101st airborne operational report 10 mar 1967

8/3/2019 101st Airborne Operational Report 10 Mar 1967

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UNCLASSIFIEDAD NUMBER

AD512778CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: unclassified

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TO:Approved for public release, distributionunlimited

FROM:Controlling DoD Organization. AssistantChief of Staff for Force Development[Army], Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITYGDS, DoD 5200.1-R; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED


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THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITEDAND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNDER LOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 ANDNO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPONI3 USE AND DISCLOSURE.DISTRIBUTION STATEWENT AAPPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;DISTRIBUTION Ui.LIMITED.


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GENERALDECLASSIIC ATIONSCHEDULEIN CCORDANCE WITHD01 521.1-R & XECUTIVE ORIEi 11652

THIS DOCUMENT IS:CLASSIFIED It_Subject to General Ieclassificatiom Schedule ofExecutive Order 11652-Automatically 9owngraded at2 Years Intervals-,DECLASSIFIED ON ECENDER 31,

Wetesm Iocmsntaties CeterlfhIse Supply IggSKyCamra Statlem

Aiamddia, Virgiia 223T thi

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SECURITYMARKINGThe classified or limited status of this report appliesto each page, unless otherwise marked.Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OFTHE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18,U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OFITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BYLAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or otherdata are used for any purpose other than in connection with a defi-nitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Governmentthereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; andthe fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in anyway supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is notto be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensingthe holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rightsor permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention thatmay in any way be related thereto.

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CONFIDENTIAL //DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYOFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL d

WAUI414NGTON. G.G. 30330 j I -ZAGAM- (M) (2 Mar 67) F(F OT

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION J5STRANSMISSION1RT t It4BTIOI EUITSIUM UANYA U U in Um m IS"1. FoS Erded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned 'Headquarters, 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division for period ending 31

____ October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed~i ~ and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and byCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations andcorrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days ofreceipt of covering letter.

2.cb 9 rmation contained in this report is provided to the Com-mandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in thefuture from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adaptedfor use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY;LU_

I Incl KENNETH G. WICK{HAMC, a/s Major General, USAThe Adjutant General 0

DISTRIBUTION:Commanding GeneralUS Army Combat Development CommandUS Continental Army Coamand airCommandantsUS Army Command and General Staff CollegeUS Army War CollegeUS Army Air Defense SchoolUS Army Artillery and Missile SchoolUS Army Armor SchoolUS Army Chemical Corps School REGRADED UNCIASSIFEDUS Army Engineer School WHE N SEPARATED FROMUS Army M ilitary Police School CLASSFIIED TfICLOSURk -US Army Infantry SchoolUS Army Intelligence SchoolUS Army Medical Field Service School - , , 3 ,US Army Ordnance School I1)OWNGRADED5 AT 3 T W-J-1(In DCLASSIID A.Ft 12 y1MS

(Contnued on page 2) --. DOD DIE 5200.10

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DISTRIBUTION (Cont d)US Army Quartermaster SchoolUS Army Security Agency SchoolMg.~ Arm- , inai.Schoo I

V IWO*~ Traifsportatiofl School"'t&~ArmfPSV~ci-al Warfare School

US Afmy Civil.'Affairs School

AIDN DUN__MAPu

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CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATIONAL REPORT FORQUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING

31 OCTOBER 1966Ist BRIGADE

101stAIRBORNE DIVISION

DIPLOMATSAND

WARRIORS

CONFIDENTIALBest Available Copy


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CONFIDEN TIALL -;W I=AXRWWIA DIVIIC

AYE)-C 12 uWa b 26UWTt? Operational Report for QuarterlY Period tmiding 31 October 1966

(R= CMM.65) (U)

TO: See Distribuztion

Referencuesz AR249 dtd 26 Ma y 296, UShIW Rag 870.2 dtd 19 July 1966,and I Ml Reg 1-3 dtd 29 septdser 1966.

sgiitoant uni ua eiiesr- -trt of the Brigade were involved incombat cp~ations during.e entire reporting period with the exception of26-30 October 1966. Training waas conducted concurrent with cenbat opar-ations and during periods wena units were refitting and prep&r. for *per-ation.'L.) Cmbtertios.A summary of the concept nd exection of eaebof the k i eriiW arei given balmw.

1. Operation JM i PAUL JcM. (Ihae ]a and Hi).a. Dates: I Auut S eptmer 1966. Days in the fields36eb. Minaeonst Codkt search and destroy operations in an dprovide security for the VUNG RO Bay/VUNG 10 Pass ua.a Relieve the 2ndRCI Marins Brigade south of 1 JT HOA. Conuict search and destroy opera-tions northwiest of 'IVY HOA, and provide protection to civilians in theinitial stages of the rica harvest.c. lcations PW =U Province, RVN.d. Commanders Bi3 Willard Pearsoue. Forces involved:

(1) US- lit Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.(2) Others 2nd Korean WaAW Brigade, I47th 10fantrYRegiment (AMV). (V/8 Cavalry OPCCN to 1/10 though 5 Septmer 1966).

f. Concept and RecutioN. (See Inci 1, Combat After ActionReport, JMW PAUL JCKES.2. oeration S1ARD.

a. Datess 6 Beptombew - 26 ocbar 1966. anyu in the field:b. Misionas To protect the rice harvest in the WVY0A andTar AN areas. Conduct search and destroy operations against VCINVA fo ain the area of operations* Provide security for 'IV! BOA South Airfield,

MWRO Bay/Pass area an d the land LOC from VUNGO Bay to 'IVY HOA.c.Location: PHU3o Province, RVr.d, cmadr- Ba Willard Pearson.

FOR OT UT Q FDNTA ~f~660508 CO FX TI ~,"Lm,.u.s YooaInclosure D M1


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CONF IDEN TALA D-C 12 Novuber 1966X ECET.Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966(RCS OSqv-6S) (U)

e. Forces involvedt(2) V31 lt fUrlt, list lftbf D1ivIsio, tjInfantry, 4th Infantry Division OPOjI through 1 October 1966.(2) Others -47th Infantry Regiment (ARV ).

f. L:oncept and Vetutica. (3ee Inclosure 2, Combat AfterAction Report, Operation SW&FD).3*Oeaion 0110W4.a. Datese Coinenced on 31 October 1966 and will be coveredin the next quarterly operations report.b. Nissiosn To conduct search and destroy operations agalntVO/NVA forces in the AO.o. Location. WM YEN and JO i BOA Provinces, RVN.d. Commanders DO Willard Pearson.

B. Trainin. The mjority of the time covered during the reportingperiod was Spent in the conduct of tactical operatins. However, duringperiods of refitting and preparation for combat operations, units con-centrated training efforts in those areas which could be impred on , asnoted during previous operations. In addition to the ephasi placed onsmall unit tactics, the following training wPs organised and conductedat Brigade lovels1. All innong personmel, officers and enlisted men, continuedto be processed through the Replacement Detachment at IAN RANG wherethey received 6 days of intensified training in small unit tactics, weaponsindoctrination, survival, land navigation, patrolling and physical con-ditioning.2. Range firing contirned on established ranges with Small art,maidne guns, grenade launchers, hand grenades and mortars,3. Flame thrower temn from each infantry battalion continuedto receive proficiency training in the use of the portable flame thrower.4. A three hour envirornental driver training course was con-

ducted for al l units to train and orient personnel to cope with drivingconditions In Vietnam.5. Selected personnel within the Brigade received specializedtraining in the use of the sniper weapon (Winchester, Model 70 rifle) andsniper techniques.6. Tactical air training was established to femiiarize al l unitswith proper air request procedures, types of ai r support and selection oftargeta.7. Mobile training teams from the 2nd Battalion, 320th Artil-ler1 continued to train CIDG uwits in survey, fire direction, service ofthe weapon, am"rnition handling and forward ob erver prvedures.B. Training was conducted for radio telephone operators inradio telepone security and procedures, use of the S01, aid operatlof the CC 106 and ARBC22 radios.9. A three week cool. an d bakers school was conducted at PHA"

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CONFIDENTIALAVW - C 12 November 1966WB3ECT: OpratiOnal Report for Quarterly Period riting 31 October 1966(RCS cSUo-65) (U)A to train ae&ated perseasi to fill adsting nineniSs fltan the

10. Trnining in fire support coordination was cmncted to astablish techniques and increase the effectivenes of Infantry, artilleryand Tao Air support during combat o rations.

1. CH 47 helicopter ladder training was conduted to gtdbl b we-cedures to be used by infantry battalion. in future operation.12. The Squad tears Combat Reaction Couwe (I we e duration)wa established on 2. Augst 1966 at PHAN RAINO,M to inmtrmct =L l unit

loaders in the latest combat techniques.13. A special 4 hour course in aduirdstration was given to allfirst sergeants, pernonnel WOO's, and ccWarw clerks within the Brigade withthe objectve of increasing the efficiency and operation of a d trationthroWhqut the Brigade.1. A special Brigade training team wa s established and conduteda pre-combat orientation course for cpxaiy/battery siss units totaling

approximately 4000 personnel of all grades of the let Brigade, 4t h InfantryDivision.13. To assist the 1st Brigade, 4th Infartry Division to becomeoperational, the lat Brigade, 101st Airborne Division conducted an In-tegration program whereby key personnel of the 1st Brigade, 4th InfaBzDivision satellited on their counterparts to observe the functioning ofthe lst Brigade, 101st Airborne Division on a first hand basis.316. On 23 October 1966, the Squad Leaders Combat Reaction Coursewas disoontirraed and replaced by the Combat NCO Academy conducted by theReplacement Detachment in MM RANG, RVN commencing 30 October 1966. Thepurpose of the Combat NM Acadomw is-o develop superb infantry squadleaders with exceptional endurance, skilled in the techniques of counter-insurgency operations, field craft, survival and leadership ability. Theschool is one week in duration and ooiy team leaders in the grade of 9-5and outstanding Pf's and Sp4t's who ar e acting in a team leader or squadleader capacity are eligible to attend the school.17 . A seinar for squad leaders was held on 1,5 October 1966.Durir* the morning, free and uninhibited discussion pertaining to Brigadetraining program and small unit tactics was ccndctd. The mjor recca-mendation made was the conversion of the Squad Leaders Combat ReactionCourse to the Combat WO Academy, orientated toward outstanding 3-4's orE-3's as fire team or squad leader aspirants. Following a lunicheon inhonor of the squad leaders attending the asainar, five guest presen-tationa were given on Artillery, Army Aviation, USd7 Tao Air, ChemicalWarfare in Vietnam ard an f loinjr discussion of mines and booby traps.The tio-fold purpose of the guest presentation was to inform the squad

leaders of the latest battlefield techniques and allow then to erpainproblem existing in each field to the experts.18. A second sminar on artillery support was conducted forselected officers on 25 October 1966. The objective of this prea-tation/diecussion was to improve artillery support, coordination andr standing thrcugh the presntation ad mubeqemt analyis of twoartillery strikes. The results of the seminar were?

a. Th. artilley of the U.S. Army is extras]; effectiveduring counterguerrilla warfare.

b. The saifll4eulted in no recomendation for radicalchange In tactics or teelmiquesa.

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CONFIDENTIALAVE.C 12 Noviebr 1966SIWE Ts Operatioa Rep-t for Quarterly Period Inding 31 October 1966

a. Intem,Aed traA.irg betwen omb" opers9 osm isr~cesuar7 to Insure the infuatrymm fulil uemtortans the new artilleryconcepts.19. To prepare for the possible contingen7 of oonductiR analrborne assault, the 2/327 f and C2/320 Art' oondiot ed intenrifiedpro-airborne refresher training and C-130 -oc*-poading pavoodresduring the period 3-19 October 1966.20. On 2e October 196.6, a special two hour clas ienm bythe Brigade Postal Officer to all First Sergemts. Bttalion a UnitMail Clark@ concerning special za1 handlinA and postal regu3ation.

C. I. The following OPLARS and OF" were pabliebedAuring the renrt rt period. Th e Brigade ms not called upon to exuteMW tontinvency plas.~

1. oFD 147-6 (JaM PAUL HOS) dated 5 August 1966 coveringeliitati n of 4 arclight strikes.2. OPORD 1.49-66 (JOHN PAUL Jons) dated 14 August 1966 coveringrelief of the 2d Korean Xarine Brigade by the the lo t Brigade, Joist AirborneDivision.3. OPORD 153-66 (MAPD) dated 24 August 1966 covering wratectionof the rice harvost in the TU f AN and HIM R1OW Valley and security of theVUN RO Bay/Pas area.4. OPLAN 16-6 (('onti eney CW SON) dated 16 Soptoaber 1966covering relaf of the CUNG SON Special r. omp f it should ameurder VCi'WA attack. (Plan not executed).5. OPLAN 167-66 (Cotingency TAX CAW) dated 21 September 1966covoring the rei iL of the VAN CAIN 3~eial "oroemi, if it shmld omunder VC/fVA attack. (Plan not executed).6. OnAN 168-66 (Operation NARS.L) dated 23 September 1966coveing reinforcenent by the 1st Brigade, 01st Airborne Division in thePLINJ area. (Plan not ecuted).7. OPM 169-66 (Operation MMH CARCLI) dated 25 September 1966Covering the reinforcement of U.S. Xarina units in the D RAW5 area.(Plan not executed).0. WU N 171-66 (Operation ALLM) dated 11 October 1966covering the deployment of the '. Brigade, 2Cst Airborne Division tothe 1 M area. (Plan not ex et.9. OME 176-66 (OperationM MMI0) dated 25 October 1966covering the deployament of the let Brigade, Jost Airborne Division tocondurct search and destroy operations wet of TUr HOL and south of cuS01 .

D. 0A15 . See Inalour I and 2 for Task Fores orgazintionand Inc1=ofre- r-, iganization of Bar Area Support.

1. The following is a liAst of losses inflicted on the emnjchz the rporting periods

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CONFIDENTIALAWIDC 12 November 1966aR=Ti OpRW=omel Ror t for Quarterly Period Sding 31 October 1966

nta IA (UO) 20 230WAVNA IA (39?) 34 la~YC/)WA IDA (PC) 69 9~V/NVA MWA (2ST) 101 52VOAVAC 29/11 36/6Rallier. 2 10Detainees 384 83Individual 50 79Cre U4 d 5 1

2. Intslligmoe Problem AreastProblem Areas cmwaalability of basic photo coverage of iraof operatio- -Disssons Dues to thie limted facilities and the restrictionsimposed by the wilmer, operations are being mounted without the benefit ofbasic photo intelligence of the area. Since the Brigade is highly mobileand subject to deployment aRwhere throughout the country on very shortnoticep the current lead time of at least a week ad a half which it takesto **quire photography of a new area is inadequate. Recently a separatebattalion was sent on a search and destroy operation in the RIM HOA area.Photography of the area was received approxiemtely one week after the oper-ation ended. Basic coverage need not be exceedingly recent to be of value.Primarly it is used to determine defensive positions, major trails, landingzone, and provide other intolligenc to supplement mp information. Thescale of the basic coverage need not be large either sice the primary re-qUireaent is resolution. There are photo system available which providebetter than 51 resolution at the scale of 1/25,000 which is completelyadequato for basic coverage. The advantage of small scale photography is thata single mission *an caer a larIp area in a sbort period of tim. Fo r ax-mple, using An aircraft a single mission can be flown at a scale of l/,0D0 andcover an area of South Vietnam fro the Cambodian border to the coast in lengthand a al l dee of latituds in width. Such a progrm# in fact, wa s copletedcovering al l of South Vietuam in 3963-196&. This photography is still beingused, though it is outdated, by many intellpee age cies ou t of countrysimply because of the completenss of it s coverae. Such a program, which, ifflown every 6 months during opttme weather conditions for different sectionsof the country, would provide the photo-interpreter with comparative photo-

grapbr, ensure basic coverage, and be avai'able on a ti*ly basis. Thenumer of photo missions now being flown by aircraft taking large scale photo-graphy eould be redeed eosiderably thereby speeding up the reaction ti ofpresently available aircraft and ensurIng that intelligence of a tacticalnature was disseminated on a more timly schedule.Action Taken: A progam of this nature would have to be

lJ-I M28 CK00Ol - 0524009 Sep 66, let Bri&ad, 11st Airborne Division.2-SITl~ #296 230001 - 23240CM Oct 66.SITr #298 250001 - 252400H Oct 66.st Brigade, 101t Airborne Division.

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CONFIDENTIALAVE-C 1 oebr165Ipf3T. Operaional ROport for QUrterly Period 3ning 31 October 1966(VI8 trFm-65) (U)woordinated at &bighu level than this -.oadquartm sinc It yea 1.*VOi aOSIM o0iW 0" M MA at repipewlUtt. "~do wdt herr,1ested that basic coverage of its area of egrmtronm at an aeeeptablescalo of lA5,00 and has suggested the above mentioned program to the0-2 Air, I Field Force 1i7ettam.F. Personnel.

1. Unit Strengthta. Brigade personnel streng at th conclusion of the rqort-ing period war& os follow.

hathoriaed Augmented (H?02) 4~517Assigned 66Present for Buty 56ase Ma~p - PIU RAO 1002)Net Yrevent for Duty 597

b. Unit strengths as of 31 October 1966 (assigned).Off WO E

lot Bn (Abn), 327th Inf 37 1 8032nd Bu(Abn),327th Inf 35 1 ?992n d Bn (Abn),S502nd Int 36 1 84a22nd Bn (Abn), 320th Arty 35 3 49OHHC, let Bde 55 5 540oSupport On 56 1" 11o0326th ftgr 5 0 2002/27 0ev 5 0 181.181 Mi 8 1 1620th cow 1 0 6c. The assigned strength was 125 pms t of the authorizedaugmented strength. The present for duty strength was 12 percent of theauthorized augmented strength.d. Of the not present for duty strength, 3U were in tv it,75 on MR, 66 MrY, 53 leave, 23 in confinemmt, 30 in hospital, 7 ALand 2 detahed.a. Sice the last report, consderable progress has been

made in improving strength accounting. The to priry areas - hoe -pitaised and intransit personnel - continue to exist, however, duringthis quarter, the following corrective action was te .nt(1) P transit Parsonmsl - a viRnrea program to purgefrom urit morning reports al l personnel assigned, not Joined, was in-ltiate. Otis hundred and te personnel who, on arrival in Vintwa wuvdiverted to other unit@, were identified. A toax free USARV visited theigadet identify by name those men oa.rried not present for duty. Asa result of these actions, over 250 personnel were dropped from theassigned strength of the Brigade.(2) Rospitalied personnel - a centralized control pointfor processing the reasignent of al l medical evacuees was established byHeadquarters, United States Army Vietnaym, on 25 &Wut 16. This nysten hasworked well in insuring the reassignment of personnal who are edicallevacuated out of Vietnaw. On 26 October 1966, United Staten Army Vietnemextended thin concept to provide for the reasigment to a central medcalholding dotachwnt of persononel who are admitted to hospitals inV2tn. Upon release fr t the hospital, these personnel arwe reas-signed back to their forwr unit. This procdure wil eliminate the

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CONFIDENTIALAVE..C 12 November 1966SUBI&WT: Operational Report fo r C'u2terly Period Ending 31 October 1966(MRs oSF-65) (U)9t~t tn 9flaaec ngllm *Aseciee with boepitalieed pereamwol me

2. Casualtiesa. Casualties fo r the period (1August thru 31 October 1966)were as follows:

Operation JOHN PAUL JONE 1 Operation MAJUI 23 26WA U2 169MIA 0 0

b. Total casualties to date are as follows:KiA 317WU 1713MIA 2

3. Personnel Programs: The following programs were initiatedand/or continued during the reporting period:

a. hsiorialization: A memorsjisation board wa s establishedduring the reporting period. This board will coord4.nate the memorial-ization of Brigade facilities at its Base Camp to honor troopers wh o havemade the supreme sacrifice on the field of battle.

b. Athletics- In conjunction with long range athletic pro-grams fo r the PHil RANG base area, the Brigade received and distributed30 company sized athletic and recreation kits to units in the Brigade.These kits provide a variety of sports and rocreational equipment suf-ficient to meet the needs of a company sized unit.

c. Accuracy of Personnel Records: To insure that personnelrecords reflect complete and accurate data on all pere:nmel, a compre-hensive records check was initiated. Because of tactical deployment ofthe Brigade, it we necessary to move the records frow base camp to theforward area to provide each individual trooper an opportunity to reviewand a-date his recordr. During this period 167 officers and 2637 en-listed me n reviewed their porsodal fi les.d. Sponsor Program. The sponsor program for incoming of-ficers was continued. This program includes a personal letter from th eBrigade Commander to each incomirg officer and offer any further as-

sistance required. Purpose of the program is to stimulate a feeling of"belonging" to the Brigade before arrival as well as to answer arquestions the newly assigned officer ma y have.a. Awards and Decortionst In addition to citing personnel

in Brigade General Orders fo r valor in combat, the following award anddecorations were presentedia _ S s) Ma U AMv 2V 14LOlD M

OFF 16 0 0 12 38 74 1 9 12 15 63 0Wo 30 1 1 0 5 0 3 0 0 0 0EM 21 1 0 65 198 29 2 134 32 4 188 815 8- le t Bde, 101st Abn Div S1 Section Journal dtd 9 Noveber 1966.

2 - Ur. SIT7

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CONFIDEN TIALAVBD-C 12 November 1966SUBJEM: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ding 31 Otober 1W / D

(ECS CSPMt.65) (u)2. WlErted Fractio: Driag th e per- the Zrigadereceived an fllsed the follevIh enlistod aoint;s allocations

E4 35 B5 97 M IVMiust 403 163 79 5 1 0September 441 139 64 0 0 0October 66 19 7 2 0 1

g. P&f: The Brigade utilized 913 out of country R&R quotasduring the period. At the present rate of llcation, 81.6% of theBrigade's personnel will be able to take an P0. Breskcsn far theperiod is as followsa

Officers Warrant Officers RelistedAugust 12 0 3MSeptember 9 0 M0October 3M 2 276

h. us0 Shows: Toe hows visited the Brigade during theperiod. They performed for approximately 4 hours for the troops locatedat Tuy Hoa South.

is Admniistrative Schools A Quarterly Adinistrative Schoolwas established to provide the highest caliber of administrative supportfor the Brigade. The Adjutant General has the responsibility for con-ducting the program of instruction. Attendance at the school is requiredfor unit morning report cleyks, unit first sergeants, and battalion per-sonnel staff NOt0.J. Postal Activities: Postal Activities involved theestablishment of a postal school by the Adjutant General. The purpose is

to provide the best possible postal service for the personnel of theBrigade. The response to this program was evident by the comment fromthe postal inspection by United States Army Vietnam on 27-30 September1966. It wa s noted that mail wa s being expoditiovi1y proc~esed to "otroops in the field an d that all aspects of postal operations aidactivities were being met.

k. Red Cross:(1) The Red cre j Recreational Unit began an acoelertedprogram during the period. The ysung ladies made weekly visits to TUT HOA

to distribute literature and serve in the mess lines. The response tothis progran has been excellent.(2) Following is a breadown of services rendered by

the Red Cross during the period: AS Oc2t TOTALRequests Received 31 68 321 1,002Leave 37 37 28 102Disability & Oovt Benefits 7 0 U 18Health & Welfare Reports 224 M2 21.4 667Personal Problem 24 24 39 87FalyProb 8 XOthers 8_1Total Served 3M 329 33f - 975;

1. Brigade Officere ML3&ay Jntice Lecture: This twohour lectire was given to al l officers in the Brigade an d covered recent

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CONFIDENTIALAVBD-C 12 November 1966TBWECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Lbtober 19&6(2C8 aSz..65) (U)developments in the law as they pertain to military justice. The lecturealso pointed out the duties and responsibilities of the trial and defensecounsels in Special Courts-Martial. In addition, emphasis was placed onthe regulations and directives pertaining to the admirnistration ofmilitary justice in Vietnam.

me Language Aids: English-Vietnamese language cards arebeing printed with short phrases, rank structure, weapons, days, andnumbers. Distribution of these cards will be made down to team leaders.4. Personel Planning:

a. Coordination continued for the scheduled rotation of ap-prozinately 900 personnel during the month of December 1966. The Brigaderequest to spread this rotational hump from 7 November to 21 December wasdisapproved by Headqarters Unitad States Anw Vietnam. However, in casewhere the individual's replacement has arrived he may be reassigned toCHUS in advance of his normal DEROS. This is expected to facilitate therotation of this large group of personnel. In addition, DERS personneland replacements will be processed in and out of CAN RANH BAY effective onor about 1 November 1 6.

b. An Arm Postal Unit organized at 0 strength was attachedto the Brigade on 1 October 1966. The arrival of personnel to fill thisunit will perait better postal service in the forward area and release oftroopers presently engaged in postal activities at the Brigade Base Camp.

5. Problem Areas: Administrative problem areas ercounteredduring the reporting period included the following:

a. Shortages or crltical ltS's, although reduced from theprevious reporting period$ contirsied to exist. Cooks, aechanics, medicalspecialists, and wiremnire the most critical enlisted shortages.Shortages of 2 Aircraft Maintenance Officers and I Medical Service CorpsOfficer have continued throughout the period.b. The accelerated promotion of officers, particularly tothe grade of captain, caused increased imbalances ik grade. Correctiveaction has included the diversion of majors and captains and the requisition-

ing of additional officers in the grade of lieutenant.6. orale: Morale remained "EXCELfT throughout the period.7. Comnnders and Principa Staff:

a. Brigade Headquartrs:BG Willard Pearson Be COCOL Chester B. McCoid DCOLTC Harry A. Buckley X01TC Donald E. Rosenblum S3MU Jerry L. De mzn alML Harold P. Austin 82YMJ Marvin Rosenstein S4MU Stephen C. oherty 85

b. Battalion Commanders:LTC Joseph 1. Col.lins CO, Tt Bn (Abc), 327th InfITC Joseph Z. Wasco 0, 2d Bc (Abu), 327th In!LTC Frank L. Dietrich W, 2d Ba (Aba), 50d InfLTG William R. Madden Jr.CO, 2d fn (Abn), 320th ArtyLTC thward P. Abood CO , Spt Ba

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CONFIDENTIALAVBD-C 12 November 1966SUIJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Inding 31 Oatcher U366(m a CSILU.40) (U) j

a. Separate Campaniea:CP T Richard R. Maglin C0, 2d Sqdn (Abn), 17th CarCT Robert & Steirar C0, Co A (.bn), 326th 3WCP T Lloyd K. bardner CC , H!C, Ist Bds

1. Gafl. There were no major changes in the concept of log-istical operations during the reporting period The Brigadels Ewase Campat PW ; RANG continued to receive all classes of supply through the PHAWANG Sub Area of the US Army Support Ceoand at CAMAZH BAY or directlyfrom CAM RA RAI. Units in the f rward area received Class I and Vdirectly through the TUT HOA Sub Area of the US ArqT Support Command CAM=7 BAT. At the close of the reporting period a command decision was madeto place the Brigade S-reon's office under Si staff euperviaion where itcould be more closely correlated with thm casualty reporting activities ofthat section.

2. ORGANIZATION FOR WUPPORTa, &mort Battalirn:

(1) Headquarters Detachment: Provided the command andcontrol function of the Forward Sipport Element (iSE) located in the BrigadeAO. It was organized into command, operations, comua ications and movementcontrol elements.

(2) Administrative Detachment: Provided for personnelactions, pay, an d mail service to the forces in the forward srea.(3) Supply Detachment: Assumed responsibility for thereceipt, storage and issue of al l classes of supply. It also included arigger team.(4) Maintenance Detachment: Provided a repair capabilityfor small arms, artillery, engina r, automotive, signal an d quartermasterequipment. It was organized into a shop office, a recovery team, andcontact team.(5) capmy D, 326th Medical Battalion: Established a

clearing station with an dO bed capacity, surgical section, holding section,emergency treatment section, and a dental section.b. Laurry and Bath Service: Was provided by TOT HOA SubArea, US Army Support Command, CAM PRN Bay. Th , element established ashower udb and laundry service at TUY H0A South Airfield an d a showerunit at TIY HOA North.c, Water: Was provided by Company A, 326th Engineersutilizing a 1500 gallon erdalator at TY HCA North Airfield throughoutthe reporting period. Additionally a 60 0 gallon erdalator was establishedin the forward area -f operations at DONGRE for a short time Units atTOY HCA South Airfield received water from a water point establimed bytho TUY CA Sub Area. At the close of the reporting period, an additional3000 gallon erdalator was placed in service by the TOY HOA Sub. Area in thevicinity of PF HIEP, South of TOY HOA.d. raves Registration: Was provided by*T Y HOA Sub Areawhich located a collection point adjacent to Company D, 326th Medical Bat-

talion at TOY HOA South Airfield.3. MATFRI AND ERVICES:

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a. %nfly:(1) Class I: "B" nd "C"rations were consued regularlythroughout the reporting ps'iod by forward elements. "A" ration supplements

were consumed regularly by personnel at the Brigade Base Camp at PHAN RANlG."A"ration supplements were received in the forward area. Throughcutseveral phases of the reporting period there were shortages of starches,ground coffee, fresh vegetables, ice, condiments and sugar* The amount ofClass I issued equaled 808 short tons during the reporting period.(2) Class II and IV: The Support Battalion provided thebulk cf al l 111nd IV supplies via direct support 0V-2 aircraft. TUY HOASub Area furnished the majority of barrier naterials. A total of 130short tone were exended during the rep-ting period,(3) Class III: All classes of POL were received fromthe TUY OCAub Area, Consumption for the reporting period totaled 847short tons.

(a) MOGAS 170,625 gallons(b) DIESEL 50,200 gallons(c) AVGAS 21,225 gallons

(4) Class V: The Brigade began all operations with itsbasic load of azun tion. All units, with the exception of 2/320 Artycontinued to deploy with the on individual and on vehicle portion of thebasic load, while Support Battalion retained responsibility for trans-porting and maintaining the bulk portion of the b;sic load. The 2/320Artilery assumed responsibility for deploying it s entire basic loadShortages of the fc -'Tng ite a were ex-. ri enced dur tn- the reportingperiod:(a) Grenade, Hand, Smoke, Yellow,(b) Grenade, Hand, Smoke, Green.(c) Grenade, Hand, Smoke, Violet.(d) Cluter, Star, Ground.

(5) Maintenance: During the reporting period, commandemphasis was placed c" al l phases of the maintenance program. A MaterialReadiness Assistance. Team was requosted -ron US ArPy Victnam. The teamconducted a courtesy ,inspection of subordinate units and completed itsactivities Just prior tj the close of the reporting period. This in-spection revealed that .ome additional effort was required in the areasof small arms maintenance and records keeping. In spite of this, theBrigade achieved a decidedly low deadline rate throughout the entirereporting periods(a) The following number of job orders were receivedand completed during the reporting period:

RECEIVED COMPLETEI Automotive 281 2752 Animett 546 542

Sgnal 954 92031

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CONFIDENTIALAM=ET, OpraUonal Report for Quarterly Period Ws1in& 31 Cs sUobe 6(zSfldGa ) (U)

D*Lea 25%rj r rument 203 2M6 Servie 295 291

T1Rcoota 4(b) Transportatioa:

I Veld.alart Land transport rmadned theprimary means of traznportJ.on from CAM RANH Bar to the Brigade Bale Capat PM RAG. The use of vehicles in the forward ara" continued to berestrted. Approximtate.ly one third of the Veilee organic to the Brigadean attached units were utilized in the forward area. During the reportingperiod there van increasing use of land LWC's to convoy supplies from TUTHOA to outlying areas.2. Air Transort: Air tr:naport by direct sup-port CV2 flight from the P IM RANG Base Camp to TVY BOA remained the primaryMeans of bringing Mms 11 and IV item, personnel and mail forward. Normally,two CV2 alrcraft were received on a daily basis. In adition to sorties toand from base camp one sortie per week wa s Mode to NU L TRANG to obtainmedical supplies. In addition, several sorties par week of C-123 and C-130aircraft were received for the purpose of hauling bulk cargo. Sorties andtotal tonnage flown by direct support C72 aircraft were as folios

SORTIS SHORT TONSkgut 16 h22September 19 433October 227 466

(4s) Ar Resupply: Throughout the reporting period,runpb to comitted units was almoet exclusively by U1-ID helicopter,while CH-47 helicopters were used to displace &nd resupply the artillery.The tollowing toenago was 24/ted by helicopter during the reportig periodtalgust 37%September 363October 383

Total 1121 Short tons4. NEICAL:

a. A simplifed medical evacuation request form was introduceddurlng the reporting period. It simplified and expedited medevac reqmmsts.(ZaclcsUrw 5)b. Significant Diseases:

AUGUST SEflNU3ER OCTOERMalaria 69 45 48ScrubTyphus 0 3 2Oastroentritie 29 25 4epatitie 0 2N-P Problem 7 5 4Venereal lisease 98 210 307

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CONFIDENTIALAVD-C 12 November 1966SUBJECT. OPraticW9 Report for Qlrterly Peric' Ending 31 0t5ter 19664r (M3 Ciani ) (U)

EA-UsT SZP"tR OTO8DFUC 193 48 116Respiratory Infections 3 10 11Heat Injury 4 7 2Skin Disorders 25 55 82

H. Civil Affairs.i. Generals During this reporting period elements of the Brigadeoperated in three provinces, NfNH TAN, PW YN and KHAH HOA. The Great-est efforts in Civil Affains/Civic Action activities wre m ad in PHU YE;Province, where the bulk of the Brigade operated during this period.Efforts in NINH TUAN, Province, where the Brigade Rear Area is locatedwere directed mainly towards maintaining liaison with local OW officialsand providing scme limited support to local Civic Action Projects. Opera-tions in UHAN HOA Province were limited to providing support for tacticalelements of the Brigade which operated, briefly, in that Province.2. Civil Affairs:

a. The most notable accomplishment of the Brigade in thefield of Civil Affairs, during this reporting period, was the initiationcf the FW YEN Province Team Meetings. These were a regularly scheduledseries of mectings between the Province Chief, al l of his US Advisors (MACV,USAID, JUSPAO, OSA, and Police), and the Brigade Commander. These meetingsprovided a fortm for frark open discussion of nutual problems and forexchange of information on the various US sponsored programs being con-ducted within the province. Theso meetings were reinforced in their ef-fectiveness by similar meetings at the Battalion-District Level.

b. Other Civil Affairs activities included the maintenanceand expansion of price stabilization, community relations, and t0(Wcooperative efforts initiated during the Brigadels entry into its curruntAO.

3. Civic Action activities included the fclloingsa. Civic Action ProJects Reported:

Health and Sanitation 8bPublic Works 33Transportation 30Labor, Commerce and Industry 20Agriculture and Natural Ru ource 19Education and Trainiag 14Public Affairs 30Comunity Relations 53Psychological Warfare andCmmuncatione 14Refugee Assistance Public Welfare 23TOTAL REPO E PROJECTS 320

b. *Jadiem Shmw* operatios vere only conducted 3 tin-durirc this roporting period. Difficulties encountered in conducting thisS"Medicine Show" - ;. igh impact, short duration operation built around avisiting ECAP (Medicial Civic Action Program) team an d including securityforces, psychological operations and intelligence persomel. These opera-tions attempt, while performing civic actions, o influence the peopletowards GW and gain information concerning the hamlet VC infrastructure.

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CONFIDENTIALAV 12 oe r 1966SUBJECT O-ational Report for MrterlY Period Ening 31 Gtber 16

W 8 OR..$) (MVPS t opeesatin gem

(1) Lack of troops to secure the operatio.s(2) District OfficialA being unlling to divert effortfrom the Coukct of the rice harvest.(3) A shortage of MOW supplies.

C* These Opra. va" a cambined 55,31 opration whichincladed civic action, psychological warfare and intelig nee personmeland which had the mission oft(1) COOnaotimg civic aUetiW(2) Oathering inUtlligenoe inforuation.(3) Conducting psyeholofical operations.(4) Getting the local GO officials eloer to the people,On e of the operations nw fairly successful and resulted in h C KI (BC),5VC captured an d 1 suspected V being arrested by the National Police.

d. Us' , l-.'s obtained from the ORemote Area HandbookO,specifications were dran up , plans madae,ad contracts let, for the pro-curement of 10 3gle Brand* hand operated washing schines. The purposeof this project was multifoldi(1) To provide washing machines for local inatitutional(orphanage, dispensary an d hospital) use.(2) To stimulate the local eoneW.(3) To help establish a new product which could be localywmufactured and sold.

a. A Brigade Voluntary Civic Action Pund and fud Councilwas established. This should prove useful in 1 funds for certaincivic action projects which cannot be financed by appropriated funds.f. The major civic action project of the Brigade during thisperiod was the support and protection of the fall FM I Province riceharvest. k otal of I33.5 metric tons of rice wor harvested and reported.This represents 89% of the origimal Province barwet goal of 9500 mtrictons. The were furnished 6 2%tons trucks from 3 Septamber to 25 Octoberand 1 light tactical raft from 13-21 Septembear to suppor the rice harvest.local officials expressed satisfaction for the protect~An provided the riceharvest. It is believed that only a munate portion of the harvest fellinto Viet Cong hands.go During this period, Tam 9, Ulat Civil Affairs Companywas detached from operatiowa control of this Brigade %w leaves oalyone Civil Affaire To (C A Tem 2$, last CA Ce) attadah to this arigade.This, in viesw of the widely separated areas covered by the Brigade, leavesthe Brigade soommhat m-derstaffeA for Civil Affairs opamtion a a

I. Chemical.1. Ohemical fappwt provided was principally in the offdive useof io t Control Agents (RCS) an d contitnal flea thrower preparation. TheBiade only used one method of HOA dissemination during the reporting period,dlvery of 1(7 A3 CS filled grenades by expended 2.75 inch rocket pods fromlov flring UN-= helicopters.

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CONFIDENTIALAVBD-C 12 November 1966ii SUBJECT Operational Report for Qurterl:, Period Dtling 31 a- ober 1966

(X3B CSFOR-65) (U)2. Oft rta~ve tuvmil systM em'a lisfecnnd containing about1OO meters of deep tunnel. After thorough searching and mapping byAgineerap the tunnels were contaminated with C an d sealed by explosives.

ApproklmatelY 330 pounds of bulk CS were used in this operation, extendingover a four day period. During this tunnel operation the KM MITE blowerwas used to a limitd degree since personnel were going to explore thetunnel system. There is an inherent danger in pumping the tunnels full ofcolored or white samoke and then entering for a search.

3. During Operation JO PAUL J0I0, ending on 5 September 1966,a total of three offensive strikes were conducted. All strikes were con-ductod using the UH-iD to drop X? A3 CS filled grenades. The first dropwas made on a secondary target since the 'primary had fled by the time theRKA chopper arrived. This action painted up the need for a more respomenivesystem since likely targets tend to disperse unless engaged ruickly. Thisproblem was solved by patting a helicopter on RCA strip alert during the dayand utilising this same ship for flares at night. The second mission wasconducted on the pr:.-t.nzy target; dug-in personnel on z hill side. As aresult of unusual metesological conditions the burning CS did not drift upover the target and the results were considered to be minimal. The thirdmission was conducted on a suspected VC location and was mde at firstlight. Weather conditlone were perfect and the CS olmd remained in thearea for approximately 20-30 minutes.

4. During Opertion SWARD only one RCA aerial mission was flown.This mission was made against suspected VC ambush sites and proved veryeffective in contaminating the hillside on which the ambush sites wereknown to be located. In addition to the RCA strike, the large tunnel com-plex mentioned in parAgrajt P nbovu wqs 6: suvurod and destroyed duringOperation SEJAR.

5. Durng this operation period 2 fl59 Cluster, rannister, CSbomblats wore obtained from the RON units departing this area. These239's have an area coverage of incapacitating CS of approxdmately 25,000square meters. In addition to the E159's each infantr7 battalion wasissued two (2) 38's fo r ground employment of RCA CS on an imradiate basis.

6* a 4 October 1966 the Commanding General, lot Brigade, 101stAirborne Division initiated a letter to the Commanding General, I FieldForce Vietnam concerning the present herbicide program. The present systemhas proven to be not as responsive as could be on certain operations tohit known VC crop in sufficient time to kill these crops. A recosen-dation was made that Sector FAC's be authorized to fly specially modified0-1 aircraft so they could spray VO crops at proper times. These missionswould not be flown without prior approval of the Province Chiof.

J. Enginee: (A Co , 326 &igr En Abn)1 Operat I.us.

a Number of days in tactical operations: 86.b. Mrmary engineer task was the sweeping of roads for mines.

Opn JOFl PAUL JONE 2000 km of road sweptOpn SEWARD 2200 km of road sweptNo mines destroyed/removed: 51

o. Attached as Tab A to Inclooure 9 to After Action ReportSWARD (Inclodure 2) is letter, Subject: Viet Cong Mines dated 23 Septem-ber 1966, which outlines thu Brigade exrerience in r,.ate ndinig.

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CONF IDENTiAl_AV-C 12 November 19663BJKCT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Fnding 31 Oct 66 (RCS /CSFc -65) (U)

d# The Driui dUscovered, 601=" V4 dntred ai gX -tenmive tunnel system in lat September and the report is attached asTab B to Inclosure 9 to After Action Report, Operation SEWARD (Inclosure 2).2. Training.

a. Total number of days in training; 4,b. 2 days devoted to assembly/disassembly of the floatingfoot bridgeoc. 2 days spent in developing technique and proficiency inladder exits from CH-47 helicopter and rappeling from cliffs. Concurrenttraining was conducted on familiarization and zeroing of the M-16 rifle.

3. Civic Action Frojecta. 85 loads of fill material were deli vered and leveled for aVietnamese school in TUY BOA.b, 31 loads of fill were hauled to TIN LIN4 Church in TOT HCA.

Project was 50% complete when work was halted due to flooding of the area.K. Signal communications instructions were c ducted con-current witFloperations in the following areasa

1. General radio-telephone operating procedures and cammuni-cations security,

2. In installation and operations procedures and communicationssecurity.L. Psycholog.l Warfare% The Brigade considers the PsychologicalWarfare e rttBe an extremely important adjunct to ground tacticaloperations. Leaflets are delivered primarily by a U-10 aircraft and aOH-h7 aircraft, both of which are assigned to the 5th Air Commando Squadronwhich is based at NHA TRANG. At times, organic aircraft have been utilized

to drop leaflets or broadcast Psychological Warfare tapes. During Oper-ation JOHN PAUL JONES, 9,083,000 leaflets were durpped and 58 hours ofbroadcasting time was utilized. The leaflets dropped and the tapes broad-cast included 8 speci-" leaflets and 6 special tapes. During OperationSEWARD, 5,47,000 leaflets were dropped an! 60 :urs of broadcast timewas utilized. There were 7 special leaflets and 4 special tapes made for0erition SEWARD. Operation OFRONIMW I was one day old at the close ofthe reporting period and on that day 143,000 leaflets were dropped insup.port of the operation. During the interim period between OperationSa'ARD and Q&RONIMO I there were h25,OO0 leaflets dropped and 2 hours ofbroadcast time utilized. The majority of the broadcasts were made fromaircraft, however, ground mobile speakdr teams have been utilized by thefront line Infantry Battalions. See Inclosure 7 with Tab A to After ActionReport, Operation SEWARD (Inclorure 2).

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CONFIDLNTtALAVBD-C 12 November 1966MJWECTS 0perational Report for uarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966I? (RO;S csFOiR-65) (U)

SECT'ION 2 (C)OeemeraObsrvatot.aulRooamndatlons

Part I Observations (Lessons loarned)A. General.

Although the igade had an excellent kill rate during the re-0crtlg period the problem re ir one of target acquisition And reducedreaction time when the ene is detected. In order to improve the killrate In forth cmirN: operations the BrtCade will ut.lize the concept of"semi-guerril a tactics" i.e., adopt guerrilla tactics during -earth anddestroy operations until contact is made and then operate oon-vntionallyusing all avadlable firepw er, nobility and reserves. The basic principleasof semi-guerrilla warfare have bew published for the guidance of all con-cerned. (Sea Incl 4).

1. Items Stay behind forces.Discussion. Following the exploitation of B2 strikes battal-ions were extracted fr m the irua leav4 ng two racor dssance platonc with

seven days rations as "stay behind" forces. After three days the platoonsreported infiltration of enemy forces back into and through the area. Thvarea was assaulted again by US forces utilizing the "stay behind" forcesto secure LZ's and block routes of exfiltratidn from the area.Observation. A "stay behind" force should be ut~lla.d tocapitalize on thEe e'nemyf tRw~mi~y tO 1'utUrfl to beade arnam after USforces have departed.

2. Item: Exploitation of B52 strikes.Discussion. In exploitation of B52 strikes the Brigade

conducted aireobile assaults directly into the strike area within 20mites following the bombing. This method of exploiting strikes waseffective and reduced the time required to get combat troops into thearea.9!ervaMja2.n By conducting rapid airmobile assaults directlyinto E52 strike araa the dazed enemy is given litto time to reorganizeor evacuate the area.

3. Ite. Displacement of Co6pany CP's.Discussiou. The VC are capable of fi4ag the location andinternal layout of t&Mcal C '. Several probes -wlJ1 ikely be made toverify their information. After careful rehearsal the VC will conduct awell supported attack on a CP to kill the maximum number of personnel

and capture as much equipment as possible.Observation. Company CP's should be relocated at leastevery forty eg - .

4. jt. Interrogation techniques.Discussion. Interrogation techniques shou3d be oriented tothe local guiWr n addition to the conventional ! line of questioning.Interrogation at the local guerrilla level will aid in the production oftimely intelligence for the small unit commander.

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CONFIDENTIALAV1ED-C 1I flovmber 1966

SUMT Operation~al Report for Quarterly Per-iod Endirig 31"Oetober 2966Part I Observations (Lessona Learned)

Obcervaties.. I%*unit comander should prepare a list ofquestions5 whih be WU3 lke the M interrogator to ask the detaineeand IN team$ shoiuldl be attacl'sd at battalion level.5. Ttem- P~cb7 trrps.

Discussion. Personnel shw.nld be sitrsmely cautious upondiscovering a-noPr-wbooby trap since it is often the bait for a noreerfctive, better concealed booby trap.Obemtion. Discovery of a =mmt~Y# cLbrious bcc* . --awarrants a thoro"Fh, a entl search of the area for a better ooncea.L-.noro effective booby trap.

6. Items Clearng of vi114ga.Discussion. An effective technique which carte employed toea a vilIMge-e -tourround it at r~ight and use artillery illuminationto flutsh out the tO .Observation. Use of this technique catches the eamy offguard and preclaudes- avng innoent civilian hampse troop movement.

?. Ita Wi fires.tflsoeuiaons Since a basic problem is ma. of target acquisitionthe us* of ro-U1 r- baa been restricted to Indfes the oessy to swainin the area of operations. Additionally, 3udicioua us. of Wi fires reducesquestionable amution eapemitu andt the resultant logistical support.It appears tactically unsound to %mie routine fires at night am a defetsivet~chnique when the Bigade has superiority in for", reserves, moblityand Lwavation an d to actively seeking omtactObservation. HU1 fires should be used to interdict eneqagres routes UFia. hae broken contact following an engagement,azwn assembly areas and when enemy forces out nuaer ours and are preparedto attkak.

8. Items Casualty evacuation.Discussion. When too man troops becom involved in the

evacuation of M~rA'IA, tactical amesntus can be loet. Cosualtierhave ocoured as a result of soldiers attempting to aid their comaes,only to become casualties thamelves.Observation. Walking wouwWe should be used when possibleto assist the se-los~wounisd'while the troops contine attacking theenemy, driving him off and clearing the field for casualty evacuation.

9. ies Cwound Immidiate Action PbroeeDiscussion. FreqUafttly Whent reQOm=iaeaI2Q elemaent mikecontact, enm friees exfiltrate the area as the Wtrmbile imieiiateaction force is being lifted into the ae" When possible a ground in-1mediate action forca should infiltrate an area on foot at the ane timethe reonnaiaaance elements are inserted into the aroa.observtion, Infiltration of i sisable ground force peamsiteizunediate aR ono newy contacts.

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CONFIDENTIALAVE-C 12 November 1966SUBJECT Operational Report fcr Quarterly PNriod E&dirg 31 October 1966

CRS CSFOR-65) (U)PeL I Obervations (Zesa Learned)

10. Items VC mining of roads in the BriCade area of operationsrequires a mena to counter this threat.

Discus ';n, In spite of patrolling an. ambushes, the VCcontinue to rFeh ur in order to inflict losses on friendly unita.It has been found tmat sweeping the roads using te AN/PIC - 3 minedetector can effectively locate almost al l mines, even those that have alow metal content. To be effective the seep m st be conducted on fc+During Operstions JMN PAUL JONIS and SWARD, over 500 Ica of mad vi.-"swept, and approximately 50 mines were discovered. The rigade seuff :"d nocasaties and lost but me ehicle to these mines.

Observation . Carefa sweeping of roads fr min s an ef-fectiv y counterVCeTf ailato inflict losses byennst of road.oc2. Itemna A means of controlling s ing ataeep paseiee andc.MvoY Is necesar.

Diries on. In September sniping at nineer mine sweepingpari getwe rnee dA arh TUY AN idreased This was countered in-itally i increasing the flank securih fla sec wit madhhe '-. party.Thip action did creen the actual e-. .h flank ederrateecame engaged Queast ci y mid the intensity of these pagemets in-creased in late Septemer e- a particularly hctp enwntero+toca airtriks ware called in m the area fro which the eue firewas coming. A three dvy serch and detroo cstion was mounted in thearea o iately thereafter. Althoah fln seurty was alintaiod thest2iping actvm:y sg.ifieanty decreased.

Observation. Sniping at convoys and sweep parties can b"t least partTa -cnSled by concerted counter actions with troopsand/or airstrikes. Particularly,-these measres nolude tha us- ofcavalry units with convoys, cavalz7 platoo= on strip alr, PAC or AOoverhead and the eomumder of the cavalry troop cent.olling froma an H-13.

12* item: A =as wa s required to de-3troy/deny a large annalcomplex.

Discussion. The tunnel complex, with a total length of 14DOmeters, was dag in very strong, stable sll, The tunnels were about 53feet in cross-section and had 12 to 17 fet of overhead cover. Reportsindicated that the gas generator tunnel destruction kit wes not effectivein destroying tunnels with more than six feet overhead cover. Initialtest shots intiosted that collapsing the tunnels with conventional dem-olition would no t be practical. B%s of CS powder were 'sed to cautairatsthe tunnel interiors and conventional demolitions were used to close allentrances, thus preserving the efitectivenass of the uootamination.

Obse -atione CS powder and couventi onal demolitions canbe used to da,7 -'rarge turel eyste=.13 . items Land lines of coudnicatia ar n required for suppIlroutes and m o m n t of heay vehicles in all weather.

Discussion. TIDang the monsoon season the bypasses whichwere capletel satisfsactory in the dry season become completely im-passable to traffic. Fords which have been a matter of inches deep becometorrents, in one case rising from 18 inches to more then 7 feet in lessthan 3 hours. In one location, large cul1ex-s were washed out three dasin succession before attempts to maintsin the hjnpss by culverts were

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CONFIDENTIALAVBD-C 12 November 1966SUBJECTs Operati-nal .port for Quarterly Period Ernding 31 uctober 1966 2(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)Part I (bservatins (Lercne Learned)aebedone. DridigL the gaps above th.e high water nut was the onl mwto insure uninterrupted traffic flw. In one case, the hurried instal-lation of a light tvctical raft crossed a limited number of vehicles overa "f or d" that had become ten feet deep.

Observation. During the monsoon 5a5on fords and bypassesare only fair weather friends.ebridges and, in same cases, rafts p:%-"Adethe only dependable means of crossing traffic in all weather.C. Intelligence:

1. Items Enemy logistical shortages.Diseusion- The enemy is comnistently short of medicalsupplies. Th7oTW7fi e has caused an exeopticnally high rate of malariaamong the enemy forces. In aidition, VC and guerriila troops are oftenarmed with only grezde indicating a shortage of weapons among thefeforces. Interrogation reports and discoveries of weapons caches lendcredence to the possibility that ammnition stores are in demand. Theenemy, whether VC or 1VA forces, traditionally has no intent to engagein sustained combat.Observation. The lack of supplies does not have as great animpact on enemy forces as might be believed since their tactics are notbased on sustained engagements. Although their recuperativ powers areinferior, cmapensation is offerea by the fact that contact on ,.12 stab-lished lines is nou-eistent, offering the enemy ample time to refit andreorganize at his leisure. His tendency, whether by choice or otherwise,to carry, a amall basic load is a distinct vulnerability.

2. Items Duration of engagements.Dtscussion. The tactics of the enemy ars to avoid major con-tact unless hfla -assuredf an overwhelming advantaRge. Normally thiswould include night combat, with poor visibility, and the absence offriendly artillery. Thus success in obtaining enemy kills and enemy weaponsis ost often obtained in short meeting engagements.Observation. Since the enemy is bent upon avoiding sustained

comat all ef ortsa-Cbe mcde to obtain maximm results from all meetingengagements. Commanders must advocate aggressive and immediate actions topreclude abrupt lons of contact and subsequent escape of the enemy.

3. Item: Fbod procurement by eneta forces.Discussion. Visual reconnaissance and photographic coveragehas clearly il aatd large numbers of cultivated areas and herds ofcattle in unpopulated and unexploited territories. These areas are un-doubtedly a source of enemy food. Denial from major productive areas hashad significant effects upon enemy stores, however, it has far from starvedthe enemy. Observed areas of food production must also be denied theenemy.Observation. The use of crop destruction and defoliation area mea.ns wherebySaditional pressu-e can be applied to the enemy. Cattlein unfriendly territcries should be extracted, or, when that is notfeasible, destroyed by GM forces.

4. Items Use of TW teams.Discussion. The recent change in processing, categorizing, and

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CONFIDENTLQLAVBD-C 12 November 1966SUBJEOT: Operational Report fo r Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)Pert I Oberstica (Western LeaniG)handling of prisoners ham resulted in modifications of operational pro-cedures. All prisoners mast be categorised by qualified Brigade personneland appropriately processed. This system necessitates the transport oflarge mmbers of prisoners to the Brigade CP and taxes both their facilitiesand tFW personnel. The dispatch of IFW teams to operating battalions servesto alleviate most of this problem.

Observations Th e employment of INP teams with coarntted bat-talions serves the ulpurpose of providing immediate tacticalrogations as well as screening prisoners to determine their statuo.5. Items Liaison with allied elements.

Discussion. Daily visits with CirO Camps and District Head-quarters are c E b 7 members of the intelligence staff. Informationobtained is often dated slightly and of varied reliability, however, ex-perience in dealing with these sources soon prove their worth. Thesevisits also serve to effect operational liaison and maintain rapport withscio eiements. Often it is possible to have CIDG units or Apache Teamsconduct missions which augment our own capabilities*

Observation. These liaison vr.sits have done much toward sup.plementing our intellience picture within the AO .

D. Logistics:Item: Mtdevac Request Form.Discussion: The original form fo r aerial medevac request includedl line _-s-- his created delays and confusion when requesting amedevac, particularly if commnications were poor or were relayed throughanother station. The medavac request form was greatly simplified and re-duced to only 7 critical entries. This incroased the responsiveness vf the

medevac system and eliminated corfusion..Observation. Routine report format must be kept as simple aspossible, pariculrly when widely used at the lowest level. (See Incl 5).

E. Personnal:Item: Interpreters.Discussion: There are insufficient ARVN interpreters. Althoughthe BrigadeThrequested 23 ARVN interpreters, not more than 15 were presentfo r duty during the quarter. In order to supplement military interpreters,

the Brigade has hired civilians through the permanent hire system. To date,nine livilian interpreters have been hired to be used in nonhazardouspositions. Military interpreters formerly occupying these positions havebeen reassigned to combat elements.Observation: Hiring of civilian interpreters is an effective raansof augmeinUg AMinterpreters .

PART !I. Recommendations.A. That a minimum of four flyable CH-47 helicopters be provided to

the Brigade where supporting artillery is to be moved by an air route and

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CONF DELITIALAVW-C; 12 November 1966 jSUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966(C SaOR-65) (U)ftrt I teervatiwes (Larsns Leane)forward logistical mupply pint. are established where no land ItC in avail-able.

Action Taken: Request made to CO , I Field Force Vietnam end approved.B. That the use of ARVN CIDO and other indigenous para-ilitary forces(RY and PF units) in cooperation with US Forces continue to be maxinised toconserve and augment the fortee available to a US commander as wel as toimprove the training, aggresaivenes, and confidence of the Vietnamese unit.Action Takent l txma utilization is being made of para-wtlitary andARVN ?rw'in al possible situatiow.C. That consideration be given to limiting the use of CBU in airstrikes throughout Vietnam. A high percentage of the bomlets do not ex-plode an are later picked up by the Viet Cong and used in making boobytraps and mines.Action Taken: Request by TWI 9-397A dtd 29 Sap 66 from is t Brigade,10lst Airborne Division through Headquarters, I Field Force to United Statesbvy Vietnam with information to 7th Air Force. Approval has been granted

by Headquarters, 7th Air Force to exclude the use of CR 1 in missions flownin support of I Field Force tactical units.D. That preparatirn of an LZ with Arty and Tac Air need not behabitually used since it is an indication to the enemy that we are goingto make ar airmobile assault in the area and this gives him an opportunityto prepare to assault US troops landing in the area or flee the location.Action Taken: IRP or Battalion Reconnaissance forces are being in-serted approximately one day's march from proposed IlZ. If the Recon-naissance element encounters VC in the LZ area an alternate LZ is designated.The objective is to enter the battle area clandestinely and surprise theenew.

5 Incl: WILLARD PEARSCU1 - After Action Report, Brigadier General, USAoperation JOHN PAUL JOMS ommanding2 After Action Report,Operation SEWARD'--- S&--3 - Staff Study and GeneralOrder, Reorganization 0Bas Camp Ie ' 40D CeOIes. 1 - CO letter "Son-guarrillaTactics' dated 20 October 1966v - Madevac Mission Request For11Th ls t 34., 101st Abn Div

DISflWTIOg2 - CO , I flORC V, APO 96350 ATIW: AVFA-C 0&T2 - Mest CofS For Force Deelomen DAWsig. 20310 (h hnes3 - CG, MAR ATT , AVC-HIST APO) 630I - CO , 101st Abn Div, Ft Campll, Ky20 - 00 , 22nd Mlitay iast Dot. AM1 6347

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CONFIDENTIAL

Iav&OO-Mw5 (12 Vae 66 ) *&St JVCTs Operatima-lRpt for QaZtrly Period ]Ding 31 October1966, 1 0e101 - 66 (c)Readquarters, I Field Faoe vietuam, APO San Francisco 9635O 2 .3 DE [ CTOs Assistant Chief of Staff for lioe Dsvelopsent, DppertmntOf the AM', W-hingtn D, C. 20310

CGmaisding aperal, United States " Vietmo, AP O 03Farces 96307I- (C) 110ferenoe Section 1, parac (2). 2UiS headquarters roo-October 1966, tVat the 1a25,000 basio photo coisra of South iebtam

be reinstituted. rhe time required to obtain photo coverage vYaZvi ao-cording to pinority assigned and the weather. For exa tle, new coverNgePriority 11 requires thee to sevn days, hile new coWerae Prioriitakes one day. Photogrsp for &rsevidah have been covered piwiounl=within 60 days can be obtained in one d y. fe 02 Air is now inludAed inplanning oonfweaoe for el1 operations. Neoesw7 photograpW is request-ed at that tim for the AO. Tral studies and LZ/PZ studies are made from

ne" recent photography. Under normal ocLd'tiu, adequate basia photointelligence of the AD should be in the bends of the units in mfficienttim for planning.2. (0) Reference Section 1, pars. 3. a () . As a result of liaisonvisits and peraal ocantacts vwith US , lot Log and CBMSC, and by provid-ing assistance with I ffORC ororft resoauaoe, the shortages of starobastground coffee, fresh vegetables, ice, oandsmatep sugar and other Item werealleviated by the end of the reporting period.N. (U) 11eference Section 1, Pams 3 a (4). Clusters star, groud is

in short supply and appears an MARY's, AS R Qenades, hand, make y low,geen an d vlolet hay, been periodically in hort supply. CDSC Am* Setiouedrises that they are presently on bend at the A SP nd have been shipped tothe tV Nos Sub Area.4. (U) Reference Section 1, pars 4 b. 2he aLaria figure# representoly caoes diagnosed in the unit's mdloa comps;. Other a"e foond amongpatients evaouated to hospitals without prior diagnosis established, bringthe malaria totals to: August 117, September 115, and 0Otobrer 67.5. (U) Reference Combat Operations After Action 11aport, OperationSeerd, pera 4 b, PaP 4-3 and pw 5 b, pes 4-4. Operatim Sewad evered a large area with extensive troop dispersim JuStifing the Seaf two

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AMA-0C-IST 1k. DEIC 1966SUB ,Gtperatimnal Report for % artrly eriod bI M 31 Octobe1966, laB iOB-66medevac helicopters. Although the flying time avrapd appromtelytwo ho=* per day per airoraft, the "quiz mnt of tVo simltaneouamedevac ships oo unrred fruatly. Th future emploment of medevaohelicopters should be contingent upon troop dispersion, sine of the ADand anount of otact. Beak up helicopter* wre on call from Mha froto reinfor~e the unit stand-by aircraft if needed fo r this operation.

6. (C) Reference Section 1, a&a I 6. Reply tra CO(~osMACT,dated 20 November 1966y stated that while the reoamadation to use0-1 aireraft slght be fessible, approl at Comat7 tern level vwOudbe required.7& (C) Reference Section I, par H g. The attahment of CAteam by the 41st Civil Affairs Company is presently lader etly. Itis expected that onUy one CA teme will iwain with the bu1.ide8. (C) Reference Section 2 (0) Part I, paza B7s Xnterdictiofire should be seleative, oclnoidnt with factual Intelligence dataand exploited by friendly troop aneuver. Th e policy of selectivefire, as reported by lo t Btde, 101st Abu Div, insofar as pertains tointerdiction In reasonable and well founded. Th e "quiet battlefield"eono6t when applied to harassing firs s, howevers, subject to tmrbtdiseuscn. In application, contiued use of selective harassing f1rehas mounted to pzaotioally no harassing fire. Ruassnug fire desigedto Sntsftpt an ony'ls fredas of movepent, disturb big, to love' hismomle, to inflict astualtes adr the threat of casualtise have adefinite value which was established in Sores and which hae been con-firmed In Vietnam. The 34 Me, 25th raf Div has# at times, emss1ieda continuig heavy prcp of harassing artillery sad mortar fire.Duig Operation Paul 2mee 111, heavy haraing fire ws delivereddaily by arillevy with 3d Bde, 25th f Div and It is sigtoant tonote that enem activity in this area of operations vs. quite low. Mscannot, of course, be totally ascrlbed to heavy hale ing fire; howe ,the creodtability of heavy harasslig fire proAras is to be accorded#=9 subteatlatin. The selective "quiet battlefield" policy of baes-sing fires as applied b7 the reporting unit and the opposite polic ofoontnus sand heavy harassing firm have value aid application In theoounteuinmurency environmt. Both policies are of merit andp to betruly offective, should be seplceyd inthongably.9. (C) Reference Tab B to noclosurs 9 to After Action Report ofOperation Sewardl; ubjects Thaml M ;structilm/Deial. Under the oi. .ctaoes described by the reporting unit, attempting to destMw ftm l

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CONFIDENTIALA ',bOC-E 2 :1 DEC MG.6

=AM#e 00*V&UatI~ Ulport for %mrterljy ftrid fhding 31 October1966, ICS CBPM - 6tcomlmeae with the 175-M gun or the 8-incb howitzer represents aninjudicious employ nt of these weapona. The ransze involved andtheir canoiaitant large range probable errors, coupled with tb*tnnel deai. ead construction, vrtually precluded an y chance ofsucoeme. This is f rther substatiated by the fact that large Amountsof explosives, purpouslefU placed by g-omd parties also failed todestr(T the emplez. Destmatica missions bg heavy artillery weapone=wat be earefully omaidered an d executed. Of principal Imaportanceto the sucess of such mission is roper selection of vapon, rangeend, eamourrentlr, the reduction of range probable error. In adition,a realstic evaluation of the target and Its vulnerability ast beaccompli2sbda

10. (C) Referenoe paaraph 16, incloaure 1, After ActionReport Opration John Faal Jones. At the present there are fiveaircraft equipped with hoist. Th e Comanodig Oftioer, 49th plasto aodifY all aircraft for hoist capability " soon as modificationkits are available.

11. (U) Reference paragraph 2 a (3), inclosure 4, After ActionReport. Operation Seward. The problem oonoerning contaminated ATVUhas been corrected and step taken to prevent reourrence.12. (C) Reference paragraph 3 A, inclosure 4, After AotionReport Operation Seward. Twenty four each, 3 XV AC generators areon requisition for 1/101st Abn Div. Expeoted availabilily date islate February 12967.13. (0) RPference paragraph 3 o, inclosure 4, fter ActionReport Operation Seward. The probleas of commnication betweenTyphoon and Strike while located at TtW Ho e wre not unique. Theproblem of VEP system stem fron excessively long radio paths andmountainous terrain obstructing radio paths. Plans are being ia-plement*d to extend higher quality VHP an d miorowave system to theTur Hoev/w niop ares.FOR THE COMIANM&R

PAUL A. BVO=LLTC, AGO

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CONFI DENT I ALCOMBAT OPERATIONSAFTER ACTION REPORT

OPERATIONSEWARDIst BRIGADEIOIstAIRBORNE DIVISION

DIPLOMATSAND

WARRIORS

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CONFIDENTIALDMARMT OF THE A@HUMJARTIRB 1ST MOAD3 1W.ST A iE DIISC31 AV 6 T

AVID-C 6 Novatber 1966SUBJACT: Ombt Operatiorm After Action Report, Operation SWARD '(R :

MACV J3-32) (U)

T1IU Commanin GeneralI Field Force VietnmAPO 96350

TOt Coanding GeneralUSM tay ZAasiaance Command VietnamATTN: 4343APO 96243

1. (U) Nam of Operation: Operation SEWARD.2. (U) Dates of Operation: 5 September through 25 October 1966*3. (U) Location: PHU YIN Province.4. (U) Covqmand Headuarter: 1st Brigade, 10lst Airborne Div-ision.5. (U) R: Brigadier General Willard Pearson sCareanding Oerera.Ht Brigaj 101st Airborne Division.6. (C) Task 0aizationt The task organization of the Brigadeat the initiat3on of peraon MSARD was as shown below. The on3" sig-nLficant changes to this organisation driTng the operation wmre the de-tachment of the 5/27 Arty on I October and the teia'nation of opera-tional control of the 1/22 Iof on 13 October.

1/327 lot Bde Troope2/327 In. da 11C (-)A 2/17 Cav2/5ce Inf A 326 zngrLRRP1/22 io t MP Plat (-)181 MI Dot2/320 Arty 20 Owl Doat22 Nil Hist DotB 12/30 Arty 101st Avn SeeTactical Air Control Past5/27 Arty 406 311)Spt s. FSE

7. (C) Su ting Forces:a. 2/320 Arty: Emloyed in a direct support role.b. B 1/3o Arty (OPCON): Provided general support (reinforein)fires during the operation.

oRIIp - 4DMGADID ArT TSAR MNURVALBJDXCLASS" APTM 32 "MM'CONFIDENTIALI've-

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CONFIDENTIALAVBD-C 6 November 1966SUWJDT: Cabaht Operations After Action Report, Operation SY*ARD (nCS:KtV J3-32) (U)

c. 5/27 Arty C-): Provided general support fire during theoperation.d. 10th ArPy Am nz: Provided two airmobils co panies ingeneral support of the operation. These helicopters flew troop lift,

combat support and resupply missions.e. 179thAm Cc: Provided two flyable CH-4? alter ift on amission support basls for use in displacing and rnsupplnl artllerywaits.f. 183 Avn Co: Provided four and five 0-1 atroraft for visualreconnaissance, artillery adjus Ls and radio relay.. 5th Air Commando Squadron: Provided airlift support forPay War Op..

h. 245th Psy Ops Co: Provided one loudspeaker and leaflet dis-semination team in direct support.i. 7th US Air Force- Flew Ws4 tactical air missions totaling306 sorties; of these missions 18 were preplanned and 126 were imediate.

The immediate strikes were requested through the Air Force Direct AirRequest Net and the average response time from the initiation of therequests until time-over-target was twenty minutes. The results of thesemissions included 9 KBA (BC), 52 KBA (EST), 78 structures destroyed, 68structures damaged, 2 automatic weapons positions destroyed, 7 autoratioweapons positions damaged, 2 boats sunk, 2 boats damaged, and trenchcomplexes damaged.

J. h5th Ber Op: Provided general support along Highways 1,6B and 7B.k. 498th Med Det (Aml): Provided responsive, rapid evacuationsupport to the Brigade throughout the operation.

8. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 1, Intelligence.9. (C) Mission: Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam directed thelet Brigade* lD-'T-rborne Division to conduct operations to protect

the rice harvest in the TUY HOA and TUY AN areas; to conduct search anddestroy operations to locate VC/NVA forces in the AD; and to providesecurity from VUNG RO Bay to TOY HOA.10. (C) Cone.t of 0 ration: Offensive search and destroy tacticswere generally useF hromu0~tperation WARD to include securing the

rice harvest aroas. The four maneuver battalions available to the Brigadewere generally utilized by protecting the TUY AN rice harvest with onebattalions protecting the rice harvest in the 0UN0CK1 Valley with onebattalion, securing the VING 10 Ba/Pass area with a third battalion, andhaving a fourth battalion as an immediate action force to exploit anycontact or suspected enemy location@ elsewhere in the AD . See Inclaoure 2(Operation Schematics) Tabs A, B, and C.

11. (C) keocution:a. Operation SINARD was characterized by counterguerrillatactics, primarily encompassing small unit actions and frequent contact

with small enemy forces. The search and destroy tactics utilized con-sisted of saturation patrolling, night movement, night ambushes, raidsand the use of small unit stay behind forces and small unit imediate actionforces. The terrain over which operations were conducted included

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CONFIDENTIALAVBD-C 6 November 1966SUBJET: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SWARD (ROStMACV 2) (U)mountainos jungles, rolling hills, dry and imundered rice paddies, sanddunes and beaches.

b. SEWARD was initiated cocwurrently with the termination ofOperation JOHN PAUL JONES at 0505001 September 1966. Brigade units werealready deployed in the operational area.c. At the beginning of SNAID the 1/327 In! (-), prvious27deployed as the I ORCELeserve to NM RA , continued search an ddestroy operations to counter en=q threats in that area. Copany A,.he Mortar and Reconnaissance Platoons 1/327 Inf remained at TVff HOA toprotect the rice harvest in the MIE NoM Valley. The 2/327 In! con-tinued the protection of the rice harvest and conducted search anddestroy operations in the TV! AN area, Concurrently, search and destroyoperations were conducted by the 2/502 Inf northwest of TUY HOA.Defense of critical terrain and security of the VUN RO Bay/Pasa areawas provided by the 2/22 Inf which was under the operational control ofthe ls t de, 101st Abn Di v (See Inclosure 2, Tabs A and B). On7 September, A Troop, 2/17 Car conducted an amphibiou assault with oneplatoon northeast of lUY HA establishing blocking positions in supportof the search and destroy operations of the remainder of the troop. The1/327 In! (-) departed NINH RCA between 8 and 10 September after being

relieved by Company P 1/22 Inf, an d returned to conduct operations inthe HIM ZUOW3 Valley. The mission at NINH HOA was soon thereafter can-celled and Compan B, 1/22 In! returned to the VUMRe Bay area. The2/502 Inf was extracted on 10 September from its area of operation andthe battalion minus was deployed to TU B0RG to counter an enemy threatto the rice harvest storage there. Company A 2/502 Inf remained atTUY H0A South Airfield as an immediate action force. On 13 Septemberelements of the 2/502 Inf provided security for a 45th tg r Op convoymoving on Highway I from NINI HOA to TU 3010, and on 15 and 16 Septemberthe 2/502 Inf returned to TUY HOA South by helicopter and began prepara-tion for future combat operations. On the night of 17 September thecamand post of Company B 2/327 Inf came under attack and was overrn byan estimated one hundred VC . Ten US troops were killed and twelvewounded in the action. The 2/502 In! conducted an airmobile assaultinto an AO northwest of TUY HCA on 19 September. The tLBP was also in-serted in conjunction with the 2/502 Inf and discovered a VC base campcomplex. The 2/327 Wn (-) moved ooth by helicopter and overland to thesouthwest portion of its AO and established blocking positions in co-ordination with the 2/502 Inf attack. Two CID companies from DONOREprovided blocking forces for these battalions. The 2/327 Inf discoveredan extensive tunnel complex in the area which was mapped and then des-troyed by the engineers. Between 28 and 30 September the 2/502 In f wasextracted form the DONG TE area and moved to TUY HOA South. Based oninformation received from an escaped POW, the ./327 Inf raided a VCprisoner of war camp in the southwest portion of its AO and twenty-threeVietnamese Nationals were liberated in the action on 3 October. Com-pany C and the Mortar Platoon of 1/22 Inf wa s deployed by helicopterinto the TV BOWG area to protect the rice storage there. On 4 Octoberthe 2/502 Inf deployed by helicopter and overlaid by vehicle to iTY ANand assumed the mission of the 2/327 Inf. Concurrently, the 2/327 Infdeployed to TUY HOA South and began refitting and preparing for futurecombat operations. (See Inclosure 2# Tab C). On 7 October the 2/327In! conducted an airmobile assault west cf TUY BOA. The battalionsecured critical terrain along Highway 7B and conducted search and des-troy operations in zone until 10 October when it returned to TVY HOASouth. This operation was in conjunction with an engineer effort torepair the road and bridges along Highway 73. During the period 11 and12 October, two platoons from Company A 2/327 Inf were deployed to alocation near PHAN HANG to provide security for the Air Force extractionof a downed 0-130 aircraft. The 2/502 In! conducted search and destroy

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CONFIDENTIALA79)-C 6 Nvember 1966tU.ET Combat Opantlon After Action flport, Operatio SO= (ms,AC T J-3) (U)operatiOnS in An area southwest of Tf ANdurit the period 13 thresh16 October to exploit hightngd and cortacta madid y LR1P toams. 0) 13October the 1/22 Iftwas relieved in pince by the 1/8 Inf, and thu 1/22Wn deploy"d to PLKIX by V7-2 a,0 0-2- aircraft , d rctnrtwd to t!-coperational control of tne 4th Infantry Division. )n 19 and 20 Octoberthe 1/327 In! and 2/327 In, respectively, were relieved by Ceamnta ofthe 28th FOK Port of their ats ions in the HIE rJoiO Valley arA for thesecurity of TUX HOA outh Airfield. On 21 October OCmpany A 2/327 Wconducted an airmobile "auit vest of TUT OA to provide seeufrty forengineer work parties repAiring Highway 73. Operation SWA terinatedIt 2400 hours 25 October following the relief of the 2/,5W Inf in taeWT ANarea by the le t Bla, 4Th Int mDv.

12. (C) Pavauta;a. The 1st We, 1Olat Abn Di v accom:lished its mission ofprotecting the T Y ,M an d HIE fUOEG Vsl1ey.riee harvests securing theVUPD RO ay/Pas arma, and conducting search and destroy operations tolocate and destroy VCand NVA forces in the AO.b. The following losses were inflicted on the enaru during theoperation 23 0 VCkV [IA BC), 142 VCAVA XIA (EIT), 9 VC/l [BA 0(c),52 VC/NVA KM (CST), 6 NVAC, 34 civil defendants, 2 VCC, 871 detainees,an d 10 ralliers. In addition, 80 individual and crew served Veapons,40.5 tons of rice, ammunition and other equipment were oapbaed.c. Friendly lossee during the operation were as follows: 26

KIA, 169 WIA.13. (U) Administrative Matters:

a. Personnel and Administration: Se e Inclosure 3, Personneland Administration.b. Logistics: See inclosure 4, Logistics,c. Civic Action: The first lo t of "Eagle Brand" washingmachines was contracted for an d delivered to the Brigade. Five of thesemachines have been donated to orphanages, hospitals and dispensaries in

the TUY HOA area.U.. (C) Special SquiPeunt and Techniques:

a. In order to effectively ma,,oy CS agents and flasethrowers,teams were made available at Brigade level to be auployed on an mon-call" basis A helicopter rigged for CS employmnt and charged flame-throwers were maintained on a thirty minute standby,

b. 1000 and 2000 pourZ beebe with instantaneous fuses are goodexpedient. for clearing lading zones in certain types of 3ungle ter-rain. With the 1000 pound bom, clearing team work is still required toimprove the landing zone; however, the 2000 pound bomb can be expectedto create a clearing sufficient to land one 1N-1 helicopter. The use ofan instantaneous fuze clear the vegetation with a nominal groundcratering effect.c. Unloading troops by ladder from a CH-47 helicopter is an

extremely slow process, and normally only landing vone clearing teamshould be unloaded in this manner. When on a resupply mission wherelanding zones are not readily accessible, the ma~ority of the items canbe free dropped to the unite and t.:e mre sensitive item can belowered by rope.

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CONFIDENTIALAVID-C 6 Nuvtbe'n 1966WETBJET Camat Operations After Act'en Report, Operation SARD (. tSu3r MACV J3-32) (U)

d. Me htiace artttwma P-dI r-ietrttt tun contimedtwidig of indirenoue forces durir. iod6.15. (C) C mm,,drs Ar - al.,,t

a. Lesone learneds(1) ne units are operati: n limited area, pat~trrwof action mist not be established. Tactic _.Ltechr"ques mutst be variedin order to prohbit oneW forces from anticipating friendly move, ,-, or

reaction.(2) Company comnand posts must be relocated at least eve*yforty-eight hours to safeguard against the enemy arnghe lo, %lon andcorducting raids, Enemy probing action against such locations at nigbt.is likely to be followed by an attack.(3) When small units are halted for any extended period oftime, every precaution mat be taken, to inoludc -xttsive use of LP's,OPts and early warning devices, to preclude a sw- rise enemy attack.(4) The VC frequently, having conducted a successfuloperation at one location, will return to the I )cation at a later date

to conduct an identical operation. This applies particularly to raidsand ambushes.(5) When a patrol moves fo r an extended distance, con-sideration should be given to establishing hmtr ambushes at irregularintervals behind th e patrol. In many instances this technique willprove successful in surprising and destroying a following enemy.(6) Units must insure that available communications areseparated into two or more locations. In the event commnicationfacilities at one location are destroyed by the enemy, an alternate

means of communication will still exist.(7) Following the extraction of friendly forces from anarea of operation, the enemy frequently infiltrates back into the sane

locations from whi'ch he was previouslyr routed. The technique of leavinga smll stay behinds force in the area, following the extraction of themajority of the unit, is often successful in trapping the returning

(8) IW teams should be attached at battalion level inr. order to speed the segregation and processing of detainees.n :](9) Interrogation techniques should be oriented on the

local guerrilla in addition to the conventional EEI line of questioning*This can best be accomplished by having the unit commander prepare alist of quertions which he would like the NI interrogator to ask theetainee.(10) Whea clearing team are reqt'ired to clear a helicopterlanding zone, valuable time can be saved by having an aviation repre-sentative present to provide guidance.(II) Persorel should be extremely cautious upon dis-covering an obvious booby trap. This is often just bait fo r a betterconcealed, more effective booby trap.(12) An effective technique which can be employed to cleara village is to surround it at night and use artillery illumination to

flush out the VC. This method catches the enemy of f guard and precludse

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CONFIDENTIALAVE-C 6 November 1966SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation S31D (RCSsMACV3-32) (U)hatw4 imooet eivlie haer troop movement.

(13) During the monsoon seaon8 fords and by-passes areonly fair weather frienea. Heavy rains and rapid runoff make it vir-tually impossible to satisfactorily install culverts to maintain by-p'ates. The only satisfactory answer is bridging, or in same cases,ra.fting.

(14) The standard ?edevac Request. Form was revised by theBrigade to reduce the number of items fro fourteen to seven. Thisrevised form has proven to be simpler and moxe efficient than the oldform.b. Commanders Notes:

(1) Although the Brigade had an excellent k rate inOperations JOHN PAUL JONES and SEWARD (208 VG KIA (C' 23 9 VC KIA(BC) respectively. Our biggest problem has been R'- k s one oftarget acquisition. Our second major problem is the z. to reducereaction time once the enemy is detected.(2) To improve our kill rate during ..: coming operations,battalion commanders and the cavalry troop cc.,nander will fully exploit,

develop, and utilize the concept of "semi-guerrilla tactics". By this Imean we must become more like guerrillas, i.e., adopt guerrilla tactics,during search and destroy operations until contact is made. Then weremove the cloak of being a guerrilla and operate conventionally usingal l available firepower, mobility, and reserves.(3) Listed below are some techniques of stealth, deception,and surprise which I desire be employed more fully in our forthcomingoperations. I am confident that the airborne soldier, once imbued withthe necessity to "out-guerrilla the guerrilla", will, with his nativeingenuity and resourcefulness, devise additional effective techniquesand tactics.

(a) Clandestine Entry into the Battlefield: Move intothe battlefield by foot rather than ride by helicopter, the noise andsight of which reduce the possibility of surprise. Enter the battle-field at night.

(b) Ni ht erations: Steal the night away from theguerrilla. Night air

101st airborne operational report 10 mar 1967

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