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0System\Projects\FBDWG\FBDWG-011 Background.ppt

Background – Military Perspective

July 28, 2014

10340 Democracy Lane, Suite 302Fairfax, VA 22030

Peter MorosoffPhone: 703-385-9320

Email: Peter.Morosoff@e-mapsys.comWebsite: www.e-mapsys.com

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October 1977

Problem: Colonel Wallace Heyer, USMC, Chief of Staff, I Marine Amphibious Force, (1) explains that the number of mobile weapons (e.g., Soviet antiaircraft weapons) is increasing and (2) directs development of methods to target such weapons. WW II methods were still the standard. They focused on targeting fixed and semi-fixed weapons and were no longer sufficient.

Examination of Methods: Exercises were used to examine targeting processes, test new methods and involve users.

Initial Observations:

• Volume of data was increasing, partly because of improved sensors availability and capability.

• Velocity of data needed to increase because targets were mobile.

• Variety of data was increasing.

Have you heard a reference to these 3 V’s before?

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First Conclusion

It was found to be impossible to handle each potential target (i.e., instance) on its own merits – there were too many potential targets and the data on them had to be moved fast.

This identified the need to (1) establish categories and (2) process data based on rules – even if people, not computers, executed the rules.

USMC Operational Handbook 7-5, Targeting by Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF’s), followed in August 1981

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Problem Festers

1983: Beirut barracks bombing – attack warnings were understood after the attack and G-2 (intelligence officer) asked for help with large volume of data.

1991: Operation Desert Storm – G-2 section was overwhelmed by electronic reports.

2001: Commander, US Pacific Command (PACOM), sought means to integrate data and information produced and used by IT of units from different Services.

2001: 9-11 attack warnings were understood after attack.

July 2001: DoD’s Extending Littoral Battlespace Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ELB-ACTD) uses ontology, software

agents, and wireless network to share information rapidly across the force with automated generation of information from data.

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People, Equipment, Data, Information and Capabilities

Dr. Katherine McGrady of the Center for Naval Analyses stated in 1991 that DoD is buying fewer pieces of more capable equipment under the assumption that warfighters will be able to create better capabilities with this more capable equipment. DoD will have fewer personnel because of increasing salaries. The amount of data being generated by computer-based tools is exploding. The unspoken bargain: process the data to produce the slightly less information fewer warfighters will need to create better capabilities with less equipment.

Cost of P

eople

Cost of E

quipm

ent

Amount of Equipm

ent

Number of People

Time

Data

Actionable Information

Closing the gap and achieving efficiency requires ontology

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Federal Big Data Working Group within Context of Big Data and Operational Evolutions

Working Group’s potential contribution is hastening the exploitation of Big Data to yield important information.

115 years ago the Smithsonian Institute filled this role for powered flight.

Today, the Working Group provides its participants with the same opportunity the Smithsonian Institute provided to the Wright Brothers.

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Wright Brothers’ 1899 Request

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Wright Cycle Company 1127 West Third Street

Dayton, Ohio May 30, 1899 The Smithsonian Institution

Washington:Dear Sirs:

I have been interested in the problem of mechanical and human flight ever since as a boy I constructed a number of bats of various sizes after the style of Cayley's and Penaud's machines. My observations since have only convinced me more firmly that human flight is possible and practicable. It is only a question of knowledge and skill just as in all acrobatic feats. Birds are the most perfectly trained gymnasts in the world and are specially well fitted for their work, and it may be that man will never equal them, but no one who has watched a bird chasing an insect or another bird can doubt that feats are preformed which require three or four times the effort required in ordinary flight. I believe that simple flight at least is possible to man and that the experiments and investigations of a large number of independent workers will result in the accumulation of information and knowledge and skill which will finally lead to accomplished flight.

The works on the subject to which I have had access are Marey's and Jamieson's books published by Appleton's and various magazines and cyclopaedic articles. I am about to begin a systematic study of the subject in preparation for practical work to which I expect to devote what time I can spare from my regular business. I wish to obtain such papers as the Smithsonian Institution has published on this subject, and if possible a list of other works in print in the English language. I am an enthusiast, but not a crank in the sense that I have some pet theories as to the proper construction of a flying machine. I wish to avail myself of all that is already known and then if possible add my mite to help on the future workers who will attain final success. I do not know the terms on which you send out your publications but if you will inform me of the cost I will remit the price.

Yours truly/s/ Wilbur Wright

Wright Brothers’ 1899 Request (Transcribed)

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(The Wright Brothers) wrote to the Smithsonian Institution for references to books and articles on the problems. A public-serving and informed Smithsonian responded with reprints and references to works by Lilienthal and Samuel Pierpont Langley, plus Octave Chanute's Progress in Flying Machines (1894), a detailed history and analysis. The Wright brothers then struck up a long-lasting, fruitful correspondence with Chanute, a distinguished civil engineer, railroad- and bridge builder, and enthusiastic student of flight.

Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: aCentury of Invention and Technological

Enthusiasm, 1989, page 57

Foundation of Wright Brothers’ Success

Today’s IT developers need the support the Smithsonian Institution provided to the Wright Brothers.

Wright Brothers’ 1899 Letterto Smithsonian Requesting

Information

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After reading the various pertinent books and articles in their field, they (the Wright Brothers) resorted to a procedure common among experienced inventors: they carefully analyzed the history of others who had attacked the common problem-gliding or powered flight-to seek explanations for their failures.

With considerable perspicacity they decided that maintaining equilibrium in flight was the critical and unsolved problem, the stumbling block for the earlier inventors and experimenters. "We at once set to work to devise a more efficient means of maintaining the equilibrium," Orville Wright confidently reported.

Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: aCentury of Invention and Technological

Enthusiasm, 1989, pages 57-8

Wright Brothers’ Use of Research Literature

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Speed of Implementation Depends on Participants

US Army took 40 years to create the capability to mass indirect fires of field artillery.

Royal Air Force (RAF) took only four years to create the operational capability to use radar as the backbone of its air defense command and control (C2) for Battle of Britain (1940).

US Army took only six years to develop and implement the Integrated Computerized Deployment System (ICODES) for developing shipload plans (1991-1997).

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ICODES Users’ Comments (1)

"My battalion (1st Battalion, 1st Marines) used ICODES to support the embarkation for our Westpac deployment in 2005 with the 15th MEU. This deployment included dozens of onloads and offloads with over 200 pieces of rolling stock. We also used the program to support disembarking in preparation for movement into Iraq and our subsequent retrograde. We were one of the first Marine Corps units to use ICODES on deployment and it reduced the time required to develop a ship load plan and greatly simplified the onload process. It also made it easy for the U.S. Navy to quickly understand how we wanted our equipment loaded on the following amphibious warships and landing crafts: LHA, LHD, LSD, LPD, LCACs and LCUs."

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ICODES Users’ Comments (2)

"More importantly, once the ships were loaded, the battalion had a very accurate computerized plan of a how its equipment was tactically loaded. If my battalion commander received an unexpected mission, he would call on our Embarkation Officer to give him an estimate of the tactical offload process. These estimates were developed using ICODES and proved very accurate in planning for a tactical amphibious assault or raid. ICODES truly proved its reliability and viability with us on this deployment."

When I asked the program manager for the Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) if they had done a study that quantified improvements in efficiency and effectiveness because of ICODES, the manager stated that ICODES contributions were so obvious that it was considered a better use of the money to fund more improvements to ICODES.

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ICODES Users’ Comments (3)

Here we have an ontology-enabled IT system that is being used for an unanticipated purpose – C2 for a tsunami-relief effort with the commander finding information useful that the developers never thought would be shown to him.

“We not only used ICODES during the tsunami relief, but in some ways use of the program was more critical during this period than during some of our more basic administrative or tactical offloads. Even though we didn't send a lot of our gear ashore during the tsunami relief (more food & water than gear), we nevertheless had to re-arrange our embarked vehicles and cargo to allow for enough room to load supplies onto the landing craft. Although the commanders never used ICODES, we often showed them PowerPoint briefs copied from ICODES so they could be aware of how the ships were currently loaded & what gear would be available for offload first.