.29 The CRO had been kept aware of the events in Kashmir in 1947 by W F Webb (the British resident in Srinagar, till February) and major W P Cranson (formerly of the Indian Political Service, but a ttached after independence to the UK High Commission in I ndia), in addition to Henry Scott, in particular the threats made by the Pir of Manki Sharif, the economic blockade imposed on Kashmir by Pakistan and the intent of invasion on behalf of the tribesmen in Hunza, Dir and Chitral.30 It had anticipated the pos-sibility of Pakistan moving beyond threats of invasion, border raids and the economic blockade31 but opted against “intervening with the government of Pakistan for obvious reasons”.32

George Cunningham’s diary entries from 6 October 1947 on-wards establish the involvement of Rawalpindi and knowledge/approval of Karachi in the entry of tribesmen into Kashmir.33 In his correspondences with E F L Wood (Lord Halifax) and

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Louis Mountbatten, he confirmed that “official eyes have been closed to make the facilities for the tribesmen available”.34 Twenty years later, an embittered Iskander Mirza in exile in London re-membered “all those dishonourable intrigues so very rampant since the very i nception of Pakistan” in a letter to Olaf Caroe (Gov-ernor of the NWFP until August 1947), “…what did the politicians do to Sir George. Behind his back they pushed tribesmen into Kashmir...”35 Cunningham – along with Caroe – believed that the Kashmir crisis lay intertwined with the imperatives of Pakistan’s and, by extension, Asian subcontinent’s defence against Russia in the NWFP and against Afghanistan and Iran in Baluchistan.36 They were strongly supported by Robert Francis Mudie (governor of West Punjab, 1947-49), who looked upon Pakistan as “the barrier which prevents Communism spreading south of the Himalayas” and “should be preserved intact”.37

split in london

The views of Cunningham, Caroe and Mudie did not go unchal-lenged. By the end of 1947, London was well and truly split. S tafford Cripps and Pug Ismay (with powerful support from Mountbatten) were pro-India whereas Bevin and Philip Noel-Baker were pro-Pakistan. The two British high commissioners meanwhile were engaged in their own “telegraphic war”.38 Prime Minister At-tlee – who had old links with Nehru which were never the same after 1948 – tended to look at “Pakistan as the more valuable ally and India as the more valuable partner”; an equivocation which general Frank Messervy (C-in-C Pakistan, 1947-48) interpreted as being pro-Pakistan.39 While the former camp wanted the prime minister to pressurise Jinnah “to stop fighting” – in effect charging him with major responsibility for the raid,40 the latter group ex-pressed doubts “whether Jinnah could a ctually have stopped the movement of tribesmen however ardently he had desired” and successfully counselled against sending such a message.41

By the end of 1947, “the movement of tribesmen” and the war it caused were already two months old. In November – the first month of the battle – raiders occupied Bhimber, Rajouri, Rawalkot and threatened Kotli, Poonch and Naoshera. Indian troops res-ponded by freeing Baramulla and then entered Uri – 65 miles west from Srinagar – driving back the raiders. On 17 November, Jhangar was relieved and the following day the raiders were pushed out of Naoshera. In the last week of November, raiders and Indian troops exchanged Mirpur and Kotli, respectively. In December, Indian military plans for winter were finalised – relief of Poonch, advance on Bhimber and control of Jhelum valley “as far west as possible” even as the raiders reoccupied Jhangar.

3

On the first day of 1948, India took the Kashmir issue to the UN acting on the advice Mountbatten had given to Nehru almost a month ago (9 December). On the same day, the CRO appraised the UK delegation in New York that:

Pakistan cannot be held blameless regarding the entry of tribesmen into Kashmir in that encouragement and assistance were given by l ocal gov-ernment officials in the NWFP and no authoritative disapproval of tribal action has been uttered by any high official of the Pakistan Government. On the other hand, the Pakistan Government is not militarily strong enough to control the tribes by force and any attempt to do so might

raise a conflagration on the whole frontier. These c onsiderations, how-ever, do not condone the apparently tacit acceptance of tribal incursions by the Pakistan Government and so there r emains a handle for the Indi-an Government to point to Pakistan as aggressor.42

While the permanent representative of England (“His Majesty’s Government” (HMG)) at the UN – since its inception – had been the redoubtable Alexander Cadogan, for the deliberations on Kashmir, Attlee appointed Philip Noel-Baker who also headed the CRO (1947-50). He too was worried that

Incursions now taking place in Kashmir constitute an “armed attack” upon Indian territory in view of their scale and of the fact that Kashmir has acceded to the Indian Union. This is so irrespective of whether f orces in question are organised or disorganised or whether they are control-led by, or enjoy the convenience of, Government of Pakistan. India is therefore entitled to take measures which she may deem necessary for self-defence pending definitive action by Security Council to restore peace – prima facie – repelling invaders but possibly pursuit of invaders into Pakistan territory. Security Council could not decide out of hand that India was not justified in so doing in the case envisaged.43

Thus, given its importance, Pakistan’s physical survival was the first “most important consideration” for which Noel-Baker was to dissuade India from invading Pakistan from East Punjab by invoking Article 51 of the UN charter.44

in the United Nations

The first hint of the diplomatic line that Britain was going to adopt in the UN came at the end of the first week of 1948 when Graffety-Smith made it clear to the CRO that there is no use in taking into account the Indian claim to a legal obligation to d efend Kashmir as it was unlikely to command acceptance in P akistan.45 Three days later, the CRO – while spelling out the “ important considera-tions affecting our attitude in the Security Council” – cautioned Noel-Baker to be “particularly careful to avoid giving Pakistan the impression that we are siding with India. In view of the Palestine situation this would carry the risk of aligning the whole of Islam against us”. Bevin at the FO, too, invoked the “Palestine parallel”.46 Noel-Baker was, however, also warned to be careful in his handling of the Indians “on account of their emotional condition [and] their respect for legal processes”.47

On 12 January 1948, the CRO wrote to its high commissions in Washington, Delhi, and Karachi and to its UN delegation in New York to ensure that “any action taken by the Security Council should not prejudice our strategic requirements in India and P akistan”.48 Attlee himself listed these in a message to Cadogan: “check hostile Afghanistan, discourage ‘Pathanistan’ and inde-pendent Kashmir (otherwise) Russia would cause mischief”.49 Simultaneously, British missions in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were cautioned that, “in view of the Palestine situa-tion, we must avoid giving Pakistan impression that we are siding with India against her (as) this would carry the risk of aligning the whole of Islam against us”.50

It was clear that the CRO did not see “how Pakistan govern-ment could be expected to get tribesmen out of Kashmir without first putting their own force in”.51 While it agreed that

There is evidence to show that transit facilities, the use of Pakistan t erritory as a base for operations, the active participation of Pakistan nationals, the provision of equipment from Pakistan – and

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later on – active help by Pakistan officers, including training and guid-ance were given by Pakistan [It complicated this straightforward as-sertion by distinguishing between] toleration of, or inability to pre-vent, aid from being given and active giving of aid. Secondly, distinction must be drawn between the actions of the Pakistan government and of Provincial governments on the one hand and those of certain of their officials and nationals on the other. Finally, the timing of any established aid must be seen in relation to the general course of events.52

Even as Gopalaswami Ayengar presented the Indian case at the UN Security Council (UNSC) on 15 January, the CRO moved to express sympathy with the difficult situation faced by Pakistan:

Because of the resentment amongst the tribes of the NWFP, the attacks on Muslims in East Punjab, Poonch and Jammu and the decision to send Sikh troops by India into Kashmir. Second, any attempt to stop the movement of the tribesmen would probably have involved P akistan in a major frontier war which they were in no state to undertake. Third, the establishment of the Dominion of India in Kashmir was a substantial blow to their prestige. Fourth, it gave India access to the NWFP tribal areas with all the scope for mischief-making which this involved. Fifth, it reduced Pakistan’s hopes of pruning their defence budget by a friendly accommodation with the tribal elements. Sixth, it placed India in a position to control some of the headworks of P akistan’s irrigation systems and hydroelectric projects. Finally, there was also the fear that there might occur in Kashmir a repetition of the events in the East Punjab whereby Sikhs and Dogras carried out large-scale massacres of Muslims designed to change the entire composition of the population.53

The fact that the Pakistan’s government was involved with the raiders, repeatedly denied by Zafrulla Khan (foreign minister of Pakistan, 1947-54), was revealed to Noel-Baker as early as 16 Jan-uary by Graffety-Smith who wrote:

Undoubtedly, staging camps [have been] occupied by tribesmen… appreciable leakage of Pakistani equipment [has occurred] through junior army and police officials…undoubtedly petrol-transport-food [has been] provided. [There is an] embarrassing great gap between proclaimed theory by Pakistan leaders and actions of their s ubordinates.54

Noel-Baker chose to not merely ignore but bury this in the face of Pakistan’s strategic utility against “Russian aggres-sion”.55 He was convinced that “Russia’s game is to prevent a settlement (on Kashmir) and then to bring about anarchy and chaos”.56 Further, he held that even if Pakistan closed its K ashmir frontiers, there would still be heavy bloodshed before the Muslim resistance in Kashmir was overcome and that I ndia’s plan for the preparation of the plebiscite was unfair as opposed to Pakistan’s “practical plan for stopping the fighting and securing a fair plebiscite – similar to almost every point to the British brief”.57

Britain used its position as the country with unrivalled influ-ence in, and knowledge of, the subcontinent to manipulate the UNSC. Exactly who was pulling the strings behind the scenes throughout these negotiations is shown by a telegram sent by the UK delegation to the CRO three weeks into 1948. It refers to the resolution of 17 January 1948 moved by Van Langenhove, the Belgian chairman of the UNSC, and assures London that “the fact that he is largely guided by us is not known…and we take every precaution to ensure that it is not known…”58 Three days later, the UNSC passed a resolution (39) establishing a three-member UNCIP, the membership of which was later enlarged to five by the

resolution (47) of 21 April. Given that Bevin did not want the UNSC to be involved in Kashmir for the fear of the Soviet Union or a Soviet satellite,59 it is not surprising that Britain was willing to go to such lengths and put at stake its relationship with India. Noel-Baker believed that “it seems…worthwhile to accept risk of un-popularity and possible subsequent difficulty (with India)…since war (between India and Pakistan)…would make strategic re-quirements unattainable”.60 He was convinced that “Pakistan’s separate identity r emained a challenge to Hindu ideology and ac-tion and India was determined to prevent any progress in con-struction and consolidation of Pakistan”.61 The FO was sympa-thetic about Pakistan’s “inherited responsibility for [the] NWFP”,62 more so because the Afghan government which was “critical of Pakistan’s policy in Kashmir” might “encourage tribes to make difficulties for Pakistan”.63 While all these manipulations were taking place the hostilities were resumed on the battlefield. On 23 January – after a lull of four weeks – Indian troops attacked and captured Kot. In the first week of February, Naoshera saw battle; in mid-March, Jhangar was freed again by Indian forces and a month later, I ndian troops entered Rajouri.

indian angst

The bewilderment that emerged in India, quickly giving way to resentment and hatred, was best presented by Mountbatten’s complaint to Attlee:

India’s complaint was passed over at the request of Zafrullah Khan, backed by Noel-Baker on 31 January to the extent that the cart was put before the horse, i e, the plebiscite has become the first issue…I am at a loss to understand why India who has been brought to her present predominant position in Asia largely through British efforts in the past and which is the only country which is now likely to give a lead in the Far East, is being treated this way. The policy which you initiated and which I have endeavoured to carry out during the past year is now b eing compromised by the leaning towards Pakistan’s cause and Noel-Baker’s obvious antagonism to India.64 Similarly, the other ‘very pro-Indian’,65 Cripps pointed out to Attlee that ‘the issue [is] whether the action of Pakistan in permitting and encouraging the passage of tribesmen across their territory to attack Kashmir was an act of a ggression against India?’66

A word about Noel-Baker’s “obvious antagonism” would not be out of place here. Condemning the Indian view on Kashmir as “unrealistic”, the “anti-Indian”67 Noel-Baker wrote that

the UNSC will not condemn Pakistan as aggressor because it will not rule out events before the accession of Kashmir to India [and] the s ingle point of Pakistan’s complicity in the alleged aggression against Kashmir cannot be the end-all of the task of the Council.68

Noel-Baker doubted India’s legal case, dismissed its political case, held Hari Singh responsible for all that was wrong with Kashmir, drew parallel with the Junagadh situation and argued for Pakistan’s equal interest in Kashmir on security grounds.69 What – apart from Noel-Baker’s “obvious antagonism” – con-sumed the UK delegation to UN was “power politics” and “strate-gic consequences of the creation of the exposed situation of Kash-mir”.70 And similarly the widely held view at London was that it was “morally and practically binding on us that the maximum pressure should be exerted on India to bring them out of the n arrow legalism of their case”.71

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However, “the narrow legalism” of India saw the establishment of Sheikh Abdullah’s government on 5 March. In April 1948, the US offered Pakistan free training courses for officers72 even as Britain became very concerned about the situation regarding military supplies in Pakistan. Graffety-Smith repeatedly made it plain that banning the supply of military equipment by Britain “would cause grave and dangerous resentment in Pakistan”.73 Cunningham wrote to the CRO, on 18 April 1948 that “it is enor-mously important to help [Pakistan] on the two matters of Kash-mir and munitions supply [and] officer’s training”, else “Pakistan might easily slip out of the Commonwealth”.74 On 4 May 1948, al-most a 100 days before Pakistan publicly admitted the presence of its troops in Kashmir, Graffety-Smith unambiguously con-firmed to the CRO that not only Pakistan troops, but also two B ritish officers (Lt Col Milne and Captain Skellon), were in K ashmir looking into the refugee problem and that General Gracey “is certainly aware of all that goes on”.75 However, it was swiftly decided that no useful action could be taken with the P akistan government on the matter at that stage, not only be-cause it could be disclosed that General Douglas Gracey (C-in-C Pakistan, 1948-51) was the source of information, but because the refugee problem and potential collapse of Pakistan’s economy and administration weighed heavily in British concerns such that it condoned the presence of troops and sought to justify it by c iting “defensive purposes”.76 General Roy Bucher (C-in-C India, 1948-49) and Gracey, in regular touch, had met between 26 and 28 March 1948 to apprise each other of the military strategies of the two dominions and formulate defensive positions on both sides so as to prevent the outbreak of an all-out war.

British leanings

Against this backdrop it is remarkable that throughout May 1948, Bucher refused to believe the existence of Pakistan regular bat-talions in Kashmir, even when, on 19 May, Gracey had admitted to the presence of two mountain guns, three to four battalions and even a couple of British officers in Kashmir for “defensive purposes” to stop the Indian advance beyond Mirpur, Poonch, Uri.77 The reason though was best summed up by Bevin in sepa-rate letters to Attlee and Noel-Baker to whom he stressed that he was “most anxious not to lose the confidence of the government and people of Pakistan” given “the trend of feeling” there for two all-important reasons: “serious consequences to the already diffi-cult relations with the Muslim world” and “Russian penetration”.78 Further, it was feared that any action would lead to a certain col-lapse of Pakistan because Britain would have to issue “stand down” instructions to its officers serving in the Indian and the Pakistani armies. For the latter this would mean the crippling loss of 460 British officers including those serving in the important posts of the C-in-C, COS, quarter-master general of forces, etc.79

And so the regular troops of the two dominions finally faced each other from May onwards. India launched its spring offen-sive along the Uri-Domel road up to the Pakistan border on 18 May. Early success came in the form of Tithwal but the advance was halted a week later. In June, Indian moves towards Muzaf-farabad and Chinari-Chakothi were halted, as well. Indian army found success at Kargil and Drass, instead.

The CRO finally informed Washington about the “indisputable presence” of Pakistan troops in Kashmir on 26 May 1948.80 The Americans accepted their view that “it will be better not to probe this matter further with Pakistan (this is probably because the Americans want to remain on friendly terms with Pakistan in spite of the tension over Palestine and the embargo on the sale of arms)…”81 The FO considered the Muslim world as a whole and any deterioration in Pakistan’s situation in Kashmir was not con-sidered in British interests there,82 more so, since the creation of Israel. The Palestine imbroglio was thorny not only because of the misunderstandings it had created in the Anglo-American special relationship but also because it, along with the upcoming Presi-dential election, made the Americans unwilling to take a lead r egarding Kashmir.83 Accordingly, the UK delegation was directed on 8 June 1948 to “avoid, if possible, any discussion in the Security Council of the presence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir…”84

Letters exchanged between Noel-Baker and the Defence Min-ister A V Alexander in June 1948 admitted the presence of “three battalions of Pakistan troops in Kashmir for some weeks” and agreed to “not press any enquiries about these…”85 The presence of the troops, it was argued, was necessary “to bolster the local Muslim morale (and) to prevent a great disruptive flow of refu-gees into Pakistan territory” and it was agreed to “not indicate whether we regard it as true or not”.86 As the summer of 1948 began, the British “official mind” was plagued by the fears sur-rounding “stand down”, “mass migration”, “strategic advantage”, “the cry of Islam in danger” and “the communist menace”.87

The fact that the FO and the CRO “knew in advance about the decision to send regular Pakistan troops into the state [Kashmir]” is also confirmed by Bucher who shared it with A C B Symon (deputy high commissioner India, 1946-49) and Terence Shone (high commissioner India, 1946-48) in July 1948. While Symon wanted to “let the matter rest so that no ill-feeling is generated”, Bucher “did not know what to do”!88 Shone revealed the extent to which Bucher exercised influence on the Indian cabinet to the CRO by claiming that the prolonged Indian silence on the pres-ence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir was due to the service chiefs, “particularly Bucher counselling them to keep quiet. He has a lot of influence with the PM, Sardar Patel and the Defence Minister and is a very restraining influence on the Cabinet”.89

Meanwhile, on 16 June 1948, the UNCIP began its first formal session at Geneva. Its members were Czechoslovakia (Josef Kor-bel – selected by India on 10 February), Argentina (Ricardo J Siri – selected by Pakistan on 7 May), Belgium (Egbert Graeffe – nom-inated by the UNSC on 23 April), Columbia (Afredo Lozano – nominated by the UNSC on 23 April) and USA (J Klahr Huddle – nominated by the UNSC on 7 May). On 7 July, it reached India and met Girija Shankar Bajpai on 13 July. On 4 August Zafrulla Khan in Karachi met the UNCIP and dropped the “bombshell” (as later called by Josef Korbel) of the presence of 3 brigades of Pakistani regular troops in Kashmir. On 13 August, for the first time, it pro-posed a ceasefire resolution. While Pakistan responded inconclu-sively to the resolution in a memorandum on 19 August, the fol-lowing day India accepted the resolution “in view of clarifica-tions”. On 25 August, the UNCIP endorsed Indian interpretation and acceptance of the resolution and answered the Pakistani

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memorandum two days later. Expectedly, Pakistan rejected the resolution on 6 September.

Gracey’s detailed presentation in front of the UNCIP in August 1948 is the best elaboration of the British concerns about the mili-tary engagements of the year: the northern territories of Gilgit and Hunza, along the Afghan, Soviet and Chinese frontiers and the western territories of Muzaffarabad and Mirpur, along the border with Pakistani Punjab. Gracey sought to i mpress upon the mem-bers of the UNCIP that if India gained an upper hand in the above-mentioned areas then it would mean facing

the Indian army on the long Pakistan border within 30 miles of strate-gic railway leading from Peshawar through West Punjab to Lahore…Occupation of Bhimber and Mirpur will give India the strategic advan-tage of…sitting on our doorsteps, threatening the Jhelum bridge which is so vital for us. It will also give them control of the Mangla headworks placing the irrigation in Jhelum and other districts at their mercy…Furthermore, loss of Muzaffarabad-Kohala would have the most far-reaching effect on the security of Pakistan. It would enable the Indian Army to secure the rear gateway to Pakistan through which it can march in any time it wishes…It will encourage subversive elements such as Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan... If Pakistan is not to face another serious refugee problem…if civilian and military morale is not to be af-fected to a dangerous extent; and if subversive political forces are not to be encouraged and let loose in Pakistan itself it is imperative that the Indian army is not allowed to advance beyond the general line Uri-Poonch-Naoshera.90

While Gracey also believed that apart from Kashmir on H yderabad too, India was “putting Pakistan into an impossible position”91 and communicated as much to Bucher, the latter h imself was sympathetic that

Pakistan is unable for political reasons to stop the movement of tribes-men from the NWFP, or of inhabitants of the Western Punjab into Kash-mir. There is considerable enthusiasm in Pakistan for the liberation of Kashmir.92

Bucher felt it “well-nigh be impossible for Pakistan” to resist this religious enthusiasm.93 He moderated general Carriappa’s proposal in June 1948 of air attacks on Jhelum bridges at K ohala and Lachhman Pattan; Mirpur and Gilgit because of political consequences as well as his belief that Kashmir affair weakens both India and Pakistan thus making the “rapid spread of Communism all over Asia all the more likely”.94 He was to later a cknowledge that “a friendly Kashmir is very vital to Pakistan in terms of defence, water supplies and the n ecessity to keep the NWFP quiet, in view of Pakistan’s lack of power”.95

So whereas domestically the British generals were working over time to calibrate the conflagration according to their needs, internationally Josef Korbel, a member of the UNCIP, felt that Kashmir had become the “plaything of Power Politics”.96 The CRO, for its part, kept cautioning the delegation to bear in mind that “the Indians should not attribute any initiative to us”.97 L ondon had a lot to feel unhappy about. India did not appreciate either “the practical difficulties of getting the tribesmen out of Kashmir” or “the anxiety in NWFP and West Punjab for the fate of Muslims in Kashmir” – issues important enough for the FO “to justify incurring some degree of ill-will from India”.98 India as “the bigger partner” had committed the “original fundamental error” over Kashmir. As if this was not enough, India’s foreign policy made “no sense in the present conditions of the world”.99

Nonetheless, given India’s size and significance, it was always a dilemma to

whether…take more active steps to save Pakistan, thereby risking I ndia’s secession from the Commonwealth or risk Pakistan’s collapse, thus losing an incalculable amount of prestige and influence in the Muslim countries.

By October 1948, the FO seems to have made up its mind that:

With the darkening world situation, that corner of the world repre-sented by Persia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India is bound to be one of the danger spots in Soviet schemes for expansion. The main bar to unity in this region is the Kashmir dispute, and we cannot help feeling that this dispute should be viewed in the light of the wider considera-tions mentioned above.100

By November 1948, Britain had also intensified its efforts to contextualise the Kashmir issue in Cold War terms in order to persuade the US to take a greater interest. Cadogan personally requested George Marshall (US Secretary of State),

to secure the services of General Eisenhower in view of the signifi-cance of the Kashmir issue in the wider setting of recent developments in South-east Asia and Far East, viz, spread of communism; Soviet military threat in NWFP and recent Communist successes in China.101

In the same month Marshall visited the subcontinent and, after meeting the Pakistan premier Liaquat Ali Khan, was impressed by the latter’s appreciation of the need for the restoration of sta-ble conditions in both the Indian subcontinent and west Asia “at this time of tension with the Soviets”.102 The FO knew that M arshall was unenthusiastic about playing a leading role in K ashmir partly because of his own unhappy and unsuccessful personal experience of playing peacemaker between Mao and Chiang in 1946 and partly because he, not unnaturally, saw K ashmir – as a Commonwealth dispute – a British headache. Bevin, therefore, personally warned Marshall:

Kashmir was on the Soviet frontier. Russia might well intervene as she had in Greece and China, playing on the tribes and on communal f eeling. Whoever controlled the valley of Kashmir controlled the s trategic and commercial communications between India, Pakistan and C entral Asia.103

Also, there was always a sense that “if we give the Americans the impression that we are trying to get them to pull one of our chestnuts out of the fire, we are unlikely to obtain their full c o-operation”104 as “[we have] many favours to ask of them and it would not do to exhaust our credit by being too persistent over Kashmir”.105

a ‘commonwealth problem’

In August 1948, there had been 300 British officers and 43 other ranks in the Indian Army. The numbers for Pakistan were 460 and 340, respectively. By November 1948, the figures were 230 (India) and 440 (Pakistan).106 No surprise then that the Ameri-cans maintained that Kashmir was a “Commonwealth problem” and were content to provide only sympathy and support to B ritain, owing to its “little interest and knowledge” as well as a lready having “too many international commitments”. More-over in the beginning the US was not totally convinced about the British approach to the Kashmir problem. In early 1948 it had some key objections. The legality of the instrument of accession,

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for one, was not in dispute for the US nor was Indian sovereignty over Kashmir. Consequently, it was not willing to endorse either the presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir or a UN takeover of the administration of the region.107 The fact that by late 1948 these objections were overcome in the light of Cold War politics108 shows the relentless and “dutiful” advocacy done by Britain for Pakistan – more so in the light of J F Walker’s report which came out in November – to prevent any anti-British feeling in Pakistan.109

In Delhi, with the winter offensive of the Indian army about to start, Bucher, anxious to avoid a clash with Pakistan, was advo-cating a defensive stance and was trying to avoid any “precipitate action on the part of… Carriappa” to the extent that he promised to send general McCay (COS Pakistan, 1948) a personal signal should the Indian government “double-cross” him over the res-triction of advance during winter months into Mirpur-Kotli-Bhimbar-Domel-Muzaffarabad.110 With his “relative detach-ment”,111 Bucher had, according to Shone,

Not only been ready to receive advice, he has constantly sought it and his influence – which has been considerable – has undoubtedly been an accommodating force. With Carriappa’s appointment (announced on 5 December 1948) our influence in military circles will therefore diminish and may disappear altogether.112

In this last phase of the conflict, hostilities intensified as Indian troops captured Pir Badesa, after advancing west from Naoshera from 15 October. The famed “tank battle” at the Zoji la pass (16,000 feet above sea-level) was fought on 1 November. Drass which had gone back to the raiders in August was recaptured in mid-November as were Pir Kalwa and Mendhar which linked Jammu and Poonch garrisons. Kargil was reoccupied on 24 No-vember but then general Bucher stopped the Indian advance to-wards Kotli, Bhimber and Mirpur. The respective air forces saw action in the last month of the war when the Indian Air Force bombed Palak, behind Kotli in the direction of Mirpur and the Pakistani Air Force responded by attacking Naoshera-Beri Pattan area damaging the strategic Beri Pattan bridge. When India a ccepted the ceasefire proposal on 23 December, its army was launched in a final advance to Kotli.

Bucher’s opposite number came in for even higher praise from Shone’s opposite number. Graffety-Smith reported to the CRO when the ceasefire was less than a fortnight away:

I am very well aware that General Gracey’s impulsive behaviour tem-perament leads him to consider the situation less frigidly than General Bucher. But I believe this to be more or less irrelevant, for any British officer commanding the Pakistan army must consider present opera-tions in Kashmir as more immediately critical and dangerous than they may appear in Delhi. Pakistan’s political and certainly her eco-nomic existence will be in the gravest jeopardy if West Kashmir falls into unfriendly hands. [There is no doubt; I take it, in the mind of HMG] Fighting is now going on in areas peculiarly vital to Pakistan’s survival. There seems to me a great difference in the relative urgency of these considerations as they affect each Dominion and I doubt whether an attitude of detachment, however possible in Delhi is p ossible or indeed permissible in the Pakistan C-in-C.113

This partisanship on the part of the British was privately a cknowledged in India. Shone admitted to Girija Shankar Bajpai (secretary-general, Ministry of External Affairs India, 1947-52) that, “the Pakistan military operations must have been done,

probably on the advice and certainly with the concurrence of s enior British officers”.114 Nehru twice sought the withdrawal of these “senior British officers”, in August and December 1948. On both occasions, Attlee demurred and gave the following reasons. First, enforcement of a stand down might drive Pakistan to des-perate measures. Second, some of the retired officers now serv-ing in Pakistan might defy the orders and stay on as volunteers. Third, popular feeling against Europeans might be roused in Pakistan such that their evacuation might become necessary at a time when the aircraft required could probably be found only by d iverting them from Berlin. Fourth, Pakistan might leave the Commonwealth. Fifth, the hostility of the world’s Muslim popu-lation towards the UK might be increased. And, finally, an inter-nal collapse in Pakistan might result, producing chaos from which the communists would profit.115

Debate in UN

Accordingly, the debate in the UNSC concerned not so much India’s complaint against Pakistan as Pakistan’s demand that the future of Kashmir be considered in view of its own vulnerability with respect to its unstable northwest frontier, an area that was of great strategic importance for the retreating empire, the emerging Commonwealth and the anti-communist block. On 22 Novem ber, the first Interim Report was prepared by the UNSC which was tabled at the Security Council and debate on Kashmir resumed three days later. Ceasefire proposals were laid out on 11 December which India accepted on 23 and Pakistan on 25 Decem-ber. As 1948 ended, Britain was engaged in persuading India not to take any step which would force Pakistan to commit its air force which would have given India the leverage to force the reluctant Britain to issue “stand down” orders. The “refugee” issue, the So-viet “threat”, the tribal problem and the “Muslim Block” cards were relentlessly played by the CRO and the FO throughout 1948.116

4

From the first resolution introduced in the Security Council on 21 April 1948, rejected by both India and Pakistan, to the UNCIP r esolution of 13 August 1948, which India accepted and Pakistan rejected and finally, the ceasefire proposals of 11 December 1948, which both accepted, the two issues of Kashmir’s accession to I ndia and India’s original complaint of aggression against Paki-stan were slowly overshadowed by the question of the terms and conditions for a plebiscite. Noel-Baker’s delegation to the UN oversaw this crucial shift of emphasis. British behaviour was dominated for British purposes for which a secure and strength-ened Pakistan was a necessity and for that Kashmir, or at any rate territories west to a certain line, was a necessity. Pakistan was clearly the more valuable ally and its position was given “maxi-mum latitude in interpretation” to prevent disadvantageous mili-tary and/or diplomatic positions. The focus remained on avoid-ing a full-scale inter-dominion war as well to ensure for Pakistan a comparable diplomatic position to that of India. While Kashmir can be called a “Commonwealth issue” in 1947, in 1948 it played itself out against complex and dynamic international conditions which made Britain keen to, first, ensure that India did not strike back at Pakistan in accordance with Article 51 of the UN charter;

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second, overcome the problem posed by Kashmir’s legal acces-sion to India which brought the matter of state sovereignty to the forefront; third, underplay Pakistan’s multifarious involvement in the tribal invasion; and finally, ensure that the focus of the UNSC firmly remained on the question of a ceasefire linked with arrangements for a plebiscite. Britain had made up its mind that “the point at issue is how to stop the fighting and bring about conditions under which a fair plebiscite can be held rather than arbitration between India and Pakistan”117 within five days of the crisis reaching the UN. This meant steering the discussions t owards a ceasefire and plebiscite plan away from India’s original formal complaint of aggression against Pakistan and from P akistan’s involvement in the invasion. This worked well in the January-April negotiations but became difficult with the entry of Pakistan’s regular army into Kashmir from May 1948, informa-tion which was publicly shared only in August 1948 when Z afrulla Khan admitted to it in front of the UNCIP whereupon it was a ccepted as a fait accompli.

London knew that India’s case was built largely on the “accept-ance of the Maharaja’s accession” which it dismissed within a day so as to treat the two dominions as “equal parties in dispute”.118 As the Attlee administration summed up a year later:

What in retrospect seems questionable about India’s action was not the despatch of troops to Srinagar, but the failure to seek the coopera-tion of the Pakistan Government and propose the despatch also of a Pakistan contingent and also their acceptance of the Maharaja’s acces-sion. This was highly provocative to Pakistan, particularly as there were good grounds for thinking that the Maharaja, and possibly also

the Government of India, had been waiting for an opportunity to bring about this accession.119

Then there was the Indian prime minister’s prickly personality and “moralistic” foreign policy – highly unsatisfactory for Lon-don and Washington in the face of “advancement of Communism in Asia”.120 Archibald Nye (high commissioner to India, 1948-52) was unimpressed by the “unrealistic Indian thinking on foreign affairs”.121 Nye had,

No doubt that India has sinned more than Pakistan. Nehru is very emotional – not disposed to see reason. The problem is a psychological one – what tactics to adopt with this particular man in these special circumstances to achieve our objects’. [The answer for Nye was to] ‘put aside the merits of the case – its legalities and technicalities’ as ‘this is no time to think of rights and wrongs’ and ‘[the] details of [the] debate must be risen over to give a broad view.122

In March 1947, the Truman doctrine had been announced; in June 1947 the Marshall Plan and Britain was naturally keen to extend this increasing US involvement in west Asia, central Asia, the Indian subcontinent and east Asia, in view as much of her own declining abilities as of the consolidation of communist forces in China and Indo-China.

The thrust of the British policy during 1948 was to “adjust our relations with India [and] avoid infuriating Pakistan”.123 To that extent they left India in no doubt that a political settlement was necessary in Kashmir, as opposed to a juridical consideration.124 The preferred policy – acknowledged as “extremely unfortunate” – then was, to force the issue with India “in view of the grave consequences to our relations with Pakistan”.125

notes

1 Mark Kurlansky, 1968 (London: Vintage, 2005), p xviii.

2 26.11.47, F 15639/8800/85, FO 371/63574, The National Archives (here after TNA), Kew.

3 November 1948, Tedder to Elmhirst, ELMT 3/1, Elmhirst Papers, Churchill Archives Centre (here-after, CAC), Churchill College, University of Cam-bridge.

4 11.3.47, Middle East Strategy Security Assess-ment, 7/2/1, Pyman Papers, Kings College London (hereafter KCL).

5 6.8.47 and 22.6.48, Middle East Strategy Security Assessment, 7/2/2 and 7/2/3, Pyman Papers, KCL.

6 19.5.45, PHP (45) 15 (0) Final, L/WS/1/983-988, India Office Records (here after IOR), British Li-brary.

7 18.4.46, Chief Of Staff (COS) Report No (46) 19 (0), TNA.

8 10.7.46, Cabinet Papers (46) 267, CAB 129/11, FO 371/52563, TNA.

9 29.11.46, COS (46-47) L/WS/1/1030, Tp (46), TNA.10 7.7.47, COS Tp (47) 90, TNA.11 14.10.47, F200/102, Mountbatten Papers, IOR.12 22.10.47, F200/103, Mountbatten Papers, IOR.13 25.11.47, CRO to its missions worldwide, DO

35/3178, TNA.14 28.9.47, Auchinleck to London, MUL 1262,

Auchinleck Papers, John Rylands Library (here after JRL), University of Manchester.

15 3/6/9.1.48, F 452/6/85/G, FO 371/69705 and 24.12.47, Bevin to Mountbatten, F 16771/8800/85, FO 371/63574, TNA.

16 26.2.48, CRO to its missions worldwide, DO 133/73, TNA.

17 10.11.47, Carter’s minutes, DO 142/493, TNA.18 29.12.47, Scoones to Gordon-Walker, GNWR 1/6,

Gordon-Walker Papers, CAC.

19 1.12.47, Scoones on Kashmir, MSS Eur D 714/84, IOR.

20 13.5.48 and 14.5.48, F 6983/6/85 G and PM/48/52 (Bevin to Attlee), FO 371/69717; TNA.

21 11.5.48 and 14.5.48, London to New York and Washington, F 7041/6/85 and F 1377/6/85/G, FO 371/69717, TNA.

22 6.11.47, F 146/86, FO 371/63570, TNA.23 23.10.47 and 5.11.47, F 14218/8966/85 and F

14722/8800/85, FO 371/63574 and 63571, TNA.24 20.11.47 and 1.12.47, F 15381/8800/85 and F 15821,

FO 371/63568, TNA.25 4.12.47 and 6.12.47, Telegram Nos F 16039/8845/47

and 752, FO 371/63568 and 63571, TNA.26 27.11.47, Inverchapel to FO, F 15700/8966/85, FO

371/63574, TNA.27 20.11.47, 1.12.47, 16.12.47; F 15381/8800/85, F

15821, F 16424/8966/85, FO 371/63574, TNA.28 29.10.47, Graffety-Smith to Noel-Baker, No 158,

L/PS/13/1845 b; Pol 134/48, L/WS/1/1148, IOR; also see 17.12.47, Cunningham to Halifax, MSS Eur D670/9, Cunningham Papers, IOR.

29 31.10.47, No 1158, L/PS/13/1845b; also see 11.12.47, Cunningham Diary, MSS Eur D670/6, Cunning-ham Papers, IOR.

30 16.10.47, Scott’s report, Pol 1401/47, IOR.31 16.10.47, Rumbold’s note on Scott’s report, Pol

1401/47, IOR.32 16.10.47, Rumbold’s note on Mahajan’s request for

restraining Pakistan to Attlee and 25.10.47, Rum-bold’s note to Attlee summarising the above de-velopments, L/PS/13/1845b, IOR.

33 See MSS Eur D 670/6, Cunningham Papers, IOR.34 See MSS Eur D 670/6 and 670/9, Cunningham

Papers, IOR.35 26.7.68, Mirza to Caroe, F 203/2, Caroe Papers, IOR.36 13.6.46, speech by Cunningham at the RIIA (ref.

No8/1244); 4.2.48, speech by Caroe at the Royal Institute of International Affairs ( here after RIIA)

(ref No8/1498); also see MSS Eur D 670/6, Cun-ningham Papers, IOR.

37 11.11.48, Mudie to Maurice Hallett, MSS Eur D 714/84, Mudie Papers, IOR.

38 P Patrick, DO 142/524, TNA.39 See MSS Eur D 670/6, Cunningham Papers and

R Pearce (ed.), Patrick Gordon-Walker: Political Diaries 1932-1971 (London, 1991), p 22, 169, 172, 174; also see, 11.11.48, Noel-Baker to Gordon-Walker, GNWR 1/6, Gordon-Walker Papers, CAC.

40 31.10.47, Ismay to Noel-Baker, No 1142 and Shone to Noel-Baker, No 1144, L/PS/13/1845b, IOR.

41 31.10.47, Noel-Baker to Ismay, 374/36 and Attlee to Ismay, Pol 1486/47, L/PS/13/1845b, IOR.

42 31.12.47, London to New York, No 4459, L/WS/1/1148, IOR.

43 1.1.48, New York to London, No 2, L/WS/1/1148, IOR.

44 3.1.48 and 6.1.48, London to New York, Nos 30 and 66, L/WS/1/1148, IOR.

45 7.1.48, Karachi to London, No 23, L/WS/1/1140, IOR.46 6.1.48, Sargent to Attlee about Bevin’s views, FO

800/470 IND/48/1, TNA.47 10.1.48, London to New York, No 131, L/

WS/1/1148, IOR.48 12.1.48, Nos 85 and 110, L/WS/1/1140, IOR.49 21.1.48, F 1099/42, Attlee to Cadogan, FO

371/69706, TNA.50 12.1.48, Nos 13, 14 and 23, L/WS/1/1140, IOR.51 14.1.48, London to New York, No 196, L/

WS/1/1148, IOR.52 16.1.48, Pol 133/48, L/WS/1/1148, IOR.53 16.1.48, Pol 134/48, L/WS/1/1148, IOR.54 16.1.48, Graffety-Smith to Noel-Baker, No 22

(339), L/WS/1/1141, IOR.55 20.1.48, Noel-Baker to CRO, No 135, L/WS/1/1141,

IOR.56 9.2.48, T No 470, Noel-Baker to Shone, FO

371/69710, TNA.

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57 20.1.48, Noel-Baker to CRO, No 140, L/WS/1/1141, IOR.

58 21.1.48, New York to London, No 158, L/WS/1/1141, IOR.

59 14.2.48, F 2383/6/85, FO 371/69709 and 15.4.48, F 5514/6/85, FO 371/69715, TNA.

60 28.1.48, Noel-Baker to FO, No 189, L/WS/1/1141, IOR.

61 10.2.48, Pol 6632/48, L/WS/1/1599, IOR.62 27.1.48, Cadogan to FO, T. No 357, FO 371/69707,

TNA.63 12.1.48, G. Squire to FO, F 488/6/85, FO 371/69705

and 29.1.48, F 1472/6/85, FO 371/69708, TNA.64 24.2.48, Mountbatten to Attlee, No 459, L/

WS/1/1141, IOR.65 4.4.48, GNWR 1/6, Gordon-Walker Papers, CAC.66 26.2.48, Cripps to Attlee, PREM 8/1455/2, TNA.67 4.4.48, GNWR 1/6, Gordon-Walker Papers, CAC.68 27.12.47, Noel-Baker to Shone, T. No 1590, DO

142/543, TNA.69 See NBKR 4/419 and 420, Noel-Baker Papers, CAC.70 17.3.48, New York to London, No 910, L/

WS/1/1141, IOR.71 18.3.48, Karachi to London, No 265, L/WS/1/1148,

IOR.72 12.4.48, Washington to London, L/WS/1/1187,

IOR.73 23.4.48, Karachi to London, No 412, L/WS/1/1141,

IOR.74 18.4.1948, Cunningham to Carter, MSS Eur

D670/9, Cunningham Papers, IOR.75 4.5.48, Karachi to London, No 465, L/WS/1/1142,

IOR.76 8.5.48, Delhi to London, No 1303, L/WS/1/1142,

IOR.77 12/19/29.5.48, Karachi to London, Nos 1393, 1499

and 1657, L/WS/1/1142, IOR.78 13.5.48, Bevin to Attlee, Ind/48/24, FO 800/470

and 9/10.8.48, Bevin to Noel-Baker, F 11799, 11800/85/G, FO 371/69721, TNA.

79 14.5.48, Karachi to London, Pol. 8144/48, L/WS/1/1599 and 9.6.48, Delhi to London, No 1804, L/WS/1/1153, IOR.

80 26.5.48, London to Washington, No 2566, L/WS/1/1152, IOR.

81 2.6.48, Washington to London, L/WS/1/1143, IOR.

82 20.4.48, Denning to Bevin, F 11800/6/85 G, FO 371/69721, TNA.

83 28.5.48/4.6.48, F 7595/6/85 G and F 7931/6/85, FO 371/69718, TNA.

84 8.6.48, London to New York, No 2569, L/WS/1/1152, IOR.

85 15.6.48 and 19.6.48, No G 2275/30, Y. No 20, L/WS/1/1142, IOR.

86 18.6.48, London to New York, L/WS/1/1142, IOR.

87 23.6.48 and 29.7.48, Pol. 8869/48 and No 2535, L/WS/1/1599 and L/WS/1/1143, IOR; 25.6.48, speech by Messervy at the RIIA (ref. No8/1558) and 21.6.48, Gracey to Elmhirst, ELMT 3/1, Elm-hirst Papers, CAC.

88 28.7.48, Delhi to London, No 2519, L/WS/1/1143, IOR.

89 4.9.48, Delhi to London, No 1844, L/WS/1/1142, IOR.

90 Quoted in Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Princ-eton: PUP, 1954), pp 138-39.

91 30.8.48, Gracey to Bucher (DO No 008/4/C-in-C), Bucher Papers, Templer Study Centre, National Army Museum (here after NAM).

92 File No 8310-154-105, Bucher Papers, NAM.93 17.11.47, Bucher to Baldev Singh, No 6/C-in-C;

24.9.48, Bucher to Elizabeth Bucher, File No 7901-87-6-1, Bucher Papers, NAM.

94 24.6.48, Bucher to Patel and Elmhirst; 13.12.48, Bucher to Elizabeth Bucher, File No 7901-87-6-1, Bucher Papers, NAM.

95 January 1951, 7901-87-6-3, Bucher Papers, NAM.96 13.9.48, Delhi to London, No 3194, L/WS/1/1145,

IOR.97 2.10.48, London to New York, No 125, L/

WS/1/1145, IOR.98 11.6.48 and 6.9.48, FO to CRO, F 8230/6/85, FO

371/69719 and 12711/6/85 S/24, FO 371/69721, TNA.

99 28.9.48, Grey to Cadogan, F 13613/6/85, FO 371/69721, TNA.

100 21.10.48, DO 142/521, TNA.101 9.11.48, London to Washington, No 11995, L/

WS/1/1153, IOR.102 10.11.48, Karachi to London, No 366, L/

WS/1/1153, IOR.103 27.10.48 and 6.12.48, Bevin to Marshall,

Ind/48/33, FO 800/470 and T. No 12938, DO 142/522, TNA.

104 11/12.11.48, F 15818/6/85 G and Sargent to Attlee, PM/OGS/94, FO 371/69723, TNA.

105 17.11.48, F 16051 G, FO 371/69723, TNA.106 20.11.48, Karachi to London, No 540, L/

WS/1/1153, IOR.107 16.2.48, G. F. Curson (New York) to CRO, L/P and

S/13/1939, IOR.108 26.11.48, New York to London, No 127, L/

WS/1/1153, IOR.109 18.11.48, Karachi to London, No 1395, L/

WS/1/1187, IOR.110 27/29.11.48, Karachi and Delhi to London, Nos

1458 and 1461 L/WS/1153, IOR.111 24.12.48, Graffety-Smith to Nye, S/24, DO

142/524, TNA.112 6.12.48, Delhi to London, No 4193, L/WS/1/1217,

IOR.113 19.12.48, Karachi to London, No 1550, L/

WS/1/1144, IOR.114 20.12.48, Delhi to London, No 4359, L/WS/1/1144,

IOR.115 23.12.48, Attlee to Nehru, No 4390, L/WS/1/1144,

IOR.116 10.12.48, Karachi to London, No 80, L/WS/1/1144,

IOR.117 5.1.48, Outward telegram from the CRO to its

missions worldwide, L/P and S/13/1948, IOR.118 28.10.47, Shone to CRO, L/PS/13/1845b; 29.10.47,

Noel-Baker to CRO, 8/47, L/PS/13/1845b; 29.10.47, Graffety-Smith to CRO, No 158, L/PS/13/1845b; 30.10.47, Noel-Baker to Ismay, 374/36, L/PS/13/1845b; ‘appreciation of the Kashmir situa-tion’, L/PS/13/1845b and Pol 134/48, L/WS/1/1148, CRO, IOR.

119 Document No Pol 134/48, File No L/WS/1/1148, IOR.

120 2.5.49, Noel-Baker to Attlee, DO 142/529, TNA.121 21.6.49, Nye to Percival Liesching, DO 121/71,

TNA.122 28.12.48, Nye to Noel-Baker, DO 121/71, TNA.123 5.3.48, GNWR 1/6, Gordon-Walker Papers, CAC.124 24.1.48 and 27.1.48, From New York to London,

T Nos 195 and 223, FO 371/69707, TNA.125 10/20.9.49, Gordon-Walker to Liesching, DO

142/537, TNA.

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