BATT L E S

TH E R I DG

A RRA S MMarch—[u

B&

FRAN& FO&,R .F .A .

Autho r of P ro blem s of the P ac ific ,

Th e Agony o f B elgium ,

” ‘fTh e Balkans

,

The British Army at W'

ar,

”

67’

s” fr o .

LONDONc . ARTH&R PEARSON

, LTD .

1 8 H ENR I ETTA STR EET, W .C.2

1 9 18

C ON TE N T S

FOREWORD

I .-THE POSITION

, SPRING I 9 I7

II .

-THE BATTLE OF ARRAs :

PREPARATION

III . BATTLE OF ARRAS : THE PUSH

IV.

-THE BATTLE OF ARRA S THE PRI Z E

V.

“ FIGHTING ON A FORT& -MILE FRONT

VI .

—&SING UP THE GERMANS

VI I .

-THE MA& FIGHTING AND THE

VIII . -MESSINES RIDGE : THE PREPARATION

I& .

—MESSINES RIDGE : THE VICTOR& . .

CONCLUSION

PAGE

L IST OF ILL& STRATIONS

THE BRITISH COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, SIR

DOUGLAS HAI G Frontz'

spiece

ARRAS CATHEDRAL TO-DA&

A TAN& GOING INTO ACTION

GERMAN PRISONERS,HAPP& TO BE CAUGHT

&SING A GERMAN GUN AGAINST GERMANS .

A WOOD AFTER BOMBARDMENT

MULES BRINGING UP AMMUNITION

A MINE CRATER,MESSINES

BRITISH SOLDIERS OFF FOR A REST

MA P S

BATTLE OF MESSINES

BATTLE OF ARRAS

BRITISH WESTERN FRONT

FO R EWO RDS

HE events o f th e Great War on the

Flande rs— A rto i s front from March to

June, 1 9 17, are as yet to o recent to permit o f

their full d i scus sio n'

W ithout prejud ice to

current military Ope rations . But,marking as

they did a ve ry d efinite stage in the develop

men t o f the war, they call fo r an attemp t to

pu t clearly in a co llected fo rm the info rmatio n

&which is no t at all scan ty) now available to

the public . This litt le bo ok make s that

a ttemp t . I ts fact s are accurate . Whe re a

conclus ion has be en ventured from the facts ,

that conc lu sion is nOt Official no r autho ri

tative , and the reade r may judge fo r himself

as to its soundne ss .

FRAN& Fox .

THE BATTLE S OF THE RIDGE S

CHAPTER I .

THE POSITION, SPRING 1 9 17.

HE Spring of 1 917was evidentlyrecognised by the Germans as

marking the turning-po int of the

war,as Offering the last chance o f

securing a peace which would

save the German aggression on

the world from punishment and allow the German

Powers a term of recuperation to prepare for a

new and greater attack . In the Spring of 1 91 6

the Germans had sought a decision by the great

attack on Verdun, an attack by which it was

hoped either to beat France into submission or

at least to break up the formidable Britishoffensive known to be preparing by bringing itto a premature explo sion . Neither result wasObtained . British and French ,

working in perfect

9

Th e Bat t les o f th e Ridges .

unity , first held the German attack and then

laun ched the great Somme Offensive,which proved

definitely that the German trench line was vuhler

able and that superio rity in the field“

had passed

from the German Army to the British-French

Army .

The German military leaders read th e writing

on the wall . They might , at home , whistle to keeptheir courage up and circulate confident men

dacities in neutral coun tries & but they knew .

One ingeniously reassuring German statement

&which found publication In an American mag

azine that under a renegade Englishman played

up for the Hun by attempting to deceive the

United States people) proved by\maps that

the Germans had lost less territory on the

Somme In three months than the French ~ had

lo st at Verdun in three weeks . But the Germanknew .

Hisfirst answer to the Somme Offensive was his

peace Offer Of 1 91 6,in which the burglar, covered

by the househo lder ’s revo lver, Offered to go out

quiet ly with the loo t in his bag. When that was

rej ected by the Allies , the German po licy showeda frenzy Of desperat ion . The first sign Of this

was in sea po licy . Ruthless submarine murderI O

Th e Po sit ion , Sp ring 1917.

o f non-combatants , regardless of whether they

were Of belligerent or neutral countries,and

indiscriminate destruction Of property , whether

belligerent or neutral , was announced and

practised . Like a nest Of anarchists cornered in

their lair,the Germans decided to shoo t up the

town . They would die killing.

On land the German po licy was marked by akindred desperat ion Of purpo se and ruthlessness Of

cruelty,but it was Of more direct military

value . After all , the chief immed iate result Of

ruthless submarine war was t o convince the

United States that Germany must be fought byall civilised Powers

,and its final result will prob

ably be ‘the starvation o f German factories and

German cupboards after the war,when the world

faces a serious shipping sho rtage and the mad

dog Hohenz o llerns can expect to have theirneeds sat isfied las t . But the immediate effect

o f the German land po licy was a great access o f

strength both in man power and in strategic

position . The Somme battle-line,which it was

hopeless to attempt to ho ld,was given up

,and

the German forces withdrawn to the Hindenburgline . The territo ry evacuated was devastated

a fter a fashion that EurOp e had no t known Since

I I

Th e Bat t les o f th e Ridges .

the days Of Att ila’s Huns . A levy in mass Of the

German population was made to reinfo rce th e

German Army and the vital German war industries . The populations Oi the o ccupied territories

were submit ted to an’ undisguised Slavery from

Belgium and the North of France civilians were

deported to Germany to work there as Slaves,

and thus release Germans for the fighting ranks .

It is necessary to have be fore the mind these

facts as to the general po sition o f affairs in the

West before turning to a consideration Of theBatt les of Arras and Messines . German ruthless

ness on land had interpo sed a strip o f desert

between the victorious and can-pressing Allied

armies on the Somme , and had by ai evy o f its

own civil populat ion and. the enslavement o f the

civil populat ions within its grip added vastly te

its arm ed resources . It was known that in March

the Germans had 49 Divisions in reserve on the

Western front and 20 more reserve Divisions in

the course Of fo rmation ,in to tal a force of, say , a

million men in addition to tho se then in the

fight ing line . The German plan was, after thewithdrawal from the Somme had broken Off a

lo st bat tle , to form a great army o f attack for an

Offensive at some vital po int .

1 2

The Po sit ion, Sp r ing 19 17.

Whilst there can be nothing but horror for thebarbarian ruthlessnesswith which the Germans

sought the means to snatch victo ry from defeat

on land ,the bo ldness of this plan compels a certain

admiration . Without a doubt it was the only

way promising a chance Of an advantageous

peace .

I f a striking victory could be gained at somepo int by throwing the last o f the nation

’s reserves,

and the last Of the nation ’s scruples,into the

contest -»if thus Paris could be seriously threatened

o r Calais gained n a German peace might be

po ssible , even though the who le world was out

raged by German ruthlessness .

Events came to the aid of the German . OnMarch re th the Russian revo lution broke out

,

and thereafter the Russian arm was practically

paralysed . The German could reinforce his army

on the Western front with men and munitions

from the Eastern front , and could revive the

drooping spirits of his home population with

bulletins o f cheap victories won against armies

in which the tongue had sought to take the place

o f the sword .

Such was the po sit ion facing the Allied Com

mand in April 1 9 17. It was a po sition full Of

1 3

Th e Bat t les o f th e Ridge s .

d ifficulties and Of dangers . The German was

preparing a great blow in some quarter. He had

ready , or on the po int Of readiness,a fresh horde

o r about a million men in reserve to be pouredthrough any gap which his armies already in the

battle-line could make . Fo r the first t Ime in the

history of the war he had only the one front to

trouble him,as a sustained Russian Offensive was

impo ssible .

On the o ther hand,the United States had

declared war, and her giant fo rce would in timecome to the aid Of the Alliance . There was an

Obvious temptation for the Allies to fall backupon a defensive pOlIcv to await and resist ,as well as

&

could be,the German attack & to be

content if the line could be held . Fortunately

a bo lder, wiser spirit animated the HighCommand .

The British Army,flushed with its victories

on the Somme , confident in the new skill it

had gained in that giant battle , and renew

ing its strength day by day with men and

guns,undertook the Offensive . The fine plan

built up by German bo ldness crumbled before agreater bo ldness . The V ictories of Arras and

Messines wrested from the German the goints

I 4

Th e Po sit ion , Sp r ing 19 17

d’

agbpm’

on which he might rest his efforts to

breach the Allies ' line & used up his mighty re

serves,fo rced him back to a demoralising

defensive , and marked the end o f all his hopes

on the Western front . By the end Of June the

German had to withdraw96 Divisions from

the firing line to refit & his Offensive was out o f

the question his defensive was faring SO badlythat the British forces were in possession Of almo stevery mile Of that trench line in Flanders and

Arto is which the German had fixed on in 1 9 1 4

for his defensive stand .

Writing early in April 1 917, Captain v on

Salzmann,the military expert Of the Vossische

Z eitung,bewailed the mechanical superio rity Of

the Allies,but took comfo rt in the mighty strategic

reserve which the genius Of General Hindenburghad built up .

In the struggle,wrote this German expert

,

for the great init iative,victo ry will belong to

the side which can hold back its reserveslongest .

”

In July 1 917, if still o f the same strategic

opinion , that German expert was no longer

in doubt as to the side to which victory be

longed , for the German reserves had vanished

I S

Th e Bat t les of th e Rid ges .

in the furnace o f the war, and the Germans had

nothing to Show for their use but a series o f

strategic retreats,“in accordance with plan

,

” from

the dominating po sitions which they fortified

when the trench war began to the inferior positions which they are now allowed to occupy until

it suits the Allies to turn them out .

1 6

CHAPTER II .

THE BATTLE OF‘

ARRAS

THE PREPARATION .

UST as the full Significance Of

the Battles of the Ridges in the

Spring Of 1 917canno t be appreciated without a glance first at

the general strategic position ,SO the actual extent Of the

achievement in the Bat t le of Arras canno t beunderstood without a glance at the difficulties

Of the country in which it was fought .

The Arto is , in which the Battle of Arras was

fought , is a tableland walling in on the left the

Douai Plain ,which is of the Flanders type o f

country , low-lying and over-watered . The Arto is

tableland is no t lofty ,but rising from it are many

hills and ridges , of which the Vimy Ridge is the

most impo rtant . These ridges and the frequent

woods and copses give the landscape variety and

charm,conquering even the ugly pit-heads and

I7

The Bat t les o f the Ridges .

slack-heaps , and the corons, or workmen ’s

villages , which mark the Arto is as a coal-mimngdistrict . The main roads skirt the ridges or passalong their slopes . Away from themain roads the

country is traversed by a net-work Of sunken

roads , sometimes Of a great depth . It would

seem that the farmer Of past generations made

cart-tracks to the main roads by scraping thesoft top -so il away , and continued to do this year

by year until the track became a great,broad

ditch paved with the hard sub-so il , lined on each

side by embankments o f a height,o ften , o f

from 1 2 to 20 feet . When a more

'

p ermanent

road was made it most Often fo llowed the Old

sunken track , macadam metalling b\eing placed

over the sub-so il .

The frequent ridges , the little woods , the sunken

roads , give this Arto is country special facilities

for defensive military Operations . The sunkenroads are , to all intents and purposes , communi

cation trenches , able to take wheeled trafiic as

well as foot traffi c . The chief industry of the

Arto is , coal-mining , adds to the resources Of an

army carrying on a defensive campaign . The

galleries of a coal-mine are Obviously very safe

store-places ,and the slack-heap Offers itself as

1 8

https://www.forgottenbooks.com/join

The Bat t le s o f th e Ridges .

seizure o f Vimy Ridge was the Battle of Arras,

its beginning , its end ,and its who le accomplish

ment . That is very far from being the case . It

was an incident Of the battle —a mOSt Important

incident—but no t by any manner of means the

who le battle .

During March . the British Army,which had

taken over from the French the southern section

o f the Somme line , was busily engaged in clean

ing up the Somme down to our poin t Of contact

_with the French in front Of St . Quentin . The

probing Of the German line showed that the

enemy had given up in the Somme district all the

territory that he was likely to sacrifice withouta great struggle—that , in fact , he was back to hisHindenburg line &and the Intelligence Departmentwas made aware o f the massing Of a great reserve

army behind the German lines for a big Offensive .

The decision was made to hit first , and to strike

the enemy at the po int from which his retreat

from the Somme had been pivoted . Before theSomme offensive the German line had run from

in front Of Lille , south-south-west to behind Arras ,and had then bulged out in a salient westward .

The Somme offensive captured for the Allies that

salient, and in withdrawn their line the Germans

20

The Bat t le of Arras.

made the po int of their Old line east Of Arras

the pivo t . From that po int their new line

stretched down to a po int in front o f St . Quentin .

Without ceasing the pressure on St . Quentin

we were within two miles Of the town on April

I st —the British Army co llected forces for a blowon a wide front , Of which Arras would be thecentre . The first moves seemed to indicate only a

northern extension o f the Somme—Ancre Battle .

On April and we seized Henin in the valley Of theCo j eul , about 5 miles south-east Of Arras , and

o ther villages up to Do ignies , improving our line

on a I O-mile front from Beaurains , south o f Arras ,to a po int near Beaumetz on the Bapaume—n

Cambrai Road . This preliminary engagement

was fought in a snow-sto rm,and throughout the

Battle Of Arras the weather was ho stile . Winter

put up a stubbo rn defensive before the coming OfSpring , and the severity o f the season established

a record for nearly a hundred years .

To the air service this lingering Of the winter

was a special hardship . I t'

has come to be established as a principle Of British tactics on the

Western front that an air Offensive to establish

superiority in the air should precede the artillery

preparation and the infantry attack in a big2 1

The Bat t les o f the Ridges .

push . Our airmen, t o whom was given the task

Of winning the first stage Of the Battle of Arras ,had to do their work in spite Of gales and snow

storms . They did it,however , with a complete

ness, a thoroughness , that marked the highest

point up t ill then attained in air warfare . From

dawn on April sth to dawn on April 7th ,night

and day , the bat tle in the air cont inued withhardly an hour’s in termission . We cro ssed the

German lines to search out the German air fleets

and destroy them . If the enemy aeroplanes

showed a dismclination to fight,we forced them

to come up in defence Of their Observat ion balloonsand aerodromes . We sent out , night and day ,

squadrons Of bombing aeroplanes , which did no t

seek targets in the streets o f Open towns,but

attacked the German aerodromes , railway stations,ammunition dumps and encampments , making

light Of anti-aircraft guns and Of defence squad

rons . In all 17great bombing raids were carriedthrough

, and over eight tons Of bombs weredropped where they would be most effective .

This direct fighting in the air and bombing of

ho stile works was the mo st exciting , but no t themo st useful, part of the air task. I t was really

only,th e preparation for the next step when

22

Th e Bat t le o f Arras .

aerOplanes swarmed up in the air with the

camera as their chief weapon,anxious only to

take pictures of the Hun and his wo rks . In all ,

air-pho tographic pano ramas were taken in

preparation for the Battle of Arras— pictures

which exposed to us no t“

only the German’

s

trenches , his gun -pits,his light railways

,his roads

or tracks , but also indicated to What extent hewas using particular ro ads and trenches , at what

po ints he was diverting traffic from one track to

ano ther . The number of things which a good airpho tograph will tell to the General Staff justifies

the arduous effort to get it . An example &cho sen

at random, and no t mo re like a fanciful instance

o f modern detective romance thanmany another

that could be cited) -An air—pho tograph shows

at a spo t which is identified on the squared map

of area markings which on clo se examinationprove to be new horse or mule lines . It is clearthat they are lines for horses and mules from the

well-wo rn tracks to the watering troughs . But

it is a very advanced spo t for animals to be

tethered , neither comfortable nor safe and

there are no wheel tracks,no trace of ammunition

wagons . No t to fo llow the examination through

all its steps , the ult imate conclusion &which is

23

The Bat t le s of the Ridges .

proved afterwards to be right) is that the enemyhas established one or more batteries in a very

fo rward po sition near there,and is go ing to supply

them with ammunition by pack-ho rses.

After the air-photographer has had his innings

the air-spo tter lumbers up in his machine . Healso has no thought of bombing or fighting . All

he wants is to be let alone while he guides ourbatteries to score direct hits on the targets whichthe air-photographer has discovered . A patient

and long-suffering man is the air-spotter &and

also his pilot) As he quietly circles around the

target which he Is Observing and sends bywireless his observations , he is stormed at with

sho t and shell, often attacked by aeroplanes , but

never attempts to retaliate—j ust goes on making

his no t altogether harmless observations . And

it is wonderful how much shooting an air-spo tter

machine will withstand without giving up . Oftena machine comes home with its wings actually

riddled with shrapnel and rifle bullets . Unlessthe petro l tank or the pilo t

’

s head is pierced the

air-spo tting machine usually carries on until the

task in hand is finished .

The air fighting in the Battle of Arras was

marked by some Inc Idents of almost ridiculous

24

Th e Bat t le o f Arm s :

daring. After the first direct fighting in the air,the German airm en showed an inclinat ion to

keep to their harbours and to refuse combats.

That was no t agreeable to our plans , which

demanded a great destruction of enemy machines ,so as to give our mastery o f the air as much

permanency as is possible in that element . So

the German airmen were taunted into coming up

by daring attacks on their in fantry . Our aeroplanes would sweep down on to a road just over

the heads o f a marching co lumn,sprinkling it with

bullets . Once a German Staff mo tor car waschased along a road for some miles and peppered

as it sprinted,until one of the staff officers was

wounded or killed and the car was then run into a

ditch and the o ther officers took to earth .

Of course all this was no t done without breakingeggs . On April 5—6 we lo st 28 machines , withtheir pilo ts and observers . Found ing their men

dacity on the incident of these lo sses , the Germanbulletins claimed great air successes . But

that yarn did no t even deceive the Germans , who

knew full bit terly which Side had the air victo ry ,as they went through the Battle of Arras blinded ,

flogged by artillery,to which their gun s could

only reply at random . I t certainly did no t

25

The Bat t les of the Ridges .

deceive our men , who saw the sky dotted with

our machines , and who ,whether gunners or

infantry,had ,

every moment , reason to blessthe boys aloft , of whom a modern bard sings

Then did the British airman’s sea-born skillTeach wood and metal to foresee his willIn every cog a nd joint his spirit stirred &The thing possessed wasman aswell as bird .

A falcon among timorous fowl he flies,And bears Britannia’s battle to the skies &In vain the Hun seeks covert in a cloudThe riven dusk is made his shaken shroud .

From April I st to April oth the Batt le of

Arras was go ing through its preparatory stage .

We swept the air clean o f the German and carried .

through our aerial reconnaissance . We seiz ed

some preparatory po ints , and kept up a steady

pressure all along our line from St . Quentin

northwards . That a big blow was in preparationthe enemy knew, but they knew no t the t ime

nor the place & and , beaten out of the air, they

had no means of finding out .

https://www.forgottenbooks.com/join

The Bat t le s o f the Ridges.

There was a note of hope in the appeal o f the

Benediction hymn

O Salutaris Hostia,Quse coeli pandis ostium‘

,

Bella p remunt hostilia ,

Da robur fer auxilium.

&

Easter Sunday evening was spent within the

British lines in.

a confident preparation . The

greater part of.

the infantry brought up for the

attack slept in bivouacs . The night was co ldthough fine & towards the morning rain came

with a north-westerly wind . Dawn was anxiously

awaited by the troops , dawn and the chance to ‘

get forward . The darkness was intensified

rather than relieved by the occasionalflash of a

gun taking part in a feeble and desultory bom

bardment of the enemy’s lines , a bombardment

which seemed to mark the flickering out of a

threatened attack , and to promise to the enemy

a chance to repair his sorely shattered lines .

From the evidence of prisoners it seems clear

that the Germans did no t expect an immediate

attack , and that when the rain came it was taken

A rough transla tion : 0 Sav ing Host , guard ian o f

Heaven ’

s Gat e , armed fo es oppress us give us st rength ,

bring us aid .

”

28

Th e Bat t le o f Arras .

as another welcome sign o f a probable pause inthe British Operations .The dawn came , showing but a timid light

through the clouded sky , until our guns , waiting

for the appo inted moment . gave it greeting .

There was then no want of light . A fierce flame

crackled and ran like chain-lightning for 1 5 miles

along our front . A thousand and more guns , from

the giant 1 5-inch howitzers to the 1 8-pdrs.,began

to discharge their mountains o f shell at the

German po sition . So quick was the rate of

fire that’

that chain-lightning ran its direful course

along the British line almo st continuously &and

along the German line there was a response in

continuous sheet-lightning as the uninterrupted

hail of shells burst .There are two incidents of awe and horror

which separate themselves from o ther impressions

of the gigantic battles o f this war in the mindsof all observers one is the oncoming of a po ison

gas cloud—silent,stealthy

“

,baleful the o ther is

the monstrous roar and flash of the guns when

the final artillery preparation preludes a Brit ish

or a French attack . This Arras preparat ion was

the greatest that the war had known . I t sur

passed all the great bombardments of the Somme29

The B at t les o f the Ridges.

battles . It brought into action high explosiveshells of terrible power and instantaneous detona

tion , monster shells which would deliver their

shattering message at the touch of a bird ’s wing

Or of a single strand of w1re which did no t wreck

trenches , but obliterated them & which did no t

cut lanes through wire entanglements , but dis

sipat ed them into dust . Even observers long

accustomed to the sights and sounds o f this

war were impressed by the intensity o f the Easter

Monday artillery attack .

The Times co rrespondent records his im

pressions of that dawn

In an instant , it seemed , the who le oi\ the enemyline broke into flame. Beyond the flicker of our guns,brilliantly visible in the half—light, and amid the

flash and swirl of our bursting shells, the enemy’s

rockets, calling for help, rose from the whole circuitof the horizon-m -red and white and green and tallorange-coloured fountains of golden rain. One couldnot guess what the signal meant, but plainly theGerman infantry everywhere were shrieking for aid

from the supports and artillery .

Between our guns and the front trenches, from asmall wood a great flight of rooks rose into the dim airand swung in pan ic round and round , silhouettedagainst the background of flames like a devil’s danceabove the eternalfires.

30

The Bat tle o f Arras.

Then other birds came, Slowly droning, frombehind us

,flying very low and headed straight for the

enemy’s country—our aeroplanes, their outlineshardly visible against the grey sky , but going serenelythrough the storm as if therewere neitherwind aroundno r death ahead of them.

As daylight grew, the outlines of Arras on the

right and the vague line of Vimy Ridge on the leftbegan to define themselves, and the face of allthebloodstained country by Neuville St. ’Vaast to Thélus andLa Fo lie Farm. Before 6 o

’clock , however, the lightdrizzle changed to a heavy storm of rain which laterbecame mixed with snow, and all the battlefield wassheeted in flying mist, driving before the Wind .

The Morning Post co rrespondent wrote

I saw the beginning of the assault between Arrasand Souchez, and the artillery concentration for thisportion of the great offensive alone was the moststupendous yet made by any group of armies. Thebarrage which shielded the infantry sweeping forwardin the grey dawn was a suddenly appalling spectacle.Throughout the night shells had poured on theGermanearthworks and the chain of concrete forts that crownthe heights of Vimy and half encircle Arras , butsuddenly this deluge lifted , and for half an hour thenight was still .&ust as the first faint streaks of dawn lightenedthe eastern sky the guns were loosed again as thoughby a single hand , and the distant ridges were aflame .

Coloured rockets spouted against the drifting clouds,31

Th e Bat t les o f th e Ridges.

and frantic signals blazed above the bursting shellsgreat cascades of golden rain and o ther lurid devicesfor proclaiming the fears o f the garrison awaiting itsinevitable fate. We could see waves of khaki fo llowing steadily in the wake of the fiery curtain g, couldeven see them vanish into the labyrinth o f trenchesthat was their goal and all the while the Germangarrisons were inarticulate. There was nothing to

stay their progress. Even after the first swift descentof this terrible wall of flame, the strange silence continued , and no t until our men had begun the siftingof wrecked dug-outs did the enemy batteries reply

,

and then uncertainly and Without enthusiasm.

To the infantryman waiting to go over the

impression was mo re simple , but it was verywarming and comforting. Fritz is getting his

iron rations , would certainly be the“remark of

at least one out o f four British so ldiers as they

waited in the trenches , sipping at their hot -.tea,

and waiting f or their turn to go on .

” The

British infantryman does no t like iron rations

&the emergency ration of bully ,c

biscuit,beef

extract , tea and sugar) neither carrying them

about &which he has to do always) nor eat ingthem

,nor explaining why he has lost them &which

he has to do o ften) and his favourite cant term

for shell is iron rations . Tommy no longer

wastes any poetry or exalted language on an

32

https://www.forgottenbooks.com/join

Th e Bat t les of the Ridges .

The song o f the guns war co rrespondents can

no te , and can tell of it in fine phrases & but howhard it is t o give any real idea o f that miraculous

British infantry in the attack—figh ting its way ,no t so much gaily

,o r cheerfully

,as good

humouredly, through horrors and terrors unspeakable . He is care-free quite

,the British so ldier of

the line , and reckless &he is good-humoured quite ,killing only as a matter of sheer necessity & and

yet withal no plaster saint,but having a piquant

human flavour o f cantankerousness,grousing

about his breakfast bacon as he goes stubbornlyon earning Military Medals by the dozen .

No t in this charge in front of Arras , b ut in one

quite near by,I recall a so ldier taking shelter for

a moment in a shell-ho le as we stro lled through a

singularly poo r specimen of German barrage .

Here , Hawkins , what are you hanging backfo r &

‘called out his sergeant

Who’

s hanging back & retorted Hawkins,

as he came on can ’t a fellow light his blinking

fag & Who ’s go t all the matches that a fellow

can ’t get down out of the wind a half-mo’

Hawkins &that is no t his name) did a very goodday ’s work

, and was complimented by his platoon

commander and his name sent on for further

34

Th e Bat t le o f Arras .

notice . But he was still in an injured frame o f

mind that evening about lighting his fag .

”

He was a typical English Tommy ,”and , whilst

I have been digressing , some thousands like himwith Canadians , Australians , New Z ealanders ,Newfoundlanders

,South Africans assisting—ln

a line twelve miles long , have been walking upbehind the barrage and giving

’

the German Army

the greatest blow it has yet experienced .

At a .m . the infantry started . By 9 e .m .

the fate of the day was practically decided ,and

we were in po ssession of German po sitions along

the who le front of attack that included Vimy

Ridge,perhaps the chief strong—po int of the

fortress line behind which the enemy had takenshelter. By nightfall the Commander-in-Chief

,

General Sir Douglas Haig,could report

We attacked at a .m. this morning on a widefront . From south o f Arras to south of Lens our

troops have everywhere penetrated the enemy’s lines,and are making satisfactory progress at all po ints .In the direction of Cambrai we have stormed thevillages o fHermies and Boursies , and have’p enetratedinto Havrincourt Wood &both villages are south of theBapaume—Cambrai Road in the neighbourhood of

Beaumetz and north of the wood) .In the direction of St. Quentin we have capturedFresnoy-le-Petit &two miles west o f the Cambrai

35

Th e Bat t le s o f th e Ridge s .

St. Quentin Road) and have advanced our line southeast o f Le Verguier &nearly four miles north-west o fFresnoy) .Our troops have everywhere stormed ‘

the enemy ’sdefences from Henin-sur—Co jeul to the southernoutskirts o f Givenchy-eu-Gohelle to a depth of fromtwo to three miles , and our advance continues .The enemy ’s forward defences on this

,

front,

including the Vimy Ridge, which was carried byCanadian tr00ps, were captured early in the morning.

These defences comprise a network o f trenches andthe fortified localities o f Neuville-Vitasse, Te legraphHill , Tilloy-lez -Mofflaines, Observation Ridges, St .Laurent , Blangy , Les Tilleuls, and La Fo lie Farm .

Subsequently our troops moved forward and

captured the enemy’s rearward defences , including,in addit ion to other powerful trench systems, thefo rtified localities o f Feuchy, Chapelle de Feuchy ,

Hyderabad Redoubt , Athies , and Thélus.

&p to'

2 p m . prisoners , including ~ 1 1 9officers, had passed through the co llection stations,and many more remained to be counted . Of thesea large number belong to Bavarian Divisions , whohave suffered heavy casualties in to -day ’s fighting.

The captured war material includes guns’ and

numbers o f trench mortars and machine-guns whichhave no t yet been counted .

In the direction of Cambrai further progress hasbeen made in the neighbourhood of HavrincourtWood . We have captured the village o f Demicourt .

In the direction of St . Quentin we have capturedthe villages of Pontru and Le Verguier.

36

Th e Bat t le o f Arras .

The Commander-in-Chief’s report the next daywas equally cheering

During the night there was severe fighting at thenorthern end o f the Vimy Ridge , where the enemyhad retained a footing. He was ejected , and anattempted counter-attack failed to materialise. Theeastern slope o f the ridge has been cleared o f the

enemy, and counter-attacks repulsed .

Our troops advanced and seized the Village o f

Fampoux &east o f Athies , captured on Monday , and

nearly four miles east o f A rras) and neighbouringdefences north and south o f the Scarpe .

The number of prisoners taken yesterday exceedsand over 40 guns have been captured .

In the neighbourhood o f St . Quentin the enemyhas been driven from the high ground between LeVerguier and Hargicourt &two miles . north o f LeVerguier and both north-west o f St . Quentin) .Our operations have been continued energetically

to -day in spite o f heavy snowstorms and generallyunfavourable weather.We have reached the \

outskirts o f Monchy-lePreux

,five miles east o f Arras

,and have cleared

Farbus and Farbus Wood &east o f Thélus) .Hard fighting took place again this afternoon on

the northern end o f the Vimy Ridge,in which we

gained further important positions and to ok. a numbero f prisoners and machine -guns .In the direction of Cambrai we have advanced our

line north o f the village o f Louverval.

37

Th e ZgBat tle s of th e Ridges .

Such counter-attacks as the enemy has attemptedat different points along our front have met with no

success .The number of prisoners taken by us since t he

opening of our attack yesterday morning now exceedsincluding 235 officers .

We have also captured over 1 00 guns , among thema number of heavy guns up to 8-inch calibre, 60 trenchmortars, and 1 63 machine-guns .Our aeroplanes performed valuable work yesterdayin co -operation with our infantry, and in a numberof cases inflicted casualties with machine-gun fire on

hostile reinforcements.

And the next day ’s report &it will be convenlentto give together these three official despatches ,d escribing the first phase of the Battle of Arras)recorded

The weather continues to be wet and stormy .

E arly this morning we attacked and captured two

important positions in the enemy’s lines north of theVimy Ridge, astride the River Souchez . A numberof prisoners were taken by us. Lat er t hese positionswere secured and strengthened .

During the night two hostile attacks upon our newpositions on the northern end o f the Vimy Ridge weredriven offby ourmachine-gun firewith heavy Germanlosses .Some progress has been made south of the River

Scarpe.South of the Arras—Cambrai Road our troops this

38

The Battle of Arras.

afternoon stormed the villages o f Henine l and

Wancourt , with their adj oining defences, and crossedthe Co jeul River and occupied the heights on the

eastern bank.

Further progress has also been made during the dayno rth of the Scarpe and east of the Vimy Ridge.In the course of patro l encounters last night north

east of E pehy, in which we secured a few prisoners,a large enemy detac hme nt came under the effectivefire of our infantry and suffered heavy casualties.

During the fighting of the &fi lland roth instant we‘

captured prisoners from all infantry regiments of sixGerman divisions, via , 79th Reserve Division, 1 st

Bavarian Reserve Division, 1 4th Bavarian Division,1 1 th Division, 17th Reserve Division, and 1 8th

Reserve Division .

The number of prisoners of each of these divisionsexceed a thousand .

That is the bald ,but certainly not unconvincing

narrative . It may be filled in with some explanation of the priz e we had gained , and some incidents

of the fighting .

39

CHAPTER IV.

THE BATTLE OF ARRAS : THE PRIZ E .

HE harvest from the Battle of

Arras was rich ln strategic

and moral advantage, and no t

wanting in material advantage .

We had dealt a first staggering

blow at the German plan of

massing a big strateglc reserve for a theatrical

offensive somewhere . Further, we had prejudiced

the German defensive line serlously . There are

indications that the enemy designed a furtherwithdrawal . From a pivo t east o f Arras

he “had already wheeled back his line to

abandon the salient of the Somme . Probablyhe had contemplated then a northerly swing

back from St . Quentin , giving some ground

in Arto is,but keeping his ho ld on the Vimy

Ridge,without which he could no t hope to

ho ld fo r long the valuable coal district aroundLens . Probably a German line Vimy—Oppy

40

https://www.forgottenbooks.com/join

The Bat tles o f the Ridges.

and the city of Arras freed from bombardment

German guns equalto the artillery o f two Divisions

had been captured , and in many caseswere at once

used ,with the ir ammunition

,against their late

owners , who had the experience of knowing whata good destructive shell the German howitz ercan be with British observers and gunners to

guide it on the right path . The German prisoners

represented something more than the strength of

a Division , and the wastage o f German forces

from killed and wounded was enormous , especially

in the vain counter-attack which sought to win

back the Vimy Ridge .

Vimy Ridge was the chief t errito rial priz e o f

the victo ry . I t had been fought for\ in manyprevious stubbo rn battles . The French tried todrive the Germans from it in December 1 91 4

and again in May 1 9 1 5 . We failed to get it in

the Autumn 1 91 5 offensive,and in May 1 91 6

the Germans,by a sudden attack

,supported by

great barrages o f tear-shells—then a comparativenovelty —managed one Sunday to improve theirho ld on the ridge at our expense . The ridge

practically g ives command of Lens , and its loss

made certain the ultimate lo ss o f the Lens coal

basin . Canadian troops had the post of honour in

42

The Bat tle o f Arras.

this section . They took the first and second lineson the rldge withoutmuch trouble , except that ofco llecting prisoners . Taking the third line was a

more stubborn task . Hill 1 45 , on the north of theridge , held out until nightfall . The ridge was

found to be wonderfully well_o rganised for defence .

In addition to the usual shelters and dug-outs ,there had been tunnelled two great galleries

where men could shelter safe from any shell fire .

But the men who could shelter there could no t

get up to the surface in time to fight,so perfect

was the co-ordination o f ourmfantry and artillery

and they were the main contributors to the greatbag o f prisoners from this sect ion

‘of the

battle-line . Trenches and dug-outs were found

by the conquerors to have been completely 0b

literated . It was hardly po ssible to tell wherethey had been . The German prisoners gave

further testimony to the effect iveness of our

artillery wo rk , for they had been without food fortwo days , all communication with their supply

train having been cut off by the pit iless curtainfire . The victory o f Vimy Ridge was a proud

achievement for the Canad ian contingent of the

Imperial Army .

The section south o f Vimy Ridge fell to the

43

Th e Bat t les o f the Ridge s .

troopsfrom the Mo th er '

Country ,and they had a

hard task in subduing the famous Labyrinth,

Neuville St . Vaast,Farbus

,Thelus and Roclin

court . In their bag o f prisoners was in

cluded a German Brigade General and his Staff ,bitterly mortified at being caught in a dug-outwithout a chance to put up a fight . Here again

the effectiveness o f’

the artillery work was manifest .Officer prisoners confessed that they and their

men had been unable to get food for four days .

The measure of safety,they felt

,their ho les in

the ground had glven them was rather a mockery ,

for they had been able merely to cower there ,co ld , hungry ,

thirsty,until they were captured

when the British cho se to come over .

~

Similarlybatteries were found safely enough dug in ,

but with the record o f no t having fired a sho t for

days,because o f the impo ssibility o f getting up

ammunition .

The next section to the south ,where English

and Sco ttish tro ops were engaged ,met with the

hardest resistance o f the first phase o f the battle .

The Germans had been established almo st in thesuburbs of Arras

,and from house entrenchments

at Blangy there came a murderous machine-gunfire . The banks of the Scarpe

,t oo

,

’

were full o f

44

Th e Bat t le o f Arras .

strong po sitions . At one stage the infantry

seemed completely held up,but good communi

cation with the artillery had been preserved ,and

the obstacles were beaten down by gun-fire .

Cavalry had a little chance in this section,and one

howitzer battery on the Scarpe was captured by

a cavalry charge . In the taking of Monchy ,t oo ,

the cavalry co -operated,at one stage dismounting

and go ing forward afo o t with their Hotchkiss guns .

The capture of Monchy—a plateau strongho ld

from which radiate a great number o f tho se sunken

roads which are a feature of the Arto is —was a

particularly fine bit o f reso lute work . The

Germans hung on to it desperately , and it affo rded

them go od Oppo rtunities fo r defence . It is

doubtful whether the '

plac e could have been takenhad no t the cavalry proved so skilful and daring .

The sunken roads in front were full o f machine

guns,and the sunken ro ads in the rear gave the

German garrison ideal means of safe communica

tion with their reserves and supply trains .

Almo st to the end fresh troops were beingpoured into the place from Douai and Cambrai .

The difficulties o f the attack were increased by

the wretched weather allblinding snow-flurries

sweeping the country .

45

Th e Bat t les of the Ridges .

A Mommg Po st correspondent describes thecapture vividly

We hold Monchy firmly, despite strong counterattacks, thanks t o the gallant English and Scottishlads, who stormed it at the point of the bayonet earlyWednesday morning, and the cavalry squadrons thatcharged up the slope into the narrow streets, drivingthe fugitives of the garrison out on the eastern sideinto the shallow trenches beyond .

The taking of Monchy is a story o f the splendidheroism and determination of troops who had beensorely t ried by three days an d nights of hard fighting,and marching insnow and rain, with little food and

less sleep , constantly harassed by hidden machineguns and shelled by German batteries . Some o f

these men came tramping back through the snow thismorning, wounded , and I heard from them

x

details o f

the struggle for this enemy strongho ld . The Germansdesperately desired t o retain Monchy. The defeatedPrussian Divisions

,flung eastward along the Scarpe

and the Cambrai Road by our first thrust, had beenordered by the High Command to hold the villageand the high ground round it at all costs. It was arace against time by the Opposing armies, and theBritish won . The impetus of our great advancecarried the first waves of infantry so far beyond thebroken f ront into the free country behind that bynightfall on Monday the first of them were resting inthe fields be low Monchy , within range of its machineguns. FreshGerman regiments were hurrying up fromthe rest billets in Cambrai and Douai to stiffen the

46

The Bat t le of Arms .

exhausted troops already in the line, but they couldnot am ve ln time. Their guns had fallen back as

ours pushed forward over the new craters to the goodroads behind .

British cavalry suddenly appeared on the fringe of

this open country, riding down the nests of snipersand the pockets o fmachine-gunners, through a stormof shrapnel and heavy shell , and their advent hastenedthe inevitable retirement from, the villages thusmenaced by our horse and foot. Monchy, which wasthe divisional head -quarters on Monday, was reducedto a brigade centre on Tuesday, and as the Britishpressure increased and fresh tr00ps could be seen bygunner look-outs in the church steeple swarming overthe fields from the slopes by Arras, it was abandonedt o a regimental commander, who presently found thetide of battle flowing to his very feet .Machine-gunners hung stubbornly to their poststhroughout Tuesday, while the houses and the chateauof Monchy were hastily prepared for a state of siege ,raking the little hills and hollows between the roadswith deadly thoroughness. They had the advantagesin the matter of observation, for in the lulls betweenthe blinding snow-squalls they were able to watchevery movement o f their opponents . The Britishinfantry , imperturbable , dug themselves into the

riddled ground and endured the fire with stoicism.

They had losses , but there was no thought o f turningback to a safer place. The cavalry , working alongon both sides of the Cambrai Road , bivouacked on thebroken ground beyond the ruined chape l-redoubtof Feuchy , and early on Wednesday mo rning the

47

The Bat t les of the Ridges .

ordeal o f the waiting -

‘

troops had a glorious end .

Infantry , cavalry , and a valiant Tank stormedMonchy just after daybreak , encircling it with suchrapidity that the garrlson were unable

”

to check theflo od that swept against them. The infantry tookthe southern end o f the village . They stumbled overthe fields , shaking the snow from their great-coats ,their heads down against the double blast o f cuttingwind and deadlierbullets . Men fell , but others went

Machine-guns clattered from windows . and

behind ditches . The red roo fs o f the cottages weredotted with the greyfigures o f prostrate Germansfiringwildly down the mp e . The bullets were likeraindrops , ” said a Londoner who survived thestorm .

They couldn ’t miss us , but they couldn ’t stop us .

”

The infantry ~were in among the cottages before the

garrison had time t o clear the some o f themlooked down appealingly and rather foo lishly from thegables ,

They were running up the narrow streetsacross the little central square . The eastern slope o fMonchy was thick with flying Prussians . Meanwhilethe cavalry was charging into the northern end o f the

village . They had fo rmed under the lee of a slightdip in the ground under a ho t fire .

‘Horses whee ledinto position and sabres flashed in the morning light .They came into V iew a moment later, and the chargeo f these troopers was witnessed by thousands o f theirdismounted comrades lying in the countryside formiles around .

&ou have never seen cavalrymen like them. Mudencrusted figures under flat metal hats, men withthree days’ beards and faces covered with grime, in

48

https://www.forgottenbooks.com/join

Th e Bat t le o f Arras .

no way suggesting the smart Lanc ers, Dragoons, o r

Hussars o f other days. They had slept in shell—ho les ,and lain inmud and rain , with no protection save theirgreat -coats they were unwashed , weary and co ld &but never have tro opers ridden to a chargewith greaterwillingness or deadlier purpose . We went fulltilt , like the devil himself, s ald a child with asubaltern ’

s star on his tunic full tilt , with a cheerfor a good half-mile into the funny old town itself.They halt ed in the streets, with sabres and lances

st ill shining,for no t a single Prussian remained to

meet them . Monchywas empty . Five dead Germanslay across the pavement , and two fallen Britishinfantrymen were near them. Abandoned machine

guns awaited their search ,the flag still hung before

the door o f the deserted regimental head -quarters ,and the beds o f the fleeing Prussian officers werehardly co ld . The village was who le and unshelledwhen the cavalry and infantry went in . Tired as theywere , the men remember having wondered at itspeaceful aspect , the unbroken curtained windows o f

the houses, the neat village church ,and the frightened

chickens in the back-yards.

This pastoral scene vanished two hours laterwhen the German gun's beyond Sart Wood beganhammering at the lost position as soon as enemyobservers in the tree-tops were sure that the Britishwere in occupation , and by nightfall Monchy hadbecome the usual battered ruln .

Yet further south the fury o f the battle dimin

ished a little . Themain attack in the first phase of

o 49

Th e Bat t les o f th e Ridges .

the Battle of Arras may be said to have stretchedfrom Souchez to Henin-sur-Co j eul. But southbeyond that

,down t o St . Quentin

,the German

line was attacked and in many places -strong po ints

seized . The only untoward incident o f the daywas a great raid on a section o f the line held bythe Australians

,which gave the enemy some

prisoners . That account was to be fully squareda little later by the Australians at Bullecourt .On April 1 2th the German was licking hiswounds sadly & so flustered that he even forgo t

to say in his co‘mmum’

gue’

that he had really wantedto be kicked out of the country east of Arras &but conso ling himself that the worst was now

over . Then the Battle of Arras broke out again

on an extended front .

CHAP TE R V .

FIGHTING ON A FORTr-MILE FRONT .

April 1 2th , in wet and stormyweather

,the Arras batt le-line

was extended northwards,and

whilst steady pressure was con

tinued east and south-east o f

Arras , the British front showed

a tendency t o develop its energy mo re particularly

in this no rthern area . We were now strenuously

engaged on a 40-mile battle front , and the German

line was being nibbled at everywhere . During

the day of April 1 2th we pushed on from the

Monchy plateau . During the night we attacked

between St . Quentin and Cambrai on a 9-mile

front and captured the enemy’s line from north

of Hargicourt to Metz-en -Couture . On the morning of April 1 3th we moved down the north-east

slope of the Vimy Ridge and debouched on the

Douai Plain ,taking the villages o f Bailleul and

Willerval and coming into touch with a German

SI

Th e Bat t le s o f th e Ridge s .

switch line passing through Oppy,and so known

as the Oppy line . Further no rth we moved

fo rward north and south o f Lens,taking Angres on

the Souchez River south o f Lens,and

,to the

north o f Lens,passing once more into the area

o f Lo o s,where in 1 91 5 we had made our first

great o ffensive against the entrenched Germans .And no t to detail any but the main incidentso f April 1 3th ,

we thrust forward from Monchytowards Cambrai

,continuing the advance there o f

the previous day .

The character o f the battle had changed . Onthe 9th ,

1 0th,and r 1 th the British Army set out

with a definite task,and accomplished it with a

thoroughness that was something .in\the nature

of an agreeable surprise . Now along a front o f

40 miles we were feeling the enemy’

s line ,with a view to findlng where the next harvest ofV ictory could best be reaped . It was necessaryto guard against the temptation o f a rash advance

into some cuZ -de-sac that the Germans might haveprepared

,and to keep in mind the fact that

Hindenburg ’s great strategic reserve , whilst much

reduced in the effort to win back the Arras ridges ,was still a dangerous factor . No thing would

have suited the German game better at this

52

Figh t ing on a Fo r ty-Mile Front .

stage than fo r a British Army t o push forward

until it was trapped into a Caudine Forks po sitionand had to surrender . Hence the pathetic plaints

in the German Press,about this time

,that we

could no t claim a victory unless we brokethrough . We were no t out to break through

,

but to break up .

The war in the air to ok a new importance withthis reconnaissance-in-fo rce phase

,and the

Germans made a desperate attempt t o show inthe air again . The Navy sent some reinfo rcements to the British and these Navalairmen

,rej o icing in the chance to wo rk beside the

military airmen,emulated them in courage and

in that diablen'

e o f venturesomeness which so

impresses the enemy . Neither gales nor snowstorms kept our men out o f the air

,and they

were harassing the Hun by day and by night,

attacking anything that showed in the-air or on

the surface o f the ground . The effect of this

bo ld air-work and o f the‘

accurate artillery workwhich accompanied it

,

’

and fo llowed up exact

observation with exact destruction,could be best

observed from the remarks o f the Germanprisoners who came in . They were deeply demoralised by the fact that whilst they had to suffer

53

Th e Bat t les o f the Ridges .

tinder constant merciless artillery fire,and even

from aeroplane machine-gun fire,their own guns

were comparatively silent . The German infantry

were obviously angry with the German artillery,

and in the prisoners ’ cages there were frequent

vio lent scenes between the two arms .Ano ther arm of our service—the Tanks —c ameagain into prominence with the new phase of the

Battle of Arras . In the great attack they had

no t been much used , though in some quarters

they had carried out useful duties . Now they

were kept busyin trimming the line , in supportingsmall local actions to reduce little German

garrisons that held out in inconvenient co rners .

In the valley o f the Co j eul they did particularlygood service . The special German anti-tankgun

,of which we had captured some specimens ,

did no t seem to be particularly efficacious , thoughthe Germans were at first inclined to trust in it .After a day when the Tanks had no t come into

action,they would congratulate themselves that

the Tank was a definitely eliminated facto r .

But,as is the case in all o ther military tactics ,

the employment o f Tanks is governed partly byconsideration o f surprise .

A new Tank tactic appeared in the Arras Battle

54

https://www.forgottenbooks.com/join

Th e Bat t les o f th e Ridges .

Wancourt and back while the infantry were stillheld up at the former place . German machinegun fire slackened immediately the Tanks began t ocharge up the main street o f Heninel,and althoughit resumed when they had vanished in clouds o fsmoke in the direction o f Wancourt , it was less

determined and more erratic . The Tanks foundWancourt alive

'

with German machine-gun batt eries

,and they charged one after another ,

smashing them up . They went slowly up one

street and down ano ther,driving the garrison into

the cellars o r across the fields to Guemappe .

The resistance at Wancourt broken,the Tanks

swung about and came back through Heninel .Meanwhile the infantry

,bombing down the

Hindenburg trenches,destroying the barriers o f

new wire,

and blowing in dug-outs

,reached

Heninel, and the Tanks were cheered heartily .

That company,squadron ,

covey,herd

,quaggle ,

o r whatever it may be called ,o f Tanks had been

on continuous duty for 40 hours , and it deservedthe cheer .

Cred it must also be given -as the stock phrasegoes—for the good work done in these days bythe captured German artillery . Circumstances ,

as we have seen,had prevented the German

56

Figh t ing on a Fo rty-Mile Front

gunners in many cases from using their guns

much in the captured area between April 5th and

oth . We gathered no t only a great stock o f guns ,but somegood ammunition dumps . The artillery ,

with some help from the R E,at once o rganised

a”

German Artillery DlVlSlon ,which helped

the enemy on his way t o the Rhine with his ownshell .Meanwhile the enemy did no t fail t o react .

It was impo ssible for him t o avo id counter

attacking,and British battle-plans are normally

designed largely with a view t o the wastage o f

the German Army fo llowing a series o f counter

attacks,which he must undertake . In this

particular battle we had developed an active

threat along a 40-mile front with such vital

po ints as Cambrai and Lens invo lved . Along a

fourth o f this front we then developed the intensesection o f the attack

,driving a bro ad wedge into

the German front . He had t o make great sacrific es to stay the progress o f this wedge o r it would

have gone in so deeply.

as to make his frontbetween Lens and Cambrai untenable . The

plateau o f Monchy was the chief obj ective of theGerman counter-attacks

,after they found it’ quite

hopeless to attempt to restore the po sition at Vimy .

57

Th e Bat t le s o f th e Ridges .

The second phase of the Battle of Arras maybe said to have ended on the night of April 1 5th ,the eve o f the great French attack in the Champagne district . The clo sing days were markedby no table successes . On the night o f April 1 3thwe took Fayet

,north-west of St . Quentin

,and

left that city in a deep salient pushed into our

lines and certainly doomed to fall . Further

north we pushed on east of Le Verguier,and

again further north , on the left wing of the battle

area,we pushed down from the Vimy Ridge

po sition,capturing an area o f difficult coal-pit

country,of which the centre was known as Fosse

N0 . 6,and also the railway station o f Vimy

village . The harvest of this success included a

battery of 8-inch howitzers .

On Saturday morning,north and south

,in

rhythmic succession,heavy blows fell on the

German line . We went forward from Fayet to

within a few hundred yards o f St . Quentin and

seized the village o f Gricourt in this sector of theline

,taking 400 prisoners there . A

”

prompt

enemy counter-attack was in vain . Further

north the enemy did no t resist so fiercely , and we

made easier progress along a wide front on bo th

sides of the Bapaume —Cambrai road . In the

58

Figh t ing on a Fo rty-Mile Front .

neighbourhood of Monchy we were kept busy ,no t in taking territory

,but in beating o ff, with

excellent wastage results,the enemy ’s counter

attacks .I t was in the suburbs and environs o f Lens

,

however,that the day ’s workwas mo st bountiful .

Lievin , a big coal centre , which is practically a

part o f Lens,fell to our assault, fell so suddenly

and with such a fine yield of sto res that it seemed

that the garrison must have fled in panic at the

last moment . It was pleasing to get Lievincheaply

,for the co st of progress in this area

around Lens was usually heavy . Some idea o f the

nature of the country hasbeen alreadygiven . For a

rad ius of five miles round Lens there is no t an

acre of easy country from the po int of view of an

army o f attack . Where there are no t the steel

towers and strong buildings of the pit-heads and

the gigantic slack heaps,there are the cow onnes or

groups o f co lliery co ttages at the d ispo sition o f the

defenders . In a previous offensive in this district ,these couronnes— generally running along thesaddles and ridges of the ground—were found to

be impassable obstacles . The enemy would packtightly with earth the row o f houses on the expo sed

side and use the row on the o ther side for

59

Th e Bat tles o f the Ridges.

machine-gun detachments , which would thus be

sheltered behind an earth-work 20 feet high and

about 25 feet thick . Fortunately the German,

as the Battle o f Arras developed,lo st a great

deal of his old determination,o therwise such

cheap captures as that o f Lievin would no t have

been possible

On April 1 4th it seemed likely that Lens wouldfo llow Liév in in surrender

,but afterwards the

German resistance stiffened . By Sunday night,

however,we had Lens encircled

,and had se ized

some o f its suburbs . It was apparently decidedno t t o attempt the assault o f the city

,but to push

round no rth and south,and wait for it to fall .

The Germans,pressed back on the north and

south of the battle front,attempted on Sunday

to retrieve their po sition by an attack in thecentre

,west of Cambrai . They attacked on bo th

sides of the Bapaume —Cambrai road from

Herm ies to No reuil. For a while the enemy met

with some success at Lagnicourt , j ust no rth of

the Bapaume —Cambral road ,but it was only

temporary . Wetook 300 prisoners here , and theGermans left dead in front of our lines .

Besides beating o ff this counter-attack in thecentre o f the giant battlefield , the British troops

60

Figh t ing on a Fo r ty-Mile Front .

continued their advance in o ther sectors . At

Lens we penetrated further into the suburbs,and

in front o f St . Quentin made some progress .

Sunday was marked by to rrential rain,which

emphasised the decision to bring the second phase

o f the Battle o f Arras to a clo se . Looking backon the record of the fortnight

’s fighting,there was

reason fo r satisfaction and confidence within the

British lines . The enemy had entered battlewith about 600 guns on the area o f intense attack .

We had taken 228 of them,and great stores o f

ammunition . The prisoners we had taken

numbered All the high ground south

from Lens -Vimy Ridge , Monchy Plateau and

Cro isilles Height we had wrested from the enemy,

and the Douai Plain now lay exposed befo re us .The ultimate conquest of Lens and St . Quentin

had been made certain and the German defensive

sy stem—the Hindenburg line , the Oppy line , andthe Drocourt —Queant line —had been gravelycompromised .

61

CHAPTE R VI .

USING UP THE GERMANS.

ROM April 1 6th,during the

pause”

in the Battle ofArras,

whilst we watched symp athe ti

cally the progress o f the FrenchoffenSlve on the Aisne

,there was

no active cessation of our Opera

tions simply a slackening of the awful intensityof the struggle of the previous weeks . On theGerman side of the line there was no illusion thatthey had reached the best line of retreat& The

systematic destruction and looting of Lens and

St . Quentin which could be observed from the

British lines was proof o f that . Regarding the

loo ting o f St . Quentin the “Morning Po st ”

correspondent recorded

Although St . Quentin has not yet been whollydevastated by fire , several o f the principal buildingshave undoubt edly been deliberate ly destroyed by theenemy, as a threat of the fate which will befall theremainder. I am to ld that the German loo ted

62

https://www.forgottenbooks.com/join

Th e Bat tles o f th e Ridges .

corps headquarters—which stood within moat ed

walls, was literally blown into the Somme with such

force that it is utterly impossible to trace the outline o fthe building or to find suf ficient remains t o give anyidea of its design . The elaborate mausoleum o f the

Caulaincourt family suffered the usual fate . The

chapel has been defaced , and the circular cryptbeneath broken open . The carved marble slabs havebeen torn away from the niches in which the bodiesrest ed , and the coffins o f two marquises, and that of

Marquise de Caulaincourt &who was also Duchess o f

Viccnza and lady—ih -wait ing t o the Empresses&osephine and Marie Louise ) exposed , the lid of the

latter having been prised up and afterwards reclosed .

In the parish cemetery o f Mons—en—Chaussée , whichI also visit ed , the graves had been opened and the

coffins exhumed in order that the lead might beremoved . The quest for lead is believed t o b e the

prime motive for this systemat ic rifling o f cemeteriesand mortuary chapels. At the same time , it is hardlylikely that the Hun would spare the tombs o f Saints ,

because they may contain j ewels instead o f lead .

St Quent in has been a rich field for the rag-picke rso f the German Army“Over persons werethrown out o f that important manufacturing town ,

allowed to take with them only what few possessionsthey could carry on their backs, and their homesbecame the spoil o f the Hun , who impounded everything they had left behind . A German soldier whot o ok part in the sack o f St. Quentin wrote recentlyt o oneZof his relatives &ou ought to see the greatpiles of clothingofallkinds we have go t here enough,

64

&sing up th e Germans.

I should think , to fit out all the people in our city .

It makes one angry to think that all this is to bedestroyed when there are so many at home who needclothes and cannot get them.

”

The troops in rest at St . Quentin employedtheir time dismantling the houses , turning out wardrobes and cupboards, stacking u p furniture that hadbeen marked for removal , and breaking the

remainder, tying up great bundles of men’s clothesand women’s garment s, and even sacks of boots and

shoes, which were assembled at the goods depots fortransport direct to Germany. Art . experts wentthrough the museums and picture-galleries sup erin

tending the packing o f their treasures , while officers ofthe newmilitary service which 15 devoted exclusivelyto the co llection of copper and brass utensils and

other metals , marked all loot of this kind , includingthe massive bronze statue in the market-place , otherbronze statues that adorned the new canal bridge,the peals o f bells from churches, thousands of coppercandlesticks, and door plates , all destined for themelting p ot .

As regards Lens,the cont inued destruction of

the town could be no ted , day by day from the

high observation ground in our hands . The

Germans had,of course

,no further hope o f using

the coal-pits &no t even Rev entlow,in his wildest

frenzies of Pan-Germanism,nowadays dares to

hint at an advance in the West) , and they set

themselves systemat ically to loo t the machinery

65

Th e Bat t le s‘

o f th e Ridges .

and to destroy what they could no t take away.

The German garrison left behind to ho ld the placewith machine-guns had—and at the time of

writing continue to have - a wretched existence .

All the town ’s approaches and all its streets are

dominated by our artillery and our machine-guns .

The garrison must live always underground, and

carry on with such scanty supplies as can be go t

through our barrages and on every favourable

occasion we drench the area with gas,which

filters down into the galleries and dugiouts. To

live underground,always wearing a gas-mask

,

with scanty food and water , in constant fear of

being buried by a shell-burst -it canno t becheerful .

The reco rd of the Battle ofArras from April 1 6th

until St . George ’s Day &April 24th) , when it flaredup again with some of its old intensity , is of daring

air work,ceaseless artillery activity and indus

trions nibbling by the infantry under weather

conditions which were generally wretched . The

engineers,the pioneers and the labour companies

were meanwhile restoring the re-conquered

country within our new line , pushing up the roads

and field railways . The weather interfered with

this work woefully. On the other hand ,our air

66

&sing up the Germ ans .

mastery helped it by keeping the road-makerscomparat ively free from enemy artillery inter

ference .

On April 20th there was a slight improvementin the weather

, and we welcomed it with a little

advance,capturing Gonnelieu,

east o f Gouz eau~

court station . The Germans tried in vain to

recapture the village the next day . That day we

advanced a little no rth of the Scarpe and also

around Lens . The fo llowing days we nibbled alittle way around Lens and also pushed east o f

Havancourt , towards Cambrai . April 23rd wasa livelier day . We made attacks along almost

all the line,no t grand attacks

,but useful and

fruitful ones . A little was gained around Lens .

We seized Gavrelle,a high village approached by

nine sunken roads , and ,pushing towards Roeux,

go t as far as the cemetery outside the town .

Guemappe , south of Monchy, also fell as the

reward of a raid from that centre .

April 23rd was also a day of great air battles .The enemy had reinforced his air squadrons and

showed a tendency to dispute our right to cro ss

his lines for reconnaissance . At this time it is

calculated that we made about 400 aeroplanej ourneys daily across the German lines to

67

The Bat t les o f the Ridges .

reconno itre , to guide our artillery,or to bomb his

works and dumps .

On April 24th we attacked no rth and south o f

the Scarpe along a front of 9 miles,meeting with

stubbo rn resistance , especially in the valley of

the Scarpe , which was do tted with strong po ints,and where the e nemy artillery had clearly be en

re info rced . Circumstances on o ther fronts had

proved favourable to the enemy, and he was able

to concentrate a very great fo rce on our f ront .

Especially had his Russian front been stripped

bo th of guns and of seasoned fighting men .

The fighting of the 24th was perhaps the mo st

stubbo rn of the Battle of Arras . Along the frontof our attack the battle swayed to and fro allday ,

the enemy counter-attacking fiercely whenever

he lo st ground . In front of Gavrelle he made

eight separate attacks , using in each from

to men . In front of Guemappe the fighting

was just as fierce . South of England men , West

of England men , and Argyll and Sutherland

Highlanders met the chief brunt of the day .

There were many picturesque incidents of a

contest which was for strong po ints rather than

for a definite trench line , and left the issue depen

dent largely ou the initiative and courage of

68

https://www.forgottenbooks.com/join

Th e Bat t les o f th e Ridge s .

these days by his bulletins,which showed unmis

takable signs of nervous debility . Frantic praise

was showered on the victorious German tro ops

for no t having retreated farther than they were

pushed and the terrible defeats of the British

tr00ps , who had no t broken through , were

enlarged upon. To give an air o f stable veri

similitude to these German bulletins we wererepresented as having been beaten off in

attacks on places miles behind the German line ,which we had never dreamed o f attacking

,which

were no t within the scope o f any po ssible attack

on our part . It was no t hard to conclude that the

Germans were nervous of lo sing places that were

actually with in reach of our attacks, and thought

it wise to place the sites of their victorious

defences far in the rear o f their own line , in

localities which they could be reasonably sure o f

ho lding for a week at least .

On April 27th we made some progress in thecentre o f our front between Roeux and Gavrelle ,

due east of Arras . On April 28th our attack swung

a little north , and ,attacking between Gavrelle

and Lens , we took the village of Arleux . South

of Gavrelle we occupied Greenland Hill. Theenemy reacted very strongly, as we were now

70

&sing up the Germ ans.

thleatening his Droc'

ourt—Queant line . His reserves were rushed up ,

and there were many

hours of bitter fighting , in which the Linco lns and

the Northumberland Fusiliers were emulous incourage and reso lution with a Newfoundlandbattalion &The contingent from our o ldest

co lony did remarkably well in o ther phases o f

the Battle of Arras .) The advantage of the

day finally rested with us . We held all the land

we had won ,and sent back to the rear nearly

German prisoners .

In addition,we won a rich harvest ofmachine

guns . The Germans had literally lined the

sunken roads with these . In some places theywere found at 1 0 yards intervals . A deep sunkenroad is the ideal retreat for the machine-gunner.

With a little spade work he can dig into the side .

o f‘

the road a safe dug-out . He plants his gunwith its muzzle j ust clearing the crest

,and

,if

time allows,he then burrows fo rward from his

dug-out and cuts a shaft upwards

,coming out on

the advance slope o f the crest,and there has an

alternative position . When artillery fire on the

sunken road is severe,the machine-gunners can

lay doggo,safe except against the rarest

chances . At this time an improved machine-gun

7I

The Bat t le s o f the Ridges .

appeared on the German side,and in very large

numbers . But in the lo sing battle that he was nowfighting

,small technical improvements in his ,

weapons or his methods could not“

restore the

spirits of the German infantry . They were getting

into the retreating habit—fighting stiflly still ,showing no serious break in the wonderful discipline which is the keystone of their military

efficiency—but obviously slipping back in

moral .

Air fighting of a lively character marked the

clo sing days of April . It was our experiencethat mastery of the ” air could be quickly &though

no t easily) obtained and just as quickly lo st .

Constant vigilance was needed to keep\the enemy

out of the air, for new air fleets were being con

stantly brought into action . We began the

Battle ofArras in April with complete air mastery .

Twice during the month we had to fight hard

to reassert this air mastery . On April 29th thefighting in the air was particularly keen . Onepo ignant incident of it was the bringing down o f

a German aeroplane just in front of our line byone of our airmen after a lively duel . Apparently

the petro l tank of the German machine waspierced and then his engine set it afire . He came

72

&sing up th e Ge rm ans .

flaming down from the sky , at first rushing , then

gently settling. The pilo t,all afire , still held to

his seat and his contro ls . The aeroplane.

reached

the ground in No Man ’s Land within 50 yards

o f our front lines , and there the fire burned itselfout , leaving the frame of the machine and the

co rpse of the man , upright in his seat with skeleton

hands on the levers . Rescue was impossible,

burial impossible . For some days this ghastly

monument of war remained in No Man ’s Land

until our advance drove the Germans farther

back,and we buried the skeleton .

If it had been one o f our airmen it is certain

that a party would have gone out to bring him in,

no matter at what co st of life . The Germans did

no t make any attempt to do so , though if they

had it is probable that no t a rifle would havefired from our trench . But at this stage of the

war the German is emphatically a shelter-loving

so ldier His High Command profess to desirea return to Open warfare . Judging by thehourly incidents of the Battle of Arras , Open war

fare would mark the abso lute rout of an enemy

now inured to a dug-in method of warfare .

The British so ldier, even the British so ld ier who

has known no other type of war than that of the

73

The Bat t les of the Ridges .

trenches, seems naturally proof against that

dug-in timidity of shells .

G. , a close and able observer,in his book,

The Last Lap,calls attention to this charac

teristic of Tommy

He is careless and insouciant . He is careless of hisown life, and will o ften risk it most unnecessarily ,

as,

for example, when he searches for souvenirs under aheavy she ll-fire .

No t long ago we took a batch o f p rlsoners, and asthere was a fairly hot German barrage behind us ,they were put for safety in one of our trenches. ABritish officer , who was standing by them , overheardand understood what they were saying. One o f themtried to encourage the others by saying that therewould soon be a counter-attack ,

which would resultin their rescue. Never & emphatically returnedone of his prisoners. We’ll neverbeat these fellows .Look there -and he pointed t o some of our men

calmly searching for souvenirs under the Germanbarrage did you ever see a German soldier aboveground , if he could help it , when shelling was on &

Those fellows don’t mind anything, and they have nonerves. We can never beat them.

”

The April fighting in the air on the Western

front , according to official computations,invo lved

the lo ss of 717aeroplanes on the part of all the

combatants . We lo st 1 47, the French and the

Belgians lo st 201 ,and the Germans lost 369 .

74

&sing up the Germ ans .

Illustrat ing the month ’s wo rk by some morefigures , we took prisoners , including 393offi cers . We brought in 257 guns , 227trench

mortars and 470 machine-guns , besides destroying

great numbers of guns . We won back from theenemy four times the extent of territo ry that we

had won on the Somme during the same period .

We had exhausted no less than 32 German

Divisions . All this had been done with losses on

our part which showed a decrease of 40 per cent .

as compared with the casualties on the Somme .

It was clear as daylight that we had now per

fec ted our methods and had mastered the enemy .

Gone was all pro spect of a great Hindenburg

offensive .

FIGHTING AND THE

HE German had now material

on which furlously to think ,to use his own idiom and it is

quite clear from his act ions in

what direction his thoughts

went , viz . , that it was necessary

to use every means t o ho ld on in the West in thehope that something at sea or in Russia would

intervene to save his skin . Various mechanical

devices came to eke out the ebbing courage of histroops . The new machine-gun has been already

no ted, and the an tioTank gun .

A naval gun now appeared with a range of

yards , probably commandeered from the

useless battle fleet shut up in the & iel Canal.

With it the Germans could send stray shells

into areas far behind the o rd inary battle area .

The effec t of such shelling is intended to be

76

https://www.forgottenbooks.com/join

Th e Bat t les o f the Ridges

that the days of successful trench war for the

defending army were over . We had proved

that we could destroy any German trench and

occupy its site .” If the defensive were to be

pro longed ano ther method of defence must be

sought .

A German Army Order of this time confesses

to the conclusion that a line of trench , no

matter how strongly fortified ,canno t be relied

upon . The continuous lines constituting a

front position are regularly and methodically

destroyed by‘

artillery before an attack begins .

Subterranean shelters,especially in the first and

second lines,have proved to be traps .”

Unfortunately,continues the German Army

Order, the vio lence of the enemy fire —that is,

the fire of the French and British batteries

prevents us from repairing our trenches . Any

attempt to do so merely exhausts the fighting

force of our men prematurely . From the outset

o f the battle another method of construction must

be applied . A defensive z one extended in depth

must be substituted for the old system of positions

which can be destroyed by the enemy . This

system ,with its o rganisations concealed as far

as po ssible from the enemy’s observation , and

78

Th e May Figh t ing and th e

with the troops ho lding it echeloned in depth so

that then numbers,scanty in the front, increase

progressively towards the rear, should enable usto pass from the defensive to the o ffensive with

the troops from the rear. During the battle

all idea of having a continuous front-trench line

must be abandoned . This must be replaced byshell-crater nests

,held by groups o f men and

iso lated machine-guns,disposed like the squares

on a chess-board . The shelter provided by theshell-craters will be extended by tunnelling intothe sides

,or by linking them to adj acent craters

by means of tunnels,supported by timber props .

The earth dislodged should be thrown into un

occupied craters near by,o r

,if the nature of the

position permits it,should be spread over the

ground between them . If tirnbered galleries

canno t be built owing to the wetness of the ground ,one must be content with\very simple organisationsto afford protection against shrapnel .

The German Army Order go es on to give ln

struc tions that machine-gun centres and shelters

for sto rm tr00ps ready to make the first counter

attack are to be placed behind the first line o f

fort ified shell-craters .

For this purpo se old shelters , dug before

79

Th e Bat t les of th e Ridges .

the new order of things , may be used ,but if

none are available the men must obtain

she lter as best they can on the open ground .

There should be a line of barbed wire in front ofthe first line of shell-craters , and the empty craters

in front of it should be girdled with wire to prevent

the assaulting infantry from occupyingthem .

In development of this new po licy the

Germans began the construction of the

or pill-boxes , as the British Army

christened them . A pill-box &the German

represents the initials of the German

term for Machine gun-emplacement-gloriousvicto rious all supreme-Hindenburg-soldier pro

tecting, or some such phrase) is a x einforced

concrete shaft with a steel lid deSlgned to ho ld a

machine-gun . The shaft is set in the ground with

the lid j ust pro truding from the surface . A

narrow slit gives a fire aperture fo r.

the gun . In

action the gunner crouches in the shaft,resting

on a little iron stairway which runs down to a

dug-out beneath, where the ammunition , the

supplies and the spare men of the gun ’s crew rest .

Wh en no t in action all remaln below.

The pill-box is safe against shells,unless

in the case of a direct hit On the lid , or

80

The May Figh t ing and th e

the burst ing in the ground very clo se of a shell o fgreat calibre

,and it is practically safe against

observat ion from the air if the lid is not allowed

to be too obtrusive .

From a mechanical po int of view this

scheme looks very well,‘

and&

in an earlier stage of

the war,when German infantry moral was at its

highest , it might have proved ,,very useful . But

it has this fatal defect for an army which is in

process of being beaten,that it calls for a very

high degree of courage and initiat ive on the partof the men boxed '

up in the pill-boxes . If they

were real die-hards and clear-thinking men to

boot , with some knowledge of how to take a

tactical advantage , the pill-boxes would be farmore obstructive than they have proved to be inactual practice . As things are , the pill-box sOon

lo ses.its medicinal qualities when confronted by

reso lute riflemen .

On May 3rd we began an attack on the Drocourt-Queant line , from north of Arleux to a po int

beyond Bullecourt , on a front of about 1 2 miles.

The at tack everywhere prospered . On the southside of the bat tle front we penetrated the Germanline west of Queant . Farther north we made

progress near Cherizy and on the Arras—CambraiF 81

Th e Bat tle s o f the Ridges .

Road . On the north wing of the battle we tooktrenches north o f Oppy and occupied Fresnoy

,

and thus broke through the Oppy —Mericourtline . We pene trated into the litt le wo od west

of'Oppy

,but could no t ho ld that point with

advantage .

The Germans were in great strength, and we

learned afterwards from prisoners that they were

massing for a counter-attack by which they hoped

to win back Arleux . Our attack upset theirplans , but they were in more than o rdinary

strength to resist . At the end of the day we had

captured territory of high tactical importance

from Fresnoy in the north to Bullecourt in thesouth . The enemy

’s casualties had\been heavy

for the troops he had massed for his attempt on

Arleux were freely thrown into the fighting . A

little kno ll north-east of Gavrelle , which was

crowned with a windmill, changed hands eight

times . The chemical works near Roeux werejust as stubbornly fought fo r. But the fighting

was no t on even terms . Our artillery and air

superio rity loaded the dice against the German

infantry,and the latter were sacrificed uselessly ,

though probably in the fighting on this daythey had a great local superiority in numbers .

82

https://www.forgottenbooks.com/join

Th e Bat t les o f the Ridge s .

enemy deserved his little success,for he had

managed to bring up two new Divisions in front

of Fresnoy .

Encouraged by this,the Germans

‘

on May 1 1 th

attempted a surprise attack on the positions

south of the Souchez River,which we had won

in the same advance . A great force of flammen

werfer had been mobilised by the enemy for thisattack

,and their use procured a momentary

success . Then our reserves came up and restored

the line . The enemy had used his oil and his

men for no thing.

We attacked again on May r1 th , making the

chief thrust this time south,where at Bullecourt

a gallant Australian battalion had been ho ldingdesperately to a little salient . Pushing on too far

on May 3rd the Australians found themselves left

in the air,having driven a lane into the German

line . On neither flank did they have any support ,and their communications with the rear were mo st

precarious. But they had won a position which

was capable o f local defence, and“the Hun

shoo ting was simply superb , as one officer

enthusiastically remarked . So they held on .

From front and right and left the exasperated

enemy made frequent attacks . Ten different

84

Th e May Figh t ing and th e

full-dress assaults were made with the obj ectof cutting the communication in the rear and

thus iso lat ing the Australians completely . All

were in vain . From May3rd to May 1 3th , when

our attacks finally brought our line up right andleft o f the Bullecourt salient

,the stubborn

garrison held out .

The attack of May 1 1 th did no t quite complete

the capture of Bullecourt,and as this battle con

tinned without cessation through May 1 1 th ,1 2th ,

1 3th, its results can be best summarised by statingthe position on May 1 4th . By then we had

pushed our line forward to Bullecourt and Roeux,

and had taken in the stubbo rn fighting 700

prisoners , including 1 1 officers . At Roeux , as well

as at Bullecourt,the fighting had been very severe .

Many pill-boxes were encountered,and the

chateau behind Roeux had been organised stronglyas a fortress .

Now that there was no longer a definite lineo f trench as the fighting obj ective

,incidents

multiplied of small bodies of our men getting

far forward into the German position . A band

o f & ent men with machine-guns were led on

by the excellence o f the shooting until they

found themselves in a po sition with Germans all

85

Th e Bat t le s of th e Ridges&

around them to shbo t at . This was consideredto be too good to last

,and a move homeward

was made . E n route the & ent men found two

temporary trenches occupied‘

by Germans,but

fought their way successfully home with their

guns,though they lo st half their number in

casualties .

_ There were no incidents of the like k ind on

the German side . German companies finding

themselves within our lines surrendered very

promptly , and ,to all appearances

,very gladly .

The next few days were filled with the beating

o ff of German counter-at tacks . The lo ss of Roeuxand o f Bullecourt was evidently felt keenly .

Gavrelle also was heavily counter-attacked , and

fell back into the enemy ’s hands for a few hours

then was recaptured . By May 2 1 5 t we held a11 _the

Hindenburg line from a po int one mile east o fBullecourt to a po int due east of Arras , with the

exception of one small sector & that is to say ,for a

stretch of nearly 1 0 miles . Until the end of the

month of May we were engaged in conso lidat ing

these positions and preparing for a new attack

further north . We had gained our obj ective ,and the enemy was pushed off his commanding

ground from St . Quentin to Vimy. Another bit

86

Th e May Figh t ing and the

o f high ground ,that at Messines, was now to

engage our attention .

May ’s fighting‘in the Battle of Arras brought

in prisoners &including 68 officers) . The

air-fighting had been very severe , and it is calculated

.

that on all sides71 3 aeroplanes were lo st , of

which 442 were lost by the Germans and 86 bythe British air forces .

CHAPTER VIII .

MESSINES RIDGE ' THE PREPARATION.

HE Battle o f Messines marked

ano ther step in the progressive

deterioration o f the German

position on the Western front .

The enemy had been hustledoff the Somme ridges and had

found himself compelled in consequence to evacuate

the Somme district . He had been hust led off the

Arto is ridges and was able to keep the Lens coalbasin and the Douai Plain below only by continuous sacrifice of men and material . He was now

to be pushed off the ridges around Ypres,the last

of his old bulwarks facing the British line . Of

these ridges the Messines Ridge was the mo st

fo rmidable .Messines Ridge may be described as the German

po int of concentration against Calals. It was

wrested from us , after fierce fight ing, during the

first Battle of Ypres in 1 91 4 ,and was suppo sed to

88

Messine s Ridge : Th e Prep aration .

give the enemy Ypres and the road to Calais .

The French came to the rescue , re-took Messines

Ridge , and lost it again in December 1 91 4 , since

which date the Germans had held it without

serious challenge . It did no t give the Germans

Ypres nor the road to Calais&because the stubbornBritish Army refused to recognise the military

impo ssibility of ho lding Ypres with the enemy

dominating the ruined town from Messines but

it did give the enemy the means to inflict constant

and serious lo sses on our troops and while they

held it , the Germans could still pretend to hope

for some future successful assault , which wouldWin

for them the French Channel ports and the means

to compel Great Britain to peace . Now that

hope was to be dissipated very plainly,so plainly

as to make its message comprehensible to the

dullest German . The Battle of Messines Ridge

proclaimed that there was little h0pe o f ano ther

German offensive on the Western front in this

war , that the r61e of the German Army now is the

dispirit ing one of ho lding on to positions unt il it

suits the attack to turn them out .

Advantage was taken of the delay to perfect

preparations . The famous Mine o f Messines,

which was very literally to blast the German out o f89

Th e Bat t le s o f the Ridges .

his front po sitions on June 7th ,1 917, was in 1 91 6

already inbeing, though itwasafterwards extended .

The German still rages and grumbles about that

Messines Mine . It infuriated him just as the

Tank infuriated him . The one supremacy that

he fe lt sure was left to him in this war was in

regard to science and material . He might no tbe able to put such good men into the line

,might

be beaten in the matter of quick adaptable couragein the field , but his Herr Professors , he reckoned ,

had an invulnerable supremacy . His machines

would always be better.Now

,in this matter of the Mine of Messines ,

the Herr Geo logy Pro fessors on the German sideknew quite well that you could no t mine to any

extent around Messmes. The water—logged stratawould no t allow o f it

, so Fritz could sleep easilyin his trench

,so far as mines were concerned &

and Fritz , confident in his Herr Pro fessors ,altogether neglected any attempt to counter

mine . But on our side there was a Geo logy

Pro fesso r who knew better, and the MessinesMine

,the greatest ever used in warfare , was

the result .

It was the only element o f surprise in the battle .

In the preparation of the Arras push the British

90

https://www.forgottenbooks.com/join

Th e Bat t les o f the Ridge s .

o f the attack could be forecasted fairly accuratelyby the enemy &who was only one day out in his

reckoning,as the event proved) , and he was able

to make the best preparation o f which he was

capable . He might be excused for v1ewmg the

position with some confidence . The ridge on

which he sat was of great natural strength

and formidably fortified . The marshy country

through which we had to advance to any attack

gave little cover the routes which the advance

must fo llow were accurately known and regis“

tered for artillery barrages .But German confidence had no t taken into

account the enormous improvement in the equip

ment for attack of the British Army . In material,

quantity and quality had bo th improved . As

to the improvement in quantity the free use of

shell to ld its own tale . On the Somme a Germanofficer prisoner had given reluctant praise to the

British artillery work , but had commented thatthe expenditure of shell was too lavish & no

country could keep that pace up . But in the

Battle o f Arras the artillery shell used showed an

increase of40 per cent . on the Somme consumption .

In the Battle of Messines , the Arras consumption

was again increased . In regard to quality

92

Me ssines Ridge : Th e Prep arat ion .

improvement,evidence was given by the superio r

effectiveness o f destruction .

No t less important , though no t so tangible andeasily recognised

,was the vast improvement in

skill and moral of the British Army since the firstdays o f the Somme . Fmm the generals down to

the so ldiers of the line,everyone knew more

and had more confidence . The generals knew the

quality of the men they comman'ded . That they

were of high courage had never been in doubt &butthere are o ther so ldierly qualities needed besidescourage

,especially in these days of ultra-scientific

warfare and these qualit ies had been now well

tested and proved . The men had a full con

fidence in their leaders from day-by

-day experi

ence of hard struggles,which always had a satis

facto ry ending , and in the course of which the

so ldier never found his officer hanging back,and

never found the system failing him with

rations or ammun ition .

The British New Army,in short , had found

itself completely , and had the confidence o f a

winning team . The Divisions which were given

the task of taking the Messines Ridge knew beforethey started that the thing would be done . They

expected indeed a tougher resistance &and would

93

Th e Bat tles o f th e Ridges

have overcome a tougher resistance ) , since the

enemy had had such ample time and opportunity

to o rganise his garrlson . The Germans , in Spite

of all lo sses, had still a fund of over

so ldiers to draw upon . At this time they had to

meet heavy attacks on the British front only ,

and so could devo te the cream of their effectives

to its ho lding . That they were soundly , deci

sively beaten at Messines was a testimonial of the

highest value to the British Army .

Victory was the reward of forethought as well

as of courage. Very elaborate had been the

preparation fo r the assault . In the first place the

road and railway system to the front of attackhad been tho roughly organised.l Then places ofsafe assembly for tr00ps had been prepared ,

wher

ever there was a chance of cover . Ploegsteert

Plug Street,as the Army knew it —Wood was of

great value for this purpose,and it was traversed

by a great net-work o f wooden paths , raised well

above ground level, for the area of the wood

becomes a marsh after heavy rain .

The next step was a careful rehearsal by all the

units to be engaged in the actual Operations .

Models o f the German ground to ,be taken wereprepared

,and the infantry learned exactly the

94

https://www.forgottenbooks.com/join

Th e Bat t les o f th e Ridge s .

pitches o f intensity,lasted during ten days . At

the same time the Air Service began to sweep thesky clean . These were certain signs o f an offen

sive coming soon , and the German made his pre

parations, confident , as I have said ,in the strength

of the po sition he had to ho ld .

Messines Ridge bulges out on the Flanders

plain between Z illebeke and Ploegsteert in a

shallow arc . The chord of this arc , about 9miles long , was the site of the German front-linesystem . Behind it, at the base of the arc , about6 miles long,

‘

was the second-line system . To

write of a first trench, a second trench ,a third

trench , and so on ,would be absurd ,

for to cross

from the front to the back o f the German Messinespo sition at any po int it would be necessary to

cro ss at least a score of trenches . A map showing

the trench system looks as if it were covered with

fine-mesh wire-netting . The main element of

strength in the German po sition was that the

Who le of the ridge had to be taken at a blow, the

chord of the arc and the base of the arc & and

there were yards of fortified country be

tween . I t was probably calculated that whilst anartillery preparation could batter the chord of the

arc,it could no t properly reduce the base of the

96

Me ssine s Ridge : Th e Prep arat ion .

arc . Suppo sing the first system carried , the

defenders could take refuge in the second system ,

and o rganise there a prompt counter-attack .

This calculation was upset because it had beenforeseen and provided for. As already mentioned ,

a part o f the preparation was to move a mass of

Field Artillery fo rward as soon as the infantry go t

go ing. Whilst the infantry were still clearing up

the chord,the artillery

,fromforward positions ,

were battering at the base o f the German arc .

Q7

CHAPTE R I& .

MESSINES RIDGE THE VICTORY .

LL the elaborate and ingenious

preparations for the Battle of

Messines worked out perfectly .

There was no t a hitch any~

where,and in one day a clear

cut victory gave the who le

obj ective sought at a stroke . General Sir Douglas

Haig’

s despatches of June 7th and June 8th to ldwith quiet satisfaction the good news thus

june7ih ,

—The Messines -Wytschaete Ridge ,whichfor over two and a half years has dominated our

positions in the Ypres salient , was stormed by our

troops this morning.

In this attack we captured the villages of Messinesand Wytschaete and the enemy ’s defence system,

including many strongly-organised woods and

defended localities on a front of over 9 miles fromsouth o f La Douve Brook t o north of Mont Sorrel .Later in the day our troops again moved forward ,

in accordance with the plan of operations, and carriedthe village of Oosttaverne and the enemy’s rearward

98

https://www.forgottenbooks.com/join

Th e Bat t le s o f th e Ridges .

defence system east o f the village on a front o f over5 miles.In the course of this advance an attempted counterattack against the southern portion of our new positions was completely broken up by our artillery fire .

The enemy’s casualties in to-day’s fighting havebeen heavy. In addition t o his other losses , up t o

p .m . this afternoon over German prisonershad passed through our collecting—stations. Othershave still t o be brought in . We have also captureda number o f guns and many trench—mortars and

machine-guns, which have no t yet been counted .

june 8th.

—The position captured by our troopsyesterday was one of the enemy’s most importantstrongholds on the Western front . Dominating asit did the Ypres salient , and giving the enemy com

ple te observation over it , he had neglected no

precaut ions t o render the position impregnable .

These conditions enabled the enemy t o overlookall our preparations for the attack

,and he had moved

up reinforcements t o meet us. The battle , therefore ,became a gauge o f the ability of German troops t ostop our advance under condit ions as favourable t othem as an army can ever hope for, with everyadvantage of ground and preparation, and with theknowledge that an attack was impending.

The German forward defences consisted of anelaborate and intricate system of well-wired trenchesand strong points, forming a defensive belt over amile in depth . The numerous farms and woodswere thoroughly prepared for defence, and includedlarge numbers of machine-guns in their garrison.

Messines Ridge : The Vic to ry .

Guns o f allcalibres, recently increased in.

numbers,were placed to bear not only on the front , but on theflanks o f an attack. The numerous communicationtrenches and switch-lines radiating in all directionswere amply provided with strongly-constructedconcrete dug-outs and machine-gun emplacements,designed to protect the enemy garrison and machinegunners from the effect of our bombardment. Inshort, no precaution was omitted that could beprovided by the incessant labour of years, guidedby the experience gained by the enemy in previousdefeats on the Somme, at Arras and on the VimyRidge.Despite the difficulties and disadvantages which

our troops had to overcome, further details of yesterday’s fighting show that our first assault and subsequent attacks were carried out in almost exactaccordance with the time-table previously “arranged .

At a .m . nineteen deep mines were explodedsimultaneously beneath the enemy’s defences, bywhich large portions both of his first and supporttrenches, including extensive dug-out and miningsystems , were completely wrecked .

Immediately upon the explosion o f the mines ourguns Opened , and our infantry assault was launched .

Within a few minutes the enemy’s first-line systemwas carried on the whole front attack .

Our troops then pressed onwith scarcely a pause upthe western slopes o f the Messines —~WytschaeteRidge , and three hours after the commencement o fthe attack had st ormed the entire crest-line from southto north.

I OI

Th e Bat t les of th e Ridges .

Shortly afterwards the whole of Messines wascaptured , and before mid -day the capture of

Wyt schaete village had also been completed afterhard fighting.

In the second stage of the attack our troops pusheddown the eastern slopes of the ridge, and advancedagainst a powerful line of German rear defences

,

which lay like the chord of an arc across the base o fthe salient formed by the ridge itself.Heavy fighting took place in a further series of

fortified woods and strong po ints, but at p .m.

the village of Oosttaverne, lying just west of thecentre o f the line, was captured . By nightfall p ractically the who le of this trench system was also in ourhands, and we had gained the whole o f the day’sobjectives.The great numbers o f German dead lying in thecaptured positions prove the severity of the enemy’slosses, a large proportion ofwhich was again borne byBavarian troops. Our own losses were light . The

enemy made no attempt during the night to recoverhis lost positions .Following on the great care and thoroughness inthe preparations made under the orders of GeneralSir Herbert Plumer, the complete success gained maybe ascribed chiefly to the destruction caused by our

mines, to the v io lence and accuracy of our bombardment , t o the very fine worko f the Royal Flying Corps ,and to the incomparable dash and courage o f theinfantry.

The whole force acted with perfect combination.

E xcellent work was done by the Tanks, and every1 02

https://www.forgottenbooks.com/join

Th e Bat t les of th e Ridges .

Irish Day certainly,Messines

,and no one will

grudge them the honour least of all the Austra

lians and New Z ealanders who had, “too , a big

share in the victo ry, and who find themselves

embarrassed sometimes by the amount of attention which is given to their explo its .

As for the English troops,who ,

of course, had

the largest share in this and other battles on the

Western front,they have never to expect a degree

of popular notice commensurate with their workand

,to do them justice

,I do no t think they

grouse to any extent at the working of the

inexorable publicity law which deprives them

of paragraph value Newspapers must giveattention to the abnormal, the unusual, to the

outstanding group rather than the mass . There

15 a story of a great New Yo rk j ournalist who Wastrying to explam to a cub reporter the theory

of news values .

If,he said

,in the Broadway to d ay a dog

bites a man,that is no t news but if a man bites

a dog,that is news .

That story illustrates well the canons of publicity . According to tho se canons , in dealing with

a great achievement by a great army made up of

different elements, the small groups in the mass

1 04

Messine s Ridge : Th e Vic tory .

stand out . At various epochs in the operat ions

of the British Army on the Western front , Indian

troops , Canad ian troops , Australian troops , Irish

troops,Scottish troops

,have figured mo st prom

inently in popular”

accounts . &e t in every

great bat tle the English troops naturally have

been mo st numerous , have done their full shareof the work in hand , and have, no t been backward ,

in gallant emulation with their bro thers , indeeds of shining courage . When a considered

histo ry of the war comes to be written this factwill be plain . But it is no t

,and never will be,

made plain in current popular accounts .

And the High Command,for o ther reasons

than those governing war correspondents , has

sometimes to assist in buttressing an incorrectand disproportionate view . If in a despatch

special mention is made o f the gallantry of

Canadian or Australian troops in some action,

nothing in the way of information is given to the

enemy . But special mention of English

troops would be so vague as to be useless the

ment ion would need to be o f & ents,orWo rcester

shires , or Londoners,or Yorkshires and that

might communicate to the enemy really valuableinformation as to the dispo sit ion of. our tr00ps .

1 05

The Bat t le s o f the Ridges .

A great amount of Staff work at the Front is

devo ted to identifying the enemy ’s Divisions in

d ifferent sections of the line,watching for the

appearance of new Divisions,for the splitting up

of veteran units to st iffen weaker units ,and so on .

This work is easy to us , for we are constantly

taking prisoners . It is harder for the German

because he rarely gets prisoners from us now.

We have to be on guard against giving him factswhich might prove the keys to the so lution of

puzzles which are worrying him . &A current

incident to illustrate this is the large reward which

we know the Ge rmans h ave offered to their

regiments in the line for the capture of the first

Am erican so ldier .)Again , on the principle that it is the unusual

that is news,accounts of the Bat tle ofMessines

concentrate mo st attention on the great mine

explosion which heralded the struggle . It was, ofcourse

,helpful—singularly so . But it was not the

who le battle , nor even an essential to its success.

Two pen-pictures of the great explosionFrom the Morning Post _ The ground openedbelow the brim ofWytschaete as though the furnacedoor of Hades itself had been thrown back , and anenormous fountain of fire spurted into the sky. Itwas infinitely terrifying. Another fountain gushed

1 06

https://www.forgottenbooks.com/join

The Bat t le s o f th e Ridge s .

reached their front since the terrific bombardmentbegan. They were reduced by hunger to the lowestebb of moral.

Follow1ng the mine explo sion , the artillery

barrage began from the groups of artillery whichkept to their po sitions , whilst o ther groups of

artillery at once moved forward fo llowing on the

heels of the infantry . A swarm of aeroplanes

also rose and advanced on the\enemy . It is no t

much to the discredit o f the German so ldier that

in the first few minutes of the battle he did not

stick it The gun-flogging he had had for a

fortnight had got on his n erves. He had beenkept short o f food . He saw now thousands of his

comrades blown up in the arr by an\

explosion

which made a record for this or any -

o ther war .

We took the first system of the enemy’

s defences

with little trouble,co llecting the remnants of the

German front-line garrison as prisoners . The

harvest o f prisoners was unexpectedly rich . The

enemy had reinforced his line considerably,and

was further reinforcmg it when we attacked .

Some regiments had all their battalions in line

&instead of one in line , one in support , and one in

reserve) . In one secto r a Bavarian Division wasrelieving a Saxon Division at the hour o f the

1 08

Me ssines Ridge : Th e Vic t o ry .

attack,and we levied on bo th fo r the prisoners

cages .

Later in the day the German resistance stiffened .

As captured documents showed , t he German

Command had given instructions that the po sitions

on -Messines Ridge were to'

be held at all haz ards

and to keep up the courage o f the front-line troops

it was announced to them that great reserves were

co llected to come to their aid whenever an attack

was developed . The opinion has been ventured

in a previous chapter that probably the German

plan was reconciled to the loss for a while o f the

front system of defences and hoped that our attack

would land us just that far,in an utterly ruined

po sition from which we could be ej ected with

great loss by counter-attacks from the second

system of defence . That Opinion seemed to be

borne out by the progress of the day ’

s fighting .

But even at the second line the resistance was no t

as stubborn as had been expected . In Wytschaete

Wood ,a wood in which “ every tree had been

reduced to a splintered stump by our shell fire,a

tough fight was put up by a Prussian battalion .

The wood was studded with pill-boxes,and a wild

tangle o f wire and de’

brz’

s made the go ing under~

foo t exceedingly d ifficult . The pill-boxes were1 09

Th e Bat t les o f the Ridge s .

connected by galleries,and o ther galleries con

use ted the far edge of the wood with the Hospice

and with the cellars ofWytschaete. The artillery

preparation had demo lished some of the pill-boxes ,but no t all . At one moment it seemed as if the

infantry would be held up here,but our men

,

rushing fo rward with bayonets,shouting the while

,

terrified the enemy , and the wood was cleared .

At Battle Wood,on the left wing of the attack

,

there was also some stubbo rn fighting . But on

the who le Messines was a cheap victo ry . Careful

organisation had foreseen and provided for every.

contingency o f the day , and we won a great result

at a relatively small co st in casualties.

It was impo ssible fo r the Germans to allow thelo ss o f this key-po sition to their Flanders coast

line to go unchallenged . But their effort to

re-take Messines was a dismal failure , and gave

proo f o f a degree of demo ralisation that had never

before been shown by the Germans in a big field

of action . The counter-attack was made 36

hours after our initial success . That was too late

to take advantage o f the confusion which must

fo llow in some degree a successful advance . It

was too early to permit of a thorough preparation

on the German part . Fallmg between the two

1 1 0

https://www.forgottenbooks.com/join

C O N C L & S I O N

HE capture of Messines Ridge on June 7th

wasp after apause , fo llowed by the success

ful attacks east of Ypres,on the ridges guarding

the Ypres —Menin and the Ypres -Roulers roads,

attacks which it is no t proposed to deal with here

further than t o say that they continued and

emphasised the victory of Messines . Some critics

have found the ousting of the Germans from their

trench fortresses to have been unduly slow . But

it is wo rk which has to be carried out with a due

sense o f proportion . Perhaps now and again a

little time would have been saved by a muchgreater expenditure o f men . The High Commanddecided that the game was no t worth the candle

,

and they know best . What is important is no tso much the date of the final German surrender

,

as the fact that that surrender is,humanly

speaking,inevitable . Victory has been organised

,

is being won .

’

The date of its consummation

may be awa1ted with patience .

P rmted in Great B rztam by ALABASTER,P ASSMORE 6 SONS Ltd .

Whitf cross S treet London E .C .